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NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 12, 13, 14, 20, 21, 27, 28; FEBRUARY 3, 23; MARCH 25, 30;
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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

JANUARY 12, 1987

Page

Weinberger, Hon. Caspar, Secretary of Defense ... 9

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

JANUARY 13, 1987

Brzezinski, Hon. Zbigniew, assistant to President Carter for National Security Affairs ... 79

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGYMAKING

JANUARY 13, 1987

Lykke, Col. Arthur F., Jr., USA (ret.), Professor of Military Strategy, U.S. Army War College ... 132

Wood, Robert S., Director, Center for Naval Warfare Studies and Dean, Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College ... 146

Drew, Col. Dennis, USAF, Director, Air Power Research Institute, Air University ... 154

Foster, Gregory D., Senior Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University ... 158

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

JANUARY 14, 1987

Schlesinger, Hon. James, former Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency ... 219

USE OF OPERATIONAL GAMING AND SIMULATION TO ASSIST STRATEGYMAKING

JANUARY 14, 1987

Hurlburt, Capt. Joseph S., USN, Director, War Gaming Department, U.S. Naval War College ... 261

Kielkopf, Col. Edward C., USA, Director, Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College ... 266

Pappas, Col. Constantine A., USAF, Director, Air Force Wargaming Center, Centers for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Air University ... 267

Sims, Col. James M., USMC, Chief, Politico-Military Simulation and Analysis Division, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ... 271

Hay, O.E., Director, Global Wargame and Advanced Concepts, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College ... 275

Page

COALITION ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

JANUARY 20, 1987

Abshire, David, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, accompanied by Michael Moddie, Special Assistant to Ambassador Abshire; and Dennis Kloske, Special Advisor to Deputy Secretary of Defense for NATO Armaments 304

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AND MILITARY STRATEGY

JANUARY 20, 1987

Korb, Lawrence J., former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Installations and Logistics 353

Stubbing, Richard, former Deputy Chief of the National Security Division, Office of Management and Budget 364

Collins, John M., USA (retired), Senior Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research Service 372

MILITARY STRATEGY

JANUARY 21, 1987

Crowe, Adm. William J., Jr., U.S. Navy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 402

MILITARY STRATEGY IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AND IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

JANUARY 27, 1987

Hays, Adm. Ronald J., U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command 485

Crist, Gen. George C., U.S. Marine Corps, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command 507

ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS TESTIMONY ON STRATEGY

JANUARY 27, 1987

Record, Dr. Jeffrey, Senior Fellow, Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis 705

Summers, Col. Harry G., Jr., contributing editor, U.S. News & World Report ... 714

MILITARY STRATEGY FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS

JANUARY 28, 1987

Gorman, Gen. Paul F., U.S. Army (ret.), Chairman, Regional Conflict Working Group, Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy 749

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

FEBRUARY 3, 1987

Shultz, Hon. George P., Secretary of State 806

MILITARY STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA AND IN THE ATLANTIC

FEBRUARY 23, 1987

Galvin, Gen. John R., Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command 855

Baggett, Adm. Lee, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command 862

MILITARY STRATEGY IN EUROPE

MARCH 25, 1987

Rogers, Gen. Bernard W., USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, accompanied by Col. Howell Estes, USAF, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, SHAPE 921

Page

MILITARY STRATEGY

March 30, 1987

Jones, Gen. David C., USAF (ret.), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 1007
Train, Adm. Harry D., II, USN (ret.), former Commander in Chief of U.S. Atlantic Command 1018
Meyer, Gen. Edward C., USA (ret.), former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army....... 1024

REVIEW OF PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY REPORT

April 3, 1987

Jordan, Amos A., Jr., president and chief executive officer, Center for Strategic and International Studies 1053
Steinbruner, John D., director of foreign policy studies, the Brookings Institution 1069
Weinrod, W. Bruce, director of foreign policy and defense studies, the Heritage Foundation 1078

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

MONDAY, JANUARY 12, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Stennis, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Dixon, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, assistant chief clerk; Robert E. Bayer, Robert G. Bell, Robert F. Bott, Richard D. Finn, Jr., Judith A. Freedman, John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Gordon G. Riggle, Mark B. Robinson, and Patricia L. Watson, professional staff members; Mary J. Kampo and Debra A. Rice, staff assistants.

Also present: Francis J. Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Edward M. McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; and Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. I call the hearing to order.

Today's session is the first hearing of the Committee on Armed Services during this new Congress. As the first order of business I would like to welcome our five new Members—Senator Gore, Senator Wirth, Senator Shelby, Senator Symms, and Senator McCain. We are delighted to have these new members. Most of them have tremendous experience already in the congressional process and they bring a great number of talents and expertise to this committee.

On behalf of the entire committee I would also like to welcome our first witness, the appropriate witness, the Secretary of Defense, as we begin this year. Secretary Weinberger has appeared before this committee many times. Mr. Secretary, we look forward to your testimony on U.S. national security strategy this morning.

The committee has decided to focus its initial series of hearings on U.S. national security strategy and its military strategy component, because strategy is the only logical starting point for both the development and the consideration of security policies and programs and budgets. Without an understanding of strategy there can be no comprehensive context in which to evaluate our military needs and our budgetary priorities.

These strategy hearings also represent an important element of the committee's plans for shifting the focus, to the extent that we can, away from an excessively detailed line item review and scrub of the defense budget and more toward consideration of the fundamental issues of national defense.

Senator Goldwater, our previous chairman, and I last year, in our introduction of the Defense Reorganization bill, went into considerable detail about some of the adverse effects of Congress getting into every single detail of the budget in defense. The reason it is so detrimental is because usually we neglect the broader picture and the broader challenges which we have a duty under the Constitution to address.

In my view, the Congress and the Pentagon are drowning in budget detail. This has diverted the committee, as well as the Department of Defense, from its broader constitutional responsibilities. I hope that we can spend less time playing what I have labeled in the past congressional trivial pursuit, which diverts both congressional and Pentagon attention from the larger challenges we face in the national security arena. We will do the best we can in that regard, and certainly that will be our intent.

I also want to clearly indicate this intentionally is not a budget hearing, as has been the practice for the Secretary of Defense's first appearance in past years. We will begin our budget hearings for fiscal year 1988 and 1989 when this series of strategy hearings with many witnesses has been completed.

A broad understanding of strategy and resource priorities is a necessary beginning point for a meaningful and objective defense budget examination. The committee is not approaching these hearings with the intention of formulating a Senate Armed Services Committee or even a congressional alternative to our current strategy. The strategy is the responsibility of the executive branch, including our military and civilian leadership in the Pentagon, the State Department and the National Security Council.

Our goal, however, is an important one. We must ask questions. We must learn everything we can about our strategy. We must stimulate thought on this subject, and we must do everything possible to gain a perspective that will help us in addressing the Defense budget.

At this stage I have serious questions about the clarity, coherence, and consistency of our current strategy. I know that does not come as news to the Secretary; he has heard my views on this subject before. I have been raising these questions for several years and have not gotten very many answers.

Many of these questions are shaped by others. Even the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, chaired by David Packard, had serious questions about the adequacy of our current strategymaking. The Commission's report states—and I quote from the Packard Commission:

> There is no rational system whereby the Executive Branch and the Congress reach coherent and enduring agreement on national military strategy, the forces to carry it out and the funding that should be provided in light of the overall economy and competing claims on national resources.

A sound strategy is more important now than ever before in our Nation's history. Although American national security objectives have remained constant for much of the post-war period, the dangers and challenges of the international environment and our security commitments have steadily increased, while American power and influence in relative terms have steadily diminished.

The combination of expanding commitments and limitations of resources poses a serious dilemma for our Nation and certainly those of us on this committee are acutely aware of that. History has clearly demonstrated that an effective strategy must be based on a calculated relationship between ends and means. The Nation's publicly declared goals far exceed its capabilities in a high risk posture. We will never have the resources or the capability to eliminate all risk, and I think we all have to recognize that.

We must, however, intelligently manage our resources and our priorities by a calculated, flexible and dynamic strategy that reduces these risks to acceptable levels. When there is an unacceptable level of risk, responsible leadership has three general alternatives. The first general alternative is to alter our global security objectives—I don't know of anyone who is advocating that; second, to increase our resources for defense and other security measures; and, third, to change our military strategy.

Upon taking office, the Reagan administration decried the gap between our commitments and capabilities and announced its intention to pursue two of these three alternatives—that is, to increase resources devoted to national security and to change our strategy. As to additional resources, there is no question that there has been a substantial real growth in the defense budget during the last 6 years. Also, there is no question that in the last 2 years growth has tapered off considerably, to the point in budget authority where the defense budget has actually gone down, although in outlays the previous budget authority has continued to push the outlays upward.

The crucial question is what we have received from this increased investment in terms of defense capabilities. In his posture statement last year, Secretary Weinberger conceded that the buildup had not closed the commitments-capability gap by stating, and I quote the Secretary, "Our current capabilities are insufficient to meet all of our commitments."

That was no shocking bit of evidence to any of us. The question is not whether the commitments-capability gap continues to exist but, rather, how wide it is now and whether we are narrowing that gap, or that gap is widening.

As to changing our strategy, clearly this administration, when it came in office, declared it would make fundamental changes in defense policy and strategic concepts. For example, Secretary Weinberger stated in his posture statement for fiscal year 1983, and I quote from that posture statement:

> Just as the level of resources that we devote to defense has become inadequate, so has our intellectual approach been overtaken by events. Indeed, our defense policy has not only become obsolete because of new threats to our security, it has also been discredited by its failure to recognize and cope with the deterioration in the global military situation. In fact, obsolete strategic concepts have stood in the way of necessary reforms; hence, we have to break with some past thinking and develop new policies and concepts.

In last year's posture statement Secretary Weinberger said, in what I consider to be a new tone and a different approach from the 1983 statement—and I quote again:

> The most important truth about the recent buildup is that we have been buying and fielding forces to implement policies and strategies over which there was little disagreement between this administration and its predecessor. Our principal difference arose from our judgment about the importance of funding these programs at levels adequate to achieve our stated objectives as quickly as possible.

We will be asking questions about whether that represents a fundamental shift or whether those statements are indeed consistent. It is clear that in the past 6 years our pocketbooks as Americans have been exercised. It is less clear whether our minds have kept pace with our pocketbooks.

Using your words of 1983, Mr. Secretary, have our intellectual approaches caught up with the dollars we have expended? Has the Reagan administration made significant changes in the strategy inherited from the Nixon-Ford-Carter era? If so, what are these changes? If not, how will the substantial gap between our commitments and our capabilities, which you, Mr. Secretary, have so forcefully described, how will that gap be closed?

I should note that the concurrent service of President Reagan and Secretary Weinberger represents the longest post-war period of joint continuity in the positions of commander-in-chief and his deputy for military affairs. It is only through such continuity that there can be a meaningful opportunity to address the complex strategy issues that have plagued successive administrations.

This raises the question of whether this unparalleled opportunity has been fully exploited through intensive management attention to strategic thinking or whether we can make improvements in the next 2 years and in the years to follow. How much time does the Secretary of Defense devote to military strategy? How much time do the Joint Chiefs of Staff devote to the subject, both individually and collectively? How many meetings have been held on military strategy between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff? How often has the subject been discussed between the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State?

I know that Senator Warner has made a great number of comments on that and has taken a real initiative in that regard, trying to coordinate the strategy between our foreign policy and our defense policy.

How many times have the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State discussed our foreign policy goals and our defense strategy with the President of the United States in an effort to correlate those various components of our national security policy?

What attention has been given to improving our capabilities for meaningful static as well as dynamic net assessments? We are going to hear a lot about net assessments in the weeks and months ahead. I know that many members of this committee will recall that we have had hearings in the past on net assessments, and I must say in this regard the net assessments that have been presented by this administration—and I must also add other administrations—to this committee and to the American public have been, in my view, both disappointing and misleading.

That was one of the principal thrusts that we had in our Defense Reorganization bill last year—giving a clear mandate to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to not only come up with net assessments, but to share those with the committee. I am sure we will be talking to the chairman about that.

By portraying tanks against tanks and artillery tubes against artillery tubes, these assessments suggest that our strategy is to put strength against strength on a quantitative basis. Is this the case? If so, Secretary Weinberger's charts show that we have made very little progress in closing the numerical gap vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, despite defense spending increases.

If not—and I certainly do not believe this is the way we should try to conduct a new assessment, although it is one relevant measure—why do these superficial net assessments continue to be presented in isolation from the myriad of other factors that must be considered when assessing our relative capabilities?

These are all questions we will be asking, Mr. Secretary, not just to you but to other witnesses appearing before us over the coming weeks.

To summarize, the committee would be anxious to know the answers to these questions. We are interested in knowing, Mr. Secretary, how you have stimulated and how you plan to stimulate, strategic thinking in the Department of Defense and what, in your opinion, are the fruits of your efforts. I know you have formed a new panel in recent months on national security strategy, and we will certainly be interested in hearing from you on that.

Before Secretary Weinberger presents his opening statement I would like to defer to my good friend and the committee's ranking minority member, Senator Warner. John Warner has made a very substantial contribution in the field of national security in his previous role before he became a Senator and he has done, I think, a very fine job in his role in the United States Senate. He has also taken a lead in the field of national security strategy. Among his accomplishments were enactment of a provision requiring the President to submit annually to the Congress a report on national security strategy, which was part of our reorganization bill last year. We expect to receive this report hopefully at the end of this month.

Senator Warner, I commend you for the contributions you have already made and look forward to working with you on a totally bipartisan approach to this important subject. I appreciate your cooperation in setting up these hearings and the cooperation of your staff, and we intend to work together on a bipartisan basis on the national security challenges facing our committee.

Mr. President of the Senate, I want to also welcome you here this morning. There are many pleasures and perils of being in the majority, but one of the great pleasures is to have Senator Stennis serve as President Pro Tempore of the Senate. Senator Thurmond, another member of our committee, has served in that job with great distinction in the last several years, and I do not know of anyone more capable of succeeding him. We are now going to address no longer Senator Stennis as Mr. Chairman; we will call him Mr. President in our hearings in the future.

So, Mr. President and Mr. Chairman, we are delighted to have you here this morning. Before turning to Senator Warner, which I will do in a minute, do you have any words of wisdom for us today?

Senator STENNIS. Well, I thank you very much for the opportunity. I am very much interested in the Secretary's testimony, of course, to yours and the other members'. But I am compelled to ask you to excuse me on a matter now that I have got to go and attend to that I could not change. But I will be back.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I join with my colleagues on this side and congratulate you on assuming the chairmanship of this committee and being another in a long line of distinguished members of the United States Senate that have led the national security efforts on the Senate side.

I fully endorse your views that both sides of the aisle will work together in a nonpartisan manner to achieve those goals which we think as Senators are in the best interests of this Nation's security.

We welcome you, Mr. Secretary, and I join with you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming our new members. Each one has an individual background of diversity and those diverse strengths indeed will enhance this committee.

These hearings are a subject which you and I have worked on for many years. As a matter of fact, we have been partners in this business for almost a decade now, and today's hearings, largely at your initiative, although last year we worked together in legislation, I think will set a proper foundation to work with the Senate and, indeed, the Congress on national defense.

Several years ago our previous chairman, Senator Goldwater, emphasized the importance of a comprehension strategy, and I quote him:

> We need a grand strategy and we need it now. It must be coherent. It must be realistic. It must be sufficient to deter any threat and protect our allies and our friends.

Further, in my own judgment, this strategy, Mr. Secretary, must be stated in a way that can be comprehended by the American public. Fortunately, the public is becoming more and more interested and involved in the affairs of this Nation in terms of our national defense and foreign policy. And to the extent that those of us are in a position of being trustees in the formulation of this policy and its implementation, we should do so that there can be greater understanding and comprehensive by the public.

Because I frankly think that the only way we can continue to assure this Nation adequate funding for defense will be largely dependent on the ability to get that public support.

The national strategy should provide the overarching framework from which our military strategy and foreign policy are derived. An explicit statement of that strategy can serve as a guide to the administration, the Congress, the Armed Forces of the United States and, indeed, provide a valuable link between ourselves and our allies.

For this reason, I am pleased to continue with my distinguished colleague, Senator Nunn, and members of this committee and others in the Senate the project that we started some 10 months ago to promote common strategic objectives between the executive branch and the Congress, to solidify a bipartisan approach to global affairs.

Last year I introduced legislation, together with Senator Nunn and 26 other Senators, a bill entitled The National Strategy Act. This initiative would require the administration to present a national strategy assessment to a joint session of the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee at the beginning of each session of Congress.

Further, a printed document describing the national strategy would also be provided to each Member of the Congress. This would enable these four key committees, the rest of the Congress, and the Nation to have common understanding of our overall national strategy. As a result, we could better assess how defense programs work and foreign policy fits into this overall framework.

I am not saying this would solve all of our problems nor that it would be easy to accomplish, but at least we could begin our legislative process each year with a better understanding of the administration's view of our national strategy.

I am encouraged with the reception this concept has received. The chairman and ranking members of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees were original cosponsors. Congressman Cheney and Congressman Lujan introduced parallel legislation in the House of Representatives. While this bill was not acted upon during the previous Congress, we amended the Defense Department Authorization Act to include a provision requiring the administration to submit an annual foundation document on national strategy. I have been advised over the weekend by the White House that this effort is well under way and that this document will, Mr. Chairman, be presented to the Congress, I believe on the 28th of this month.

I commend the administration for their cooperation and enthusiasm in supporting this initiative. We look forward to receiving the President's first annual national security strategy report this year.

These hearings are directly supportive of our original initiative and they will be valuable to the Congress as we weigh events and issues throughout this coming year. If we are successful, they will also raise the public understanding of our national strategy. The United States can only sustain a strong commitment to national security if the public understands the need for it.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to join our chairman again in welcoming you. This is your first appearance before the 100th Congress. I hope it will be a memorable one.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, why don't you go ahead and proceed with your statement? I would like to thank you in advance for two things. First, for giving us your statement in advance. I read it and I think it is a very strong statement and a clarification of some things that have been bothering me—we will get into that in the future. I think it does clarify some very ambiguous positions from the past.

Second, I want to commend you in advance—and we will not get into this today; it is the subject of another hearing—for the work the Department of Defense has done on the 2-year budget concept. We are going into that as an experiment. We asked you to submit a 2-year budget in legislation which I authored 2 years ago. We gave you some time to do it, and my impression is the Department of Defense has really grabbed it and gone with it and done a very commendable job. If we can make it work in the defense budget, we may very well set an example for other parts of Government.

Before I call on you, though, let me call on Senator Thurmond, who has been an outstanding member of our committee and has done a tremendous job in everything he has ever undertaken on this committee.

Senator Thurmond, do you have any opening statement you would like to make?

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you upon becoming chairman of this committee. There is no committee in the Congress, I think, that has a greater responsibility than this. You have made an indelible imprint on our defense establishment, and I feel that you will do an excellent job as chairman.

I also want to say that I feel that Senator Warner will make an excellent ranking member. I have yielded to him to be the ranking member for the next 2 years. His experience will be of tremendous benefit to our defense establishment.

And I want to commend you for scheduling this series of hearings concerning our national security strategy. You and Senator Warner have been leaders in the Senate in calling for the congressional review and assessment of U.S. strategy. The new structure of the subcommittees should improve upon the mission orientation of the committee's budget analysis begun by our former colleague, Senator John Tower.

Also, I would like to add my welcome to our new committee members. They are very able people. I am sure they will make a fine contribution. It is a pleasure to have you gentlemen on the committee and I look forward to working with you.

Secretary Weinberger, it is always a pleasure to have you up here before this committee. You have consistently represented our President with candor, ability and dignity both here and abroad. It is my opinion that you have one of the most difficult jobs in our country. Yours is the task of trying to implement a strategy that is severely constrained by the resources approved by the Congress. We must remember that we must remain strong militarily. The goals of the Soviets have not changed. They still desire to spread their aggression throughout the world, and we must remember that.

Unfortunately, our adversary has not suffered the same impediments that you must contend with. Although the Soviet Union has some severe internal problems, choosing to spend money on their military forces is not one of them.

Mr. Secretary, I look forward to working with you during the 100th Congress. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. It will be a pleasure cooperating with you and Senator Warner.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond, for your opening statement and for your leadership on this committee and in the Senate.

Secretary Weinberger.

STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman and Senators, I think the 100th Congress is off to a very good start so far. I am happy to be here and discuss these very important matters with you. I have a quite long statement which you have been kind enough to refer and which I would like to put in the record in full. I will present a much shorter statement.

I also want to make one or two comments about your opening statement, because I think you have covered some very important points, and I really would be quite content to rest the entire presentation on the basis of Senator Thurmond's very kind and perceptive opening comments.

The opportunity to discuss strategy, I think, is a very important one and a very welcome one. By reviewing this strategy you are focusing on the foundation and really the whole source of our defense budget which, therefore, could be subsequently analyzed in a proper context.

Your approach tracks with the ways that we devise our defense program. Our interests and our strategy determine our defense needs upon which we then base our military programs, and America and its allies are well served when decisions on programs and policies flow from a careful assessment of our interests, our strategy, and our military needs.

As you review the President's First Annual National Security Strategy Report when it comes in, you will recognize the major features of our foreign and defense policies, for these endure from year to year and from administration to administration. One of our great strengths is the continuity of our national security policies and the bipartisan consensus that is supporting them.

There are, of course, differences among us, but I think that it is important to say that these differences do not shape the basic foundation of our national security strategy which has been shaped really since 1945, not only by Republicans and Democrats but by the outside forces over which we have little control that force and focus that strategy.

I was glad to hear you say, Mr. Chairman, that our publicly declared goals are neither overreaching nor too broad, and that there is no difference in connection with those goals. That, I think, is true, and that then leads us to the ways in which we can reach those goals. I am glad there was no suggestion to change them, because essentially they represent a modest but an absolutely vital agenda for America and for all of us who love freedom, because essentially that is our agenda.

What we really want is a system and a situation in which we are able to pursue freedom and in which our allies are able to pursue it without interference or attempts to substitute other systems for our own. We have no aggressive intention. We covet no real estate nor any other country, but we do feel it is vital that we have an opportunity to pursue our own lives and our own hopes, and to pursue happiness in the way each of us wishes to do—free from foreign or any other interference. That is basically a very modest goal, and it is the goal which has animated all administrations and all Americans since our founding.

There have been events which we have successfully resisted, that have attempted to block that and interfere with it. Part of our responsibilities, yours and mine, is to ensure that we always have the means to resist. You point out that we can do two or three different things to ensure that those goals can be reached. You point out that we could, if we find the level of risk too high, alter our global security objectives. You state quite correctly that there is no slight possibility of anyone agreeing to that because that cannot be done consistent with the kind of lives we want for ourselves, our children and our allies.

You point out that we could increase our defense resources for that and for other security measures, and we have advocated that very strongly. While we have had substantial increases, as you point out, we have also 2 years now in which we have had actual declines, and that can be a very difficult thing to assimilate. It also makes attaining our security goals more difficult, and we understand clearly that it increases the risks.

We debate the means to achieve our objectives, but as we do we shouldn't allow the underlying bipartisan national security consensus to be overshadowed by some of the differences that undoubtedly will emerge in our discussion. Public attention always focuses on the differences, but they need to be understood in the context of the entire body of defense policy.

The goal in our discussions is to bolster our national consensus and to recognize the great benefits for America of bipartisan solidarity in foreign and defense matters. Our defense strategy is part of a planning process used by our Department to determine our defense program. Our process has several components that appear on this chart.

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND POLICIES

Components of Defense Planning



First, we have to identify our national security interests, and as I have said, these interests encompass both broad ideals, freedom, human rights, and economic prosperity, as well as specific geographic concerns, as they must. That is the territorial integrity of our country and our allies and unencumbered American access to world markets and to sources of strategic resources that are in many cases thousands of miles from our shores.

Then we have to assess the threats to our interests. This entails analyzing the nature, the magnitude and the strength and vulnerabilities of military forces or other conditions that endanger our interest. Then we must formulate our defense policies and strategy. Defense strategy details how to pursue defense policies. It is the plan for employing our defense resources to safeguard our national security interests.

Finally, we have to determine the military capabilities needed to carry out this strategy. These needed capabilities, the forces, weapons, manpower, and so on, become our defense programs and, therefore, determine our budget. This process is a dynamic one. Every year it involves reassessing, validating and, when appropriate, modifying the strategy and the ongoing policies and programs.

This year, as you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, we have not only been in agreement for some years, but we have carried into fruition the idea of a 2-year budget. It is a genuine 2-year budget.

It is not a 1-year budget plus a skeleton. It is a full 2-year budget, and when appropriate, we will present it and urge that the appropriation bill be for 2 years. I think that will give us a much better way to plan and better way to look at, from a longer perspective, this budgetary conclusion at the end of this whole process.

In the text of the full testimony which I have given the committee we have tried to summarize our security interests and our defense strategy for deterring aggression. These are also discussed in more detail in the annual report which you have.

Rather than go into the full testimony this morning, I thought I would concentrate on the central issue of how appropriate and well-matched are our interests, our strategy, and our capabilities. That relationship is depicted on that chart.

Debate in this issue often revolves around what some people perceive as a so-called strategy-capabilities gap. I think you have touched on this, Mr. Chairman, this morning. In an ideal world our interests, our strategy, and our capabilities would be exactly matched. Our allied and United States military capabilities would be enough to give us assurance that through our defense strategy we could safeguard our shaped interests against any reasonably likely threat.

That kind of state in essence would eliminate all questions of risk to which you properly referred and which are elements that run through all of this. Risk is the difference between what we need and what we have for successful defense, and the elimination of risk in security matters is not feasible.

I think it is fair to say we had it for a very brief time in the early 1950's. But our goal now should be to keep the risk down to a level that is consistent with the Nation's wealth and with the values we attach to our freedom and our security interests. Now, how much do we want freedom? That is essentially the question. There are several options for reducing our security risks. Some of these options are wise and others are very short-sighted and quite dangerous.

The best and, of course, the slowest working, the least certain of the options would be to diminish the threats to our interests, which would be nice if we could do it. But it is the least certain because its success depends on factors wholly outside our control. A key component of U.S. foreign policy and defense policy is always to try to persuade the Soviets to reduce that threat through such means as to convince Moscow to restrain its military expenditures, to cease its aggression and its exploitation of instabilities around the world; try to negotiate, which we have been trying to do—genuine, verifiable reductions in nuclear arms and non-nuclear forces; to negotiate no agreements which permit increases; to keep our militarily exploitable technology out of Soviet hands; and to pursue what we term competitive strategy, which is simply programs that align our enduring strengths against enduring Soviet weaknesses, thereby rendering Soviet military power less potent over time.

Another option to improve the matching of our interests, strategy, and capabilities is to scale back our interests. There have been many suggestions favoring this. This option sounds tempting because it could be accomplished with a simple U.S. declaration that we are no longer willing to safeguard some security interest or some ally. I am convinced that this is not a possible option if we want to keep our freedom.

To those who say we should scale back United States interests, I would ask: what mutual defense treaty should we repudiate? Which allies or friends should we abandon? Which of our commitments that you refer to in your statement, Mr. Chairman, as growing should we abandon? Which are unrealistic? Which are not forced on us by the Soviet threat? What American interests should we give up? I know of no answers that would enable America to continue on the road that American Presidents and Congresses have followed at least since 1945.

American interests worldwide form a security perimeter for our values and our future prosperity. A breach or a weak spot in that perimeter endangers the whole, as is always the case with a defensive perimeter, and it would call into question America's resolve as leader of the world's democracies and make our allies question whether they should remain allies any longer.

The interests our administration has sought to protect are essentially the same as those our predecessors endorsed. Indeed, in the nature of things, America's interests and goals and, indeed America's destiny does not change. In the preceding several decades, America's alliances, treaties, and cooperative arrangements have changed very little since 1980. This constancy is reflected in our force deployments.

For example, in the last 6 years the number of bases overseas has decreased slightly to about 335, which is about 27 percent of our total bases. Military personnel have been fairly constant over the years. About 24 percent of all our people in uniform are forward deployed, as indeed they should be.

Certainly we should review and revalidate our interests worldwide, which is what we do now, both in the executive branch and in the Congress. I see no prudent way to scale back American interests while remaining true to America's values, maintaining our alliance commitments, and safeguarding our future.

There are then those reluctant to increase America's military strength to provide more reassuring security and to reduce the risk. Sometimes they charge that this administration's strategy is to fight everywhere around the world at once. That is not our strategy. Our strategy is to deter aggression against the United States, our allies and our interests, so we will never have to fight anywhere in the world.

We and our allies seek to do this by maintaining forces that are capable of responding quickly and effectively to the most serious threats to our interests. We also want those forces to be flexible and strong enough to give us credible responses to other threats as well. We cannot ignore the fact that Soviet military power could enable it to attack in more than one place at the same time.

Our strategy recognizes that the Soviet Union, together with Soviet-backed forces, is fully capable of this simultaneous aggression in multiple regions of the world. Whether they will choose to do so or not is a matter of intentions which we can't foretell. But should aggression occur in several regions simultaneously, American military responses would be governed by existing commitments, general strategic priorities, the specific circumstances at hand, and the availability and strength of our forces.

Our ability to respond would be buttressed by the flexibility we have built into our forces. Our ability to respond reduces the risk that we will ever have to meet such attacks, but the inability on our part to respond increases the risk that we may have to.

It is as simple as that. Our strategy recognizes that a variety of factors would affect the nature and the locations of our military actions. Our strategy is not to try to fight everywhere at once. The key point is that to deter aggression we and our allies do not plan to maintain all the forces required for a high confidence simultaneous defense against Moscow-directed attacks in all threatened or potentially threatened areas. But, we do need credible responses to major threats worldwide so we can ensure that our weakness does not tempt our adversaries.

Just a few years ago, Mr. Chairman, our weakness and our announced intentions did tempt our adversary. That was in Korea, where the United States announced many years ago that Korea lay outside our defensive perimeter, and it did for about 6 months. After that, we recognized because of the aggression of North Korea which was supported by others, that we were not able to consider it outside our defensive perimeter and we had to scramble very rapidly to get in place the forces that were needed to repel aggression there. Our success in doing that is measured by and is part of the fact that we have been able to respond, that we were able to respond then in time, and that we have been able to maintain forces that make it clear we would respond again. That has deterred aggression in that vital part of the world for us as well as for our allies.

So the strategy of flexible responses to aggression against our interests is not new. Essentially it has been United States strategy since we abandoned the doctrine of massive retaliation in 1961.

What is different is our administration's conviction that to deter convincingly we must have the military strength to carry out credible responses. Otherwise, we will have hollow forces which leave us with a hollow strategy and no real effective deterrence. The military forces that we have advocated since 1981 to support our strategy are not radically larger than those envisioned by some of our predecessors. The difference is that we and the Congress have recognized thus far that these forces had to be highly capable and that they had to be ready.

In sum, a change in U.S. strategy cannot reduce our defense needs, because our defense needs are compelled by Soviet aggression. Changing our strategy is not going to change the Soviet intentions or the Soviet capabilities. Our strategy is still to deter aggression by our capacity to respond to it, and the only alternatives to a strategy of credible response to aggression are early capitulation, early escalation, or the abandonment of our allies and our interests.

Strengthening America's military capabilities is a critically important part of what we must do. We have a limited long-term potential for easing our defense burdens through reducing the threats or scaling back our interests or adjusting our strategy. We know we could never secure even this long-term potential unless we are strong enough to offer an inducement to the Soviets to enter into some kind of reduction agreements with us that are thoroughly verifiable.

Consequently, our primary option has to be to ensure that we have the military capabilities that are strong enough to support our strategy and keep our security risks at a prudent level. Keeping America's security risks low is the objective of our defense budget. Our current budget request, which falls short of what we had planned for, specifies the investments that we need to ensure our security against the threats I have outlined. Those who propose to reduce that budget need to acknowledge, in doing so, that such a reduction would increase our security risks, and that those who wish to reduce our budget are willing for the Nation to incur such risks.

It is a popular delusion that cuts can eliminate only fat and not muscle. If advocates of cutting defense expenditures believe the resulting increased risks to be acceptable, then we could debate what level of risk America should accept and for which interests. But discussion should proceed from a common understanding that reducing military capabilities does affect our security and does add to the risks that we could lose our freedom.

It is impossible to discuss these matters rationally with those who ignore the results of defense reductions and who like to imagine that no danger can come to our interests no matter how deeply they reduce the Nation's defense. Those who would arbitrarily dismiss our long-term security interests as secondary to short-term fiscal goals, those who demand new taxes before they will consider the Nation's security, should at least acknowledge some responsibility for the increased risks that they would force on the Nation.

In our deliberations, we need to distinguish between responsible calls for improvements in our strategy, which we obviously and certainly welcome, and those who are really saying that what we need is a strategy that costs less. The safer course is to gear our strategy and capabilities to our interests and to the threats to them. Fiscal constraints, of course, have to be considered, but again in making our budget decisions we should weigh carefully the increased risks that result from reduced military capabilities.

The question really is how much is enough in strategic forces in Europe, in East Asia, in the Pacific, and in other areas of vital interests? To this there is no precise answer. It comes down to judgments about what is an acceptable degree of risk; judgments that the President and the Congress ultimately must make.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and I present our assessments of national security risks in our various reports and testimonies to Congress and in recommendations to the President. Our defense budget request presents what we believe must be done to keep those risks at a safe level. How, then, should we proceed to ensure our security?

As I have stressed, we all should continue to review and validate our assessments of U.S. interests, the threats to those interests, and our strategy. We must continue our steady progress toward improving military capabilities. In strengthening our forces we should continue to ensure that we are buying the right capabilities, those that are best suited to our defense needs.

We need a balanced program, ensuring, for example, that we do not neglect readiness or sustainability when faced with pressing modernization needs. In the acquisition of these stronger and needed capabilities, we must continue our progress toward greater efficiencies, building on the many reforms we have made since 1981. We seek Congress' cooperation in assuring and achieving stability in the procurement program, so essential to maintaining the critical industrial base and attaining high acquisition efficiency. That is why we are very pleased to have the 2-year budget before you instead of just a 1-year budget.

The security of the free world, Mr. Chairman, also requires that our allies do their fair share to defend our common values. President Reagan and I share the desire of Members of the Congress that our allies bear a fair share of the collective security burden. The issue is how best to achieve that. In addition to coaxing greater effort in every way we can, which we do, we should continue to lead our allies by our example. We should recognize the difficulty of arguing for greater responses by others to their growing security threats and to ours when at the same time we are perceived to be cutting defense spending.

So, as we work to get our allies to do more I think we should not be tempted, out of frustration, to do less. Such short-sighted action could very well result in lesser, not greater allied defense effort. It would also play directly into Soviet hands by aiding various Western European factions advocating dangerous security policies.

We must remember that we support our allies and friends not wholly from altruism, but because it is in our interest to do so. A free and prosperous Europe, for example, is vital to a free and prosperous America. We couldn't live in a world where the Soviets had overrun Europe.

The Soviets would like nothing better than for us to reduce our NATO support. They have been trying to destroy that alliance as well as our alliances in the Pacific since their formation. And so as we push for greater efforts from our allies, we are doing our utmost to increase cooperation among our allies on research and acquisition of new defense systems.

This is an extraordinarily difficult challenge, but one with a very high potential for payoff. It is one that I know, Mr. Chairman, in which you have been very interested and taken a lead. It is one of the many initiatives we are pursuing with congressional support to acquire ever greater military capability from our defense resources.

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned a couple of points in your opening statement that I would like to refer to very briefly. You referred to statements that I had made in 1983, and you said something—quoted a brief sentence from that long report to the effect that our defense policy had become obsolete because of new threats to our security, and it also needs to recognize and cope with the deterioration in the global military situation.

That is the correlation of forces which was increasingly in Soviet favor through the seventies and running well into 1980 and into 1981 before we were able to start making our changes and our improvements. Then you quoted another sentence of mine to the effect that obsolete strategic concepts have stood in the way of necessary reforms. Then you noticed a statement in last year's posture statement to the effect that the most important truth about the recent buildup is that we have been buying and fielding the forces to implement policies and strategies over which there was little disagreement. Our principal difference arose, in our judgment, about the importance of funding these programs at levels adequate to achieve our stated objective.

I think it is important to bear in mind specifically what was referred to in the rest of that report from which the short excerpt appears in 1983 as well as later. That is, we do believe that the mutual assured destruction concept has become obsolete, and that it does not recognize and cope with the deterioration in the gobal military situation. Something new is needed, and something new has been added—the Strategic Defense Initiative, one of the President's very highest priorities. If it can be realized, it could bring to us, and to the world, perhaps the most hopeful strategic concept in at least the last 40 years.

We referred last year in the posture statement to the basic fact that there was little disagreement to the welcome support that the Congress had given the beginnings of the research in strategic defense.

You asked if our intellectual approaches have caught up with the dollars we have expended, and the answer is clearly yes.

You asked, has the Reagan administration made significant changes in the strategy inherited, and again the answer is yes with respect to strategic defense.

Previously, it was considered either very bad form or slightly immoral to talk about defenses. The President, as he has so frequently done, is not afraid to challenge the conventional wisdom. He has come forward with strategic defense as a new concept, a very hopeful concept and one that enables us to utilize our excellent technological skills and our inventive and productive genius just to give the world a far better and far more hopeful concept than we have ever had.

You asked also, Mr. Chairman, if we had any regular discussions between myself and the Joint Chiefs with respect to strategy, and the answer is yes, every day. We have formal meetings every week and informal meetings every day, and I have formal meetings with the Secretary of State at least twice a week and many informal discussions much of the rest of the time at which these problems are discussed in either detail or in broad terms. It is vital that we continue to do so.

You raised some question as to whether we were possibly trying to use a strategy of strength versus Soviet strength measured on a basis of tank for tank, artillery piece for artillery piece, plane for plane and so on, and clearly that is not the case.

What we try to do is use our competitive strategies, to align our great skills with Soviet weaknesses and our enduring strengths with the Soviet enduring weaknesses. We do that in a number of ways, particularly including our financing and deployment and development of weapons systems involving the Stealth technology, antisubmarine warfare and a number of other areas, in tactics in the follow-on forces attack and in the deep interdiction that is part of our NATO strategies.

These are all ways in which we try to deal with the numerical advantage of the Soviet Union, to cope with the differences in the systems under which, without any public opinion, without any restraints, on what three or four people in the Kremlin decide should be spent for defense. They have been able to sustain a massive buildup for over two decades, about 23 years now, without any pause or any interference and without any factors that change that, a point that Senator Thurmond referred to in his opening statement.

We have to recognize that with our differences in systems, we need something other than just tank for tank as a means of dealing with the great Soviet advantages. That is why we stress these competitive strategies and these attempts to utilize our strengths against their weaknesses.

The goals are the same. The goals will never change. The goals are to keep our freedom and peace and deter any aggression or war against us. Those will have to remain unchanged no matter who are in your chairs, who are in our chairs or who is in the President's chair.

The idea that we can somehow reduce our commitments and keep our peace and freedom can only work if the Soviets agree to it. The Soviets have not agreed to it. They have done nothing but increase their military strength, increase their ability to project power, and increase their ability to conduct war in various parts of the world, simultaneously.

We cannot say that because we think that means too expensive a response is required that we have to cut back, change our commitments and narrow them to fit some idea of our reduced capabilities. No one should think that we have to reduce our capabilities or that the Nation cannot afford to keep its peace or its freedom.

By these two budgets we have submitted, we are spending no more than 6 percent of our gross national product. We are spending no more than 27 or 28 percent of our total national budget. This is far less than has occurred in previous years. We believe it is the minimum necessary to do what we all desire—keep our peace and freedom.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Weinberger follows:]

Prepared Statement of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger

Good morning, Mr. Chairman. At the outset, I would like to salute this committee for making evaluation of U.S. national security strategy an early and high priority for the 100th Congress. By reviewing U.S. strategy, you are focusing on the foundation and source of our defense budget, which therefore can be subsequently analyzed in its proper context. Your approach thus tracks with the ways we devise our defense program: U.S. interests and strategy determine our defense needs, upon which we then base our military programs. America and its allies are well served when decisions on programs and policies flow from a careful assessment of our interests, strategy and military needs.

As you review the President's first annual national security strategy report, you will recognize the major features of our foreign and defense policies -- for these endure from year to year, *and* from administration to administration. Indeed, one of America's great strengths is the continuity of its national security policies and the bipartisan consensus supporting them. Yes, there are differences among us. But thankfully, these do not shake the foundation of our national security strategy, shaped since 1945 by both Republicans and Democrats, in both our branches of government.

As we debate the *means* to achieve our objectives, we must always keep our common *goal* in mind -- the survival and success of freedom. We should not allow our underlying, bipartisan, national security consensus to be overshadowed by some of the differences that undoubtedly will emerge in our discussions. Public attention may focus on these differences, but they need to be understood in the context of the entire body of defense policies. The goal in our discussions is to bolster our national consensus, recognizing the great benefits for America of bipartisan solidarity in foreign and defense matters.

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND POLICIES

Components of Defense Planning



U.S. defense strategy is part of the planning process DoD uses to determine our nation's defense program. Our process has several components, which are depicted graphically on Chart 1:

(1) Identify U.S. National Security Interests. U.S. national security interests are defined as values, conditions and geographical assets deemed to be of major importance to the preservation and well-being of the United States and its allies. U.S. interests encompass both broad ideals (e.g., freedom, human rights, and economic prosperity) as well as specific geographical concerns (e.g., the territorial integrity of our allies and unencumbered U.S. access to world markets and sources of strategic resources).

(2) Assess Threats to U.S. Interests. This entails analyzing the nature, magnitude, strengths, and vulnerabilities of military forces or other conditions endangering our interests.

(3) Formulate Defense Policies and Strategy. Defense policy sets forth security objectives and guides for development of defense strategy and military capabilities, to be used in conjunction with other instruments of national power to counter security threats and advance U.S. interests. Defense strategy details how defense policies are to be pursued. It is the plan for employing defense resources to safeguard our national security interests. Thus, strategy specifies how our defense means are to accomplish our desired national security ends.

(4) Determine Military Capabilities Needed to Carry out U.S Strategy. These needed capabilities (forces, weapons, manpower) become our defense programs and therefore determine our budget.

The defense planning process I have described is dynamic. Every year it involves reassessing, validating and, when appropriate, modifying our strategy and ongoing policies and programs.

Later in my testimony, it will be useful to refer to Chart 1 to recall the relationship of interests, strategy and capabilities, especially when I discuss the issue of how well matched these are.

U.S. Interests

America's paramount national interests are peace, freedom, and prosperity for ourselves and for others around the world. We seek an international order that encourages self-determination, democratic institutions, economic development, and human rights. We endorse the open exchange of ideas and other measures to encourage understanding between peoples.

More specifically, we maintain our steadfast concern for the security and well-being of our allies and other nations friendly to our interests. We oppose the expansion of influence, control, or territory by nations opposed to freedom and to other fundamental ideals shared by America and its allies.

National Security Objectives

Threats to U.S. interests require us to formulate national security objectives and policies to counter those perils. The most serious threat to America and its allies continues to be Soviet military power and Moscow's willingness to use it for political and economic gain and for endangering our interests. The Soviets threaten our interests directly and also by exploiting regional instabilities and supporting radical regimes around the globe hostile to U.S. interests. America's security threats are discussed further in Soviet Military Power, my Annual Report to the Congress, and Admiral Crowe's posture statement and testimony.

Major U.S. national security objectives are to:

-- Safeguard the United States, its allies and interests by deterring aggression and coercion; and should deterrence fail, by defeating the armed aggression and ending the conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its allies, and interests at the lowest possible level of hostilities.

-- Encourage and assist our allies and friends in defending themselves against aggression, coercion, subversion, insurgencies, and terrorism.

-- Ensure U.S. access to critical resources, markets, the oceans, and space.

-- Where possible, reduce Soviet presence throughout the world, increase the costs of Moscow's use of subversive forces, and foster changes within the Soviet bloc that will lead to a more peaceful world order.

-- Prevent the transfer of militarily critical technology and knowledge to the Soviet bloc.

-- Pursue equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements, with special emphasis on compliance.

The President's national security strategy report will discuss our foreign and defense policies, their interrelationship and the uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of our national power. My testimony today will concentrate on the defense aspects of our strategy, especially those concepts I believe are of particular interest to this committee.

Our defense strategy is driven by and supports President Reagan's overall foreign policy, and especially these principles:

(1) Realism. We must deal with the world as it is, not as we wish it would be. This particularly characterizes our dealings with the Soviet Union. Our strategy is geared to actual Soviet actions, which provide evidence of their intentions, rather than Kremlin declarations. We assess the Soviet threat through careful analysis of facts, acknowledging weaknesses as well as strengths.

(2) Strength. America's strength is the result of our combined political, military, economic, moral and cultural posture. But it is military strength that is essential against adversaries who could destroy all we value if we are militarily inferior. Although military strength alone is not enough, without it there can be no effective diplomacy and negotiations and no genuine, lasting security.

(3) Willingness to Negotiate Arms Reductions with our Adversaries. While recognizing fundamental differences with our adversaries, we seek meaningful and productive discussions to bolster U.S. and allied security and make the world safer. And especially in negotiations over arms reductions, it is realism and strength that are crucial to progress.

KEY FEATURES OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Deterring Aggression and Intimidation: U.S. Peacetime Strategy

U.S. defense strategy is a combination of a peacetime and wartime strategy. The goal of our peacetime strategy is to deter aggression against the United States, its allies, and interests worldwide. Our wartime strategy prescribes U.S. actions should deterrence fail. Our peacetime and wartime strategies obviously are closely linked, since successful U.S. deterrence depends primarily upon our probable responses to aggression. For conciseness, my discussion here integrates our peacetime and wartime strategies, reflecting this close linkage.

America's peacetime defense strategy is to deter threats to our interests by means of clear alliance commitments and military forces that provide us with effective and credible responses to any type of aggression. To deter successfully, we make clear to potential aggressors that we have both the means and the will to respond powerfully to aggression. We emphasize our resolve to respond to aggression, but our strategy is to avoid specifying exactly what our response will be at any given time. This is the essence of "flexible response," which has been U.S. strategy since 1961 and NATO strategy since 1967.

U.S. and allied forces deter a potential aggressor by confronting him with three types of possible responses should deterrence fail:

-- Effective Defense: To confront an adversary with the possibility that his aggression will be defeated without our side resorting to actions escalating the conflict. This is sometimes referred to as "deterrence through denial." Example: Defeating a non-nuclear attack with conventional forces only.

-- The Threat of Escalation: To warn an adversary that his aggression could start hostilities that might not be confined in the manner he envisions -- that escalation could exact far greater costs than he anticipates, or could bear. Example: NATO's deterrence of a Soviet conventional attack is enhanced by our ability and resolve to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, to halt such aggression.

-- The Threat of Retaliation: To raise the prospect that an attack will trigger a retaliatory attack on the aggressor's homeland, causing his losses to exceed greatly any possible gains. Example: Our deterrence of a Soviet nuclear attack today is based on our resolve to retaliate against the Soviet Union using our nuclear weapons.

The responses summarized above are part of the overall U.S. defense strategy for safeguarding our interests worldwide. Our global strategy for deterring aggression can be summarized as follows:

To Deter Nuclear Attack. To do this, the United States relies on a credible warning capability; strong and survivable nuclear forces; and survivable, fully capable command, control, communications and intelligence (C^3I) supporting systems. The U.S. strategic nuclear capability must ensure that any potential attacker is faced with unacceptable risks and outcomes from his aggression and thus is deterred from attacking or attempting political coercion. U.S. retaliatory forces must be able to hold at risk the full range of Soviet targets despite Soviet advances in passive and active defense. We seek to do this through our strategic nuclear Triad: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); and strategic bombers. The combined effect of having these three reinforcing components complicates Soviet attack planning and any efforts to prevent U.S. retaliation. In addition, the existence of the three legs provides an important hedge against the possibility that a single Soviet technological breakthrough could threaten our overall deterrent capability. By maintaining our Triad, we compel the Soviet Union to disperse its resources against three components, preventing it from concentrating its considerable resources on defeating only one or two U.S. strategic systems. The strengths of each leg of the Triad not only complement the strengths of the other two, but also compensate for their weaknessses. To deter all types of nuclear attack, our forces as a whole must possess various characteristics and capabilities -- including survivability, prompt response, endurance, mission flexibility, and sufficient accuracy and warhead yield -- to hold at risk those assests the Soviet leadership values most.

To Deter Non-nuclear Aggression. To do this, we rely on nuclear and non-nuclear U.S. and allied forces, which together can respond to an attack with effective defense or credible capabilities for escalation or retaliation. This combination of forces deters by making the outcome of aggression uncertain and by making the probable costs exceed the probable gains in the minds of any potential aggressors.

Effective defense has several important advantages as a basis for deterrence. It has high credibility and stability. Moreover, because it provides protection against attack, it is more reassuring and more successful in preventing intimidation, which the Soviet Union could achieve by threatened use of its military power.

These unique advantages of effective defense explain the attractiveness we see in having thoroughly reliable defenses against nuclear attack, as envisioned in President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Effective strategic defenses would bolster (not replace) deterrence, provide protection should deterrence ever fail, and reassure all peoples now exposed to nuclear attack.

The advantages of effective defense also explain why the United States and its allies must have strong conventional forces, and the capability to project them and support them, in order to protect our global interests. We cannot rely solely on a nuclear crutch to deter and defeat non-nuclear aggression. But of course, as long as our adversaries possess nuclear weapons, we must continue to maintain modern, effective nuclear forces.

Should Deterrence Fail: U.S. Wartime Strategy

Our purpose is to prepare for war so well that we successfully deter aggression. But should deterrence fail, our strategy calls for securing all U.S. and allied interests, denying the aggressor any of his war aims, and causing or convincing him to stop his aggression.

In responding to a non-nuclear attack, the United States would act not only to defeat the attack, but also to convince the attacker that his continued aggression would entail grave risks to his own interests. Still, because of the enormous military strength of the Soviet Union, the United States cannot prepare only for a "short war," which could merely tempt Moscow to believe it could outlast us in combat.

U.S. strategy seeks to terminate any conflict at the earliest practical time and restore peace on terms favorable to the United States, its allies, and friends. Our goal would be to limit the scope of any conflict, and confine it to conventional means that do not engender or risk escalation. Should our attempts to defeat aggression fail, however, U.S. strategy provides for the flexible and sufficient application of force to ensure that no area of vital interest is lost by default.

As a U.S. response to Soviet non-nuclear aggression, the threat of geographic escalation is an element of U.S. strategy; but it is not a substitute for sufficient military capability in the primary area of operations. Since the Soviet Union possesses war-widening options at least as effective as those of the U.S., and particularly since geographic and nuclear escalatory considerations may be linked, U.S. interests demand careful attention to the potential benefits and risks of escalation. Contingency planning must include, however, options for exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities and for military initiatives in regions of clear U.S. advantage, in order to dissuade the Soviets from continuing their attack.

Balance of Forces

To protect our mutual interests, the United States and its allies must maintain military capabilities sufficient to make our defense strategy credible and effective. This does not require that we and our allies match our adversaries in every category of weapon system; e.g., numbers of tanks, aircraft, ships, etc. The calculus of deterrence and defense is far more complicated than just static numbers. At least as important are the performance characteristics of the weapons, the quality and morale of people operating them and the tactics used. Moreover, geography and the unique features of a specific security mission decisively affect the military forces needed. Finally, the cohesion of our alliances -- into which our partners have joined freely, in contrast to the alliances of the Soviet Union -- also relieves us from having to match the Soviet threat unit for unit. All these variables, plus others, are weighed against the threats to our security in determining our military needs for protecting U.S. interests and meeting our commitments.

In 1981, the largest problem we faced stemmed from a 20-year Soviet arms buildup, which was accompained in the 1970s by a 20 percent real reduction in U.S. defense effort. The global military balance -- in Soviet terms, the "correlation of forces" -- was shifting in favor of the Soviets in their view as well as ours. Through an investment nearly 50 percent larger than our own, the Soviets were buying advantages in virtually every area of comparison -- in nuclear forces, in the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance, and in Southwest Asia.

With the dramatic strengthening of our military forces since 1981, we have made substantial progress toward ensuring a balance of forces sufficient to keep our strategy credible and effective. If we can maintain a steady strengthening, we can preserve our gains. But if we falter, the military balance can erode rapidly, since the Soviet buildup continues unabated.

Alliances for Collective Security

For free peoples, cooperation and collective security are essential to the preservation of our nations and our values.

This alliance system enables us to share our common security burdens and achieve a division of labor capitalizing on the relative strengths of each state. Our alliances with the nations of Europe, East Asia, and our own hemisphere, together with other important security relationships in those regions and in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, are critical strands in U.S. strategy.

Alliance security requires that national forces be able to fight together effectively in combined operations. It also requires a coherent program of security assistance and a sharing of key technologies so that each alliance partner can increase its capabilities for the military role it accepts for itself.

Because of our alliances, we all are able to achieve a level of deterrence and defense that otherwise would be unattainable for any one of us. Furthermore, cooperation in defense matters can reinforce political cohesion and improve diplomatic and economic relationships.

Security Assistance

Security assistance is an indispensable tool of American foreign policy and an essential element in strengthening our defense posture around the world. It is in our national security interest to keep old alliances strong and form new ones, and to assist allies and friends in strengthening their defense against external aggression and internal conflict. Our security assistance program also helps us gain access to bases and overflight rights, improves our power projection and forward-defense capabilities, and can augment the U.S. industrial base.

Forward-deployed Forces

Because American values and interests are shared by many nations that literally span the entire globe, and because of our geographic position, we cannot defend adequately those interests with U.S.-based forces only. The proximity of Soviet forces to our allies and overseas interests imposes severe demands on the timeliness of our response, since territory or interests once lost would be difficult to regain. Thus our strategy requires forward-deployed forces, whose purposes are to:

- Deter aggression and coercion more convincingly than could be done without a visible U.S. presence;
- Increase our ability to respond effectively and quickly in the event of a conflict and to bring it to a favorable end;
- Reassure our allies of our commitment to our common security, assist them in resisting intimidation, and encourage them to sustain their full contribution to our collective security;

-- Facilitate in peacetime the integration of U.S. and allied forces in wartime;

-- Discourage regional instabilities and ambiguous aggression; and

-- Provide a more stable international environment for constructive diplomacy.

For the above purposes, the United States stations ground and air forces in NATO countries, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, plus naval carrier battle groups and Marine amphibious forces in the Atlantic, Western Pacific, Mediterranean Sea, and Indian Ocean. We also forward deploy non-strategic nuclear forces for these same purposes.

It is sometimes suggested that we should "bring the troops home" to save money. Every study of this issue, however, has found that it is more expensive to bring our forces home and keep them here -- with the requisite deployment capabilities -- than it is to maintain them abroad.

We must have the capability to augment and expand rapidly our forward-deployed units through reinforcement by U.S.-based Active and Reserve Component units. These forces will provide additional combat capability in the event of an extended confrontation. They will depend on airlift and sealift to get them to the combat theater in time to be effective. We will continue to complement our rapid-deployment capabilities by expanding our stocks of prepositioned material overseas. Furthermore, we will continue to make every effort to secure host nation support; overflight, landing, and bunkering rights; and access to essential overseas bases and facilities in advance of potential crises or contingencies.

Flexibility

U.S. forward deployments and our contingency plans for our forces represent our judgment about the seriousness and likelihood of aggression against our interests. Yet, we know we can never be certain about the location, time, and nature of future aggression against our interests. Therefore, our forces, plans, and way of thinking must be flexible to enable us to respond to unexpected contingencies.

Our requirement for flexibility increases the importance of strategic mobility -- our ability to deploy and sustain our forces over great distances. Soviet outposts in many regions of the world make it possible for Moscow to threaten friendly nations, directly and through surrogates, in places where we have no shield of land-based forward deployments. The spread of these military outposts is made more serious by the expansion of Soviet capabilities for projecting power, particularly in regions close to the Soviet Union.

MATCHING U.S. INTERESTS, STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES

A key basis for evaluating our national security strategy is to consider how appropriate and well-matched are U.S. interests, strategy and capabilities, whose relationship is depicted on Chart 1. Debate on this issue often revolves around what some people perceive as a so-called "strategy/capabilities gap."

In an ideal world, our interests, strategy, and capabilities would be exactly matched. U.S. and allied military capabilities would be sufficient to give us virtual assurance that, through our defense strategy, we could safeguard our shared interests against any reasonably likely threats. Such a state in essence would eliminate from our security concerns the element of risk -- risk being the difference between what we need and what we have for successful defense. But the elimination of risk in security matters is not feasible. Therefore, our goal should be to keep that risk down to a level consistent with our nation's wealth and preciousness of our values and security interests.

There are several options for reducing America's security risks. Some of these options are wise; others are shortsighted and dangerous.

Reducing Threats

The best, yet slowest-working and least certain option for reducing U.S. security risks would be to diminish the threats to our interests. It is the least certain because its success depends on factors outside our control. And yes, a key component of U.S. foreign policy and defense policy is always to try to reduce the Soviet threat through such means as:

o Convincing Moscow to restrain its military expenditures and cease its aggression and exploitation of instabilities around the world.

o Negotiating genuine, verifiable reductions in nuclear arms and non-nuclear forces.

o Keeping our militarily exploitable technology out of Soviet hands.

o Pursuing what we term "competitive strategies," which are programs that align enduring U.S. strengths against enduring Soviet weaknesses, thereby rendering Soviet military power less potent over time. The competitive strategies we adopt should force the Soviets, in responding, to compete less efficiently or effectively. We seek to enhance deterrence by making a significant component of the Soviets' force structure or their operational plans obsolete, thus forcing difficult decisions upon them. Those decisions might include shifting more resources to defensive systems and operations, rather than continuing to structure forces for offensive operations. As an example, we can exploit and increase, especially through advanced technologies, the competitive advantages of our penetrating bomber force. This could make obsolete much of the Soviets' air-defense infrastructure, forcing them to make an enormous investment in defensive systems.

Scaling Back U.S. Interests

Another option to improve the matching of U.S. interests, strategy, and capabilities is to scale back U.S. interests. This option may sound especially tempting because it can be accomplished with a simple U.S. declaration that we are no longer willing to safeguard some security interest or ally. But I am convinced it is not a possible option if we want to keep our freedom.

To those who say we should scale back U.S. interests, I would ask: What mutual defense treaties should we repudiate? Which allies or friends should we abandon? From what international cause should we retreat? What American interest should we give up? For these questions, I know of no answers that would enable America to continue the road that U.S. presidents and Congresses have followed since 1945. U.S. interests worldwide form a security perimeter for our values and future prosperity. A breach or weak spot in that perimeter could endanger the whole, and would call into question America's resolve as leader of the world's democracies.

The interests this Administration has sought to protect are essentially the same as those our predecessors endorsed. Indeed, in the nature of things, America's interests, goals and indeed America's destiny does not change. As in the preceding several decades, America's alliances, treaties, and cooperative arrangements also have changed very little since 1980. This constancy is reflected in our force deployments. In the last six years, the number of bases overseas has decreased slightly to 335, about 27 percent of our total bases of 1,228. Military personnel overseas have been fairly constant over these years -- 24 percent of all our people in uniform.

Yes, we should review and revalidate our interests worldwide, which is what we do now, both in the Executive Branch and in Congress. But I see no prudent way to scale back U.S. interests while remaining true to America's values, maintaining our alliance commitments and safeguarding our future.

Changing U.S. Defense Strategy

Those reluctant to increase America's military strength to provide more reassuring security for our interests sometimes charge that this Administration's strategy is "to fight everywhere around the world at once." That is not our strategy.

Our strategy is to deter aggression against the U.S., our allies, and our interests, so we will never have to fight anywhere in the world. We and our allies seek to do this by maintaining forces that are capable of responding quickly and effectively to the most serious threats to our interests. We also want these forces to be flexible and strong enough to give us credible responses to other threats as well. We cannot ignore the fact that Soviet military power could enable it to attack in more than one place at the same time.

Our strategy recognizes that the Soviet Union, together with Soviet-backed forces, is fully capable of simultaneous aggression in multiple regions of the world. Whether they will choose to do so is a matter of intentions, which we cannot foretell. Should aggression occur in several regions simultaneously, U.S. military responses would be governed by existing commitments, general strategic priorities, the specific circumstances at hand, and the availability of forces. Our ability to respond would be buttressed by the flexibility we have built into our forces. Our ability to respond reduces the risk that we will ever have to meet such attacks. Any inability on our part increases the risk.

Thus, our strategy recognizes that a variety of factors would affect the nature and locations of our military actions; our strategy is not to try to fight "everywhere at once." The key point is this: to deter aggression, we and our allies do not plan to maintain all the forces required for a high-confidence, simultaneous defense against Moscow-directed attacks in all threatened or potentially threatened areas. But we do need credible responses to major threats worldwide, so we can ensure that our weakness does not tempt our adversaries.

This strategy for credible responses to aggression against our interests is not new. Essentially it has been U.S. strategy since we abandoned the doctrine of massive retaliation in 1961. It has served us well, for example, by ensuring that war has not returned to the Korean peninsula, despite the North's openly stated intentions, even when U.S. forces were involved in contingencies elsewhere. What is different is this Administration's conviction that to deter convincingly we must have the military strength necessary for actually carrying out credible responses. Otherwise, we have "hollow" forces, leaving us with a "hollow" strategy.

The military forces we have advocated since 1981 to support U.S. strategy are not radically larger than those envisioned by our predecessors. The difference is that we, and the Congress, recognized that these had to be highly capable, ready forces.

In sum, I do not see how a change in U.S. strategy can reduce our defense needs. Our strategy is to deter aggression by our capacity to respond to it. The only alternatives to a strategy of credible response to aggression are early capitulation, early escalation, or the abandonment of our allies and interests.

Are there better ways for employing the forces we have? This is what our military commanders and planners work on every day. And we welcome new ideas on strategy and employment of our forces. But, absent a withdrawal to isolationism, there is no easy strategy "fix" that can reduce the requirements of deploying forces where they are needed and giving those forces the weapons and support essential to their effectiveness. Any conceivable, effective strategy always would require forces strong enough to respond to aggression.

Strengthening America's Military Capabilities

As I have discussed, we have only a limited, long-term potential for easing our defense burdens through reducing threats, scaling back U.S. interests, and adjusting our defense strategy. Also we know we can never secure even this long-term potential unless we are strong enough to offer an inducement to the Soviets to enter into such reduction agreements with us. Consequently, our primary option must be to ensure that we have military capabilities strong enough to support our strategy and keep our security risks at a prudent level.

Keeping America's security risks low is the objective of our nation's defense budget. Our current budget request, which falls short of what this Administration had planned for, specifies the investments we need to ensure our security against the threats I have outlined. Those who propose to reduce that budget need to acknowledge that such a reduction increases our security risks, and that they are willing for the nation to incur more risks. It is a popular delusion that such cuts eliminate only fat, not muscle. If advocates of cutting defense expenditures believe the resulting risks to be acceptable, we could debate what level of risk America should accept for which interests. But discussion must proceed from a common understanding that reducing military capabilities does affect America's security and does add to the risk that we could lose our freedom. It is impossible to discuss these matters rationally with those who ignore the results of defense reductions and imagine that no danger can come to our interests no matter how deeply they reduce the nation's defenses.

Thus, there is nothing wrong with disagreements about, say, the seriousness of the Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean or the correct formulation of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. Such issues are what defense debates should focus on. As we debate the means to ensuring our security -- which are provided by our budget request -- we must not lose sight of our common goal, nor forget that continued reductions in our military capabilities does affect America's security by increasing the risks we must face.

Those who would arbitrarily dismiss our long-term security interests as secondary to short-term fiscal goals, those who demand new taxes before they will consider the nation's security needs should at least acknowledge some responsibility for the increased risks they would force this nation to run.

In our deliberations, we need to distinguish between responsible calls for improvements in U.S. strategy (which we certainly welcome), and those who really are saying: we need a strategy that costs less. The safer course is to gear our strategy and capabilities to our interests and the threats to them. Certainly, fiscal constraints must be considered. But again, in making our budget decisions, let us weigh carefully the increased risks that result from reduced military capabilities.

The question really is "how much is enough" -- in strategic forces, in Europe, in East Asia, in the Pacific, and in other areas of vital interest. To this, there is no precise answer. It comes down to judgments about what is an acceptable degree of risk -- judgments that the President and the Congress ultimately must make. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I present our assessments of national security risks in our various reports and testimonies to Congress and recommendations to the President. Our defense budget request presents what we believe must be done to keep those risks at safe levels.

Even without a precise answer to "how much is enough", it seems to me that we certainly would want to bolster our military capabilities for defense missions and for areas of U.S. interest according to the following guidelines:

o We and our allies must have credible military responses, the prospects of which convince our adversaries that aggression would mean unacceptably high costs to them. So even though we do not specify what our responses would be, our strategy is never to tempt our adversaries to believe that they could pursue aggression cost-free.

o We should, as a minimum, be capable of countering ongoing improvements in Soviet military power. This is especially important to us since we continue to rely on our technological superiority to help offset the Soviets' numerical advantages. We must modernize rapidly enough to ensure that we never have to send our forces into battle without the advantages that our nation can offer.

o We should rectify vulnerabilities in our forces and correct clear inadequacies (e.g., ineffective counters to key Soviet weapons, insufficient ammunition, etc.).

THE PATH AHEAD

How then should we proceed in ensuring America's security? As I have stressed, we all should continue to review and validate our assessments of U.S. interests, threats to those interests, and U.S. defense strategy. We also must continue our steady progress toward improving our military capabilities.

In strengthening our forces, we should continue to ensure that we are buying the right capabilities -- that is, those best suited to our defense needs. We must have a balanced strengthening, ensuring, for example, that we do not neglect readiness and sustainability, when faced with pressing modernization needs.

In the acquisition of stronger defense capabilities, we must continue our progress toward greater efficiencies, building on the many reforms we have made since 1981. And we seek Congress's cooperation in achieving stability in our procurement programs, so essential to maintaining our critical industrial base and attaining high acquisition efficiency.

Challenging our Allies

The security of the free world also requires that our allies do their fair share to defend our common values. President Reagan and I share the desire of members of Congress that our allies bear a fair share of our collective security burden. The issue is how best to achieve that important goal. In addition to coaxing greater effort in every way we can, we should continue to lead our allies by example. We should recognize the difficulty of arguing for greater responses to growing security threats, if at the same time we are cutting U.S. defense spending.

As we work to get our allies to do more, we must not be tempted, out of frustration, to do less ourselves. Such short-sighted action could very well result in lesser, not greater allied defense effort. It would also play into Soviet hands by aiding various Western European factions advocating dangerous security policies. We must remember that we support our allies and friends because it is in our interest to do so. A free and prosperous Europe, for example, is vital to a free and prosperous America. The Soviet Union would like nothing more than for us to reduce our NATO support. They have, after all, been trying to destroy the Alliance since its formation.

As we push for greater efforts from our allies, we are doing our utmost to increase cooperation among our nations on research and acquisition of new defense systems. This is an extraordinarily difficult challenge, but one with high potential payoffs. It is one of the many initiatives we are pursuing, with Congress's support, to wring ever-greater military capability out of our defense resources.

Long-term Strategy

In the long run, a national consensus for our military strategy is essential because the life cycle of our major weapons systems stretches over several decades. Most of the research and development monies in this year's budget are intended for systems that will be in our forces in the 1990s and early 21st century. Hence, a coherent long-term strategy is required to take account of future threats and opportunities and to guide our research and acquisition. To this end, we have set up a bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy, which will report to me and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs by the end of the year. The Commission is composed of distinguished experts on national security, many of whom have served in some of the most senior positions in our government.

CONCLUSION

In closing, I would stress what I hope will be very clear in these hearings. Under President Reagan's leadership and with the bipartisan support of Congress, America has been following a coherent national security strategy that is prudent, affordable, and of great benefit to our nation and our values. Still, it is very appropriate that this committee review our strategy before deciding what military capabilities we need to support it.

While major elements of our overall strategy for deterring aggression remain stable, each year our defense professionals make improvements in specific features of our strategy. We hope these hearings advance these on-going efforts, as well as increase public and political awareness of all aspects of our strategy.

Having focused on strategy as the basis for our defense program, we will then be ready to review our defense budget, which I look forward to doing with this committee.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate your cooperation. We did not give you a lot of notice in terms of this hearing, only 2 or 3 weeks, but that is not a lot of notice in terms of a subject of this importance. We appreciate very much your appearing and discussing strategy.

Before I get into the point you made a moment ago, let me say Senator Warner and I have discussed the 10-minute rule for questioning. We have more members now on our committee than we have ever had, and we have always had a 10-minute rule. I think we are probably going to have to cut that to 6 minutes. We are going to experiment with this this morning, but that would take, if everyone uses their 6 minutes, 2 hours to get one round of questioning, so we will start with that.

When you get a time slip, I would ask that you not ask any more questions at that stage. We will start by imposing that on ourselves here at the head of the table.

Also, I would hope that we would confine our questions. I am not going to dictate to anyone how they ask their questions, but I would hope we would not get into the budget details this morning unless it relates directly to strategy.

We will be having hearings with the Secretary at a later point on the budget details themselves.

Now we can start the clock. Senator Warner, does that suit you on the 6-minute rule?

Senator **Warner**. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman, but I would not just limit it to budget details. We should concentrate on the framework and purpose of this hearing. There may be other questions of interest other than budget. I would hope the membership recognizes we have 15 hearings on strategy. The Secretary will be back, and therefore let us try and contain this record to the same.

Chairman **Nunn**. I agree.

Mr. Secretary, you mentioned a moment ago the reference to the 1983 posture statement, talking about flawed concepts and intellectual approaches and so forth. You said that primarily referred to the strategic defense initiative and the strategic area, which I am glad to get that clarification.

In terms of conventional strategy, what fundamental changes have been made during the last 6 years in the conventional area as far as strategic thinking is concerned?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Primarily, Mr. Chairman, we have tried to make our forces more ready and more substainable. We have tried to increase our ability to project our power to wherever we might need it as quickly and as effectively as possible. We have tried to strengthen, reinforce and increase our alliances, recognizing that we cannot do the whole task by ourselves.

You may say that these do not represent strategic concepts. The strategic concepts that they represent are a recognition that the threat against our basic goals and our very modest agenda of keeping our peace and freedom is increasing in ways that would enable the Soviets to wage aggression in various parts of the world simultaneously. We feel we have had to respond to that.

Our strategy has been primarily responsive. It has specifically not included an examination of various parts of our interests which we could possibly give up because we do not think there are any.

Chairman **Nunn**. If I could interrupt just for a moment, what you are saying then is what we have tried to do is improve our ability to implement the conventional strategy that was in effect when you took over?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes. I do not find any major differences in what America's strategic objectives and goals have to be. I know of no President who has not wanted to keep our peace and freedom. There have been differences in the strength of the forces required to do that, and there have been differences in the assessments of Soviet intentions and capability, but I do not think anybody has ever been in office who did not want to keep our peace and freedom.

It is vital, however, to recognize that there are differences in the means and resources required to do that. You cannot do that, for example, if you are going to reduce our military investment by 20 percent over a whole decade. That is what concerns me about the last 2 years.

Chairman **Nunn**. Let me go forward on this one, using time as need be. I am glad to get that clarification. Frankly, I think your strategy this morning, the long statement, has clarified a number of points that have been troubling me and other people for some time; for instance, the 3½ war strategy. You simply make it clear that it is not our strategy.

The reason a lot of people thought that was perhaps our strategy, was your 1983 posture statement which said,

> Our long-range goal is to be able to meet the demands of a worldwide war, including concurrent reinforcements of Europe, deployments to Southwest Asia, the Pacific and support for other areas. Our long-range goal is to be capable of defending all theaters simultaneously.

Today, you say by contrast,

> Our strategy is not to try to fight everywhere at once.

You also say,

> Should aggression occur in several regions simultaneously, the U.S. military responses would be governed by existing commitments, general strategic priorities and the specific circumstances at hand and the availability of forces.

On another point——

Secretary **Weinberger**. If I might, Mr. Chairman——

Chairman **Nunn**. I will let you come back.

Secretary **Weinberger** [continuing]. I believe everything you say except when you said "by contrast." There is no difference between those two statements in my opinion because you will not be able to do what is necessary unless you are ready——

Chairman **Nunn**. In my opinion, there is a fundamental difference, but whatever it is, I understand it better now even if it is the same thing you intended before.

In terms of horizontal escalation I think there has been fundamental clarification, if I use that word correctly. Page 7 of your statement on horizontal escalation states it very well, that it is certainly an option but not absolutely the policy, that there are real risks involved in that policy, and that those risks have to be measured.

Going on to one other subject that you have already alluded to, the subject of deterring nuclear attack or nuclear deterrence. In this administration we have had several top officials, including once or twice the President, that have defined the whole area of retaliating in the nuclear arena after receiving a nuclear attack as a doctrine that is "immoral, uncivilized and discredited".

I would include on that list a speech you made in December 1984 when you termed this doctrine "flawed, simplistic and disproven." I know that you are talking about perhaps the ultimate absurdity of a MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) doctrine that has no defenses at all, but I think it is important that this morning you have said, "Effective strategic defenses would bolster"—and in parentheses, your parentheses—"(not replace) deterrence."

It seems to me that is a very important clarification, because deterrence means retaliation. What you are basically saying is that the goal of our strategic defense initiative is not to replace deterrence but, in your words, to bolster deterrence. That clarification is overdue and welcome.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I do not wish to argue with you when you welcome my comments, Mr. Chairman, but it is important to point out that there are no essential differences between the views. The problem is when we had no prospects of an effective defense because of our doctrine, it was considered provocative even to talk about it, then one had to question whether or not reliance solely on retaliation was indeed a worthwhile strategy to pursue.

When the President introduced the concept of strategic defense in 1983, we had an opportunity not only of strengthening deterrence without the requirement for retaliation, but we also, because of the increased doubt that the Soviets would have as to whether a first strike would work and could succeed, had a better way to deal with an actual aggression if deterrence should fail.

The two complement each other, but there is another critical point, Mr. Chairman. We cannot substitute the only thing we have, which is a retaliatory capability, until and unless we have effective defenses. That is why it is so vital that we continue to proceed as rapidly as possible to secure strategic defense.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much. My time has expired. It is clear that we are still going to be dependent for some time on what has been labeled an "immoral", "uncivilized", discredited approach because we are going to have to rely on retaliation.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I join in congratulating you, Mr. Secretary, for the sincerity with which you accepted the challenge of the Senate to come before us on strategy, which I hope will be followed by the other witnesses that come into that seat. You are off to a good start.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Now, the question I pose is as follows. You carefully described that this defense budget is arrived at through an assessment of threat to the territorial integrity and the needs of our own Nation plus our allies.

Now, going back, when the President came to office, it is my belief that there were seven formal defense treaties involving 43 other allied countries. Further, President Carter had just enunciated his Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf strategy, which, by the way, I though was a very positive step on his behalf, a needed one. That, although not formalized, imposed a further requirement on our military resources at that time.

When President Ronald Reagan came to office, he felt it necessary to increase defense spending to meet that requirement, the most recent imposed by President Carter and the other 38 presidents who preceded him; but to the best of my knowledge, in the years that President Reagan has been in office he has not imposed a further international commitment or requirement of any substantial magnitude requiring additional forces.

In other words, the defense budgets under Ronald Reagan have been devised to meet the threat and to meet the commitments largely formulated by the previous presidents. Am I not correct?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think that is absolutely correct, Senator. It is important to note that in Korea we have reversed a potential possibility, that was publicly stated, of our withdrawing from Korea. We have made it clear that we are not withdrawing from Korea, but we certainly have not added any commitments. We have accepted the commitments that the Nation has entered into, and we think they are all vital. We do not see any that we can give up. I think you are correct.

Senator WARNER. Now, moving to the Soviet Union. They were the driving force in threat assessment during President Reagan's time in office and, indeed, yours, as the chairman pointed out. Just adding a footnote to history, you have served the longest in your office as a Secretary of Defense, I believe.

Now, has there been any change, particularly under Gorbachev in his brief period, which would impact in any way to lessen the need for defense expenditures in this country?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir, not in any way to lessen it but to increase it. The basic change in the Soviet position has been an increase in their military capabilities, an increase and continuation of their unwillingness to sign any kind of agreement that would provide for verifiable reductions in armaments, and attempts to secure military advantage by continuing unilaterally with their strategic defense which they started many years before we did.

Senator WARNER. We read a great deal about Mr. Gorbachev today. Perhaps it is for the best to help his people give greater expression of their own views or more recognition to the value of dissent. His statements with reference to Afghanistan, hopefully will result in the withdrawal of the Soviet invaders. When you have taken all these statements in the aggregate—of course they are fairly recent—is there any basis upon which we can, as a Congress beginning its deliberation of this budget, change the strategy which you have enunciated to this point?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I certainly do not think so, sir. You mentioned Afghanistan, and I have to call your attention, Senator, to the fact that the so-called withdrawal of all Soviets from Afghanistan has to have quotations around it. They introduced more troops immediately prior to the withdrawal of some air defense units which they could safely withdraw in view of the total absence of any air force that Mujahadeen possesses.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, on the question of our strategic forces: We have followed statements by our President and Mr. Gorbachev to the effect that there is a goal to eliminate all nuclear weapons, and while that may be a very laudatory goal, the practicality of achieving that in any foreseeable future period, in my judgment, is quite remote.

Do you join in that view?

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. It would require, Senator, verifiable agreements, and I mean really verifiable, by thorough, on-site inspections agreed to by the Soviets; a phased decrease, on a timetable and a scale, that would allow us to be certain that they were, indeed, eliminating these weapons; and the assurance that there would be no cheating on their part as there has been so often with so many of their agreements in the past.

That does present a somewhat remote contingency, but those were the conditions the President had in mind when he talked about the kinds of elimination of offensive ballistic missiles that were discussed, indeed, but not agreed to in Iceland. We have to keep our own strength up and continue modernization so we will have a credible response.

Senator **WARNER**. What you are saying is that while Congress may want to shift some emphasis, quite properly, to conventional forces, there is no basis upon which to have drastic reductions in our strategic forces.

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. None whatever. We have had no increase in our strategic forces. It is important to remember that the percentage of the budget allocated to strategic resources is precisely the same as it has been for the last 4 years.

Senator **WARNER**. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **NUNN**. Senator Exon.

Senator **EXON**. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, thanks for being here this morning. I want to congratulate you on your 2-year budget. It seems to me that a 2-year budget will assist us in making the important tough decisions that we are going to have to make.

I also want to congratulate you for the considerable pain and suffering that you must have gone through by coming up with a budget with only a 3 percent real increase in the defense budget. I know that was not easy for you.

I congratulate you also on your very informative statement that was introduced here this morning. Let me talk about overall strategy just a little bit. Any overall strategy must necessarily be based upon the threat to our security and the possibility of the threat occurring.

My question has to do with the warning the President will have of a possible Soviet nuclear strike against the United States. I am really intrigued, Mr. Secretary, by the return to a rail-mobile MX deployment system. This overcomes my well-known objections to the MX program, going way back to October 1981, when it was announced that we would deploy the MX in the vulnerable Minuteman silos.

Does the real garrison MX not indicate, Mr. Secretary, that we now are convinced that with our combined intelligence network we would have days rather than minutes of warning time of a Soviet first strike?

Secretary **WEINBERGER**. Senator, I would be glad to go into this in far greater detail in a closed session.

Let me say, generally speaking, we have to be prepared, and we think we are, for what could be called a bolt from the blue attack or from an attack of which we had the kind of warning that you spoke of, a matter of days. We could not fulfill our responsibilities to the Nation if we were not trying to be prepared for all contingencies, including the worst.

The strategy that is involved, however, in basing recommendations for the remaining 50 of the MX missiles, 50 already being authorized for deployment in existing silos, is based on keeping our ability to respond at the required level. I will be able to discuss these critical subjects in greater detail in closed session.

Senator EXON. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. I think it is time, though, that we begin to lay out for the American people a little more of our strategy. For many years, it has been assumed correctly or incorrectly, that we did not have the necessary intelligence-gathering and warning systems to provide more than a few minutes warning. Our main fear was a bolt out of the blue strike, where we would have only minutes of warning.

It seems to me that if we are going to use some kind of a rail-mobile system, we have better intelligence and warning systems and have changed our strategy accordingly. The public should know this. I do not mean that we have to reveal all of the intelligence capabilities we have.

It seems to me that it is safe to say at this juncture that we are not as concerned as we once were with being knocked out in a first strike out of the blue from the Soviet Union as we once were.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, it is not that we are not concerned about it. We have to assess the probabilities, but I would not feel that I were discharging my responsibilities if we were not trying to deal with every possible contingency. We do not assign the relative probability being equal to every possible contingency, but we do have to have that capability. I think the instant we decide that certain things are not going to happen, the more we increase the risk that they might.

Senator EXON. Let me follow up on this question. Certainly if we are going to go to a mobile-based rail system, as was announced by the administration within the last couple of weeks, that would more or less indicate that we think we would have time to get these missiles out onto the rail system sufficiently dispersed so that they would not be the sitting duck targets that we currently have with MXs in the minuteman silos.

Let me follow up that question. That if this rail-mobile system proves out during our studies, which I suspect it will, is there consideration in the administration to shift some of the first 50 MX missiles now ordered to a rail system and not put all of the first 50 MX in the minuteman silos?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Two comments, and I will take the last question first. No, the idea would be that we would have 50 of the existing silos. We followed the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission, and they recommended 100 in the existing silos. Congress has authorized and appropriated for, or are supposed to appropriate for, the 50. There is no change in the plan to put those 50 in but we feel the other 50 should be on a rail-mobile system.

I have to comment on one of the assumptions in the beginning part of your question, and that is that these would not be available to be dispersed. On the contrary, they would be, that is the whole point of the system. They would be capable of being dispersed very quickly.

The other thing I would comment on would be that they would remain as to one-half of one of the three legs of the triad. We would have the other means also that, we think, are essential to give us the kind of additional deterrent capabilities represented by the triad.

Senator EXON. My time is up, Mr. Secretary. I would go into this question further if I have another round. I would simply say that I do not think the Scowcroft Commission report had a halo over it. I do not think we have to be wedded to its recommendations, and I hope that you would take that into consideration as we work with you on our overall strategic deterrent in the future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Surely.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, most of the congressional focus, the vast majority of the military leadership planning, revolves around a limited or global confrontation with the Soviet Union, which also is the least likely scenario. There are, however, numerous small conflicts and insurgent movements in the world today.

What amount of our strategic planning is involved in the foreign internal defense missions of our Armed Forces?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, that is a very important question and a very important part of it. We do agree that we have threats from low intensity conflicts and from terrorism, and we are training and equipping our forces to try to deal with that.

We have a much greater airlift and air projection capability for the special operating forces. We have other conventional forces who are trained to participate in such missions. We have asked for increased air and sea lift support and increased modifications to some of the existing planes and acquisition of others to help us carry out this mission.

We agree with you that low intensity conflict, terrorism, and small actions in various parts of the world are also threats to the Nation's security. We are budgeting and trying to plan for dealing with these matters.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, the Reagan administration is often criticized for allocating too great a share of its defense budget to strategic forces and thus badly neglecting the modernization of our conventional forces. What would be the strategy implications and risks or benefits of shifting a greater portion of the deterrent to conventional forces?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I am glad you asked that question Senator, because there has been a lot of misconceptions that we have shifted to that kind of imbalance. I would like to point out that, although this is not a budget hearing, we have not changed in any way the roughly 13, 13.5 percent of the budget which is devoted to strategic forces.

We have, on the contrary, increased the conventional forces and their strength, and we believe that we have to do both. We do not believe we are in the position to give up the modernization of our strategic forces that requires, as I say, about 13 percent of the budget. It is proceeding very well.

We have the ground-based missiles, the new aircraft, the improved submarines and the improved command and control all well along, as I indicated, and as outlined by the President in October 1981. This has required about 13 percent of the budget over the years, and no more this time in either of the two budgets that we have submitted.

We have also tried to improve the conventional forces at the same time and are proceeding with that. We would like to do more. It is difficult as the top line is reduced below the amounts that we think are safe in the last 2 years. Conventional improvement is very expensive.

Conventional forces cost much more, basically, than nuclear forces. We recognize that it is vital to increase and improve them. In lieu of the funding we would like, we have tried to gain as much as we could by making more ready and more sustainable the forces we have.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, in your prepared remarks you indicate that, should deterrence fail, our goal would be to limit the scope of a conflict to conventional means. Has the resource allocation of the Reagan administration prepared us to accomplish this in a non-nuclear NATO war?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We are getting there, sir. It takes quite a while, but we are making improvements. Our two budgets that are before you, as well as the ones submitted in the past, made progress toward that.

We cannot do it all alone. We do have to have allies, and that is why it is important that we urge as much burdensharing as possible. But we are moving toward a situation in which we hope our conventional forces also would be strong enough to deter an attack. We hope not only our conventional forces, but the technologies and the new tactics that I mentioned would have the same effect.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, are these conclusions verified by the various war games conducted at our war colleges?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have had very good results with a lot of the war games, particularly our ability to hold and sustain in these areas before the necessity to move to escalation.

We all recognize that we need more and stronger forces, and that requires funding. We have to bear in mind that conventional forces, as I said before, are more expensive than nuclear forces. It is extremely important to have them, but it does require larger funding than many have been willing to make.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, what criteria do you apply to judge the stability of our nuclear deterrent? What is your assessment of the stability of the nuclear forces today, and how does that assessment change when strategic forces modernization is complete?

Secretary WEINBERGER. In 1981, we believed that there had been serious erosion of our strategic capabilities and our modernization.

We had done very little in the previous 20 years to modernize and strengthen the strategic capability.

As a result, in October 1981, the President announced a complete program to modernize all three parts of the triad at once—particularly to strengthen our command, control, and communication capability. All of that is under way, and the Congress has been generous in its funding of much of that.

We hope that will not diminish, but will be continued until completion. When completed, about the end of this decade at the present rate of funding, we believe we will have substantially strengthened our ability to deter an attack by the Soviets.

We also hope that we will be measurably closer to strategic defense deployment, which cannot only add to our deterrent but will add greatly to the basic safety of the world.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, as the last question, to what extent do elements of the strategic modernization program capitalize on our advantages and exploit Soviet weakness?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Very much so. They include, for example, the use of the Stealth technology and the use of antisubmarine technologies to strengthen our capabilities to carry out our missions to deter attack, the retaliatory missions.

We believe we are utilizing these competitive strategies and our strengths against Soviet weaknesses.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Thurmond. I might add on that point, to a question you asked, Senator Thurmond, about war games. We are going to have the war colleges appear on Tuesday and Wednesday afternoon of this week. We are going to be the beneficiaries of a thorough briefing on the latest war games.

Unfortunately, those will be classified hearings. We will determine later whether there are certain parts of it that can be declassified. I think it will be very interesting and educational for all of us.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First let me congratulate you and Senator Warner as you assume your new duties. You are both perfectly equipped to carry on a great tradition of a bipartisan partnership, and we all look forward to it.

And we join you in welcoming our new members. They have already had an impact on these proceedings. They have cut our questions from 10 minutes to 6 minutes. [Laughter.]

I know I join everybody in welcoming you, Mr. Secretary. And thank you for your thoughtful statement this morning. Mr. Secretary, on television yesterday you claimed that the Defense Department has consistently planned to seek funds for two new nuclear aircraft carriers this year so that they would be available in the 1990's.

But last year you told us we did not need to order new carriers until the 1990's. What change in strategy necessitates accelerating the purchase of two more aircraft carriers, particularly when resources for defense are less this year than we projected or you projected a year ago?

Secretary **Weinberger**. First of all, Senator, we feel we must have deployed and available for deployment, 15 carriers at all times.

Second, I certainly am under the impression that my statements earlier had been that we needed to have two new carriers in the nineties. To get them, they must be ordered 6 to 7 years in advance. In so doing, about $1 to $1½ billion for systems and platforms which are essential, will be saved.

There is no question that carriers in excess of 50 years old cannot be employed very usefully or effectively. We have to make these replacements. They are not to add to our forces, but they are to replace them. Certainly by starting the replacement authorization early a very large amount of money can be saved as we did with the two carriers that are now under construction at Newport News, the *Washington* and the *Lincoln*.

Senator **Levin**. Mr. Secretary, your earlier statements were not that you need to have carriers in the nineties, but that you need to order carriers in the nineties. I would refer to two statements, one in last year's posture statement, when you said the Navy will have to order replacements for some of its other carriers in the early 1990's—you specifically used the word "order replacements."

I also would refer you to your annual report to the Congress for last year when your 1987–91 shipbuilding program, your 5-year shipbuilding program, was specifically set forth showing no new carriers being ordered in that 5-year shipbuilding program.

So there has been a change in the Defense Department strategy here from what you said last year. I want to know exactly what change is out there in the threat that necessitated this major reallocation of resources away from some other very, very needed equipment and capabilities?

Secretary **Weinberger**. First of all, Senator, I would strongly challenge the major reallocation of resources. The outlays involved in this for this 5-year period are quite small; the outlays for the 2 years that we're discussing in the two budgets to be submitted are also very small. They don't involve any reallocation from anything else.

The Navy shipbuilding program has been adjusted to include these within the previous top line. I do not concede that there has been any change or anything of the kind. There has been, however, a continued recognition that in order to have our maritime strategy and our national strategy carried out. We need 15 carriers. This is nothing new.

We also have to try to get them in time and in sequence. We can play around with the word "order" all you want, but the fact is that we have to have the authorization if we want to do it for a far less amount of money than if we simply proceed and order them separately which adds an extra unnecessary $1 to $1½ billion to our expenditures.

By ordering them together as we are doing—and the experience of the *Washington* and the *Lincoln* has been extraordinarily good—we are able to have that kind of savings. We constantly review the shipbuilding program and bring to the top the highest priority items.

To keep 15 carriers afloat and mission capable requires that we get two carriers in the nineties. This is the very best time to begin the authorization process and to begin the assembly of the long lead items—in other words to begin the process by which we can save $1 to $1½ billion.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, would you at least on this issue be willing to agree that in last year's 5-year shipbuilding plan there was no planned or projected request for funds, long lead funds, or plans to order carriers, at least through 1991? Would you at least concede that much?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Last year's 5-year plan has had another year added to it. These are rolling plans. As they are reviewed each time, another year is added to what will be done. As we came up on that process, we concluded that these should be added.

Senator LEVIN. I am glad that at least we can read between the lines that these rolling plans as of last year did not contain this request. And I want to know what has changed.

You say that experience changes, and I couldn't agree with you more. You learn things in a year. I want to know, what have we learned about the threat that now requires us to order two aircraft carriers this year, when we were not going to order any aircraft carriers until the nineties?

There must be some change in the threat out there which led you to propose that we spend $7 billion for two carriers.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The principal thing that has changed is the fact that when you have one 5-year plan in 1 year and make a new 5-year plan the next year, an extra year is added in front of it. I am sure you are familiar with this.

That is what was referred to as a rolling process that you have. Each year the plan is made. It is for a different 5-year period. Certainly it seems to me desirable to get the items as inexpensively as possible that we all agree we must have—and I gather you do not have any quarrel with the idea we need 15 carriers.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, my time is up. We thank you for your rolling answer. [Laughter.]

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have to assume from that you now understand it.

Chairman NUNN. I believe we need to follow the old rule of order of appearance. I will leave that to my ranking member.

Senator WARNER. We will turn now to Mr. Humphrey. Before that, it should be mentioned how old those ships are that these new ones will replace. They are over 40 years old.

Secretary WEINBERGER. They will be 50 years old by the time we get around to replacing them, sir.

Senator WARNER. Well, they are rolling along. [Laughter.]

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, let me begin by congratulating you on the beginning of your 7th year on the hot seat. Surely there is no Cabinet office in any administration whose occupant comes under more pressure and criticism than the Secretary of Defense, and I think you have borne that criticism with class and with grace.

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is very nice of you. Thank you, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I want to express personal thanks to you, Mr. Secretary, for all the guff that you have taken and for your loyalty to the President. And I personally hope that we can count on your presence for another 2 years. You need not respond to that. That is my personal hope.

Mr. Secretary, on page 10 of your prepared statement you discuss a number of points, a number of ways to reduce the threats, as you put it. And one of those points is to convince Moscow, to paraphrase you, to convince Moscow to restrain its military expenditures and cease its aggression around the world.

One of those points—one of those places where the Soviets are conducting aggression today, of course is Afghanistan. There is no more blatant case than that. I want to focus on that for just a minute if I may.

Over the weekend or perhaps its was Friday, I saw a press clipping—I do not know how accurate it was—which quoted one of the highest ranking persons in the administration responsible for foreign policy, quoted him as implying, at least, if not stating, that a 1 year withdrawal—that a 1 year period would be a satisfactory withdrawal time for the Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

We know of course the reports are that the agreements reached so far in the UN mediation process entail an immediate cutoff of aid to the freedom fighters by various nations who favor their cause, an immediate cutoff and then a phased withdrawal of Soviet troops.

The Pakistani Government, I understand, in these talks has been holding out for a 4-month withdrawal period. And the Senate for its part last week passed a resolution supporting a 4-month period as one that is reasonable. The danger, of course, is that if we opt for a withdrawal period that is too lengthy it defeats the gains that the freedom fighters have made in several years of terrible sacrifice on their part.

Mr. Secretary, have you, has the Defense Department, been consulted in this process of coming to a policy with respect to a withdrawal period?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We certainly have been and would expect to be consulted before a new decision is made by the administration, Senator. There is no reason in the world why a Soviet decision to withdraw should take a year. They went in in about 2 weeks and they could get out in about 2 weeks.

It is also quite clear to me that a lot of the Soviet talk about their willingness to withdraw may very well be of the same character as the so-called withdrawal of troops a couple of months ago, in which they inserted new troops and then built a big stand for the press to watch the withdrawal of the troops that were being withdrawn. The net combat capability was increased by that.

Some of the troops they are talking about withdrawing now are again air defense units, which have not been serving as air defense units because they do not have to. The Mujahideen Air Force does not exist.

So I think we should view very skeptically Soviet promises, and we would certainly expect to be, are being, and have been consulted on the basic policies of the United States.

Senator HUMPHREY. But your view is that 1 year would be an unreasonable withdrawal period?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I do not think it is in the slightest degree necessary. In view of the Soviet record of violating other agreements, I would suspect if we got near the end of that year the Soviets would find numerous conditions requiring them to stay another 18 months. We would have more conferences and more promises to be broken.

Senator **Humphrey**. May I say, I think it is important for the administration to clarify at the earliest possible moment what its actual policy is with respect to a withdrawal period, because as I understand it the impression was distinctly given that we are, at least on the part of one high ranking official, that we would regard 1 year as a reasonable period.

My concern is that the diplomats, ever ready to accept Soviet promises at face value, will throw away in an unreasonable agreement the gains that the freedom fighters have made, at the expense of thousands of their lives and at the expense of the lives of really many noncombatants as well, because of the brutal tactics employed by the Soviets and their puppet government.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I would certainly hope not. I do not know who the various high ranking officials are who always insist that they not be quoted. It always makes me question as to their veracity. It seems to me if one is willing to be quoted about something by name, he must believe it; if one is not, you possibly do not.

In my opinion, the Soviets are talking about various kinds of proposals, but at least one purpose of those talks is to try to reduce the amount of aid that Pakistan and others have been able to give to the freedom fighters in Afghanistan. I hope that whatever agreement the Soviets may make would be one that gets them out as quickly as they went in, and gets them out completely and leaves the people of Afghanistan free to choose the kind of government they want.

Senator **Humphrey**. Well, I would hope, Mr. Secretary, you could make room in your busy agenda—we are at a critical juncture or approaching a critical juncture on the resumption of these UN-sponsored talks in early February. I would hope that you would make room in your agenda to try to steer the administration toward a withdrawal period consistent with that suggested by one of the direct negotiating, or indirect negotiating, partners, namely the government of Pakistan.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I certainly would because we are here on strategy and it is an important part of our strategy not to have the Soviets pursue these invasion routes to the oil fields. Afghanistan is one of those, and the importance they attach to it is shown by the fact that for the first time since World War II they are using their own troops, not somebody else's, to try to carry out their strategic objectives.

Our strategic objective must be to block that kind of advance. We would have a difficult time, Europe would have an impossible time, living, if the Soviets controlled access to the oil fields.

Senator **Humphrey**. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. My time is up.

Chairman **Nunn**. Before we turn to Senator Gore, I would ask unanimous consent that a statement by Senator Dixon and a statement by Senator Kennedy be inserted in the record at the appropriate juncture. Is there objection?

[No response.]

Chairman **Nunn**. Without objection—both of whom were present and had to go to another hearing.

[The prepared statements of Senator Dixon and Senator Kennedy follow:]

Prepared Opening Statement by Senator Alan J. Dixon

Mr. Chairman, today begins the first hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee of the 100th Congress. I first want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on assuming the chairmanship of our committee. You have reorganized the committee working with the ranking member, Senator Warner, to redirect the oversight approach of the Armed Services Committee from just the budget approach we have had in the past. I believe you have strengthened the mission orientation of the committee which will improve our ability to focus on our oversight responsibilities of the Defense Department and relate the administration's budget requests to our country's total national security goals.

As the chairman of the new Readiness, Sustainability and Support Subcommittee, I intend to have the subcommittee closely review our military's ability to sustain America's military forces during a conflict, whether it be a high- or low-intensity war. My philosophy will not be one of confrontation with the administration but one of working together for a strong, effective military force.

At today's first hearing, I look forward to Secretary of Defense Weinberger's presentation on U.S. national security strategy—I hope the Secretary can explain how the United States can sustain its conventional war-fighting capabilities in the face of continued stretchout of major conventional programs while at the same time increasing the strategic forces budget. At a time of constrained defense resources, conventional force modernization clearly occupies a much lower priority in this administration than strategic forces. The strategic buildup request by the administration in my view is the main force in the Defense Department funding with potentially damaging consequences for our conventional forces.

Funding for the readiness-interrelated accounts are only holding steady which could result in a "hollow force" of weapons that are not adequately maintained or operated. I do not believe that the administration's request in the readiness-related share of the budget for fiscal year 1988 and 1989 begins to make up for the lag in this area during the administration's previous budgets from fiscal years 1981-1986.

Once again our ammunition account has taken another large hit compared to other defense programs. What we have is the administration request for ammunition programs which not only has fallen behind inflation, but actually is lower in current dollars than it was in fiscal year 1982. Again this decline contrasts sharply with the growth in funds devoted to strategic programs in the 1980's.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the committee's hearings during the next month on our military strategy and I urge the administration and my colleagues in Congress to review with us where we are headed in the next decade.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Prepared Statement of Senator Edward M. Kennedy

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for your decision to move so rapidly to begin the business of this Committee, and I also want to congratulate you on your decision to focus these early hearings on questions of national military strategy. Too frequently, the fundamental purpose of our national defense establishment and the primary objectives of our nation's military forces in time of war get lost in arcane debates about the desirability of specific weapons systems as opposed to other weapons systems, all competing for the same scarce dollar. It is high time for us to begin the process of examining whether our ways and our means are in fact consistent with our most important objectives.

It is commonplace to say that defense is like insurance, you can never have enough. But in the cold reality of today's budget climate—where we continue year in and year out to spend hundreds of billions of dollars more than we take in—tough choices are required, on the defense side of the equation as well as on the domestic side. When it comes to defending our nation, everything is important, but, simply put, we cannot afford everything. The fact is that some things are more important than others when it comes to our national defense, and these hearings on strategy will give us some insight into the difference between what we, as a nation, must have to defend ourselves and our allies in the event of an attack, and what we, as a nation, would like to have—in the best of all possible worlds.

Our Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense will be holding hearings in March and April on those questions of strategy—or as General Maxwell Taylor called it—of objectives, ways and means—that arise within our particular jurisdiction. One of the most important questions that we will be looking at—and I hope that it will be addressed during the hearing today—involves two questions about the continued viability of the Carter Doctrine as a statement of national policy. During his administration, President Carter stated that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf Region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. Such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

Is the objective set forth in that statement of national policy still applicable? Do we have the ways and the means realistically to achieve that objective today? If we do not, what must we begin to do differently? I anticipate that we will be asking the same question when it comes to national wartime strategy.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Gore.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First let me say for the record how pleased I am to be able to join this distinguished committee, to join such a distinguished group, and to come in with such a distinguished group. And I look forward to working with you and with our ranking member, Senator Warner. And I really look forward to that very much.

Chairman **Nunn**. We are delighted to have you, Senator Gore.

Senator **Gore**. I also want to add my words of welcome to you, Mr. Secretary. And I look forward to working with you as well, both when we agree and when we disagree.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Good.

Senator **Gore**. I would like to ask that your chart be put back up there during my 6 minutes. I found it very intriguing for one thing, because the arrows seem to go down on one side and then back up on the other side, making kind of a circular flow chart there.

But in reference to that, I would like to ask you about one specific national interest and national policy. You noted in your statement that we have a national interest in securing the freedom of our allies, and of course our allies in Europe are very important to us. And yet, their freedom, as we have traditionally believed, is experiencing a threat from the predominance of Soviet conventional military power in Europe.

You would agree with that so far, would you not?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes, I have no problem with that thus far, Senator.

Senator **Gore**. All right. Now, our strategy for meeting that threat to our national interest has been, along with NATO, to improve our conventional capabilities. However, in recognition of the fact that it is unlikely we can match the Soviets tank for tank, in your words, into the foreseeable future our strategy has also included a reliance on nuclear deterrence.

Nuclear deterrence, of course, has two main subdivisions: deterring an attack on ourselves and second deterring a Soviet attack, either conventional or nuclear, against our allies.

Again, you are still with me, are you not?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes.

Senator **Gore**. Now, our capabilities for implementing that strategy are both conventional and nuclear. What would be the implications for our strategy if we reached with the Soviet Union a verifiable agreement that eliminated all nuclear ballistic missiles, both in the United States and in the Soviet Union?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Well, Senator, you also have to bear in mind that you are asking a hypothetical question.

Senator **Gore**. Well, it is a proposal that is formally on the negotiating table, proposed by President Reagan.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I am glad you stated that it is proposed, because accompanying that proposal is a proposal that would free us to develop and deploy strategic defense. If we are able to do that and if we are able to verify the agreements you mentioned, the offensive ballistic missiles, which would leave us with other nuclear capabilities, we would then have to be sure that our deterrent capability was sufficient.

These would be new conditions that would require us to assure that the conventional as well as the remaining nuclear capability and the strategic defense were sufficient to deter attack upon us. That is something we have to do all the time. We have to re-examine the equations of deterrence constantly.

Senator **Gore**. Mr. Secretary, let us leave it in the form of a hypothetical, then. Let me ask you again, if you assumed in this hypothetical we are working on that the conventional military balance in Europe improves only slightly in our favor and that we are still not able to match the Soviets tank for tank and that they still have the preponderance of conventional force in Europe.

What, then, would be the implications for our strategy of eliminating ballistic missiles?

Secretary **Weinberger**. We would have to do what we are doing—that is to acquire a conventional strength that is a deterrent, even though it isn't matched tank for tank.

This involves using our technologies, our productive and inventive genius, our improved and skilled tactics and the superiorities that we get from the different types of manpower that we and our allies have.

These are all ways in which we would try to deal with that changed situation. But we would also have strategic defense, I think, under any circumstances, which is important.

We can construct all kinds of hypotheticals, including a hypothetical that leaves the Soviet Union unable to do anything or leaves us unable to do anything.

These aren't very useful hypotheticals. The important ones are the ones that are realistic.

Senator **Gore**. Well, I think it's important for our proposals that we make to the Soviets to be realistic as well.

Let me go back to this same hypothetical that I'm giving you here. You're saying, if I interpret your answer correctly, that our national interest in protecting Europe and in assuring the continued freedom of Europe and their ability to feel free and to be free of intimidation, that that national interest would be threatened by the removal of ballistic missiles unless we were somehow able to improve our conventional forces in Europe to the point where they alone were capable of deterring Soviet conventional forces.

Now, do you think—moving to our military capabilities—do you think it is realistic to suppose that we can achieve that level of conventional military capability within a 10-year period?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, I think so, Senator. What you're asking is whether it's realistic for us to try to keep our freedom and our peace.

Senator GORE. No, that's not what I'm asking at all, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary WEINBERGER. That's the bottom line, and you must recognize that it would take a very substantial increase in our resources devoted to defense.

Everybody recognized that conventional defense is a lot more expensive than nuclear defense. I think most people would prefer to have a world free of nuclear weapons. In all of your hypotheticals, you have, I hope and assume, included the thorough verifiability of any Soviet reduction, the fact that these reductions would come down on a timetable on a phased basis that brought us both down to zero at the same time, and that it would cost more money to get the kind of conventional deterrents we need and to get a strategic defense in place.

It all comes down to a question of how much we want to keep our freedom.

Senator GORE. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Gore. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I'd like to just follow up that line of questioning.

Could you tell us what evidence you've seen that NATO would be either willing or able to spend more for conventional defense forces in the eighties than they've been willing to do in either the sixties or seventies?

Secretary WEINBERGER. In the sixties or seventies, they spent more than we did on a proportionate basis. They furnished more of the conventional defense than we would.

You can argue that that's all right, because that's their homeland. But as I say, I think we have a joint interest in maintaining a Europe that's not overrun by the Soviets.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Secretary, if I can interrupt, I only have 6 minutes.

But there is a 5 to 2 disadvantage.

Secretary WEINBERGER. You didn't want a complete answer.

Senator COHEN. Well, I don't want a 6-minute answer. You can take two more, if you like.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have to bear in mind that what they have done is a pretty good indication of what they can do.

The important thing is to have the public support in Europe as well as here which is necessary to enable us to have the strength required to keep our peace.

We came dangerously close to losing it two or three times. We weren't ready in World War II. We weren't ready in World War I.

I don't think we have as much time as we had then to get ready.

Senator COHEN. I didn't want to interrupt the flow of your statement, but the fact is that it's roughly about a 5 to 2 disadvantage in tanks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, about 3 to 1 in artillery, and the list goes on.

And frankly I see nothing that would justify a conclusion that between now and 1996 the European countries or, indeed, the

United States would be willing to spend the kind of money that would be necessary to compensate for that deficiency.

Secretary **Weinberger**. You don't compensate by building that many more tanks. You do it by tactics, by anti-tank weapons, destroying tanks in the rear, and other means.

Without doubt it will require a big effort. And it will require more money than a world with nuclear weapons.

Senator **Cohen**. In your statement on page 15, you referred to "various Western European factions advocating dangerous security policies."

The British Labor Party has adopted a policy which, if it's elected, would do the following: eliminate the independent British nuclear deterrent; remove all U.S. nuclear weapons and "nuclear bases" from British soil and British waters; seek nonnuclear NATO and nonnuclear East Atlantic; and "work for policies of 'defensive deterrence' in complete contrast to the present offensive and 'aggressive' defense posture of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact."

Would you describe for us what the impacts would be upon NATO strategy if the Labor Party were to come to office?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I think we would have a very, very much more dangerous situation than we have now, unless they change that policy.

I obviously don't want to get into the internal politics of another country. But since you have asked me how NATO would be affected, the answer is that if those policies would be carried out it would be quite disastrous for NATO. It would require that something would have to be substituted for the kind of strength that we and the British at the present time give to NATO, as well as give to the protection of Britain and to the protection of the United States.

I've made that point many times before. We have to recognize that if all of those things that you outlined as part of their program came to be policy, we would have to recognize that we would all be at a vastly greater risk than we are now.

Senator **Cohen**. I agree with your statement. I think we ought to say it over and over again, notwithstanding the fact that some might interpret that as an interference with the internal politics of the British.

I think to the extent those policies are advocated seriously and accepted on a serious basis, that would undermine NATO's security to the degree you mentioned.

On page 15 you also discuss the importance of making progress toward greater efficiencies in defense acquisition. The position of the Inspector General, however, has been vacant for some months now, and I'm wondering what sort of signal this sends. Are we serious about coping with waste, fraud and abuse when that person is absent?

Secretary **Weinberger**. First of all, the position has been filled now, Senator, and we will be able to announce it as soon as the clearance process is completed.

Second, we have a large and a very well-run Inspector General's office that has been operating and issuing reports and audits during this period.

We wanted to get the very best person possible for the task. And as always, when you try to recruit for a sensitive and important position of this kind, you have disappointments and people you would like to have fill the position not being willing to do so.

But mostly, we've been searching to get the very best person available. I hope and believe you'll be pleased when the announcement is made within the next week or so.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much. Final question: Last year we passed legislation in the final moments of the Congress dealing with low intensity conflict. I think you, Secretary Shultz, former Secretary of State Kissinger and others have recognized the fact that the threat to this Nation's security posed by insurgencies and terrorism is as great as that of a confrontation between the superpowers, and yet we were not in a position to deal effectively on a military, psychological or, perhaps, even diplomatic level.

The Congress responded to that by trying to formulate some policy, focus attention on these issues in the Defense Department, create a separate Assistant Secretary's office and create a unified special operations command.

And I'm wondering, what steps has the Department of Defense taken to implement that legislation.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We're responding to that, of course. We are searching for the best person to be the Assistant Secretary, for the best person to be the new commander of those special units, and we are making very good progress.

Meanwhile, we have requested increased funding for the capabilities required for special operations forces, including modifications as well as acquisition of new aircraft, and the additional training and additional aircraft required to project those forces to the various parts of the world where they might be needed, as well as new equipment.

We are carrying out faithfully and rapidly the direction of the Congress. And again, we hope to have some names to you soon.

Senator COHEN. Has a site been selected for the new headquarters of the unified command?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I'm sorry?

Senator COHEN. Has a site been selected for the new headquarters?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, not as yet, although we have several under consideration.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen.

We have had excellent attendance this morning. We're grateful to all of you for being here.

Senator Wirth, we are delighted to have you on the committee.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to working under your distinguished leadership and that of Senator Warner. And I want to commend you for starting us out with this very important set of discussions.

Mr. Secretary, welcome. I look forward to working with you as I have in the past.

I'd like to go back to the top and the chairman's initial question, in which he asked what changes in strategy had occurred over the last 6 years.

And in response to that you had said that we had built upon our previous strategy by increasing our capability, increasing our ability to deliver, and increasing the ability of our allies or encouraging our allies to carry a greater share of the burden.

That's a fair summary of that opening exchange, I think.

Secretary **Weinberger**. In addition, though, Senator, I did add the Strategic Defense Initiative, which the President launched in 1983, and on which we're making remarkably good progress.

Senator **Wirth**. In fact, it seems to me there have been some very, very significant changes in world events. I think we have been attempting to determine how the Defense Department and our defense strategy meet those significant changes in world events in terms of how we make the investments in the budget, that rather than trying to look at the budget program by program, as might have been done in the past, we're trying to get a little bit of a different view.

Let me try an example on you, and see what kind of changes might have occurred.

If we look at the Far East, we have seen, I think, at least three significant changes over the last 6 years.

One of those has been an increasing relationship, a strengthening of the relationship, between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and the potential there for pressuring the Soviet Union by perhaps a different kind of alliance.

Recently, however, the People's Republic has suggested that they may be concerned about demobilizing many of their ground forces, which in turn, presumably, would change the relationship between us and the Soviet Union in the Far East. That's one event that has occurred in the Pacific.

A second is the balance of trade with Japan, which has been an increasing problem for us, an increasing political issue, and an increasing issue of fairness as perceived by many of us, I believe, in the Congress, and certainly by millions of Americans.

Why should not the Japanese carry a greater part of the defense burden? And in fact, the most recent defense budget initiatives in Japan suggest that the Japanese are starting to do that, or starting to understand, perhaps, the pressure for increasing their share of the burden.

And the third set of changes in the last 6 years would appear to be a rather significant increase in Soviet naval capability in the Pacific, not only moving out of our former bases in Indochina, but moving further toward Southwest Asia.

If those three events are, in fact, significant changes in world events in the Pacific in the last 6 years, the question we then have to ask is, how has our Defense Department's strategy changed to meet those changing events?

Or do those events not make any difference for the basic strategy that we have?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Senator, on the first one, I wouldn't be too concerned about the Chinese plans to reduce the size of their military.

They have an extraordinarily large military. It does need some modernization and improved equipment, and we're working closely with them to try to secure that.

You're quite right that the improved military-to-military relationship is one of the new features, and one of the ones that I think is welcome, not from the point of view of trying to secure their actions against the Soviets or anything of the kind, but simply because we have a number of common interests that could and should lead us to a closer relationship which we're securing.

But when they demobilize, as you put it, or when they reduce the size of their military, they are not necessarily weakening it substantially. They are not giving up the opportunity to secure the services of those people. They are enabling themselves to add to the efficiency and internal strength in many of the units that are involved.

Senator WIRTH. But if I might, doesn't that relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China suggest greater pressure on the Soviets, and therefore suggest that our relationship overall with the Soviet Union might be changing as a result of that kind of, say, second front strategy?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We shouldn't think of our relationship with China as leading to any second front strategy or anything of the kind.

Senator WIRTH. Well, the Soviets certainly have to commit very significant resources in that particular area of the world.

Secretary WEINBERGER. They are doing that which is one of the worries of the Chinese. There are a very large number of Soviet divisions and a very large number of SS-20s poised at and aimed at Chinese targets.

I think that our improving relationship with China is a very good thing, and I hope it continues.

On the reduction of the total numbers in their military, as I said, I don't think that's particularly significant. It could actually give them a degree of increased strength in many ways.

On the balance of trade with Japan, that certainly is an important factor. But I have made the point repeatedly, Senator, and would make it again today, that we cannot link trade and security issues.

Our security relationship with Japan is absolutely vital for both countries. You did point out correctly, and I'm glad you did, that this year their budget represents a substantial increase in defense, greater proportionately than ours, and that they are now recognizing that the limitation of 1 percent of their gross national product for security is artificial, unrealistic and will not be adhered to. I think that's a very favorable factor.

The balance of trade is another problem. We are trying to work in the military-to-military relationships, as well as others, to secure with the Japanese an exchange of technology and an agreement to work on technologies that can benefit and strengthen both our countries.

With respect to the Soviet problem and their naval capabilities, almost all of them in the Pacific, along with vastly increased air capabilities in the Pacific.

This is one of the things, I think, that has led Japan to recognize that they did need more investment of their total resources for defense.

There is no doubt that that Soviet naval strength is there, and it's one of the things that we think is an indication, at the very least, of not only the Soviet capabilities of beginning aggression in more than one part of the world at once, but of their willingness to do so.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also want to add my congratulations to you and to Senator Warner.

And might I add that I notice on the witness list that we still have some hearings to be determined, that we might get a representative of the Secretary's long-term strategy commission that has been going on for several months to come over and talk to us. And I think one of the open dates you still have is January 21.

I just make that as a request that might be helpful.

Chairman NUNN. We'd be delighted to do that, Senator Quayle.

I talked to Secretary Ikle and told him when they were prepared to come forward, to let us know, and we'd be delighted to hear from them. He indicated to me it would be a little later in the process, maybe around May or June. We could amend that if they decide they want to give us a preliminary look.

Secretary WEINBERGER. You can have it whenever you want.

Senator QUAYLE. I would just think that some representative of that commission might want to come over and share with us what they're thinking about.

I think it would be very compatible with what you started a few months ago. But I'll leave that up to you and Secretary Ikle and the Secretary of Defense.

Chairman NUNN. I'd certainly like to hear from the Secretary about when you think they would be prepared to come forward.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Essentially, whenever you're ready. I think you have an ambitious schedule of about, as I recall it, 23 or 25 days of hearings already scheduled.

And then, as I understand, you are planning to go into budget hearings. I think after that process, whenever you're ready, that would be fine.

Chairman NUNN. All right, we'll work together on that.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you for the suggestion.

Senator QUAYLE. Now for my 6 minutes. I hope the clock watcher over there recognizes that. The contribution of all the new members, we're glad to have you, despite your interference with our regular routine, coming from the House—and many of you came from the House—you understand what the 5 minute rule is. Now you're going to have 6 minutes. Welcome to the Senate.

In this line of discussion with Senator Cohen and Senator Gore, there's an impression that I got that if we eliminated the ballistic missiles that somehow there wouldn't be any nuclear deterrence left.

That's simply not the case. If you had eliminated strategic ballistic missiles, you'd still certainly have tactical missiles and nonballistic nuclear capability; you'd certainly have the bomber force; you'd certainly have the cruise missile force.

So I think if you look at that hypothetical situation, the United States, particularly in the bomber and cruise missile area, might do reasonably well.

So I don't want to leave the impression that somehow we're going to jump from no ballistic missiles into having to just look at the conventional capabilities, because that's just simply not the case.

Mr. Secretary——

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle, without taking any of your time, we are going into depth in that, I'm sure, in the subcommittee and maybe in the full committee. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are working, I understand, on an impact statement as to the implications of what would happen if we did go forward with that zero ballistic missile proposal. They had not made that assessment at the time of the Reykjavik summit.

Senator QUAYLE. I think it's something we ought to go in depth on. As a matter of fact, I think it would be a very good exercise.

My point is that just listening to the discussion here, it seems that all of a sudden we would just jump to comparing conventional versus conventional, when, in fact there would still be a lot of other strategic deterrence forces still left.

But that's not really my line of questioning. I just wanted to get that point across.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I just wanted to say, Senator, that's one of the problems with hypotheticals.

Senator QUAYLE. I'd like to go and to look at the change that this administration has tried to implement as far as strategy is concerned.

And the major change as I detect from listening to your statement here today is the Reagan administration's efforts to show the importance of strategic defenses; that strategic defenses could be a very important component of increasing our deterrence.

I'm not going to get into this argument on how we're going to increase the morality of deterrence. I certainly have serious reservations about the mutual assured destruction. I think we're targeting military targets, but we always had the option of targeting cities and nobody knows exactly where our targeting is going to go, whether that is moral or immoral, I don't think is the question.

I think the question is how—and I think, Mr. Secretary you clarified this, or at least in the chairman's opinion, clarified this, how we are going to bolster deterrence.

I think we could all agree that we should bolster our deterrence.

Now, the question is, how are we going to bolster our deterrence? And this gets into one of the things that the administration has tried to do, and that is, to show the importance of strategic defenses in bolstering and improving upon our deterrence.

Any administration is going to do that, and I certainly believe that this is a direction that we ought to go.

Now, looking back in the last 6 years on trying to bolster this deterrence that we've had, and has worked, I might add, we are going to come to rely more on strategic defenses, and in particular, you're talking about the Strategic Defense Initiative.

I don't want to give up or throw in the towel on developing nearly leak-proof defenses, as a matter of fact I think eventually technology may prove possible. Who knows where we'll be at the time that technology comes; maybe we will have them; maybe we won't have them; we don't know.

I certainly believe technology may prove that we can render all nuclear ballistic missiles obsolete.

But my concern is, Mr. Secretary, is the cornerstone of this administration—strategic defense. And I'm saying that we need to get on with it.

Certainly, we have to research it. It's got to be developed. It's got to be tested. I certainly understand the constraints that are placed on this with the ABM Treaty.

We could certainly employ one strategic defense site within the ABM Treaty if we so choose.

And I would just like to see where we are in trying to get this cornerstone of this administration strategy changed from previous administrations to look at strategic defense. Because I'm very fearful that the patience of the Congress is fairly thin.

And I am also one of those who believe that we can probably deploy incrementally SDI much sooner than perhaps we had thought in the past.

And I'd just like to get your comments, given that the cornerstone of this administration is strategic defenses, on how we might be able to accelerate and to implement and to have potential deployment of the beginning of a Strategic Defense Initiative that will bolster our deterrence.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, the first way to accelerate it is for full funding of the request that we've made in 1988 and 1989, and the supplemental we've requested to repair some of the damage done to the concept in 1987.

I have no problem at all, and I don't know of anybody who does, with acquiring, as quickly as possible, the ability to deploy, and to deploy things, however, that are an effective, useful, and an integral part of the whole system.

What we worried about in the past when people talked about immediate deployment was deploying something that was not an integral part of the whole system, but was simply something that might be ready now that would give a small capability of defending against a very small number of missiles.

But if we have, as we are working toward now, the ability to defend a portion, a Phase I, if you like, of the system, that would be an integral part of the whole system, I would hope we can do that just as soon as possible.

It does have to be an integral part of the whole system.

Senator QUAYLE. Could Phase I be a deployment at one site within the terms and the confines of the ABM Treaty?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I've talked to General Abrahamson; we've had a number of briefings with him.

And I hope if you want any—or if the committee does, you would call on us. We'd be delighted to brief on the progress to date, where we expect to go, and why we need the funds that we've requested.

As I envision it, we could begin deployment when we are told that it is ready and is an effective part of Phase I of the system.

The important point is that Phase I be something that would form the foundation of Phase II, and that we be ready to move to Phase II.

It is important that we do the research that can give us an effective Phase I and that Phase I be a part of the whole system.

Then a deployment decision, in effect, is not a decision to deploy the system, but to begin in a measured step-by-step way—never to lose sight of the President's goal which is to have an effective system that will protect people and protect continents rather than just targets.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Shelby, we are delighted to have you.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be here. This is my first meeting as a member of the Armed Services Committee and I do welcome Secretary Weinberger.

Mr. Secretary, we have had a lot of discussion today about our common interests. Our relationship with NATO and Japan and our other allies.

How are we going to be able to convince the public in these countries, through their various parliaments, to support more of their GNP for a common defense. This would in turn help us in changing some of our strategy?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, sir, it is a difficult problem. It is a matter primarily of convincing them that their own national interest requires it. I hope we can do some of it by example, though in the last couple of years other countries have done more than we have; not all of them, but some.

It is also important to point out, in all the NATO meetings—I go to four a year and regard them as extraordinarily important meetings, as I do our meetings with our Korean friends and our meetings with our Japanese friends and others. We have to keep working constantly to show that it is in their interest as well as ours.

There are two or three ways that don't work. You can go over there, call a press conference and denounce everybody because they are slackers in this war. Some people have recommended this, and it does not work.

We can also try our best to be persuasive, to demonstrate by our own example, through the publication of a number of documents and an exchange of intelligence indicating the reality and growth of the threat.

Our book, Soviet Military Power, which we have had some five editions I think, grew out of suggestions of my colleagues in the NATO meetings that if they could only have some authoritative intelligence as to the nature and growth of this threat, it would help them at home.

So we do that in a large number of ways to make it as effective as possible. I certainly am not going to claim credit for the Japanese increases this year which are substantial and most welcome, but it is an indication that they recognize to a greater extent than perhaps they ever have before how much they need the increase.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Secretary, you are very well aware that there is a movement in this country and a lot of talk, not only in my State of Alabama but elsewhere, that the Japanese, the South Koreans, the other Pacific Rim nations as well as our allies in Europe are not paying their fair share. And the defense budget as you well know from—your 7th year of service—is getting tougher and tougher.

As a supporter of national security—it concerns me that they are not paying their fair share as I see it of their gross national product.

Would you know today what is the total gross national product of the NATO nations and what are they paying versus the U.S. for national security?

Secretary **Weinberger**. We can certainly get that.

[The information follows:]

Defense Spending of NATO Nations

As we published in the March, 1986 "Report on Allied Contributions to The Common Defense," Non-US NATO GDP in fiscal year 1984 was $2,783 billion dollars and Non-US NATO Defense spending was $99.8 billion or 3.5 percent of GDP. This report will be updated in March of 1987 and forwarded to the Congress at that time.

Senator **Shelby**. I would like to have that.

Secretary **Weinberger**. We can do that easily, Senator, and will be very glad to do it.

I think we have to bear in mind two or there issues. One is that there are contributions that can be made outside of the budget process. That is to say, in Japan for example, we get a value in excess of $1 billion in housing and in various services that the Japanese Government pays for in the maintenance of the U.S. troops there. This strengthens us and frees us from that financial burden.

There are somewhat comparable things in Europe. We have an agreement that enables us to use German reservists for some very important work in the event that NATO had to go to war. These things might not show up in a GNP.

What is important, however, is an attitude, an understanding and a willingness to make the maximum contribution that their public opinions will permit, as we try to do with ours. We try to be as helpful to them as we can in the exchange of intelligence, in persuasion and in pointing out to them frequently that if their fair share of the burden is not met, precisely the reaction you pointed out will be felt at home, and that will weaken all of us, so we urge them to do as much as they possibly can and more than they are, just as we urge our Congress to do more than we are doing.

Senator **Shelby**. I assume their goals would remain consonant with ours: freedom.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes. There is no doubt about that. The worry is that some of the policies of some of the opposition parties could put at serious risk NATO's ability to preserve freedom at serious risk.

Senator **Shelby**. That has been alluded to here with the British Labor Party leader and others.

Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you very much.

Senator Wilson.

Senator **Wilson**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me add my voice to the swelling chorus who are congratulating you and our friend John Warner on your new responsibilities.

The long history of collaboration between the two of you I think bodes well for effective leadership for the committee.

Mr. Secretary, let me associate myself in the interest of time and brevity with the generous and gracious remarks extended to you, quite properly, by my colleague from New Hampshire, Senator Humphrey.

I am delighted we are having these strategy hearings. I commend the chairman on that decision. I think it is an entirely proper thing that the committee as well as the executive branch focus on fundamentals.

I was handed a selection from the Congressional Record in which my friend the chairman and I conducted a colloquy last fall when we had a minor disagreement, but as so often seems true, particularly when you reread these things and gain some perspective, what we agreed upon seemed far more important than the disagreement that triggered the colloquy.

What we agreed upon was that the very considerable disparity that is the subject of controversy, but the disparity between conventional strength of the NATO and Warsaw Pact existed and likely would not be cured in the near future for reasons that relate to money.

And I must say, too, that in addition to congratulating you upon what I think is the clearest statement of this kind that I have seen in a very long time, I know that it must be painful but it is reality that is imposed on you, the requirement to present such a modest increase, one that I know that you find not able to take us to the goals that you have stated in your Strategic Statement, that of trying to cover our commitment, none of which anyone has suggested we back away from.

That point, though, that was made in the colloquy that I had with Senator Nunn last fall I think points up the fact in the context of lessened defense spending, and by lessened I will define that as meaning less than was projected as being necessary to meet those treaty obligations, less than was necessary as projected as the requirement to close the gap and to not meet in absolute parallelism or parity. You quite correctly pointed out that that is not our goal, but that instead we are seeking to juxtapose our strength with Soviet weakness in a way that will make us credible in deterring their clear goal of world hegemony.

Given this inability to catch up in conventional strength in Europe in the context of our strengthened defense spending, would you not agree that what it really points out is the irony to some perhaps that as we are constrained more and more by Gramm-Rudman and other fiscal realities, that the importance of strategic spending becomes greater and that proportionately in terms of the strategic deterrence to basic goals of the Soviet Union, that our reliance upon the effectiveness of strategic deterrence becomes greater and greater and that for the dollars involved, that we derive far more in the way of a guarantee that we will hold and check their ambitions than by attempting to play catch-up in a race that we probably cannot win in terms of conventional strength?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Senator, I think that it is extremely important to continue the modernization and the strengthening of the nuclear triad. We have to do that, no matter how many discussions there might be of possibilities of reduction.

I also think we have to bring the Strategic Defense Initiative on line as soon as we can, as I have indicated in my discussion with Senator Quayle.

I do not think we are in any position whatever to make reductions in our rate of modernization of our strategic triad. That is why we are disturbed every time there are cutbacks.

Our percentage of the budget that is required to do this remains constant. The idea that we are somehow short-changing conventional strength is wrong, misleading and does a disservice to both our budget and to the country.

We cannot stop the strategic modernization, as you pointed out, in the hope that there may some day be a verifiable agreement or there may be a willingness to change immediately to acquire at great expense the immense conventional strength required if any of these options were done unilaterally or without proper verification.

We propose to continue the strategic modernization and we hasten to point out that it does not require any larger share of the budget than it has for the last 4 years which is about 13 or 13½ percent.

Senator WILSON. I think, Mr. Secretary, that while we are largely in agreement on that score, which would come as no shock to you or anyone else, that the challenge that we face is one of how to stretch what we will agree are inadequate resources in a way that is most effective. And in that connection I am compelled to note that even within the strategic account, there is going to be a tremendous and intense competition for funding as several systems come on line at the same time.

We are speaking of modernization, we are speaking of strategic defenses, and quite properly, because I think it should be clear that deterrence is gained not only from the fear of our retaliation but also from the frustration that would be experienced by the certain knowledge of the Soviet war planner that his own strategic effort can be frustrated.

If you can deny him the objective, whether it be offensively or defensively, you are in fact deterring at least one kind of attack that we have been most concerned about.

It seems to me that we are faced with the more intense competition, even within that strategic account, than we have seen at any time during our history. But it seems to me as well that the emphasis that has been given to strategic defenses by this administration is proper.

My own view is that we have to have a balance. We have to maintain a retaliatory deterrent, but have to substantially enhance that by moving far more aggressively than in fact we have toward deployment of what I will call a first generation ABM system.

I think that we would have to agree that the constraints on that are far more political than technological. I would be interested in your comment.

My time is up but I would be interested, Mr. Chairman, if we could get the Secretary's comment.

Chairman NUNN. Go ahead, you may answer that.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We want to acquire a strategic defense capability as soon and as effectively as possible. My worry about deploying something immediately that is not an integral part of the whole system stems from my concern that we should not spend resources on items that will not give us the needed effective response or effective deterrent.

If we are talking, however, about something that is an integral part of the whole system and, is indeed a Phase I of the entire system to carry out the President's vision of protecting continents and people, then the earlier we could deploy it, the better.

It is critically important from my point of view that we have an effective Phase I to deploy and that we not spend resources on something that would not be effective or an integral part of the whole system. As you say, there is major competition among the various interests here for the scarce resources, and we would not want to use them up on anything that was not as effective as possible.

But if we have—and we are working toward developing and making very good progress—a good Phase I on which we would build a Phase II and a final phase of the Strategic Defense Program, then by all means let us deploy it as soon as we can. We are not ready yet—we need the resources we have requested.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner, according to the election results, we were supposed to run out of Republican senators who ask questions before Democrats, but the math has not worked out. I don't know whether you have slipped one over on us or not, but we are now back to the Republican side.

Senator Symms, we have enjoyed your company in the Senate for several years and we are delighted to have you on the committee.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward with enthusiasm to working on this committee with all of my colleagues and particularly you and Senator Warner.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to associate myself with the comments made by Senator Humphrey. In the interest of time, I will not repeat the points he made. But regarding Senator Quayle's and Senator Wilson's questions, if you can't recommend a Strategic Defense Initiative deployment now to the President when do you expect to be able to make that recommendation? As you know, there are many people who believe that deployment of some sort of strategic defense is possible—in fact necessary—within the next 5 years.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would hope it would be, Senator. A lot will depend on the rate and certainty of the funding for the continued research, development and testing required to get the first phase ready.

General Abrahamson will be glad to brief any and all of you on the substantial progress. I hope it could be within a very few years. But there is more to do in the research, development and testing, leading us to this first phase.

From my point of view, the sooner the better. I don't want to expend resources on something that is not a first phase or an integral part of the whole system, but has some independent characteristics that might be helpful. The competition for those resources is going to be very strong, and we need to have an effective Phase I on which we can build Phase II immediately and Phase III.

As far as timing is concerned, it depends to a great extent on the rate of funding of the research program. If that is cut back severely, as happened in 1987 and which we are trying to restore and, if it is not made up in the requests of 1988 and 1989 that are before you now, then we will have to stop many of the research projects that are currently underway. That would delay things a very long time.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much.

On another subject, Mr. Secretary, the United States Government must have a consistent policy if we are to have successful strategy. And I find it somewhat frustrating that although you and the President have always been strong supporters—and I laud you for that—of funding and helping wars of resistance against Soviet expansionism in places throughout the world, such as Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua, it seems to take us forever to get adequate weapons in the field to these freedom fighters who need them.

I visited Angola in January 1980. I met with Jonas Savimbi and reviewed some of his troops. There was a great deal of enthusiasm in the UNITA forces. They want to achieve a victory that will bring freedom to their country.

My administrative assistant returned there 2 years later, and by comparing notes we could see that there has been a marked improvement in the ability of Savimbi's forces to carry out operations against the Soviet-backed Cubans and the Luwanda Government they prop up. The UNITA people have no question that their goal is victory over the Communists in Angola.

But it seems that our State Department people in Africa have the typical "detente no-win" attitude; a "Savimbi can't win" mentality. They assume we will have a stalemate and some negotiated settlement. They just seem to sit and hope for the best.

How can we reconcile these distinctly different policies? How can we ever spend enough money on defense if some in our Government don't seem to know which side freedom is, or are willing to truly support it?

I will give you another example in Africa. Secretary Shultz gave a great speech last week praising one African nation for accepting capitalism and rejecting the socialism it had before. At the same time the Federal budget arrived in the Budget Committee calling for $1.8 billion in additional funds for the International Development Banks. Much of that money goes into finance regulation, state-owned operations and other socialist programs. Mr. Secretary, does it seem to you that we have an inconsistent foreign policy?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't think the President has any doubt—I certainly don't and I know of no one in the administration who has any doubt as to the importance of people like Savimbi and others being assisted in all proper ways.

Some of those get us into covert actions which we are not at liberty to discuss here. But certainly there would be, I think, no interest on the part of the President in any kind of renewal of a no win detente type of policy in that important area because of the presence of Cuban soldiers and the obvious strong support of the Soviets for those forces that you have correctly identified.

Possibly the inconsistencies that you cited may result from the fact that various people in other agencies may have different views and perhaps have not had an opportunity to be alert to the President's views.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Symms.

Senator McCain, we welcome you. You have had a very distinguished and illustrious military career. You spent several years explaining this committee to the United States Navy and we expect you will explain the Navy to this committee as we go along.

We are delighted to have you on board.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I had hoped that Senator Warner had been fulfilling that duty for some time.

Chairman NUNN. He tries hard but sometimes we don't understand.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, we should also note that Senator McCain was preceded by a very distinguished father who likewise had the responsibility of interpreting the Senate to the Department of Defense.

Chairman NUNN. He was one of the closest friends of my late great uncle from the State of Georgia, Carl Vinson. I have heard the McCain name for the last 25 years of my life.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will do my best to live up to those very kind words, and I indeed feel honored to have the opportunity to serve on this committee.

I especially appreciate the series of hearings that you are holding, Mr. Chairman, because I think all too often, and for too long we have been understandably mesmerized by the details of the budget, as opposed to trying to grapple with what this Nation's national security requirements are. I think it is entirely appropriate that we begin these hearings with perhaps one of the most knowledgeable and experienced men in Washington, Secretary Weinberger.

I look forward to working with you, Mr. Secretary, as I have in the past.

We have discussed a lot of issues, Mr. Secretary. I think we have not touched on the issue which of course is vital to any nation's defense capability and that is the subject of manpower.

As you are aware, we watched in the late 1970's ships that could not leave port and planes that could not fly and tanks that could not run, not only because of the lack of spare parts, but because of the lack of trained personnel. We have gone a long way toward curing that problem, but we are faced, as you know by the mid-90's, with a very serious manpower pool problem. We will be required to recruit one out of every three eligible men, as opposed to one out of every four today.

I don't think that our defense budgets are going to increase dramatically. I think we are, therefore, going to be faced with a real challenge to get the kind of qualified men and women to man the very expensive equipment which we have continued to debate so vociferously in this committee and in the halls of Congress.

I have grappled with this problem for quite some time, Mr. Secretary, and I have again come back to the concept of national service. I believe that the young men and women of America want to serve this Nation. I believe they want to give something to this Nation. I think they want to provide that service as long as it is in a fair and equitable manner. I believe they should be provided with alternatives to military service such as Peace Corps, domestic areas throughout our country such as National Forests and others.

Have you given any serious thought to the concept of national service as an alternative to the enormous challenges of providing the manpower pool in the middle 1990's that we will need?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes, Senator, we have. Before I respond to that, I think I would be remiss if I did not express on behalf of the military the enormous debt that we owe to you for your very distinguished and gallant record in behalf of the Nation and the Armed Forces. That is a debt that the Nation owes you as well as to hundreds of thousands of others. I particularly wanted to express it, especially as I may have to disagree with you.

With respect to national service, I think we have to bear in mind two things. One is that we are getting now—and you quite properly set your sites ahead into the 1990's when the available pool will be lower—not only all of the numbers we need and more, but the high quality of the people we need, measured by educational achievement.

We are also extremely pleased with the retention—the ability to retain careerists—as well as to retain more first year volunteers. These things are perhaps the most encouraging part of the defense picture of the last 6 years. They have improved in almost every category every year.

It is essential that we continue this because we will have manpower needs as we bring additional authorized ships on line and as we move toward greater strength in all of our areas of need.

I have not seen any indication yet that we are not going to be able to do that, even though we are going to have to draw from a smaller pool. The fact that we have surpluses now is very encouraging.

It is vital that we keep up the various indications of the importance of military service—the pay, the allowances, and other benefits. People, as you know, don't join the military to make money. They join in very gratifying numbers on a volunteer basis because they want to serve, as you pointed out.

My only worry about national service is that if it is indeed to be effective it would have to include everybody.

And it would force many people into doing things they really don't want to do, whether it's national service, military or otherwise.

I would like to proceed on the basis of an All Volunteer Force as long as we can. I think essentially we get better service from people who choose to be in the military. It puts fewer strains on what we might call the social fabric of the country.

If a situation arose in which mobilization were required, obviously, we're preparing for it and ready. However, it would involve a great deal of compulsion which we would like to eliminate as long as we possibly can.

We have done that. We've done it successfully. In the nineties, I believe we could continue to do it, if we could keep up the recognition of the importance of military service and the importance of fair and equitable pay and benefits for people in the military.

So I would like to avoid as long as possible, anything, even a national service, that had an element of compulsion in it, keeping in mind the stresses and strains put on the country when people were required to take forms of service, although specifically military, that they didn't want to do.

I think you'd get some of the same result on a national service type of program. We have given thought to it, and essentially the conclusion at the moment is, we don't need to do it.

We have a very good service system now. Let's try and keep it as long as we can on a completely voluntary basis.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would just like to say that I think there are other factors involved besides just the ability of manning our armed services.

And I think it has to do with people wanting to serve their Nation. As I mentioned, I think there are young men and women throughout this country who would be more than happy to do so, in fact, I think an overwhelming majority of them would like to serve.

I know our chairman has worked very hard on these issues, and I would look forward to addressing them. I don't think we're going to easily solve the problems with this shrinking manpower pool as we go into the nineties.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I should hasten to add, Senator, that I would welcome any increase in the number of people who would want to participate in other forms of national service.

I think that would be fine, and excellent for the Nation and for them. I would just like to keep the aspect of compulsion out of it as long as possible.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator McCain. I must say, I do share your interest in that subject. I believe it's an appropriate one for the manpower subcommittee to get into later this year.

Senator Glenn and Senator Wilson may very well want to get into that. There are all sorts of features and complications to it; you'd have to proceed very cautiously with any kind of plan.

Everyone should note that even today, though, with all the success we've had—and I agree, we have improved our quality of manpower; I think that's been one of the most significant things that's happened in the past 5 or 6 years—we still have total incompatibility between any kind of long war plans and our present manpower policy.

They just don't go together; they're out of synch. I've always been curious how you could possibly plan 90 days ammunition, for instance, in a 5-year plan, when there's no possibility of having the manpower available to do that under the present manpower policy.

So some things are badly out of synch, even when they're going well. Senator McCain, I'd be delighted to work with you in exploring that area, and I emphasize the word, explore.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't want my silence to indicate any agreement with your assessment of our ability to get into a long war if needed.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, I've been silent several times today when I didn't agree with you. So we'll stipulate that for the record, to protect both of us.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I took yours for complete agreement, of course.

Chairman NUNN. At this stage, given the time, the Secretary's schedule, I would ask that our second round be confined to one question.

We'll see how that goes, then if we have time, a third round. Mr. Secretary, I know you've got a busy schedule, we appreciate your time spent here.

Mr. Secretary, at a committee hearing in 1982, I asked Undersecretary Ikle, and representatives of each of the military services whether the administration's then-current 5-year defense plan would provide what the Joint Chiefs of Staff call a quote, reasonable assurance, end quote, that our armed forces could implement our strategy.

Each of them, including Secretary Ikle, said no, that the 5-year defense plan would not, even if fully funded, provide that kind of reasonable assurance.

We've spent about $1.3 trillion in the last 5 years. Let me ask you the same question now.

Does the administration's current 5-year defense plan, which we have before us, understanding it's a rolling plan, does it provide a reasonable assurance that our Armed Forces can implement our current strategy if fully funded?

Secretary WEINBERGER. If fully funded, I think it does, yes. But you have to bear in mind, Senator, that we've had to make substantial reductions in the 5-year plans, on each of the years in which we addressed the renewal of them because of the actions of the previous year of the Congress in reducing our request.

Because of these cutbacks, we've already lost close to $300 billion of the amount of funding that we originally requested.

Chairman NUNN. If you have reasonable assurance, though, that your 5-year plan will carry that out, it seems to me that money was not needed.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I do not think that it's a question of not needed. It was needed, and needed urgently. What we have is a much lower degree of funding than we felt was essential.

But we are still making very substantial progress. We've been able to do so by making each dollar go farther, by making major cutbacks in cost overruns—as you know, our major weapons programs now run at minus 1 percent a year in cost increases as opposed to 14 percent a year in 1980—and by other various means.

We are making better use of each dollar. And I think we could give that kind of reasonable assurance.

But it depends on receiving the kind of funding, even at the reduced levels, that we've requested.

And some of the comments I've seen, just since our 2-year budget came up in the last week, have been that we'll be, quote, lucky to get it.

The country will be very unlucky if we don't get it because it is the minimum necessary to achieve our goal.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, I've been privileged to be at every hearing in the Senate at which you've appeared in your long tenure. I would certainly say that I think this is the finest that we've ever had.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you, sir.

Senator WARNER. I think you've been most responsive, and your answers were directly to the point.

My last question to you, Mr. Secretary—I've listened carefully, and I go back to the very early days in President Reagan's administration, when certain elements advocated that we try to achieve a military superiority to the Soviets.

That attempt was renewed, I recall, at the convention in Dallas. Others and myself were fortunate to not let that happen since it's really unattainable economically in this country. There's also a serious question as to whether it's advisable in terms of our relationships with the Soviet Union and our allies.

At this time, as you look at the elements of parallelism between the U.S. forces and the Soviet forces, necessary differences because of geography, disposition of the allies, and so forth, do you believe that our present force structure is adequate?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, considering the total force structure, including the Guard, the Reserve and our mobilizable assets, and our ability to get them there quickly, and assuming that we have full funding of the programs we've requested, I think this gives us reasonable assurance that we can deter an attack upon us, which is the whole goal of our strategy, and for what we strive.

If deterrence failed, we would obviously need all of our mobilizable assets, reserves and all the rest. We would also need the help of our allies which I think we would have.

It's a very hypothetical question. I think it would be adequate, but at a much higher degree of risk than if we could have had the kind of funding we'd sought over the past 5 years, and particularly, had we not had the sharp reductions that were made in 1986 and 1987.

Senator WARNER. And that includes the allies and our commitments with them?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Indeed, it has to.

Senator WARNER. But at a higher degree of risk?

Secretary WEINBERGER. At a higher degree of risk, exactly. What we had proposed originally, and have proposed each of these years, has been an attempt to get the capabilities we need at reduced risk.

But every time we're cut back, and we have 2 years of negative growth, means that we have to postpone doing things that need to be done; it means that those things that we all agree have to be done will be more expensive; it is in everyway adding to our risks.

We can afford to do what is necessary to reduce the risk.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

A couple of comments, and then one question. First, Senator McCain, we're delighted to have you on the committee.

I think all the good things that have been said about you this morning are absolutely true. But to suggest that the Navy needs more support on this committee is almost an affront to the Secretary of the Navy.

The Navy has had great support here. We have a former great Secretary of the Navy himself, John Warner. Almost every member of this committee, even the landlubbers, have been greatly in support of the Navy.

If the Navy gets any stronger than they are now, God help the Air Force and the Army. We won't have either.

Following up my question in my previous round, I would simply say to you, Mr. Secretary, that I hope we're not going to adopt the Scowcroft Commission as written in tablet form that can never be changed, the future planning for our nuclear deterrent requires flexibility.

In the opinion of this one Senator, the Scowcroft recommendation was as much a political document as it was a military document with regard to the critical defense needs of this country.

I simply say that I like very much the rail mobile concept that you've come up with, and I hope that we can move that along even faster than your early budget recommendations seem to envision.

My question this round is with regard to SDI. I noticed on television yesterday, and several of your responses to questions here this morning, Mr. Secretary, that you keep talking about a first phase of SDI.

And I think that's a very reasonable and realistic approach, Mr. Secretary, if I might say so. Whatever SDI amounts to, we're going to have to make a decision somewhere along the lines as to what the first phase would be.

I assume that you believe that the first phase of SDI, if it proved feasible in the laboratory, would be deployment around our missile fields to strengthen our deterrent?

Is it not true that your first phase would envision deployment around our present missile fields?

And second, could we deploy a system around some missile fields without violating the current ABM Treaty?

Am I correct in my assumption that this probably is what you're indicating?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir, you're not. I hate to have your last question answered on a negative note, that is not what we're trying to do.

We're trying to get the first phase of a system that would protect a continent and the people.

Senator EXON. Protect what?

Secretary WEINBERGER. A continent, and the people in it, and not particular, specific, narrow targets within that continent?

Senator EXON. On the first phase?

Secretary WEINBERGER. That's what I've been trying to emphasize, Senator, that the first phase should be the first stage toward getting that.

Now, as you know, we are looking at four or five different ways of destroying incoming Soviet missiles outside the Earth's atmosphere before they get near target.

And the first phase that we are talking about would be the first perhaps one or two of those kinds of methods that would give us that capability, on perhaps a more limited scale than we would ultimately like to get.

But we're not talking about, and I've tried to emphasize that repeatedly, deploying what I call the traditional ABM system, the sort of Sprint or Spartan system that we had talked about in North Dakota.

We're talking about a totally new set of principles, and a totally new approach, which, in effect, gives us the capability to destroy missiles of the Soviet Union outside the Earth's atmosphere before they get near any target.

It's the first phase toward achieving that ultimate goal, not a first phase of trying to protect missile sites.

Senator EXON. Well, I must say, in all due respect to you and you know that I'm a strong booster of yours—that you're talking politics rather than national defense.

I would suspect that most reasonable people would recognize that if this system amounts to something, as some of us think it might, that it would be deployed around our missile fields.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. With the assurances that this saga will continue in your subcommittee, Senator Exon, I'll call on Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And being the new chairman of that strategic subcommittee, I'm sure that we will get into a more definitive definition of what the first phase is and how this is really going to work. And I look forward to working with Senator Exon, and also the Secretary.

I'd like to, in my one question, extend this defensive concept and strategy from here in the United States to our allies, our allies in Europe, our allies Israel, Korea, Japan, the defenses against the ballistic missiles threat.

We talk a lot about our allies. And it seems to me, we had hearings last year, that one of the new threats that our allies and the United States are faced with, particularly in Europe, is the new introduction of the Soviet Union's short and intermediate range ballistic missiles, the SS-21s, the SS-22s and the SS-23s.

Last year the Congress authorized $50 million to explore on a matching fund cooperative arrangement with countries to see what we could do in defenses against the ballistic missiles that the Soviet Union has introduced.

I just wondered how this fits into our strategy, particularly NATO, down into Israel and the Far East with Korea and Japan, what kind of a priority it has with you personally, looking at the ballistic missile threat in Europe, and how this relates to our Strategic Defense Initiative and our defense strategy here in the United States.

I see a connection, and I just wondered if you do too insofar as the strategy is concerned, in trying to implement a defensive capability, not only by the United States but our allies as well.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Indeed I do, Senator, yes, and I think it's a very perceptive question.

First of all, the Strategic Defense Initiative is designed to try to deal with and destroy Soviet missiles of the SS-20 caliber as well as the intercontinental missiles.

It is the short-range missiles that we would be concerned with in your question. Those would be the ones that we need to develop the capabilities of an anti-tactical ballistic missile system, or other methods of trying to defend against them.

Alternatives are to attempt to get treaties and agreements that are verifiable that would eliminate this capability from the Soviets, but that is not extremely realistic at the moment.

So we do need to develop this kind of capability. We need to encourage our allies to work on it. And we need to move toward a defensive strategy with respect to this capability which the Soviets have and are adding to in great numbers.

I think our allies recognize that.

There are a number of aspects of the research on the strategic defense program which would be very helpful in this connection, even though the strategic defense program itself envisions defenses against the SS-20s and longer range missiles.

But a lot of the byproducts of the research would be helpful in anti-tactical ballistic missiles, too.

So it is important that we work on that, and particularly, that we encourage our allies to work on it.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much.

Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I'd like to briefly go back and build on our earlier discussion of changes that have occurred in the world in the last 6 years that would force strategic changes, going directly back to the chairman's purpose in launching this, I think, fascinating and very important set of hearings.

We talked about three changes in the Pacific. If you look at the Middle East, certainly we've seen a number of changes there, and perhaps most striking, the persistence of a kind of religious nationalism there—spilling out in the Iran-Iraq war and so on, and how that in turn would drive changes in American strategy.

We saw the fallout from Iceland. The President's statements, depending on which ones you listen to—which interpretation we listen to—seem to suggest that there would be a greater emphasis on conventional military in Europe, which in turn would appear to drive a changing definition of what the United States Navy would have to do in the North Atlantic in terms of supplying that conventional capability.

Senator McCain, I think very appropriately, brought up changes in demographic patterns that are going to drive, probably, changes in the way in which we view manpower in the country.

Our defense industry is the focus of a new subcommittee established by the chairman, chaired by Senator Bingaman, which will focus on U.S. technical capabilities, which are changing very significantly.

All of which is to say, I think that the focus of the debate moves away quite rapidly from what you might have suggested in your opening remarks, in which you said the key question is: How much is enough?

The question moves from that, rather, to how best do we secure America's national interests, given the resources at hand?

To do that, we have to move back and look at the world, which is changing very dramatically, beyond just the introduction of SDI. It is changing very dramatically.

We do not have an endless set of resources, as you well know. And you very eloquently come up and ask for more and more money: it just isn't going to be there.

What we do have to do is reexamine what's going on in the world out there and try to move and change our strategies with that, rather than fall back on a lot of assumptions that might have prevailed in the previous 10 or 20 years.

I think I'm taking a little license from what the chairman has been attempting to do with this set of hearings. But I have found this—this is not really a question, Mr. Secretary, rather than I think a restatement of what we're trying to do in this, as I understand it.

Chairman NUNN. The Senator is exactly correct. I think we're trying to focus on the strategy, whether it's changed appreciably in the last 6 years; whether circumstances dictate that we make changes. We'll be hearing a lot about that with other witnesses.

Senator WIRTH. Well, I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weinberger, I appreciate your coming up today. This is, I know a bit of a shift from all of the other hearings as well that I've sat through in 12 years in the House. I think this is a very welcome shift and change.

And I look forward to working with you as we attempt to understand how we can best put our limited resources to use in what I think is a rapidly changing world.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I appreciate the opportunity to be here, Senator. I know you won't mind if I respond briefly to your observation of a moment ago.

And that is, you used the phrase, two or three times, given the resources we have. You have correctly pointed out that I have felt that some of these have been inadequate in the past.

Senator WIRTH. You noticed that.

Secretary WEINBERGER. And that there's no reason for them to be inadequate. It is not a matter of our ability to cut back on our commitment. It's not a matter of our being able to change the Soviet threat by reducing our resources.

It's not a matter of our saying, no matter what happens, we won't fund this, that or the other.

There are a number of changes that you've mentioned in the world. At least two or three of them are changes which require and demand the application of increased resources, much as we would rather that was not the case.

We have to remember that these threats against us, these demands on our resources, and these requirements imposed on us are indeed imposed on us. They aren't of our own choosing.

We have a modest, limited, defensive strategy and goal and set of objectives which is simply to be let alone to pursue our own lives as we wish, free of attack and free of aggression. It is a situation which requires constant examination of the threats against it. We must apply the needed resources, and not shrink from the fact that it does require resources that may not be politically or otherwise popular in a country such as ours—one that basically doesn't like defense spending.

Somebody, however, has to point out the necessity for defense spending. I hope that you will not be deterred by the fact that over the years I have made very much the same kind of plea; and that therefore, you will automatically discount this as something that requires little attention.

The threats are very real and are increasing. They do not leave us many options, to cut back on strategies to fit the resources that we may wish to apply.

We may be forced to do a lot more than we want. If we don't make those defensive preparations and strengthening moves in time, we may not, in another situation, have the opportunity or the time to do what is necessary.

We cannot afford to be overtaken by events or by threats which are too strong to meet if we don't plan for them—not just 5 years ahead of time, but 7 or 8 years ahead of time.

That requires consistency, and it requires a willingness to do things that a lot of people would much rather not do. That's been the essence of our presentations over the past 6 years.

Senator WIRTH. Mr. Secretary, my time has expired. I would never discount anything you have said, nor the sincerity with which you approach this. Nor would I hope you would discount the feelings that many of us have that the world is changing very rapidly, and that we in turn have got to change and reforge perhaps parts of the way in which we spend and commit our scarce national resources in defense, the Pacific again being a very good example of a rapidly changing area in which we may well find that approaches we were taking some time ago have to be changed significantly

But in any case, I look forward to working with you over the coming years. And thank you very much for coming.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Wirth.

Before turning to Senator Wilson on the last question of this morning's hearing, I have a couple of administrative announcements.

We will have a hearing tomorrow morning with Mr. Brzezinski. We will have former Secretary Schlesinger on Wednesday.

We will have an open hearing on War College strategy Tuesday afternoon. We will have a partially open hearing on Wednesday, but probably primarily closed Wednesday afternoon on an actual war game which is classified.

We have a business meeting of the committee this afternoon. It was originally scheduled for 2 o'clock. We're going to slide that because of the late hour, to 2:30. I don't anticipate that will take too long. It will relate to the committee budget for this year.

One other announcement on behalf of Senator Warner and myself. We're going to try to cut down the number of questions for the record, not only in the full committee but in the subcommittees as well.

We're going to have someone on each side—and I'll ask our staff directors to appoint an individual to do that on each staff—to review the questions for the record. And those questions will hopefully be eliminated that are duplicative of what has already been said in open hearing, or questions that are repetitive or redundant as to other questions being asked.

We're going to try to cut down the number of questions, but not eliminate any crucial questions.

Anyone that wants to appeal that process can come to Senator Warner or myself, and we'll look at them directly. We hope that won't occur very often.

We're not trying to prevent questions for the record. We are trying to lessen the burden on the Pentagon and the people over there in answering questions that may be duplications.

Senator Warner, do you want to comment on that?

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, that reform alone may result in a substantial cut in the defense budget.

One other logistic observation. You and I discussed the attendance today and particularly those who were in attendance. Perhaps in the future, as you suggested, we will find a larger facility for the next series of hearings.

Chairman NUNN. We will try to do that. The Caucus Room is taken for most of the occasions. We have the Auditorium that we are going to take a look at. Hopefully, we will continue to have a great deal of interest in these strategy hearings.

Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, before I ask my final question, again in commending you let me say that I think the focus on strategy is a very wise one, and I think you have got the horse before the cart.

This morning we have focused I think a good deal on our responsiveness to a Soviet threat and looked at it in terms of forces. I note with great interest that we will have before us again the Secretary's annual report on Soviet military power and we will also have Admiral Crowe's posture statement and his testimony.

It seems to me that at that point or perhaps elsewhere in closed session, we would do well to focus even more clearly than we have in the past on our response to the Soviet strategy, not just to the forces that they are deploying, but to the strategy.

That may sound like a strange statement. Everything that the Secretary said implies their strategy, and indeed the presence in terms of the regional conflict that they support and sponsor more than implies it. But I think it might be well for us to spend some time explicitly on the strategy.

My final point, I guess I will have to admit, is a rhetorical question.

Senator WARNER. If the Senator would yield. In fairness, the Secretary opened up on the means by which he compiles his budget. The starting point is the Soviet threat which we have always treated through the years as implying basically their strategy coupled with their resources to implement that strategy.

Senator WILSON. Yes, of course. And my point is that I think it would serve the committee well if we dealt with it in terms of that strategy in a more political way than in fact has been dealt with here this morning. And that is not a criticism.

Senator **WARNER**. Well, the Secretary of State is due to come up as a witness and he surely will dwell on that at length.

Senator **WILSON**. Good. Let's hope so.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by pointing out that I am very pleased with the questions that the Chairman of the Strategic and Nuclear Subcommittee, my friend Mr. Exon, put to the Secretary. I have a feeling that they are much nearer together than may have appeared to either one, and in particular to Chairman Exon, because in fact I think what the Secretary is saying is that he favors the earliest possible deployment of a tiered system that will provide the kind of uncertainty to Soviet war planners who might entertain the notion of a first strike, the kind of certainty that will have to do with military targets.

But I think what he is saying is that the way to achieve that is not merely to deal with it in terms of a ground-based defensive system or a terminal phase system, but that there is, without being unduly optimistic, reason to believe that a first generation system can be involved with more than one phase and that that is not at all science fiction, that it is within the realm of the possible.

How soon it is possible depends upon the level of funding which Congress provides. I will merely point out that in response to someone else's question earlier, the Secretary extended an invitation to all members of this committee to receive a briefing from General Abrahamson, and of course the committee will receive that as a committee. But what I think he is suggesting is that individually we may wish to go over and see things that can't be presented in open session, and that is a very good idea because I think you are much nearer together than that may appear.

Chairman **NUNN**. Thank you, Senator Wilson.

Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your being here. We look forward to working with you this year on a number of subjects that we have covered this morning, plus others. Thank you very much.

The hearing will now adjourn.

[Whereupon, at 12:48 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

TUESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1987

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The committee met in open session at 9:34 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Gore, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Also present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Jeffrey H. Smith, general counsel; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, assistant chief clerk; Robert E. Bayer, Robert G. Bell, Richard D. Finn, Jr., Judith A. Freedman, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Michael J. McCord, Frederick F.Y. Pang, Gordon G. Riggle, Mark B. Robinson, professional staff members; Russell C. Miller, research assistant; Kathleen L. McGuire, staff assistant.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Edward M. McGaffigan, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Leon Feurth, assistant to Senator Gore; Jim Sayer, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terry Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Nunn. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning for the second of a series of 13 hearings on U.S. national security strategy and its military strategy component. Our committee today is very fortunate to have Dr. Brzezinski, the assistant to President Carter for National Security Affairs as today's witness.

Last year Dr. Brzezinski authored a book on U.S. strategy entitled "Game Plan" which I recently had the privilege of reading. The subtitle is, "How to Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest." This publication is certainly one of the most thought-provoking examinations on the overall subject of strategy that I've seen in recent years.

I have already read the book and if the members have not had a chance to do so, I would certainly urge that they take a look at it. It is very interesting, the kind of thought-provoking stimulation that I think we need in the public dialogue, congressional as well as executive, in analyzing our strategy options.

Dr. Brzezinski, the committee sincerely appreciates your willingness to take time from your busy schedule to appear today. I am sure this hearing will be a valuable part of our record on the subject.

Yesterday morning we began by exploring a number of central strategic issues with Secretary Weinberger. During today's session, I am sure we will go over a number of those issues again, one being the degree of attention that this administration has paid to strategy making. That same question would apply to previous administrations, and certainly your experience in the Carter administration and how you viewed strategy making there, both the pluses and the minus, would be of great interest to us.

In his written statement yesterday, Secretary Weinberger appeared to, in my view, downplay the importance of strategy by commenting, "I do not see how a change in U.S. strategy can reduce our defense needs." My view of strategy is not simply to reduce our defense needs. The question is whether we can make existing resources more effective in order to reduce the risks that are inherent in the world today, from a national security perspective.

We will ask a number of questions relating to your past experience. We also asked Secretary Weinberger questions yesterday about the gap between our commitments and our capabilities, recognizing there is always a gap. The question is whether we can narrow that gap with existing resources, so we will be going into that with you.

There are a number of questions that come to mind relating to Europe. I know you have addressed the subject of our NATO commitment, how long term and what type of commitment it should be and whether we should begin examining that over a period of years. We will certainly want to go into that. Also, the question of what happened at Reykjavik in terms of nuclear offers and counteroffers that were made, and how that impacts our overall strategy in terms of, particularly, conventional capabilities.

We have a number of questions but we will get into those later. Again, let me thank you for being here. Before we turn to you for your opening statement, Senator Warner, do you have any comments this morning?

Senator WARNER. Just to join you in welcoming our witness. I have always been an admirer. I am particularly intrigued by the very forthright views in your written statement, and I am sure you will elaborate in your testimony on Europe, and the need for an integrated strategy for nuclear and conventional forces, and also your perspective on the SDI. That will be a key issue this year.

Chairman NUNN. Any other members have any comments this morning?

Senator KENNEDY. I look forward to your elaborations with regard to the recommendation to alter the force structure in

Europe for the Southern Command, which is the rapid deployment force or some variation of it.

That happens to be a matter of particular interest, and is a significant part of the testimony. We will look forward to hearing from you further on that.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Dr. Brzezinski, why don't you proceed. You are our main witness this morning, so take whatever time you need and we will be glad to listen, and then we will have questions after you complete your statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT CARTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by commending the committee for holding these hearings, for they deal with a subject that is often neglected, the fundamental strategic underpinnings of American Defense policy.

In my opening remarks I would propose to outline briefly the basic geopolitical premises that our policies must address, and then to take up in turn the strategic policies that I believe follow from these premises. At the end of my statement I will summarize some of the specific proposals that are contained in it.

In any case, a long-term strategy for the United States must contain the following three elements. First, it must be derived from a correct diagnosis of the United States-Soviet conflict, and be based on a realistic assessment of the Soviet challenge. Second, it must provide an effective response to the strategically most pressing threats, but also exploit the principal vulnerabilities of the adversary. Third, it must actively explore opportunities for an equitable accommodation, and generate the necessary incentives for a positive response from the other side.

Let me speak briefly to the geopolitical premises, for they do, in my judgment, condition the nature of the strategy and our strategy should not be divorced from geopolitical realities.

First, I think we have to recognize the American-Soviet contest is a long-term one. It is a classical historical conflict, one which is not subject to a quick termination, either through some generous act of reconciliation or through a cataclysmic confrontation. The latter is excluded, in my judgment, because of the reality of nuclear weaponry, which dictates an altogether novel relationship between powers in this world.

Second, we have to recognize that the American-Soviet contest is now global in scope, but its central geostrategic focus is the Eurasian continent. Eurasia contains half the world's land surface, contains the bulk of the world's population and economic wealth, and thus is the focal point of the American-Soviet opposition.

Third, on Eurasia, that competition is being waged on three fronts. The first pertains to Western Europe, which encompasses the most vital and industrialized section of Eurasia and controls the principal outlets to the Atlantic Ocean. It also happens to be the most militarized region of the world.

The second front is in the Far East. It represents the world's most rapidly growing region in terms of economic potential, and it controls Soviet access to the Pacific Ocean. Thus, both Western Europe and the Far East control vital Soviet access to the two principal oceans of the world. Our trade with this region now exceeds trade with Western Europe.

The second competitive front emerged after the invasion of South Korea and the American security commitment to the Far East as a whole. In recent years a third front has emerged, and that front involves Southwest Asia. It involves two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves and the principal outlets to the Indian Ocean.

Therefore, this front is catalytic in nature, for Soviet success on this front would give the Soviets the capacity to prevail on the other two fronts. And thus an outcome on this front is really catalytic in nature. It affects all three fronts eventually. This front emerged after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the American commitment to the security of the Persian Gulf, first formulated in the Carter doctrine and then reaffirmed by President Reagan.

However, looking to the future, Mr. Chairman, we have to consider the possibility that the fourth central strategic front in the American-Soviet contest may eventually emerge, and this front might be located in Central America and the Caribbean. Any superpower conflict in this area would involve, necessarily, a major expansion of the competition and would create a potential danger to the United States of truly significant proportions. The Soviet Union realizes that it is at a disadvantage in this area, and therefore it has been pursuing its policies with caution, advancing its interests with tactics not so aggressive as to precipitate a direct clash.

In dealing with the American-Soviet contest, it is important not only to analyze its geopolitical dimensions and identify its principal foci. It is also important to bear in mind the rather unique nature of the Soviet challenge.

The Soviet challenge is uniquely one-dimensional. The Soviet claim to global status is derived exclusively from its military might. The Soviet Union is not competitive with the United States economically, ideologically, or politically.

In that sense it is a unique challenger. All previous challengers in history to the preponderant world powers had the capacity to challenge the preponderant power, not only militarily but also economically, socially, ideologically. This is not the case with the Soviet Union.

This difference is crucial to the historical outcome of the American-Soviet competition. Unless military power proves decisive, social creativity will eventually determine the outcome, and in this respect the United States has a significant advantage. But it makes it essential that Soviet military power be checked, and it does focus our attention on this dimension of the competition.

That brings me to the strategic aspects of our response. It must be based, as I have argued, on an analysis of the geopolitical premises and an understanding of the nature and the limits of the Soviet threat, and it calls for an American strategy that has a military, a geopolitical, and a negotiating component.

Any strategy which fails to have these three elements fails to be a comprehensive strategy. It has to have a military, a geopolitical, and a negotiating component.

Let me address myself to these three. I have already suggested the Soviet challenge is primarily military, and therefore it is essential that it be checked. In my statement I provide a table assessing, as best as I can, likely Soviet military capabilities vis-a-vis the United States as I perceive them today and 10 years hence.

SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES

1986	1996
Strategic Forces	
No assurance that the United States would be unable to inflict massive destruction on the Soviet Union in the event of a Soviet first strike	A reasonable possibility that a Soviet first strike would be able to disarm the United States to such a degree that a retaliatory response would be fragmentary
Conventional Ground Forces on the Three Central Strategic Fronts	
Probability of Soviet success in a purely conventional engagement on the first and third fronts, offset by the possibility of nuclear escalation	Probability of Soviet success with a higher degree of assurance, and a lower likelihood of U.S. nuclear escalation
Conventional Ground Forces in Long-range Force Projection	
High vulnerability to conventional attrition by U.S. RDF because of inadequate logistics and vulnerable supply lines	Progressive improvement in in capabilities, but probably continued inferiority to U.S. RDF
Naval Forces in Strategic Conflict	
Secondary role in strategic conflict	Gradual shift to a significant strategic SLBM and SLCM capability
Naval Forces in Central Conventional Conflict	
Soviet capacity for serious, but not conclusive, disruption of U.S. ocean control and of U.S. sustaining efforts on behalf of U.S. forces engaged in conventional conflicts on any one of the three main fronts	No basic change
Naval Forces in Remote Local Conflict	
Soviets unable to sustain long-range deployment of ground forces in the event of limited conventional naval collision with the United States	No basic change but progressive expansion in radius of Soviet capability

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. In my judgment, any assessment of Soviet military capabilities ought to focus on what the Soviets can do with their military resources, and not on the numerical proportions of the Soviet resources. It seems to me that only too often we tend to compare American and Soviet military power in terms of charts and tables and numbers which give you a sense of the relative Soviet advantage in this or that area of military power.

What is really important in my judgment are not these numbers and these proportions, but how Soviet power may be applied and what it takes to check it, for military power is significant in terms of its political or military application, and not as an abstraction.

In that sense, the Soviet military challenge becomes somewhat more diversified and more nuanced than might appear from the simple numerical comparisons. I have tried to suggest that there are different aspects of this military challenge, both in terms of strategic potential, conventional potential on the three central strategic fronts, conventional ground forces in long-range projection, naval forces in strategic conflict, naval forces in central conventional conflict, and naval forces in remote local conflict.

I have tried to share with you my best estimate of what the current situation is and what the likely situation would be in 1996, depending on the kind of measures we do or do not adopt in the meantime.

Obviously, one cannot be dogmatic about these matters. These are simply estimates and judgments, and they do depend a great deal on what does or does not happen at our end. In any case, it's my basic view that our objective ought to be the achievement and maintenance of what I call mutual strategic security, that is to say, the maintenance of a strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union that excludes the advantages of any first-strike strategic attack and that at the same time sustains extended deterrence. The latter is also very important.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Brzezinski, would you tell us for the benefit of those who may not be familiar with the term—it is thrown around a lot by military experts, but the average person does not know what extended deterrence means. It is a very important concept in terms of the overall relationship between nuclear and conventional forces and in terms of the relationship within the alliances of the world, particularly NATO.

But, would you tell us what your definition of extended deterrence is?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Extended deterrence involves the effort to deter conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union at all levels of such conflict, ranging from limited conventional to the strategic through the possibility, though not necessarily the certainty, that conflicts at the lower threshold of violence would escalate into nuclear confrontation.

That means that the United States has to have the capacity to make that possibility credible. In other words, it has to have the forces, strategic forces, that it can use not only in an apocalyptic confrontation with the Soviet Union involving mutual national suicide, but also strategic forces that are susceptible to being used in a much more flexible, controlled and limited fashion at different levels of a military confrontation.

I want to repeat that there's nothing automatic about it. It does not mean that the United States has to use nuclear weapons. But it does mean that the aggressor has to contemplate the possibility that even a local conflict would contain in itself a high probability of escalation into nuclear conflict.

This means, in turn, and it pertains exactly to your question, Senator Nunn, that the United States must adjust its strategic doctrine and its deployments away from mutual assured destruction, which is essentially apocalyptic in nature, and toward greater flexibility in war-fighting options so that it will be able to respond at any level of a possible conflict.

This in turn leads me to the view, and I realize that this is a very controversial issue, that American strategic forces should have both offensive and defensive components. U.S. strategic offensive forces must be modernized, but their configuration and numbers should be contrived not to pose a threat of a disarming first-strike attack on Soviet strategic forces. That, I think, is important. The Soviets should not be put in a position of finding themselves vulnerable from a disarming American first-strike attack.

But in light of Soviet modernization plans, which in the mid-1990's will provide Moscow with between 8,000 and 10,000 first-strike warheads. It is also, in my view, necessary to deploy a limited strategic defense. That defense should be oriented toward the protection of U.S. strategic forces and command and control systems. It should be composed of a space-based screen to destroy Soviet missiles in the boost phase and a land-based terminal defense to intercept incoming warheads.

While it would be an imperfect defense in terms of population defense, it would achieve the critical objective of injecting a degree of randomness into any Soviet planning of a first-strike nuclear attack. As a result, no Soviet military planner could ever advise the Soviet leadership that Moscow could prevail in a conflict at the strategic level. That in turn would give the United States the needed strategic confidence to compete with the Soviet Union at other levels.

The alternative means of seeking mutual strategic security, namely, through the proliferation of mobile strategic systems, is in my view less desirable militarily and probably in terms of cost. Leaving aside the likely domestic U.S. difficulties over the deployment of numerous mobile systems, the fact is that in a competitive proliferation of mobile systems, the Soviet side is likely to have a major advantage, both in quantitative deployments and in strategic deception.

Moreover, competitive deployment of mobile strategic systems is likely to bring greater insecurity than the deployment of a prudent mix of offensive and defensive systems would be. On the conventional level, the United States must address a perilous strategic paradox: U.S. conventional forces are weakest where the United States is most vulnerable, along the Southwestern Eurasian strategic front, and strongest where its allies have the greatest capacity for doing more on their own behalf and where the risk of a United States-Soviet clash is lowest, along the Far Western Eurasian strategic front.

Consequently, and again I know this is controversial, the United States should undertake a gradual and certainly only partial reduction in the level of American forces in Europe. A total of perhaps 100,000 troops could be gradually withdrawn. That would leave over 250,000 U.S. troops deployed in Europe, a number that represents a clear deterrent to the Soviets and substantial commitment to the defense of NATO.

Budgetary savings from these reductions should be allocated to a significant expansion of U.S. airlift capabilities. Manpower withdrawn from Europe should be absorbed into an enlarged rapid deployment force and used for the creation of additional light divisions for potential use on the southwest Asian central front or in Central America.

I will turn next to the geostrategic component. The first priority for American policy is to hold the three central strategic fronts. In Europe, the United States should encourage the development of a politically and militarily integrated Western Europe, less dependent on the United States but still tied to it by strategic alliance. NATO should become increasingly a European regional alliance, but with an active and major U.S. presence in it.

In the Far East, the United States should promote an informal geopolitical triangle through wider economic, political, and some military cooperation among the United States, Japan and the People's Republic of China.

Japan should be encouraged not to increase its defense spending greatly but rather to increase its economic assistance to developing countries in which Japan shares a security interest with the other industrialized democracies.

This is an important point, and I will just elaborate on it. Japan spends currently approximately 1 percent, slightly more than 1 percent, on its national security. The United States spends somewhere in the range of 6 percent; our West European allies on the average about 4 percent. The Williamsburg Declaration clearly indicated that America, Western Europe and Japan are interdependent in the security sense, and Japan certainly benefits from that interdependence. Japan is a beneficiary of the fact that the Suez Canal is open for its trade. Japan is a beneficiary of the fact that the Persian Gulf is open for its oil. A very high percentage of Japanese trade passes through the Panama Canal. All these areas are of vital security interest.

Yet, Japan contributes nothing to collective global security. It contributes now 1 percent of its GNP to its own defense. I think, however, it would be a mistake for us to press Japan to greatly increase its defense spending. This could be devisive in terms of the Japanese body politic. It could revive a destructive debate about the utility of the American-Japanese alliance, and it would frighten Japan's neighbors.

I think it would be far more constructive if Japan was pressed to increase its overall contribution to our collective security to roughly 4 percent of its GNP, on a par with Western Europe, but to direct the additional increment to what might be called strategic international economic aid. That is to say, this aid should be channeled to those countries in which we all share a collective security interest, such as South Korea, even more so the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan (which bears the brunt of the Afghan invasion), indirectly the Afghan resistance, Egypt (which is in dire need of economic assistance), and finally, the Caribbean/Central American initiative for which Congress has not been able to appropriate the money needed and which certainly requires development funds which would enhance regional stability, from which Japan, as I said, is a beneficiary.

In my judgment, this would be a far more constructive way of directing Japan to carry its share of collective defense without, however, precipitating some of the negative consequences of strong-arming Japan on the question of its own domestic arms spending, which would then in turn entail also the buildup of the Japanese arms industry.

In Southwest Asia, the most important priority for the United States is to step up the political and military pressure on the Soviet Union regarding Afghanistan. It is imperative that the United States increase, quantitatively and qualitatively, the level of military assistance sent to the Afghan resistance and promote a wider international awareness of the war through public denunciations of the Soviet occupation and through efforts to facilitate television and radio coverage of the war itself.

The United States should also press in U.S.-Soviet bilateral meetings for a disengagement of Soviet forces. We should advance a diplomatic formula that calls for the external neutralization and the internal self-determination of the country. The former would restore Afghanistan's previous status as a neutral, and the latter would allow the Afghan people to determine their own form of government. As a temporary expedient, the peacekeeping forces from Islamic countries not unfriendly to the Soviet Union but still independent of Moscow, such as Algeria and Syria, could be stationed in Afghanistan upon the prompt removal of Soviet occupation forces.

In addition, the United States must seek to reinforce the resilience of Iran and Pakistan to Soviet advances where possible. Continued economic and military aid to Pakistan and the eventual restoration of more normal relations with Iran are essential components of the needed U.S. strategic response on the third front.

In addition, as part of its effort to hold the three fronts, the United States should exploit the weaknesses of the Soviet Union. Moscow is vulnerable at three levels: the systemic weakness of its socioeconomic system; the geopolitical weakness of its imperial system; and the internal weakness of the multinational nature of the Soviet Union itself.

The Soviet objective in Eastern Europe is to dominate its satellites militarily and ideologically and to integrate them into a kind of economic commonwealth. Consequently, the United States should promote the development of an independent-minded and increasingly assertive East European public opinion not only through radio broadcasts but also through news communications and information technology such as video cassettes, miniaturized printers and word processors.

The United States should also look with favor at the growing economic operation between Western Europe and Eastern Europe because such cooperation would inevitably lead indirectly to closer political ties. That means, for example, that the United States should encourage the countries of Western Europe to provide Eastern Europe with economic options that even the Communist regimes would find attractive.

The internal weaknesses of the Soviet Union stem from the fact that Moscow rules over the world's last surviving multinational empire. The central government dominated by the Great Russians, whose population numbers about 135 million, dominates in turn a dozen other major nations and scores of smaller nations. Those include 55 million Soviet Moslems, 50 million Ukrainians and 10 million Balts. The multinational character of the Soviet Union creates fissures and openings, as demonstrated most recently in the protests in Alma Ata in Kazahkstan.

The United States goal should be to give sharper political definition to these trends through greatly intensified use of modern means of communications. The techniques that have proven so effective in breaking down the Soviet Union's efforts to isolate Eastern Europe should be more actively applied to the Soviet Union itself. The object of the effort should not be to stoke national hatreds or even to foster the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The real opportunity is to mobilize the forces for genuine political participation, for greater national co-determination, for the dispersal of central power and for the termination of heavy-handed central domination that breeds the expansionist impulse.

Soviet systemic weakness compounds Moscow's vulnerability at both these levels. In virtually every other imperial system in history, the center exerted some kind of an attraction for the periphery, whether in terms of learning, culture, economic wealth or ideology. That is not the case with the Soviet Union. Its ideology has lost its appeal, with not even the most fervent Third World revolutionary movements aspiring to a future based on the Soviet model. Its imperial realm might be characterized best as an economic co-stagnation sphere with the Communist block lagging severely behind the West in all indexes of economic well-being and falling further behind in most.

I have spoken, Mr. Chairman, about our military response and our geopolitical response, but the third important element of our response involves negotiating. As part of the same overall strategy, the United States should engage the Soviet Union in bilateral negotiations. These should not, however, become obsessed with arms control at the strategic nuclear level alone, as has occurred in the last few years and particularly at the Reykjavik summit.

First, in the short term, the United States should formally propose a schedule for ministerial level meetings to move forward U.S.-Soviet negotiations during the remainder of the Reagan administration. I have in mind a formal schedule for meetings between our Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister designed to give impetus and high-level control to the negotiating process. Such regularly scheduled meetings would, in effect, set a timetable for the American-Soviet negotiating process.

Second, on the strategic level we should seek in the remaining 2 years of this administration a 5-year interim agreement that provides for serious reductions in the overall arsenals of the two sides. The current proposals at Geneva, which call for a restriction of

6,000 on warheads, 1,600 on launchers and 154 on heavy missiles, create the basis for such an agreement. A more comprehensive agreement, however, requires progress on the issues of verification and modernization and on finding ways to incorporate limited strategic defense into the arms control process. Hence, in my view, we might consider seriously an interim agreement which resolves partially some of the issues and involves a positive step forward based largely on some reductions along the lines of those regarding which bilateral consensus has now emerged.

In addition to watertight provisions for verification and for restricting modernization, the United States should press the Kremlin to lift gradually Soviet strategic secrecy. In the age of highly accurate and prompt strategic systems, Soviet strategic secrecy introduces an element of uncertainty and anxiety that is incompatible with strategic stability, and that vastly complicates the efforts to achieve effective arms control. In this regard, the United States must make a major public issue of Soviet strategic secrecy and insist that its veil be lifted for the sake of mutual strategic security.

Third, beyond any potential 5-year interim START agreement, the United States should propose a wider set of negotiations involving proportional reductions in the strategic and conventional forces of both sides. Such comprehensive arms reduction talks ought to have as their objective the shaping of a truly comprehensive mutual security without either side enjoying a one-sided advantage in either strategic or conventional forces.

I believe this dimension of the problem was skirted and slighted at Reykjavik. This is of particular importance to stability and security in Europe, where the Soviets have a considerable advantage in conventional forces. It is in the U.S. interest to draw down forces on the Central European front both because a smaller U.S. presence in Western Europe leads to less friction in allied relations and more self-reliance among West Europeans and because a smaller Soviet troop presence in Eastern Europe will inevitably lead to greater self-assertion among the East Europeans.

Fourth, and this, too, is likely to be quite controversial, the United States should indicate a willingness to resolve the crisis in Nicaragua on the basis of the same formula as in Afghanistan. In both cases the United States should seek external neutralization and internal self-determination. The external neutrality of Afghanistan and Nicaragua is consistent with the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Neither country should become a base of operations for one superpower against the other. Internal self-determination for Afghanistan and Nicaragua disengages Washington and Moscow from the struggle for power within the two countries, thereby diffusing the potential crisis. At the same time, in my judgment it is reasonable to assume that the outcome of genuine self-determination in both countries will produce regimes whose ascendance will be in the U.S. national interest.

Let me conclude with a final point. Within the executive branch, there must be more emphasis on strategy. Occasionally this has been provided by particularly insightful top policy makers. There have also been periods when all the top U.S. foreign policy decision makers have been quite unversed either in Soviet-American affairs or in matters of grand strategy. To compensate, the role of strategic planning should be enhanced.

The Policy Planning Council in the State Department is not the right vehicle, because all too often the State Department tends to confuse diplomacy with foreign policy. Only in the White House is it possible to generate the necessary broad interagency approach to long-term planning. Hence, within the National Security Council, a top-level civilian-military geostrategic planning staff should be created to formulate and periodically revise the broad outlines of a long-term policy. I believe that the legislation that you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, have passed is a very important step in that direction, but it should have an institutionalized reflection within White House machinery. U.S. policy is likely to become infused with the requisite longer-term geostrategic content only if the top decision makers or their immediate deputies are engaged in this undertaking, only if periodically the President himself is involved, and only if regular consultations are held with appropriate congressional leaders.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[An appendix to Mr. Brzezinski's prepared statement follows:]

APPENDIX

CHECKLIST OF THE PRINCIPAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED LONG-TERM STRATEGY BY MR. BRZEZINSKI

1. The objective of U.S. policy on the strategic level must be Mutual Strategic Security.
2. U.S. strategic offensive forces must be modernized, but their configuration and numbers should be contrived not to pose a threat of a disarming first strike to Soviet strategic forces.
3. The United States should deploy a limited strategic defense of its strategic forces and command and control systems.
4. The United States should undertake a gradual—and certainly only partial—reduction in the level of American forces in Europe.
5. Budgetary savings from these reductions should be allocated to a significant expansion of U.S. airlift capability. Manpower withdrawn from Europe should be absorbed into an enlarged Rapid Deployment Force.
6. Japan should be encouraged not to increase its defense spending greatly, but rather to increase its economic assistance to developing countries in which Japan shares a security interest with the other industrialized democracies.
7. The United States must step up the political and military pressure on the Soviet Union on the issue of Afghanistan.
8. The United States should also advance a diplomatic formula that calls for the external neutralization and the internal self-determination of Afghanistan.
9. The United States must seek to reinforce the resilience of Iran and Pakistan to Soviet advances where possible.
10. The United States should promote the development of an independent-minded and increasingly assertive East European public opinion.
11. The United States should seek to give sharper political definition to the trends toward self-assertion among the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union. A real opportunity exists to mobilize the forces for genuine political participation, for greater national codetermination, for the dispersal of central power, and for the termination of heavy-handed central domination that breeds the expansionist impulse.
12. The United States should formally propose a schedule for ministerial-level meetings with the Soviet Union to move forward U.S.-Soviet negotiations during the remainder of the Reagan administration.
13. The United States should in the course of the next two years seek a five-year interim strategic arms control agreement that provides for serious reductions in the overall arsenals of the two sides.

14. The United States must make a major public issue of Soviet strategic secrecy and insist that the Soviet veil of secrecy be lifted for the sake of mutual strategic security.

15. The United States should propose a wider set of negotiations, involving proportional reductions in the strategic and conventional forces of both sides.

16. The United States should indicate a willingness to resolve the crisis in Nicaragua on the basis of the same formula as Afghanistan, external neutralization and internal self-determination.

17. Within the NSC, a top-level, civil-military geostrategic planning staff should be created to formulate and periodically revise the broad outlines of a long-term policy.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Dr. Brzezinski. I'm going to ask the staff again to go by the 6-minute rule today, and then we will try to make another round of questions. We do not have a full contingent here today, although we have a good attendance, so we ought to be able to get around twice this morning.

Dr. Brzezinski, on that last point you made about a top level civilian military planning staff in the National Security Council, when you were the National Security Director did you have such a staff?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I did not have such a staff in a formal sense, although I must say that there was a much more systematic involvement of the top presidential advisors, the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence and myself in what might be called strategic planning, and it took place in the following fashion:

At the beginning of the administration, with presidential approval, I undertook the task of formulating the strategic and political objectives of the administration for its 4-year term of office. In the course of several months, my own staff and I, in consultation with the different departments, developed a document, very highly classified, for the President of about 40 pages in length, developing the major geostrategic objectives of the administration and its foreign policy and defense policy.

That document was discussed at length with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Central Intelligence Director, revised in the light of their comments, and then approved by the President. It provided the basis for some of the things we did.

Without going into specifics, to give you just one or maybe more than one example, the document provided, for example, as its fifth objective, the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China by 1979. And we did in fact achieve it by that time, in fact earlier. It provided for a revision of American strategic doctrine, which we undertook with a series of presidential directives, culminating in Presidential Directive Number 59 and a series of other directives.

So in an informal, not institutionalized, fashion we did so. I think it would be desirable to institutionalize this process, however, by having some mechanism within the White House staff which undertakes this on a regular basis and engages either the permanent pertinent secretaries or, if not them, their deputies in that process on a continuing basis.

Chairman NUNN. Would you assess strategic planning from all key elements, for example, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs, and the President during the Carter and Reagan administrations?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. As a broad judgment, I would say that we probably undertook too much and had too ambitious an agenda even though we did have a comprehensive and deliberately developed agenda. We pursued too many goals, engaging the President perhaps too heavily in the realm of foreign policy, at some detriment to presidential involvement in domestic policy.

I would say in the case of the Reagan administration, it has been more a matter of the absence of any systematic planning. The President has some very generalized objectives, such as redressing the imbalance in American-Soviet military power, to which he dedicated himself with great energy and with some success. But beyond that it seems to me that there has been a relative absence of goal definition in this administration, and as a result a pattern of conduct on the foreign policy scene which justifies being described as essentially reactive but not one which sets the agenda and defines the thrust and direction of American foreign policy as such.

Chairman **Nunn**. How would you characterize Reykjavik within that, the proposals that were made on our side to go to zero ballistic missiles, which had not been cited by the Joint Chiefs or any of the other agencies, and also the willingness to engage in serious dialogue if not agree to the elimination of all strategic offensive arms without reference to the affect to the conventional balance?

I know that is a leading question.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Since you asked me to characterize it, I would characterize it as a spontaneous competition in strategic Utopias. My impression is——

Chairman **Nunn**. Mutual or unilateral?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. It is mutual. The Soviets did it, too, because the Soviets talked about total elimination of nuclear weapons, which actually has been their slogan for quite some time. We gave it a new twist with the notion of the elimination of ICBMs, but I am not quite sure the extent to which this was previewed systematically in the executive branch. My impression was that there were no comprehensive studies of an interagency type undertaken regarding strategic and political consequences of the implementation of a comprehensive ICBM ban in the course of the next 10 years.

Chairman **Nunn**. What you are saying now is that we need a comprehensive approach to arms control that would have a conventional component that would at least parallel the strategic component?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Yes. In my statement, Senator, what I propose is that we concentrate in the remaining 2 years on seeking what might be called an interim strategic arms control agreement, one which does not resolve all of the issues but which essentially capitalizes on some areas of agreement which have been reached and which would have the effect of somewhat containing and reducing the scale of strategic competition and of proposing to the Soviets at the same time that we develop what might be called comprehensive arms reduction talks in which in the next phase a systematic effort would be made to balance reduction of the strategic forces with proportional reductions in conventional forces.

Chairman **Nunn**. One other question, and I suspect my time will have run out. I completely agree with you on the Japanese role. I think it is absolutely essential that the Japanese begin putting more of their gross national product into the broad definition of western security. I also completely agree with you that it should not be all in the military component and that should not be the way that we push.

I agree that we need to get the Japanese to do a lot more in the Third World crisis areas that you have identified. I have one question on that. I thought there was a certain danger to encouraging the Japanese to make that aid available on strictly a bilateral basis because the Japanese are known around the world as tying aid to trade, and if there is anything they do not need help in now it is trade flows.

Would you consider that that aid should be of bilateral and multinational assistance? For instance, to the Philippines, Pakistan, Egypt and so forth from the Japanese?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. It clearly would be better if it was in the multilateral context, but if we were to succeed in pressing the Japanese to increase their overall contribution to collective security to approximately 4 percent of their GNP, with roughly 1 percent of that being in defense spending and 3 percent in strategic international economic aid, the benefits of that would be so great that I would be willing, initially at least, to forego the insistence that the aid be dispensed in a multilateral context.

If it were extended on a bilateral basis by Japan to countries that we would target by mutual consultation, such as the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Egypt, Central America, the security benefits would be so high that even if the Japanese were to take advantage to enhance their trade with these particular countries, I would be willing to go along with that and feel that it still is of sufficient collective benefit to justify it.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Doctor, your statement this morning did not lack wholeness. Indeed, I am sure that some of your thoughts will provoke thinking elsewhere.

Let us turn first to deployment of SDI. I followed that on page 6, but I see no reference to the ABM Treaty. My question is how would you handle that treaty and at what point?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. The ABM Treaty was an important aspect of the American—Soviet effort to reach some degree of stability in the course of the 1970's. The question does arise whether that treaty is adequate for the likely conditions of the 1990's and into the next century.

I think there is considerable evidence that the Soviet Union has been, at the very least, stretching that treaty through deployment of certain facilities, and certainly the Soviets have been engaging in some strategic defense research and presumably development. Thus, there is the question whether the treaty as currently defined copes adequately with the existing situation and insures the same degree of security for both sides.

Beyond that, it does seem to me, as we consider the need for genuine mutual strategic security, some changes in the nature of the treaty should be contemplated. I would favor personally a revision of that treaty to permit both sides to deploy, in fact, some limited strategic defenses designed to protect their command and control communications installations and the principal strategic forces.

I personally am a skeptical agnostic regarding the populationwide strategic defense. For one thing, it is way off in terms of time. Second, I fail to understand what populationwide defenses would give you in the event of a comprehensive central war, for even if you had such a defense, all it would give you is protection against one way of dying, namely, through nuclear warheads delivered by ICBMs. That would not protect you from dying from warheads delivered by bombers or by cruise missiles or by depressed trajectory firings or from chemical warfare or biological warfare, all of which would likely be employed in a central comprehensive war. Hence, I am not quite sure what populationwide strategic defense would give you.

Senator **Warner**. Let me press the second point. You suggest that we start now to begin to renegotiate the ABM Treaty?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Yes. I would talk to the Soviets about the mutual utility of some limited strategic defenses as part of a regimen of mutual strategic security pointing into the 1990's and into the next century in the light of technological developments, in the light of changes in the nature of nuclear weaponry, transforming nuclear weapons essentially from——

Senator **Warner**. Turning to the NATO withdrawal of 100,000. When Neal Kinnock visited the United States, we visited and I disagreed with him indicating that his views about the withdrawal of strategic forces of the United States of certain elements in Great Britain would begin the unravelling of NATO. I am inclined to think, in view of the political environment in those nations now and the fragility of their ability to maintain their current participation in NATO, that such a bold stroke as you propose here might indeed lead to the unravelling of NATO.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. I frankly disagree, although it is a judgmental case. We are dealing with the future, but it does seem to me that too much is made of a fixed number of American forces in Europe. I am not suggesting that we withdraw from NATO, and I am not suggesting that we massively reduce our forces.

Senator **Warner**. No, your formula here is quite accurate.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. It is a gradual reduction that I favor, and I favor it because our forces are finite. We do not have unlimited forces. If we had unlimited forces, I would say by all means leave what we have in Europe and do more elsewhere.

In my judgment, as we look into the 1990's, the major geostrategic threats to the United States in terms of locality are likely to occur in the Persian Gulf, the area of the Middle East, and in Central America, and we do not have adequate forces for dealing with these threats.

Senator **Warner**. But is not one of the major objectives of the Soviet Union the breakoff of the United States from its European allies and to fragment that——

Mr. **Brzezinski**. It is, but I do not believe that some reduction of American forces in Europe would accomplish the Soviet objective. I would remind you, Senator, that in the decade of the 1960's, initiated by the Berlin crisis, we actually reduced our forces in NATO by 112,000 men, and Europe was not decoupled. There is no——

Senator **Warner**. Just one last question.

When you advised President Carter about the Persian Gulf commitment, although it was never formalized, it was, I think, a major stroke and one that I endorsed. Did you consider the correlation of our military resources at the time the President went out and announced to the world that the United States would take up this added commitment?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Yes, I did, and of course we did not have the forces for a totally effective deterrent at the time, but I was guided by historical experience. When President Truman proclaimed the Truman Doctrine in regards to Greece and Turkey, we did not have the forces then, either.

A democracy cannot develop its forces surreptitiously, deploy them overtly, and then announce its commitment. A democracy has to announce its commitment, say it is engaged, warn the other side that if it aggresses it will become involved in a conflict with the democracy, and then proceed to build up its forces.

We were in the process already of building up the rapid deployment force, which was initiated by the administration which I served. This was accelerated after the announcement of the Carter Doctrine, which was in a State of the Union Address, which was later reiterated by President Reagan. This administration has continued the efforts to build up the RDF as well as the sea and airlift capability that has to go with it.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Exon.

Senator **Exon**. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I welcome you, Dr. Brzezinski.

Let us follow up on your recommendations on the phased withdrawal of our troops in Europe. Looking back on the end of World War II, which was over 40 years ago, and the history of the NATO alliance, is that alliance based fundamentally on the United States' permanent presence in Europe for as long as that alliance exists? Or would it not be reasonable to have the United States, an important part of NATO do whatever is necessary to protect Europe while still gradually withdrawing our troops?

What I am getting at is the GNP of Western Europe is larger than the GNP of the Soviet Union, and it seems to me that for over 40 years now the Europeans have recognized that it is a pretty good proposition economically for them to have large military forces maintained in Europe by the taxpayers of the United States. That is becoming an increasingly difficult budgetary and strategic squeeze as we recognize our shortage of military capability elsewhere.

Our NATO partners in Europe should carry a much greater share of their responsibility to maintain the integrity of their geography without the excessive presence that the United States has really had there for over 40 years.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Right. Let me just make a one-word correction, and it is not for reasons of pedantry but because it has implications. You referred to my views as involving the withdrawal of American forces from Europe. I am not advocating the withdrawal——

Senator EXON. I said partial.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Reduction. Otherwise, I agree with the thrust of your comments. When we became members of the NATO alliance, even President Eisenhower, who earlier was the commander of our forces in Europe, explicitly talked about the American troop presence in Europe as being a transitional thing, not as a permanent phase, and he already in the early 1950's discussed in some detail with his National Security Council the possibility of a very significant cut in the levels of American forces in Europe. I cite some NSC documents to that effect in my book, to which Senator Nunn made reference. President Eisenhower was very strong in his view that already in the 1950's called for some substantial reduction of American forces in Europe.

You are right. Europe's GNP could sustain a higher level of defense capability. It is striking to me that the two countries in Europe which are most prepared to defend themselves, France and Turkey, are also the most resilient countries in terms of their determination to stand on their own feet. I think there is something ultimately corrosive about excessive dependence on foreign troops for one's own protection.

Chairman NUNN. Could you add to that the one that is most prepared is Switzerland, who is not part of any alliance?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. That is right, or Sweden. So I personally do not believe that some reduction of American forces would precipitate a stampede in Western Europe either into neutralism or into subserviance to the Soviet Union.

Senator EXON. If so, they do it at their own peril. I am getting a little bit wary, as one United States Senator, with the Europeans continual reliance on the United States that is that after World War II they were down and out and had to have economic help, which we gave, and it is the United States of America's equal responsibility with them to defend their geography. I think we have to defend it if it is attacked, but I am not sure that we should not consider at least a reduction in forces, as you are suggesting.

Let me go to another proposition. On page 4 under strategic forces, you indicate that as of today the United States has adequate strategic forces for our deterrence, but you predict that 10 years from now there is a reasonable possibility that we would not. I am interested to know on what you base that, given the significant advances that we have now under way with regard to the D5 missiles on the Trident submarines, the Stealth bomber the MX missile, and the possibility of a Midgetman missile.

It seems to me that if we go ahead with these plans as presently envisioned, given the Soviet Union's present inventory and their ability to produce more warheads, I cannot see how we would slip as badly by 1996 as you envision in this brief summation on page 4.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Senator, I would draw your attention to the distinction of words used. In the category below, I use the word "probability". Here, I am saying a reasonable possibility, which means that there is a reasonable possibility that with Soviet deployments continuing at the rate at which they are going and with the United States not taking certain needed corrective steps, our response would be fragmentary.

In other words, our response would not be absent, but it could be highly disaggregated and disrupted and I have in mind particularly the vulnerability of our command and control systems. It is not only the question of the vulnerability of our strategic forces, but there is a very serious problem existing today regarding our command and control, which could become aggravated in the course of the next decade unless rather substantial measures are taken.

This is an issue of which people are conscious. It is an issue which has surfaced in the course of the last number of years because of the increased precision and accuracy of nuclear weapons. Some corrective steps started being taken in the course of the late 1970's. I believe they are being continued, but the problem is very grave. And this is what I have in mind when I speak of fragmentary retaliatory response, one in which not only some portion of our strategic forces could be attrited in the first phase of the nuclear engagement but also in which the remaining forces may not be able to respond in a coordinated fashion on the basis of effective central command.

Senator EXON. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Brzezinski, we welcome you here. It is very interesting to hear your exposition. You have a very imaginative mind. It is a question of just what is practical in these matters, I think.

On page 13 of your statement this morning, you recommended the United States should indicate a willingness to resolve the crisis in Nicaragua on the basis of the same formula as in Afghanistan which you have previously discussed.

If you were President of the United States today, in very few words what steps would you take, practical steps, to resolve the crisis in Afghanistan and in Nicaragua? You say it should be similar.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I tried to suggest a formula which would be the point of departure of an attempted resolution: namely, that the United States should propose that both countries be subjected to a neutral external regimen. They would be neutralized on the basis of international guarantees, making certain that neither country becomes a platform for hostile political or military or intelligence activities against the superpower located in that region.

I believe that such an arrangement regarding Afghanistan would in fact satisfy our strategic objectives in that part of the world because it would enhance the security of Pakistan and of Iran and thus keep the Soviet Union further away from the Persian Gulf.

I believe that if such an arrangement were to be contrived for Nicaragua such that Nicaragua could not become a base for Soviet and Cuban arms or for Soviet military or political activities, then Nicaragua would pose less of a threat to its immediate neighbors.

Moreover, part of the formula is an understanding between the superpowers that each country would be permitted to pursue its own internal political arrangements on the basis of self determination. In the case of Nicaragua, if it should be the will of the Nicaraguan people to have the present government, I would abide by that. My own judgment is that in open political competition, the government probably would not prevail, but if it did I would accept that provided Nicaragua was effectively neutralized subject to effective external control.

In regards to Afghanistan, I am convinced that internal self-determination would mean that the Communist puppet regime in Kabul would be promptly displaced and, hence, a neutral Afghanistan would not be a Communist Afghanistan.

Senator **Thurmond**. Do you think the Soviet Union would go along with what you are recommending?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. The Soviet Union over time may find that to be a preferable solution to the other alternatives, these being an escalating conflict in Nicaragua, regarding which Soviet capacity for intervention against the United States is likely to be limited by geographical and logistical considerations, and a protracted war in Afghanistan. The latter does have the effect of reducing Soviet influence in the Third World, of mobilizing the Moslem world against the Soviet Union, and of intensifying within the Soviet Union the political self-awareness of Soviet Moslems, turning them increasingly against Moscow's domination. So over time, the Soviets may conclude that this adventure has proven to be disproportionately costly to any potential benefits.

Senator **Thurmond**. Speaking about the SDI, we received testimony yesterday that the United States may deploy elements of the strategic defense initiative in increments in the near term. What are the strategy implications for maintaining strategic equalibrium with the Soviet Union?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. That depends, Senator, on how we deploy such an incremental strategic defense. If we begin to deploy it for the purpose of defending our principal population centers, in my own judgment, this probably would not be productive either to our own security or to greater stability in the American-Soviet relationship.

If we are to deploy it for the purpose of enhancing the survivability of our command and control facilities and of some of our land-based strategic forces, and not go beyond that, I believe that it would be eventually a contribution to mutual strategic security in the sense of reducing our own feeling of vulnerability to Soviet deployments but without enhancing Soviet insecurity, provided we were not matching these deployments with unlimited, unrestrained deployment of first-strike-potential U.S. forces. This is why I favor a cap on the level of American first-strike-potential strategic forces.

Senator **Thurmond**. Dr. Brzezinski, U.S. policy is to deter conflict, and if deterrence fails to terminate hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and our allies. We have deterred nuclear war and conventional conflict with the Soviet Union. We have, however, failed to deter conflicts through surrogates on the low end of the conflict spectrum.

How might we better deter such conflicts?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. I do not think I can give you a sweeping answer in one or two sentences because these proxy conflicts of which you speak occur under such varying circumstances in so many different parts of the world that you really have to deal with them on a case-by-case basis. A different response may be called for in the case of, let us say, Angola than Ethiopia, a different response still in the case of Central America and so forth. So I cannot give you a generalized response.

It does seem to me that it really depends on the configuration of forces from area to area. In some cases, we can rely on local forces. In some cases, we can rely on proxy forces. For example, in a sense, the war in Chad between the Libyans and the Chadian Government is a kind of proxy war, with Libya waging it directly to the Soviet benefit and with France supporting the local government against the Libyans. So it varies from country to country.

Senator **Thurmond**. I believe my time is up. Thank you, Dr. Brzezinski.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Levin.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome. Doctor, your testimony, as always, is thoughtful and thought provoking, and we welcome it.

You said this morning and you have stated in your book relative to the commitment of 350,000 troops or so in Europe that the majority of Europeans, and I am quoting from your book, Game Plan, obviously find it more convenient for the United States to commit major forces and to undertake disproportionate financial burdens.

Some of us have been troubled, as you point out, for some time, about those uneven burdens that we are sharing. The United States now is spending about 7 percent of its GNP on defense, our European allies about 3 percent of their GNP on defense. We are now spending roughly 28 percent of our budget on defense. Our European allies, I believe, are averaging 6 percent of their budget on defense.

We have had 350,000 troops roughly in Europe for 40 years or more now, and there is a feeling among many of us that we ought to try to figure out a fairer way to promote the collective security. The trick is how do you get to that fairer way without weakening the NATO alliance, which none of us would want to do.

There is already a perceived conventional imbalance in Europe between ourselves and the Soviet Union. That perceived conventional imbalance is going to make arms control more difficult, among other problems that it creates, including the security issue itself.

Could you comment on what political steps between us and our allies could be taken which would make it possible for us to move to a reduction in forces in Europe. Not withdrawal I should point out but just a reduction, promoting thereby fair burden sharing, and a sense of European collective security, allowing us to put those forces in other needed parts of the world where we are not as strong as we need to be?

Specifically, what political steps can we take to achieve that in a way which does not create confrontation or crisis with our own alliance?

May I say, having asked the question, this is something that our new subcommittee on conventional forces and NATO is going to be looking at in some detail. We would welcome your comments because I think that is going to be the secret, how to get to there from here without weakening our alliance.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. I think you put your finger on the critical issue, and I think you have stated the problem extremely well. Let me say that I do not have a solution and I do not have too much confidence in the probability of a political dialogue with our West European allies producing the desirable result.

The reason is the one you have mentioned. It is more convenient to have America do more and, therefore, for oneself to have to do less. I think this is part of the legacy of Europe's disintegration, historical suicide, the product of world wars; and, therefore, some unilateral steps by us, I think, would be necessary. Unless we take some unilateral steps, that is to say, some limited gradual reductions, I do not think the Europeans will take any initiative by us to discuss the issue very seriously.

Beyond that, there may be some things that would help. It has been suggested, for example, that we would consider a European as a NATO commander, and that might help to symbolize the fact that NATO has in fact increasingly become a regional alliance. When we and the Europeans entered into NATO, I think both of us thought of it as a global alliance. We expected the Europeans to help us in Korea; the French expected us to help them in Vietnam; even the English expected some assistance for their efforts in Malaya. Today, NATO is really a European alliance. The Europeans are not helping us politically outside of Europe, not even in the Persian Gulf, and certainly not in Central America or elsewhere. So let us symbolize that by making a European the commander of NATO. That is a thought, if not a recommendation. But maybe it would help.

Certainly an initiative by the United States to expand the arms control negotiations with the Soviets from the purely strategic level to what I would call comprehensive arms reduction talks might help to put more emphasis on the need for balance in conventional forces and by implication suggest to the Europeans that there are two ways of achieving it, either by joint agreement with the Soviets or by themselves doing somewhat more.

But ultimately, the credibility of any initiative along these lines, I think, will depend on our willingness to follow through by doing what is needed. And I do not advocate some reduction in American forces in Europe lightly. I know there are risks involved.

But I see great risks in us not doing it, given the geostrategic developments elsewhere. The fact of the matter is that in the next few years the most vulnerable part of the world and the most explosive part of the world is going to be the Persian Gulf region. And if things go badly for us there, if the Soviet Union gains a preponderant position, if the Soviet Union is then in a position to dictate the price of oil to the Far East and to Western Europe, the Soviet Union would be in a position to undo our presence in the two critical extremities of Eurasia.

Hence, we need to do more there, and this is why I am led to the belief that we ought to begin some gradual redeployments. I think the Europeans then, for the first time in 40 years, will have to ask themselves whether the time has not really come for Europe to do what it ought to be able to do, which is to defend itself to a significant degree against the Soviet Union, which is weaker than Western Europe in GNP, which is entering an era of a systemic crisis, which is not likely to contemplate an invasion of Western Europe lightly, given our continued presence in Western Europe, in any case.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

As our subcommittee looks into this in even greater detail, we would look forward to consulting with you in greater detail on this issue. I appreciate it.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Brzezinski, I find your statement to be one of the most interesting I have read in my 8 years of service in this body. It is loaded with insights and interesting and shrewd observations. But I am not surprised, because I regard you as one of our country's brightest strategic thinkers, and I only wish that you were playing a part in this administration.

One of the interesting insights that is contained in your statements on page 13 where you note that too often the State Department tends to confuse diplomacy with foreign policy.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I noted that you liked that when I was reading it.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is not only true, it is also funny, the way you put it. It underscores the importance of preserving through this witch hunt, the role of the National Security Council.

It is my opinion that over the last several years, the State Department has played too great a role in selection of NSC presidential advisors, in hopes of neutralizing NSC, with unfortunate effects. And I hope that Mr. Carlucci can re-establish the fierce independence of that office while putting it on a responsible management basis.

Turning to one of my pet causes, Afghanistan, I guess that has been discussed to some extent before I arrived this morning. But nonetheless, I want to focus on your point that in Southwest Asia the most important priority for the United States is to step up political and military pressure on the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Well, we can clearly understand what you mean by the military pressure. It does not take much elaboration. Things are going a little bit better there recently, because either the Mujahideen are getting much better with their AK-47's or possibly there are some new weapons systems in there. But they have certainly gotten better. It is too bad that improvement was not effectuated years and years ago.

Let me ask you then about the other element in the proposal, to step up the political pressure. What are we doing to bring political pressure to bear on the Soviets so as to increase the cost of occupation of Afghanistan?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, it seems to me that it is very important to drive home to the Soviet Union the proposition that any generally comprehensive improvement in the American-Soviet relationship requires the resolution of the Afghan issue. This is not a marginal issue, one to which only lip service is being paid. I was struck, for example, with the fact that in Reykjavik the discussion of Afghanistan was marginal and perfunctory, and I think that is the wrong message sent to the Soviet Union.

And the reason I stress this is not only because of the moral dimension of the problem, though that is important because the Afghan people are being subjected today to genocide, but also because of the geopolitical importance of the issue. If Afghanistan is subordinated, the pressure on Pakistan and Iran is going to be enormous, and we are going to confront a far greater challenge. So we ought to stress that this is a central issue in the American-Soviet relationship and drive this home to the Soviets.

Beyond that, I believe we could do a great deal more to try to publicize that war worldwide, that is to say, to enhance through our own means the television and radio coverage of that war, because if global public opinion becomes more aware of what is going on, the way it was about the war in Vietnam, the more international pressure there will be on the Soviet Union.

I think we could do more to drive home to Soviet public opinion the moral and human costs of that war by stepped-up broadcasts into the Soviet Union on that subject, by particularly trying to target on a much more concentrated basis the Soviet Central Asian population, which is beginning to feel some affinity with the Afghans, and to whose feelings the Soviet Government cannot be totally unresponsive.

All of that would bring home to the Soviet leaders the larger costs of this war and perhaps precipitate in them a re-evaluation of the advantages of continuing on the present course or the disadvantages of continuing on that course.

Senator HUMPHREY. What about economic pressures? We recall just a few months ago that we were offering to subsidize the sale of grain to the Soviet Union. What is your opinion, not only about that—I just cite that as an example—about the potential of bringing to bear of economic pressure?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think the capacity for us to press the Soviets for economic leverage is quite limited and should only be used under very special circumstances, and particularly in those areas where we do have some genuine leverage on a continuing basis.

Under extreme circumstances, comprehensive sanctions can be used, and they do have some limited impact. For example, for 1½ years the grain embargo on the Soviet Union did cause the Soviet Union enormous discomfort and had some genuine negative economic consequences for the Soviet Union. But after a year or so, it went down. The Soviet Union found substitute sources and so forth, and therefore there was no point really in maintaining that indefinitely.

I would say high technology, particularly dual-use technology, is the area where we ought to be very strict. But beyond that, I would leave large scale comprehensive economic sanctions only for situations of severe crisis.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, to be sure the Soviets have a way of getting around these things. But it seems to me that there is a message sent in creating embargoes. The Carter administration, as you well know because you probably had a key role in planning the sanctions, imposed a number of sanctions, all of which have been liquidated as far as I know.

Aeroflot is flying, not that Aeroflot gains a lot of revenue from flying to the United States. That is not the point. The point is that when we restore Aeroflot, when we lift sanctions, when it is business as usual, we are sending a message that, notwithstanding our protestations on the anniversary date of the Soviet invasion every year, during the rest of the year it is business as usual and they can ignore what we say about Afghanistan?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Well, I agree with you. There are some sanctions which do not cost us anything, which are essentially symbolic in nature, which it is useful to maintain. And I think Aeroflot is a good example.

But when it comes to a comprehensive economic boycott, then we do have to ask ourselves: Does it really impose on the Soviet Union some real disadvantage? Does it cost us anything, and what are the tradeoffs? And at some stage, such comprehensive sanctions do become counterproductive to our interests, and therefore I would not dogmatically insist on them.

Senator **Humphrey**. Well, would you agree or not that it is business as usual with the Soviets today, notwithstanding Afghanistan,

Mr. **Brzezinski**. I would certainly not conduct business as usual as long as Afghanistan continues, because I think it is, first of all, a moral outrage; and second, it is a long term geostrategic threat.

Senator **Humphrey**. I quite agree. But my question was, would you agree that present policies constitute business as usual?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. I think to a large extent yes, and I think that that is regrettable. And I think, as I already said, in Reykjavik, for example, much more should have been made of Afghanistan. I would hope that in a future encounter more will be made of it. The point is not to pinprick the Soviets. But more should be done because it really is a source of major instability, and the Soviet Union should recognize that, whatever its own motives regarding Afghanistan may be, the consequences of its presence in Afghanistan are regionally destabilizing in an area where we have truly vital interests, Western Europe's and the Far East's dependence on the Persian Gulf.

Senator **Humphrey**. I wish I had more time. I would like to be able to have you all to myself for about half a day.

Chairman **Nunn**. Buy a few books and you might arrange that. Senator Bingaman.

Senator **Bingaman**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Brzezinski, concerning your suggestion on page 13 that the United States resolve the crisis in Nicaragua on the basis of the same formula as in Afghanistan, could you be more specific about what that would imply with regard to our support for the Contras. Specifically, are you suggesting that U.S. support for the Contras is one type of external involvement of a superpower that could be withdrawn if there was a quid pro quo by Soviet-Cuban troops?

As I understand the administration's position, the support for the Contras is not only the result of Soviet-Cuban involvement down there, but a result of our dissatisfaction with their internal lack of democratic government, et cetera.

I would be interested in what you would see as the necessary conditions to be met before the United States could appropriately withdraw support from the Contras.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. My objective in this formula is to clarify what are the legitimate goals of the United States vis-a-vis Nicaragua, bearing in mind that it is rather difficult for us to insist that the Soviet Union accept more regarding Afghanistan than we are prepared to accept regarding Nicaragua.

The formula that I propose involves internal self-determination as well as external neutralization. And my willingness to support the Contra effort, which I do support, is conditioned on the notion that it ought to have a defined political objective. In my view, right now, that objective is unclear, undefined, and perhaps not clearly limited. Are we trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime? Are there no circumstances under which we would be prepared to accept it? Can we live with it under any set of arrangements? Those are the areas of ambiguity in our current policy in my judgment.

In my view, if Nicaragua were neutralized externally in a watertight fashion subject to international controls and the Soviet-Cuban presence was thereby eliminated, we could live with the Sandinista regime in Managua if that was the will of the Nicaraguan people. But the Nicaraguan people should have the opportunity to express their feelings, and those who oppose the regime should have the right to participate in its political process. If we can get that outcome in Nicaragua, I would be very satisfied.

It seems to me that the formula I propose gives us the basis for saying to the Soviets: We're not asking you to do any more in Afghanistan than what we are prepared to live with in the case of Nicaragua, and vice versa.

Senator **Bingaman**. Let me ask your reference to—I think the phrase was "spontaneous competition in utopias at Reykjavik." The suggestion is made, and I gather was made again by Secretary Weinberger yesterday, that with regard to the SDI program, one of the goals of the administration would be eventually to share that technology with the Soviets so that there would be an ability to have a defense on both sides and thereby increase stability.

Is that in your view a credible suggestion or goal of our foreign policy?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Well, there is a certain naive charm to that idea that I find captivating, but not particularly practical.

Senator **Bingaman**. You do not believe that that would ever be the result?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Well, if we assume that the United States and the Soviet Union are still rivals politically, which I assume is a reasonable assumption, if we assume there is a military competition between us and the Soviets, which means that each is somewhat wary of the other and which I think is a reasonable assumption, if we assume that these conditions would continue even if there was an arms control agreement with the Soviets, then I do not see how we could be transferring to the Soviets technology which deals with tracking, with acquisition, with surveillance, with guidance, and so on, which are all on the cutting edge of military capabilities.

Senator **Bingaman**. But you do believe that some limited strategic defense is in our national interest, regardless of whether the Soviets develop the capability to match that?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. I would say that some strategic defense would be in our interest and would be mutually stabilizing, providing it is clearly limited and providing it is also accompanied by restraint on the deployment of potential first strike offenses for strategic systems.

The only condition under which I would find it superfluous, that is to say, the only condition under which I would find some limited strategic defense superfluous, would be if there was a really watertight comprehensive strategic-conventional arms control and reduction agreement which resulted in a truly massive reduction of strategic arsenals and a relationship of genuine mutual security, accompanied by some significant proportional reductions in conventional forces, because then we would have the relationship of mutual stability in which we would be less dependent on extended deterrence.

Anything short of that still leaves us with the requirement for extended deterrence, that is to say, to reinforce our conventional capability with the potential for strategic engagements as part of deterrence. And that inherently puts a cap on what can be achieved in arms control.

Senator **Bingaman**. My time is up. Thank you very much.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Cohen.

Senator **Cohen**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I might first point out, Dr. Brzezinski, that it is an extraordinary experience to see the amount of accolades flowing from this side of the podium upon you. I do not recall that being the case when you were a member of the Carter administration.

I think that lends credence to the theorem that one must depart office before being worthy of holding office.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. If I may interrupt, there is a further reason to it. It is the sacred duty of every administration to make its predecessors look better. We lived up to it. I believe this administration is living up to it as well. [Laughter.]

Senator **Cohen**. With a little help from its friends.

Well, I do not want to get into withdrawal of troops from Korea, but I would like to go back to Senator Bingaman's question. Even if the Nicaraguan people chose to have a Communist government with voluntary, free, open elections, would you not advocate permitting Nicaragua to maintain an extraordinarily large army or perhaps even to expand a 10,000 foot runway, or to perhaps intimidate its neighbors?

Assuming that they voluntarily choose to have a Marxist-Leninist government, would you still insist upon a U.S. determination to resist its expansionist policies?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Oh, yes, absolutely. In effect what I am saying is that if the Nicaraguans choose to have the Communist regime, we could live with it, the way, for example, the Soviets can live with Finland, which does not have a Communist regime but is a genuinely neutral state and therefore does not threaten Soviet interests.

If we could have a neutral Communist state—and, that is to say, if we could have a dismantling of this large army, international controls over the inflow of arms into Nicaragua, carefully monitored to our satisfaction, and if we could have the elimination of Soviet and Cuban and German or other instructors or advisors from Nicaragua—then Nicaragua would not be in a position to pose any physical threat to its neighbors.

And under those circumstances, I think we could live with a neutral Nicaragua, the way we expect, for example, the Soviet Union to be willing to live with a neutral Afghanistan, subject to similar constraints.

Senator COHEN. You mentioned the gradual redeployment of the forces in Europe. I am not sure exactly what the reaction is going to be, between your recommendation about a phased reduction of 100,000 troops coupled with what has taken place in the fallout from Reykjavik. But I nonetheless think there is merit to what you are suggesting.

But you also talk about redeploying those 100,000 troops to other regions, particularly perhaps in the Middle East. How realistic—no?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. No.

Senator COHEN. I am talking about a light division being rapidly deployable.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I would like to build our air and sea lift capability, because it really is inadequate. And I would like to have greater flexibility in our ability to project our forces abroad. That means some enhancement of light divisions, because the situation that we are in today is that we have deployed forces of a heavy type in Europe, which are not capable really of fighting anywhere else.

Senator COHEN. But the fact is we do not have the airlift and sealift capability today to project those forces.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. That is right.

Senator COHEN. But they would primarily have to be based in the United States, would they not?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. That is right.

Senator COHEN. Because those countries could not tolerate——

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. That is exactly right. We could maybe have some repositioning of equipment in some places, depending on the politics of our relationship with particular countries.

But basically, as you look into the nineties and to the year 2000, the fact is that we are likely to be faced with geostrategic threats in areas where we cannot deploy our forces permanently and we have enormous forces deployed permanently where the local forces could be built up. There is the GNP for it.

So my strategic view is we ought to build up our light forces and enhance our air and sealift capability, build up our C-5 arsenal, build up the C-17's, which are a long way off, to give us more flexibility and versatility in projection of forces.

Senator COHEN. In your testimony you indicate that the Soviets have the capacity for serious, but not conclusive, disruption of our ocean control capabilities, at least between now and 1996, assuming no basic change. Do you presume that the Philippines will stay in the U.S. availability or orbit?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I obviously have to guess on this, and I would guess yes. Even though there is some movement in the Philippines in the direction of pressing us to withdraw our forces, by and large the Filipinos know that they have also a major economic stake in our presence in the country.

Senator COHEN. And the loss of the Philippines——

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Would have a very serious impact, and that, I think, would affect our ability for sea control, which, incidentally, has implications also for our plan to enhance our present inventory of aircraft task forces. These are essentially either force projection systems or strategic war fighting systems, and they are not that central to ocean control, which I think is far more important.

Senator **Cohen**. Your testimony implies that you do not think much of the Midgetman.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. I have some uncertainties about it, to put it mildly. I think it is going to cost a hell of a lot more than it is projected. I think we are going to have a hell of a problem deploying it in the country in the numbers that are going to be adequate to meet the Soviet threat, and I am not convinced that strategic security built on both sides in mobile forces is going to enhance our sense of security. In fact, I think it is probably going to enhance our sense of insecurity.

Senator **Nunn**. Senator Dixon.

Senator **Dixon**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a prepared statement which I will submit for the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Alan J. Dixon

Mr. Chairman, we begin today's hearings with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

I look forward to hearing from Dr. Brzezinski as he discusses the military and technological components of the United States National Security strategy. I have reviewed Dr. Brzezinski's opening statement and feel his views are very important to what this committee, through your leadership, is focusing on this month.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Dixon**. Doctor, I appreciate the fact that there are probably a great many things that you presented here to the committee that are in the long run more important than the Nicaraguan question. Probably in this session of the Congress we will spend more time discussing this issue simply because of the commitment of the administration to support the Contras in Nicaragua and because of the contentiousness of the issue both in the Congress and in the country.

Last year Contra assistance passed in the United States Senate by a vote of 53 to 47, as you know. That whole question, I think, will be subject to considerable debate this time. I happen to be one of the minority in my party who supplied one of those necessary votes for the passage of that legislation last time. Obviously, in view of everything that has transpired, some of us are reassessing that question, so I would like to pursue in a more finite way, if I might, the things that you have said about Nicaragua. Essentially my vote was cast because I wanted to keep the pressure on down there to ultimately force free elections to come about in Nicaragua. I have said publicly on the floor and in my State exactly what you testified to today, but I will accept the result in Nicaragua and if the result in a popular free election should be that the Sandinistas prevail, then of course we will have to live with that whether we like it or not.

You cannot have a free election and then say you deny the result of that election. That is not the American way. Essentially I think you and I are in full agreement thus far. Would that be a correct statement?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. That would be the correct statement. I would have myself voted for the support for the Contras, but I would have also pressed the administration and I would continue pressing for a clear definition of what kind of a settlement it is prepared to accept short of a military resolution of the problem.

Senator DIXON. That is just what I wanted to pursue with you. Quite obviously, if there is any remote chance, and this is only my view of it, for Contra assistance this time, it will be based upon a considerable set of circumstances and guidelines with respect to what we want to see take place down there.

I think that is a fair statement. What I am trying to find out from you is, how would you do that? How would you try to bring around the Nicaraguans and others to see to it that free elections take place in Nicaragua as a condition of this whole subject matter being pursued in this session of the Congress?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, in a way I have already indicated that, and so have you, by supporting some military opposition to the Sandinista regime, and this is why I would have voted to support the Contra effort. If we do not have some military pressure on the Sandinista regime, it will try to have its cake and eat it, too. It will try to preserve itself in power and maintain its external links with the Soviets and Cubans and eventually resume a more activist policy vis-a-vis its neighbors from which it has desisted lately largely because of Contra pressure.

Senator DIXON. This is the central point, that the Contra pressure has been significant so far as that evaluation continues to be a part of the Ortega government?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. That is true, but I would repeat, it is important, it seems to me, to define more explicitly than the administration has done what are the parameters of an acceptable political solution both in terms of external arrangements and internal arrangements? I think implicit in the administration's current policy is that the only acceptable Nicaragua is a truly democratic Nicaragua, according to our standards. I would rather put more emphasis on the more explicit definition of external restraints on Nicaragua to assure its neutrality as well as on guarantees for internal political freedom, and then indicate that if the end result of that would be a kind of neutralized Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicargaua, provided we were satisfied that it is genuinely neutral, we would be prepared to accept it and to live with it.

Senator DIXON. The distinction you are making here is an important one. I think the administration seeks to overthrow that government by the use of Contra assistance. I think you and I and some others who would support Contra assistance, believe that it is the vehicle by which we bring about free elections, and we live with that result. Is that not true? That is the American way, even if we do not like the result.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. That is correct, although I personally expect the Sandinistas would eventually lose these elections, but I may be wrong.

Senator DIXON. Well, I hope you are right, but that is something we would have to test in the political marketplace.

One other thing I wanted to quickly allude to if I have time, Mr. Chairman. We were discussing earlier, I think Senator Cohen had the question of the mobility of a mobile basing mode, and I got the impression in your testimony that you oppose generally a mobile basing mode either for the MX or for the Midgetman. Am I correct in assuming that from your testimony, even in light of the excess of SS-24s and SS-25s that the Soviets have?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think we essentially face three choices. If the Soviets proliferate their strategic systems, and if there is no arms control, we can either proliferate our own strategic forces, including having mobiles, or we can have a prudent mix of strategic offensive and defensive systems. Of these two choices I prefer the second, because I think it is more stabilizing, and in the long run may drive the Soviets toward a similar arrangement, thereby giving us more security. The third alternative is a satisfactory arms control agreement which really eliminates the problem. I do not think the third alternative is very likely in the near future. And therefore it is a choice between the first two.

Senator DIXON. That is my point. Of course, we would all agree with you that arms control is the best type of result, but given the fact that they are developing and have developed and continue to pursue the SS-24s and SS-25s on trucks and on rails, do you not think that we ought to have a mix and that we ought to, to some extent at least, employ that type of mobility in our basing mode?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, the reason that I prefer limited strategic defenses to reliance on mobile systems is that while the Soviets have unlimited basing options, and while they are in a far better position to engage in strategic deception than we are, we are limited both in our capacity for strategic deception and probably in deployment modes. And this means that eventually in such a setting we are likely to be less secure than they.

Senator DIXON. Well, I would like to pursue that further with you on another opportunity, but my time has run out. Thank you, Doctor.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Dr. Brzezinski. I also want to join in congratulating you on a fine, as I think Senator Levin said, thought-provoking statement. I certainly agree, as the chairman indicated in his opening statement, that we ought to look at how we can encourage Japan to do more rather than to just rearm. I think your ideas are very well thought out. I am intrigued by your recommendation on the withdrawal of 100,000 troops from Europe. You say it is a judgmental decision. I certainly think it is. I look forward to working with Senator Levin as we try to explore this.

The only trick is, as we do less, how do we get the response to have Europe do more? And for some reason I think that the situation is, when we do less, the response is that they are not going to do more, that they will probably do less also, and if that is going to be the response, then we have to think this out, but anyway, I think it is worthwhile to explore.

We have got new commitments. We have got new arrangements that are emerging, and I think it is something at least worth talking about. I have some innate reservations about it, but I am not at all reluctant to talk about it. Let us focus a moment on the prudent mix of offensive and defensive forces that you talk about.

I assume when you discuss a deployment of a limited SDI that you are referring to an article you wrote a couple of years ago in the New York Times which would be a constellation of the kinetic weapons with a ground-based set of interceptors. Is that basically the type of system that we look at, the terminal phase and also the boost phase, and a limited deployment of SDI?

If we would have a limited deployment of SDI and it would work and be effective against the ballistic missiles on a limited basis, would not we then probably want to deploy more rather than just limit it? What is the definition of a limited deployment of SDI assuming that it is as effective as some of the promising technology indicates, shouldn't we move this prudent mix of offensive forces and defensive forces more in the direction of not limiting SDI but maybe having a different type of balance rather than limited. I guess I am struck by your definition of a limited SDI which seems to me to be saying, well, we are just going to do a little bit of it, and not too much.

Could you expand on your thoughts on that?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. There is a quantum leap from what I call limited defense to protect your command and control systems and a portion of your strategic forces to a strategic defense designed to defend people. To defend people significantly you have to have a strategic defense which is really for all practical purposes nonporous. Even small leakage can result in megadeaths of millions.

If you are trying to protect command and control facilities and strategic forces on a limited basis, what you want to make certain is that the planner of a strategic attack is deprived of the certainty that he can have an effective strike against precise targets to a degree that he either decapitates and disrupts your control and command arrangements or attrites your strategic forces so that you are no longer able to respond in a significant way.

In the latter case, even a partial attrition, particularly on a random basis, of incoming attacking systems achieves your purpose because it deprives the planner of the attack of that certainty. And therefore there is really a fundamental difference between limited strategic defense and total defense, and having a limited defense does not mean that you can simply incrementally expand to have total defense. It becomes quite different, not only order of magnitude, but even in the type of system, one that does not exist.

Senator QUAYLE. Does not exist now, but if in fact you would expand on that technology then you would have an effective limited SDI that would still be porous. You would protect the national command authorities, communications command, strategic forces. You would still only have a limited protection. But if in fact it is effective, and you could have that limited protection from a technological sense, I would think that you would be able to build upon that and to expand it. We will have to wait and see where we go, whether you call this population defense against ballistic missiles. That is a problem right now.

You mentioned the bombers and cruise missiles. That is another problem. The ballistic missiles is the destabilizing threat that we face right now. Just looking at eliminating that threat and as we move toward a limited deployment, which I certainly subscribe to, then we would build upon that and you would have even more.

That is just my own idea of the thing. I certainly understand what you are saying. I do not think that we are disagreeing.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. It is important to note, however, that even if one were to progress to where you describe, Senator, you would be dealing with a totally different order of magnitude in terms of cost, so you would be dealing with something infinitely more expensive. First, you would be dealing with a much more complex system if you really wanted to have total population defense. Second, the other side would therefore know whether you are moving into it or not. Third, and quite importantly, if you want to deploy limited strategic defenses you could do it by joint agreement, which would preclude the deployment of a comprehensive populationwide defense.

Senator QUAYLE. My time is up. Just quickly on your assessment here of 1986 to 1996, Soviet vis-a-vis United States, what assumption did you use for defense budget increases? Did you plug in a budget assumption on that?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, quite frankly, I do not think the level of budget spending is necessarily directly connected with our strategic capabilities. For example, in the last 6 years we have spent approximately $330 billion over what we would have spent without greatly enhancing our strategic capabilities as such.

We have improved different aspects of our forces. We have improved our readiness to some extent. We have improved our sustainability. We have improved our Naval forces. But in terms of strategic forces, that money did not buy us a great deal strategically. Our strategic forces today are only marginally, very marginally, stronger than they were in 1980—10 MXs—and therefore the budget is not that decisive. It is where you go and what you go for that is much more important. My assumption is that we will probably keep spending somewhere on a level slightly above the inflation rate, hopefully at the rate of 3 percent per annum increases. The decisive question is, where do we allocate some of the effort?

Chairman NUNN. May I just venture here that I think there is a fundamental difference between the kind of strategic defense system that Dr. Brzezinski is talking about and the kind that Secretary Weinberger described yesterday. In fact, Secretary Weinberger precisely rejected the kind of defense system that Mr. Brzezinski has laid out here, and there is a fundamental difference in the design and architecture of that system. You do not have the same goals. You do not have the same scope, magnitude, economic cost. So this is an issue. You can take one side or the other, but I do not think you can say that it is not a fundamental difference.

Senator QUAYLE. If you would yield on that point——

Chairman NUNN. I would be glad to.

Senator QUAYLE. Listening to Secretary Weinberger's response yesterday I had the same conclusion. I called him yesterday afternoon and we had further discussion. I am not convinced, and we will find out when they bring up the architectural designs, that what Dr. Brzezinski is describing is really that incompatible with what the Secretary of Defense has in mind and what I think he is going to recommend.

I am really not convinced that that is the case.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Brzezinski, what do you believe?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I would put it this way. If I were commenting on this 2 years ago, I would have agreed with you. Now I think there is a possibility that the Secretary is using this concept of incremental deployment as an umbrella under which something along the lines that I favor may begin to emerge without ostentatiously and explicitly abandoning the President's goal, which is to defend people, to replace deterrence, to get rid of the nuclear threat, or whatever the slogan may be.

Chairman NUNN. You are basically saying the bureaucracy may march off to a different tune than what the President has told them to without informing the President?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. That occasionally has happened.

Chairman NUNN. Perhaps that is what is happening but it is a very questionable way to do business. At some point the Congress gets involved and they have to explain to us what they really are seeking to do.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr. Brzezinski.

Like many of my colleagues I have greatly enjoyed the sweep of your testimony here today, and this kind of testimony, I would say to the chairman and ranking member, is exactly the kind of discussion that we ought to be having more of, and again I think it shows the wisdom of leading off this year with this kind of discussion.

I had so many questions as a result of your statement that it is hard to select for 6 minutes. There is much that you have said that I disagree with and much I agree with, but I guess given the constraints of time I would like to follow up on the questions that have just been asked on SDI.

Am I correct in assuming that your strategic vision of SDI is of a system that is at least in part space-based?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, I would think so, although it need not begin that way.

Senator GORE. All right. Now, you, however, want to limit it. "It should be confined," and I am reading from your book—I enjoyed your book, incidentally—"confined to the protection of strategic forces, the National Command Authority, and C cubed I." Targets like Washington?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes.

Senator GORE. Would you employ interceptor missiles around the beltway?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Not necessarily around the beltway, but one of the objectives would be to prevent the highly disruptive possiblity of decapitation of our command authority.

Senator GORE. Washington, Omaha, Cheyenne Mountain?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, maybe some SLBM bases, presumably some bases from which reinforcements to Europe would have to move both men and equipment. These are some of the matters that would have to be decided, but essentially along these lines.

Senator GORE. OK. Now, you have the interceptors around Washington and some of these other targets, and you have also got the space-based components in orbit. Would you envision the space-based component selectively stopping missiles aimed at the C^3 I targets?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. No, the advantage of the space-based component is in fact in its randomness. The planner of a strategic attack, because the defense has a random effect, could never be certain whether his planned mission can be executed given the random character of the defense screen through which these weapons would have to pass.

Senator GORE. Now, that would be true whether the planned mission was a first strike or a retaliatory strike, correct?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. In a retaliatory strike it would make no difference.

Senator GORE. We have a doctrine, as you well know because you have written one yourself, for retaliation. That doctrine requires specific missions for our retaliatory forces.

Are you telling me that it would make absolutely no difference whether or not a screen in space made it impossible for us to have assurance that we could perform that mission?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, first of all, I started out with the Soviets, and now you are talking about us.

Senator GORE. Well, if I could interrupt for a moment, do you not think it is a fair assumption that if we go forward with the space-based defensive component, there is a possibility that the Soviets——

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. But there is a different answer depending on who fires first.

Senator GORE. Let us assume that the Soviets have a system just like the one you are proposing for us, and they have a space-based screen. They launch a first strike. We launch a retaliatory strike. Our weapons have a specific mission assigned to them for that retaliation. They encounter the Soviet space-based screen. What does that do to——

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I understand the thrust of your question, and my answer will be the following. Your retaliatory response would suffer some degradation in the choice of targets, but the tradeoff that would be bought—and to my judgment a highly beneficial one—is that in fact the existence of such a screen would reduce the likelihood of a first strike. The only first strike that would not make sense if you have such a screen would be a first-strike attack which is totally devastating, in fact, therefore, in my judgment, is suicidal if you retain a retaliatory capability. That would enhance deterrence.

Senator GORE. Let me present a concern and ask you to react to it in the brief time that I have remaining. There is a tremendous amount of uncertainty over the level of effectiveness for any such space-based screen. It seems reasonable to assert that the aggressor nation would have to assume the high assumption within that range of uncertainty. They would have to assume the high end. The nation defending itself and relying on that space-based screen would have to assume the low end of the uncertainty.

Now, one of my concerns is that this range of uncertainty is so large that it contains the seeds of tremendous instability in the arms race itself. Second, once both nations move in that direction, both encounter the kind of momentum that the Senator from Indiana was speculating about from the other direction, saying if we had gotten rid of our inhibitions on this, if we get it up there partially, why not just keep going?

And third, the tit for tat problem. Now, those three problems, it seems to me, add up to not necessarily crisis instability in the short term, but arms race instability in the form of greater pressures on both sides to accelerate their defense expenditures and their measures and countermeasures vis-a-vis the other side.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. These are all very thoughtful arguments, Senator, and they need to be discussed very fully. My brief answer would be that first of all, insofar as the Soviet side of the equation is concerned, their level of insecurity would be very much conditioned by the level of our offensive strategic deployments, and you will have noticed that both in the book and in my testimony today I speak very specifically and explicitly about unilateral American limits in terms of the number of first-strike-potential strategic systems being deployed by the United States. Therefore the Soviet side, faced with a limited American defensive screen, which obviates to some degree the effectiveness of their first strike, and also limited American offensive strategic forces would be able to calculate that the United States really does not have the capacity to launch a preemptive first strike. We would have to monitor very closely Soviet behavior.

Now, if the Soviets deploy a limited strategic defense and match it with an uninhibited deployment of offensive strategic systems, we would then face a second choice, namely, either to expand the scale of our limited strategic defenses or compensate for the Soviet deployments by some enhanced strategic offensive deployments. I would prefer the former to the latter, but that is the second choice we would have to make. The Soviets might then discover that it really is not buying them any more security to keep enhancing their strategic offensive forces. And they may conclude that in fact it is better to adopt a similar position, that is to say, also accept a cap on their offensive strategic forces.

In any case, I find such a relationship in the long run more stabilizing than one in which the Soviets continue to proliferate SS–24s and SS–25s, a high proportion of which we will never be able to locate without really intrusive verification. Oh, I know, arms controllers always tell you that verification is wonderful, and then they tell you when there is a violation that it is ambiguous. But you are talking here about life and death, and we had better be sure that we know how many they have and where they are. And we are going to be very limited by political pressures in our deployment capabilities, so I do not find greater security in the proliferation of mobile systems.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you. It seems to me that in their evaluation of our strategic capabilities they will be forced, as we will be, to look not simply at offensive deployments but at the combined strategic utility of offenses and defenses, and even an offensive force constrained short of a first strike capability on its own merits could become far more destabilizing in terms of the arms race if combined with an unconstrained defensive capacity which magnified its utility.

Now, I just want to make that point briefly, and I appreciate the chairman yielding.

Chairman **Nunn**. I will go ahead and yield to Senator Wilson. The only thing I was going to ask, do you take into account the cost effectiveness, at the margin in these judgments.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. As you know, Senator, that is a terribly controversial issue for which each side can produce conflicting figures. I have seen a sufficient number of figures to make me feel reasonably confident, but not dogmatically so, that limited strategic defenses are cost effective vis-a-vis efforts to attrite them.

Chairman **Nunn**. But you do use that as a criteria. You think that that should be part of our design of the system?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Absolutely.

Chairman **Nunn**. If you completely drop cost effectiveness at the margin do you not lose an awful lot of the logic of your argument?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Absolutely, but you also have to take into account the likely cost of mobile systems, management, protecting them, moving them around.

Chairman **Nunn**. But that is arithmetic. What I am saying is, you still believe we ought to use cost effectiveness at the margin wherever the arithmetic comes out?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Yes.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Wilson.

Senator **Wilson**. Mr. Chairman, I hope you will recall that I tried unsuccessfully to get the Senate to apply that standard on a far more broad basis than we succeeded in doing, but that is another story for another time. I will add to the chorus of praise for Dr. Brzezinski. It might be unnerving to him to learn that he has said almost nothing this morning with which I disagree.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Let me try harder.

Senator **Wilson**. Let me come back to the very important point about whether or not the Secretary of Defense speaking for the administration is really talking about the kind of deployment of a defensive system that Dr. Brzezinski is talking about here. I recall very well a fascinating article that you and Dr. Jastrow and Ambassador Camp wrote in the New York Times Magazine which was something of a precursor elaborating in greater detail that kind of system that you described this morning.

Yesterday in his response to Senator Exon, Secretary Weinberger spoke not of simply defending our retaliatory force, but also of a system that would have a far greater footprint, although he did not use that phrase. He used, I think, the phrase something that could defend a continent.

I think you have made the point very well this morning on page 6, of the necessity to deploy a limited strategic defense, which should be composed of a space-based screen to destroy Soviet missiles in the boost phase and a land-based terminal defense to intercept those that survive.

While it would be an imperfect defense it would achieve the critical objective of injecting randomness into any Soviet planning or first strike nuclear attack. I think that is the point. Even a system which Dr. Jastrow in a recent report on the Marshall Institute Study said if it were only 50 percent effective it would effectively discourage first strike.

Now, if that is our goal, do you not think it is true, Dr. Brzezinski, that a lot of this debate is somewhat semantic because if we are preventing an irrational Soviet war plan engaging in first strike against our strategic assets, we are effectively going to discourage them from any kind of first strike. One that would make even less sense would be one that was targeting our population.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Except that in the really dangerous nuclear scenario which involves the deliberate initiation of hostilities pertains to a strategic attack on strategic assets. As long as we retain the capacity for retaliation, we eliminate the danger of a deliberately initiated total strategic war. This is why I favor the kind of formula that I advocate here, because that in turn then permits us to maintain a structure of deterrence not only against a central war but also extended deterrence, which is so critically important to our alliances.

Senator **Wilson**. Well, I could not agree more. I think that you are absolutely correct when you say that unless there is assurance you will succeed in a decapitating first strike, it is suicidal to even entertain the notion. Now, that being true, it would seem to me that the deployment of even a first phase or first generation system of the kind that you described as imperfect, but nonetheless achieves the frustration of that first strike capability is perhaps the most significant arms control ever we have for the reduction of offensive weapons if it is deployed. That is, if the defensive system is deployed, and it would seem to me that the robustness of that system may very well depend upon the success that we have in being credible and in discouraging the Soviets from the buildup of offensive weaponry, that deployment might very well lead them to invest heavily in what could be largely an obsolete or at least not a useful weapons system.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Well, that is true. Although if you have in mind the probability to which Secretary Weinberger was alluding, namely, some initial incremental deployment pointing toward a continental defense, then at least theoretically I could envisage some initial deployments which would not serve the strategic goal that you and I have been discussing. You could theoretically have some initial deployments which focus, let us say, on New York City and Los Angeles as the major resources to be protected, and that would not meet the standard that I am setting here. I do not think it would strategically stabilize the balance, and it would not enhance security.

Senator **Wilson**. I do not think anyone is envisioning that either. I do not think we are talking about point defense in the sense that we have thought of it. We are talking about an attack on strategic assets.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. That is right. I think that is why, commenting earlier on what Senator Nunn said, I stated that 2 years ago I would have agreed with him. But now it is possible that within the Defense Department and maybe in the White House there is a realization that some incremental movement toward limited strategic defense makes sense, but since public support for strategic defense is derived from the notion that it defends people rather than missiles, the original objective should be maintained, at least rhetorically.

Senator **Wilson**. My time is up, but I think you are right. That, is a change which I think is in the process of occurring, and it is why I said yesterday to my friend from Nebraska, Senator Exon, that I do not think that he and the Secretary are very far apart and getting closer.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Wilson, has your time expired?

Senator Wilson. Unhappily, it is, and I have about three more questions.

Chairman Nunn. Well, one thing the President of the United States has specifically said in a prepared speech, as I recall, is that the goal of the Strategic Defense Initiative is not to enhance deterrence but to replace deterrence.

Mr. Brzezinski. That is right.

Chairman Nunn. If that is not fundamentally contradictory to what you have outlined here this morning, then I do not understand the term. Do you not think that that is——

Mr. Brzezinski. Mr. Chairman, as I said, I think that incremental movement in this direction would in fact be in contradiction with what was originally stated, but it may also be recognized by the powers that be. The public support for strategic defense is likely to be stronger if the original objective is maintained.

Chairman Nunn. I think at some point somebody has to state that. I cannot really see how a democracy can move into a major system like this with it being sold on the public relations networks as a population protector, and all the time the bureaucracy is out here moving into a different situation. I mean, that borders on fraud on the American people, and I think at some point somebody has to tell the truth, and if we cannot sell a program on the basis of what it really is going to be, then we had better not spend $40 or $50 billion getting ready for it. Otherwise, we have just perpetrated fraud on the American people, and I am afraid that that kind of creeping change is coming, but it is creeping in terms of change in the program without any candor about describing the program.

Mr. Brzezinski. I suspect, Senator, you have described much of the history of military procurement.

Chairman Nunn. Not anything this visible. Not anything this big. Not anything this controversial. Not anything this important to both this country and the world.

Senator Wilson. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I think the point really I was trying to make in my first question to Dr. Brzezinski is that he has made the case that by effectively frustrating and making irrational a first strike against strategic assets, the kind of defensive system that he is talking about, one that enhances deterrence, is one that effectively precludes an attack on population. That does not make sense for the Soviet war planner either

Chairman Nunn. That is enhancing deterrence, not replacing deterrence, and that is——

Senator Wilson. That is what he is talking about, preserving a balance of offensive and defensive, and that is what makes sense.

Chairman Nunn. Certainly. I would agree with that. I am not disagreeing. I am saying that although I think we have to look at cost effectiveness at the margin and a lot of other things first, he has put that in his preamble, but I do think that at some point we have to explain that to the American people, and it seems to me that that is absolutely opposite of what is occurring. Senator Shelby.

Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Brzezinski, along those lines, what are your thoughts on the development of some type of strategic defense system that the Soviet Union might be working on or even having deployed in a limited way versus us?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. You are asking me what is the likelihood?

Senator SHELBY. What is your judgment on what is going on there?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, my best judgment, which is certainly not as up to date as that of some of the other witnesses, is that the Soviet Union has been steadily exploring the possibility of enhancing its defense capabilities, and that in some aspects it has actually been doing so in the field. The Soviet Union, for example, has a very highly developed shelter program for its top political and military personnel on a very substantial scale. That is part of its defense effort.

Some of the Soviet efforts in the area of strategic defense seem to involve the progressive deployment of nationwide radar capability, which could then give the Soviet Union the capacity to move more rapidly into more overtly effective strategic defense. We do know from intelligence sources that the Soviets have been conducting experiments with laser weapons, particle beam weapons, and so forth, and therefore it stands to reason that the Soviet Union has not been passive in this area. I notice that academician Sakharov recently referred to that quite explicitly.

Last but not least, from everything we know about Soviet strategic doctrine and strategic history, there is a high emphasis placed on defense in the Soviet military tradition. It would be very odd if that element was altogether missing in Soviet strategic planning.

Senator SHELBY. That is part of their psychology, is it not?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, and military experience, military history.

Senator SHELBY. Doctor, let us shift to another subject that has been talked about here by you and some of the members. Let us talk about Nicaragua and Afghanistan and the link. How would you mechanically suggest that we work it out?

You mentioned that in the case of Afghanistan we could possibly bring in some Syrian troops into Afghanistan. How would you suggest that we hold an election for self-determination internally? Let us talk about internal staff in both countries now, Nicaragua and Afghanistan. I think that is a very important——

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. With respect to Nicaragua there is the instrumentality of the OAS, which conceivably would provide the mechanism for surpervising either both or one of the two principal aspects of such an arrangement, namely, internal self-determination, elections, external neutralization, control over flows of arms, and so forth. Alternatively, one could envisage the membership of the Contadora group of nations providing participation in some international supervisory arrangement.

In terms of Afghanistan, I have suggested one possible alternative, namely, the reliance on forces from Islamic countries which the Soviet Union does not view as hostile to itself and which are demonstrably independent nonetheless, such as Algeria and Syria, but there could be others. Perhaps some arrangements involving some of the principal neighbors of Afghanistan being involved either in monitoring or at least in guaranteeing the resulting arrangements. For example, the Soviet Union, China, India, Pakistan, and the United States, perhaps even Iran, could join in some guarantee for the neutrality of Afghanistan and jointly participate in or supervise arrangements designed to maintain that condition if it is achieved.

Senator **Shelby**. But it is essential that the internal workings of both, if we got to that step, the free elections, self-determination not be a sham. Is that right?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. That is absolutely right, and I am quite confident that the outcome of any such process would not produce a Communist regime in Afghanistan, and I am reasonably confident that it would at least not produce a totalitarian version of communism in Nicaragua, that the depth of support in Nicaragua for the fully radical totalitarian variant of communism is probably not that deep.

Senator **Shelby**. Dr. Brzezinski, what is your judgment on the recent proposal that we have a cease fire with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. I do not think that is adequate because the cease-fire proposal by the Soviets does not entail the removal of Soviet forces.

Senator **Shelby**. It is to their advantage?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Yes, a cease-fire proposal is tantamount to the end of resistance. I think that the Soviets, if they are serious, can take one of two or both steps, withdraw their forces and/or engage in negotiation with the resistance. We, after all, were prepared to negotiate with the Communists in Vietnam. There is no reason why the Soviets should not be willing to negotiate with the mujahideen. In El Salvador the government negotiates with the opposition. There is no reason why the Nicaraguans could not negotiate with the Contras.

Senator **Shelby**. Thank you.

Senator McCain.

Senator **McCain**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your patience, Dr. Brzezinski.

I, like the others, have a number of questions and comments as to your very thought-provoking testimony and your book, which I just finished reading also. I think it is also well when we talk about reductions of forces in Europe to go back to the historical perspective, that you mentioned earlier, of General Eisenhower in 1947 when he testified before this committee that if within 10 years all U.S. troops are not withdrawn, the experiment would ahve been a failure.

We have certainly not had his predelictions take place, obviously, but there are a number of areas I would like to discuss with you. There is one issue that you raised in your testimony that has not been touched on so far. It seems to me when you are down at the end of the line you search for those since they are of some importance.

It is on page 3, where you talk about the internal problems of Central America. If they should merge with a larger domestic explosion in Mexico that inflames the U.S.-Mexican relationship. The Soviet Union is almost certain to exploit it, thereby opening up a fourth central strategic front in the U.S.-Soviet conflict.

Those of us that live in border States I am sure are more aware of the internal difficulties in Mexico today; the fact that the average Mexican citizen has experienced a 30 percent decrease in his standard of living and Mexico has experienced over 50 percent decrease in their export earnings due to the drop in the price of oil, and despite the immigration bill, the continuing immigration pressures because of the exacerbation of the economic conditions in Mexico.

I notice in your other testimony you had, although I did not always agree with them, some recommendations as to how we could resolve these other issues. What do you suggest that we do vis-a-vis Mexico?

Mr. Brzezinski. That is a terribly complex issue, as you well understand and know, and I do not have a quick and easy formula for dealing with the Mexican problem. Let me state it in broad terms. In my judgment Mexico is increasingly facing not only serious economic but also mounting social, demographic, and political problems.

Our response to it has been essentially on the level of remedial palliatives, that is to say, designed to move from one crisis to the next problem, and I can readily understand why this is the case, because the issues are so complex and difficult. I fear, however, that unless we use our capacity to influence events in Mexico to encourage the Mexicans to engage in more effective systemic reform now and in the immediate future, we are then likely to confront in the next decade the possibility of gradual fragmentation of Mexican political stability matching its economic crisis and in that case will have the condition which I anticipate in this paper.

It is this which leads me to the view that as a general proposition, without becoming too specific, we ought to be using the kind of influence we now have to press the Mexicans to attack more energetically the root causes of what in my judgment is a mounting and not a declining crisis.

Senator McCain. Well, I would agree with that. Perhaps you would also agree that maybe it is time we paid more attention at all levels of our foreign policy to the Mexico problem rather than treating it with benign neglect, which I think has characterized our treatment in the past.

Mr. Brzezinski. I agree with that. I think we are really facing here potentially an extraordinarily severe crisis, which once it surfaces will inevitably spill over our borders because of the intermingling of peoples.

Senator McCain. On the subject of Nicaragua, I also, in my support for aid to Contras, never had the slightest misconception except that the United States policy is that we seek free elections in Nicaragua, and that should be our primary goal. However, history indicates, I think you would agree, that it is very seldom that a nation which is taken over by Marxism-Leninism is in a mood to allow those elections which, as we both agree, would probably vote them out of power.

I would like to turn to your statement concerning the Japanese and the fact that you would not seek an increase in defense spending on the part of the Japanese but an increase in their economic assistance to other nations which is crucial to both our nations' national security.

I find the prospect of the Japanese increasing their spending by 3 percent over basically what they are doing now in the area of economic assistance charming but not practical. I would be very interested and intrigued in a scenario which would motivate the Japanese in that direction. I also share the chairman's deep concern about the commitments that are required of nations that receive help economically, particularly lesser developed ones which ties up their trade.

I think we have seen a consistent pattern of that across the Pacific Rim, and the one area that the United States is deeply concerned about is our growing trade imbalance with the Japanese. I would also like to point out that as you were architect of the policy of the United States military presence in the Persian Gulf, the greatest strain on our ships, men and materiel, particularly in the area of All Volunteer Forces was maintaining significant forces due to the lines of communications, lack of home ports, wear and tear on equipment, and the supply lines being so far extended.

I would suggest that a case could be made that at least the Japanese could provide substantially more funding for our defending their interest particularly in light of the fact that U.S. oil imports have shrunk dramatically as far as our requirements of petroleum from the Middle East. Would you comment on that?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Well, as a practical matter I think it is more likely to be successful if we press the Japanese to provide strategic economic aid than if we press them to provide funding in support of our defense activities directly. So if I have to choose between these two alternatives, I would consider mine considerably more practical than the one you suggest.

In terms of setting a target for what the Japanese are doing, I think 4 percent of Japan's GNP, as I indicated in my testimony, is a future target. But if you want to get the Japanese to do somewhat more, I think all of our negotiating experience with the Japanese shows that you ask for a hell of a lot more and then they will give you a little bit. Therefore I would not start by asking too little, Senator, because if you do you will not get anything.

Senator **McCain**. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Symms.

Senator **Symms**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to apologize for missing your testimony. I have been following many of the comments you have been making with a lot of respect and admiration in the last year or so. I will read through your testimony, but I do not have any questions at this time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Shelby and Senator McCain and Senator Wilson, we are down at the end of the questioning this morning, so if each of you want to ask another question I will be glad to extend it if our witness has time.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Yes.

Senator **Shelby**. I will be real brief, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Brzezinski, let us talk about the Philippines briefly. We have been following it. You have been following it for years. I look at the Philippines and our naval presence there as strategically very important to the whole area. I know that the Philippine people derive a good bit of economic benefit from our presence there. Will that be enough to keep us there with the problems that are going on in the Philippines? You mentioned it earlier.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, by itself that would not be enough. I think it provides the basis for some measured optimism, but clearly what is needed is a very major remedial effort by the Filipino government to get control over the socio-economic situation. That will require from our end a fair amount of support directly, but also indirectly by encouraging others, for example, the Japanese.

Senator SHELBY. The Japanese can play a big role here?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. That is right, and I think we can view that legitimately as a Japanese contribution to collective security because our presence in the Philippines is clearly important to the protection of the Japanese maritime lifeline. The Japanese are thus the beneficiaries of the security role that we are playing. This is, incidentally, another argument for pressing Japan to do more along these lines.

Whether the Philippine Government will gain control over the situation or not I think is still very much an open question. I am very sympathetic to what President Aquino is doing, but I think it is still an open question as to whether her government will be in control over a situation which has become relatively dynamic and perhaps increasingly less subject to effective control from Manila.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. We have two more questions. I am going to leave Senator Exon presiding. I just want to thank you for being here. We will be back in this room at 2 o'clock for the beginning of an interesting session with the War Colleges. Senator Exon will preside until you all finish your questions. Thank you, Doctor.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Senator Wilson, do you have any further questions?

Senator McCain.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you for your patience, Doctor. I just have a very brief question that I would like you to respond to.

Secretary Weinberger yesterday stated, and I think it is an accurate quote concerning withdrawal, "It is more expensive to bring our forces home and keep them here with the requisite deployment capabilities than it is to maintain them abroad."

How would you respond to that statement?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. My response would be that these forces, which are largely organized in heavy divisions, are not going to do us much good outside of Europe, and hence it is a question of our national security as to how we use them. If these forces are not going to contribute what they ought to be contributing to our national security, then they are in fact a wasting resource. Even if it should prove more costly initially to readjust some of these forces into light divisions and to build up our air and sealift capability, the net contribution of such an effort to our national security would be more productive than the overconcentration of such forces in one sector, but only one sector, of our total confrontation with the Soviets.

Senator McCain. Thank you. I share your concern that you state in your book concerning the institutional resistance against airlift capability on the part of the Air Force. I believe you say accurately in your book that they do not like to spend their assets carrying another service around. I think that is a very good point. Taken in the larger context if we are able to save money, which I agree with you in the long run there is going to be enormous savings, will we spend those moneys in the areas which you feel are crucial to replacement of NATO forces, or will we just find another way to reduce the defense budget. Finally, how do you feel our allies would react as far as the size of their defense budgets are concerned if there were the phased reduction as you described it, as you contemplate it, that would take place in the next few years?

Mr. Brzezinski. I think initially they would be amazed that we have woken up to our national interest and probably not do more. After that, they would have to face up to the fact that the major burden of responsibility for their security rests on their shoulders, and they would have to decide whether they prefer to become subordinate to the Soviet Union while basking on the Costa Brava in the summers or whether they are prepared to do 2 or 3 percent more in order to compensate for the marginally reduced American presence in Europe.

I think eventually they would realize that the latter solution is more compatible with their interests than the former.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Doctor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Exon. Senator Wilson.

Senator Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Brzezinski, on this same page, page 6, on which you have spoken of the necessity for deploying a limited and as you admit imperfect defense, you have stated that you think that is the preferable means of achieving mutual strategic security to the alternate, the proliferation of mobile strategic systems, and defensive systems. As you know, I quite agree with you.

Let me just ask you, though, to elaborate on a couple of points which you made. You commented that a road mobile system with a single warhead may well prove unaffordable. You talked about the difference in the openness of society and the difficulty the American public would have with producing a mobile missile of that kind.

But I think you said something here that most people have not heard before, and I think it is in need of further attention and elaboration. You said, "Leaving aside the likely domestic U.S. difficulties over the deployment of numerous mobile systems, the fact is that in a competitive proliferation of mobile systems, the Soviet side is likely to have the major advantage, both in quantitative deployments and strategic deception," by which I take it that you mean it makes much more sense for the Soviets to go mobile than it does for us. It is much easier for them to do so. They have 11 time zones.

We have not only four, but because of the difference in the openness of our society, considerably less geography to deal with than that. In addition you stated, "Moreover, competitive deployment of mobile strategic systems is likely to breed greater insecurity than the deployment of a prudent mix of offensive and defensive systems would be." Would you elaborate on what you meant in the statement that "competitive deployment of mobile strategic systems is likely to bring greater insecurity?" I happen to agree, but I think it deserves attention.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Let me begin by responding, Senator, that I very firmly believe—and I think it is a critical point—that looking ahead for the next two decades, which is what we have to do in strategic doctrine, we have to move away from making deterrence depend on mutual assured destruction, the doctrine of MAD, and instead rely more on mutual strategic security, as defined here, as the basis for deterrence.

One of the reasons that I believe that mutual stragetic security would be enhanced by limited strategic defenses is my conviction that if we make our strategic relationship with the Soviets dependent on both sides having mobile systems, and given the fact the Soviet Union is larger and more capable of camouflaging its systems, the element of insecurity on our side particularly will be quite high. We will never be quite certain what is the relationship of strategic security, to what extent Soviet targeting capabilities have so improved that even limited American mobile systems, probably confined to specific areas in terms of their mobility, will not have become vulnerable.

As we simply proliferate these systems, we will not be buying more security. We will be merely competing in insecurity, and I think a competition in insecurity is not going to be stabilizing. We will presumably be both maximizing mobility and numbers, which is not the way to maintain a stable relationship of mutual strategic security. All of which leads me to the same conclusion that, I take it, you have, namely, that some limited strategic defense deployment is desirable. And it is in fact, I think, timely for our decisionmakers to begin to take the necessary steps in that direction.

Senator **Wilson**. Well, that is precisely the conclusion that I had come to as well. The increased mobility of Soviet forces in a nation that is 11 time zones wide affords remarkable opportunity for deception and for camouflage. It does create tremendous insecurity, to which the only real response is not further buildup of our offensive forces but the deployment of a defensive capability which, however primitive in a first generation, is sufficiently successful to frustrate the success of a first strike and therefore discourage it against both strategic assets and therefore against population.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. If I may just add, in a competition among mobile strategic systems, the Soviet Union has the advantage of size and system. Size gives it more territory, and its political system permits deception. We suffer from these two liabilities. If we move into strategic defense, we compensate for it with the superiority of our own technology, and therefore we buy that element of security to which we are entitled.

Senator **Wilson**. One final point which I think is of particular interest. Jim, you were out of the room when I had an earlier exchange with Dr. Brzezinski when I referred to a comment that I made yesterday after your question to Secretary Weinberger, and if you will recall at the time I said that I thought that you might not be as far apart as it seemed.

It seems to me one of the difficulties that we have, and Senator Quayle used a phrase, there is no set glossary, there is no agreed upon set definitions when we engage in these discussions of SDI. Yesterday when Senator Exon asked Secretary Weinberger whether or not the kind of defensive system that he was talking about was essentially a point defense of our strategic offensive assets, our retaliatory force, the Secretary's reply was that it was more than that, that what he had in mind was something that would protect a continent.

What I think he failed to make clear was that he is talking about protecting strategic assets and thereby protecting the rest of society. Now, what he is talking about, I hope and think, is the kind of system that Dr. Brzezinski has been describing here this morning on page 6 as one that would involve some space-based deployment both of sensors and of weapons, and a boost-based capability and a terminal phase capability.

I think perhaps there has been confusion about some of the terms. A lot of people are confusing "terminal" with "point," and I think what we are seeing is that there has been an evolution in the thinking at the Pentagon. The idea of the Astrodome perfect leakproof defense, as Dr. Brzezinski has set forth on page 6, "While it would be an imperfect defense it would achieve the critical objective of injecting a degree of randomness into any Soviet planning of a first strike nuclear attack."

Thank you very much, Doctor. I greatly appreciate your clarity and obviously your point of view.

Senator Exon. Senator Wilson, thank you very much. I have just a couple of questions. I compliment Senator Wilson for enunciating what he said yesterday and expanding on it somewhat. I did not ask the Secretary and was not referring to limiting SDI for certain development to a point defense or an area defense only.

I asked that if we are successful in the laboratory would he not think that at least the first phase, and I used his term, first phase, wouldn't it make sense to deploy that first phase in the defense of our nuclear deterrent, which we still believe and which you believe in your testimony today is the key deterrent that the Soviet Union recognizes?

I said yesterday that I thought the Secretary's answer was to a large extent political. Because it seems in this administration that if you even give any hint that you have some priority within our strategic programs, that you are somehow against the modernization of our deterrent.

I think we need to define our priorities, and I think you've helped in that area. And I'm going to continue to push for prioritization of our programs because I still believe that our programs, including SDI, are in competition for funds and will have to be funded in some kind of phases.

And I would certainly think that most strategists will agree that if we have to start with a first phase of SDI, the first thing we would want to protect, without necessarily saying we're not going to go any further, would be our land-based deterrent, which we all know is in jeopardy today.

I have a couple of questions. First, just expanding on this, do you see a need for the Midgetman. I have been informed that while I was over at the Budget Committee, where Secretary Weinberger is testifying, that you expressed your feelings about the Midgetman.

From what I've been told by staff, I almost agree completely with you, Dr. Brzezinski. It would be nice to have all these things, if we could afford all of these things.

The facts of the matter are that I'm very much worried that the next President of the United States will find himself with almost a bankrupt, certainly a fiscally unsound defense program.

Lots of talk. Lots of good ideas. But a little short, I think, on how to pay for all these things.

Let me ask you, since you have expressed some of the same concerns that I have with regard to Midgetman, what do you think of the new proposed rail deployment system for the MX?

Is that something that you think has some merit?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think we need some limited counterforce capability. The MX is the best missile that we have yet built. It's the most precise tool that we have for some counterforce capability.

Since we are not contemplating a first strike of a surgical or total type against the Soviet Union, we have to anticipate only situations in which we will be using the MX after a Soviet attack, a partial Soviet attack on some of our key assets. In that context, the very few MXs that we are now likely to have should be, in my judgment, based in a mobile mode. I think the Reagan administration made a very major error in rejecting the congressionally approved basing mode for the MX, initiated by the previous administration. But that is now water over the dam. Since we are beginning to deploy a limited number of MXs, I think that under the circumstances the rail-based mode of deployment is probably the most desirable one. It certainly doesn't make much sense, in my judgment, to place them in fixed silos.

Senator EXON. I said yesterday it's interesting to see how history repeats itself. In October 1981, when the administration came out with their announcement that they were going to deploy the MX in Minuteman silos, this Senator and others spoke out against it.

Yet I've always been a strong supporter of the MX. But I thought it made no sense whatever to put that new 10-warhead missile in a Minuteman silo that had been targeted for at least 15 years by the Soviets.

And it made the reason for the building of the MX almost obsolete from when we started.

But I am glad that we now have a mobile MX system, and believe that it should be looked at further.

Maybe a rail deployment and road-mobile deployment of MX would made the Midgetman unnecessary. So I think that's something we have to explore.

One final question.

Senator WILSON. May I interject a point right here?

Senator EXON. Certainly.

Senator WILSON. I am sitting here silently cheering your statement. I think you're making all kinds of sense.

Let me just, to piggyback on that and ask Dr. Brzezinski one point. Pursuant to what the chairman has been saying, what in your view is the likelihood of a real bolt-out-of-the-blue attack where we have virtually no warning whatsoever of Soviet first strike?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. I would say, Senator, that is very, very low. And if you went to the airport and somone told you there's very, very low probability that the plane you're about to take is going to lose its wings, you probably wouldn't take it. And we are dealing here with national security, national survival. It's something that we have to make sure can never happen, even though the probability of the Soviets deliberately initiating it is very low.

But beyond that is a further point. Even if the Soviets were never to initiate it, the fact that they may have the capability to do so would inhibit our freedom of action at other levels of deterrence, and therefore undermine the credibility of extended deterrence. And this is why it's terribly important that not only we conclude that the Soviets are not likely to do it, in fact, can never do it, but it's very important that the Soviets know that they cannot do it with impunity.

Senator **Wilson**. Let me put the question another way, given the comment that the chairman made about the rail mobility of the MX.

Do you see the possibility of a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack being a significant argument against rail-mobile basing?

In other words, the argument is made by some in favor of Midgetman in depreciating the value of rail-mobility of MX, that it will be not sufficient because there will be the possibility that a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack can attack those rail cars in the depot, that they will not have the opportunity to deploy.

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Well, I personally would favor, a strategic mix in which we have some D–5s and some MXs and in which we have a retaliatory capability based on other systems that assures that the Soviets—even if in a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack they were able to destroy most of the MXs—would still be susceptible to a retaliatory strike. And in the event of a partial attack on some of our resources, we could use the MXs for counterforce strikes.

So I would favor some limited MX deployment along the lines as projected, 50 to 100 missiles on rails. I would prefer skipping the Midgetman altogether, because I think it's going to engage us in a diversionary activity which is going to be very costly from the budget point of view, and politically, and be impossible to resolve in terms of deployment. I would have the D–5 program go ahead up to the 1,994 limits prescribed, which would give us roughly 1,900 time-urgent first-stike-capable counterforce warheads. And I would deploy some strategic defenses.

I think such a mix would not be threatening, would be survivable, would give us security. It would take us to a condition of mutual strategic security, because it would not pose a first-strike threat on the Soviets.

Senator **Wilson**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you, Senator Wilson.

Let me follow up with a concern on arms control and the Midgetman. Would if not be very difficult to verify as to where Midgetman or any other road mobile ICBM is and what it's doing? If we cannot get together with the Soviet Union on some kind of restraint on deployment of these mobile missiles, wouldn't that, from an arms control standpoint, only complicate verification, as we try to work out something in the future?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I know that there is disagreement on this issue. And I remember that Senator Gore indicated that he disagreed with me when I expressed the view that land-based mobility is going to create serious verification problems for us, particularly in terms of Soviet potential for deception, camouflage, covert deployment. That happens to be my view.

Senator EXON. Unlimited—almost unlimited land——

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. That's right.

Senator EXON [continuing]. Which we don't have.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I'm very skeptical that we'll be able to determine, with a sufficient degree of confidence, the level of Soviet production, and therefore, the scale of Soviet deployments. And we do know that the Soviets have an extensive and very admirable tradition of strategic camouflage. Therefore, I do not understand the basis for this confidence that we would certainly verify Soviet mobile deployment without truly intrusive and unilateral inspection rights.

Now if an arms control agreement gave us a certain annual quota of intrusive, unilaterally initiated and unilaterally directed inspection opportunities, maybe we could overcome that. But I rather expect that the Soviets will not accept that in the foreseeable future.

Senator EXON. My final question is with regard to the industrial might of the United States. Traditionally and historically, we have relied on a quick conversion of our heavy industry and our high-tech industries to mobilize them in the case of a war.

How concerned are you about our ability to have that and to mobilize it, both in heavy industry and high-tech industry, given the current situation where we are losing much of our heavy industry. Unless we can correct it someway, we are going to lose, I think, much of our production technology, at least with regard to high tech, to forces overseas.

Is that a major concern in the long-term security interests of the United States in your opinion, Doctor?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think that is a massive danger. We are already in the process of losing our capacity to be self-sustaining in terms of the machine tool industry, which is directly relevant to the conventional sector of our national defense. And if we begin significantly to lag behind in the high tech ultrascientific areas, then the same thing will begin to take place on the strategic level. I think at this stage the initial manifestations of the problem pertain particularly to the conventional sector of our national defense. But it's likely to spread. And it is a very serious national security problem which, in my judgment, has not been given sufficient attention in terms of strategic planning.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Doctor.

Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to take you to another area of your expertise, maybe it has come up since I've been absent, and that is to Eastern Europe.

In your statement you talked about how we ought to have more communications we ought to figure out a way to get more information into those Eastern bloc countries.

I wonder if you might be able to give us an assessment of where the Eastern European bloc countries are as far as total domination by the Soviet Union?

Is there any kind of hope that we're going to see those Eastern bloc countries assert any more independence?

Are there specific things beyond what we're doing now as far as radio communications, things of that sort, to open up those societies?

And I guess, finally, in your assessment, if you get into a wartime situation, how reliable are those Eastern European countries and their contributions to Warsaw Pact really going to be?

Would you just run through where we are?

Mr. **Brzezinski**. Sure. Let me put it this way. Militarily, Eastern Europe is quite effectively integrated into the Warsaw Pact and subordinate to Soviet war planning and command structure. So military integration has moved very far afield, much further than most people in fact know, and we know a great deal about it, probably much more than the Soviets think they know that we know.

Politically, the region is reasonably well under Soviet control, though Romania in recent years has been able to pursue a quasi-independent foreign policy on some issues. But in terms of foreign policy issues, and political subordination, the rest of Eastern Europe is quite effectively dominated.

Economically, I would say that Hungary, Romania, and Poland present specific problems to the Soviet Union, but of very different types. Hungary is a problem because it's been very successful through rather extensive economic reforms, to a point that goulash communism implies for the Soviets some ideological deviation. Romania has been a massive failure, which weakens its capacity to sustain its independent foreign policy. Poland has been an economic failure, which produces social-political repercussions domestically, which are troubling to the Soviets.

And that brings me to the third dimension of control, which is control over the societies. By and large, Eastern European societies are reasonably well controlled by the communist regimes, with the exception of Poland. In Poland, we have seen in the last several years, a progressive de facto emancipation of Polish society from the Communist political system, in the sense that the internal dialogue of the country, its political culture, its self-expression, has resumed its traditional character. And there's been a loss of effective control.

Now, in the long run I anticipate that what has happened in Poland will very gradually repeat itself unevenly in the other countries. And I therefore expect a gradual attrition of Soviet control over Eastern Europe—but the operative word is gradual.

Now, insofar as the reliability of Warsaw Pact forces is concerned, my judgment is that if there was a central war in Europe, initiated by the Soviet Union and with the Soviets forces moving westward on the offensive in the initial phase of that war, Warsaw Pact forces would be loyal to the Soviet Union, and the Soviets would not have major problems with them. But once the Soviet offensive were halted—if it were halted—disaffection would begin, particularly with the Poles. I think probably not only disaffection but resistance would manifest itself, and then would spread elsewhere, probably first from Poland to the Hungarians. And then it's an open question to where afterwards. But once Soviet military operations ceased to be successful, I think the disaffection, the political ferment, would translate itself increasingly into anti-Soviet resistance.

Senator **QUAYLE**. Are there things we can be doing to change the assessment from gradual attrition from Soviet control of Eastern Europe?

Mr. **BRZEZINSKI**. I think we ought to be doing more of what we have been doing. And I think one of the best things the Reagan administration has done, a very concrete thing, is the creation and support it has provided for the National Endowment for Democracy. I think that has been an extraordinarily innovative and constructive step which deserves not only the support that the agency has, but a very significant increase.

It is essentially on the level of political consciousness that the future of Eastern Europe will be determined. What has happened in Poland is the manifest society-wide defeat of the 40-year-long Communist effort to transform the political consciousness of the people. I think it is very desirable that the same thing be repeated elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and eventually, within the Soviet Union itself, as the incapacity of communism to move into the 21st century becomes more evident.

The more we can communicate with these people, through the radios that we support (Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty), through the access for them to videocassettes, VCRs, underground newspapers, printing presses and so on, the more we can transform the nature of the East-West relationship.

In this way, we're buying security far more cheaply than we otherwise would have to buy it through our defense budget. The amounts of money which go into this kind of an effort are trifling compared to what goes into defense. And yet the payoff is going to be decisive on the level of political consciousness. Because if we can halt the Soviets defensively, and gradually transform their internal political orientation, we can transform the relationship and make it more constructive, more peaceful, less threatening.

Senator **EXON**. Senator Quayle, he's been on now for a little over 3 hours. Could we have one more question?

Senator **QUAYLE**. This will be my final question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What is it that the National Endowment for the Democracy, is doing that you feel is particulary helpful in Eastern Europe?

Mr. **BRZEZINSKI**. They are sustaining and supporting freedom of thought, to put it most generally.

Senator **QUAYLE**. Freedom of——

Mr. **BRZEZINSKI**. Thought. That is to say, they're creating opportunities for the people to say what they wish, either in print, or through videocassettes, or through external radios, or through internal informal means of communication.

There is now, in Eastern Europe in varying degrees, and most intensively so in Poland, an extensive underground press which we know little about here, but which is really quite significant in scale. The Minister of the Interior in Poland, for example, claimed recently that his forces have discovered, and I'm citing his figures, 700 underground printing presses capable of producing in the last several years 5 million publications. That gives you a sense of what's going on. Because if that's what's been discovered, I'll leave it to you to imagine what is going on.

Senator **Quayle**. Thank you.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you very much, Senator Quayle.

Dr. Brzezinski, thank you. You've been very generous with your time in coming here and allowing us to pick your fertile brain. We appreciate it, and the people of the United States appreciate it.

Thank you very much. We are in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon in this room.

[Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

TUESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGYMAKING

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m. in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Bingaman, Dixon, Gore, Shelby, Warner, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; and Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, assistant chief clerk; Robert G. Bell; Robert F. Bott; Richard D. Finn, Jr.; John J. Hamre; George K. Johnson, Jr.; Ronald P. Kelly; James R. Locher III; David S. Lyles; Frederick F.Y. Pang; Gordon G. Riggle, professional staff members; and Lori M. Jackson, staff assistant.

Also present: Jeffrey F. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Edward M. McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn; Leon Feurth, assistant to Senator Gore; Jim Sayer, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; and Samuel J. Routson, assistant to Senator Symms.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The Armed Services Committee meets this afternoon for the third in a series of hearings on military strategy. Today we have an unprecedented opportunity to hear testimony from a type of defense expert that has rarely, if ever, been asked to testify before our committee. Our witnesses today are members of the faculty of the four war colleges.

The National Defense University, the Army War College, the Naval War College, and the Air University are responsible for preparing senior field grade officers for positions of military leadership. One of the most important subjects taught by the schools is military strategy. It is, therefore, highly appropriate that these teachers help to educate the members of the Armed Services Committee and stimulate our thinking in this difficult but fundamental aspect of national security policymaking.

In addition to stimulating our thought and giving us your ideas, one of the goals that Senator Warner and I had in planning these strategy sessions was to address the problems in American strategymaking. In the hearings this afternoon, I hope we will cover any intellectual gaps that our witnesses believe exist in our current strategic planning. The breadth of any gap in strategic thinking could be disposed of by certain questions such as how should we think about strategy, why has so little attention been paid for so long in the strategy of the United States during all administrations, Democratic and Republican, and how do we best translate strategic concepts in the resource priorities and defense policies.

I would like to introduce the four gentlemen who will be testifying today in the order in which they will be making their statements: Retired Army Col. Arthur Lykke. Colonel Lykke, we are delighted to have you. Colonel Lykke is a professor of military strategy at the Army War College.

Dr. Bob Wood, the dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies of the Naval War College. We are delighted to have you.

Col. Dennis Drew. Colonel Drew is Director of the Air Power Research Institute at the Air University.

Mr. Greg Foster, Senior Fellow at the National Defense University.

I would like to emphasize that these witnesses are not appearing as representatives or spokesmen for their schools or military services. We have asked them to appear as individuals whose views on strategy are highly respected within the national defense and security community. In other words, I hope they will feel free to offer their personal opinions to the committee with the same academic freedom that they enjoy in their classroom, because that is what we need here this afternoon.

If we wanted to hear directly from the services, we have that opportunity. We will hear from them later. We are really trying to provoke thinking in this area, not try to come to dogmatic conclusions as a committee. Your own personal thinking is awfully important to us. I felt strongly about this point. I talked to Admiral Crowe about it, told him that we were going to be asking your personal opinions and also wrote him a letter on that point. I am sure he understands that completely.

Gentlemen, we greatly appreciate your willingness to take us on as your students today. The committee will have questions for you after you have given your opening statement. Senator Warner will be here in just a few minutes, and when he comes he will probably have an opening statement to greet you. On behalf of us and the whole committee, we are delighted you are here.

STATEMENT OF COL. ARTHUR F. LYKKE, JR., USA (RET.), PROFESSOR OF MILITARY STRATEGY, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Colonel LYKKE. Sir, for the past 10 years I have tried to be a teacher of future military strategists. In doing so I have found several problem areas, one being that there is no consensus as far as terminology regarding this vital subject. So what I propose to do today, sir, is to give you a way of thinking about military strategy that may be helpful in building a consensus. I think a good place to start, sir, will be with national interests.

National Interests

—Fundamental concerns of a nation.
—A highly generalized concept of elements that constitute a state's compelling needs, including self-preservation, independence, national integrity, military security, and economic well-being.

The definition here is taken from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dictionary of Military Terms.

National Interests

—National survival.
—Territorial integrity.
—Freedom of the seas.
—Safety of U.S. citizens abroad.
—Economic well-being.
—Access to natural resources and markets.
—International stability.
—Containment of Soviet expansionism.
—Nuclear nonproliferation.
—Human rights.

Here is a sample listing. Now in order to secure these national interests, our leaders have, in effect, a bag of tools to use called elements of national power. Sometimes you see different listings.



This one comes from the Army Field Manual 100-1. They are purposely drawn this way because there are no boundaries between them. Seldom do you find something that is purely military in nature, or purely political.

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

POLITICAL

ECONOMIC
TECHNOLOGICAL

MILITARY
SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL

Now, by just changing one word on that slide we have national strategy. This is a master plan for the use of the elements of power to secure the national interests. So military strategy is just one of the component parts of the national strategy.

This is the definition for national strategy, utilizing all of the powers of the Nation.

National Strategy

The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its Armed Forces during peace and war, to further national interests, prioritites, and policies.

Chairman Nunn. In other words, you take national strategy as the broad term encompassing all of the various components of national power and military strategy as one component of that.

Colonel Lykke. Yes, sir. Some people call this grand strategy.

Now, let's zero in on military strategy. Here is the definition, but we need more than that. We need to study this as a discipline. By that, I mean we need to be able to break it into its component parts and see how they are related.

Military Strategy

The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force.

First, let us just say that there is something out there called military strategy which is certainly influenced by many external factors. The threat is constantly changing. Personalities come and go in government.



TECHNOLOGY

POLICY

ECONOMICS

ETHICS

MILITARY STRATEGY

PERSONALITIES

DOCTRINE

THREAT

POLITICS

Money, technological changes, policies and politics which are the driving forces, of strategy impact upon it. We must not forget that our strategies and policies must be based on the values and ethics of our people or they will not be supported and will fail.

This slide shows that as there are different levels of conflict, we must also have different types of strategies.

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT



PROBABILITY

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

LIMITED WAR

CONVENTIONAL WAR

THEATER NUCLEAR

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR

RISK

This is a complex and fascinating subject with many different issues and debates going on. Back at the Army War College, we tell our students that there are no school solutions. We also encourage them all year long to question everything they see and everything they hear. This is not done in the negative, nay-saying way of being a critic, but in the positive sense of trying to do a better job.

MILITARY STRATEGY DEBATES

WAR IS A SCIENCE	VS	WAR IS AN ART
WAR OF MANEUVER (OFFENSE)	VS	WAR OF POSITION (DEFENSE)
VICTORY BY BATTLE	VS	WIN WITHOUT FIGHTING
MILITIA	VS	PROFESSIONAL ARMY
MOBILIZATION	VS	FORCES IN BEING
GLOBAL WAR	VS	REGIONAL WAR
ANNIHILATION	VS	ATTRITION
DETERRENCE	VS	WAR-FIGHTING
DIRECT APPROACH	VS	INDIRECT APPROACH
ISOLATIONISM	VS	COLLECTIVE SECURITY
SUPERIORITY	VS	ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE

This is my own personal frustration slide, because people tend to talk around strategy. Not having a consensus on terminology they start describing it with adjectives. You hear about things like a two and a half war strategy, an ink blot strategy, a strategy of attrition, a defensive strategy and so forth. People should be more concerned with what strategy actually is.

(____________) STRATEGY

OR

STRATEGY OF (____________)

EMPHASIS HAS TOO OFTEN BEEN PLACED ON THE ADJECTIVES, OR MODIFIERS OF STRATEGY. WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON STRATEGY ITSELF -- ITS COMPONENT PARTS AND HOW THEY ARE RELATED.

Also, I would offer that perhaps the most overly used and misused word in the defense lexicon would be the term "strategic". I have heard that used in so many different ways pertaining to something important, or something about the military, or something about nuclear weapons, or something that is long range in nature. So we urge our students to be very specific when they use that term.

This is a second problem area as pointed out by General Taylor about 27 years ago. So often strategy has not had the full attention that it should have. I am personally very pleased that this committee is starting to work to solve that problem.

> The determination of U.S. strategy has become a more or less incidental by-product of the administrative process of the defense budget.
>
> GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, 1960.

Here I need to do a selling job and convince you all that in order to talk about strategy or write about strategy, you must discuss three things: ends; ways; and means. Now this works for any type of strategy, technology, political and so forth. Since we are talking about military strategy, we can translate ends into military objectives, ways into strategic concepts; and means into military resources.

MILITARY STRATEGY

MILITARY OBJECTIVES (ENDS)

+

MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS (WAYS)

+

MILITARY RESOURCES (MEANS)

Why should you believe me? You do not even know me, so I need all the help that I can get. I have called on some big hitters; first, once again General Taylor. During a visit to the Army War College, we asked General Taylor if during the Cuba missile crisis he had any special problem as far as formulating military strategy. He said no, because the objectives were so clear. Get the missiles out of Cuba. He said the rest was just ways and means.

> Strategy consists of objectives, ways, and means.
>
> MAXWELL D. TAYLOR.

Herman Kahn, a noted futurist and nuclear strategist, talks about this complex package once again of three things. I especially like that final sentence, "paying particular attention to the interactions between the various elements".

> Defining a national strategy includes the description and analysis of a total complex ("package") of objectives, tactics, and means . . . paying particular attention to the interactions between the various elements of the complex.
>
> HERMAN KAHN.

Admiral Eccles was for 25 years the guru of strategy at the Naval War College.

> So, when considering international or grand strategy, national strategy, military strategy or maritime strategy, one should remember that he is dealing with three interwoven essentials: objectives, the effects desired; scheme, or plan; and the physical means, the economics and logistics.
>
> HENRY E. ECCLES.

In talking about different types of strategies, he says remember three interwoven essentials: once again, objectives, the scheme or plan, and the means.

Finally, General Goodpaster says it as simply as possible. Strategy covers what we should do, the ends, or military objectives; how we should do it, the ways, or the strategic concepts; and what we should do it with, the resources.

> Strategy covers what we should do, how we should do it, and what we should do it with.
>
> ANDREW J. GOODPASTER.

So in somewhat more detail, let's discuss the first element, the task or the mission.

MILITARY OBJECTIVE

A specific mission or task to which military efforts and resources are applied.

That looks so very simple and obvious, but it is the most important and the most difficult portion of strategy formulation. When the military gets political guidance, they must translate it into feasible, doable military objectives. If they have difficulty or they cannot do that, then that may show that our leaders have selected the wrong element of national power to use.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

—Deter war.
—Terminate war on terms favorable to U.S. and allies.
—Defend U.S. territory.
—Protect U.S. citizens abroad.
—Secure air and sea lines of communication.

Here is a sample listing. Please note that this is talking about *what* we are trying to do and not how to do it.

MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The military course of action accepted as the result of the estimate of the strategic situation.

This is where the *how* comes in, different courses of action to accomplish the objective. One again, a listing of strategic concepts.

MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

—Forward defense.
—Strategic reserves.
—Mobilization.
—Assured destruction.
—Collective security.
—Security assistance.
—Show of force.

Sir, I should mention that some people call these strategies. We may choose a concept of forward defense with forward basing and forward deployments, or we may choose to hold our forces back in this country in strategic reserves, or a combination of the two. Further down to collective security, we may recognize that in this day and age we need all the friends that we can make in the world. Finally, the military resources, active and reserve forces along with allies.

MILITARY RESOURCES

—General purpose forces.
—Strategic and tactical nuclear forces.
--Reserve forces.

—Allied forces.
—Manpower, materiel, and money.

At the Army War College, we have come up with a simple memory aid, sir. We believe that our most vital national interest is national security.

A MODEL FOR MILITARY STRATEGY


NATIONAL
SECURITY
MILITARY STRATEGY
OBJECTIVES
CONCEPTS
RESOURCES

We hope that it rests on a firm foundation of a military strategy that consists of ends and ways and means. This simple stool also shows that if those legs are not balanced properly, then our national security may be in danger.

TO ENSURE NATIONAL SECURITY, THE THREE "LEGS" OF MILITARY STRATEGY MUST NOT ONLY EXIST, THEY MUST BE BALANCED.



Finally, sir, you will be hearing people talk about the three levels of war, talking about strategy, operational art, and tactics.

> There are three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. They are all concerned with ways to employ means to achieve ends.
>
> Art Lykke (what does he know?)

I believe that this way of thinking about strategy given to you today shows that there are fundamental similarities. After all, whether you are a strategist or a planner or a four star general or a squad leader, you are all concerned with ways to use means to achieve ends.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Lykke follows:]

Prepared Statement by Col. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. (USA Retired), Professor of Military Strategy, U.S. Army War College

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. (USA Retired), Professor of Military Strategy, U.S. Army War College. I have a brief prepared statement which I would like to present to the committee.

What is military strategy? In ancient Greece, it was the "Art of the General." In its glossary of military terms, the U.S. Army War College lists eight definitions of military strategy. This highlights the first of many problems in the study of this important but complex subject. There is no universal definition, nor even the approximation of a consensus. Today the term "strategy" is used altogether too loosely. Some call a line drawn on a map a strategy. Others believe a laundry list of national objectives represents a strategy. The problem is not just semantics, it is one of using competently one of the most essential tools of the military profession. In trying to decide between alternative strategies, we are often faced with a comparison of apples and oranges, because the choices do not address the same factors. Only with a mutual understanding of what comprises military strategy can we hope to improve our strategic dialogue. There needs to be a central agreement on a conceptual approach to military strategy: A definition; a description of the basic elements that make up military strategy; and an analysis of how they are related. For the purpose of this discussion, we will use the definition approved by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force.[1]

During a visit to the U.S. Army War College in 1981, General Maxwell D. Taylor characterized strategy as consisting of objectives, ways and means. We can express this concept as an equation: Strategy equals ends (objectives toward which one strives) plus ways (courses of action) plus means (instruments by which some end can be achieved). This general concept can be used as a basis for the formulation of any type strategy-military, political, economic, etc., depending upon the element of national power employed.

We should not confuse military strategy with national (grand) strategy, which may be defined as: The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.[2]

Military strategy is one part of this all-encompassing national strategy. The military component of our national strategy is sometimes referred to as national military strategy-military strategy at its highest level, and differentiated from operational strategies used as the basis for military planning and operations. Military strategy must support national strategy and comply with national policy, which is defined as a broad course of action or statement of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.[3] In turn, national policy is influenced by the capabilities and limitations of military strategy.

With our general concept of strategy as a guide—strategy equals ends plus ways plus means—we can develop an approach to military strategy. "Ends" can be expressed as military objectives. "Ways" are concerned with the various methods of applying military force. In essence this becomes an examination of courses of action designed to achieve the military objective. These courses of action are termed military strategic concepts. "Means" refers to the military resources (manpower, materiel, money, forces, logistics, etc.) required to accomplish the mission. This leads us to the conclusion that military strategy equals military objectives plus military strategic concepts plus military resources. This conceptual approach is applicable to all three levels of war: Strategic, operational, and tactical. It also reveals the fundamental similarities among national military strategy, operational strategy, and tactics. Strategists, planners, division commanders and squad leaders all must cope with the problems of ends, ways, and means.

Some readers may question this idea, thinking that while military resources are necessary to support a strategy, they are not a component of that strategy. They would limit military strategy to a consideration of military objectives and military strategic concepts. However, in discussing the importance of superiority of numbers, Clausewitz states that the decision on the size of military forces "is indeed a vital part of strategy." [4] And Bernard Brodie points out that "strategy in peacetime is expressed largely in choices among weapons systems . . ." [5] By considering military resources as a basic element of military strategy, we may also alleviate the problem of disregarding the importance of military objectives and strategic concepts while concentrating mainly on force structure issues.

There are two levels of military strategy: Operational and force developmental. Strategies based on existing military capabilities are operational strategies—those that are used as a foundation for the formulation of specific plans for action in the short-range time period. This level of strategy has also been referred to as higher or grand tactics and operational art. Longer range strategies may be based on estimates of future threats, objectives, and requirements, and are therefore not as constrained by current force posture. These longer range strategies are more often global in nature, and may require improvements in military capabilities. Military strategies can be regional as well as global, concerning themselves with specific threat scenarios.

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[1] JCS Pub. 1: *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.* Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 1 June 1979, p. 217.

[2] JCS Pub. 1: *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.* Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 1 June 1979, p. 228.

[3] JCS Pub. 1: *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.* Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 1 June 1979, p. 228.

[4] Clausewitz, Karl Von. *On War.* Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey: 1979, p. 196.

[5] Brodie, Bernard. *Strategy in the Missile Age.* Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey: 1965, p. 361.

Military objectives and military strategic concepts of a military strategy establish requirements for resources, and are in turn influenced by the availability of resources. If we fail to consider military resources as an element of military strategy, we may be faced with what has come to be called a strategy-capabilities mismatch. In other words, inadequate military capabilities to implement the strategic concepts and to accomplish the objectives of military strategy. This is the usual case when we are developing a long-range strategy requiring improved military force structure capabilities. However, it may be disastrous if we are concerned with an operational strategy upon which contingency plans and military operations will be based. That is why operational strategies must be based on capabilities.

Let's zero in on the first basic element of any military strategy—a military objective. It can be defined as a specific mission or task to which military efforts and resources are applied. Several examples come to mind: Deter aggression, protect lines of communication, defend the homeland, restore lost territory, and defeat an opponent. The objectives should be military in nature. While Clausewitz, Lenin, and Mao have all emphasized the integral relationship of war and politics, military forces must be given appropriate missions within their capabilities. Liddell Hart stresses that: In discussing the subject of "The objective" in war it is essential to be clear about, and to keep clear in our minds, the distinction between the political and the military objective. The two are different but not separate. For nations do not wage war for war's sake, but in pursuance of policy. The military objective is only the means to a political end. Hence the military objective should be governed by the political objective, subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily—that, is practically—impossible.[6]

In our definition of military strategy, the ultimate objectives are those of national policy. Sometimes policy guidance is difficult to find, unclear, or ambiguous. National policy also concerns itself with all the basic elements of national power: Political, economic, socio-psychological, technological, and military. [7] To make things even more interesting, national policies in these various fields are often overlapping, and may even be contradictory. There are seldom "purely military" or "purely political" objectives. National leaders may choose to use the military element of power in pursuit of national policy objectives that are primarily political or economic in nature. This can cause problems. Sometimes military force is not the appropriate tool. Military commanders may then have difficulty in deriving feasible military objectives from the objectives of national policy.

Now for an examination of a military strategic concept. It can be defined as the military course of action accepted as the result of the estimate of the strategic situation. [8] Military strategic concepts may combine a wide range of options, such as: Forward defense (forward basing and/or forward deployment), strategic reserves, reinforcements, show of force, prepositioned stocks, collective security, and security assistance. These are a few of the ways military forces can be used either unilaterally or in concert with allies. The determination of strategic concepts is of major importance, but is all to often paid little attention, or is even ignored.

Finally, we should study the "means" portion of our military strategy equation—the military resources which determine capabilities. These may include conventional and unconventional general purpose forces, strategic and tactical nuclear forces, defensive and offensive forces, active and reserve forces, war materiel and weapons systems as well as manpower. We should also take into consideration the roles and potential contributions of our allies and friends. The total force package must be well-rounded with combat, combat support, and combat service support elements adequately equipped and sustained. Depending upon the type of strategy we are developing, the forces we consider employing may or may not currently exist. In short-range operational strategies, the forces must exist. In longer range force developmental strategies, the strategic concepts determine the type of forces that should exist and the way they are employed.

Now that we have looked at the basic elements of military strategy, let's try to put them together in some meaningful way. Figure 1 shows one possible model. National security, our most vital interest, is supported on a three-legged stool entitled military strategy. The three legs of the stool are labeled objectives, concepts, and resources. This simple analogy leads one to the observation that the legs must be balanced, or national security may be in jeopardy (figure 2). If military resources are not compatible with strategic concepts or commitments are not matched by military capabilities, we may be in trouble. The angle of tilt represents risk, further defined as the possibility of loss or damage, or of not achieving an objective. It is, of course, the duty of the military to determine if there is risk associated with a strategy, the degree of risk, and to bring it clearly and forcefully to the attention of civilian leaders.

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[6] Hart, B.H. Liddell. *Strategy*. New York, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975, p. 351.

[7] *Field Manual No. 100-1: The Army*. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC: August 1986, p. 3.

[8] JCS Pub. 1: *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 1 June 1979, p. 328.

A MODEL FOR MILITARY STRATEGY


NATIONAL SECURITY
MILITARY STRATEGY
OBJECTIVES
CONCEPTS
RESOURCES

FIGURE 1

TO ENSURE NATIONAL SECURITY, THE THREE "LEGS" OF MILITARY STRATEGY MUST NOT ONLY EXIST, THEY MUST BE BALANCED.


NATIONAL SECURITY
MILITARY STRATEGY
OBJECTIVES
CONCEPTS
RESOURCES
∢ RISK

FIGURE 2

Let's test our model with an example to see if it is useful in explaining military strategy. The Carter doctrine was a statement of national policy: Let our position be absolutely clear. An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. Such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

Let's devise a military strategy to carry out this policy. One implied objective is securing access to our Persian Gulf oil supplies. This economic/political objective must first be translated into military objectives, such as: Maintaining freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz; and defending key oil fields, refineries, and ports. The strategic concept might be by means of a rapid deployment force from our strategic reserves. But, do we have sufficient strategic mobility and power projection capabilities in being today to keep the stool level? Which leg needs to be adjusted? Military resources? To program and produce the required airlift and sealift forces may take years. In order to have a feasible short-range operational strategy, it may be wiser to change the strategic concept to that of forward defense, and station or deploy more U.S. military forces in the region.

Perhaps we have examined the subject of military strategy in sufficient depth to arrive at some initial conclusions on its nature. First, it's not the title of a strategy that is important: It's the content that counts. The names are often changed for cosmetic reasons reflecting little substantive alteration. A study of history shows that military strategies have been identified by a wide variety of labels. The "massive retaliation" of the Eisenhower administration, the "flexible response" of the Kennedy administration, and the more recent "realistic deterrence" have all been referred to as strategies. We had the "2½-war strategy" of the Johnson administration changing to a "1½-war strategy" following the Sino-Soviet split and the realization that buying a military force in time of peace that could fight 2½ wars simultaneously was just too costly. These latter examples of strategic statements describe procurement guidelines for a force structure rather than military strategies. Other names for "strategies" over the years have been: Attrition, annihilation, counter value, counter force, deterrence, warfighting, direct and indirect approach, search and destroy, oil spot, assured destruction, containment, and countervailing.

One should remember that under ideal circumstances military objectives and strategic concepts determine force structure and worldwide deployments of military forces. However, military objectives and strategic concepts are necessarily affected by the capabilities and limitations of the military forces in being.

Military strategy may be declaratory or actual. In other words, as stated by our leaders, it may or may not be our real strategy. U.S. military strategy has seldom been clearly expressed, and infrequently described in sufficient detail for all to understand. Some say that it is unwise, impossible, or even dangerous to enunciate openly a military strategy. This very act may limit our options in a crisis situation, or tip off our potential adversaries on what our actions might be.

A nation may need more than one military strategy at a time. For instance, if a nation has only a deterrent strategy, and deterrence fails, what does it do then? Surrender? Submit to piecemeal attacks and incremental losses? Unleash a massive strategic nuclear attack? These are some of the options if it does not also have a warfighting strategy. Military strategy can change rapidly and frequently, since objectives can change in an instant. However, it takes much longer to alter the military forces so that they may be responsive to new objectives and concepts.

In summary, military strategy consists of the establishment of military objectives, the formulation of military strategic concepts to accomplish the objectives, and the use of military resources to implement the concepts. When any of these basic elements are incompatible with the others, our national security may be in danger.

I have appreciated this opportunity of appearing before the committee and shall be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Colonel.

Senator Warner, we have had one presentation, and we are about to have the next. Would you like to make an opening statement now?

Senator WARNER. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Dean Wood.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. WOOD, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES AND DEAN, NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Mr. Wood. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon. In my written statement, I have presented in detail how in Newport we attempt to interrelate policy, strategy, the national security environment, decisionmaking and military operations in order to develop strategic thinking among our students and to provide a focal point for strategic research in the Naval service.

Let me today in my oral remarks highlight two aspects of strategy development worthy, I believe, for your consideration. Col. Arthur Lykke has indicated that clearly defining and linking objective, concepts and means are central to strategy development. I agree.

Strategy, furthermore, in its broadest terms involves more than the threat or application of force. It entails an interlinked set of concepts through which we seek to relate ends to means. It reflects all of those interests, values, assumptions, principles and guides to action that go under the name of policy.

Moreover, it is important to understand that international conflicts of interest are endemic, and we cannot divide time into periods of peace and periods of war. The spectrum of conflict is continuous, and any point on the spectrum requires that we bring to bear the relevant panoply of national capabilities from psychological to economic to cultural to military instruments.

It is also patent that any national strategy must harmonize with the strategic culture of the people it seeks to serve. By strategic culture, I refer to generally shared attitudes in the society at large concerning the nature and requirements of external security, the conditions of peace, the causes of war, and the utility and restrictions on force.

Today, I would underline two aspects of the strategic culture that bear directly on U.S. strategy development. One bears upon problems of intelligence and expectations and the other bears upon problems of implementation.

The first aspect of our strategic culture I would signal is the tendency to project into the international sphere attitudes derived, first, from our domestic situation and, second, from our peculiar historic security environment. On the domestic side, for over a century our national agenda has focused less on constitutional issues, that is the structure and limitations of political power, than on bargaining issues, that is the distribution of benefits within our system. Furthermore, we have pursued our national politics in an environment of remarkable prosperity.

In the external world, on the other hand, many states are struggling to answer the most fundamental questions of who rules, under what restrictions, and how power is transferred, and this is being played out under conditions of much greater scarcity than we have ever experienced.

Second, our historical security position has been rare for a great power. Abraham Lincoln's Secretary of State may have expressed it most eloquently when he said the great position of the United

States is that we have a weak neighbor to the north, a weak neighbor to the south, and fish to the east, and fish to the west. Most other states have been shaped by different historical imperatives and have thus been more conscious than Americans are of the tenuousness of their national existence.

As a result of our background and experiences, we interpret threats and offer political solutions that at times seem to underestimate the deadliness of many struggles in the world and to overestimate the possibility of political or negotiated settlements.

A second problem in our strategic culture concerns our unwillingness in peacetime to take war seriously enough. Obviously, we spend billions on defense, raise the exercise forces and devise plans, but the key aspects of war and perhaps of international conflict generally are uncertainty, risk and probabilities.

The conditions of deterrence and the requirements of victory are dependent on time, space and circumstances. A single strategic option, a fixation on one region or theater and a limited range of options may meet the desire to limit expenditures and to be as nonprovocative as possible. If we have a gut feeling, however, that the maintenance of deterrence requires that we pose a range of threats to our enemies and that the flow of conflict is inherently uncertain, if we sense this, then we need to insist on a much broader range of contingency planning, operational options and military exercises.

To be effective, strategy must not only link in some general sense resources to ends, but it must also provide the conceptual basis for developing and exercising a variety of operations or campaign options.

Two major geopolitical facts shape our foreign policy and strategy. The first is that many of our friends and interests lie on the periphery of a great Eurasian empire, a vast militarized bureaucracy possessing interior lines of communications. The second is that the classic extra-European empires have collapsed since World War II, and the globe has fragmented into a large number of states claiming independence and a large number of political movements claiming states.

Many of these new states, regimes and movements are economically underdeveloped, weak in political legitimacy and insecure on their boundaries and often important either in terms of resources, location, population or power potential.

In a generalized sense, these systemic factors have dictated a foreign policy animated by two desires. The first is to prevent the U.S.S.R. from converting its superior interior position into direct or indirect domination of its immediate neighbors. Our second aim is to minimize the threats that an interdependent world of weak regimes and antagonistic movements might represent to our interest in a peaceful interlinked global economy and stable political regimes responsive to the peaceful development of their peoples and resistant to external manipulation by our principal adversary.

Strategically, these interests have been translated into concepts of forward deployment of U.S. forces, coalition defense, extended nuclear deterrence and flexible response. As I indicated a moment ago, to be effective, strategy must go considerably beyond these generalized concepts. A credible deterrent posture and a recognized ability to shape the international environment and, if necessary, to employ force requires an array of operational alternatives and campaign options sensitive to different situations and dynamic change.

A powerful forward strategy demands we develop contingency plans that link the entire range of American and allied powers, not simply military, and articulate military-political options that allow us to think through possible sequences of actions and reactions in what in military parlance one might call theaters of operation.

The world will never go according to plan; therefore, we need to test and exercise a variety of alternative plans. This is the essence of readiness. It is a mistake to confuse the development and testing of various campaign plans with the forward national strategy that they are designed to implement.

The ability to remain forward in peacetime and to prevail in wartime requires that we exercise a wide range of options and operation. So often this is portrayed as preparing for war in some offensive or provocative sense. Thinking and practicing the unthinkable and the difficult should be the job of our military commanders and is the most effective assurance of peace and the most certain guarantee that we will not be fixed by one set of assumptions and one set of responses.

The strength of deterrence and the key to successful war termination depend on avoiding the unpreparedness of 1941 and the rigidities of 1914. As we develop our national strategy, then, we should avoid tendencies both to see the world in our own image and to defer serious contingency and campaign planning within and across theaters of operation until the crisis is upon us.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wood follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. ROBERT S. WOOD, DEAN, CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT

Military strategy at its most basic is a plan of action relating military assets to political objectives. It is a set of interrelated concepts about the employment of force under specified circumstances and for specified ends. The adequacy of a strategy thus depends on its ability to guide the acquisition, structuring, and use of force to achieve, in concert with other elements of national power, a state's objectives.

Brilliant strategy may allow a state to defeat an enemy that possesses superior military strength and even shift to a more advantageous theater of combat. It is nonetheless dangerous to underestimate the strategic intellect of one's enemies and to ignore the relative intractability of geopolitical factors.

All strategies are fiscally constrained because resources are always limited relative to a wide variety of demands. But a politically-defined budgetary ceiling that delimits the level of national sacrifice without a clear appreciation of national interests, threats, and international circumstances is defective at the outset.

All of the above are truisms but ones which, as Winston Churchill noted, democracies appear to forget on an alarmingly regular basis. A call for a better articulated national military strategy should never, therefore, be a demand simply to do the same or more with fewer resources. It must include a realistic assessment of our interests, our geopolitical posture and historical role, the nature of enemies and friends alike, and the character of contemporary international politics.

Strategy then is a military plan of action designed to achieve policy objectives and to meet the threats and seize the opportunities identified by policy. Ideally, this military plan of action will not only flow from policy but will be consistent with the diplomatic, economic, and other plans of action also designed to serve policy. If military strategy links forces with ends, it must also provide the conceptual basis not only for raising and organizing forces but for developing and exercising a variety of operational or campaign options. Strategy must be executed at a particular time, in a particular place, and under particular circumstances. The translation of strategic concepts into force deployments and employments in time, space, and circumstances constitute military operations and campaigns. Campaigns are a connected series of military operations to attain the results defined by political judgement and the strategic concept. Campaign plans in effect provide the guidance a battle force commander would give his force to reach the strategic objective. As campaign plans are developed and exercised, strategic concepts may in turn be refined or even altered to take into account operational experience. On occasion even policy presuppositions are modified.

Needless to say, the actual relationship among policy, strategy, and campaign options is never this tidy. Nonetheless, however confused the process, these distinctions are real and a necessary condition for differentiating the hierarchy of containment policy, the national strategy, and specific campaigns and operations. In assessing plans and exercises for military operations anywhere, it is thus helpful to state the political-military assumptions and the strategic concepts underpinning those operations. The basic contours of U.S. policy and strategy, however, are really fairly clear. What is not so clear, and is often confused with our fundamental policy and strategy, is the range of appropriate operational options.

A large number of U.S. interests and friends cannot be reached by walking to them. We must cross vast areas of water and air. Unfortunately for us, those same interests and friends lie on the periphery of the greatest Eurasian empire in history, a vast militarized bureaucracy possessing interior lines of communications. At the same time, there has emerged in the former colonial areas a host of new or renewed states, many economically underdeveloped, weak in political legitimacy, and insecure on their borders. Finally, the U.S. has acquired a nuclear force capable of delivering a devastating blow on any would-be enemy that might strike directly at the United States.

All of these factors make fairly clear the contours of U.S. policy—and strategy. The objectives are to prevent the U.S.S.R. from converting its superior interior position into direct or indirect domination of its immediate neighbors and to maneuver in a chaotic third world environment so as to protect one's material interests and to minimize alignments between states and movements in those areas and our principal adversary. In sum, we are pursing in modern guise the classic role of a "regulatory state" seeking to construct and maintain the central balance while advancing its interests in a fragmented world. Coalition building, aid and trade programs, arms sales, periodic interventions or punitive strikes, counterbalancing regional adversaries—these policies of containment and power management, while relatively new to the United States, are not without substantial historical antecedents.

The principal military issue associated with this geopolitical posture is how to project military power across the whole spectrum of conflict in a technological and political environment that increases the cost of using military force. And, of course, all of this must be related, on the one hand, to a grand strategy that includes economic, diplomatic and other instruments of national power and, on the other hand, to restraints on the percentage of national resources that we are willing to devote to these international missions.

It is at this point that controversy generally breaks out. Given limited resources, what type of force structure will allow us to sustain our forward strategy from "peacetime" management of power, to deterrence, to general war? And, secondly, what sort of operational options should we develop to sustain our interests across a number of regions and conditions? And, yet, if intellectually one has made the trek from our geopolitical posture through our general policy and strategy, we can at least focus the debate and delimit the choices. Unfortunately, we too often talk programs and specific operations without having made the journey. If political and military leaders are to exert effectively their role in national strategy, it is at this level of macromanagement where genuine dialogue can be shaped within the government and programmatic choices can be framed.

The mission of the Naval War College is to lead, through a rigorous course of study, senior officers and federal executives along this intellectual journey—to educate them in matters of military strategy, resource allocation, and combined and joint operations. This includes the theory, strategy, doctrine, planning, coordination, and direction of the military force available to a commander.

THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE AND STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT

There are currently about 400 U.S. and international officers in residence at the College. They are all successful professionals, who have proven their ability in the past, and who will be counted on in the future to be the leaders of their profession. This is true not only of our U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force and Marine Corps officers but also of the 61 international officers in residence.

Officers in Residence—Total: 396

[In percent]

USN	45
USA	17
USAF	6
USMC	13
USCG/Civilian	4
International	15

Just as the number of officers attending the College has grown, the faculty has expanded to include officers from all services as well as an impressive group of civilians with a solid academic reputation in their respective disciplines. This mix has enhanced the joint framework of the War College education. Every seminar in every subject includes an interchange among all the services represented and their civilian peers. Moreover, there is a close and continuing dialogue between all the War Colleges on matters of common interest.

The Faculty—Members: 86

[In percent]

USN	34
Civilian	34
USA	10
USAF	10
USMC/USCG	12

The Naval War College thus provides a place where officers are afforded an opportunity to live together, to read books, to think independently, to test their views against others in and out of uniform and to participate in disciplined and rigorous inquiries that deepen their knowledge of their profession. The job of the faculty is to direct and focus these officers in their endeavors rather than familiarize them with masses of factual material.

STRATEGY AND POLICY

One of the College's goals is to teach its graduates to think strategically. Their study of strategy and policy examines the relationship between a nation's political interests and goals on the one hand, and the way military force may be employed to serve those interests and goals on the other. Its application involves a process in which the officer must first create a description of what occurred, then analyze it, compare and contrast it to some fundamental concepts, examine it in relation to other similar and dissimilar experiences, and refine the fundamental ideas with the generalizations which emerge. These are the themes that are the basic underpinnings of our examination of strategy and policy. They are common to all nations that use military force to further political objectives.

Fundamental Themes

—Military Means and Political Ends.
—Force Coordination and Strategic Execution.
—Non-military Means and Political Objectives.
—Strategic Theories and Military Capacity.
—Military Advice.
—Domestic Factors and Technology.
—Alliances.
—The International Environment.

Our goal is to give our officers the mental tools for evaluating current strategy and for formulating new strategies—for understanding what conditions should be satisfied in order to have a national or regional strategy which supports and achieves our nation's political objectives—and for distinguishing good strategy from the kind which is simply a capability in search of a mission.

During their year in Newport, the officers examine several historical case studies as part of their study of strategy and policy. Collectively, these cases, and others like them, bring into vivid relief the themes previously mentioned. Moreover, the nature of these cases is such that the officers must apply a national as well as an alliance perspective in their analysis. Discussion of these wars enhances their capacity for flexible, dispassionate thinking. Moreover, it also fosters the development of broad-gauged officers who are knowledgeable in the history of their profession and its role in the world and who understand that the past has a great deal to teach every profession.

SELECTED STRATEGY AND POLICY CASES/ISSUES

Theory and Prototype:

—Athens versus Sparta.
—The Second Punic War.
—A Revolutionary Era: Europe 1789-1815.

The Modern Security Environment:

—The Age of Nationalism: Europe 1815-1890.
—Total War: World War I.
—World War II and Coalition Strategy.

Contemporary Use of Force:

—The Cold War and Korea.
—Modern Revolutionary War: Algeria.
—Granada and Lebanon.

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONMAKING

Another major focus of study is planning joint forces. Its objective is to develop and apply a comprehensive framework for planning future forces. Officers integrate the many and sometimes competing variables involved in planning, selecting, and obtaining these forces and their necessary support. As in our other areas of study, the College examines the full spectrum of conflict from strategic nuclear war to terrorism and considers the resulting force implications. Throughout, we approach our planning cases from an integrated joint and allied perspective. We have always considered this comprehensive approach mandatory since our national strategy, with its emphasis on coalition warfighting, requires that we look at both the complementary and competing U.S. and allied perspectives on a worldwide basis and then study specific theaters and potential compaigns to identify combined and joint force requirements, deficiencies, problems and alternatives.

FORCE PLANNING

—Framework for Planning Joint Forces.
—Spectrum of Conflict.
—Joint and Combined.
—Objectives, Strategy, Forces, Threat, Risk.
—Limited Resources.
—National Security Command Structure.
—Case Method.

We require that our officers approach force planning in the spirit of recognizing that America's defense effort requires a close relationship between our military strategy and force structure we select to carry out that strategy. We emphasize that our defense strategy must be anchored firmly in our national security objectives, and our force structure decisions must stem directly from this strategy. The College reinforces the key variables of objectives, strategy, forces, threat and risk. A major consideration is the proper and explicit selection of objectives to ensure they are not vague, misdirected, overly ambitious or incomplete.

Our approach is to use extensive current cases to place the officers as closely as possible into the environment of a senior decisionmaker or as a principal staff officer to a senior decisionmaker. As part of this study, officers study all major strategic nuclear force modernization decisions and alternatives from the beginning of this administration to the current strategic defense initiatives. In addition to those displayed, we emphasize the force planning issues in the European theater such as theater nuclear forces, chemical forces, conventional force modernization, and follow-on-forces-attack. We also examine the other theaters to ensure a global perspective, as well as to consider specific regional contingency requirements.

SELECTED FORCE PLANNING CASES/ISSUES

Force Planning Cases:

- —Strategic Nuclear.
- —NATO and Warsaw Pact.
- —Contingencies.

National Security Command Structure:

- —Grenada/Lebanon/Terrorism.
- —Defense Reorganization.
- —Command of Special Operations Forces.
- —Technology Transfer.

Defense Resource Board Simulation:

- —USN and USAF TACAIR.
- —Close-Air Support.
- —Army Combat Support/Combat Service Support.

When studying the national security command structure, we candidly assess its strengths and weaknesses. We have extensively researched and written original cases on our operations in Grenada and Lebanon. We also look realistically at the major alternatives that have been proposed for defense and JCS reorganization. Other cases consider development of a U.S. response to terrorism, command of special operations forces, and development of a technology transfer policy.

Our focus on planning forces concluded with a simulation of the Defense Resources Board using selected, actual issues and papers. Officers are placed in either the role of a member of the board or a principal presenter to the board. In addition to those mentioned here, the officers have also considered such issues as the Army POM and the F-16/F-20 competition.

OPERATIONS

A third major focus is to prepare senior-level military officers for major command and senior staff assignments. We believe that senior-level professionals will be required to make increasing use of many military disciplines as they deal with joint operational problems and changing circumstances that will confront them in the future. The College employs a multi-disciplined approach to warfighting. Officers wrestle with national military strategy and its maritime elements, joint and service doctrines, military decision making, operational planning, the principles of military warfare, threat assessment, and war gaming techniques, among others.

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS

- —The Theater Level of War.
- —Military and Maritime Strategies.
- —Strategy, Campaign and Joint Operations Linkage.
- —Integrating Air, Land and Sea Forces in Joint OPS.
- —Elements of Military Decision Making.
- —Warfighting Capabilities and Limitations.
- —War Gaming as Decision Making Tool.

The focus is on the theater commanders, their subordinates and their senior staff officers. These are the integrating concepts. We place the officers in situations that force them to consider how the operational commander sees, shapes, fights, and sustains theater level campaigns and battles. The College highlights the commander's problem of organizing and coordinating separate service assets in a campaign. In sum, the College wants its graduates to be able to advise a commander how to organize and employ the total force within a theater to make a strategic difference.

In terms of the operational issues and cases that the College has used, we emphasize capabilities and limitations of forces and types of warfare.

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS—SELECTED ISSUES/CASES

- —National Military Strategy.
- —Maritime Strategy.
- —Air Land Battle.
- —Forward Defense.
- —Aerospace Doctrine.
- —Strategic Mobility.

—Terrorism.
—Space.
—Unified Command Plan.
—War Termination.
—Joint Operational Planning.

Cases and war games highlight strategic concepts, joint and service doctrine, sensor and weapon capabilities, and the functions and tasks of today's forces. We use the planning logic of the commander's estimate of the situation—a logic that identifies the alternatives available to one's enemy as a key variable in a military situation. Rules of engagement and limited intelligence are among the considerations that the officers must factor into their operational planning. We require them to make difficult decisions in a timely manner, in the face of uncertainty, in complex, joint operational simulations.

The officers play two major war games. One is a Super Power confrontation in which they assume the roles of theater commanders and their principal subordinates. The second game focuses on a crisis within a theater with the officers assuming senior military and civilian roles. They consider how to employ forces under their command to assist the National Command Authority in resolving the crisis favorably. Throughout, we emphasize that the officers must use current forces to solve these operational problems.

RESEARCH AND GAMING

As a first rate graduate level institution, the College sponsors an extensive research program which focuses on strategy and campaign development, planning, war gaming and other advanced research.

Each summer the Naval War College conducts the largest and most comprehensive war game in the western alliance. It is a three-week, multi-service endeavor by hundreds of officers and senior civilian officials and simulates the course of air, ground and naval warfare in all theaters and conflict in space. It stresses interservice operations, rather than only those in the maritime realm. We believe that the scope of flag and general officer participation attests to this last point.

Global War Game Series—Flag and General Officer Participation

USN	32
USA	13
USAF	20
USMC	18
Plus:	
Career Ambassadors	2
Royal Navy Flag Officers	4

The game's purpose is to gain insights into the nature of a global war between the West and the Soviet Union, insights related to strategy, to objectives and bargaining, to campaigns, to tactics, and to weapons systems.

GLOBAL WAR GAME SERIES

Objectives:

—Strategic Concepts for Joint/Combined Land/Air/Maritime Campaigns.
—Theater Priorities for Combined Operations.
—Effects of Blue Strategies on Red Decision Making.
—Diplomatic Initiatives Supporting National Strategies.
—Logistics.
—The Nuclear Threshold.
—Application of Advanced Technology to Tactics.

There has been a sharp learning curve over the course of the games and in each new simulation we build on what we have learned, while not ordering the players to follow any preconceived script. It is an interactive, free play game in which the Red and Blue military and National Command Authorities may use their conventional and nuclear forces as they wish. The forces and logistics of each side are based on the best available intelligence, while combat results are assessed by an experienced team of umpires using the most modern assessment techniques available.

The issues that arise from the play of the Global Game, as well as other games, are a source of research topics for the officers attending the College as well as the faculty. Last year, two Army research fellows reported aboard for a two year stint that will extend over three Global War Games. They have already contributed significantly to Army participation in the Global Game. Their job at Newport is to focus on improving cooperation between the Army and Navy in joint combat operations and campaign planning. This program will facilitate long term inter-service continuity in the research program. The Air Force is considering a similar program. It already has an officer assigned to our War Gaming Department.

Other games as well as the scope of the College's Advanced Research Program sustain the joint context of our studies and provide insights to senior commanders and political leaders.

SELECTED WAR GAMES

Project	Sponsor
Blade Parallel	USCINCSOUTH
Drug Interdiction	COMDT, USCG
Live Oak	SACEUR
Inter-American 86	Naval War Colleges of the Americas
JLASS	NWC/AWC/AFWC/NDU
MNC Force Requirements	SACLANT

ADVANCED RESEARCH

Project	Participants
Northern Flank Combined Air Campaign	USN/USAF/USMC
AWACS Support of maritime OPS	USN/USAF
Fourth Generation Soviet Aircraft	USN/USAF
Special Operations—A Framework for Change	USA
Strategic Airlift Requirements	USAF/USMC

SUMMARY

In sum, the Naval War College offers a credible educational program in the higher direction of war. The College believes that its graduates must understand the realities of national power and military force and how best to integrate our nation's military capabilities to assist in reshaping the strategic environment. While they are grappling with the issue of how to fight smart together today, they gain an appreciation of the value of long term vision and consistency stemming from national interests and objectives. While War College research and games directly help the national political and military leadership define issues and assess alternatives, the most important product remains the officer-student who will, through the course of his career, apply the analytical rigor and strategic sensitivity gained in Newport.

Some have criticized the American military officer for being more engineering than military minded—a technician rather than a student and practioner of war. We believe this criticism is unfounded. The very essence and purpose of the College is the same today as when Admiral Luce founded it: that is "to ensure that officers, not their equipment, are the controlling factors in war."

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you very much, Dr. Wood.

Next, Col. Dennis Drew.

STATEMENT OF COL. DENNIS DREW, USAF, DIRECTOR, AIR POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, AIR UNIVERSITY

Colonel **Drew**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today.

Mr. Chairman, Colonel Lykke, my colleague from the Army War College, it seems to me has presented an excellent overview of the building blocks of strategy, an overview which is conceptually accurate and, I believe, understandable. Now I would like to focus and expand upon just one of the ideas presented by Colonel Lykke on the ways of applying military force or, as he labeled them, military strategic concepts.

The legislative branch of the government is often fully occupied with the resources portion of Colonel Lykke's model, whereas a constant theme throughout military history is that how resources are used is at least as important as the resources that are available. How we use our resources is influenced by many factors, and all of these factors form the disparate ingredients for the stew that we call military strategy.

I would like to call your attention to another ingredient, one that is often overlooked in this strategy recipe. Recent history has illustrated that the nature of the conflict itself is a very important factor and one that presents us with some challenging dilemmas. Let me illustrate how the nature of a conflict influences military strategy by using revolutionary insurgent warfare as an example.

Revolutionary warfare is fundamentally different from traditional or the European model with which all of us are familiar. To begin with, rather than a clearcut act of aggression by one nation against another, revolutionary or insurgent warfare is essentially civil warfare. This is particularly important in terms of strategy. Civil wars, by their very nature, are rarely settled by reasoned compromise. It is much more likely that they will be finally settled only by the complete victory of one side and the complete defeat or at least withdrawal of the other.

In essence, although such struggles may be limited wars from the American perspective, from the perspective of the insurgent the war is an unlimited struggle fought for unlimited political objectives. The reality of this situation should have the considerable impact on American objectives and military concepts in such a struggle.

A second peculiarity of revolutionary warfare is that the insurgent's center of gravity, that is the hub of his strength upon which everything else depends, is the population from which the revolution grew. This is the same population from which the government must draw its support if it is to survive and defeat the insurgency.

In other words, both the insurgents and the government targeted for destruction by the insurgents have essentially the same center of gravity. Formulating a successful military strategic concept in such a situation challenges the traditional notion of attacking and destroying the enemy's center of gravity with conventional military means. To do so could destroy support for the government.

A third peculiarity of insurgent warfare concerns the tactics of the insurgents. At least in the early stages of such a struggle, insurgents use the classic tactics of the weak when facing the strong. They wage guerrilla-style warfare, fighting only when it is to their advantage and eliminating as much as possible lucrative targets for their foes who possess stronger forces and greater fire power. They win by not losing, by slow sapping the strength and will of the government, by inciting Draconian reprisals from the government that further alienate the population, by demonstrating that the government is not in control of the situation and, above all, they avoid a decisive defeat until they are strong enough to inflict decisive defeat on government forces using conventional military methods.

Now, the implications of revolutionary warfare for military strategy, it seems to me, are at least threefold. First, rationalizing limited American objectives in what we consider to be a limited war will be extremely difficult when the enemy is pursuing, from his viewpoint, unlimited objectives with every means at his disposal.

Second, coordination of the instruments of power and strategy must be completely in concert right down to the battlefield itself.

Third, the successful military prosecution of such struggles will require specialized training, unique operational strategies and perhaps modified equipment. Thus, the nature of warfare influences all three of the elements of strategy: objectives; concepts; and resources.

At the opposite end of the conflict spectrum, nuclear warfare and the deterrence of nuclear war present their own set of dilemmas. The most perplexing of these dilemmas is that there is precious little empirical evidence upon which to base strategy decisions. Moreover, the entire purpose of nuclear deterrence is to assure that there never will be any empirical data.

The real difficulty is, of course, that even though we have few facts upon which to base our decisions in the nuclear arena, we can never afford to be wrong. Even though the problems and dilemmas are different at both ends of the conflict spectrum, the strategy decisions that we must make are the same. They concern objectives, concepts and resources, the ends, ways and means of military power as illustrated in Colonel Lykke's presentation.

The purpose of my short discussion has been simply to point out that strategy, and particularly military strategy is a very complex subject. It may be helpful to think of strategy as a three-dimensional game of chess with an ever-changing playing board, perhaps more than two players and very limited knowledge about the opponent's position, capabilities or intentions.

The object of the game is to take advantage of your opponent's weakness and avoid his strengths, while at the same time protecting your own weaknesses and preserving your own strengths. In such a struggle, there are few constants, innumerable variables, many unknowns and no perfect answers.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Prepared statement of Colonel Drew follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF COL. DENNIS M. DREW, USAF, DIRECTOR, AIRPOWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CENTER FOR AEROSPACE DOCTRINE, RESEARCH, AND EDUCATION (CADRE), AIR UNIVERSITY

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the committee on the subject of strategy. Colonel Lykke from the Army War College has presented an excellent overview of the building blocks of strategy, an overview which is conceptually accurate and understandable. However, there are many approaches to the subject. The subject of strategy is much like a rich tapestry made up of many valuable threads.

For these proceedings, however, I would like to focus and expand upon just one of the ideas presented by Colonel Lykke in his presentation. Rather than the "ends" sought (i.e., objectives) or the "means" involved (i.e., resources), I would like to focus on the "ways" of applying military force, or as Colonel Lykke labeled them "military strategic concepts." The Senate and the legislative branch of government as a whole are often fully occupied with the resources portion of Colonel Lykke's model, whereas a constant theme throughout military history is that *how* resources are used is at least as important as the resources available. My purpose is to demonstrate that strategy is a very complex subject. Our students at the various professional military education schools wrestle with it in the academic setting. In the field, our officers must deal with these complexities and the very real dilemmas they present.

How we use our resources is influenced by many factors. Primary among these has been the ever-increasing pace of technological change which has changed the way wars are prosecuted. The advent of aerial warfare is a good example of how technology has changed the face of warfare in the 20th century. The list of other factors that influence how we use our resources is almost endless, and as Colonel Lykke noted, includes policy, ethics, doctrine, personalities, economics, and the list goes on and on. It is also true, as he pointed out, that the other two legs of his model—the objectives sought and the resources available—affect our military concepts. All of these factors form the disparate ingredients for the stew we call military strategy. I would like to call your attention to another ingredient, one that is often overlooked in the strategy recipe. Recent history has illustrated that *the nature of the conflict itself* is a very important factor, and one that presents us with some challenging dilemmas. This is particularly evident at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, especially when dealing with so-called revolutionary wars or insurgencies, of which there are many recent examples including our own participation in the Vietnam war. Let me illustrate how the nature of a conflict influences military strategy by using revolutionary insurgent warfare as an example.

Revolutionary warfare is fundamentally different from the "traditional" or European model with which all of us are familiar. To begin with, rather than a clear-cut act of aggression by one nation against another, revolutionary or insurgent warfare is essentially civil warfare. It is a struggle for power within a nation even though one or both sides may receive assistance from other states. Although such a struggle may not meet the legal requirements of international law to be termed a civil war—which was the case, some argue, in Vietnam—it will be civil war in the reality of its prosecution.

Although we viewed the war in Southeast Asia as a case of aggression by North Vietnam against South Vietnam, the enemy viewed the struggle as a civil war for political control of the larger Vietnamese nation. This is particularly important in terms of strategy. Civil wars, by their very nature, are rarely settled by reasoned compromise. It is much more likely they will be finally settled only by the complete victory of one side and the complete defeat or at least withdrawal of the other. In essence, although such struggles may be limited wars from the American perspective, from the perspective of the insurgent the war is an unlimited struggle fought for unlimited political objectives. The reality of this situation should have a considerable impact of American objectives and military concepts in such a struggle.

A second peculiarity of revolutionary warfare is that the insurgent's "center of gravity," i.e., the hub of his strength, upon which everything else depends, is the population from which the revolution grew. This is the same population from which the government must draw its support if it is to survive and defeat the insurgency. In other words, both the insurgents and the government targeted for destruction by the insurgents have essentially the same center of gravity. Formulating a successful military strategic concept in such a situation is, to say the least, a difficult task. It is a task which challenges the traditional notion of attacking and destroying the enemy's center of gravity with conventional military means. To do so could destroy support for the government.

A third peculiarity of insurgent warfare concerns the tactics (or battlefield strategy) of insurgents. At least in the early stages of such a struggle, insurgents use the classic tactics of the weak when facing the strong. They lack the wherewithal to confront the government in a conventional military manner. Instead, they wage guerrilla-style warfare, fighting only when it is to their advantage and eliminating, as much as possible, lucrative targets for their foes who possess stronger forces and greater firepower. They win by not losing, by slowly sapping the strength and will of the government, by inciting draconian reprisals from the government that further alienate the population, and by demonstrating that the government is not in control of the situation. Above all, they avoid decisive defeat until they are strong enough to inflict decisive defeat on government forces using conventional military methods.

The implications of revolutionary warfare for military strategy are at least threefold. The first has to do with American objectives in such struggles at whatever level we might be involved. Rationalizing limited American objectives in what we consider a limited war will be extremely difficult when the enemy is pursuing, from his viewpoint, unlimited objectives with every means at his disposal. The second implication is that if we again become directly involved in such a struggle the coordination of the instruments of power and strategy must be completed in concert right down to the battlefield itself. It will require the coordinated efforts of all the instruments of power to dig out the insurgents from the population, remove the root causes of the insurgency, and gain the active support of the population for the government. Third, the successful military prosecution of such struggles will require specialized training, unique operational strategies, and perhaps modified equipment. Thus, the nature of warfare influences all three of the elements of strategy—objectives, concepts, and resources.

From the foregoing, it should be clear that revolutionary wars present strategy problems that differ significantly from the traditional European model. The same can be said for the opposite end of the conflict spectrum. Nuclear warfare and the deterrence of nuclear war present their own set of dilemmas. The most perplexing of these dilemmas is that there is precious little empirical evidence upon which to base strategy decisions. Moreover, the entire purpose of nuclear deterrence is to assure that there will *never be* any empirical data. What deters? How much is enough? Can escalation be controlled? The list of perplexing questions goes on and on, and hard facts are few and far between. Unlike most forms of warfare, in the nuclear arena we do not have 5000 years of recorded battlefield experience upon which to base our strategy decisions. The real difficulty is, of course, that even though we have few facts upon which to base our decisions in the nuclear arena, we can never afford to be wrong.

Even though the problems and dilemmas are different at both ends of the conflict spectrum, the strategy decisions that we must make are the same. They concern objectives, concepts and resources—the ends, ways and means of military power as illustrated in Colonel Lykke's presentation.

The purpose of my discussion has been simply to point out that strategy, and particularly military strategy, is a very complex subject. I have purposely concentrated my own remarks on just one portion of Colonel Lykke's three sided model and have talked in some detail only about one form of warfare. With these kinds of complexities in mind, it may be helpful to think of strategy as a three-dimensional game of chess with an ever-changing playing board, perhaps more than two players, and very limited knowledge about the opponent's position, capabilities, or intentions. The object of the game is to take advantage of your opponent's weaknesses and avoid his strengths while at the same time protecting your own weaknesses and preserving your own strengths. In such a struggle there are few constants, inumerable variables, many unknowns, and not perfect answers.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the Committee and its staff for this opportunity.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Colonel Drew.

Mr. Foster.

STATEMENT OF GREGORY D. FOSTER, SENIOR FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. It is perhaps fitting and proper that I speak last because in a sense I am a heretic on these definitional matters. As such, I run the risk, at the outset of perhaps injecting some ambiguity where now there is developing a degree of clarity.

I think it is important, however, that I do so because in undertaking hearings such as these, you should recognize that there is very little agreement within the national security community as a whole as to precisely what strategy is. To the extent that there is such disagreement, this suggests that we should question very assiduously our ability to make judgments even on whether or not there is a strategy, much less on matters of how one goes about formulating that strategy. Only when we reach some common agreement on these terms will we be in a position to answer such questions.

Traditionalists, at the risk of oversimplifying, tend to view strategy as being synonymous with military strategy—or how one goes about prosecuting a war. Traditionalists tend to see strategy as being merely an instrumentality of policy, and they tend to see the meaningful taxonomy or distinction that should be made as that between strategy, operational art, and tactics.

I question some of the premises underlying these positions. I think the question we really need to be asking ourselves here and as we continue this dialogue is whether what we really want is the ability to prosecute war successfully or the ability to conduct a successful peace. I am afraid the answer to that question is less clear than it should be. We should pause to consider that fact.

Why do I question some of these fundamental traditional premises? First of all, I think that war in the modern era has completely redefined itself so that it accommodates today all manner of international conflict—not merely the direct military confrontations that we have tended to view war as encompassing in the past. Dramatic advances in telecommunications and transportation technologies have created a situation such that, in actuality, we live today on a sort of global battlefield in which there is very little to distinguish between what is tactical and what is strategic.

Strategy in my mind is not merely an instrumentality of policy, but instead is the overall conceptual framework within which the individual pieces of policy fit. We have immigration policy. We have human rights policy. We have technology transfer policy. All of these are meaningful in a truly integrated and cohesive sense only to the extent that they are part of a broader grand design.

I do not think that the meaningful taxonomy with which we should concern ourselves is that between strategy, operational art, and tactics—as the traditionalists, at least implicitly, would suggest. The meaningful distinctions the members of this committee should be dealing with are the distinctions between strategy, policy, and programs. We run a very acute risk of allowing the debates that take place within the national security community to devolve as they have in the past, into discussions of programmatic detail.

Thus, the questions we should be dealing with first and foremost are not tradeoff questions between air, ground, and naval forces; between combat, combat support, and combat service support forces; between force development, readiness, and sustainability. Instead, we should be addressing those fundamental tradeoffs between such things as military forces, foreign aid, public diplomacy, industrial-base development and the like, because those are the elements that should be the meaningful constituent components of an overall grand design.

Having said that, I think that strategy in the modern era can only be viewed as grand strategy—the coordinated direction of *all* the elements of power at the Nation's disposal; not merely military, but also political, economic, diplomatic, moral, psychological, and technological.

In the final analysis, I would define strategy or grand strategy as a philosophy of global conduct. Why do I call it a philosophy of global conduct? Quite frankly, the first-order questions with which we must concern ourselves even before we start asking the instrumental tradeoff questions are truly philosophical in content. They range from having agreement on such seemingly esoteric questions as the very nature of reality in the international arena, the proper role of the state, and so forth, to more specific questions such as how do we view the utility of force and what the nature of the threat is. Do we in fact face a unitary threat orchestrated out of Moscow, or do we face a variety of threats with which we must deal if we are to remain strategically viable? Similarly, what is the nature of conflict that will confront us in the future?

Finally, there is an even more specific level of philosophical question with which we must come to grips. That genre of questions deals with specific relationships in the international environment, not the least of which is what is and what should be the proper nature of our relationship with the Soviet Union. Is it in fact a zero-sum relationship in which a gain for one side is, *ipso facto,* a loss for the other, or is it, and should it be, something else?

In the final analysis, what I am talking about is the use not of force but of power. To the extent that you, at least on the face of it, agree with this idea, what we are talking about really is an exercise in managing perceptions in the international arena. It is in this sense that the ancient Chinese scholar Sun Tzu had words that are more meaningful for us in the modern area than are the words of Clausewitz. It was Sun Tzu who said, among other things, that "supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."

Finally, I would suggest that true strategy is the very antithesis of crisis management. We, as a nation, behave and think as if what we need to be able to do is to deal effectively with crises. In contrast, I think that if we have common agreement on these underlying, essentially philosophical questions, then we will be in a position not to have to treat every emergent situation as a crisis.

Therein lies an important point. Strategy in the modern era, if it is to be truly viable in an open society such as ours, must be closely tied to national consensus. It is not clear to me exactly what the proper nature of that relationship is. In other words, is consensus necessary for strategy, or is strategy necessary for consensus? Nonetheless, we must recognize that these two phenomena are inextricably linked. If we do not recognize this fact, then we will continue to talk past one another, trying to ascertain whether a given administration actually has a strategy or not.

The way things are conducted now, strategy tends to be a very cloistered process. Accordingly, it is very difficult for us to ascertain whether there is in fact a strategy, or whether there are activities ongoing that involve the formulation of a strategy. Only when we achieve a national consensus on some of these fundamental core values, some of these fundamental philosophical questions, can we meaningfully engage in such discussions.

Ultimately, the problem is intellectual. It does not relate to the nature of our political process as some have suggested. Regrettably, very little has changed since Richard Hofstadter wrote his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life,* in the early 1960s. Ultimately, we must undertake those actions that will stimulate broader perspectives and lead to intellectual growth.

It goes without saying, however, that intellectual development is a long-term process; therefore, there are some near- and mid-term institutional reforms I would suggest we need to undertake. In the interest of time, I will not elaborate on those reforms here. I have made some suggestions in my written testimony and would be glad to deal with questions on that matter as we proceed.

Finally, I am attracted to a quote from the late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who once said, "A new and valid idea is worth more than a regiment, and fewer men can furnish the former, than can command the latter." It is with this in mind that we should proceed from this point and truly come to grips with national strategy.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Foster follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GREGORY D. FOSTER, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Mr. Chairman and other members of the Committee, I am extremely pleased to have the opportunity to testify on the important subject of strategy. These hearings represent a salutary -- even seminal -- effort on your part, not only to establish a proper frame of reference for adjudging the appropriateness of U.S. defense spending and other associated aspects of our national security posture, but also to raise the level of discourse on such matters. The general public, though perhaps not fully attuned at present to the true significance of such an initiative, nonetheless owes you a collective debt of gratitude.

It is truly regrettable -- even if understandable in some perverse sense -- that strategy has not figured more centrally in the heated defense and foreign policy debates that have taken place in this country in recent years. Hopefully, what transpires during these three weeks of hearings will not be a dialogue of the deaf. We are, after all, talking about a relatively arcane subject -- much discussed by the cognoscenti of national security affairs, but little understood (even by the discussants themselves).

My basic premise in entering into this dialogue is that we as a people, unlike some other peoples abroad, do not think strategically. To those who would subscribe to my conception of strategic thinking, this is a perfectly valid premise. In its purest sense, strategic thinking represents an ability to accept and deal with contradiction and paradox as organic features of the surrounding environment; to synthesize seemingly disparate, unrelated ideas and events into a meaningful whole; to appreciate and accommodate the long-term implications of one's actions; and to generate truly creative solutions to the problems that face us. Absent such propensities, strategy-making devolves into a ritualistic exercise in bureaucratic bookkeeping and auditing -- a condition that in fact afflicts our national security establishment today. The rhetorical exchange that commonly passes for reasoned dialogue between the Congress and the Executive Branch on matters of national security would be whimsical were it not such a pointed indictment of us all -- legislators and policymakers, operators and planners, civilians and military officers, government and public alike:

> "Where are you going?"
>
> "Somewhere."
>
> "Why are you going there?"
>
> "Because."
>
> "How will you get there?"
>
> "Somehow."
>
> "What will you do when you get there?"
>
> "Something."

Naturally there are those who would refute my premise on the grounds that hundreds and hundreds of people throughout government toil daily on planning and policy formulation tasks. Yes, we regularly bear witness to an interminable flow of executive orders, presidential decision directives, federal regulations, periodic reports to the Congress, and random public pronouncements that set the policies of each administration. Yes, each year we produce dense, voluminous documents that specify program guidance in nauseating detail. Yes, we have scads of military operations plans covering scores of possible contingencies. And yes, we have an extraordinarily active and informed community of national security authorities outside of government who literally set the terms of debate on critical issues, and whose interaction with serving public officials is unparalleled anywhere else in the world. But let us not deceive ourselves into thinking that frenetic activity is somehow an accurate measure of substance. The question we must ask ourselves is whether the fruits of these labors actually contribute to or derive from some grand design that sets a proper course for this country in the conduct of international affairs. I think not.

The contentiousness of my claim is, in large measure, a function of my admittedly heretical conception of what strategy is -- or, more appropriately, what strategy should be. I stand in distinct opposition to most traditionalists in this regard. Traditionalists are essentially neo-classicists who believe in the eternal sanctity of the military art. Their growing numbers reflect a wave of fevered nostalgia surrounding recent efforts to resurrect what some believe to be the timeless verities of Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz. To the traditionalist, strategy is literally military strategy, or how one goes about prosecuting a war. All other forms of non-military "warfare" (e.g., economic or psychological) presumably are strategic only when a shooting war is underway, and then only as adjuncts to military operations. The traditionalist sees strategy as merely the military means for carrying out the political ends (policy) of the nation -- a distinctive level of warfighting that superintends the conduct of lower levels of military engagement, such as operational art and tactics.

Such thinking is fine if what we seek is an improved understanding of how to conduct military campaigns, but it contributes little to strategy per se. War today has completely redefined itself to encompass all manner of international conflict. Because the awesome lethality of modern weaponry has placed clear and unyielding limitations on the utility of direct military confrontation for the industrialized nations of the world, we have entered into an era of surrogate conflict in which political advantage is sought through the use of various alternative means of exerting leverage over one's adversaries. Furthermore, dramatic advances in telecommunications and transportation technologies have produced a shrinkage of the world to the point that we live on a sort of global battlefield. The smallest tactical action (military or otherwise) now can have almost instantaneous, demonstrable strategic ramifications. This tends to negate any meaningful distinction that might have been made in earlier times between strategy and tactics.

Lest this convergence of strategy and tactics inadvertently leads us to outfinesse ourselves semantically, however, let us be clear that there is a pronounced qualitative difference between strategic thinking and tactical thinking. If we restrict ourselves to thinking of strategy as having relevance only when someone is shooting at us, then we actually are thinking tactically rather than strategically. We thereby also are rendering ourselves acutely vulnerable to political defeat in detail -- even though such an outcome may not manifest itself fully until many years hence. Moreover, if we insist on unquestioning adherence to the narrow legalistic definitions of war that have guided our thinking to date, then we blind ourselves to the question everyone should be asking: Do we really want the ability to prosecute war effectively or to wage a successful peace? I am afraid the answer to this question is less clear than it should be.

It is precisely in this sense that the ideas of the ancient Chinese scholar Sun Tzu offer more sophisticated relevance to contemporary strategy-making than do the ideas of Clausewitz. Clausewitz was concerned with fighting and winning wars: actual engagements between opposing military forces. Thus his ideas apply, at best, only metaphorically to the more subtle forms of modern-day strategic interaction that have become so pervasive. In contrast, Sun Tzu espoused the importance of weakening one's adversary sufficiently in the preceding peacetime that resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory. To quote perhaps his most memorable maxim: "Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting." Unfortunately, the Soviets evince a much more developed appreciation of such nuanced thinking than do we.

Unlike the traditionalists, I am convinced that strategy in the modern age can only be thought of as grand strategy -- the coordinated direction of all the resources, military and non-military, of a nation (or alliance) to achieve its objectives. Our focus should be on how best to achieve our political objectives, whatever they may be, without becoming decisively engaged militarily. To think otherwise is to confuse the distinction that properly should be made between force (a physical phenomenon) and power (a psychological phenomenon). This is not to suggest that military force should never be used, but rather that it be used selectively as merely one of a panoply of instruments available to the nation for achieving broader global objectives. Power is the quintessence of strategy -- an exercise in "perceptions management" involving the manipulation of symbols to create or reinforce particular images in the minds of others, and thereby to induce desired behavior from them. This is the very principle on which deterrence is based.

Retired Rear Admiral Henry Eccles has acknowledged the important distinction between force and power in defining strategy as "the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives" [my emphasis]. In defining strategy in this way, Eccles in effect conveys two fundamental notions:

- that, rather than relying on the military instrument alone, one must capitalize on the totality of one's strength by making full use as well of political, diplomatic, economic, technological, psychological, and moral capabilities to exploit adversary weaknesses; and
- that modern capabilities enable us to exercise control over situations (events) and areas (geographical locales) without having to rely on physical engagement or occupation.

In the final analysis, strategy involves (1) capitalizing on one's strengths while exploiting an adversary's vulnerabilities, and (2) effecting tradeoffs among the capabilities necessary to attain such advantages. To the extent that modern strategy is truly grand strategy, this suggests that the first-order tradeoffs that must be made are not the particularistic military ones between air, ground, and naval forces; between combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities; or between force development, readiness, and sustainability. Rather, the first-order tradeoffs are the more general ones between, for example, military forces, foreign aid, public diplomacy, industrial base development, and the like. (A suggested taxonomy of these various instruments of power is shown in Figure 1.) Before one can make even these first-order tradeoffs, however, one still must understand what strategy actually is and how it should be formulated.

At root, grand strategy is a philosophy of global conduct, in that it depends for its very efficacy on being grounded in a set of underlying premises that are

Figure 1


NATIONAL POWER
(STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES)
ORGANIC POWER
NATURAL RESOURCES
ECONOMIC WEALTH
GEOGRAPHY
HUMAN CAPITAL
SOCIAL COHESION
MILITARY
Spending
Arms Balances
Force Deployment
Intervention
POLITICAL
Alliances
Regime Support
Immigration Policy
Human Rights Policy
International Organizations
Covert Action
DIPLOMATIC
Diplomatic Relations
Negotiations
Treaties
ECONOMIC
Trade
Currency Valuation
Budget
Foreign Aid
Lending Institutions
TECHNOLOGICAL
R&D
Industrial Base
Scientific Exchange
Security Assistance
PSYCHOLOGICAL
Propaganda
Cultural Exchange
Public Education
MORAL
National Unity
Crisis Response
Policy Consistency

philosophical in content. If a nation is to have a viable strategy, it must take a collective position on these premises. At the most basic level, these premises respond to a set of questions that deal with the very nature of reality and the proper role of the state in the international system: Are there truly objective factors in the international arena (such as the goodness or badness of particular actors, the "inevitability" of revolution, and so forth), or can truth be manipulated (as in proclaiming victory in an ambiguous military operation)? Will (and should) the state remain an enduring form of collective behavior and representation in the international sphere, or be displaced by other entities such as alliances or even multinational business enterprises? Should national interests take precedence over multinational interests? Should there be universally accepted and obeyed standards of international behavior? Is some form of world order or world government desirable and/or inevitable?

A second set of questions focuses in general on the dynamics of the international milieu: Does military force have primary utility as an element of national power, or should it be used only as a last resort after all other forms of power have been exhausted? When employed, should force be applied incrementally or decisively? Do we face a unitary threat or multiple threats? Are these threats principally military or non-military in nature? Do they emanate from states or from other sources (e.g., religious movements)? Is conflict inevitable? Does it have any positive effects, or only negative effects? What form(s) is conflict in general likely to take (military or non-military)? What form(s) is military conflict likely to take (nuclear, conventional, or subconventional)? What do we value more: democracy or stability?

Yet a third set of questions concerns specific relationships, such as between the United States and its principal adversary, the Soviet Union: Is communism a threat to the Free World? Is the U.S.-Soviet relationship zero sum in nature (a gain for one side is a loss for the other)? What should that relationship continue to be? Is it possible (and desirable) to compete and cooperate with the Soviet Union simultaneously? Can the United States "use" the People's Republic of China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union?

Only when these questions have been answered by a serving administration and subjected to public scrutiny is it then possible to engage effectively in the more instrumental aspects of strategy-making -- i.e., determining what capabilities to target against what adversary vulnerabilities under what circumstances. These philosophical precepts provide both an overarching conceptual mosaic for the formulation of specific policies and a necessary unifying basis for the achievement of national consensus.

Strategy is not, as the traditionalists would have us believe, a mere instrumentality of policy. In fact, quite the reverse is true. Strategy, as a philosophy of global conduct, provides the guiding intellectual framework within which the more narrowly focused pieces of policy fit. Where policies are fragmented, inconsistent, and ad hoc in nature, it is due to the lack of a cohesive strategy that can provide consistency and continuity. Absent such an intellectual framework, various political and ideological forces will rush in to fill the void. Thus we see each new administration driven almost compulsively to distance itself as far as possible from the policies of its predecessors. Thus we see the seemingly ineradicable tendency of Congress to focus on programmatic details (such as which individual firearms the military services should be allowed to buy) and to engage in overweening porkbarreling (such as whether to permit the closing of a given military installation). Thus we see pockets of bureaucratic recalcitrance and inertia driven by ideological attachments (e.g., free markets, federalism, privatization) that actually may be at odds with national security concerns. And thus we see an informed public (principally the media) eager to latch onto and label as doctrine anything that remotely hints of providing a degree of unifying thematic content. This is why, in the current administration alone, we have had the "Reagan Doctrine," the "Weinberger Doctrine," and the "Kirkpatrick Doctrine" (to say nothing of the Navy's so-called "maritime strategy"), none of which have had either the breadth or the depth to undergird the nation's overall strategic posture.

Strategy is the national security equivalent of what scientific historian Thomas Kuhn, in his landmark study The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, labeled a paradigm some 25 years ago. As it has come to be understood, a paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one scientific community (or subcommunity) from another. A fundamental image of the subject matter within the science, it defines what should be studied, what questions should be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answers obtained. Finally, it subsumes, defines, and interrelates the exemplars, theories, and methods and instruments that exist within it.

In an open society such as ours, strategy and consensus go hand in hand, although it is impossible to say which comes first. Is a cohesive strategy necessary, in other words, for consensus, or must consensus be achieved before a strategy can be formulated? The consensus I have in mind is neither a compromise solution nor mere majority opinion. Nor, for that matter, is it an intellectual herding phenomenon. It is, instead, a condition of "spontaneous unanimity" on fundamental values (the sorts of philosophical premises enunciated above). Even though differences of opinion should be expected and encouraged, there exists among the parties to any given issue a common basis of understanding and agreement on these underlying "first principles." Thus, in contrast with ideology, which is a definition of reality attached to a particular power group to support that group's interests, strategy cuts across power groups and thus provides a tangible measure of national unity.

Because consensus and strategy are so closely linked, a truly robust strategy cannot be crafted in a veil of secrecy. Although it may incorporate important clandestine or covert elements, a U.S. strategy must, in most key respects, take the form of "open covenants openly arrived at." The need for consensus manifests itself most significantly in the specification of the major premises underlying our strategic posture. Nonetheless, as portrayed in Figure 2, the formulation of strategy is a more detailed process in which some degree of consensus must be sought at other levels as well. In fact, at every step in the process, there is a clear need for common understanding and agreement that presently cannot be said to exist. Aside from the fact that, at the most basic level, there is remarkably little agreement throughout the national security community on the meanings of such fundamental terms as war, national security, national interests, and strategy, numerous open-ended questions exist at virtually every step of the process.

Figure 2

STRATEGY FORMULATION PROCESS


TERMS/
DEFINITIONS
ASSUMPTIONS/
PREMISES
CURRENT STATE OF THE WORLD
FUTURE STATE OF THE WORLD
INTERESTS
OBJECTIVES
THREATS
CONTINGENCIES
CONSTRAINTS
MEANS

For example:

- What is the current state of the world? Is it essentially stable or unstable? Hostile or friendly? Bipolar or multipolar? Are the United States and the Soviet Union in relative states of ascendancy or decline? Are there accepted norms of international behavior? What new dependencies and vulnerabilities are being created by the emerging global economy? What effects is technological diffusion having on the global balance of power?

- What will the world of the future look like? Will there be a proliferation of international actors (both state and non-state)? Will there be any major realignments of alliance structures? Will supranational bodies grow or recede in importance and influence? Will we see a proliferation of military regimes, military establishments, and nuclear-armed states? Will there be a continuation of technological diffusion and malassimilation in the Third World? Will resource maldistributions precipitate more crises? Will pronounced trade imbalances, debt blackmailing, and deficit mugging continue? What will be the effects of expected global age maldistributions, increased Third World urban crowding, and skewed immigrant flow?

- What are the vital and survival interests of the United States? How should these interests be distributed by type (geographical, political, psychological, moral)? Are there supranational interests that should take precedence over U.S. national interests?

- What are the overriding U.S. strategic objectives? To contain communism? To roll back communism? To prevail militarily over the Soviet Union? To prevail politically/ideologically over the Soviet Union? To achieve a mutually acceptable modus vivendi with the Soviet Union? To avoid direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union? To preserve the international status quo? To create a new global order? To achieve/maintain global stability? To reduce the level of global violence? To increase the number of countries under democratic rule?

The very nature of these questions provides moot testimony to the difficulty of achieving true national consensus and of developing a viable strategy. Obviously, effective strategy-making is a far less demanding undertaking in authoritarian societies such as the Soviet Union, where popular consensus is essentially irrelevant. There, well-developed geopolitical instincts (that we, frankly, do not have) can be acted upon quickly and assertively without being subjected to the harsh glare of public scrutiny. For us, the challenge is demonstrably greater. It is not an insurmountable challenge but one that the future suggests must be met.

The future promises to be vastly more complex than anything that has yet faced the United States during the country's brief history. Accompanying this complexity will be greatly accelerated rates of change and uncomfortably high levels of ambiguity and uncertainty. At the same time, there will be heightened public demands for improved performance from governments and their supporting institutions. These competing pressures will lower the threshold of tolerance for most political decisionmakers so that what previously were dealt with as routine situations suddenly will become crises. Thus, all other things being equal, crisis management seems likely to become the norm rather than the exception. While it may be argued that a crisis now and then is needed to oil the machinery of government and to stimulate the body politic, in point of fact the prospect of repetitive, near-continuous crisis is a daunting one. I have difficulty believing that such a state of affairs would do anything other than engender high levels of public angst and completely immobilize our government.

Strategy is the antithesis of crisis management. Where crisis management focuses on the moment, strategy looks to the future. Where crisis management is ad hoc, strategy is structured. Where crisis management is narrowly focused, strategy is broad-gauged. Where crisis management is disruptive, strategy is stabilizing. Therefore, to the extent that we wish to forestall or ameliorate crisis and the crisis mentality, we must seek to institutionalize the capacity for strategic thinking in this country. Unfortunately, there are forces at work in our society that make such an endeavor extremely difficult.

More than a few observers have argued that the very nature of the American political system effectively precludes any sort of effective strategy-making. I take issue with this argument. Our political system is a given, and one that we would not want to forsake. What it gives up in the way of efficiency, it more than compensates for in the way of stability. No, there are other important influences in our lives -- bureaucracy, the law, business, and even religion -- that inhibit our ability to think strategically every bit as much as, and probably more than, our political system does. Collectively, these influences have bred in us habits of thought and observation that are pervasive (hopefully not intractable) impediments to expansive strategic thinking: our affinity for routinization, simplification, specialization, and efficiency; our desire to establish precedents, contractual obligations, and liability; and our insatiable thirst for immediate results. These are tendencies that have been acculturated into us. But I am convinced that, rather than being causative in nature, they are merely manifestations of a deeper underlying intellectual stagnation that also is a cultural phenomenon. Little has changed -- if anything, the situation may have worsened -- since Richard Hofstadter wrote his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, in the early 1960s. Hofstadter noted a condition in this country that also has been aptly described by William Barrett in his book, Irrational Man: "In their actual life Americans are not only a non-intellectual but an anti-intellectual people. The charm of the American as a new human type, his rough-and-ready pragmatism, his spontaneity and openness to experience are true of him only because he is unreflective by nature."

If we are discouraged with the political fractionation and conflict that characterize the conduct of government, if we are disenchanted with the seeming inability of political leaders to act with foresight and decisiveness, then we must grapple with the root causes. As a society, we operate at the level of opinions and attitudes rather than at the level of insight and understanding. Where individuals in government cannot see eye to eye on particular issues, it may simply be because they cannot see past the ends of their noses on core values. There is no single culprit; we are all at fault. The challenge before us, then, is to develop the intellectual capacities of the nation -- to broaden perspectives, to extend time horizons, to establish a common frame of reference, and to nurture disciplined thinking -- so that Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, hawks and doves, military and civilian, Congress and the Executive Branch can think and act in harmony.

Strategy is a philosophy of global conduct. Philosophy in turn, beyond being simply one's view of the world, also is a disciplined way of thinking (anyone who has ever read a text on philosophy needs no convincing on this count). We must strive for such discipline in our thinking so that purely visceral tendencies do not drive our decisionmaking. There is particular relevance to the words of Ayn Rand, who addressed the graduating class at the U.S. Military Academy in March of 1974 as follows:

> You have no choice about the necessity to integrate your observations, your experiences, your knowledge into abstract ideas, i.e., into principles. Your only choice is whether these principles are true or false, whether they represent your conscious, rational convictions -- or a grab-bag of notions snatched at random, whose sources, validity, context and consequences you do not know, notions which, more often than not, you would drop like a hot potato if you knew.
>
> But the principles you accept (consciously or subconsciously) may clash with or contradict one another; they, too, have to be integrated. What integrates them? Philosophy. A philosophic system is an integrated view of existence. As a human being, you have no choice about the fact that you need a philosophy. Your only choice is whether you define your philosophy by a conscious, rational, disciplined process of thought and scrupulously logical deliberation -- or let your subconscious accumulate a junk heap of unwarranted conclusions, false generalizations, undefined contradictions, undigested slogans, unidentified wishes, doubts and fears, thrown together by chance, but integrated by your subconscious into a kind of mongrel philosophy and fused into a single, solid weight: self-doubt, like a ball and chain in the place where your mind's wings should have grown.

I have taken such words to heart and attempted to apply them in modest fashion at the National Defense University. In addition to my normal analytical duties as a member of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, I teach an elective course entitled "Strategic Brainstorming" at the National War College. I created the course because of my concern about how we approach strategy in our military educational system.

The American military has come under especially harsh criticism in recent years. Repeated military failures abroad have prompted critics to attribute the problem in large measure to the historical illiteracy of our officer corps. Generally speaking, the military has responded assertively to such criticism. Viewing the allegations of historical illiteracy as a flawed but useful impetus for reform, the military has moved to expand instruction in the writings of the classical military theorists in the curricula of most service schools. This renewed emphasis on the classics, though salutary in its own right, nonetheless has had the effect of encouraging the passive ingestion of the ideas of others, without at the same time encouraging the more active development of a contemporary generation of strategic thinkers within the military who are capable of producing their own new body of strategic thought. The need that exists, therefore, and what my course seeks to do, is to create a learning environment in which strategic thought, built on a firm foundation of self-generated concepts, is stimulated, encouraged, and rewarded. Only in this manner can the American military reasonably expect to produce the Clausewitzes, Liddell Harts, and Mahans of today who can leave a much-needed legacy of strategic thought for future generations.

In order to stimulate the students to raise their thinking to the level of abstraction, I expose them to some relatively esoteric writings (e.g., The Crack in the Cosmic Egg: Challenging Constructs of Mind and Reality, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, The Dancing Wu Li Masters, and Design for Evolution: Self-Organization and Planning in the Life of Human Systems) and then ask them to adapt concepts from these writings to the domain of strategy. The course has been quite successful thus far, although it has reached only a relatively small audience. I would hope that it might provide a useful model for the expansion of strategic thinking courses elsewhere.

Needless to say, intellectual development is a long-term process that will not come about overnight. We cannot afford, however, to wait for generational change alone to correct the problem while the world passes us by in the meantime. Therefore, in order to accelerate the process, we need to undertake near- and mid-term institutional reforms designed not only to legitimize and nurture the art of strategic thinking but also to alter entrenched perspectives. In other words, we must recognize the relatively restricted bounds within which existing institutions operate (e.g., the State Department and the Defense Department) and set about, accordingly, to create new institutions that, because of a broader focus, will force their members to look at "the big picture."

In the interest of space and time, let me merely list here, without elaboration, some near- and mid-term initiatives that might be undertaken:

Near Term

- A National Commission on U.S. Strategy: Nine distinguished Americans -- three each selected by the President, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House -- to assess the state of U.S. strategy and strategic thinking, and to evaluate the sorts of mid-term reforms listed below.
- A Congressional Caucus on National Strategy: Bipartisan, bicameral body that will stimulate public dialogue on strategy, keep strategy in the public eye, and institute legislative reforms.

Mid Term

- A National Strategy Council: Permanent body of distinguished Americans, separate and distinct from the National Security Council staff, to provide continuing advice and counsel to the President on long-term, global strategy.
- An Institute for Strategic Affairs: Government academic institution to provide analytical and research support to the National Strategy Council and, as appropriate, to the NSC staff. Would contain a Center for the Advancement of Strategic Thinking to advance the art and practice of strategic thinking.
- Congressional Committees on Strategic Affairs: Committee in each house of Congress focused on integrated strategic matters. Would have subcommittees on defense, foreign policy,

international economic affairs, intelligence, and so forth.

- Creation by the President, acting through the NSC, of regional public outreach teams to conduct regular national security affairs seminars around the country and to conduct surveys. These teams would become principal vehicles for public education and consensus building.

Such reform measures are merely suggestive and certainly worthy of more assiduous investigation. They do, however, represent tangible initiatives that could be undertaken to enhance America's collective strategic sense. Let us never forget that strategy is an exercise of the intellect rather than of muscle. Strength without thought may be not merely meaningless but totally counterproductive. As the late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once noted so perceptively: "A new and valid idea is worth more than a regiment and fewer men can furnish the former than can command the latter."

Chairman **Nunn**. I thank all of you for your testimony.

Let me start the questions, Mr. Foster, by asking you one of your own questions. Is the relationship or should, in your opinion, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union be a zero sum game; that is to say, what helps one hurts the other automatically? How do you answer that question?

Mr. **Foster**. I do not think on the surface it should. My personal opinion—a pet theory of mine—is that, quite frankly, what we are dealing with in the Soviet Union is a collective personality that has two sides, one side of which is fundamentally authoritarian in nature. Psychologists tell us that the way to deal with an authoritarian personality is to be authoritative, to present a posture that that person either respects or fears.

On the other hand, I think the Soviets are fundamentally insecure. The way to deal with an insecure person is to remove the source of those securities, something that is very difficult to do when you are dealing with someone who tends to see enemies all around him. The dilemma that faces us is how, on the one hand, to be authoritative and provide a posture that the Soviets respect or fear and, on the other hand, to be so overly aggressive that he is forced to withdraw into himself.

Having said that, I think the posture we should seek to pursue in the future is one of concurrent cooperation and competition. I do not think we should view the relationship as being zero sum. I think both actors should accept the other as being a legitimate player on the international scene, and we should proceed accordingly.

Chairman **Nunn**. Let me ask a question of any of the panelists who would like to answer.

Can you define our current military strategy in broad terms? Do you have a clear vision of what that strategy is, and, if so, would you please share it with us?

Mr. **Wood**. I can start out. I think it flows from what I said. Yes, I do believe that there are clear outlines of a national strategy, at least at the conceptual level. As I said earlier, our strategy really flows from our geopolitical position, from the fact that most of our interests and friends lie across the ocean and across the air, and that our principal enemy, in fact, can walk to where they want to go.

That in itself constrains the kind of strategy we are likely to have, particularly if the problem has been for us, as it has been for a number of historic states, to reassure those states lying on the periphery of that great central power. If you boil it down from that, you really are talking about a forward strategy in the sense that Robert Osgood once said we have ended our nonentanglement in world affairs. We are permanently entangled on the front line; that is, a forward deployment of American forces, at least conceptually, constitutes the first pillar of our national strategy and has done so since the conclusion of World War II.

Second, because of the inadequacy of that conventional force, we have supplemented it with the attempt to extend in one form or another our nuclear deterrent capability.

Third, we have understood that in order to operate in that periphery of the Soviet Union, it requires that all defense be coalition defense; therefore, it is impossible to conceive of a unilateral strategy on the part of the United States operating in that area.

Last, we have tried to manipulate the risks facing the Soviet Union by something which sometimes faces under the label of flexible response. The Soviets must never, given their central position, if you take the Soviets alone, explain the possibility of defining the time and place of combat. Should we allow the Soviets to define that, we are likely to lose.

Any strategy must, therefore manipulate the risk which the Soviets face so that they cannot face any combat with any degree of certitude. I would argue that in a real sense, the strategic principle, that even lesser enemies have to realize, is that they cannot force us into a single response at a single point, that we need to, in effect, respond much more broadly. I think that has driven much of our national strategy since World War II.

As I indicated, the problem of national strategy strikes me as being less of a problem, at least talking about it in the military sense at this point and only the military sense, than how do you move from that point to the kind of force structures you are going to develop, where they are going to be deployed, what kinds of alternative options you are going to have, what kinds of operational alternatives you will develop. It seems to me that is a far more intellectually demanding problem.

Contrary to what Greg said, I must say that I think the philosophical issues are, in fact, less of a problem than he might imagine. I think he may have given a solution for which there is no problem, at least among those who spend a lot of time thinking about it. We sometimes argue over definitions, but if we get away from the definitions and look at the phenomenon, no matter what you label it, what I am impressed with is the incredible degree of continuity in the debate over the last 40 years.

Chairman NUNN. Let me ask one question. Why do you think President, then General Eisenhower, has proven to be so wrong in his assessment that we were only going to be in Europe for a few years and that if we stayed there for 10 years the policy would be deemed a failure?

Eisenhower was a pretty broad-gauged individual. He had been through a war, probably had more experience in that vein than almost anyone at that time, and had a lot of strategic vision. Yet, here we are, 35, 40 years later, and forward defense, which was supposed to be a temporary matter—at least that was the way it was described—has become a permanent and, according to your analysis, which is probably correct, the very fundamental foundation of our whole strategy.

Mr. WOOD. I think the real issue was that as we came out of World War II, we really did not completely understand, and many Americans still do not understand, what a major historical transformation had taken place in the role of the United States. Many of us in World War II believed that at the conclusion of that war we would go back to business as normal and that whatever postwar involvement there would be would be temporary in nature. I think we did not understand that in fact there really was something fundamentally changed.

Churchill, by the way, probably said this best. In 1938 at a dinner which was given in his honor by Walter Lipmann, Lipmann asked him a number of questions about what was going to happen with Britain. In that very eloquent statement, those extemporaneous remarks that Churchill had been preparing obviously for 20 years, he said you have to understand that war will come. We, the British, will be unprepared. I hope and trust we will prevail, but should we falter the torch will finally pass from London to Washington, and you, the Americans, must finally learn to think imperially, that is, to understand that your interests, your specific and concrete interests, are tied up in a global balance of power in which you shall be the foundation and the maintainer, and from that role you cannot escape, only at the peril of your life. The world will be made by your hands or by the hands of your enemies, and as between that there may be no alternative.

I think that that fundamental grasp of what had happened as a result of World Wars I and II did not fully dawn upon the United States until well into the 1950s, and I would argue many Americans even today resist the logic of the historical transformation that took place as a result of those two great wars.

Chariman Nunn. My time has expired, but if anyone else wants to comment on that last answer, you may. Does anyone want to agree or disagree?

Mr. Foster.

Mr. Foster. At the risk of overstaying my welcome, I would briefly like to make a couple of comments.

Chairman Nunn. We would encourage you. When you hear something with which you disagree from the panel, this is what we are trying to do. We are trying to get differences of opinion out here on the table so we can begin to think through it ourselves.

Mr. Foster. In fact, on this particular question I am in very distinct agreement with Dr. Wood. I think he provided a very eloquent answer. I would only add a couple of things, very briefly.

I would urge you to seek out, if you have not already read it, an article that appeared in Foreign Affairs 3 or 4 years back (Winter 1982/83) by Michael Howard of the United Kingdom, in which he pointed out that our presence in Europe is not merely to deter the Warsaw Pact but to provide reassurance to our allies. I think that is an important point to remember. The question of reassurance is a critical piece of awareness on our part that we should not lose sight of.

Sun Tzu pointed out that the first and foremost thing we want to accomplish is to attack the enemy's strategy. To the extent that what the Soviets seek in Europe is not actually to engage in war but to fragment the alliance, I think the way to go about attacking that strategy is to maintain our presence and to provide the assurance or reassurance to the peoples of NATO that will allow the alliance to maintain its cohesion.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you.

Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this panel. I personally, and I think others, are quite envious of each of you. You have a little time to do some original thinking. That is something that on Capitol Hill is a rarity.

My question to you is generated by a response given by Dr. Brzezinski this morning. One of the themes or purposes of this set of strategy hearings that Senator Nunn and I have devised is to determine the relationship between our commitment and our resources. I specifically asked Dr. Brzezinski this morning about the rather bold decision that President Carter made, one which incidentally I supported, to bring into the fold of our many commitments one involving the Persian Gulf, which is some 7,000-plus miles away.

Now, he said that a democracy sometimes does not have the opportunity to develop in parallel with the commitment and the resources to back it up. In other words, a president is forced into a decision to make a broad, sweeping commitment and then hopes to play catchup, either himself or his successors, to get the resources to match the commitment.

To me, that is a rather dangerous way to formulate our foreign policy. I am wondering if anyone would like to comment on that. Perhaps, Dr. Wood, you might lead off.

Mr. Wood. I do not know if it is any comfort, but it is not a new problem, either to this Nation or to this time. As you were talking, I was reminded of Disraeli in the 1870s, who had a serious problem of Russian penetration into Turkey, and the British public were unprepared to do anything. So he basically tried to cover over the lack of British resource commitment by rhetoric. Fortunately, the Russians miscalculated and overplayed their hand and finally turned British public opinion around in time.

Too often, democracies are saved by their enemies and the overextension of their influence. That is, in fact, a very dangerous way to do business.

Senator Warner. Particularly in today's modern communication and intelligence and satellites and the like. We pretty well know one another's resources.

Mr. Wood. One of the areas I think we need to emphasize—and, again, we may take a page from the British on this. At the risk of revealing where I come from, we are a maritime power, by which I do not mean that we basically concentrate simply on naval forces but that with most of our interests and friends, we have to go across large bodies of water to get there and that they are generally hanging on the periphery, as I say, of a central power.

Any strategy that is going to prevail, particularly in a democratic power such as our own, has to find ways and means of persuading those peripheral powers to play a far greater role than they would be prone to play, understanding that you are not going to improve substantially the investment of a Denmark, of a Holland, of a Luxemburg. It is only those who have historically seen themselves as great powers or potentially see themselves as great powers who are likely to invest in a national defense because they believe they can make a difference: the Germans, the British, the French, the Japanese potentially, the Chinese, et cetera.

It seems to me that in the long term, given the limitations of our capabilities which are likely to remain permanent, we have to figure out how we deploy and use our forces in such a way not only to reassure them but to also be given enough sense of anxiety that they will do somewhat more than they are prone to do. I think that has been the dilemma of American foreign policy and will remain so into the future.

Senator **Warner**. I come back to my principal question, the extent to which the President can make commitments without knowing at that time if he has the military resources to back up those commitments.

Now, Secretary Weinberger, confirmed my view that President Reagan has not made any new commitments, certainly not of the sweeping magnitude as the one that President Carter made, and I do not see this in a policital context, just a plain statement of fact.

According to Dr. Brzezinski this morning, the military assets needed to implement and back up President Carter's Persian Gulf commitment have to some extent been made possible through the accelerated defense, increased defense spending of President Reagan. So back to the question again, to the extent to which a President can reach out, knowing he is reaching beyond his military resources for a set of commitments.

Would someone else care to comment?

Colonel **Drew**. Senator, I am not too sure the President did reach beyond his resources, but rather that was the only thing going on at the time in the Middle East. The question really is could we handle that and something else as well which may be a more likely situation. I do not know.

Senator **Warner**. We already have on the books seven treaties and some 40-plus commitments in terms of our military assets.

Colonel **Drew**. The real problem, it seems to me, and it is a problem of the republic, is of the realities, the political realities of foreign policy versus the enormous amount of time it takes to develop the resources to go with them, military resources specifically. It is a very difficult problem. I think since the commitment was made, certainly we are in an awful lot better shape in terms of military organization, plans, exercises, et cetera that we have gone through to prepare for that sort of contingency.

Again, I do not know where we are in terms of total commitments, if we could handle that sort of a contingency plus a major contingency in Western Europe for instance. I do not know. It would depend upon the circumstances. We are in a real dilemma here, it seems to me, with the political realities of what has to be done in terms of foreign policy and the difficulty in procuring, training, developing and organizing military forces which takes a great deal of time.

Senator **Warner**. Anyone else?

Mr. **Foster**. Yes, I would like to address that. I think this brings us full circle to the point I made earlier. We need not merely to focus on military resources but on the totality of resources at the Nation's disposal. There are ways to compensate for perceived or actual shortcomings in military resources by having an orchestrated integrated, coordinated plan to employ all of the elements of power at our disposal.

Second, I do not think, specifically with regard to military resources, that we should view as immutable those things that are now in place. Although we deal in perhaps nauseating detail with such programmatic matters, the types of technologies, the size and numbers of the platforms, the force structures, and even the doctrine we now have need not be accepted, as immutable. There are alternative force structures, other perhaps less-sophisticated technologies, and other ways of using and framing doctrine that can compensate for some of these resource constraints with which we must deal. I do not think we do a very good job of that.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. We had a very interesting discussion with Dr. Brzezinski this morning. Dr. Brzezinski brought out in his testimony here this morning that compared with the United States, the Soviet Union does not even belong in the same ballpark other than with regard to military power. Certainly they do not have the technology nor the technological base of our Nation. They do not have all of the other resources that we have.

I am curious to know, since the Soviet Union is considered as the No. 1 threat today what the Soviet grand strategy is and how they hope to prevail given only basic strength that they have.

How does their grand strategy differ significantly from what you think our grand strategy should be?

Colonel DREW. I am not a Sovietologist, Senator, but I worry, and this gets back to my opening statement again, that perhaps after concentrating for years on building up their conventional forces, et cetera, that they are looking at one of our Achilles heels, and that is vital areas in the third world. Rather than coming at us with a big bang, so to speak, they may be trying to make us suffer the death of a thousand cuts in the third world, and thus the emphasis in my statement on limited intensity conflicts around the world.

I think what they are doing is taking advantage of situations in the third world, festering causes that wind up being revolutionary wars, and they wind up supplying the disciplines, the cadres, the money, et cetera, even though they are not directly involved. Even though the insurgents involved may not be controlled by a Communist group, they certainly try to influence those sorts of things, and I think that can be very detrimental to us. I worry about that a lot as well as, of course, the traditional worries about Western Europe, Northeast Asia, et cetera, et cetera.

Senator EXON. What you are saying, then, Colonel, is that the Soviet Union is beginning to recognize that they have some serious problems, also. I tend to agree with what I think is the thesis of your philosophy, and that is we better take a look at the fact that maybe the Soviet Union never will be able to successfully attack Europe. Maybe they can reach whatever their national goal and agenda is by working through surrogates around the world in third world countries, looking further down the road, so to speak, than we traditionally do.

Colonel DREW. I agree with that, but I think we must remember that that is probably true precisely because of the amount of attention that we pay to places like Western Europe and Northeast Asia, the resources we have put together, the connection to our strategic nuclear forces, et cetera. We do not want to forget that.

Senator EXON. That is back to my basic question of what is their national strategy.

Colonel DREW. I think perhaps it is changing. I do not know if it is changing, but we need to pay more attention to, again, the periphery, which leads us to some real dilemmas about which kind of a war do we prepare for or, to put it another way, how much of our resources do we devote to worrying about wars in the periphery.

Mr. **Foster.** I am not sure I can add any scintillating insights to that. I also am not a Sovietologist, but I question that even Sovietologists or members of the intelligence community know precisely what the Soviet grand strategy is—beyond some etheral ideological platitutes about defeating capitalism, that is.

What I do know is that, by virtue of history and culture, they have a more refined geopolitical sense than we, and I think they also have, for whatever reasons, a more nuanced appreciation of what the late Basil H. Liddell Hart called "the indirect approach." That leads me in essence, to reinforce your argument and that of Colonel Drew. I think the Soviets recognize that they can immobilize us in place in Europe while nibbling around the edges until something falls off. I think that is what they are all about.

Mr. **Wood.** Let me make a distinction between Soviet aspirations and Soviet grand strategy. Andrei Gromyko, in a remarkable statement about 10 years ago, said what the United States has to understand is that there is no area on the globe in which Soviet involvement and interest can now be excluded, and that includes Latin America.

That is a remarkable statement for a Russian statesman to make and a complete break with historical Russian attitudes. The appetite has in a sense grown with the eating. Their capabilities have, in effect, truly rendered them a global power in their own eyes. They, in a sense, need our agreement to that. We provide the Good Housekeeping seal of approval if they have in fact reached the great power status, which is an ironic turn of events.

It strikes me that the Soviets, in terms of policy aspirations, would prefer to be surrounded by friends, and the problem is they constantly want to be surrounded by friends. As Henry Kissinger once said, the problem with the state which wants absolute security is it makes everybody else absolutely insecure, and there is an element of that in Russian history and Soviet mentality.

That is clearly their aspiration. They do want to be involved in most of the great decisions in the world today, including in regions in which they traditionally have had no interest. I think that is going to define their approach to the world for some time to come.

In terms of the kind of grand strategy by which they hope to achieve this, it strikes me that they have recognized that military intimidation, particularly on the periphery, to some degree, if used skillfully, does work. There is no question that not only do we spend a great deal of time reassuring, for instance, our West European allies, but our West European allies spend a great deal of time reassuring the Russians.

The real problem is what does it take to reassure the Russians? On occasions, the Russians have been skillful at exploiting that desire. On occasion they have been very, very bad at exploiting that desire, but it is an important approach to use their military power without actually using it.

I think they agree, however, with what's been said, that overall they prefer to increase their influence by aligning themselves where possible with those insecure political movements in much of the third world who basically are asking very fundamental questions about their ability to maintain power.

The Soviets have proved themselves very good at aligning themselves with a number of forces and saying through thick and thin we will provide you the wherewithal, we will not ask too seriously a moral question, we will look the other way as you exploit that power in order to consolidate your regime. That, in effect, gives them an instrumentality which we often are unable to give.

It is impossible for us to look the other way as we provide military equipment and technological advice of a military nature. We simply, in effect, ask questions which go beyond the original question of who is going to rule and how am I going to maintain power.

I should point out that Lenin took Clausewitz and took Machiavelli and simply Sovietized them. If you really want to understand Soviet mentality, it is still worth reading Clausewitz's "On War" and Machiavelli's "The Prince" because I think they very much think of the world in those terms.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for exposing us to this type of discussion of Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Sun Tsu, Kissinger and Lenin, especially late in the afternoon. It is really quite uplifting. I came in toward the tail end, Mr. Foster, of your testimony, and I walked in on what I think was a Socratic question of the sort. "Is duty pleasing to the gods because it is good or is it good because it is pleasing to the gods?"

I did not understand quite what you were saying about strategy building a consensus or consensus building a strategy. You raised it as an issue, and I am not sure that you answered it. I suppose everybody here would be familiar with the expression if you laid every economist end to end, you would never reach a conclusion. I suppose if you laid every global strategy end to end, you would never reach a consensus.

The question I have is how do we get from here, which you described as being fairly conceptually deficient in our strategic thinking, to there when we are faced with the present day realities?

For example, I assume the military has a "strategy" of dealing with Iran should the Ayatollah die today or tomorrow and the Soviets make a military move across the Transcaucus. You have to have a strategy of dealing with that, I assume, Colonel Drew. Where do we ever reach that point in the spectrum of developing a philosophy of global conduct that we could have some confidence that we could rely upon the serenity and wisdom of a Sun Tsu and not the fire power of an M-1. How do we get from here to there?

Mr. FOSTER. There is no school solution to that question. Obviously, you recognize, No. 1, the difficulty of such an undertaking and, No. 2, that it is a long-term process; so I am not sure I could project myself into the future and say where we actually reach that point.

I need to point out, however, what I mean by consensus. I do not think we have a consensus on fundamentals in this country today, or what I would call a philosophy of global conduct. Consensus to me is not mere majority opinion, nor is it a compromise solution on a particular issue. Nor, for that matter, is it some sort of intellectual herding phenomenon. It is, I believe, a sort of spontaneous unanimity on fundamental core values.

That being said, the question still remains, how we get there from here if, in fact, intellectual change and development is a long-term process? I have suggested in my written testimony some near- and mid-term institutional reforms that not only would nurture the art of strategic thinking but also would serve to change perspectives. My position is that, because intellectual change and development is a long-term process, we need to undertake institutional reform—that is, to create new organizations that will force people to look at problems differently and to see things from a different perspective.

One of the things I have suggested—not original to me, by the way—is creating a body that might be called a "global strategy council" or a "national strategy council" that would be separate and distinct from the National Security Council staff, which, of necessity, must focus on coordinating actions out of the in box and, fighting today's brush fires. This would be a bipartisan group if distinguished Americans who would provide continuing advice and counsel to the President on matters of long-range, global strategy.

Looking at this end of Constitution Avenue, I think there also is some utility in considering the creation of committees on strategic affairs in each House of Congress that would attempt to integrate and focus what now are carried out in separate bodies foreign relations, international economics, military affairs, and so forth.

There are other things that could be undertaken, I think, in the near term.

Senator COHEN. In other words, you would advocate combining this committee with the Foreign Affairs Committee?

Mr. FOSTER. I think that is not unreasonable.

Senator COHEN. Certainly if we are going to call upon our globe strategists to start integrating their thinking from purely a military to one that includes military, economic, and I think you indicated political as well, we ought to consolidate the committees on Capitol Hill so that we do not segregate our particular intellectual capacity.

Mr. FOSTER. That makes sense.

Senator COHEN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that would be a good proposal for you to make to Senator Pell.

Chairman NUNN. The real question is who is the ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator COHEN. I am just concerned, as we sit back and philosophize—or vaporize, as it may be—about how we develop such a comprehensive and global scope, what happens in the meantime? How do we deal with each issue which may erupt in the minds of our current deficient thinkers as not only an issue but a crisis?

Mr. FOSTER. Obviously, we cannot just stop now and say all of a sudden we are going to start thinking strategically by edict. Things have to continue. This will be a long-term process, but I think by undertaking some institutional reforms in the near term we can at least come up with a partial solution or mechanism for facilitating the sort of longer term intellectual capacity we want.

Senator COHEN. Just to raise the point once more, let us suppose that the President, on SDI, which has remained fairly controversial, said: "Before I develop a strategy, I want to have a consensus among my strategic thinkers." Do you think he ever would have come up with an SDI initiative?

Mr. **Foster**. Probably not.

Senator **Cohen**. Is it not better to try to develop a strategy and then hopefully develop the consensus to support that strategy?

Mr. **Foster**. Again, I am not clear on what the proper relationship is. If one assumes that strategy as a mechanism can serve the function of coalescing all of one's constituents out there, then I think the answer is yes: but it is not inconceivable to me that through some means we could develop a consensus that would provide a better basis for strategy. It is a chicken and egg problem. I recognize that.

Senator **Cohen**. Dr. Wood.

Mr. **Wood**. Let me make the problem even more complicated, if I can.

Senator **Cohen**. If you quote Pericles to me——

Mr. **Wood**. I am not going to quote anybody except maybe a Congressman who was up for election recently. When he was asked a question by his constituent as to where he stood on the right to life movement, and he said, well, some of my friends are for it, and some of my friends are against it, and I am for my friends.

The problem with leadership is it has to lead, and it has to lead before there is a consensus. I cannot think of any major movement in American foreign policy, which was not against the opposition of a lot of politicians, strategic thinkers and professors.

So I think, in effect, if we wait for a grand consensus to emerge, we are going to have an extremely difficult time. Somebody has to be the lightning rod. Someone has to in effect focus the agenda. When that happens, everybody is going to stand and say, well, he did not consult all these people and we do not have the agreement of MIT and Virginia and Harvard, et cetera.

Let me make it somewhat more complicated. There seem to be two issues. The reason there is such a debate and has been certainly since the late 1960s is that there is not in fact a consensus among our political leadership of what the problem is and who the enemy really is or, putting it more exactly, what the nature of that enemy is.

There is also a great disagreement among our political leadership of whether the problem is ourselves or our enemies, and I say that has developed and has been a consistent part of American politics, at least since the latter part of the 1960s. Vietnam certainly had something to do with it. I think that has been exacerbated by a second phenomenon; that is, in the fragmentation of our political parties and the fragmentation of Congress itself.

The fact is that our current politics tends to favor the Lone Ranger. It is very possible to reach the pinnacle of national leadership without, in fact, the backing of one's own party, and I say it is a remarkable phenomenon.

Senator **Cohen**. Only the Democratic Party is that way.

Mr. **Wood**. The institutional developments plus this break in political consensus which may be as fundamental as all the philosophical issues that have been raised. Until we finally resolve in our own minds what the problem really is and develop an institutional mechanism whereby we can move together rather than have hundreds of people move in different directions, we are likely to have this debate continue for some time into the future.

Colonel DREW. I think one thing does need to be said here. Despite my good friend, Greg Foster, wanting to do some reorganization, I am always a little bit perturbed that every time we are confronted with a problem, we either attack it by some sort of new technology, that is develop a gadget that will solve the problem, or we reorganize something.

It seems to me the real key in the long term, at least, is education, particularly in the military but also of our policymakers who wear mufti, and the purpose of that is to learn to ask the right questions. I think this gets back to what Bob was just saying. Who is the problem, et cetera? Are we asking the right questions about the problems we perceive? I think the SDI thing is perhaps a good example.

I do not know how it would have come out, but I am very disappointed, for instance, at the public debate which is almost totally focused on a technological question, will it work, and an economic question, can we afford it. The real questions are, it seems to me, the more difficult ones.

The answers to those two questions are really relatively simple because either it will or it will not work someday, and either we will or we will not be able to afford it someday.

I have no idea what the answers to either one of those questions are, but the tough questions, it seems to me, are the ones that need to be asked. Should we or should we not do it? Does it make war more or less likely? What does it mean in terms of deterrence theory? What does it mean in terms of crisis management? Does it make war more or less likely at what level, et cetera?

I am not too sure anybody asks those questions very well. We tend to get hung up, for some reason or another.

Senator COHEN. We are asking the questions, but we cannot get the answers. We are asking those questions. That is not going unchallenged. I hope your initial comments about reorganizing was not a subtle comment upon the Nunn-Goldwater bill of the past session.

Colonel DREW. No, sir.

Chairman NUNN. That is the first time I have heard my name first on that one.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Barry may be listening out there. I think you had better correct that one.

Senator COHEN. But you are here.

I did not want to cut you off, but I think members of this committee and Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees are trying to raise these kinds of questions, not simply can we afford it, is it cost-effective at the margin, and simply, will it work. We are asking those questions, too. You cannot, however, simply engage in a theoretical discussion about whether or not it would be a deterrent and have stability at a certain level if in fact it is beyond the realm of the Nation's ability to pay for it.

Colonel DREW. I agree.

Senator COHEN. So, you have to take that into account as well. When you look at the kinds of deficits we have, you have to factor that in and balance that off against the combination of war, MX missiles or Midgetman missiles. It is all part of the package. So we are not ignoring the fundamental question you are asking.

I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen.

Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just ask for any of you that are interested, and maybe Mr. Foster would comment on this. I think it is in line with some of the things he said but maybe some of the others as well.

It seems to me that perhaps to the extent there is a deficiency, it is not in our military strategy or development of military strategy, but it is the integration of that military strategy with the grand strategy.

In answering some of these questions that Senator Cohen was just alluding to, I think Senator Nunn said that President Eisenhower felt that if we were not out of Europe with our troops by the end of the decade, that would be a sign that our strategy had failed; maybe not our military strategy, perhaps in some sense our grand strategy in that there may be a point at which keeping a quarter of a million troops stationed in Europe is inconsistent with grand strategy goals for the country or at least has to be looked at in those terms because it does erode our economic base to an extent. It does put on us a burden that some of our allies have not been willing to share, but it is a burden we have carried for a very long time.

I would be interested in any reaction you have as to where the deficiency is. Is it in the development of a grand strategy, in integrating our military strategy into that? That seems to me to be the case rather than in the development of a military strategy for pursuing specific military goal.

Mr. FOSTER. Yes. Very clearly, it is problematical. Again, this whole exercise takes place within relatively cloistered circles to which I am not privy nor do I have access. I do know, however, that there are national security decision directives that attempt to provide national-level policy guidance. One of the major problems, though, is that virtually without exception these documents are relatively highly classified and receive very limited distribution. Thus, it is questionable in my mind that the type of guidance and the stimulus to consensus that they should provide is provided and that it reaches the right people.

In the meantime, well-entrenched programs, not only within the Department of Defense but in the other departments as well, proceed apace. They have bureaucratic momentum built up. This is not endemic to any particular administration. It also happened in previous administrations. I was involved in a study about 1½ years back in which we went all the way back to NSC-68 and came forward, looking at the key national security policy guidance document that was promulgated by each administration. At the same time, we looked at what had taken place with regard to military force structure, defense spending, and so forth. Seemingly, there was little impact on these programs based on the guidance and the premises articulated in these documents. Without exception, one of the contributing factors was that there was such limited distribution. They did not affect the community.

So yes, even if we do have a grand strategy, I am not sure that enough of the right people know what it is.

Mr. WOOD. Let me make two comments. One, sometimes I think we beat ourselves around the head and shoulders entirely too much as to whether we do or do not have a grand strategy and how the military component fits into it.

Second, I sometimes think we confuse innovation with creativity.

Point number one, I am constantly impressed as I go back to the period immediately after World War II at the sophistication in terms of what we did abroad and in terms of commanding an internal consensus of our grand strategy. The containment policy developed after World War II was not simply a policy for the involvement of American forces in Europe or in Korea. It was not simply a military doctrine, but it involved the heavy involvement in the lives of those two states who had opposed us in World War II and the transformation of their internal politics. It included the Marshall Plan and the development of the European Economic Community.

I am always surprised that people say that we have never had a grand strategy when I consider the period of the late 1940s and the 1950s and into the 1960s, the most stunningly successful period in American foreign policy and from which we can learn even today a great deal if we would go back and contemplate the inner relationship between those elements. I am impressed, as I say, by the level of consensus which finally developed in those areas.

The second point I would make, which has to do with NATO, concerns the question of how much. What do we do in order to get the Europeans to contribute more to their national defense or to the defense of Western Europe. It is a legitimate issue. The numbers as well as kinds of forces are always important issues, but it is also very dangerous to change what has become in many people's mind a permanent element in world politics.

The withdrawal or the substantial drawdown of American forces in Western Europe, the transformation of the leadership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, would create a stunning reappraisal on the part both of the European governments and of their opposition parties and on the part of the Soviet themselves.

I guess this is really a variation of if it is not broken, do not try to fix it. I am afraid we may try to fix it in a very innovative way as we look at the problems we face in the Pacific and in Asia and in the Mediterranean and so forth, and I think we have to balance what we are going to do, but I think we ought to move very carefully in being entirely too innovative in the world of global politics.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me just ask one other question if I could.

You suggested, Mr. Foster, as one of your midterm proposals, to establish a national strategy council. In your view does it make really better sense for the President to have the advice of our National Security Council? I mean, it appears to me that, while I do not know all the history of the National Security Council, that was created at a time and under circumstances where security, military security, was preeminent.

It is still in many ways, but there are other vital national interests which are also of a strategic nature that may not get the attention they deserve in the White House by virtue of this being a security council rather than a strategy council.

Would you comment on that?

Mr. FOSTER. Although I have never served on the NSC staff, I nonetheless do think I have a fair sense of how bureaucratic organizations of any kind operate. I have a hard time seeing the NSC staff being able to elevate itself above being merely a coordinating mechanism that is able to handle today's brush fires. There, of course, is always the difficulty of separating planning from operations, and I recognize that difficulty.

On the other hand, absent some move to try to provide an environment in which long-range questions can be dealt with from a global perspective by individuals whose advice the President could be expected to respect, I do not think the mechansim is now in place that could provide that sort of perspective.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Wood, in a response, I think, to Senator Cohen's question, you said that you spent a lot of time discussing who is the problem? Are we the problem or are they the problem? Which is it?

Mr. WOOD. I think fundamentally they are the problem.

Senator QUAYLE. What are our problems? What would you say are our problems? What do you teach these people what our problems are, I guess "our" problems being, you know, first the United States of America and then second western democracies in general. What do you tell them?

Mr. WOOD. I think the answer to that to some degree goes to the statement that I made. I think that we as Americans do tend to believe that as a nation we are immortal, and I think that, in fact, it is very difficult for our populace as a whole to really view ourselves as passing from existence. Most of the states we are dealing with have a keen understanding that in fact many of them have at least been transformed in history and can change fundamentally.

I think somehow we have never really internalized that problem.

Senator QUAYLE. Is that unique to the culture of the United States, or would you put that in all western democracies?

Mr. WOOD. No, I think it is specifically unique to the United States. I think that most West Europeans have a very keen belief that they could really pass out of history altogether, if not even existence.

I think that, therefore, we do not think in the ways that Dr. Foster was mentioning. We do not think in terms of a grand strategic approach to the rest of the world. We do not think of how we mobilize the whole range of forces in some kind of consistent way because at every point various sorts of other interests will get in the way in one form or another. I think some of our problems either way are, however, dilemmas. They are not puzzles that can be solved. They are built into our constitutional system, and I would not change them.

The fact of the matter is we do have divided power. The fact of the matter is the Founders determined that the President would not simply have absolute power in terms of external security. It will be a shared power. All of that makes it very complicated in some sense for us to carry out a foreign policy.

On the other hand, it seems to me that that very system should force us in the direction at least to some degree that Dr. Foster is mentioning, and that is the development through mechanisms which draw the branches of government together and an informed public together in order to develop, over time, a consensus on what critical issues are.

I think Colonel Drew said it was a problem of education. In some sense it is. In fact, it is the only way we can do business in this country. It is very hard to rule in this country, as we now know, by fiat or by indirection or by trying to beat the system. We get in trouble all the time when we are tempted to do that. So we have to take the constitutional system as it is.

This type of discussion this afternoon and what you are going to be having in the next couple of weeks strike me as being on target for that very reason. I would make one cautionary note, if I can, on the idea of a Strategy Council, to which I am indeed sympathetic but which my instincts as a political scientist keep saying is never going to work.

President Truman did not want the National Security Council in the first place because he felt it was going to be an instrument for Congress to tell him what to do. It has not entirely worked that way, that was the theory, but presidents are always suspicious of those things they do not control. They fear that the so-called objective councils will give interviews to the Washington Post and become kibitzer and therefore try to enter into the political process in a way that will make life complicated for the President.

I would guess——

Senator QUAYLE. That is true.

Mr. WOOD. That is right. We have a long way to go before any administration, whatever its political coloration, is likely to be greatly enthusiastic about a council of wise men who are trying to shape American foreign policy. If it is in the area, if you will, of national debate and national discussion, it may work, but as a mechanism I would not bet the family jewels on it.

Senator QUAYLE. If you look at this forming of the consensus—and you just pointed out how difficult it is in our pluralistic system, and go back to Senator Cohen's point. In our system, we go ahead. We think we have a consensus. We have elections. There is a consensus, whether it is in reality or not, or at least it is perceived that you won the election so you have this great mandate and this great consensus.

Then you develop a strategy. You go out, and it falls more in the realm of education. It is very difficult to sit around and form the consensus. We are always trying to do that, and we think that once we come out of it, we call it bipartisanship up here when you can find and develop this consensus.

Again, it is part of the leadership, and I am curious as to how to do this on a scorecard, if you would put western democracies over here and totalitarian governments over there, and you would show what our weaknesses are. At least from the United States' point of view, you would say this idea that we are in fact immortal, that we are not going to pass from history as one of the main liabilities that we have inculcated in our culture, that hurts us in determining how to mobilize our forces. Yet, you would not take that kind of cultural feeling to others.

I am trying to get out of you some of the other weaknesses and liabilities you see from western democracies' point of view as we are pitted against the totalitarian governments, whether it is the Soviet Union or elsewhere.

Senator COHEN. May I add to that question? You said people in the United States feel that they are immortal. Some writers have suggested that the United States is suffering from a feeling that it is immoral.

I am thinking of Francois Ravel's book, "Why Democracies Perish," which pointed out that we perhaps are unique in engaging in a sort of self-flagellation while the enemies of our society are outside the gates banging on the doors seeking its destruction. So I am wondering whether you would say immortal and immoral in that category as well.

Senator QUAYLE. Then briefly, because my time has elapsed, I would like the other ones to respond if you really think that this is, as far as from a western democracy point of view, the chief liability that we have as we look at the battle that we have with totalitarian governments.

Mr. WOOD. Let me preface it with an anecdote. At least, I will not answer with an anecdote, but I will preface it with one. I can recall some years ago that a lecture was being given at the Naval War College on the 1920s and 1930s. The lecturer was in fact a professor at the War College, and the questioner was a French officer who got up and said it is a disgrace, the kind of political leadership which the United States had in the 1930s.

He went into a tirade about the leadership, foreign policy leadership, of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, at which point the answer given by the professor was, let us see, that was the same period of time when Salazar ruled Portugual, Franco ruled Spain, Daladier ruled in France, Mussolini ruled in Italy, Adolph Hitler ruled in Germany, Chamberlain was ruling in Britain, and Tojo was in charge in Japan. You stand there and tell me that the United States suffers from a deficiency of leadership?

I think we always ought to keep that kind of answer in mind, that whenever the problems of American democracy, the Soviet system and the systems of other enemies or potential enemies are equally and, I would argue, far more defective to the degree that they are not representative of the aspirations of their own people.

That does not tell us what we should do, but at least it puts in perspective——

Senator QUAYLE. What are we teaching these people who go through the school in this area? What are we telling them? I guess that is my question. What are you telling them that our deficiencies are?

Mr. WOOD. Some things we can do. For instance, the strategy council is one institutional solution. There are institutional solutions.

I'm of the opinion that we went through a period in the 1970s in the organization of our political parties and of our political institutions generally which maximized the normal fragmentation of American life, which meant that we have far more chiefs than we have braves. And it was very difficult to lead in the circumstances of the 1970s for any president.

I think we are now beginning to move out of that period, where we're seeing a greater degree of consolidation within parties, and within our political institutions themselves.

I think for a starter, that ought to be improved and increased.

I think we do need a far greater debate across parties and across institutions as to what the fundamental values and issues are. I think we are beginning to move beyond the breast beating of several years ago about the immorality of American foreign policy.

It seems to me that while there's still an element of that in American national life, I think it ought to be resisted. I think that we have, in fact, certainly, as a people engaged on occasion in immoral acts. But I would argue that our track record as a nation is remarkably good, remarkably good by historical and contemporary standards, and I think we need to put it in perspective.

But there was clearly a period, in the late sixties and the early seventies, when I think we did enter a moment of national hysteria where I think we lost all sense of perspective, were unable to make any kind of discriminations.

I was on a college campus during that period of time, and heard such statements that the Soviet Union and the United States were basically morally equivalent. I mean that's outrageous; it's false.

It showed that we were failing as professors.

Senator COHEN: That statement was made here in the United States Congress when the invasion of Grenada took place.

Mr. WOOD. My view is that people who say that are not paying attention.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Dixon.

Senator DIXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Wood and all of you gentlemen, my friend from Indiana has asked you specifically what's our problem. And I just wanted to make kind of a response and see what your evaluation of it might be.

In the time that I've been here, which is the time that Mr. Reagan has been President of the United States, we have doubled the budget for our military spending.

We spent the last several days hearing from Secretary Weinberger, Dr. Brzezinski and you gentlemen about what our grand strategy might be.

I suggest that there is no clear understanding of what that might be, but if you look at what's done from the standpoint of the budget, it occurs to me that we have once again this time a budget very heavy on the strategic stuff, very weak on conventional means.

I mean, we're going to cut back on TACK helicopters, M-1s, F-15s, F-16s, F-18s. I could go on at length. At the same time we're going to increase 66 percent, if you want to believe this budget, spending for the Strategic Defense Initiative.

They want to take the 50 MXs we have, that we're going to eventually have under the present basing mode, and have another 50.

If we grant that, which I suspect we will not, and railroad cars; I certainly prefer that basing mode.

But the point is, I wonder what the strategy is in all this. It seems to me that, particularly in the subcommittee that I've been active in the past and will chair this year, our spare parts acquisitions are going down in the last several years, again, including this year. Ammunition: not adequate.

How does that fit the strategy as you folks see it, as you make your plans for war games? What is our strategy in that kind of a scenario?

Mr. WOOD. I'm not a budgetary expert, but let me frame the problem the way I see it.

There's no question that as you develop a strategic vision, you have to decide the balance of forces you're going to have, the kinds of structures of your forces.

Unfortunately, that will never be reflected in any budgetary year, because by necessity, it can't be. And as I say, I have as yet limited knowledge of what the current budgetary program looks like.

But the fact of the matter is, sometimes you buy certain things rather than other things because of how long it takes to get them.

You're talking about capital expenditures that will take you well into the future. And in fact, even in some of the gaming we've done it becomes clear as an issue is that in battle, some things disappear faster than can be replaced in time to make a difference.

And you have to decide how long it takes to replace what you've got if you ever had to use it. In a sense, some of our budget decisions are driven in what looks to be distorted directions by those kinds of calculations in any particular budget year, but they may be completely rational.

I think the question constantly has to be asked at the end of 4, 5, 6 years, will there in fact be the proper balance? I think that is a legitimate question. But I think it's very difficult within any single budget year to argue the case too vigorously as to whether more or less should have been spent in these areas, unless you look at those broader questions.

And that is, in terms of contracts, how long it takes to let contracts; how long it takes to get the weapon system you're after. All of those are going to drive the decisions you'll make in any particular year.

And by the way, that isn't particularly different than the decisions businessmen make in large corporations, where they sometimes, in some years, heavily invest in things which let other parts of the company appear to deteriorate.

The real question is whether that goes on persistently and there's never any balance, then you clearly have a major problem.

Senator DIXON. Well, let me follow it up on the same line of questioning on a different subject matter.

Again, anyway, something that's been apparent to me for a great many years, we've heard testimony from Dr. Brzezinski, but I think it's not more than a representation of what the general view in the country is regarding our situation in the NATO alliance, where he has suggested we ought to reduce those forces, that we have a great many more problems and more vulnerability in the

Persian Gulf; that there would be a more useful employment of at least 100,000 people, but take any number you want to.

A number of years ago, the chairman of this committee, Senator Nunn, had some plans for taking some initiatives that would require all our NATO allies over there to participate in a more significant way in the support of what's happening in Europe, that I thought was a good idea and I supported enthusiastically.

But it was nothing more than a ramification, or an idea similar to what Dr. Brzezinski said earlier today.

And then the suggestion that the Japanese be involved more than 1 percent, although I guess it's a fractional amount. It would be more than 1 percent now.

But isn't it a fact that if you don't pursue those goals soon, after all of these years, that part of the grand strategy is going to be in pretty serious shape? Which is to say that we have everybody where we're strongest, and nobody where we're weakest, and don't seem to be doing much about it over a substantial period of years while a great many people have been suggesting this is a problem.

I mean, I would love to hear some suggestion about that. That might not be the grand strategy, but it's a thing a lot of people agree on that are pretty expert in this field.

Mr. WOOD. The issue here tends to be, to what degree can we redeploy forces from Europe in order to sustain missions that we have elsewhere, either military missions or nonmilitary missions.

Will those resources, if they're released, allow us to do other things elsewhere?

Senator DIXON. And where our friends and allies participate on a better scale as they should.

Mr. WOOD. There are two sides to the answer.

That is, I'm convinced that if the President and Congress were in agreement as to the desirability of the restructuring of forces, and we had entered into a dialogue with our European allies in a broad sense, then you could perhaps reach an agreement as to what the level of responsibility should be.

I should tell you that, in fact, when there's disagreement within the administration, or between the administration and Congress, the Europeans, like all our friends and allies and enemies, will exploit those divisions, and then you're basically stuck with the status quo.

The worst thing that could happen, it seems to me, is for the United States to unilaterally make that decision without any full and open discussion with the Europeans.

But if we discuss it with them, there ought to be a degree of unity in our own national leadership as to what the primary questions are and to what the answers are likely to be.

I do think, however, that we may be deluded a little bit by what we used to call the Vietnam bonus; and that is, if we stop doing what we are now doing, we'll be able to do other things. And we've been waiting for sometime now for that Vietnam bonus to materialize. It never did, of course.

Simply put, the redeployment of forces does not mean that resources which are released from one area can quickly and easily be deployed in other areas.

That's a question we need to think through. But I'm sympathetic with the notion that we have to somehow put ourselves in the position where the Europeans see the defense of their security as their primary problem and their primary objective, and we help them do that, rather than be put in the position, which does often happen, where we propose and they kibitz.

That may be the problem of leadership. But I think it's in our interest, over time, to begin to shift more of the burden. One of the reasons that hasn't happened is for the obvious reason that Europeans are not united. There's no such thing as a Europe, despite the European institutions.

When we talk about the resources of Western Europe being equivalent to that of the Soviet Union, that may be quite beside the point, because that's like saying the resources of Mexico, Canada, and the United States are, in fact, equivalent to something else.

It's true, but it's probably perfectly irrelevant, because there's not a single political leadership that controls those resources.

So it is in Western Europe. So in some sense, that's a good rhetorical debating point, to say how many resources they have and therefore they ought to be able to do more.

But those folks are divided into different governments and have different constituencies. And I think that may be the real issue.

And I think it would be a mistake for us to throw our hands in the air and say, well, because you people aren't united, you are subject to constituent pressures, we are going to take up our marbles and go home.

And I don't think we've done that. I don't think that in fact the proposals we've made have done that at all. I think we do need to put pressure, but we ought to understand the limits of what that pressure is likely to accomplish.

Senator **Dixon**. Thank you.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Symms, I'm going to leave it between you and Senator McCain to see who goes first here.

Senator **McCain**. I think the marines usually go first.

I'll just ask one question, and then he can have some time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Foster, could you just clarify for me your views on whether you believe the Soviet Union operates under a zero sum strategy with reference to Third World countries, i.e. Angola, Nicaragua? In other words, their gain is our loss; is that the way they view it?

Mr. **Foster**. Again, although I couldn't claim the expertise of a Sovietologist, my perception is yes, they very definitely do. They are of that mentality, that a gain for them is a loss for us, and vice versa. Now, there may be individuals with more expertise than I on the collective Soviet mentality who would counter that argument, but that's my perception.

I guess by implication, then, the logical extension of your question is that if they think that way, how can we afford to think any other way? I don't know the answer to that, I'm afraid.

Senator **Symms**. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator McCain. I think Senator Symms is waiving his time.

Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate this very distinguished panel being here today.

As a War College graduate, I certainly appreciate the work that you do to prepare our military and civilian leaders for positions of higher responsibility. I think it's one of the crucial missions that you have.

I just have a few comments. And one of them is, I'm sorry that I wasn't here when Senator Cohen was carrying on a high-level dialogue with you concerning this business of consensus and strategy.

I think, Mr. Foster, that you leave out a crucial element when you try to solve that dilemma. I think if you look at our national leaders: Theodore Roosevelt in the case of the Panama Canal, Franklin Delano Roosevelt before World War II, Harry Truman in the case of Korea, you will see that the national interest overrode consensus. Particularly that of President Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt's actions prior to World War II, would have left us in very bad condition had he not taken the measures which he had. In this day and age these would have been gross violations of the will and intent of Congress, and indeed, probably would have been cause for the convening of special committees which would last for a year or two.

One of the things that has harmed our ability to arrive at consensus nowadays is that our leaders lacked the ability to go to the American people, until this President.

I think we had a consensus to send Marines—I think wrongly—to Lebanon. I think that consensus obviously shattered after the bomb went off and killed those brave young Americans.

Dr. Foster, I applaud your goal of sending out teams into the countryside to educate the American people, to send outreach teams to conduct regular national security affairs seminars around the country. I think that's a great idea.

But I would be very curious to see what the participation of our citizens would be. I think the majority of the American people elect and select their leaders, both political and military, to carry out those functions for them.

It is not that the American people want to be kept in the dark concerning the conduct of foreign affairs, but I believe that they want to feel secure about the fact that they have leaders who can conduct them on a day-to-day basis until a crisis arises.

Then I think we have to go to the American people when we're in a crisis and seek their support for whatever action is contemplated.

I understand that we have the advantages of a free society. But it's not clear to me whether we believe that the Soviet Union simply fishes in troubled waters; whether they just look for places around the world where they can take advantage of U.S. weakness; or if they have a grand strategy that says, 5 years from now we will penetrate Central America and 10 years from now we will seek to overthrow the government in Mexico.

Perhaps that question has been asked of you before, but I would like to have another go at it if I could.

Mr. Foster. If my notes serve me properly, there are essentially four points to which I need to respond.

The first is the question of leadership. I agree wholeheartedly with what Dr. Wood said and with what you said. There is no substitute for leadership on such matters. But I failed to bring that out as perhaps the single most critical issue in engendering some sort of public consensus. It was a failure on my part merely to express the point, not that I didn't believe it. That is a point of view that Walter Lippmann noted very perceptively over 50 years ago, when he pointed out that typically the American people do not align themselves on specific sides of an issue. Rather, they align themselves with leaders who can articulate a point of view. The attraction, then, is for the leader and not necessarily the substance of the issue.

Second, I do agree that we find ourselves in a situation in which military engagements can probably only be undertaken in normal circumstances if they are of short duration. In fact, that's a subject on which I wrote an article a few years back, entitled "On Selective Intervention." I made the point that, as an essential element of deterrence, we should take a more active approach to intervention under particular types of circumstances, as serving the function of enhancing our overall deterrent posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Therefore, we need to pick and choose those types of situations in which we could most profitably involve ourselves. By definition, such situations must be of short duration and amenable to a decisive conclusion in a relatively short period of time.

Third, on the question of sending out teams to the countryside, I still think that is a viable approach that should not be discarded out of hand because of what we, perhaps with a great deal of justification, perceive the response of the American people would be. With all due respect to you and your colleagues, these people do elect representatives to represent them in Congress. But, I think at the same time that they feel themselves increasingly distanced from decisionmakers in Washington, and that if mechanisms were provided that would allow them to engage in more regular dialogue, the results might well surprise us. But we have to approach this as a living experiment. We don't know how it would work. But we shouldn't discard it because of how we think it would work.

Finally, do the Soviets have a grand strategy, or are they just masters of exploiting situations? I don't know the answer to that question. But I do think they have a more refined strategic or geopolitical sense, moreover, they do not have to incur the "burden," of having to generate consensus for their actions. I think they have enough of a strategic sense that even if they don't have a grand game plan, they at least have an intuitive sense of what exploiting a given situation when it emerges will do for them strategically. Whether or not they have a game plan, I don't know. But I think they know, or at least have a better sense than we do, of what situations to exploit under what particular types of circumstances.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, could I ask if any other members of the panel would like to respond?

Senator GORE [presiding]. Surely.

Colonel DREW. I have no idea, Senator, whether they have a master plan or not. But they are master fishermen. As to whether they are fishing with some sort of plan in mind, again, I'm not a Sovietologist. I really can't comment on that.

Senator COHEN. I think they probably had a game plan to penetrate our Embassy in Moscow.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. Thank you. I will recognize myself in turn for questions.

First, I would like to say how much I enjoyed all four of your presentations. I thought they were very perceptive and interesting, ranging from a classical definition of strategy to more innovative or newer definitions of strategy. I found it all extremely interesting.

I would like to focus on nuclear strategy if I could just briefly here, and look specifically at the problem of managing perceptions. I think you, Mr. Foster, used that phrase.

Do the rest of you agree that in nuclear strategy, the management of perceptions is obviously one of the keys? There is no disagreement with that, is there?

Second, is the only disagreement with the fact that what we are dealing with is a system?

[No response.]

We are not establishing a strategy for ourselves in a vacuum and then watching the results of that strategy on a neutral playing field. It is an interactive system, and as we develop our strategy, we have to be closely attuned to the reaction which occurs on the other side. So far, no disagreement, is there?

[No response.]

In a system of that kind, it seems of paramount importance that we pay close attention to the kind of information we get about what effect our strategy is having on that system. What kinds of feedback loops are there? How do we evaluate the success or failure of particular strategic moves?

You would all agree that strategy is a dynamic process which has to be constantly reevaluated. In that reevaluation, one of the most critical elements is the effect that our strategy is having on the decisions made by the other side. Nobody disagrees so far; correct?

[No response.]

I am concerned that there may be something that would be described in systems theory as artificial feedback loops where we get information that appears to be one thing, and it actually is a distortion of the reaction that our strategy has caused on the other side.

I am wondering if any of the war colleges or any of the four witnesses here have explored that particular theoretical problem?

Mr. WOOD. There are some inherent limits in any kind of action/reaction theory. We in the American scholarly community, are particularly prone, however, to give great credence to action and reaction kinds of theories. I would argue that the Soviet Union is remarkably immune to the kind of reaction/action/reaction cycle. We sometimes attribute their responses, either negative or positive, far too much to what we have or have not done.

I think that if you take the Soviet military and political thought generally over the whole historical period since 1917, what is at least impressive to me is the degree of predictability in Soviet behavior. On the contrary, there is a fair degree of unpredictability on our side, but I say the Soviets are far less unpredictable than we sometimes think.

Senator GORE. Do you think Gorbachev is predictable?

Mr. WOOD. In terms of the broad ways which he frames the problems, I think, in fact, that he is. What is interesting about what we hear about Gorbachev today is that he is innovative both in domestic and international affairs. I would point out that the same thing was said of Krushchev in the latter part of the 1950's and the early part of the 1960's. By the way, both statements are true.

What you have to understand is that that innovation is within a range, a range which, I think, most Soviet specialists would see as fairly——

Senator GORE. I believe you said eariler you are not a Sovietologist; is that right?

Mr. WOOD. I am not a Sovietologist, no. By training I am, but by profession I have not been for years.

Senator GORE. Well, fine. If you had that training, that is great. What I want to get at is, in keeping with the nature of this panel, the strategy process itself, how we reevaluate and update our strategy, how we establish our goals in the first instance and how we evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy we choose to arrive at those goals.

Now, you are quite familiar with the old phrase "the fog of war." Is there something approximating the "fog of cold war" where this action/reaction cycle in the arms race produces a tremendous amount of uncertainty at times about whether an action or reaction by the Soviet Union or by us reflects a new intention or it merely reflects the new technological capability of the particular weapons system they have chosen to use in reaction to something we have done?

I am not sure if I am making myself clear, but in looking at the history of the arms race in the latter half of this century, it seems to me that there are many examples of one super-power developing a strategy, either containment, insuring deterrence, or whatever, and choosing a particular way of pursuing that strategy—a weapons system or a geopolitical move—which is then misinterpreted by the other side, not fully understood by the other side, not seen clearly by the other side, and which produces a reaction on their part which is not in keeping with what we intended to do in our strategy.

I see it coming from both super powers, but I will not pursue it if it is not a subject——

Mr. WOOD. I will pass the microphone over to Greg. I think the problem might be what is called the law of unintended consequences, but that does not stem from what a rational observer could see to be a likely reaction of the Soviets.

I think that the unintended consequences or the surprise on our part grows from the fact that we have not sufficiently understood the Soviet system, the Soviet imperatives, the Soviet problems and, therefore, when they react in a certain way, the problem is we interpret it a certain way.

The real problem we face as Americans is to assume that the Soviets strategically think the same way we do; therefore, if we push this button, they are going to react in a way in which somebody from Iowa might react. In fact, the greatest example of that was in the early 1960s when Secretary McNamara basically espoused that doctrine, that the technology itself and the weapons systems themselves carry within themselves a certain logic, and if we do certain things the Soviets will ultimately respond in a certain pattern.

I do not think that has happened. I think we need to understand the Soviet cultural and political reaction far better. You are absolutely right. There is a reaction, but very often the reason we are surprised by the reaction is because we expect certain things, because we project certain responses, and, when we do not get them, we seem surprised.

Senator GORE. My time is up, but I would just like to conclude briefly by saying I disagree with your analysis there, not totally but up to a point. I am struck by how difficult it is for us to ascertain the Soviet intentions in a variety of different strategic areas. I know that President Reagan and his team and those who went to Moscow before Reykjavik for the preparatory meeting, not preparing for Reykjavik but to prepare a summit, they came back amazed at all the misconceptions the Soviet Union had about the United States and all the misinterpretations that they had about why we were doing certain things.

In conclusion, I would just like to say that if, indeed, it is a system in which our strategy plays out, all modern systems theory is beginning to focus more and more on the preeminent importance of information feedback loops, whether it is quality control circles or whatever you are talking about, renewed attention to the quality of the information, better ways to evaluate it to assure that it is absolutely correct to the extent of your ability to do that.

That, it seems to me, is one of the great weaknesses of our current strategymaking system. My time is up, and I will give it back over to the chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have several comments and then some questions. I guess this is basically for the panel. Would you agree that when you are talking about a grand strategy, you are really talking about the political, economic and military implications, that they are all linked together globally. At times it seems to me, that even a lot of us in the United States mix up what we call strategy with tactics, and they are two different things.

In other words, the Soviet Union strategy perhaps has changed some, but their tactics are always changing. You can see what their goals are. You know what their goals are. They are stated. It is no secret. They might push back from time to time, but are they not basically pushing and shoving around the world? They are looking. They are probing.

Someone on the panel referred to the fact that you can bleed to death from a few cuts, or a thousand cuts. You do not need a direct confrontation if you can wound something. You can destroy an elephant by a few cuts in the right places or a lot of cuts here and there without really taking him down straight on. Is that not what they are trying to do in a sense? Is that part of the tactics that they are using to achieve their grand strategy, Colonel Drew?

Colonel DREW. One of my comments, sir, and I would agree with what you are saying, is whether we call it a tactic or a military strategy or whatever.

Senator SHELBY. Tactics and strategy are really two different terms, are they not, but are not tactics used to carry out strategy?

Colonel DREW. The classic definition is tactics are what you use on the battlefield. Strategy is what gets you to the battlefield, but in that sense, the broader world sense, yes. You can say that was a tactic, I guess.

Senator SHELBY. Perhaps the Soviet Union's tactics have changed because we are in a different age with different weapons systems, but assuming that the Soviet Union's overall grand strategy has not changed, has our strategy to combat them throughout the world really changed, considering their movement in many ways to the third world, to the surrogate type fighting that is going on? Are we waiting always to react to something that is put in place by them, or do we have a grand strategy?

Am I making sense to you?

Colonel DREW. I cannot speak for the highest level of government, of course, but I can tell you that at least in the military there is much more interest in those kinds of conflicts and educating our officers, at least at our university and I assume at the other schools as well, and in those kinds of warfare that we may get involved in, revolutionary wars. There is a great deal of interest in looking at those kinds of wars because they are so different.

Senator SHELBY. If you are looking, however, at the third world and things that we are having to react to, is the Soviet Union, although they are probing and they are looking for opportunities always, setting the agenda?

Colonel DREW. I think the agenda really is being set by——

Senator SHELBY. Circumstances?

Colonel DREW. Circumstances within these particular areas that breed the sort of discontent that leads toward revolutionary warfare.

Senator SHELBY. They are picking up on this. They are probing. They are looking, and they are taking advantage of it in a resourceful way.

Colonel DREW. In my opinion, yes.

Senator SHELBY. This is what you are teaching at the war college?

Colonel DREW. We are looking at it very hard, yes.

Senator SHELBY. Dr. Foster, I believe Senator McCain touched on how do you disseminate and bring together a consensus, which is hard to do in a democracy although we live within a democracy, for a grand strategy? How would you really do it?

Would you reach out and hold town meetings? That is not your term, but if you were trying to do this for grand strategy, would you not come right in conflict with the evening news and all three networks and CNN and everything else?

Mr. FOSTER. I think the answer to that question is obvious. It is a long-term educational process. Now, having made such a general, grandiose statement, I do not have a game plan right now that I could articulate that would suggest all the specific steps I would take.

I think one mechanism among many—aside from perhaps injecting into our educational institutions more of a sense of global strategic considerations and the discipline of strategic thinking—is this idea of having grass-roots national security issues. This would provide a near-term mechanism that could be used to facilitate more regular dialogue with the American people.

Beyond that, I have not really crystalized my thinking to the point where I could give you a game plan, a whole menu of things that we might do. I think, nonetheless, that this is important, because in the final analysis it is a question of reeducating the American public.

There are a lot of influences in our daily lives, not the least of which, for example, is the fact that we are a nation of laws. Being a nation of laws, we tend on the whole to think legalistically. If there is even a shred of validity to my contention, the question then becomes how you get people not to think legalistically in terms of simplistic dichotomies, blacks and whites, winners and losers, liabilities, and contractual agreements. How do you get people instead to look at the longer term, bigger picture? It is an educational process.

Senator SHELBY. My time has expired. I think we could stay weeks doing this, and we would learn a lot.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Shelby. We will, I suppose, run around with one more question on each Senator, and then we are probably going to be closing out, but I do not want to cut anyone off.

I want to ask each one of the witnesses, starting with Colonel Lykke, getting away from grand strategy and getting back down to strictly military strategy, how would you critique our present military strategy from your personal perspective? What would you change if you were in charge?

Colonel LYKKE. Sir, my concern is that we, as a nation, must find some way to formulate a truly joint military strategy. I believe it is nothing but chaotic for each individual service to come up with a strategy of their own.

Chairman NUNN. You think that is what is happening now?

Colonel LYKKE. It is starting to look that way, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Any other points, Colonel?

Colonel LYKKE. No, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Do you believe, with a followup here, that the reorganization with a clearer authority to the chairman and the mandate on his coming up with strategic thinking changes and so forth, do you think that will have any effect one way or the other?

Colonel LYKKE. That will be a big help, sir, because we must find a way to get good policy from our political leaders down to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs. That is crucial.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Colonel Drew, could you tackle that question? How would you critique our present strategy? I would like your personal view, not speaking for the war college or the Air Force.

Colonel DREW. Two things come to mind immediately. One is perhaps an overemphasis on our traditional interests in Europe and Northeast Asia, and as I have emphasized all along, the more likely case might be someplace else which, of course, leaves us with the dilemma of do you prepare for the worst case or the most likely case. That is truly a dilemma.

The second thing I worry about is the future generation of military thinkers. I would like to see more done to somehow stimulate military officers who think about these sorts of things, to read the military classics and so on. We emphasize——

Chairman NUNN. You are saying military education?

Colonel DREW. Yes, sir. We need to do something, in other words, to reward those folks who go on to take the skeleton of an education that we give them at the war colleges and to continue the self-education process in the broadest sense, the military classics, et cetera, and to really think about those sorts of things. We do not have very many rewards for our officers for that now. There is nothing that is checked off on their performance appraisal that says——

Chairman NUNN. Are you saying intellectual pursuit is not rewarded beyond the skeletons?

Colonel DREW. It is very difficult to do that, yes. We have not done it yet. Let me put it this way, it is not well rewarded.

Chairman NUNN. Any other point on that?

Colonel DREW. Just those two items come immediately to mind.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Dr. Wood.

Dr. WOOD. Socrates showed a long time ago that intellectuals always run some degree of danger, whether it is the civilian or military world, and that is not going to change.

There are two points I would make. First of all, I think what is encouraging is that if you compare what is happening today to what was happening a decade ago, we really are for the first time in 10 years engaged in genuine strategic dialogue.

Chairman NUNN. Dialogue——

Mr. WOOD. Within the military, within the political establishment. I think we are actually raising strategic questions, and we are talking strategy. Whether you are talking things that come out of air-land battle, out of maritime strategy, whatever their origins, whether they are joint or service oriented in character really makes no difference. The fact is that for the first time we are genuinely talking about stragetic issues rather than simply programmatic issues. That should be encouraging, and I think we need to go further.

The thing which concerns me more than whether we are going to be able to develop a joint military approach to strategy is whether we are going to be able to develop a joint governmental approach.

What struck me as I talked to people in the State Department is the problem of the left hand and the right hand. It is clear that in the military they are very used to thinking in terms of contingency planning, testing different options, looking at various alternatives, devising scenarios in order to test those and how little that is done in the Department of State and how little the two sides really talk to each other in terms of joint vocabulary and a joint point of view.

I know that in fact the NSC was designed to bring that happy conclusion about, but it has not happened, and I think the biggest problem we are going to have in the future in terms of strategy development is to get the various components of the Government involved in a genuine dialogue.

Adding one last point which relates to a question posed time and time again, I do not think we need to educate the entire American public on strategy. I would be satisfied if I could educate 1,000 or less than 1,000 people, most of whom live in this town and some of whom run newspapers as well, both in and out of this town. If you could give me a list of 1,000 people that I could select and we could get a genuine dialogue among them and a common vocabulary and a common perspective, I would sleep a lot better at night. I think that is where we need to zero our efforts.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much. Mr. Foster.

Mr. FOSTER. I have a number of suggestions, some of which have already been expressed, some of which are structural and organizational, others of which are substantive.

At the highest level, I would agree that we need somehow to stimulate more direct and regular interaction among the various elements of the national security establishment. Although you yourself prefaced your question by saying, let's get back to looking at military strategy instead of grand strategy. I think we need to have that broader interaction so that we can see where what we do militarily fits into the bigger picture.

Second, I would agree that there needs to be even more of a push than there already is on true integration among the military services. The thrust of the Defense Reorganization Act—very largely attributable to you two gentlemen and Senator Goldwater—is a major move to forget that sort of integration and jointness.

From a substantive standpoint, I think we need to start thinking in terms of global contingencies, if you will. As it now is, we have CINC's out there who are formulating regionally based contingency plans. Although I'm not on the inside, I question if we're really thinking very much about how we integrate all of this and look at the problem globally.

I think we need to rethink the distinction that properly should be made between what we do that contributes to combat effectiveness, or war-fighting capability, and what we do that contributes to deterrent effectiveness. It's not entirely clear to me that the type of systems we buy, the type of doctrine we formulate, the kinds of things we do that contribute to combat effectiveness, are necessarily the things we should be doing to enhance our deterrent posture. Obviously, this is a very contentious point that we could elaborate upon in more detail.

Along those same lines, I think we need to rethink our approach to force structure, technology, and doctrine, and the interaction of those three things. It's not entirely clear to me that the more advanced technologies are necessarily the ones we should be pursuing. You yourself posed the question to Mr. Weinberger on the McNeil-Lehrer Report last night: Why should you be convinced that 15 aircraft carriers with some aging systems on them is preferable to 13 with more up-to-date systems, with better capability?

I'm not sure that those huge platforms are the ones we should be thinking about.

Chairman NUNN. I was trying to keep Senator Warner from knowing about that. I'm sorry you told him. We've been doing real well today.

Mr. FOSTER. Sorry. I have a propensity for that.

Finally, I would agree that our military educational system is critically important. One of the problems we still have is relying on 20-year careers, trying to cram too much stuff into a 20-year period. What ends up happening is that military education, I think regrettably, ends up having to take a back seat; it ends up being viewed as simply a respite from the real world and troops. I think there is a need to rethink that, to take a more positive approach to the contribution that the military educational system and process can make.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Dr. Wood, I have to respectfully disagree with you on your last conclusion about public involvement.

For almost two decades now, I've been involved one way or another in strategy discussions. I think one of the healthiest developments in our overall national defense posture has been the greater involvement of our public.

Further, I think one of the problems inherent in our defense planning and explanation has been the fact that we have talked amongst ourselves inside of the great beltway surrounding Washington all too long.

Chairman NUNN. John, may I say that I agree with you on that. I also would like to thank our television coverage, C-SPAN, because I noticed that an awful lot of people around the country that do watch hearings, whether it's this one or another one, really do want a lot more information in these areas.

We all think that this is not of interest to a lot of people in the public. Perhaps some of them are already on the sofa asleep this afternoon, I don't know.

But I do believe that there are an enormous number of people out there who are vitally interested, and who are very well equipped to follow this.

Senator WARNER. And their interests are reflected here in the Congress, as it should be under our democratic process, by virtue of their votes and support.

I said on the opening day of the hearing, if we're going to have a national defense posture, and a strong national defense budget, it's only achievable if we've got a strong consensus and the backing in our Nation.

And I also would opine that I doubt if any president would go out in a major military operation—hopefully it doesn't have to happen—without the backing of the American public henceforward.

So much for that.

Gentlemen, you are a panel of experts. And I've consulted with my chairman here, and he concurs with this request.

Could you provide us, not this afternoon, but at the earliest opportunity, a consensus of your thinking, the four of you, on the framework of how these hearings should be conducted over the next several weeks; indeed, we may over the next several months, but the bulk of it would be in the next several weeks.

And within that framework, the half-dozen specific questions that should be put to, shall we say, almost every witness. Because we are putting in, as Senators, a tremendous expenditure of time and a certain amount of government expense in these hearings.

Senator Nunn and I and other members felt they were essential. We would like to have a product that will emerge that will be of value to not only the Senate and the Congress but the President and the American public.

Would you kindly get together, at your earlier convenience, and see if you can reach a consensus as to a framework as to how we should continue. Look at the witness list that we have, and make suggestions as to additional witnesses and areas.

And also, the half-dozen key questions that we should, as a matter of process, give to each panel that comes before us.

Thank you very much.

Chairman NUNN. That would be very helpful for us to have that.

[The information requested follows:]

FRAMEWORK OF STRATEGY HEARINGS

Colonel DREW. It seems to me that the hearings on strategy have been well conceived by the Committee and its staff. They are probably long overdue in that the legislative branch is often focused on "line items" within the military budget rather than with how those items fit into the overall scheme of things. As the hearings continue, their purpose should be to paint the overall picture, and to investigate how others might view that picture and react to it. Thus it would seem advisable to call witnesses who are experts on the viewpoints of our principal adversaries, as well as witnesses from Allied nations who could give their impression of the overall U.S. military strategy.

I have attached to this insert four questions for other witnesses as requested by Senator Warner.

Question 1. In previous testimony, several witnesses expressed concern about the education of present and future military strategists. Admittedly, the various war colleges, because of time constraints, can only provide the framework for a comprehensive education in the subject. What can be done to encourage our officers to continue their personal education, particularly the study of military history and theory which are so important to the art of war?

Question 2. A witness in a previous session talked to us at some length about the fundamental differences between revolutionary or insurgent wars and wars on the more traditional or "European" model. Since many experts believe such revolutionary conflicts are the most likely we may face, what is being done to meet this important challenge?

Question 3. A previous witness discussed the dilemmas of maintaining nuclear deterrence and preparations for a major war in Europe while the most likely sorts of conflicts seem to be limited wars, perhaps revolutionary wars in the so-called Third World which are very different kinds of conflicts. Should we prepare for the worst case—or should we prepare for the most likely case.

Question 4. A continuing theme throughout these hearings has been the need for better Joint strategy. How do we achieve more jointness?

THOUGHTS ON FRAMEWORK ON STRATEGY HEARINGS

Colonel LYKKE. I am very pleased that your committee has scheduled hearings on military strategy. That very act will do much to focus attention on this vital subject. I would just suggest that you consider making expanded use of the Army War College in the future. We have many dedicated and experienced personnel on the faculty who would be pleased to contribute to your efforts. For instance, during the hearings, I noticed a great interest on the part of several Senators for information on the Soviet Union. We have a superb Sovietologist, Colonel Dave Twining, who is one of the top rated lecturers at the Army War College. His presentations are highly informative. We also have two noted historians, Colonel Hal Nelson and Professor Jay Luvaas who give outstanding tours of nearby battlefields. These two instructors do a wonderful job "getting you inside the head" of the various Civil War Commanders. This is a great way of studying the practical application of strategic theory.

I would suggest you schedule Admiral Harry Train (USN Retired) to testify before your committee. A few years ago he presented a lecture here on the problems of military strategy formulation that was the best I have ever heard. He is brilliant and articulate. His breadth of experience is hard to match, since he has served in Washington, D.C. as Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in the field as a CINC.

Here are a few questions that may prove useful during subsequent testimony.

1. When witnesses talk about strategy, or things "strategic," ask them to define their terms.
2. What is the best way to ensure that we develop an effective joint military strategy?
3. For those advocating a "maritime strategy," ask "How can we go about turning this unilateral service strategy into a truly joint military strategy?"
4. What is our global military strategy? Where can it be found?
5. What is the relationship between military strategy and arms control? Are they contradictory or complementary?
6. If we decide to pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative, how do we orchestrate the changeover from deterrence based on punishment, to deterrence based on denial? Should we substitute the latter for the former, or should there be a combination of the two?

FRAMEWORK CONSIDERATIONS

Mr. **Foster**. This suggested "framework" addresses three key considerations that seem relevant to the conduct of the remaining Armed Services Committee hearings on U.S. strategy: (1) the objectives to be served by the hearings; (2) the general line of questioning that should be followed if meaningful responses are to be elicited; and (3) the structure and content of questions that could be asked to all remaining witnesses, irrespective of their backgrounds or affiliations. Because witnesses already have been selected and general topics for discussion already determined, these two factors are not addressed here.

Objectives

The remaining hearings should focus on the following objectives:

Determining the degree of "natural" agreement (or disagreement) that exists among participants in the strategy-making process on fundamentals—that is, what strategy in general is and what current U.S. strategy in particular is.

Educating both committee members and witnesses (the underlying premise being that even the witnesses have something to learn about strategy).

Signaling to the Executive Branch and the American people Congressional concern over the importance of a cohesive, integrated national security posture.

Demonstrating increasing Congressional sophistication on the nature and process of strategy.

Line of questioning

Generally speaking, witnesses are likely to feel constrained and defensive about having to assess the strategy of the current administration. Therefore, a more indirect line of questioning should be followed that (a) encourages witnesses to focus on specific elements of strategy; (b) provides a basis for adjudging, after the fact, how much "natural" convergence on basics exists across witnesses (and thus, by inference, throughout the national security establishment as a whole); and (c) gives a measure of the "strategy sense" of the larger national security community. Proffering these questions verbally and requiring verbal responses (rather than written responses) will produce more spontaneity and thus offer a more accurate measure of the sorts of things the committee hopes to determine.

Structure of questions

Common questions that should be posed to all witnesses deal with the five major aspects of strategy-making that can be expected to affect our ability to formulate and carry out a variable strategy: (1) substance, (2) process, (3) participants/actors, (4) organizations/institutions, and (5) intellect. Suggested questions in each of these areas are as follows:

Substance

Question. What do you understand to be the principal elements of current U.S. strategy? In other words, what are this country's major national objectives? What are the principal interests we are trying to protect or preserve? What is the nature of the threat(s) facing us (USSR—other? military—other?)? What principal type(s) of conflict should we be prepared to face (military—other? nuclear—conventional—subconventional?)?

Question. To what extent is there general agreement within the United States on the following: (1) the utility of military force as an instrument of national power? (2) the nature of the threat(s) facing us? (3) the principal type(s) of conflict (as opposed to war, per se) for which we must be prepared? Where disagreement exists, what effect does that have on the thrust and coherence of our strategy?

Question. What principal elements of continuity have weathered the transitions from the Nixon/Ford administration to the Carter administration and, thence, to the Reagan administration? Why have there been these particular elements of continuity? What major discontinuities have there been? What have been the effects of such discontinuities? How can we better ensure continuity from administration to administration?

Process

Question. If you were to start from scratch to formulate a national strategy, what three or four substantive (as opposed to organizational or procedural) things would you do first? Why? (For example, how would you determine what our national interests are? Would you seek documentation laying out your predecessor's "strategy" or ignore that altogether? Would you attempt to assess the nation's strengths and weaknesses?)

Question. Should strategy be formulated on a top-down or a bottom-up basis? (Presumably, a totally top-down approach runs a risk of encountering resistance from some of the parties charged with implementing the strategy, while the bottom-up approach may produce a watered-down, lowest-common-denominator formulation.)

Participants/Actors

Question. What role, if any, should Congress play in the formulation of the nation's strategy? Should Congress focus principally on the details of weapons programs, for example, or on broader questions such as the appropriateness of national interests and objectives? How might Congress organize itself better to assume a more strategic orientation?

Question. What role, if any, should the general public play in the formulation of the nation's strategy? How important is national consensus to the viability of that strategy?

Question. What role, if any, should allies play in influencing the direction of our national strategy.

Organizations/Institutions

Question. Is the present organizational configuration of our national security establishment adequate and appropriate for formulating and carrying out a truly effective, integrated strategy? How might we organize more effectively for that purpose?

Intellect

Question. Are we as a people adequately equipped intellectually to engage in truly effective strategy-making? What things might we do, on a national basis, to enhance or more fully exploit our intellectual capacities?

Question. What things might the military in particular do (e.g., professional military education, career incentives) to enhance and nurture the strategy-making capabilities of its officers?

General

Question. What are the major impediments to effective strategy-making in this country? How might they be overcome? What are the major strengths of this country that, if more fully exploited, could enhance our strategic posture and our ability to engage in more effective strategy-making?

Senator WARNER. Dr. Wood may wish to rebut my earlier——

Mr. WOOD. What I want to do is sustain it, and indicate what I really meant.

Of those thousand people that I mentioned, many of them are in fact molders of public opinion.

What the public is getting is diverse points of view, which is fine. But unfortunately, the game is not entirely being played fair.

All of the major components in the debate set up straw men, and then in print and on the public platform and on television, argue against straw men that they have set up.

What I meant is that if I could get those thousand folks to at least agree as to what the critical issues were and the critical vocabulary, the public would be much better served, and could make a much more informed decision.

Senator WARNER. Pick a few beyond the beltway.

Mr. WOOD. And beyond the beltway, yes.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If I could make perhaps a couple of comments before asking my one question.

I was interested to hear the discussion about Soviet leadership and our possible misinterpretation of their intentions or goals.

Mr. Gorbachev may be the messiah of new ideas in Moscow. But I think our assessment of Soviet leadership is somewhat akin to what Dr. Johnson said of his second marriage, the triumph of hope over experience.

I recall that when Andropov took power, there were rumors circulating, especially here within the beltway, Senator Warner, that he was a closet liberal, that he drank Scotch, that he listened to jazz and wore either New Balances or Reeboks in his spare moments.

And so that I think we tend to overestimate the liberality or the new capabilities of leadership in the Soviet Union.

I await with an open mind to see if that in fact comes to pass. But I remain skeptical.

Second, I point out—some members have indicated that perhaps the Soviets are misinformed about America's intentions.

If they're misinformed, it's not for lack of information. They're not only allowed to watch our deliberations on C-SPAN, which they certainly have access to, or the networks, or sit in our hearings, as they are wont to do.

But they're also allowed to testify before congressional hearings.

So if there is any misunderstanding about American intentions, it's through no fault of an opportunity to have that information available.

I'd like to point out one of my concerns about this discussion of how we integrate the strategic thinking is the difficulty that Senator Nunn and Senator Goldwater faced in the Goldwater-Nunn bill that was enacted last year—now called the Nunn-Goldwater bill, long live the king as to how we integrate military creativity without bumping into the wall of the status quo.

What we found is that most people in the military, do not get their stars and stripes by pointing out to their superiors their intellectual deficiencies in their planning.

And we went at this for some time with the military reform caucus, which is neither a caucus nor reform-minded, I might point out. But we had to search out those individuals for the most part who were retired from the military who were willing now, once their uniform was off to say, "Here are some of the problems."

We couldn't find much in the way of assistance in dealing with young, bright officers who were aggressive, ambitious, wanted to climb the ladder, who were at least publicly willing to debate the kind of issues that needed to be debated.

This is not unique to the military. It's endemic to our system. It's called the human factor.

And that's one of the reasons why I asked wouldn't it be a nice step forward if we, perhaps, integrated this committee—well, let's start with the authorization committee and the appropriations committee. We are in the process of gridlock on Capitol Hill. And I think the logical conclusion would be, why don't we merge the two committees? Let's have some action for a change, instead of hearing after hearing, and delay and paralysis.

The same would be true with this committee being merged with Foreign Relations; it makes perfect sense and is logical. Maybe even combine it with the Intelligence Committee. If you really want to have a conceptual integration to formulate strategic thinking, that would be the logical thing to do.

I don't know anyone who is rushing in Congress to give up their fiefdom here, or in anyway surrender what little patch of jurisdiction they have.

So it's really a human factor that we face. And with regards to all of this intellectual discussion about what the ideal should be, it is unlikely we'll ever even come close to reaching that ideal.

It doesn't mean we should give up searching for it. But the practical realities of us achieving that Nirvana appear remote to me, at this particular time.

But I think it's important that we point out our problems and try to make whatever incremental changes we can.

I doubt very much whether we will ever get to the sort of radically new way of operating around here that might produce more in the way of kind of global thinking that has to be done.

One final comment. Dr. Wood, you said something interesting before, and I wasn't sure about the consequences of it.

You said, if it isn't broke, don't fix it. And I think you were referring to NATO at that particular time, at least initially in your comment.

And I was concerned this morning, for example, when Dr. Brzezinski testified, he suggested we pull out about 100,000 troops over a period of 15 years. That in itself is not a new suggestion. I think Dr. Kissinger has proposed something even more drastic in the past.

Senator Nunn has talked in other terms about the need to reallocate our resources to match our requirements. So it's not any kind of a breakthrough in the way of a proposal.

But coming on the heels of the discussion on Reykjavik, it might send quite a signal to the Europeans about what our intentions are in terms of the long haul.

I'm not sure that's going to be healthy, but it might be.

There is also a suggestion that perhaps we ought to establish a Japan-China-U.S. axis. That appears to be somewhat of a creative thought.

I would say, maybe we ought to have some reservations, find out exactly how stable that new modernization program is that's taking place in Bejing, particularly in view of what's occurring now with the student demonstrations.

I would also want to question whether or not we should have Japan simply increase its commitment to the economic stability in the world by reaching the 4 percent level. And I want to know what kind of signal would that send to the Europeans, saying, wait a minute, we're not too interested in spending a lot of money for military. How about if we reach our 3 or 4 or 5 percent level by spreading economic assistance, and not having as much to do with military proposals.

They are under tremendous pressure, as you know, from their own peace groups, who are demonstrating against our role in NATO affairs.

So these are proposals. And I think Senator Warner has made a very valid suggestion, Mr. Chairman, that perhaps we should lay out a series of questions that you gentlemen would think were appropriate for us to pursue, and to try to see if there is a consensus as to how we approach these problems.

Should we be looking to the lands of the rising sun in terms of a new axis? What does that mean in terms of European security? How do we approach that as we discuss arms control?

I think that those cannot be raised abstractly without press accounts unsettling the leadership of the world in terms of, what are they doing now. We have to be fairly deliberate in how we approach this.

I would appreciate your comments. Dr. Wood, do you want to answer about, if it ain't broke, don't fix it, what you were referring to at that time?

Mr. Wood. I'm not suggesting that it may not be possible, it may not be desirable, in fact, to redeploy forces, including from the NATO area.

I guess what I'm saying is very much what you said. That should not be a question that is answered in the abstract. It has to be part of a broader policy, involving our own leadership, and also broader discussions with the European allies.

It cannot be simply an attempt, quote, "to save resources, or to save money", or whatever. We have to think of it as part of a much grander design.

And I think we ought to do that, and begin to think in those terms. I think there's always a limit to burden sharing, because everybody sees their problem somewhat differently.

But nonetheless, I'm not objecting to the issue of refocusing some of our attention which should be. I think Asia's becoming terribly important.

But what I'm suggesting is, we need to go about with some degree of circumspection and not as an abstract problem.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen, for excellent points.

Senator SHELBY. I will be real brief.

I want to get back to the simulated games, just a minute.

Have you found, and I assume you have, in the simulated warfare, the war games, that a lot of your basic assumptions on military strategy wouldn't work for various reasons, and you changed it or you adjusted it?

I know that we carry around with us some basic strategies that perhaps won't work in the real field, and if simulation would prove that out, then would you adjust it accordingly?

Mr. WOOD. I think we should defer some of the answers to that until tomorrow. We are going to have a discussion tomorrow which actually will look at the advantages and limitations of gaming. I think that answer will be——

Chairman NUNN. We will get into that in the classified session tomorrow afternoon and go through the most recent war game. That will have to be classified.

We are going to talk a great deal about assumptions that go into those, and perhaps changes and weaknesses that come out of them.

But Dr. Woods' group has been very helpful in putting that together. I don't think any of the panel here will be there tomorrow. It'll be a different group of people. But they are working with the War College.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. I want to thank each of you for being here today. It's been very helpful. This emphasis on strategy is not going to end with 2 weeks of hearings.

We're going to continue to be interested in it, and I think Senator Warner's question is a very good one to you.

If you could give us in writing your thoughts on the subject about how our committee can continue to stimulate discussion in a meaningful way on this subject.

We don't intend to come up with an Armed Services strategy for the Nation. That is not within our capabilities in my view, nor within our constitutional responsibility.

But we do hope by these hearings to begin to stimulate more strategic thinking in the executive branch of government, in the Pentagon and in the Joint Chiefs, and in the other relevant departments.

So your help here today has been very, very positive, and we are grateful to each of you.

Do any of you have anything else you want to say before we conclude the hearing?

[No response.]

Thank you very much. We'll be back here in this room tomorrow morning with Dr. Schlesinger at 9:30.

[Whereupon, at 4:42 p.m. the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, January 14, 1987.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
Washington, DC.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The committee met in open session at 9:35 a.m. in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Humphrey, Quayle, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, assistant chief clerk; Robert E. Bayer, Robert G. Bell, Richard D. Finn, Jr., Judith A. Freedman, John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Frederick F.Y. Pang, Gordon G. Riggle, Mark B. Robinson, professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz and Russell C. Miller, research assistants; and Lucia M. Chavez, staff assistant.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Edward M. McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Samuel J. Routson, assistant to Senator Symms; Lorne Craner, assistant to Senator McCain; and Patricia Buckheit, assistant to Senator Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. Today the Armed Services Committee convenes for the fourth in our series of hearings on military strategy. We are most fortunate to have as our witness a man who is both uniquely and pre-eminently qualified to address this subject. Before entering public service, Dr. James Schlesinger was Director of Strategic Studies at the Rand Corporation. As Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Dr. Schlesinger served his country with distinction. Since his retirement from public office, Dr. Schlesinger has continued a close involvement in strategic affairs through his writings and his participation in numerous study groups, organizations, and conferences.

The focus of today's hearing is the U.S. national security strategy. In his opening statement, Dr. Schlesinger will address several related topics including the nature of strategymaking in the nuclear era, the inevitability of risks, and our overall deterrence strategy. Certainly we will be interested in his views on Reykjavik.

I particularly look forward to hearing Dr. Schlesinger's comments on deterrence as there appears to be considerable confusion within the administration on this subject. At one time or another senior administration officials, including the President, have called our current strategy of deterrence "immoral," "uncivilized," "flawed," and "discredited." Yet, as Dr. Schlesinger has stated before, we are most likely to have to depend on deterrence to preserve our safety and freedom for the rest of our lives and those of our children.

At our hearing on Monday, Secretary Weinberger stated, and I quote him, "effective strategic defenses would bolster (NOT replace) deterrence." I thought this represented, and I still believe it represents, a marked improvement on past administration statements, as it seemed to imply that even with strategic defenses we would still rely on retaliatory forces to deter at least nuclear aggression. However, in a TV interview later that evening the Secretary stated there had been no change in administration policy.

So we are left with the President of the United States having said that the purpose of SDI was not to enhance deterrence but to replace deterrence, and the Secretary of Defense saying that the purpose of strategic defenses is to bolster and not replace deterrence. It seems to me that the administration still has a way to go in getting the very important concept of SDI straight in their own minds.

I do not know precisely how many years we will have to depend on the threat of retaliation to preserve our freedom. All of us would like for there to be another alternative. I do know, however, that unless and until a better alternative proves feasible we should stop calling into question the credibility of a strategy on which our security ultimately depends, and on which that security has depended for many years in the past.

Senator Warner, before I turn to our witness this morning for his opening statements, I would be delighted to hear from you.

Senator **WARNER**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have known the distinguished witness for many, many years. As a matter of fact, I was once his employee when he was Secretary of Defense and I was Secretary of the Navy. Together we did a lot of planning and strategy together, mostly against the Congress of the United States. [Laughter.]

So I am glad to hear today another perspective.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **NUNN**. Would any of our other Senators like to make opening comments? Senator Exon.

Senator **EXON**. I would make a quick opening comment.

Dr. Schlesinger, I certainly want to welcome you here. You are not only a student of the main thrust and subject of this committee, but you have been a practitioner of the art, and therefore I am always interested in what you have to say. I hope that you will be getting into what you feel about our present plan for the overall nuclear deterrence. We will likely get into some very specific questions with regard to the many facets of deterrence as we see it today. A major issue is how are we ever going to come to some kind of a verifiable understanding or agreement with the Soviet Union.

The newspapers this morning indicated that now there are powerful forces within the administration that want to go back on what was tentatively agreed to at Reykjavik with regard to a 10-year moratorium on deployment of some type of SDI. These are all very weighty matters that our committee has to look into, and look into it we will. Therefore, the helpful advice of expert witnesses such as yourself is extremely good for us.

Thank you for coming.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Dixon.

Senator DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I would just ask leave to place a statement in the record. I have been an admirer of Dr. Schlesinger's. I had the pleasure of reading his article of November 20 discussing global stability and am delighted to see him this morning.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, the committee today is starting its third day of hearings on United States military strategy.

The first witness this morning is Dr. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I look forward to Dr. Schlesinger's presentation on the various aspects of the United States national security strategy.

Dr. Schlesinger's outstanding background will allow the members of this committee to hear from an individual who can clearly identify the objectives and capabilities of the United States military and the strategy that links the two.

I have the utmost respect for Dr. Schlesinger's views on the subjects before the committee. I believe it is appropriate that the committee examine the overall U.S. defense strategy, and I am delighted that the chairman has seen fit to include Dr. Schlesinger among a very distinguished and knowledgeable list of great Americans.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Dixon.

Dr. Schlesinger, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will attempt to limit my comments today so as to provide greater opportunity for discussion, since this is a small group. I want to talk to you about strategy in the era of nuclear superpowers, and I want to make two important points:

One, that strategy has been transformed as the nuclear era has progressed.

The other is the new framework for U.S. strategy in the nuclear era.

Let me start first with the transformation that has taken place—not with the dawn of the nuclear era, but gradually as the Soviet Union has acquired a counterdeterrent that limits the exercise of what has been a U.S. monopoly, at least until the middle 1960s and arguably until the early 1970s.

The nuclear age is different. At one time—and as I look around I see at least some of the members of this committee, Senator Exon, myself, will recall World War II—we thought in terms of a Napoleonic concept of a Nation in Arms, total war.

Chairman NUNN. I think Senator Warner would probably qualify. [Laughter.]

Senator EXON. I think there are some others. [Laughter.]

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I used to think that the people from the Korean war era were youngsters. Now we have Senator McCain who has come out of the Vietnam war. And may I join with others, Senator, in welcoming you and your new colleagues of the Democratic side to this committee.

You will all recall that the epitome of strategy was von Clausewitz. He too was a product of the Napoleonic Wars. Clausewitz's view was that the purpose of warfare was the annihilation of the enemy's main force. The chairman may recall with some ambivalence the late U.S. Grant, sometimes President of the United States, also known as "Unconditional Surrender" Grant. Unconditional surrender was taken on in World War II as the Nation's goal in dealing with Germany and Japan.

Warfare has become to a large extent, as the modern era progressed, a war of material attrition. This was reflected in U.S. strategy during World War II in which the United States established itself and achieved victory by becoming the Arsenal of Democracy, as then-President Roosevelt called it.

We often read about military strategy, as if it were subtle. It need not be so. In World War II, military strategy was perhaps best epitomized by Montgomery's brilliant victory at El Alamein. The strategy consisted in large degree of building up sufficient supplies so that he could overwhelm Rommel. That was a period of material attrition.

In the Korean war period, General MacArthur stated, "In war there is no substitute for victory." As late as the 1950s—before the Soviets had developed a counterdeterrent—the United States could base its strategy on massive retaliation, the destruction of the enemy's homeland. General LeMay, Commander of SAC, used phrases about "peeling the top six inches of topsoil off the Soviet Union."

Thus, as we come into the modern period, we had the notion of military force being used in an unrestrained fashion to destroy the enemy. What is different now?

As of this moment, the Soviet Union can drop 6,000 megatons on U.S. soil. That megatonnage is much less than it was a few years ago. As the Soviets have added to their number of warheads, they have gradually reduced their total megatonnage. But 6,000 megatons is still an impressive number. We sometimes forget how impressive it is, because we use standard notation in order to indicate orders of magnitude 6,000 megatons is 6 million kilotons; it is equivalent to 6 billion tons of TNT; it is 12 trillion pounds of TNT. If we just use the figure of 6 billion tons, we should recognize that the bomb that destroyed the Marine barracks in Beirut some years ago represented one/three-billionths of what the Soviet Union can drop on U.S. soil.

So things have changed. In a couple of hours the Soviet Union, if it were determined to do so, could kill 150 million Americans; and for those who survived the prompt effects, a very large proportion would later die. We are vulnerable. That is what has changed. The United States is now vulnerable. It has not been vulnerable since the War of 1812, when the British sailed up the Potomac and burned the White House. Indeed, it is totally vulnerable for the first time in its history.

That forces us to be prudent. Not only are we vulnerable, but the ability to destroy the United States rests in Soviet hands. We depend upon the Soviet leadership to be prudent, and we certainly depend upon the Soviet leaders not to be mad. We depend upon self-restraint on the part of Communist leaders, our ideological foes. Thus total war, total victory—the strategies of the past prior to the nuclear era are of little relevance. In a sense "strategy" has been transformed because of this requirement for prudence.

The old rules do not work, except perhaps for the New Jewell movement in Grenada, or perhaps for the Sandinistas. However, in the relationship between these nuclear superpowers that have the capacity to destroy one another in a matter of hours, the old rules of strategy simply do no work. That poses lessons difficult for Americans to learn.

America has never felt vulnerable. Unlike the nations of Europe, which have experienced conquest time and time again, the United States has never been conquered. We have lived in this North American redoubt utterly secure, and Americans find it hard to appreciate this fact of vulnerability when we depend on a daily basis upon the self-restraint of our ideological foes to survive.

That explains, I should point out, the enormous emotional and political appeal of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Strategic Defense Initiative holds out the hope to this society, which has never felt its vulnerability, that once again we can achieve a high degree of invulnerability. For the moment, it is not my purpose to examine the long, long road to achieving such a result. Rather I want to stress the enormous emotional appeal in suggesting that SDI could bring us back to the invulnerability that we enjoyed before the Soviet Union developed a counterdeterrent.

There is a corollary of this transformation that has occurred. Much of what has been written on strategy is obsolescent—I stress "obsolescent" not "obsolete." Many of the writers on strategy, the great strategists of the past, the glorious and not-so-glorious commentators from Sun Tsu on down, are obsolescent in an age in which we deal with potential conflict between the two nuclear superpowers.

There is a clear conclusion of all of this. If it involves the superpowers, wars must now be fought with limited means, if we are to survive—means more limited than either we or the Soviets possess. That implies a need for prudence, a need for restraint, and this has been reflected in the actions of the superpowers even in lesser conflicts.

The United States did not exert its full power in Vietnam. The Soviet Union today behaves in an un-Soviet kind of way in Afghanistan by not overwhelming the Afghan resistance. It implies that clearcut victories of the sort that we have enjoyed many times in the past in American history, and we recently enjoyed in the case of Grenada, those clearcut victories are likely to be few and far between, which makes it difficult by the way to maintain support for governmental policies.

That is my first point: The transformation that nuclear weapons possessed by the superpowers have brought to the age of strategy has made obsolescent much of what has been written in the past—not irrelevant, not obsolete, but obsolescent because the full power of a Nation in Arms can no longer be rationally employed.

Let me make a few comments on national security strategy. The changes that I have referred to exist in this area, as well. The change reflects a new amorphousness about strategy, a new formlessness. In the past, strategy has been specific and it has been frozen in time and place. Today we face steadily changing conditions that makes strategy less easily formed and subject itself to change.

In the past one could look at an hereditary enemy. The Schlieffen Plan was dedicated to the destruction of the French power to resist—originally prior to World War I but then employed in a modified form in World War II. After the formation of the German Empire, the Germans knew who their enemy was. They knew the geography. And so they were prepared to deal directly with what they regarded as "the threat."

The parallel to the military strategy represented by the Schlieffen Plan is what we call "grand strategy." That is a good, rotund phrase. I encourage you not to be too much swayed with it, and to take it with a grain of salt. Why? The United States today bases its policies on deterrence over a long period. Requirements shift. Alliances shift. Countries in the Third World change sides. There are few specifics that we can provide for conditions that the United States faces, in contrast let's say to Germany dealing with France after 1870.

We do not even face the conditions that Winston Churchill faced in World War II when he talked about this grand strategy for defeating the axis by attacking what he hoped was the soft underbelly of Europe. And the purpose of that grand strategy, or really war policy, was to put the western allies in a better position after World War II to deal with the Soviet Union. It was as much political as it was military. By attacking toward the south and toward the east, more of the continent of Europe would fall under the control of the western allies, less under the Soviet Union.

Now I emphasize that the situation today is quite different. Under current conditions, the key is adaptability and flexibility, a subject to which I will return.

Let me turn now to the new framework for U.S. strategy. Basically, strategy deals with the allocation of resources, the expenditure of resources—which is your principal focus—in order to reduce risks—risks to the Nation, risks to international stability.

I start with the observation that in sustaining our position our power is augmented by our prestige. This is no different from other nations in an imperial position. I say that with some care. I do not use the word "empire." I refer to other nations in an imperial position such as the United States is today. In the past, the Roman Empire sustained its position through its prestige. A handful of legions guarded the borders of the Roman Empire, and because no one dared to attack that limited military force was for centuries adequate to protect the Roman Empire.

The prestige of the British Empire and the Dutch Empire similarly tended to deter attack. But the U.S. position, even though it is now in an imperial position, is unique. It is not exactly an empire. The United States' role today is to sustain a stable order—the only power in the history of the world that is attempting to sustain a stable order essentially on a worldwide basis. We inherited this role from World War II, when the United States emerged as the only undamaged nation with substantial economic and military resources.

But even though we are in a position of a quasi-empire, I would like to stress that we possess—lucky us—imperial burdens without the benefits of empire. We have all of the burdens that frustrated empires have in the past, but we are not able to order our alllies, we are not able to command. We deal with a set of sovereign nations, each of which retains independence of action, and thus we must persuade. And this weakens our ability to put together adequate military force.

As I hinted earlier, strategy is about allocation of resources to reduce risks. One definition by the former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carney, called "strategy" "a plan of action best to employ resources toward the achievement of aims." At a general level, I am afraid we cannot go much further. Note the word "best" which suggests that success is not guaranteed. Risks are inherent in any strategy. However, Americans like certainty; they do not like uncertainty. Note also the phrase "toward the achievement." Once again it does not imply that there is any guarantee.

In formulating its global strategy, the United States is engaged in comparing different risks—and in accepting these risks. We are attempting to distribute resources and military assets globally to deter not "an" opponent, but many opponents. Therefore, in the allocation of resources and the distribution of assets to deter opponents we must allocate those resources to protect our truly vital interests. I stress this because "vital interests" is easily debased coinage. Everything becomes a vital interest, and we must be able to distinguish between those things that are truly critical and those things that are only desirable.

We also must recognize that in order to deter effectively we must always convey our willingness to fight. Whether we actually fight or not depends on the circumstance, but unless we are prepared to convey that willingness, the whole goal of deterrence is lost. The distribution of U.S. assets around the world reflects historical accident. Of course, each of us, when serving as Secretary of Defense provide you annually with a document that explains the present necessity of those assets being in whatever place they are. But we must all recognize that there is in our deployments a good deal of historical accident.

Our forces are in Korea as a reflection of Mr. Truman's decisions reversing what his Secretary of State had said about Korea being beyond our defense perimeter. They have stayed there. General Bradley, our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time, stated it was "the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time"—as the United States attempted during the Korean war to deflect forces toward Europe where we feared the Soviet Union was contemplating an immediate assault. And yet here some 35 years later the forces of the United States remain in Korea, which the JCS chairman then described as the wrong place at the wrong time.

In the case of NATO I think that Senator Warner will recall the origin of capital ship deployment in the Mediterranean in what is now the Sixth Fleet had to do with adventitious developments in Turkish-Russian relations and the decision of President Truman to send the Ambassador of Turkey, after he died, home in a carrier. Carriers have been in the Mediterranean ever since. One should bear in mind these historical accidents. Once those forces are in place, however, as I shall indicate later, it is not always easy to withdraw them.

Note, then, that we must live with a high level of risk; that we live with an increasing risk of deterrence failing somewhere around the world—not necessarily in Europe, which has been our principal concern, but elsewhere. Note also, that there is no guarantee that we will win in any sense, if deterrence fails. We are hopeful that the risks represented by continuing to deter will succeed and therefore we will be able to maintain our interests without actually fighting.

There is a growing gap between commitments and resources. This is not primarily a reflection of the American budget process. Instead, it is a reflection of the growth of Soviet military power, for we could not expect the Soviet Union forever to remain a backward state without a substantial nuclear capability. Once the Soviets had their counterdeterrent, the strategy that the United States has basically employed since the 1950s has come into question, and there is widespread doubt whether the United States would actually use nuclear weapons to defend our positions other than in Western Europe. Indeed some, including one former Secretary of Defense, have now stated that we would not use nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe; that those weapons exist only to protect the United States of America.

As the credibility of our nuclear threat has declined, the weaknesses of our conventional position have become more apparent. Consequently, the gap between commitments and resources increases. There is no easy solution. The act of withdrawal, the act of reducing commitments as this Congress underscored some years ago when President Carter wanted to remove our ground forces from Korea, the act of withdrawing forces may reduce one's prestige so much that they actually weaken one's position. The withdrawal of forces, if one has become overcommitted, is not an easy task for a great power that depends upon prestige as well as the physical instruments of power.

One other point on this is that in a sense after the fact the distribution of assets always will appear to have been wrong. Why? We deal with foes who scarcely intend to strike us at our strongest points. They will seek out our weak points. So when we have appeared vulnerable at places of less than major strategic interest to us, it is there that the attacks are likely to come.

Let me add one other point on commitments and resources. It is wise for the United States not to tempt fate. Do not tempt fate.

Avoid tokenism. If we are going into Lebanon, go in in force—in such a way that one's opponents are concerned about the American reaction. Don't put in a token force that actually tempts one's opponent, that incites one's opponent to take advantage of the opportunity we have created for him.

DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA

Now let me turn to some specific areas of interest. First, the defense of North America, depending primarily on the strategic deterrent and on maritime forces. This is our easiest task, as it is hard for the Soviets, other than through a decision to attack with nuclear weapons, to get at us. North America is the least threatened position, and yet it is also our toughest task. Why? Because it is the area of our highest concern. We wish to take no risks about the security of the United States, even though the probability of assault is vastly lower than it is for Iran or for Saudi Arabia or West Germany.

For the Western Hemisphere generally, militarily speaking the United States remains dominant. Not that much has changed since Secretary of State Richard Olney stated in 1895 in a note to our current ally, the United Kingdom: "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon those subjects to which it confines its interposition."

The Soviet Union is unlikely, at least in my judgment, seriously to challenge the United States in the Western Hemisphere. The Soviets may play around with opportunities, but they recognize that the Western Hemisphere remains an area of prospective U.S. dominance, and that they are unlikely to indulge in adventurism. Remember that the late Nikita Khrushchev was removed from power by his colleagues for indulging in the sin of "adverturism"—his "harebrained schemes," becoming deeply involved in Cuba.

EURASIAN CONTINENT

I turn from the Western Hemisphere to the Eurasian Continent, and thus to the periphery of the Soviet Union. That has been the abiding strategic concern of the United States since 1945. The Soviet Union has possessed conventional forces that generally have appeared stronger than the conventional forces that the Western World has been able to array against them. Our abiding strategic concern is that the Soviet Union would not be sufficiently deterred by our nuclear power and would attempt to exploit their conventional military forces or, alternatively, that European nations and other nations along the periphery might fear Soviet conventional power and would seek accommodation.

Preservation of a free Western Europe, of our sister democracies in Western Europe, has been the principal U.S. foreign policy and military objective since World War II. But note to what a great extent we depend upon our Allies for the security of Western Europe.

FAR EAST

I pass over the Far East. As long as the Chinese People's Republic does not rejoin its alliance with the Soviet Union, the Far East remains an area of relative Soviet weakness. Soviet advantage is much clearer in the Middle East, in South Asia, and indeed in Western Europe itself. In the Far East, the Soviets have little to gain and much to risk, and consequently that area of the world looks less precarious than it might have a decade ago. Indeed, since the fall of Vietnam, peculiarly enough, the Free World's position in the Far East has steadily improved.

By contrast, one cannot say the same of Europe. General Rogers still states that he would be required to ask for authorization to use nuclear weapons within 72 hours, roughly, of a Soviet assault. Western Europe continues to depend upon the U.S. nuclear deterrent, as the chairman indicated in his opening comments.

I want to make just a comment that there are great subtleties in nuclear strategy. We continue to depend upon the first use of nuclear weapons to offset Soviet conventional force advantages. We have always insisted on the need for us to be able to penetrate to the Soviet Union, and since the early 1970s our strategy has been selective strikes. It is therefore hard to argue that if the Soviet Union possessed its own SDI—a strategic shield that could stop 1, 2, 10, or 15 incoming warheads, that that might not weaken the strategy upon which the United States and its allies now depend. My purpose at the moment is only to show the intricacies of nuclear strategy, not to go into the merits of a defensive shield, which may come up during questioning.

EASTERN HEMISPHERE

For the Eastern Hemisphere close to the Soviet periphery, the United States must be able to introduce forces rapidly. When one introduces forces rapidly, that implies significant risk. There is notably in the Persian Gulf region a high degree of risk. The Persian Gulf, the Middle East generally, is another area of principal American concern in which we will depend upon the base structure provided by countries only in limited or no alliance to the United States.

We have in the region of the Persian Gulf a weak deterrent. In some ways it is getting weaker. Yet, at the same time, our dependency on the Persian Gulf is growing as a result of the collapse of oil prices to which few people outside of the oil industry pay attention. American production is rapidly falling. It fell 800,000 barrels this last year. It is falling 500,000 barrels a day each year. By 1990 the United States will be dependent upon foreign sources of supply, which means increasing dependence on the gulf, for well over 50 percent of its oil.

We are heading toward the kinds of conditions that we feared in the 1970s. The reason I stress this is that the Persian Gulf is becoming the Achilles Heel of Western society, and that one of the purposes of this committee I would assume would be to look at our deterrence and war-fighting capabilities for that region in order to be assured that we have enough resources to cover the risk.

Note the dependence upon oil from the Middle East—and in Europe the dependence upon others. It is part of the appeal of maritime forces and a maritime strategy that we don't really have to depend upon others; that our decisions can be unilateral. In that way we can avoid the foreign entanglements that George Washington referred to in his farewell address, or at least reduce those entanglements.

However, through a maritime strategy one cannot sustain large, fixed positions on the continents. So I think that to the extent that the maritime strategy is misstated as an exclusive strategy as opposed to a necessary element in overall American strategy, it is illusory.

Unilateralism is no longer possible for the United States. It is no longer a basis for U.S. strategy, except possibly in the Western Hemisphere. If the United States were to decide to remove the Sandinista regime by military measures, you might have grave political repercussions but militarily the United States would remain dominant in the Western Hemisphere.

In the Eastern Hemisphere, close to the sources of Soviet power, we are dependent upon our allies or other friendly nations. Therefore unilateralism is not an option for the United States.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman. First, the task for U.S. strategy is demanding because of our international responsibilities. It is increasingly demanding, and yet strategy formation is amorphous. It will depend upon people whose political judgments, indeed whose judgment of the interests of the United States, diverge.

Second, since our commitments are greater than our resources, we are sustained in part by the intangible of United States prestige, which we should always nurse. But that intangible of prestige can rapidly evaporate. It is uniquely great powers that one can humble. If the United States had defeated North Vietnam, the world would have paid relatively little attention. It was excepted that a superpower can reduce a third-rate military state. But man bites dog is news. When a great power is humbled, whether it be in Vietnam or Lebanon or elsewhere, that has a considerable resonance.

Third, in order to deter one must always convey one's readiness to fight—or deterrence will not work.

Fourth, one must distinguish between critical and marginal interests. The loss of some countries in the Third World, while unwanted, is not catastrophic for the United States. The loss of the Federal Republic of Germany would be a catastrophic blow to the West. The loss of Angola is not. We sometimes try to make these Third World countries more important in the international balance than they really are. The test of importance is whether or not a nation will affect the international balance.

Fifth, the key for our strategy is adaptability and flexibility in rapidly changing conditions. There is not a preconceived strategic plan on a computer that can be exercised. That strategic plan changes steadily with changing circumstances.

And sixth, this reflects the difference between offense and defense in football, or at least football as I understand it 30 years ago. In football, the difference between the offense and the defense is substantial; it is psychological. The offense works on the basis of preplanned plays in which each man has his assignment. The defense is intuitive; it is responsive. For a great power like the United States defending a variety of interests around the world, there is a large element of the psychology of defense in any strategy. We must be prepared to exercise adaptability and flexibility. We must never assume that we can have a preplanned strategy like the Schlieffen Plan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Dr. Schlesinger, for that very enlightening presentation. We are confined to 6 minutes here. We are probably going to have a couple rounds of questioning, hopefully, this morning, but I would like to confine my questions to the conventional area.

I understand the premise that we have a nuclear deterrent restraining both superpowers. You've laid that out very well. Our conventional strategy is not what it was before the nuclear age. Accepting that as a premise, what would you advocate as our goal in terms of measuring where we are in terms of conventional defense in Europe, in Northeast Asia, and most importantly in the Persian Gulf? In other words, what is the benchmark against which this committee, and indeed the Congress, should be measuring our defense budget? What is the goal?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. In northeast Asia the goal is to symbolize the U.S. commitment. Indigenous forces allied to the United States are capable of handling their opponents with one exception. It is a misfortune of geography that Seoul, the capital of South Korea, lies 25 miles below the Demilitarized Zone, and for that reason there is this South Korean feeling of vulnerability which is reinforced by the tactics of the North Koreans.

But if one just looks at the force structure, one finds less of a problem there than in the confidence that the South Koreans have that the United States will reinforce their position. It is basically that argument about confidence, rather than the relatively small number of ground forces, that were involved with the debate over Mr. Carter's decision to remove those forces.

In Europe our task must be to encourage the allies to do better. I do not mean that our allies should provide forces equivalent to those of the Warsaw Pact. They're not going to do it. But we can make that conventional capability much more stalwart than it is today by better support, not necessarily more troops; by redeployments; and if the Germans would even consent to it, by better defenses in the heart of Germany.

Chairman NUNN. You are suggesting strategy changes within the overall flexible response to strengthen the conventional leg?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We are living in a strange period, Mr. Chairman, in which increasing numbers of Western leaders, happily more of those out of office than in office, former Chancellor Schmidt, Dr. Kissinger, I believe Dr. Brzezinski, and others, have raised doubts about the nuclear deterrent as protecting Western Europe. I think that unwise, myself, but that is the case. There is a feeling in Europe now that they must be serious about conventional capabilities. If we can exploit those feelings, we can dramatically improve conventional defense at least of Germany.

Chairman NUNN. Now how would you measure that? You alluded to General Rogers' statement 6 years after we had spent a huge amount of money, and much of it had to be spent whatever the strategy, there is no doubt about that, but 6 years later, or counting the last year or two of the Carter administration, 7 or 8 years after the American taxpayers had made some sacrifices to increase defense capabilities. Here, we have the head man in NATO, an American General, who says over and over again that if we have a conventional non-nuclear strike launched against NATO by the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact, we will have to turn to nuclear weapons in a matter of days, not weeks. You mentioned 72 hours.

So assuming he is correct, and maybe you can quarrel with that, but assuming that is correct for the purposes of this question, what should our goal be? How long should we really believe or aspire for our conventional forces to be able to fight without having to be the first to use nuclear weapons? And I am not suggesting getting rid of the first-use doctrine. I am saying, what should our goal be? What should we be measuring against?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. In my judgment, the goal should be at least 90 days, but that is only a proxy for being able to fight longer than the Soviet Union. We used to have these arguments in the Eisenhower period when the conventional forces were looked upon as a trip wire that we should have only very limited stocks so the Soviet Union would know that after 5 days, or 10 days, that we would have no alternative but to turn to nuclear weapons.

The question was obvious: What if we are winning? Do we want to run out of stocks then?

You want to be able to fight for longer than the Warsaw Pact, and for the Warsaw Pact to know that. I have used 90 days as a proxy for that, but after 90 days you can begin to resupply from the United States. You can perhaps get indigenous European——

Chairman NUNN. The NATO goal is 30 days. Should the United States plan unilaterally for a 90-day supply, if the NATO goal is 30 days, and the allies will run out of ammunition in a couple of weeks?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Absolutely not, Mr. Chairman. I think your position on this in the past, and I presume at the present time, is absolutely right. The United States should not invest more resources in NATO and in NATO security than the NATO partners are prepared to do themselves. Bringing up the U.S. level should be held out as an inducement to our Allies to do more. When we go up to 90 days and they are down at 5 or 10 days of supply, the situation becomes ludicrous.

Chairman NUNN. Let me, as the third part of this question, focus on the Persian Gulf and then my time will have expired.

On the Persian Gulf, what should our goal be there with conventional forces?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Painful as it is to Secretaries of the Navy, to Admirals, to enlisted people, to officers to be out in the region of the Persian Gulf, which yield less than ideal circumstances, it is the Achilles Heel of the West and will become increasingly so over the next decade. The deterrent is skimpy, and we should do more.

I think that we ought to, if we can, sustain two carrier task forces in the region. But more importantly, we should be heading for a degree of political understanding that will permit us to sustain a presence, not just—and at least the potential for a base structure—but a presence. Why do I say a presence?

If the United States had a brigade of troops in the Persian Gulf oil fields, would that be able to defeat the airborne forces of the

Soviet Union? Probably not. But we have a brigade in Berlin of 5,000 people, and one of the great deterrents in this world is that the Soviet Union, just as we ourselves, are reluctant to see Americans killed. The presence of an American brigade in that region, if we can ever get the political conditions to allow it, would alter the deterrent situation in the region of the Persian Gulf. I think that should be our goal.

First, our own resources, carrier task forces.

Second, the potential for a base structure.

Third, in the longer run—and the political preconditions do not exist at the moment—the presence of a U.S. brigade, a token force if you will.

Chairman NUNN. My time has expired.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. A token force not in hostile territory, however.

Chairman NUNN. My time has expired.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Schlesinger, again I join with the others. It is a pleasure to sit and discuss this issue with you. This set of hearings is to devise or to elicit from our witnesses two things, and they are somewhat separable: substantive issues like the ones addressed by the distinguished chairman in various parts of the world; others hopefully will come forward and give us some advice on procedural issues.

Therefore, I will devote my time to two questions on procedure. You among the witnesses are uniquely qualified to give us your advice on the procedure by which a president, be it this one, the last one, or a future one, arrives at a strategy. You worked in the Office of Management and Budget. You were a distinguished Secretary of Defense, and you have served in other Departments.

Could you comment on what is being done today, first in the past, today, and if you have recommendations as to how that should be changed for the future.

If I may, I would like to make certain I have about 1½ minutes left for a second question.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Do you want to, for insurance purposes, ask the second question now, Senator? [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. All right. The second question is this: in my opening statement I said several days ago that I felt it was important to get a better public understanding of a statement of strategy such that we could hope to receive stronger support of the implementation of our foreign policy in terms of the Congress and the President working together in developing the resources needed to sustain that foreign policy. But as I listen to you, it suddenly occurs to me that there may well be a division of what we should make known in terms of a stated foreign policy and what we should retain either in the classified form, or just pull back to leave a certain element of doubt, which is essential as we face a superpower with essentially equivalent military assets to ours?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Let me deal first with the initial question. Our military forces do not change rapidly. What a new president has on January 21, is what he inherits from his predecessor. By the time he leaves office 4 years or 8 years later he has not radically changed the force structure.

U.S. interests do not change radically. So the first thing we should bear in mind is the continuity, the general continuity of strategic objectives of the United States and of the force structure and of the strategy from administration to administration.

In the last 30 years there has been only one Presidential candidate, Mr. McGovern—I trust that I get his views accurately—who has challenged the basic U.S. commitments around the world and urged us to "Come Home, America." All other candidates of both parties more or less agreed with the central strategic objectives of the United States. That is, I think, indispensible to the conduct of American foreign policy. If we have grave divisions, we do ourselves injury, which leads to a parenthetical observation that anything that we can do to maintain the consensus within the society and to avoid sharp cleavages in the body politic is desirable.

A president inherits these forces. He inherits strategic goals. He inherits a strategy. He will change that strategy only slightly and, for that reason, it always has seemed to me that the tendency in politics to overstate the changes that a new administration will bring should be avoided. That goes along with the goal of maintaining consensus.

We do have major changes from time to time, but they are driven by major world events. You will recall that President Nixon moved from a 2½ war to a 1½ war strategy. Why? Well, it was not only budgetary pressures, it was the fact that the People's Republic of China had changed sides and that our requirements had been altered by that fact. And one of the few major changes in U.S. force structure that has come in recent decades was President Nixon's changes in 1969 or thereabouts reflecting, amongst other things, the end of the Korean war or the prospective end of the Korean—excuse me; I am lost in World War II—the Vietnam war.

Changes in the U.S. position can only come through major changes in the international scene, if we are wise, if we are not imprudent. President Reagan has done some major things in improving U.S. forces, with the support of the Congress. But I should point out, although he has improved pay and morale and sustainability, that there has been no major change in the U.S. force structure in the years of the Reagan administration. We essentially have the same force structure that we had in 1981 when President Reagan came into office.

Now this is simply a reflection of the fact that we have had no major changes on the international scene, and we have had no radical shift in the consensus in the United States about what we should spend on defense. So we are bound to wind up with the same force structure. The first rule for a president is included, Senator Warner, in the Hippocratic Oath, "Do no damage." Don't come in and radically change things either rhetorically or in terms of the forces that you control.

When a captain goes to take command of a ship, as Senator McCain can confirm your recollection as former Secretary of the Navy, Senator, the first thing he does when he gets there is not to do anything, not to disturb anything. I think that this provides a metaphor. A president should have a clear set of instructions as to how he will want these issues handled, and he should have a set of relationships with the Congress that permits him to handle them more or less in the way that he would like, but certainly in a way that will be agreed.

If a president does not care to get involved in detail, he should delegate authority clearly for a coordinated national security strategy. If a president—I hope he is a gifted one—wishes, as President Nixon did, to involve himself in the formulation of strategy, that is important. But the lines of authority in the formulation of strategy for the modest changes that any president will make in 4 or 8 years should be quite clear so that there is no doubt in the minds of others that there is a process of coordination at work.

In that filibuster, Senator, I have forgotten your second question. [Laughter.]

Chairman NUNN. I think you have used Senator Warner's second round of questions.

Senator WARNER. Well, that possibly shows—it may well show the relevant importance of the second question, but it was the extent to which we should announce that foreign policy and contain it.

But, Mr. Chairman, I see that my 6 minutes are expired. Maybe at some point in time we could get an answer.

Chairman NUNN. Perhaps we could get a brief answer to that one.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Very briefly, if I can, Senator, this is a very difficult one. As you may recall, the Kennedy administration wanted, because of its contempt of the vagueness of the Eisenhower years, to issue a document that laid out a blueprint of American strategy, of its interests around the world, and how it would deal with them. That document was put together. It was called the "Basics," BSNP, Basic Security National Plan, or something like that. And then they classified it. Why?

Because if you say what you are going to do, you are making pretty clear what you are not going to do. You do not want to be too clear about that. Secretary Acheson's announcement that Korea was beyond the defense perimeter of the United States gave us all the clarity that we wanted, but it gave the North Koreans certain clarity that misled them.

Chairman NUNN. May I ask a question on this, just interjecting here, are we talking about "here," when you are talking about writing off Korea, I have always considered that a goal rather than a strategy itself. I have considered "strategy" the ways and means to carry out the goal. But it seems to me when you write off a section of the world saying we are not going to be in NATO and we are not going to be in Korea, you are talking about basically not so much a change in strategy but a change in the goals and a change in the definition of our vital interests. Am I right, or wrong?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That is correct. That is correct, Senator.

When Secretary Acheson indicated that Korea lay beyond our defense perimeter, it enticed the North Koreans, at cost to us and to the South Koreans, to attempt to exploit that. And, as so frequently happens, Americans changed their minds. One of the great protections of the American democracy is that nobody around the world believes that we are as clearheaded as we think we are, and that even when we renounce certain things they don't believe us, fortunately.

Now I think that your objective of a clearer understanding of what our strategy is is desirable if, Senator, one has the caveat that one should never go public with something that is too sharply defined for fear of the consequences or the incentives on the other side.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Schlesinger, certainly any grand strategy has to take into consideration a tremendously important part of peace in the world. That is, how and when, if ever, can we come to an understanding with our adversaries to some degree.

In your opinion do we need on-site inspections to measure Soviet nuclear tests to ensure compliance with treaty restraints?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. A comment on your initial observation, Senator Exon. It will take a long, long time, decades at least, before there is any approach to political reconciliation between the United States and the Western World and the Soviet Union. That will take us a long——

Senator WARNER. Excuse me, Dr. Schlesinger. Do you think you could bring both mikes up, because occasionally it is difficult to hear. Thank you.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It will require as much time as the reconciliation between Protestant Europe and Catholic Europe in the 17 century. So we should not expect quick resolution of political differences.

We can work out certain limitations on both sides. Of course we would prefer to have on-site inspection. That has not in the past been regarded as a requirement. One should be careful in dealing with the verification problem for nuclear tests to understand those times that verification is an excuse used to avoid doing what one does not want to do and when it is a real concern.

To a large extent since the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the verification issue has been used as an excuse. I say that and will confess that I am one who has used it as an excuse. Why? Because the United States, dependent on a nuclear deterrent, in my judgment, can never have a total test ban, a comprehensive test ban.

We will need to have a continuation of modest, modest testing. We can have very sharp limitations on testing, but we cannot have a comprehensive test ban without risk to the security of the United States.

Now because it has been a U.S. goal for a comprehensive test ban under various presidents and various parties since 1963, we have frequently fiddled around with the verification issue when that is not really what concerned us.

Senator EXON. Well, let me press my question a little bit further. From your point of view, do you believe that we have the wherewithall to adequately measure testing in the Soviet Union without onsite inspections or, to put it another way: Is it necessary? Should a main caveat of any kind of an understanding with the Soviets be that we have on-site inspections to monitor whatever tests are allowed under the restraints of the treaty?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Senator Exon, once again this is a question of what level of risk one is prepared to live with. Our monitoring capabilities are good, they are improving; we can determine what the Soviets have done within a limited range. It may be desirable to have on-site inspection, but it is probably not essential.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Let me just open up this whole matter to get your views——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. May I add one thing to that?

Senator EXON. My time has expired already?

Chairman NUNN. You can go ahead.

Senator EXON. What I was going to do was just to ask you to expound, if you could, specifically on the triad concept. Is it still a viable one? Do you think maybe we are too concerned about having exactly equal legs on the triad? I am talking about the need for deploying Midgetman, the MX missile, the Trident and the D-5. How do you see all those programs progressing?

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, would you yield to me? I rarely, if ever, want to interrupt these proceedings but I think the witness has made a very profound observation with respect to testing, saying that it is desirable but not necessary, and I detected he wished to expound further on that, and I think it is important that we get that in the record at this point. And then of course Senator Exon's question.

Chairman NUNN. Maybe we could get him to expound on that one, and reserve the other one if you could, Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Certainly.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Senator Warner, Senator Exon, there is one thing that we should recognize. The area of nuclear testing has been one of the more fertile areas for U.S.-Soviet negotiations. We would like to have on-site inspection of Soviet strategic capabilities of a variety of sorts, and we would like to have on-site inspection in Eastern Europe. If on-site inspection for nuclear testing can establish the precedent that opens up inspection in other areas, then it will have served a function that is more valuable than simply the monitoring of nuclear tests, per se.

Nuclear weapons are now old hat. They are not the cutting edge of strategic advantage and of strategic advances. As a consequence, we should recognize that the cutting edge lies in strategic delivery vehicles, the follow-on to the SS-18 if there is one, the deployment of Soviet tank armies in Eastern Europe, and the like. Those are things that are vital for us to monitor in an environment where the military relationships between the two sides have become more stable on paper. And if this can be the precedent, it is enormously important.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the answer. I am out of time. There are many other things I wanted to get into, but maybe they will come up in questions from others, or I will be back for a second round. I will yield now.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Senator Humphrey.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Did you want me, Mr. Chairman, to deal with the triad question, or just reserve that?

Chairman NUNN. I think we need to reserve that one just in the interests of time, because I want everybody to be able to ask questions.

Senator HUMPHREY. I thank the Chair for that consideration.

Dr. Schlesinger, we are of course examining national defense strategy, and in your piece in the Washington Quarterly you define that as the allocation of resources. My question might make me sound like a pacifist, which I assuredly am not, but against what are we defending? What do we have to fear from the Soviet Union?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. There are certain things we have to fear just in terms of the purely destructive, potential destructive capabilities of the Soviet Union. As I indicated in my initial comments, the Soviet Union, unlike any foe we have had in history, can destroy American society in a matter of hours. So we must deter against that.

In addition, the Soviet Union has been a power that is expansionist. More so than the Russian Czars? Arguably not. But it is still an expansionist power. It is not that they are soon going to be in the Western Hemisphere, but the periphery of the Soviet Union is part of what provides what I will call the amenities of American life.

If one could consider, if one could hypothesize the Soviet Union having reduced the democracies of Western Europe, placed them under the shadow of the Soviet power, and have successfully isolated the United States and the Western Hemisphere or in North America, this would be a very different society. It would be a mean-spirited society, a suspicious society. We do not want those things to take place.

Could the United States survive under those circumstances? Probably so, but it would be a very different America.

Senator HUMPHREY. We should then fear Soviet expansionism. Is the Soviet Union still expansionist, in your view?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Soviet Union has been both a cautious and an expansionist power. The Soviet leaders do not run risks. If there are open doors, they will walk through them. So yes indeed they will seize opportunities. The Soviet Union not only is an opportunistic power, it is part of Marxist doctrine to be opportunistic, to take advantage of the opportunity of the moment. Yes, they will seize opportunities, and I think the most worrisome from our standpoint at the moment are those that lie to the south of them.

Senator HUMPHREY. An interesting question might be, why do they continue to be expanionist, but I will not ask you to reply to that because I have a number of other questions and limited time.

In your view what are the goals of the Soviet Union in the region of the Persian Gulf? How do those goals relate to what is going on in Afghanistan?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The goals of Imperial Russia, before that of the Soviet Union, under Peter the Great, or at least what is alleged to be the legacy of Peter the Great, was a search for warm water ports to the south. At the time of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, negotiated by von Ribbentrop and Molotov in 1939, one of the features of that Pact was that the Nazi Germany allowed the Soviet Union a dominant position in the region to the south in the Persian Gulf. So it is not just the Soviet Union, it is long-term Russian expansion; but this has been radically reinforced in the course of the last 20 years as the Western World, the industrial world, has become dependent upon that region for its energy supplies.

During this period, oddly enough, there has been a collapse of the Western system of defense. The CENTO Alliance, which was established by Secretary Dulles, the linchpin of which was the

Shah of Persia, is no longer there. So we must recognize that our vulnerabilities are greater because of our oil dependency. Their historic ambitions are no less, and have been encouraged by the opportunity, the potential opportunity, to dominate the world's oil tap.

Senator HUMPHREY. But you are saying it is a combination of the old Russian imperialist drive toward the Indian Ocean and a warm water port coupled with the modern opportunity they see to control, if not seize, a choke point at those terms of navigation and a denial of a vital resource.

But how does that all relate to what is going on in Afghanistan?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that the relationship was probably a lot clearer to the Soviets when they moved in in 1979 than it is today, and certainly our apprehensions were a lot clearer to us in 1979 than they are today. There has been a slip, as it were, in the Soviet timetable at least, and perhaps a slip in their ability to attain their objective.

At that time we were concerned, very much concerned, that Soviet domination of the whole of Afghanistan would: One, permit them to station fighter aircraft that would allow them to intercept ships in the Persian Gulf going toward the Straits of Hormuz; Two to stir problems in Baluchistan; and Three, to be, as it were, poised to take advantage of whatever chaos succeeds in the wake of Khomeni's death in Iran. We were much concerned about that. In the long run, we should not dismiss those concerns simply because they have not become a clear and present danger in the light of the continuing Soviet struggles in Afghanistan.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes. I would note, in order to embellish what you said about the fighter aircraft, I understand that now by using the lengthened airfields in Afghanistan, their fighter aircraft can fly to the Persian Gulf and return unrefueled, which is no small advantage to them.

My time is really up. I wonder if I could get in one quick question, since everyone else seems to be exceeding their time. It is a vital point. We seem to be quite possibly coming upon a critical and perhaps historic juncture with resumption of the U.N.-sponsored talks in February relative to Afghanistan. I have a great concern now that diplomats, with our acquiescence, might well give away in these talks or in the diplomatic process all that has been won at such very great cost by the people of Afghanistan and other concerned nations.

Do you share that concern? What do you see as an equitable agreement to restore an independent Afghanistan?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I share that concern conceptually. I do not think it is a high probability. I do not think that the Soviets would acquiesce in the restoration of an independent Afghanistan as it was before Soviet troops moved into the country, or indeed as it was before 1978 at the time of the coup.

I think that the Soviets have a hankering to get out of Afghanistan, but they are unwilling to pay the price, and as a consequence——

Senator HUMPHREY. They have a hankering to leave on terms favorable to themselves.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. They would be prepared to do that, and we might be prepared, and even the Paks might be prepared, but I don't think the Afghani's are prepared for it.

Senator HUMPHREY. I hope that we are not prepared for that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BINGAMAN [presiding]. Secretary Schlesinger, I guess I am next, so I will go ahead.

I would like to ask a couple of questions about what I perceive as the problems we have in integrating our economic policies with our military and diplomatic policies. It strikes me, and particularly with regard to your suggestion about the Persian Gulf becoming the Achilles Heel of the West, we have in my view a major disconnect between what we perceive as needed or required as far as a military response to our growing dependence on foreign sources of oil, and really there is no compensating or parallel nonmilitary response to that growing dependence on foreign oil.

I guess I am just struck by the fact that I serve both on this Committee on Armed Services, and on the Energy Committee, and here we are discussing what we should do to respond to the fact that we are becoming more and more dependent on foreign sources of oil. There does not seem to be any real discussion, at least by administration officials there is no serious discussion about what should be done in the nonmilitary sense.

I would be interested in your general ideas about whether we do an adequate job of integrating military and other strategic concerns to the country, and then specifically with regard to this growing problem in energy that you have alluded to.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that is a most pertinent question, Senator, and I do not think we do an adequate job. In discussing strategy, I should have observed that it was not limited to the national security area as we normally define it. One is engaged in balancing risks in other areas as well. Most notably in the economic area, the fact of a trade deficit, if I may mention that before turning to oil, the fact of the trade deficit of $170 billion and a steady growth in U.S. indebtedness to other parts of the world is going to have major national security consequences down the line.

Why? Because that implies a very low dollar in the future compared to the Mark, the Yen, and the like, a lessened ability of the United States to carry out its commitments in these countries, and great problems for those who represent people who have children in Germany or Japan. They will be getting those letters again as they did in the 1960s about bring my boy home.

The value of the dollar, the trade deficit, and the indebtedness position of the United States all directly relate to our future military capability.

With respect to oil, the United States has this inclination to swing from panic to complacency. During the 1970s as a result of the oil crises, we were geared up emotionally to deal with these problems. Now, as a result of the receding of our dependency, partly as a result of what happened in the 1970s including the rise in the price of oil and the normal price quantity tradeoffs, we are inclined to neglect the problem.

The American public thinks an oil crisis is not when we are dependent on the Persian Gulf, but when the price of gasoline is rising. And the fall in the price of gasoline that has major import for national security does not strike the public as a crisis but as a welcome boon. It strikes Wall Street the same way as it strikes the public, by the way, because it is an economic stimulus even though it undermines our national security position.

Now we do not have the emotional balance, it seems to me, to retain the view that the United States ought not to allow itself to become excessively dependent upon foreign sources of petroleum. We are allowing ourselves to do that today. I do not know whether all of the members or most of the members approved of the President's decision to attack Tripoli some months ago now, but let me assure you that that decision would not have been as easily made if the oil market had been tight and if the United States had been 60 percent dependent, let us say, on foreign sources of supply—mostly in the Arab world.

The latitude of U.S. foreign policy is sharply diminished as our dependency on petroleum rises and we do not, as your question indicates, do a good job of balancing that with long-term considerations in mind.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me just ask one follow up. I guess I still have a minute here.

Is there some structural change needed in order for us to better integrate military strategy with our national strategy as things change? You cited the trade deficit. You cited the energy situation. Is the National Security Council properly constituted to bring to bear these other concerns when we are making national security decisions?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that the national security apparatus, or the National Security Council is appropriately structured. The question is the efficacy of those who coordinate. There must be an awareness at some level of the tradeoffs that must be made between economic considerations and purely military considerations.

We do not have a consensus in the United States at the moment on these issues, and both our economic policy and our military budget are suffering from that fact. We, in order to deal with the trade deficit, in order to deal with the budget deficit, and in order to deal with our military buildup, will have to have a tax increase at some point, but there is no consensus. I think I am justified in saying that. There is no consensus in favor of a tax increase.

There is concern about a tax increase on the conservative side because it is feared that this would just be an excuse to add to domestic spending. And the consequence of that is that we are not having this military buildup that the President initially called for. We need a national consensus about what we should put into the military establishment, and what limits we must impose on ourselves with regard to the growth of domestic spending before we can deal with these problems.

At the moment we are stalemated, simply stalemated. The budget deficit continues. The trade deficit continues. Our indebtedness rises, and the military buildup is stalled out.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you very much.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Schlesinger, I very much appreciated, as always, listening to your very insightful views on these very important issues, and I certainly am not in disagreement. I would certainly hesitate to do so, as a former employee of yours. There are a couple of areas that I would like to discuss with you and hopefully I can get to more of them in the second round.

I appreciate your statement about the United States' commitment to Europe. From other readings—you did not specifically state it today—you do not at this time support any reduction in U.S. forces in Europe. You stated the requirement for two additional carrier task forces permanently stationed in the Persian Gulf. All of this appears to me to mean that we would have to maintain present manpower levels, or even increase them slightly in the years ahead.

We are faced with the dilemma that I know you are very aware of; that is, with either static or increasing manpower requirements, we have a shrinking pool of available males as we go into the 1990s. Males would be, due to our structure, comprise the primary source of our forces for the foreseeable future. We have, I think, done a laudable job of increasing and improving morale and readiness, and thereby "readiness," sustainability, and confidence in our Armed Services. However, it seems to me that in the 1990s, we are not going to be able to meet those manpower goals with this shrinking pool, unless we expend such enormous amounts of money to entice the prerequisite number of individuals that it will be almost prohibitive. From a budgetary viewpoint, cutbacks in pay and salaries would lead us to the conditions we were in in the late 1970s, which we all of course deplore, at least in hindsight.

Have you thought seriously about the prospect of a national service concept where all males serve this country in some capacity, whether it be in military service or Peace Corps or VISTA, or some other aspect of national security for a limited time as not only a way of solving this manpower problem, but also on a larger scale of allowing men and women to serve this country in some capacity, as is true in other nations throughout the world?

By the way, I have addressed this issue to groups of young men and women in my State and around the country, and it has gotten generally a very favorable response. I do not necessarily accept the argument that "it is too expensive" as a reason for rejecting this idea out of hand. I would appreciate your thoughts on this issue.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that the manpower problem, or perhaps it is the personpower problem now, is becoming overwhelming as we proceed with these low-birth cohorts in the later years of the 1980s. I have not thought long and hard about the national service concept, but I will give you a horseback opinion which I think will please you. I am for it. I would support it. I am not sure it is my preferred outcome. I have long felt that the all-volunteer force in legislation was a mistake.

I would like to see a restoration of the standby draft, and if need be the drafting of individuals, at least at the outset, into the reserves, not necessarily into the active duty forces. I think that would give one the adequate spillover at least in the years immediately ahead.

President Nixon, under whom the all-volunteer force concept was established, has said about it: It was a mistake. "If you understood the complexity of events and the public psychology during Vietnam and the pressures," he said it was a mistake. I think it was a mistake. We should have a standby draft. But I am willing to go further and explore the national service concept, and I have sympathy. I think that it could be very helpful.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger.

You mentioned, and I think understandably, the importance of the Persian Gulf, obviously for the reasons of our dependency upon imported oil. You failed to mention that we have now made a gradual shift in the years since the first oil crisis, and have become less dependent upon Persian Gulf oil and increasingly dependent on sources of oil much closer to this country, primarily Mexico. Mexico is in a state of some unrest, as we know. Conditions continue to deteriorate there from a socioeconomic viewpoint as well as a number of other areas. Relations between our two nations have been exacerbated for a number of reasons, including some of the rhetoric we hear in the halls of Congress.

I am very concerned about our relations with Mexico. I think that events in Nicaragua can have a significant impact on the political makeup of that country. I would be interested—this is kind of a broad-brushed question—what your recipe for our policy should be as far as a resolution of the issue in Nicaragua is concerned, and how do you think we should also address our relations with Mexico, because I think both are tied together.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The initial comment, Senator, is that the reduction of our dependency on the Persian Gulf is in the process of being reversed. Sixty-odd percent of the world's oil resources lie out there. Our own production is falling. By 1990 we will be importing more than 9 million barrels a day, a record. By the middle 1990s we will be importing about 13 million barrels a day, if it is available. There is only one place we can go, and that is the Persian Gulf.

Mexico has been a welcomed augmentation to our supply, and it looks as if it may increase. We are concerned about stability in Mexico, largely for reasons of political security more than our access to Mexican oil which will always be there. Assuming that the Mexicans are willing to sell at all, the access will be there.

In my judgment we have put great pressure, undue pressure on Mexico. Despite the mistakes of the Lopez-Portillo period and the expansion of Mexico's debt, because of the objectives of the banking fraternity we have contributed to Mexico a level of austerity that is causing political unrest in the country. I would be prepared myself to move in the direction of the post-World War II type of agreement in which we stretched out the debt, reduced the level of interest that was required, alleviating their economic problems, and back away from the austerity program which we have helped impose on the country.

The greatest risk to Mexico, in my judgment, comes from the political instability that may come from economic suppression.

Nicaragua is a potential point of infection. The Mexicans are not great admirers of the Central Americans, and particularly the Guatemalans, but instability in Nicaragua can spread to its neighbors and ultimately spread to Guatemala. The Guatemalan border has been a source of concern to Mexico. In my judgment, what we ought to do about Nicaragua and the Sandinista Regime is to make up our minds as a country and to relate means to ends.

At the present time the means that this country is employing, the Contras, are not sufficient to obtain what is visibly the goal of American policy, which is a change of regime in Managua, a change at least to the point that they admit other elements into the government. The Contras do not have that strength, and they are not going to achieve that.

So if the level of support for the Contras is simply at the level that permits harassment, then we should make use of that in order to bind the Nicaraguans to as great an extent as possible to their internal problems and to get them to commit to the removal of all foreign forces, including advisors, get them to commit to the reduction of their military establishment, and get them to commit to the nonuse of their resources to spill over their borders in the way that at least initially they hoped, which was a revolution without borders.

It seems to me to be weakening to this country to have an objective for our Nicaraguan policy that we cannot attain with the means that we are prepared to provide. If that is the case, then we should change the objective to adjust it to the means that we are prepared to provide. In the course of my introductory remarks I talked about the allocation of resources and the distribution of assets to reduce risks. It is plain from what we are doing that we are prepared to live with the risk of a Sandinista Regime inside of Nicaragua as long as it confines its activities inside the country. That is what you can read from the resources we are putting up.

The rest of it is rhetoric and is not, I suspect, an entirely satisfactory answer but I don't think the situation is entirely satisfactory.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We are glad to have you before the committee again, Doctor, Mr. Secretary.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator GLENN. Just a comment on your discussion with the chairman here earlier, and I am sorry I got here late today. I had some other commitments.

But this question of whether we have 30 days in Europe or 60 days, and so on, has always been to me rather academic. We assume that the Soviets look at this like we do, that they get pushed to the point where they have to resort to nuclear, the only thing that is going to be saved is our moral sensibilities or sensitivities here that we were not the ones that did the first bang. We were not the ones that did the first nuclear explosion, and that is going to be of little consequence I think in how the whole thing comes out.

I want us not to be the first Nation that goes that route, either, but it seems to me that it gets rather academic if we assume that the Soviets are going to go into a nuclear exchange as a backup, just as we probably would do the same thing. That is just a comment on it. That is not my question.

We are going to be forced in a few weeks here to deal with very specific items on what we vote for in the budget, the big budget. You are a student of American foreign policy. I would like to start on that note of, if you were advising us here, specifically where you think we should be concentrating our efforts this year on setting up a military to back up what you properly have analyzed in your article, and so on, here, that American commitments continue but American consensus to back up those commitments and our ability to do it is diminished. That was basically the theme of your article, I believe.

If you were on this committee now, what would you be advising, or what would you be voting for if you were Secretary of Defense today, I will put it on that higher level here, what would you be advising us to do to carry out these commitments in the best fashion that would be supported by a concensus to the American people?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. As members of this committee, Senator, if not as United States Senators, you have the happy circumstance that you can create the Armed Forces without worrying in your role as committee members whether or not there will ultimately be a consensus that they be employed if deterrence fails.

Senator GLENN. Let me put it in terms then of American foreign policy. You are a student of American foreign policy. Now where do you think we should be concentrating our efforts this year? Should it be Navy, Army, draft? There are a whole host of things, if you were Secretary of Defense, what would you recommend to carry out the foreign policy of this country. We have commitments all over the world. Where do we need the greatest emphasis?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that in terms of foreign policy, the requirements for this year are two, and they reflect our two greatest longer term vulnerabilities. The Middle East, and the Persian Gulf on the one hand; and NATO cohesion—I say that carefully—NATO cohesion, less their military forces. These positions have been damaged by both the results of Reykjavik and the European response to Reykjavik, which has led to a loss of confidence in American leadership. They have also been damaged in the Middle East by the Iran Contra affair in which the United States is seen to be less reliable in terms of living up to those publicly professed commitments.

This has undermined our prestige and our credibility, and I think that the repair of both of those things as a way, as a step, is a necessary first step to the rebuilding of our deterrent posture.

Senator GLENN. I think you very properly identify energy as perhaps the trigger of trouble in the future, because we are going to get back into higher needs for energy and the rest of the world along with us. So the Middle East and the Persian Gulf in particular plays a specific role there. We are all aware of that. We are committed to keeping the Persian Gulf open.

Specifically, would you support two more carrier task groups with the idea that they would be devoted perhaps full time to keeping an American presence there off the Persian Gulf?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I indicated that, I thought we should devote much of our Navy's resources to the Persian Gulf region. I think you are referring to the request in the budget for two new ships.

Senator GLENN. It was floated, and then I understand there is a little weakened support for that perhaps at this time, but that was proposed originally at least, the two more carrier task forces which comes at $13 billion to $15 billion each, or something like that, so we are talking $25 to $30 billion.

Senator WARNER. Senator, would you yield for a clarification?

Senator GLENN. Certainly.

Senator WARNER. It is two carriers to replace two carriers in the existing force level. As I listened, you repeatedly said "two more" carrier task forces. It is not 17. We are dealing with the same number 15, and the budget request is for ships to replace existing ships.

Senator GLENN. OK, but then—I thought it was for the whole task force, so maybe I was misled on that. Would they then use the support ships from current task forces? It would just be these specific ships?

Senator WARNER. My understanding is it is a request for the funding necessary to initiate construction of two new carriers to replace two existing carriers in the 15-carrier force level.

Senator GLENN. That was not my understanding——

Chairman NUNN. If I could add, I think that Senator Warner is correct on that. If I could add a further clarification, while at the same time cutting the number of modern aircraft being procured substantially below the replacement required to keep modern aircraft on those carriers.

Senator GLENN. I was under some improper assumptions on that, then.

Let me ask you, you have identified the Persian Gulf, in the time I have remaining here, the Persian Gulf as the number one Achilles Heel.

Chairman NUNN. Why do we not go ahead, Senator Glenn. It might be interesting to get him to answer that question as led by Senator Warner and modified by me.

Senator WARNER. I would also ask that you give Senator Glenn additional time, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GLENN. Give me an extra 30 seconds.

Chairman NUNN. We will not take it out of your time. [Laughter.]

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I have always found carriers to be immensely useful, but they are also immensely costly. I cannot really answer that question without looking at the overall budget allocation of resources.

If, as the chairman has indicated, we are going to wind up with an unbalanced force structure by reducing the number of aircraft as it were in order to start procurement on new carriers, I would be very reluctant to do that. I think as we face these budget pressures that one of the prime necessities for this committee is to maintain balance amongst the components. I would look with very great care, because of the spending on the carriers in the out-years. That is not to say that they are not immensely attractive or desirable. That is a waffle answer.

Senator GLENN. Let me ask one more question. I know my time is up, but just one more question, Mr. Chairman.

You identified the Persian Gulf and that area of the world as an energy supply point that is our Achilles Heel. I agree with that. I think it has been an Achilles Heel for a long time. Our European allies have not taken up the burden in Europe so we could allocate more of our resources to that area, but I share your concern about that area.

Do you have another? If that is number one, what is number two? What is number three? What is number four in areas we should be particularly sensitive to as you see it over the next 10 years or so? Because that is what has got to guide us if we are going to carry out foreign policy. If we have these commitments and we are charged with furnishing the forces and analyzing that here in light of what our commitments are, and that is a tough one, I have advocated for a long time we combine the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee but we have not gotten any place with it and did not expect to, but I do not see how we can consider the things we consider without foreign policy, nor can they do the opposite.

Do you have some other sensitive points there that you think we should be adapting our military to? The Persian Gulf is key. I did not necessarily agree with rapid deployment force, putting supplies out there that are vulnerable was hardly a good use of our money and our resources. They are very vulnerable to air attack if we do not have forces there to defend them, but that is another subject.

But are there other choke points of the world, or areas of the world besides the energy-rich Middle East that you think are key that we should be addressing ourselves this year in the budget?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. In the long run, for the West the cohesion of the Alliance and the protection of the West is all important. As your comment indicated, the United States cannot do it alone and should not do it alone—but cannot do it alone, whether it should or it should not. And therefore, the other area of prime importance depends upon the reactions of the Europeans and the proposals that we may be prepared to make to the Europeans.

If the Europeans are prepared seriously to look at improvements in their forces as a way of shoring up the overall deterrent strength of the West, I would be prepared to put that as a second priority, a dual priority for the United States, but only "if." One must not kill European incentives by making American commitments in the absence of an appropriately forthcoming attitude on the part of the Europeans.

As I indicated in my comments, I do not worry much about the Far East at this time. I am always concerned about command of the sea, but that leads me to worry about such things as attack submarines in relation to the Soviet Union more so than carriers.

Senator GLENN. And our ability to control these choke points of the world and the Soviet move into the northwest Pacific, extending their influence there, Cam Rahn Bay, the Straits of Malacca. All of those areas are things we have to address, I think, like you said.

I thank you for the extra time.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. And the United States must retain command of the sea, there is no question about that. We as this international coalition depend upon ocean commerce. We cannot be satisfied with a rough equality with the Soviets in terms of naval forces, because their naval goal is only to disrupt communications in the West.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have questions. On the other hand, I am a late arrival because of other obligations. Have Mr. Wirth and Mr. Shelby been able to ask their questions yet?

Chairman NUNN. No, they have not. They have been here quite a while.

If you would want to defer?

Senator WILSON. I would be happy to defer.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Mr. Shelby was here before I was.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Dr. Schlesinger, I want to touch on just a minute something you had enunciated before. You said before that you are—and I have seen some of your writings—you are a strong proponent of arms control, but that we should not just use arms control as a panacea that would solve all of our problems.

Would you elaborate on that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes. Indeed the arms control has only limited usefulness when it is successful.

Senator SHELBY. And how will it be successful?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It is not going to eliminate the defense budget. It is not going to eliminate the risk that nuclear weapons may be employed. It is not going to solve our security problems.

It has a limited usefulness in that it may serve to improve the stability in the relationship between the two powers. For several decades there was an illusion that arms control could do wonders, that it could bring disarmament. That illusion I think has faded as a mass movement.

But that belief in it as a panacea led to a corresponding disenchantment with arms control in later years: that it could do nothing, that it could not contribute to the stability amongst the major powers. That in itself is an error.

It is a very useful, but very limited, tool. It can improve stability and it can improve the relationships between the powers, and that's all that it can do. It cannot solve all of our security problems, but one should not reject arms control because it does not provide a panacea.

Senator SHELBY. But it is one of many avenues that we can approach, is that correct?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It is indeed a desirable, but not a necessary, complement of military strategy. It is not necessary, but it is highly desirable.

By contrast, military forces and military strategy are an indispensable complement to arms control. One cannot have arms control unless one is prepared to build one's military forces and to convey that to one's potential opponent.

Senator SHELBY. Dr. Schlesinger, is it also not a dangerous, but idealistic, concept that we all have in us to rely strictly on arms control? Is that not what you are saying?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Reliance on arms control, exaggeration of arms control as a panacea, is the road to the end of the international position of the United States and the security of the West.

Senator SHELBY. I want to touch on one other——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. But that is the exaggeration of arms control.

Senator SHELBY. One other subject. You have served this Nation as Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Defense, Director of the CIA. I knew you first in the role of Secretary of Energy, coming from the House, and we talked about in the Committee on Energy there, and Commerce, on your appearances some of the things you talked about here today, that is, the instability of the Persian Gulf area, our continuing and growing dependence on that area.

What is the alternative to our energy supply, first, other than self-reliance over here? You know, the market forces are working over here, maybe in a disastrous way as far as national security is concerned, because it puts more and more of our dependence on the Persian Gulf in the precarious way that you have so aptly pointed out.

What is the alternative as far as energy, because it is all interrelated, as you have pointed out.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, as I commented earlier to Mr. Bingaman, the American public moves from complacency to panic, and we are now in a complacency period. We ought not to get into our panicky mode, to be sure, but we also ought not to get into our complacency mode.

And we are allowing our dependency to rise to a level that we will regret in the 1990s. It seems to me that we ought not to allow that to occur, that we should take preferably international steps to avoid it.

During the 1970s, the IEA was prepared to support a concept of a minimum sales price for oil, in which the Japanese and the Germans as well as the United States accepted that minimum sales price. That would seem to me to be one of the first things that we might do.

Why? Because if we proceed unilaterally we will put our own manufacturers at a disadvantage relative to the Germans and the Japanese. I would encourage, through a multilateral agency, the IEA, to move toward that minimum sales price.

I would discourage the movement of boilers, of utilities and industry back toward oil, when we know that the source of oil is going to be the Persian Gulf. I would add to the size of our strategic petroleum reserve.

Senator, in the middle 1990s we are going to be in a position where that immense strategic petroleum reserve will last us for about 60 days. Right now we think it will last us for 180 or longer. But the more we depend on imports, the smaller is the utility of any stockpile of 750 million barrels of oil. I would add to it.

In addition, although the Congress has just acted, I would adjust the tax code so that the benefits to the oil industry and the oil producers are flexible. When the oil price plummets to $7 a barrel there should be more support through the tax code in the form of depletion allowance and other writeoffs, and as the oil price moves to $28 a barrel those benefits would disappear.

And in this way we can ease the burden on our own domestic producers.

Senator **Shelby**. Doctor, my time has expired.

Senator **Wirth**. Thank you, Senator Shelby.

Dr. Schlesinger, again thank you so much for your help to so many of us during the years, and we appreciate your being here again this morning.

In response to an earlier question, you were talking about U.S. vulnerabilities. You talked about the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, and also touched very briefly on the NATO alliance and the challenge or potential threat to the NATO alliance that might have come out of the negotiations in Reykjavik.

Could you expand on that and perhaps tell us what you think did happen as a result of those discussions in Reykjavik and why that was threatening to the NATO alliance?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I certainly can, and in part I will later be answering Senator Exon's question about the triad. The Western World depends upon nuclear weapons. The Atlantic alliance has been held together by the glue that is nuclear weapons.

At Reykjavik the President, at least at one point, had agreed that in 1996 we would get rid of all nuclear weapons, all strategic nuclear weapons. That was an agreement to a proposal by Mr. Gorbachev. That agreement was not based on an understanding of the alliance strategy, of its history, of its psychology; and it was a cause of great distress in Western Europe. The American negotiators, who were proxy negotiators for the Europeans, did not seem to understand the basis of NATO strategy, and therefore there was a loss of confidence.

Now, we have backed away. That position is not a moot position. We are not, I think, going to accept a position in which we abandon nuclear deterrence, even though the President continues to speak of a world without nuclear weapons. I think it is becoming a more long-run goal.

But that was very disturbing to the Europeans because it did not seem to be based upon an understanding of alliance strategy or history or agreements.

Now, we have on the table and we had on the table something else, which is the proposal by the United States to get rid of all ballistic missiles by 1996. That proposal has not been subject to analysis. Indeed, the NSDA within the administration requiring analysis of that proposal went out only several weeks after Reykjavik.

That is not the normal procedure. If we lay something on the table, we ought to be aware of its consequences in advance. But from the Europeans' standpoint, our proposal to rid ourselves of all ballistic missiles means the wiping out the Pershing forces, which have been introduced into Germany only after great turmoil within the alliance. I think that there is consternation about that, about relatively little consultation.

But the significant thing is that one of the ways we encouraged the Europeans to take the Pershing was to say that it was essential to have missiles based on European soil that could reach Moscow.

And now we say that it is unnecessary. It is hard for us to turn around.

Now, the Pershing is more symbolic and psychological in its impact than it is in terms of its military role, but there is a little restlessness. But the basic restlessness of the Europeans lay in the apparent unfamiliarity with the western dependency on nuclear weapons and that the heart of NATO strategy for decades has been nuclear deterrent, which we were apparently willing to abandon.

On the ballistic missile issue, we have told outselves and the Europeans over some decades that the triad is a vital concept. But we were prepared at Reykjavik to abandon two of the legs of the triad. That is in conflict with the Scowcroft Commission report, which stressed the importance of the various legs of the triad to complicate the problem of Soviet targeting and Soviet economic resource allocation.

The Scowcroft Commission report was embraced by the administration, but it has now been at least de facto abandoned by the administration with no prior analysis. I think that is an additional source of disturbance in Europe.

So generally speaking, at the moment the Europeans are quite concerned about what they saw at Reykjavik. They see what is going on with the Iran-Contra thing, but that does not affect their security directly, that does not affect their vital interests. Therefore, if the Americans fumble a few and make fools of themselves, the Europeans are not above a little Schadenfreude at witnessing that.

But on Reykjavik, we were undermining, without being aware of it, their security. And they do not like that.

Senator WIRTH. Senator Wilson, you have been quite kind in deferring on the basis of when Senators arrived. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Schlesinger, let me focus you away from this discussion, which I find interesting, but onto another that I think may have been touched on earlier before I got here. It has to do with the subject of manpower.

The concern that a number of us have as we sat here and listended to the various presentations on the subject of strategy, that from Secretary Weinberger, that from Dr. Brzezinski, is that the treaty obligations that we presently have and, beyond those, simply considerations of strategy, dictate manpower requirements that seem to be in question in the future.

Indeed, if we pose the present available manpower against those requirements, many would say that we are now short of meeting them. And yet, the difficulty that we are facing in this time of ever more stressful, stringent budget cutting requirements would dictate that we find some way to try to stretch those manpower resources, recognizing that those are probably the most expensive thing we do, even more expensive than strategic weapons.

So let me just ask you this. A number of people, and most recently my new colleague, the distinguished junior Senator from Arizona, have talked about a national service program, which I must say that philosophically I find quite appealing. I like the concept of young people giving something back to their community, the State, and the Nation.

But however attractive you may find that, history in the interval between proscription as we have known it and the present volunteer force has resulted in an increase in the compensation to our troops, one that I have supported and I think that it has been necessary and fair.

But however my value judgments may weigh in on it, or anyone else's, the fact is we now have an all volunteer force that is considerably better paid, better compensated, with more benefits by far than a few years ago, even in the very recent past.

The question that I have is, in your experience as Secretary of Defense, faced with the necessity to fulfill manpower requirements, if you were now in that job faced with the very difficult responsibility for stretching what we would probably all agree are inadequate resources to meet what seem to be expanded needs, how would you view the idea of national service, not from the standpoint of its philosophical attractiveness, but let us talk numbers.

What would it cost, and where would you set the priority, I note that a number of the service chiefs say cut everything else, but do not cut our manpower. And I commend people like Senator McKean for saying, well, we have got to be a little bit innovative and find a new way to do it. We are going to need more manpower, but the dollars are not there.

And how do we reconcile it?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. There is no single answer to that, Senator Wilson. In the first place, a Secretary of Defense reflecting his responsibilities is bound to be sympathetic to the national service concept, because it helps solve his real problems. That is one way to go.

I myself mentioned earlier the restoration of the reserves as need be. That is another possibility. But your question goes to how does one deal with the manpower and dollar requirement, and I initiate it by saying that I always fought, and I think that all Secretaries of Defense are likely to fight, to maintain active duty manpower.

But if we are driven to it by necessity, we can look at ways of shifting more of the burden into the reserves. Why is that? You look at the Soviet force structure, for example, which is our principal concern. They have first echelon, second echelon, third echelon divisions at various states of readiness.

The American belief has always been in the uniformity of forces, in the uniformity of divisions, rather than allowing some of them to be more ready and better manned than others, better manned by active duty forces.

We can experiment more amongst other things, with a higher proportion of less ready divisions consisting of reserve manpower, and to gauge that to our ability to transport those troops in the United States overseas to where they may be needed.

There is no point in having troops that are ready to fight within 15 days if it is going to take you 270 or 360 days to get them, to get a particular unit to the zone that it is likely to be in.

Now, neither the service Chiefs nor the Secretary of Defense is likely to be very eager to explore these possibilities. I understand and sympathize with them. But if budget necessity drives one in that direction, they must be explored, and money can be saved and active duty manpower requirements reduced, even though total requirements may be left unchanged.

Senator WILSON. Mr. Secretary, Dr. Schlesinger, my 6 minutes have expired. A follow-up question that I would ask really tends to the point you made about uniformity and the problem that we face in terms of being able to project the force adequately with this manpower situation.

I would ask for the record if you might have some comments as to whether or not we have, in terms of strategy, in terms of budgeting, devoted adequate attention and resources to our airlift capabilities.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I can answer that, Mr. Chairman, very briefly. No, no, no. And this has been a problem. In 1974, I introduced an amendment in the wake of the Middle Eastern war and the airlift that the United States employed, an amendment calling for more airlift and for a strengthening of the civil reserve that would permit us to move forces forward, airlift and sealift.

And it was torn apart. Airlift and sealift just have never been very glamorous, and the consequence has been that we are not able to introduce forces into the Eastern Hemisphere as rapidly as our national strategy requires.

Senator WILSON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you again, Senator Wilson.

Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Schlesinger, it is always a great delight and pleasure to have a chance to interchange with you. You know my deep respect for you and for your intellect and understanding of these subjects. I am sincere in saying that, as you know.

I have a few short questions and then one that I would like to elaborate on if time permits. First, suffice it to say you do believe strongly in the desirability of a triad, correct?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Which means you also believe we should not forego land-based missiles in the future, correct?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That is correct.

Senator GORE. Do you also believe that we should emphasize survivability in land-based missiles? That is, weapons systems which extract from the Soviets an extremely high cost to attack, such that it makes it very difficult for them to target those missiles?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, but not exclusively.

Senator GORE. All right. Now, we have heard a great deal of discussion about MAD and the doctrine of mutual assured destruction is widely derided. Is it not true that when you were in the Defense Department our country shifted away from MAD and in fact we have not had MAD as our strategy for quite some time, correct?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That is correct.

Senator GORE. Now, those are the short questions as a prelude to the one I wish to explore a little bit more in depth with you now.

I am amazed that we have got so many subjects to cover here that you are expert on that we have not really had a chance to explore one topical strategic point about which you have written so eloquently, and that is the Strategic Defense Initiative. What role do you see the Strategic Defense Initiative playing in America's strategy and specifically how do you evaluate ballistic missile defense, the—what I would refer to as the down and dirty version of SDI that I believe many had in mind all along and which now is emerging more and more as the real SDI?

Would you respond?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that the United States should pursue a vigorous SDI program with a respectable annual growth in resources. My judgment would be 15 percent, perhaps 20 percent, if the budget is there. But aside from the overall budget pressures I do not think it should be an immense rate of growth, as the administration has called for, but I think it should be respectable.

It serves the role, first, of deterring any possibility of a Soviet breakout. If they see that we have a vigorous program they would be less inclined to move in that direction. It serves the role of providing us with the analytical capability to do intelligence work on what the Soviets themselves are doing, and the Soviets have a vigorous if not particularly successful program. So we have a steady growth, and emphasis in research and development that should, of course, stress those things that we could use for early deployment, without a commitment to early deployment. But it should not exclude the exotics, the lasers, the particle beams, and the like.

I think that we ought to have and should convey our willingness to sustain such a program. We should also be willing in an arms control environment to impose restraints on what we do in exchange for restraints on what the Soviets do. There is no possibility of the kind of defense that has been proffered and has been seen on TV for several decades well into the 21st century.

What we can do in the near future, if you look at the 1996 date the President used Reykjavik, is deploy some kinetic kill vehicles. It would be a very rudimentary defense. It would serve the purposes of knocking down some number of incoming objects. It would deal with the unauthorized ballistic strike. It would deal with the third country problem if there is a third country problem, but it would be a defense of very limited capability. At the moment we don't know enough about what we can do even to talk about such a defense. We are engaged in a research program and regrettably throughout its history since March 1983 we have turned the research program on its head and have drawn strategic conclusions before we have begun to solve the technical problems.

Senator GORE. First the verdict, then the trial.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We do not know what the systems architecture should be for such a defense at this time either in the simplified defense or the longer-run goal. We are working on it but until someone has resolved some of these problems one has inadequate knowledge.

Senator GORE. What would be the danger of——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. There is one other point, and perhaps that was what you were going to prod me on.

Senator GORE. Please go ahead.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That is that one should not get seduced into a near-term deployment on the basis of some promises about what a long-term deployment might be able to do. A near-term deployment must stand on its own legs and not be based upon getting started toward the Astrodome. There are reasons to consider a near-term deployment first because the presuppositions on which the 1972 ABM Treaty was based have not been met and, second, because the technology has changed. So the subject deserves another view, but it deserves a meticulous view, it seems to me. We should not deploy these defenses out of impulse.

Such a defense must be, as Mr. Nitze has said, cost effective, survivable, and on the strategic basis must contribute to the security of the United States, by protecting command control sites, by protecting perhaps missile fields, but by avoiding a response by the Soviet Union of an immense expansion of their own offensive force structure. So it is an immensely complicated question that can only be handled first after we know a lot more about the technology and not base it upon hope, and second, after very careful examination of the strategic consequences.

It deserves another rehearing because of the changes since 1972, but it deserves a very careful rehearing, and not an impulsive reaction.

Senator GORE. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Schlesinger, I also want to join in the accolades. It is always of great interest to listen to you and to be able to get your thoughts on strategies or whatever issue. I went back to my office after a taping I had and I said I was listening to the world according to Dr. Schlesinger. I found it rather interesting, and I congratulate you for it.

Moving away from the mutual assured destruction which you indicated that we had been doing, we have moved away from mutual assured destruction of targeting cities to the mutual assured destruction of trying to look at targeting military targets. That has been the major shift. We still do not have any defensive capability against strategic weapons, so therefore we still have the reliance of deterrence on offensives forces that in fact are vulnerable, and that—so we have shifted a little, but we still linger a little bit, and that gets back to this point of what we are going to do in the nature of deployment and what the mix of our offensive forces and our defensive forces on a strategic basis are going to be.

I gathered from your response to Senator Gore that you said we should not be impulsive about moving forward with a deployment of a strategic defense system until we have certainly thought this out, and I concur with that, and I also believe that you have got to look at the system whether it is Phase I or an incremental basis of deploying SDI on what it is going to contribute on its own and also in relationship to further technology down the road.

I think it is both, and I do not think you are just going to just deploy it for the sake of deployment. I think we are going to deploy it if in fact it strengthens deterrence. I guess my question is, do you believe from what you know about the technology that is going to be available, say, at the point 1996, before and after, that strategic deterrence, basically SDI, can afford and give us a strengthening of our deterrence? Do you see the strategic defense systems strengthening our deterrence in the future?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I see the possibility of that, Senator. At the moment we do not know enough about what such a system might be to say that it would, but there is certainly the possibility of strategic defense contributing to deterrence by reducing, further reducing, I think, any incentive the Soviets might have for a first strike. But as yet we have been doing in this country a great deal of arguing about hypothetical possibilities. It would be helpful if we could get a little bit more understanding of what the technical options are under our belt.

Senator QUAYLE. Should we look at the technical understanding in the near term or in the long term as a priority? And added to that, should we look at the boost phase or should we look at the terminal phase? I mean, where should we—I mean, if you had the responsibility of sitting down and devising how we are going to proceed with a possibility, to use your word, of deployment of a strategic defense system, where would you focus?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I would tend to focus on the terminal phase because that is a nearer term prospect. Boost phase is a more distant prospect, particularly a boost phase system that can be effective against the Soviet countermeasures. Kinetic kill weapons are not going to be an effective system as a boost phase defense if the Soviets take countermeasures. It could be against the present generation of Soviet forces.

So I would be inclined to be assured that we had a terminal defense that the Soviets could see we could deploy so that whatever their possibilities of breakout are they repress them out of a fear of U.S. reaction. I do not want to be in a position in which the Soviets can deploy defenses in the 1990s and that our response is, "yes, but we have got something on the boards that is going to look awfully good in 2020."

I think that we have to deal with the near term in order to assure that we can deal with the longer term. I would continue to explore the directed-energy weapons. At the moment amongst them the free electron laser looks to be the most interesting; chemical lasers appear to have, what shall I say, receded somewhat in interest. These are, however, impressions, and I think that you should get a more expert briefing on the present state of the program.

Senator QUAYLE. But basically you think it is a possibility, though we do not know as of yet that strategic defenses will in fact enhance and strengthen deterrence?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That is a lively possibility and it is one for which one must design the strategic defense employment to assure that that is the result rather than merely the objective.

Senator QUAYLE. One final question. You had in the past—in your opening statement you talked about some of our limited options and the flexibility that we ought to have. Do you think from a strategy point of view that we ought to be looking at more of our limited nuclear options short of MAD that the President could in fact have at his disposal? Have we done enough to look at limited nuclear conflict in our limited nuclear options?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It would be my impression, and I repeat, because I have not been in the business in recent years, that we have not done enough in examining the limited nuclear options as opposed to the massive options. The reason for that is that the system tends to concentrate on the SIOP, on executing the SIOP, and that there has always been some psychological reluctance to look at the lesser options, but it is the capacity of the United States at this time, before we, one may hope, improve alliance conventional capabilities, it is the capacity of the United States to execute such limited options that I think are central to the military deterrence of the Warsaw Pact.

Senator QUAYLE. What would you put in that category of limited nuclear options that we ought to be——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. There is a whole series of possibilities here. The limited nuclear options that might be confined to the immediate battle area 10 miles or 10 kilometers or 20 miles on either side of the forward edge of the battle area.

The reason for that is that one wants to limit the use of nuclear weapons geographically and locationally. It is important if one is going to achieve restraint that the other side knows that your are limiting in some way. Geographic limitation is one possibility. Another set of possibilities are to select military targets around the periphery of the Soviet Union, hen houses, for example, radar sites, in which the Soviets learn, one, that we are prepared to use nuclear weapons, and two, that we are prepared to attack targets on Soviet soil.

There is also the possibility of economic targets, the bulk of the Soviet oil refinery business, for example. But as long as we are dependent upon nuclear retaliation and, as long as your question suggests, we do not want to go to the busting of cities, we must look very hard at these options that avoid cities, convey a message, and add to deterrence.

Senator QUAYLE. I would just say finally, and you do not need to respond because my time is up, but to be able to convince and to show that we can actually deploy these limited nuclear options, one of the key ingredients that we have got to focus on is accuracy and discrimination of our weapons, which I personally do not think we have done enough, not only nuclearly but also conventionally as well.

Chairman NUNN. Could I follow up on that? Is it not a bit disingenuous for those who have been trying to sell SDI on the theory that it is the alternative to mutually assured destruction to postulate our policy as a continuous one of adhering to the MAD doctrine? You answered a little while ago that you started when you were Secretary of Defense moving us away from the mutual assured destruction doctrine.

Are we still in that posture? Is our policy now or was it when you were Secretary of Defense a policy of mutual assured destruction, or is it one broader?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It was not our strategy, mutual assured destruction. If I may give a little history of that, mutual assured destruction was the professed public strategy of Secretary McNamara after he backed away in 1962 and 1963 and 1964 from the notion of damage limiting. There has been some disingenuousness and public pronouncements on this, Mr. Chairman, and it can only be described as disingenuousness. We should be very careful about what we are saying.

The United States does not now have a targeting doctrine stressing mutually assured destruction. Its targeting doctrine for deterrence of major conflict is something other than mutual assured destruction. We hope to reserve our forces in order to force the Soviet Union to reserve its own forces, not to attack western cities.

However, we have, although our targeting is not based—and our strategy is not based upon mutual assured destruction as is frequently implied in the editorials in certain newspapers, we have a mutual assured destruction capability. Why? Not because that is our preference, but because that is reality. The Soviets have that capability against us. We must have it against them in order to deter their attacks against cities.

Chairman NUNN. How do you categorize the argument that Secretary Weinberger has made over and over, and other people in the administration, that SDI is the alternative to an immoral mutual assured destruction doctrine that we now have as the alternative. Where does that fit on the scale of accuracy?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That is—I must divide that question into—rephrase the question, I must say. If the Secretary is saying the possibility of or the hope for a total defense is an alternative to mutual assured destruction, then that lies reasonably high on the honesty scale. Why? Because what the Secretary, I presume, is saying is that that will permit us in this rather hypothetical world that they have spelled out to reduce the capacity to destroy Soviet cities and their capacity to destroy our cities, and that is a logically correct argument. Whether it is plausible depends upon your view of the prospects of SDI, and many people do not think that SDI for the protection of the United States is going anywhere.

Where does that fall down? In the first place, as we discussed earlier, others, perhaps not the Secretary, have implied that the United States has a targeting doctrine and a strategy of mutual assured destruction which has not been true for 12 or 13 years. Even the Hoffman Report was——

Chairman NUNN. That is a feature of it I am centering in on.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. And one other thing. Even if we can protect the United States against ballistic missiles, we cannot necessarily protect our cities against low-flying cruise missiles. Most of our population is on the coast as opposed to the Soviet Union. Therefore the Soviets may retain an assured destruction capability even though our ballistic missile defense is perfect. I am sorry.

Chairman NUNN. That is all.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Schlesinger, I think I may be in disagreement with you on your views expressed earlier that on-site inspection, while desirable, is not necessary in the context of the two treaties the President is forwarding. I sent for the letter of communication from the President to the Senate, and I would like to go through several parts with you. The President states, "Unfortunately, as I have frequently stated and the enclosed study makes clear, the TTBT and PNET are not effectively verifiable in their present form." That is a basic assumption that he makes.

I ask if you concur or not in that.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. That, as I indicated, we can monitor within a range, Senator. Could the Soviets test what we detect as 143 kiloton weapon, which actually might be a 160 kiloton weapon? Absolutely. They might go over the ceiling. Is that 17 kiloton yield difference militarily significant? I doubt it. But if the point is that we cannot be assured that they will not go over the limit under the 150 kiloton quota, the answer is yes.

Senator **Warner**. The President goes on further and he cites that it is his judgment that the effective verification through direct on-site monitoring with the Cortex system is the appropriate remedy here. However, in his specific message he states that if there is a better or an alternative which is feasible then in essence he would consider it. It seems to me that he has put forth a very reasonable approach to this, and I am wondering in view of that if you wanted to sort of revise that statement any further.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Well, Senator, I think that I agree with him.

Senator **Warner**. He states that "We have not yet found any alternative approach which equals the effectiveness of Cortex." He continues, "The United States is willing to consider any other direct yield measurement method the Soviets might propose provided it is at least capable in terms of accuracy and nonintrusiveness as Cortex. To date they have not been forthcoming in that request."

And then further he states—I think I have given the thrust of what he is trying to achieve.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Senator, you used the word "reasonable" to characterize the President's position, and I fully concur that it is a reasonable position. I indicated that on-site inspection might be desirable for this purpose as well as for other purposes. I indicated in my remarks, I think I used the word "it is not indispensable."

Senator **Warner**. My recollection is, it is desirable but not necessary.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I think I used the word "indispensable" thereafter. We should understand that our ability to monitor is substantial but limited and that if the Soviets decide to test a two megaton weapon we will know for sure that they are over the limit. When they get down into the range of the limit, 175 KT or possibly even 200 KT, can we identify it and prove it? The answer is no.

So if the question that you are directing toward me is whether or not we can verify with certainty these ranges, I concur with the implication of your comment. If the question is whether a treaty roughly enforced——

Senator **Warner**. Let me——

Dr. **Schlesinger** [continuing]. In which the Soviets cannot substantially deviate and cheating would not have significant military consequences and would a Congress be reasonable to accept that if it is suggested by the President that two is reasonable?

Senator **Warner**. What I suggest we do is to ask that the chairman make available to you the transcript today as quickly as possible. Then you would have the opportunity to go through the same document I have, namely, the President's letter of transmittal, and you may wish to supplement, revise, or otherwise modify the record, because I think your statement is a very important one, and your wisdom is relied on by the Senate as we begin to proceed.

Second quick question. Yesterday our witness, Dr. Brzezinski, advocated the withdrawal of 100,000 U.S. troops from Europe in the NATO structure. You suggest today that you have some views on that. Would you like to comment specifically?

Chairman **Nunn**. Let me just add just for clarification that I believe he said it ought to be done in close consultation with the allies, done with the consultation preceding any withdrawal very prudently and very carefully over a period of time. It was not an immediate type situation. And he also said those forces needed to be made available in a more flexible mode for the Persian Gulf contingency, that that was the larger problem. I think it was in that context.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. The conventional deterrent in Europe needs strengthening. American reduction in force for psychological as much as for military reasons would weaken the deterrent. I would be most reluctant to see that take place if it is done in consultation with the alliance I think the likelihood of that happening is much reduced.

I do not think the Europeans are prepared to see that happen. I am willing to explore discussions of American troop levels as a way of engendering appropriate European response to the whole question of their building of their own forces, but that requires great delicacy and the incentive one holds out at the outset to the Europeans that if you succeed in this manner that we will withdraw 100,000 people is not likely to induce the kind of psychological state that we want on their part. So I would be very reluctant to do so.

In the course of recent years there has been some growth of disenchantment in the United States, some regrowth of disenchantment with NATO. I think it is a mistake, on balance, for us to be disenchanted with that organization.

Senator **Warner**. I thank you, Doctor.

Chairman **Nunn**. Dr. Schlesinger, thank you very much. One of the limitations on having you as a witness is that you are, as has already been observed, an expert in so many areas, we have a hard time confining ourselves to the subject, but that is inherent in your intellectual capacity, and we cannot alter that, I suppose.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for referring so politely to the evasive actions I have taken.

Chairman **Nunn**. We are grateful to you. We know you are busy and have a lot of other things to do, and your testimony has been extremely helpful, so we thank you.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

USE OF OPERATIONAL GAMING AND SIMULATION TO ASSIST STRATEGYMAKING

The committee met in executive session, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m. in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Wilson, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, assistant chief clerk; Robert E. Bayer, Robert G. Bell, Richard D. Finn, Jr., John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Gordon G. Riggle, Mark B. Robinson, and Patricia L. Watson, professional staff members; Colleen Getz and Russell C. Miller, research assistants; Karen A. Love and Richelle M. Turner, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gordon Kerr, assistant to Senator Levin; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Edward M. McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; and Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order. We do not have microphones on because this is a closed hearing. Let the record show that we are in closed hearing at this time, and I will ask the staff to assure that everyone here is entitled to be here.

Mr. PUNARO. We can vouch, sir, for all those associated with the committee. The Department of Defense will vouch for all those in the Department of Defense.

Chairman NUNN. Who can vouch for the Department of Defense?

Mr. PUNARO. We have done that. George, is everyone OK?

Colonel JACUNSKI. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. This afternoon we hold the fifth hearing in a series on military strategy. This hearing will focus on operational war gaming. Over the years, the various schools and agencies in the Department of Defense have developed sophisticated war gaming and simulation procedures.

These games were initially developed as educational devices for military officers. Increasingly, war games are being used not only to educate participants, but to test our strategy, our operational concepts, and even new potential weapon systems. War gaming and simulations have become critical methods to help military planners develop and evaluate military strategy.

We are delighted to have our witnesses here today. In the order in which they will be testifying, our witnesses this afternoon are: Capt. Joseph Hurlburt, Director of the War Gaming Department, Naval War College. Captain Hurlburt, would you hold up your hand. Identify yourself as we go along here so everyone will know from whom we are going to be hearing.

You can correct my pronunciation as necessary.

The next witness will be Col. Edward C. Kielkopf, who is the Director of the Center for Land Warfare at the Army War College. Is that a close enough approximation?

Colonel KIELKOPF. Right on target, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Next, Col. C.A. Pappas, Director of the Air Force Wargaming Center at the Air University.

Col. James M. Sims, who is Chief of the Political-Military Simulation and Analysis Division of the Joint Chiefs.

Colonel SIMS. Correct, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Glad to have you.

Mr. Orville E. Hay, Director of the Global Wargame and Advanced Concepts Department at the Naval War College. We are delighted to have you, Mr. Hay.

On behalf of the committee, I welcome each of you here this afternoon. You are appearing in the same capacity as your colleagues from the war colleges did yesterday, as experts in this area, but not as representatives of your individual services or your institutions. We are looking for your personal views here this afternoon.

We will be asking you your personal views, and I talked with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs about that and he understands it very well and he certainly will protect any of you in giving your personal views. We are not looking for the service views or the institution views. We are looking for you as experts to tell us what is on your mind, not only in the presentation but also in the questions.

I understand that Captain Hurlburt will lead off with a general presentation on war gaming. Colonel Kielkopf, Colonel Pappas, and Colonel Sims will then briefly describe their institution's use of war games, and finally Mr. Hay will brief the committee on global war gaming that is being conducted at the Naval War College.

Before our witnesses begin, I would like to sound a note of caution to the committee. War gaming, as I understand it, and I will learn more this afternoon, is a critical intellectual activity at the Department of Defense which must be conducted in an intellectually open environment. If we are to learn from war games, people have to be free to make mistakes.

That is the purpose, to find out what the mistakes are. Mistakes are always made in war games, and again, it is a demonstration of why war itself is mistake-prone. We always have the fog of war, as it is called. That is why we hold war games, so we can learn from those mistakes and avoid them when a real war comes.

So I hope everyone will put this in that context.

The global war game at the Naval War College is perhaps the largest and most comprehensive war game in the free world. You will hear some of the things in this war game that may disturb you. It is very important that you understand this is just one game. People have to be free to make good and bad decisions.

We also have to understand—and I am sure our witnesses will explain this—that one of the critical parts of any war game is the assumptions made. If you change the assumptions and change the rules, you change the game itself.

So we will hear now from our witnesses, unless there is any other Senator that would like to make a comment. John McCain, you may want to say something, because I am sure you have been through this yourself. Do you have any comments for us this afternoon?

Senator McCain. No, I don't, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for having this hearing, and I think it is important that we get this information and I think it is an important part of this very valuable series of hearings which you are holding.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman Nunn. The prepared statement of Senator Dixon will be inserted for the hearing record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Dixon

Mr. Chairman, this afternoon is our fifth hearing on military strategy.

I look forward to hearing from the War College panel which will provide our committee with an introduction to operational gaming and simulation with a special emphasis on its use to refine U.S. military strategy. I also understand that today's witnesses will also summarize the gaming and simulation work of their institutions and present the results of a recent war game.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. We are ready for our leading witness.

STATEMENT OF CAPT. JOSEPH S. HURLBURT, USN, DIRECTOR, WAR GAMING DEPARTMENT, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Captain Hurlburt. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee:

It is a distinct pleasure to be here with you this afternoon to discuss war gaming. I have been associated with gaming as a professional technique since 1969 and have found it one of several useful approaches to examining national security issues.

My intent this afternoon is to sketch briefly the history of war gaming and its uses, then describe the various techniques of gaming, and finally discuss current use of gaming at the Naval War College.

So-called "capture" games with military characteristics, such as chess, and the pit and pebble games of Africa and Asia date back several thousand years. The early players, like their modern counterparts, typically played them for intellectual stimulation and recreation, rather than to explore issues.

The war game as we know it today really dates back only to the 18th century, when the Prussians began to consider war as a science. They developed games commonly knows as kriegspiel, which employed charts and representations of forces aggregations to explore the outcome of military engagements.

German interest in war gaming continued on into the earliest 20th century, when Germany began to use it as a heuristic device to assist in solving military problems. For example, in World War I the spring offensive of 1918 was tested and rehearsed by means of strategic war games. The games revealed, by the way, that there was very little chance of this offensive producing decisive results.

Prior to and during World War II, the plans for rapid armor movement into France and the invasion of Russia were examined extensively through war gaming. During lulls in the fighting, games based on the actual situations were conducted to explore the effectiveness or alternative courses of action and to rehearse impending or probable events.

Chairman NUNN. Excuse me. Are you saying that before World War I the Germans played war games? Is that what you mentioned?

Captain HURLBURT. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Did they turn out to be anywhere near correct as to what happened?

Captain HURLBURT. In the case of the spring offensive, yes, in 1918. More accurately, prior to World War II, yes, sir, the games showed that they would be successful in their drives against France and into Russia. And indeed, they were quite effective.

Chairman NUNN. So the German war games leading up to World War I were reasonably accurate?

Captain HURLBURT. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. And also World War II?

Captain HURLBURT. Yes, sir, which I think explains the durability of war gaming. There have been successes in the past.

The Japanese also picked up on the Prussian writings, translations thereof, and they attributed much of their success in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 to war games. They also extensively gamed the attack on Pearl Harbor, as well as their sequential campaigns in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia.

In the United States, gaming was introduced about 1886 by the Army. A year later it began at the Naval War College, this being our centennial year, in Newport. There it has been used as an investigative and training technique, and it has alternately waxed and waned in importance over the years, with the highest previous record of interest in war gaming during the period between World Wars I and II.

During that time, War College students spent a majority of their time planning for and conducting games, so much so that at the end of the war Admiral Nimitz would write that the war against Japan had been fought so many times and by so many people in the halls of the Naval War College that nothing in that campaign came as a surprise except the kamikaze attacks. Those had not been envisioned.

On a less grand scale, these games also assisted in the development of the underway replenishment groups, the circular carrier formations, the forward submarine campaign, and the amphibious operations that proved so successful during the war.

Post-World War II gaming at Newport looked very heavily at logistics, while elsewhere gaming contributed to the development of nuclear strategy. By 1955 even the business community had adopted its own version of a war game.

At about that same time, the advent of digital computers made high speed simulation possible, and a blend of gaming and computer simulation began to emerge. Gradually, this evolved into the large scale computer-assisted games in use today.

I should point out that the role of the computer is to make gaming more efficient, therefore allowing you potentially to look at more variables. It does not, however, add its own dimension to the game. It is the human dimension that remains the important part of gaming.

I would now like to address gaming techniques. Some of this may seem a little bit dry, but I think it is important for you to understand the sophistication with which we go to put games together.

A game consists of six fundamental elements: players who make decisions and interact; umpires who implement the decisions, control the flow of the game, assess interactions and provide feedback to the players; an arena or stage upon which the game is played—and this can be as simple as a chart on a table or as complex as a major computer installation; a scenario that sets that stage; a set of procedures, sometimes referred to as rules or models; and data on which the players act within the rules.

The size and sophistication of these elements varies with each game. The most important, of course, is the player element, because games revolve around the interplay of human decisions and the game events. Thus, the game must be structured to help the players make those decisions and learn about their effects.

To accomplish this, a number of game styles and techniques are used. The first of these I will call level of play. Generally speaking, there are three levels of play: global or strategic, where the primary decisionmakers represent opposing national command authorities and their major subordinate military commanders. The objectives are to broaden the perspective of the participants, test strategies, and identify important issues at the global level.

Theater or operational art level games seek to identify strategic, operational, and tactical problems peculiar to a given theater. The primary decisionmaking level here is the unified or specified commander in the region.

In the local or tactical game, the primary decisionmaking level is at the battle group commander or his ground and air commander equivalent or below. These games are frequently used to compare various forces and tactics, with sharp focus on tactical employment, weapon and sensor performance, and interrelationships among various warfare areas.

The ideas generated in these games often are easily developed into concepts that can be further tested and refined in at-sea or field exercises.

Another aspect of the game is the number of sides represented. In its simplest form it is one-sided, wherein the control group also plays the opposition. Such a technique might be useful if you wanted to explore several options against a fixed opposition strategy or tactic.

Typically, however, war games are two-sided, because the interaction between the players is important. Increasingly, a third dimension, or the rest of the world, is played as well, and I expect more multi-sided games in the future as a natural reflection of the complexity of the real world.

Games may also be open or closed. In open games, all players have full information, with the exception of the opposition's plans. They are typically played around a single chart, upon which all the forces are arrayed like a chess board, and play centers around discussion of interactions developing as each side unfolds its plan.

This technique is useful if you only have a short time to explore an issue. Such games require players that are both of good will and expert in their field.

Closed games—and I might add, draw poker is an example of a closed game—restrict the amount of information available to the players as a function of the information gathering and distributing systems they are playing, thereby introducing the fog of war and raising player uncertainty. This technique is most common because decisionmaking is an important element in most games.

Finally, war games may be characterized as seminar or operational. Seminar games tend to be highly aggregated and cover long periods of game time, while operational games tend to be detailed and cover shorter periods of game time. The seminar game has the unique ability of allowing a full discussion of issues among the players during the course of the game, while operational games usually await some post-game analysis.

These various gaming styles and techniques are woven together for a given game based upon the players' objectives which drive game design and game play. So each game is unique, although a series of games can be mutually supporting.

At the Naval War College various techniques are used to support a schedule of about 50 games a year. Most of these run for 1 week, but can be as short as 1 day or as long as 3 weeks, as is the case with our global game, about which we will be hearing more later.

They are being used to study a wide range of issues from space to ASW, from unconventional warfare to global war, from advanced technology to political-military relationships, from drug interdiction to command, control, and communications.

Gaming participants range from junior officers to members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and civilian equivalents in the executive departments, members and former members of Congress, and often include representatives from many of the nations of the free world. This week, for instance, over 300 officers from the NATO nations are conducting a major game in Newport under the auspices of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

In many ways the war gaming department at the Naval War College is a research laboratory supporting the War College curriculum, the Chief of Naval Operations, the fleet commanders, and their staffs. The gaming effort is divided nearly evenly among these groups.

And this makes us somewhat unique among the war colleges, in that we put so much support to the operating forces as contrasted with purely educational games. In our curriculum support we conduct about a dozen games a year for the resident courses, plus an additional four games in conjunction with our sister service colleges, the naval war colleges of South America and the German Naval War College.

The remainder of our 50 games go to support the fleet commanders in chief and a number of their subordinate commanders, as well as the Coast Guard, and include a number of bilateral games with friendly or allied nations. I should point out here that all of our games reflect the inherently joint nature of modern warfare. Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy play is included in all games, and at least half the games include similar full time Army participation.

In closing, I would like to assert an important note of caution to underscore what you have said previously, Mr. Chairman. People have both used and abused the discipline of gaming. When I hear the phrase "we proved in a war game that," I wince, because war games do not prove things. They are not reality and they cannot be duplicated, as can laboratory tests.

On an individual basis, they serve to educate, provide insight, and generate issues for further work. They are best used to investigate processes. They can help commanders and staffs practice decisionmaking under conditions that are difficult or impossible to reproduce in peacetime—massed battle group operations, high intensity air attacks, or full scale mobilization, for example.

War games impose a strict discipline that forces participants to organize separate bits of technical facts into operationally coherent packages and help them explore the feasibility and implications of plans, concepts, or new technologies.

War gaming also provides a forum for communicating ideas in vivid and memorable ways. Groups of games exploring the same or similar issues or set in the same theater begin to give you trends or inferences that are useful and enable players to understand the sequence of actions that lead to success, and over time they provide confidence and strategy development through exploration of options for both sides.

Admiral Nimitz's quote to which I earlier referred is a perfect example of that. He was not saying that they knew how the war would come out, but over 20 years they had looked at all the options and had come to understand that only a complete defeat of Japan could end the war, and that would take about 5 years with many violent battles along the way.

Only the introduction of the atomic bomb shortened that period, I might add. Some of the battles actually fought had been considered unlikely during the gaming process, but when they did develop in the real world their importance was understood.

Even then, Admiral Nimitz admitted the kamikaze came as a surprise. The Japanese suffered an even worse surprise by letting war games establish a mind set. For example, in their gaming of the battle of Midway prior to the actual operation, their carrier force was attacked while the air wings were away attacking Midway.

The American attack on the carriers resulted in two of them being sunk and another seriously damaged. This was a major setback to their operations, but their game solution was arbitrarily to restore the ships to action since the outcome was considered highly unlikely.

As you know, in the actual event they lost all of their carriers and the battle through the confluence of several different, but still unlikely, events. So we must be careful in assessing both the good news and the bad news coming from war gaming.

Sir, that concludes my briefing and I would be pleased to respond to questions or, if no questions, Colonel Kielkopf will give his testimony.

Chairman NUNN. What I would like to do is run through our witnesses here and then come back before we begin the war game. We can then have questions that may arise from any of the members before we start. We may not have any questions, because I think we want to get along with it.

I understand in the order of appearance our next witness will be Col. Edward Kielkopf, who is Director of Center for Land Warfare of the Army War College.

STATEMENT OF COL. EDWARD C. KIELKOPF, USA, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR LAND WARFARE, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Colonel KIELKOPF. Sir, we are deeply involved in the development and conduct of war games for instructional use at the Army War College. The models and games which we have developed are available and used throughout the Army. Our focus is on supporting the objectives of the various courses of the curriculum. This is accomplished through decisionmaking simulations, map exercises, and planning exercises, all of which may or may not be computer-assisted, depending upon the learning objectives desired. We also sponsor student research on force mix analyses, knowledge-based planning models, and a joint land, aerospace and sea simulation with the other senior service colleges.

In support of an early course in the resident academic year entitled "Joint Forces, Doctrine, Strategic and Operational Planning," our students participate in a decisionmaking simulation which involves a terrorist incident on and off an installation in the continental United States. A computer-assisted theater level overseas deployment planning exercise is also conducted during this course. This is particularly supportive of our emphasis on jointness in the preparation for and conduct of war. The course culminates with a computer-assisted two-sided field Army level map exercise that causes the students to apply the principles of the Army Air Land Battle doctrine in planning major joint operations to achieve operational objectives.

In a subsequent course which emphasizes military operations in various theaters and the coalition aspects of warfare, there are decisionmaking exercises at both the low intensity level of conflict and the high intensity level. These exercises are accomplished on the basis of a given strategy, rather than in a development and comparison of alternative strategies. During the final omnibus course at the Army War College, a computer assisted exercise is used to illustrate the problems of resourcing a global military strategy and a political military simulation is used to illustrate the issues involved in implementing such a strategy.

Over the past several years, the Army War College has conducted week-long conferences for general officers which have included decision-oriented theater level planning exercises. In 1986 these became joint general officer courses with flag officers of other services participating. Operating under guidance provided jointly by the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, the Air University and the Army War College jointly present, and alternatively host, a course for general officers focused on joint war-fighting. These courses will be conducted three to four times a year. The supporting exercises are computer assisted and further our emphasis on planning and executing joint operations.

The use of war games at the Army War College enables us to provide our senior level students some practical experience and insights into high level decisionmaking on the employment of joint forces in a complex environment with an attendant high degree of uncertainty. We expand the understanding that to achieve strategic goals such goals must be clearly understood and that senior leaders and planners must think jointness and maintain a focus well beyond the current operations.

An appreciation is gained, too, of the time sensitivity of intelligence information, as well as the time required to translate decisions into execution and outcomes. A perspective is also provided on Soviet Army operations at the higher field levels. Finally, the perspective on current U.S. doctrinal concepts as they apply in major operations is expanded.

Sir, this completes my testimony. I am prepared for any questions.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much,.

Our next witness is Col. C.A. Pappas, USAF, Director, Air Force Wargaming Center, Air University.

STATEMENT OF COL. CONSTANTINE A. PAPPAS, USAF, DIRECTOR, AIR FORCE WARGAMING CENTER, CENTERS FOR AEROSPACE DOCTRINE, RESEARCH, AND EDUCATION, AIR UNIVERSITY

Colonel PAPPAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I deeply appreciate this opportunity to testify before the committee. At the onset, I would like to explain who the Air University is and how it fits in with the Air War College. The Air University is comprised of many major organizations, among which are the Air War College for colonels, the Air Command and Staff College for majors, and a course that we call the Squadron Officer School for captains.

What I say with regard to supporting the curricula of these professional military schools will apply to all. The Wargaming Center, by the way, supports all of those schools.

Before I begin describing wargaming at Air University, I would also like to point out that some of the terminology in wargaming is not consistent and rigorous as one would expect. We do use mathematical models, and we do use the disciplines of operations research. But even in those fields, the terminology is not consistent and not rigorous.

When we in the Air Force speak of operational wargames, we mean wargames which exercise operational commanders or staffs, as opposed to students in a curriculum. We call the latter an educational wargame. So this conflicts a bit with the Navy definition as they differentiate between seminar games and operational games.

We have been wargaming at the Air University since 1961. Our first wargame was a manual, controller directed, strategic nuclear wargame called Big Stick, as in, "speak softly and carry." It was classified, and it supported a course we called the Weapons Employment Planning Course. That exercise was later incorporated into the curriculum of our Air Command and Staff College.

In 1974, we developed our first computer-assisted wargame. The exercise called Fast Stick is a tactical exercise that meets the definitions that Captain Hurlburt used to differentiate among tactical, operational, and strategic wargames. In 1977, we had our first theater war exercise for the Air War College. All of these exercises run today.

In summary, I would like to say this: that we run more than 30 exercises per year to support those three schools and other courses taught at Air University. In addition, we use political-military games which are manually controlled, and we add such exercises as rapid deployment exercises for the Air War College and force structuring exercises which mirror the PPBS process.

Finally, in closing, may I say that we have more than 25 years of experience in educational war gaming and are entering the field of operational wargaming with a new development, a 7 year development at Maxwell Air Force Base to develop a system similar to what the Navy has now for operational gaming.

We are now in the fifth year of that 7 year development. We are seeking to increase our support to the operational Air Force with operational war games and will do so when the new system reaches full capability.

As a last comment, I would reiterate what my colleagues said. We do have some joint games that are of interest: The general officers course which Colonel Kielkopf mentioned is jointly supported by our two wargaming centers. We work with the Navy and the Army and the National Defense University on a joint game for senior officers.

We have a similar game for majors, and field grade officers. And finally, we do support the global war game at Newport that you will hear more about later.

Thank you for the opportunity to present these remarks.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Pappas follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF COL. CONSTANTINE A. PAPPAS, USAF, DIRECTOR, AIR FORCE WARGAMING CENTER, CENTER FOR AEROSPACE DOCTRINE, RESEARCH AND EDUCATION (CADRE), AIR UNIVERSITY

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the committee on the subject of wargaming. Captain Jay Hurlburt from the War Gaming Department at the Naval War College presented an excellent overview of the past and present uses of wargaming and has provided some definitions necessary to understand wargaming and how wargames may relate to strategy making. I will focus on wargaming at Air University.

Before summarizing our work on gaming and simulation, it is important to note that many of the terms now used by the wargaming community are not universally accepted definitions as are those found in traditional mathematical disciplines. Definitions of entities, processes, and descriptors vary even in the text books used by civilian universities to teach the techniques of mathematical modeling and simulation—the tools of computer-assisted wargaming. And in the military, our Navy colleagues have traditionally called the opposing force the Orange Side while Air Force gamers refer to them as the Red Side. Even the word wargaming is spelled as a single word or as two words in the various publications. The Military Operations Research Society (MORS) is now working on a project sponsored by the OJCS to develop a taxonomy for wargames and a standard set of definitions for the military wargaming community. The final report may be of value to this committee.

The term, "Operational Wargame," should be clearly defined to preclude misunderstandings. At the Air University (AU) we differentiate between "Educational Wargames" and "Operational Wargames." While both types are designed to teach participants and improve their understanding of selected facets of warfare, educational wargames are designed to complement a military curriculum comprised of lectures, seminar discussions, and assigned readings. The students are given the opportunity to apply in a realistic environment, the knowledge gained in the course and thus learn more about warfare than traditional methods alone can provide. On the other hand, operational wargames are designed to exercise players assigned to operational commands or to jobs closely associated with planning for, or conducting warfare. The purpose of operational wargames may be to teach or to evaluate or simply to exercise a staff. In any case, both educational and operational wargames improve the player's knowledge of warfare in general and of the area of interest in particular—experience in warfighting without a war.

Educational Wargaming at AU began in 1961 as a part of the curriculum of a course called the Weapons Employment Planning Course. A strategic nuclear wargame called BIG STICK (as in speak softly and carry) using forces and targets similar to those in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) allowed students to learn while applying knowledge gained in the course. In 1964 BIG STICK was included in the Air Command and Staff College. Refined versions of that exercise have been a part of the curriculum since then.

Computer-assisted wargaming at AU also began at Air Command and Staff College. In 1974 a manual, controller-directed, tactical exercise called FAST STICK was programmed to run on time-sharing computers. The purpose of the FAST STICK exercise—as is the purpose of the majority of existing AU wargames—is to help students learn more about planning for and conducting combat operations. Again, students gain experience in selected aspects of warfighting without a war.

The first theater-level wargame, a NATO Central Region game called TWX, was developed for the Air War College in 1977. Students play roles of the major commanders and their staffs to plan for and conduct a conventional war to defend Western Europe against a combined Warsaw Pact attack. As with BIG STICK and FAST STICK at Air Command and Staff College, TWX supports a broader curriculum of study at the Air War College.

A political military game and a rapid deployment planning exercise as well as a national security study with a force posturing exercise are also a part of the Air War College curriculum. These exercises and wargames in conjunction with the lectures, seminar discussions, assigned readings, and independent research better prepare Air War College students to analyze existing strategy and to formulate new strategy. However, the exercise themselves do not analyze real-world strategy per se. They do provide great insight and sharpen the strategic thinking tools of the participants.

In 1982, the Air Force approved a seven-year program (beginning in FY83) to develop a wargaming capability for the Air Force similar to that of the Navy at the Naval War College. An executive summary of that program and a summary of new wargames are attached. Phase I is scheduled to be completed in 1987. Phase II is well under way with the JLASS exercises briefed by Colonel Ed Kielkopf of the Army War College.

Phase III is to provide the capability for Operational Wargaming using real-world data and a wide variety of real-world scenarios. When our system matures in 1989, we will be better able to assist in the study of real-world strategy by simulating our plans (and excursions from those plans) against varying alternative enemy courses of action.

The Air Force Wargaming Center achieved limited operational capability in January 1986 when we hosted the first of three Senior Officer Combat Employment Courses for general officers. The course included two wargames: A Central Region game similar to the Air War College TXW game, and a Joint Task Force Exercise in which teams of three or four general officers develop a consensus campaign strategy to support a Joint Task Force Commander. In both exercises, teams compare and contrast decisions and the rationale for these decisions. The purpose of these exercises is to stimulate thought and discussion, not to develop or critique a particular plan or strategy. The course has been combined with a similar course taught by the Army War College and will be offered as the Joint General/Flag Officer Warfighting Course beginning in March 1987.

While AU has more than 25 years of experience in educational wargaming, we are new to operational wargaming. We are maturing rapidly and when the Wargaming Center reaches full capability, AU will increase the scope and number of operational wargames.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity and consider it an honor to have been selected to testify before your committee.

COMMAND READINESS EXERCISE SYSTEM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background.—In 1982, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/FM) established a formal Program Management Office (PMO) at Air University to acquire a comprehensive wargaming capability—the Command Readiness Exercise System (CRES). The system consists of a special-purpose facility, computers, simulation software, a communications subsystem, and a staff of wargamers and controllers. Using either notional or real-world data, CRES will be capable of supporting simulated warfare using a multitude of scenarios, force structures, and levels of intensity—worldwide.

Acquisition.—Acquire in three incremental phases:

Phase I consists of the facility, hardware, software, and staff necessary to provide realistic wargaming in direct support of the curriculum to Air War College, Air Command and Staff College, and Squadron Officer School.

Phase II adds the hardware, software, and communications needed to link CRES to senior service schools' wargaming centers to provide a joint wargaming capability.

Phase III adds the hardware, software, communications, and staff necessary to support operational wargaming to improve readiness by exercising real-world commands, testing real-world operational plans, and examining the effects of changes in strategy, doctrine, and force structures.

Operation.—As each phase of CRES becomes operational, the systems will be transitioned from the PMO to the Air Force Wargaming Center (AFWC), a major element of the AU Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (AU CADRE). The AFWC staff will work with exercise sponsors to define individual applications and will design and run all exercises.

Payoff.—CRES will add a significant new capability to professional military education and to the Air Force. PME students will be able to apply newly acquired knowledge of air warfare concepts and doctrine in realistic simulations of wartime procedures. When Phase II is operational, students at all senior service schools will be able to engage in true joint exercises. When Phase III of the system is completely operational, combat commanders will be able to exercise their key staff and subordinate commanders or test their real-world ops plans. CRES will help develop a broad base of warfighting knowledge throughout the Air Force.

THE WARGAMES

The wargaming exercises used at the Air University support broad, general concepts to meet specific learning objectives. Phase I exercises may be used to support research, such as evaluating specific strategies or tactics. General causal relationships are easily determined and reflect the current doctrine involving the use of air forces.

The purpose of a *Theater Wargame* exercise is to teach the principles of effective decision-making with respect to managing tactical air forces in planning and implementing an air campaign in a theater war situation. As with all CRES wargames, the simulation software is database driven and allows game sponsors to select a wide variety of scenarios anywhere in the world. Command and control nodes include an Air Component Commander and key staff, intelligence, logistics and operations planning advisors, and Army liaison functions. ATAF staffs are included in NATO scenarios.

In a *Subtheater Warfare Exercise,* players apply current planning and employment concepts of tactical air forces (TAF) in simulated combined-arms warfare. Subtheater exercises are played at TACC or ATOC level and below. Players employ

TAF assets according to the air strategy given by the theater-level Air Component Commander. The players act as TACC current planners to prepare detailed air tasking orders (ATOs) which then are "executed" by simulation software. Players also assume roles of a TACC current operations staff to modify ATOs as necessary during the employment phase of exercises.

The purpose of a *Force and Deployment Planning* exercise is to teach players the decision process and sequence of events necessary to respond to crisis situations using existing OPlans, Conplans, or beginning from a no-plan posture. Players analyze the situation, develop a commander's estimate, concept of operations, select the force needed, and plan for deploying that force to the region of crisis. Force and deployment exercises are played at various command levels. These command levels may include all command nodes from the Joint Chiefs of Staff down through an Air Component Commander's staff. Players review the same type of computer-generated products as those provided by the real-world Joint Operation Planning System/Joint Deployment System. The output from this exercise can be linked to the theater and subtheater exercises.

The objective of a *Strategic Nuclear Exercise* is to teach players the thought process and sequence of events necessary in the nuclear planning and employment process. A simulated confrontation between nuclear powers is gamed in an environment of stress and uncertainty. Players gain an appreciation for the military complexities of planning for and executing strategic nuclear operations, and the role played by senior or intermediate-level staff officers when implementing national nuclear strategy. Strategic nuclear exercises include: (1) formulations of defense strategy, (2) force structuring, (3) weapon/target assignments, (4) employment of nuclear forces, (5) strike assessment, (6) reconstitution and restrike, and (7) negotiations between the powers.

The *Tactical Employment Exercises* acquaint players with the concepts and tasks required to employ conventional military power organized as a joint task force. During the exercise players must analyze the threat, assess U.S. capability, select a force from available resources, develop a plan of action, employ forces to meet objectives, and manage resources to sustain the force. These exercises involve two or three squadrons of aircraft and are designed for company grade officers.

The *Logistics Planning Exercises* are simulations involving the logistics planning for the overseas deployment of a tactical fighter wing in support of a NATO-type agreement. It is designed as a planning and a management game to emphasize sound decision-making practices: Analysis of data, planning, communications, and the decisions themselves.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Colonel.

Our next witness is Col. James Sims, U.S. Marine Corps, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Colonel Sims.

STATEMENT OF COL. JAMES M. SIMS, USMC, CHIEF, POLITICO-MILITARY SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS DIVISION, ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Colonel SIMS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:

The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducts analysis, evaluations, and net assessments of military forces, programs, and strategies. These analyses address the conventional, strategic, and politico-military dimensions of national security issues.

Wargaming is one of the analysis tools that is used to perform these analyses of military strategies, force structures, and postures.

OJCS WARGAMING

—Effectiveness of SIOP.
—Support of arms negotiations.
—Conventional warfighting.
—Force capabilities and requirements.
—U.S. national security policy.

Wargaming is employed by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess the effectiveness of the SIOP under various scenarios, to provide strategic planners with insights for future modifications of targeting, timing, and weapon systems applications, to assess the effectiveness of weapons and force mix alternatives in support of arms control negotiations, to assess the worldwide warfighting capability of conventional forces of the United States, its allies, and those of potential adversaries, to assess the joint force capabilities and requirements, including assessments of current programmed and planned forces, and to examine U.S. national security policy, international security affairs, and military strategy.

These wargaming results serve as an important element in developing the military advice provided by the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.

Wargaming analysis of conventional and nuclear warfighting is conducted by the OJCS in the same manner as described by my colleagues on the panel, by military analysts assisted by computer models.

At this point, I wish to reiterate a point made earlier by Captain Hurlburt: While wargaming is an important and viable tool in conducting analysis, we feel that it has its limitations and cannot be substituted for solid military judgment and experience.

OJCS POLITICO-MILITARY GAMING

—Identify national security issues, problems and opportunities.
—Develop strategies and national security policies.
—Develop contingency plans.

Politico-military gaming, for which my division is responsible and which is closely associated with the purpose of these hearings, is conducted to identify national security issues, problems, and opportunities, to develop new or innovative strategies or national security policies, and to aid in the development of contingency plans.

OJCS POLITICO-MILITARY GAMING

—Interaction of political, military, economic, other factors.
—Free play.
—Regional or topical issues.
—Interagency participation.
—Credibility.

Politico-military gaming provides a simulation of crisis situations involving the interaction of political, military, economic, and other relative factors. Politico-military games emphasize the importance of the interplay between political decisions and military capabilities, the relationship of military assets and political objectives that Dr. Wood and Dr. Foster have described yesterday.

The scenario for a politico-military game describes a plausible future crisis or strategy problem that is presented for analysis and resolution. Participants discuss national interests and objectives and develop strategies and courses of action to deal with the crisis.

Politico-military games are free-play, not scripted exercises. With the exception of the crisis scenario and recommended issues for discussion, the direction and the conclusions of the game are determined by the players. Politico-military games are not war games in the sense I noted earlier or that was noted in the statements of my colleagues; the primary emphasis is not on the movement of military forces or on command and control. The emphasis of the politico-military game is on the whole structure of political actions, rather than just military measures.

OJCS politico-military games address either regional or topical issues. Regional games over the years have emphasized potential crises and U.S. security interests in NATO, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Topical games have focused on such diverse subjects as terrorism, arms control negotiations, security assistance, and the strategic defense initiative.

The credibility of politico-military gaming we feel depends on two main factors: first, the expertise and the experience of the participants and the plausibility of the scenario and the crisis that they must confront. Further, our experience has shown that the representation of three areas is critical to the success of politico-military gaming:

First, the policies, actions, and reactions of the Soviets and Soviet surrogates;

Second, the actions and reactions of our allies and the nonaligned nations;

And third, the likely U.S. public and legislative reactions to unfolding events.

A realistic portrayal of these various elements is built into the game by carefully balancing the expertise of participants who are invited from throughout the government community, industry, and academia.

Since 1962, when politico-military gaming began in the Department of Defense, a unique charter of my division is that our games must be inter-agency. As a result, we always have participants from the State Department, CIA, the NSC staff, as well as the Services and DOD and other appropriate agencies as the topic may require.

One of the major gaming activities of the OJCS is the annual JCS and CINCs Conference War Game, which is conducted over a three-day period during a conference attended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified commands. The emphasis is on deterrence through the use of military forces in reponse to political and military crises.

JCS & CINCS' CONFERENCE WAR GAME PROCESS



JB 07-700 pg2. disk 112

In very broad terms, this viewgraph describes the process of the game. The JCS and the CINCs themselves, not a deputy or a substitute, respond to a global crisis that is of such magnitude that armed conflict will likely result if the crisis is not defused.

The Chiefs develop courses of action which are considered by a distinguished individual who plays the role of the President. His decision on U.S. actions is then considered by a control team to decide the likely response of the Soviets, the other nations of the world, and the U.S. public and the Congress.

The control team comprises distinguished individuals from within and outside government who are recognized experts in the areas they represent.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs this past year extended an invitation to the chairman of this committee and of the House Armed Services Committee to participate in the game. However, schedule conflicts, particularly involving the election, did not allow it. We have been fortunate, however, to have the participation of former Congressman Jack Edwards and Senator Richard Stone.

Chairman NUNN. I guess the result of that war game was that you cannot afford to have wars during an election.

Colonel SIMS. Nor on Sunday morning, sir.

The principal issue of concern to the JCS and the CINCs throughout the game is the use of military forces to respond to a crisis. They deal with the increased readiness and the deployment of forces and like actions which would demonstrate resolve.

They also must consider that an intended deterrent action by one side may well be seen as provocative by the other.

In summary, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducts extensive wargaming on a continuing basis. The wargaming results serve as an important element in developing the military advice provided by the chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.

Thank you, sir, for the opportunity to present my remarks.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Colonel Sims.

At this point, does it make sense to see if there are any questions or are you going to go, Mr. Hay, directly to the war game, or do you have some preceding remarks?

Mr. HAY. However you prefer.

Chairman NUNN. Do you have remarks of introduction?

Mr. HAY. I have about 20 minutes of remarks that would flow into a conversation.

Chairman NUNN. Why do you not go ahead with that. Does anyone have a question in particular now?

[No response.]

Go ahead with your introduction.

STATEMENT OF O.E. HAY, DIRECTOR, GLOBAL WARGAME AND ADVANCED CONCEPTS, CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Mr. HAY. My department, very much like Jim Sims', uses war games as a research tool as opposed to a training or an educational tool. Still, educational training comes out of it. We are not designed to try to come up with the final answer on any particular subject. We are really trying to work at peeling back the subject to get down to a more definitive set of issues that can be dealt with in more classic analysis and planning.

I would like to quickly go through the background, structure, a bit of the scenario, some of the insights, the key issues of mobilization and technology, and I have quite a bit of backup material. Hopefully I can pick up any issues you want to deal with, sir.

The game as a concept started in 1978 when we realized in the Navy that we did not have the tool to deal with larger strategic concepts. So this game was built in a conceptual world. We built the game world of 1985, and this was back in 1979, for the players to play in.

It was a crude attempt at that time, because we did not know how to play the other services and the other agencies. But our objectives were quite good and they have been followed to this day. Let me run through them very quickly.

We were not just looking to see how the Navy played out in the middle of the ocean. We were very interested in how these concepts were part of joint, combined land and air and maritime campaigns; theater priorities which were bothering us in the Navy at that time; examining the effects of blue strategies on red policy and military decisionmaking; trying to put military policy inside the context of political strategy.

We were interested in that timeframe because a lot of the foreign service people who came to the games were upset because they felt if you went to war it meant that they had failed in their jobs, and we were trying to understand better how political, diplomatic and military arts worked together.

And in the timeframe we're talking about, maybe 9 or 10 years ago, people either thought of conventional or nuclear war. We though of it as a war where the use of nuclear weapons was a shroud that hung over everything you did. So in the free play of this game, players could use nuclear or chemical weapons wherever they chose, and therefore they were always under the specter of nuclear warfare.

And we were looking at technologies, how they help or hinder the strategy that various people tried to project and how that would work out over a period of time.

I might mention that logistics in this timeframe, 9 or 10 years ago, and even to some degree today, were different than operational play, and that is pretty similar to the real world. I can remember as a marine where the Wing operations officer worked a whole set of plans down, came all the way down to the squadrons before he worked it all the way up on the logistics side, before he saw if it was even feasible, because he saw logistics as a support, not as a shaper of strategy.

Over the first 5 year series—and I might say here that I built the package of global games to look somewhat like the games that were done prior to World War II that Captain Hurlburt talked about. The first series keyed was 1985, the second 5 years focused on 1990. These are the shifts in naval thinking that we saw over that period of time, and that were reflected not only in the games but reflected in the planning and the operational aspects that the Navy was working with.

I would like to point out that there are several levels of the game. I want to take just a few minutes to run through some wiring diagrams quickly to demonstrate what I mean.

Chairman NUNN. Could I ask one question about that previous chart. When you say there has been a shift in thinking, over what period of time? I am not quite sure.

Mr. HAY. I am talking from 1979 to 1984. There is another evolution coming out of this series of games, but since I am only into the third game in the series, I would like to point them out as I go through the discussion. I do not have a final list like this.

Chairman NUNN. I think we ought to ask questions on these charts as you go along if anyone has one.

Senator BINGAMAN. I would just like to ask—the shift there, you say the Persian Gulf was considered major in 1979, less so in 1984, is that correct?

Mr. HAY. That is right. A greater concern of Navy thinking in the 1979 early eighties timeframe was on the Persian Gulf. Perhaps that would be a trigger that would get into a larger general war.

Senator BINGAMAN. But by 1984 that was not considered the case?

Mr. HAY. By 1984, the Navy was thinking—the CINCPAC players, for example, were thinking that if the world went to a general war they could handle that theater, at least in the maritime sense, fairly quickly and they would move their emphasis up to the Northwest Pacific. So that is the kind of shift that occurred there.

Senator EXON. Or putting it in another way, what you are saying is that in the intervening time you felt that the forces had been accrued in the Gulf region to where it was not as vulnerable an area as it was previously?

Mr. HAY. I suspect that is certainly an element. Another one is an assessment of the threats, the regional threats, the Red threat and what have you, and how it would play.

I can give you an example of that more specifically on these particular earlier points. In this timeframe, there were many Navy planners and thinkers who thought [deleted]. Indeed, in the first global war game Dr. Fred Ikle was playing the Blue NCA.

[Deleted.]

And then when he wanted to come back in, it was very difficult to do.

But this last year's game—and I am moving out ahead now—Admiral Moreau, who recently died and who was ATSOUTH CINCUSNAVEUR, [deleted]. So he was looking at larger aspects and much more aggressively than 5 years ago.

Senator LEVIN. Are these shifts in the thinking that preceded the game or shifts in thinking that resulted from the game?

Mr. HAY. I think it is a combination of the above, and that goes back to the way we have been trying to array our information. I have a couple of slides here in a few minutes that will show you the study—game—study way that we approach dealing with it.

If I could hold just a moment on that, I will pick that point up.

Senator LEVIN. Let me ask another question. Are the games based on what we have and our wherewithal in the area at the time, or the wherewithal that we are expected to have in the future?

Mr. HAY. What I did in the first 5 year series is look each year at 1985. We would look at the POM submissions and we would look at the bow waves that were occurring in the projections. We would make adjustments and we would play with those amounts of equipment.

What we have done in this series, because the Army and the Air Force are playing with us much stronger in a more joint operation, we just take the POM. The POM adjusts, of course, each year. One of the aspects that we have seen over time is that we have better sustainability now than we did, say, in 1981 as we looked out to 1985 and as we look out toward 1990.

These political-military seminars dealing with the kinds of issues that would really happen as we can conceptualize them in general war are based on combat simulation models and the expert witnesses of the colonels and the lieutenant colonels who work within the game.

This game is so large that there is no one model. We have about 20 or 24 different operations going on at the same time, and I will quickly demonstrate that in a minute. The main scenario we play on line in the game and we take time and effort to do special off the line operations, which I will demonstrate for you later.

These next three graphs, if you look at them three dimensionally will give you an overview of the game. This is from my view as game director. I have all these special operations going on, staffed with experts from around the country to support the teams. To give you a sense of dimension, a normal Atlantic game would be the size of one of these boxes here, with all of the peripheral activities, and we have three of these going on at the same time, supported by the Navy.

Consider controllers for this conversation, umpires. The Air Force control is headed up by Colonel Pappas' folks. The land control is headed up by the Army War College. Red control is headed up by Navy intelligence working in cooperation with other intelligence agencies. The intel fusion cell, which kind of adds life to the intelligence, is headed up by the DIA.

Space C3 EW, for example, is headed up by Space Com/AdCom and the intelligence community. Nuclear is headed up by SAC and the Department of Energy folks.

We have an international political forum, and the reason I take a little bit of time to go through this is to show you the large world that we are trying to allow the players to work in. I will come back to that point several times.

In 1981, I introduced an international political cell made up of largely retired foreign service officers, but including some active CIA, DIA, and other folks, into the game. To show, for example, Romania, Bulgaria, the French, the British, and the Japanese do not look necessarily the same way that Red and Blue did. Until that time, Red and Blue divided up the world between them as pawns. They were so upset at this change even though they intellectually knew better, that it stopped the game play for a day, and we argued back and forth about how these countries would play.

Now, in the games, we have a much more vibrant view of how the assumptions of various countries play over time as they are going through the war from their own view and their own self-interests.

We have a Media-Public Affairs cell, and I use this cell to drive us past the idea that the game is only a military game. As I mentioned earlier, we are looking at the politico-military dimension. In most games people even at the NCA levels are driven down to pulling the trigger or driving the ship. The media cell puts on the Good Morning America-type program every morning that shows the world the news from the day before, and they put out a newspaper in the afternoon. A little vignette; Red manipulates the media quite strongly, and it is an interesting thing to watch the media people come to me as control and whine about it, and I have to send them back into the game to deal with Red.

On the other side, the Blue NCA came to me this last year complaining that the media not only shaped the players' opinions of the game at large, but was actually shaping the Blue NCA, to which I told them: Take your Pierre Salinger player and get him on these guys and get them in line.

We play real world weather. We take weather from the past year from zero to 50,000 feet. We look at meteorological factors. This is really significant, because this last year, war in the winter and weather was the major factor of all the operations that had been going on over the central front in the air war and over the Norwegian Sea in the Navy battles.

Quickly, on the Blue side let me point out just a couple of things along the same aspects of what I have been talking about. This is SACLANT and SACEUR, not CINCLANT and CINCEUR. [Deleted.]

And NATO, of course, here just telescopes out and is a similar operation. We do play with the British in the game, but we have not gone any further.

I point to Congress up here. Admiral Watkins over the last several years has been very interested in getting more congressional play. I had Jim Lloyd and Bob Daniels last year, along with several staffers and others from GAO, playing in that cell, and it was very good.

[Deleted.]

In another instance, in the last slide I had on the maritime defense zone, a carrier moved out of Mayport at about D plus 25 in the war with its array of escorts and what have you. The battleground had not coordinated its move within the maritime defense zone to make sure that everything was as sanitary as possible. That carrier got hit by two torpedoes from a submarine. Again, Bob Daniels and Jim Lloyd got together and said: "Well, let us find out what in the world happened". And the motion that generated through the game helped emphasize the point of how the maritime defense zone and the Navy should be working together.

From Red, this looks like any unclassified DIA classification. [Deleted.]

And each of these different players are playing what we think the flow of information and power will be between them. One of the things that I can see out of this from my position in the game is that some of my spies down in this area cannot come back and tell me the information I need, and they are very frustrated.

That allows the general secretary, who is my senior spy in this area, Doug McKecken to sit down and help review some of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system.

The scenario for this game—perhaps in the question and answer period we can get deeper, but I stole one of Jim's scenarios from the JCS CINCS game as a baseline on a nonattribution basis and then used that very solid foundation to play out in our games.

The Red strategy—and I am getting into what some of you might call assumptions—the assumptions behind the game—Red does not wear a black hat, red is not attacking from a bolt out of the blue or saying, 90 days from now we are going to sneak up and attack NATO.

The situation develops out of a crisis that is occurring between East and West Germany that Red feels they cannot resolve short of conflict. Therefore, they are looking for a limited military objective, trying to remain conventional.

Basically the order to the military commander is: Seize West Germany, secure East Germany, be prepared to exploit any opportunities and to continue the attack on request.

This is the general approach that Blue saw looking at the intel from their worldwide view. And we will come back to this slide later. Red then looked to unfold his maritime forces on its flanks and his other theater, Far Eastern and what have you, to protect flanking operations until he took care of his primary operations in the center.

The Blue strategy—and I have got to say for Blue and NATO, for the same reason as in Jim's game, the Blue and NATO moved much more quickly on warning than we would expect. But we were looking at the postulation that, if they had moved quickly, could the military of NATO and Blue deter, and if so—if not, how would it limit the battle space of the war? Very aggressive forward defense.

Chairman NUNN. You said a while ago that either side was free to use nuclear weapons whenever they chose to. But you said on these charts both of them have as a goal, a strategy, to remain conventional.

Mr. HAY. That is correct.

Chairman NUNN. How do you reconcile those two?

Mr. HAY. Red's viewpoint is, given the situation, forced into this particular battle, he would like to keep it conventional so he can control it. If his larger political aim is to take over Western Europe or at least to see Blue move out of it so it can be more, if you will, Finlandized, if he starts using nuclear weapons in that theater he starts risking it coming apart from the control point of view, and if it gets too far out of hand in fact loses the eggs in the basket.

Senator DIXON. May I ask a question. Following up on what the chairman asked about, [deleted].

Mr. HAY. That is right.

Senator DIXON. [Deleted.] Did we have any?

Mr. HAY. In the off-line game—and thank you. In the off-line game we did play the binaries.

Senator DIXON. Oh, we used the binaries?

Mr. HAY. In the off-line game. In the on-line game, we estimated that in 1990 we did not have enough——

Senator DIXON. [Deleted] is that right, because they did not use it, I take it?

Mr. HAY. No. There was a military objective, too, if I might. And this is an argument that rages on the Red team very strongly. One view is that they have an asymmetry over ourselves [deleted] and we do not have a retaliatory way in which to handle the problem. [Deleted.]

Senator DIXON. That was my next question. Was that part of it then, the theory [deleted].

Mr. HAY. That is one of the major factors.

Senator DIXON. Is that a finding in this?

Mr. HAY. That is an insight, yes, sir.

Captain HURLBURT. That has played out in other games the same way. And the issue of uncertainty [deleted]. It is not peculiar to this game. It is fairly common.

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Senator DIXON. But you have not seen that in the game yet?

Mr. HAY. In this particular game, over 1985–1986, we have not. [Deleted.]

Senator DIXON. One more question. Do we give our people the clothing, defensive stuff, and do they ever put it on?

Mr. HAY. We give them what we think they would have in 1990. And we penalize them down to the limitations of what we think it would be [deleted] yes, sir.

This is in fact what happened in the central front. Austrian neutrality was violated, which put tremendous pressure on the southern sector. The Polish sector up north did quite well up here, up in the Hamburg-Kiel area. Because of the limitations of the Dutch, the Belgians, in terms of sustainability in ammunition—as you know, [deleted]—those lines were not annihilated, but they were pulled back into reserve and the German Third Corps and the American Fifth Corps had to move out, and they therefore had to trade back some territory.

This is the way originally NATO was set up, pretty much the way you would see it in the real world.

Chairman NUNN. The orange line represents what?

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

What you see here more or less correctly is what happened at D plus 10 and D plus 20 and D plus 42. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. Would you go through each one of those lines again, maybe slowly, and just tell us what each one represents?

Mr. HAY. This line right here is D plus 10 or 10 days, 11 days into war. The largest point you see is in the central region.

[Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. How many days does that last?

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. How do our allies up north continue to fight [deleted]—are we giving them ammo under this assumption?

Mr. HAY. Yes, we are. There are several factors, though, and let me try to hit a couple. One is that war does not flow the same way analysis does. So the ebb and tide of it will probably provide them, if they do not just spend their weapons early, a few more days.

A second factor is the weather. This is winter, the weather is miserable. The air operations, for example, are much slower.

[Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. Who took their place?

Mr. HAY. No one. [Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. Do we show what happens elsewhere on land?

Mr. HAY. Yes, sir. I have it within a global maritime perspective, by theaters, sir.

Because Red was not wearing its black hat and had not been planning for [deleted] days, you can see that at D-Day the force ratio was not what you would call tremendously in its favor for offensive operations. And this is one of the reasons that, in answer to your last question, also one of the reasons that the forward line of troops did not progress faster than we have shown.

[Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. The Germans would not define that as holding the line, would they?

Mr. HAY. That is right [deleted].

Senator GLENN. Could I ask a question on the follow-on forces? General Rogers testified last year that the follow-on forces concept, which is designated to limit the enemy's effectiveness or interdict their reinforcements, was a key part of NATO's strategy over there. However, this strategy apparently did not work very well in this particular game. You were trying to use air strikes to interdict the enemy's forces, but the rate at which they went across there would not indicate that air was very effective at all.

What was the reason for that, or was that—did that actually happen in the game, and if so why was it so ineffective?

Mr. HAY. Let me talk on both sides. On the Blue side, we did use some of the USAFE concepts for deep interdiction [deleted]. They look like they might do very well in slowing down the lines, but that is a tentative conclusion.

We do not have tools yet to understand how those new systems and new tactics will play. We played them as best we could. The Air Force looked at them and is continuing to study them throughout the year. But I do not have an answer on that.

I do think the Air Force tactics and new mines will be effective in slowing down the forward movement to some degree. [Deleted] and our airports and seaports. It does not appear, particularly in foul weather, that they can operate as well, that they have the punch to really take out our supply for long periods of time.

They did take it out for short periods of time, but overall, it was not significant.

Senator GLENN. You ran this in the worst weather period and that would have a major effect on it?

Mr. HAY. That is right.

Senator GLENN. But even there, you would think it would be more holdup just by road interceptions and bridges and things like that, that could get probably in bad weather.

Mr. HAY. I suspect in games we tend to move things faster than they might in reality because we do not have all the friction of marching through the mud and what-not.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

Mr. HAY. This is basically the air ratios as they evolve. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. Was their air more effective against the blue than vice versa?

Mr. HAY. No, sir, it was not. They came forward with their air operations, as you might suspect, early. When you are on the offense against a good defense, you are going to take some heavy losses. [Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. Are you going to explain to us why? [Deleted.] Are you going to tell us that is training or quality? Are you going to get into that later in your assumptions?

Mr. HAY. No, sir, we can do it now. [Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. You make assumptions in terms of quality of aircraft and training and how many hours a pilot has in training in each year. Does that affect these results?

Mr. HAY. We did not measure that into these factors. Clearly there is a factor that is probably to Blue's advantage. We were basically looking at the air frames and missiles capabilities and measuring those against each other. So they have the fourth generation Foxhound and Mainslay that look like a carbon copy of F-15s and AWACS.

But their whole force, even in 1990, is not largely that. There is a fourth generation super structure, and then below that they are back down to MIG-21s and lesser airplanes. As it goes down, then they start losing even more.

Senator GLENN. The time period you are talking about, did you use AMRAAM?

Mr. HAY. Some years we used AMRAAM and some years we did not, depending on what the buy looked like. When AMRAAM was played and it was given the attributes that we think that it will have, it was like Maverick, significant in the air battles.

Chairman NUNN. What effect did the air battle have on land battle? How much in the way of aircraft were you able to use for close air support, or was it mainly air to air combat?

Mr. HAY. That is two questions, sir. I am having a little trouble. As best as I can recall, I cannot define it down to movement of the forward line of troops. [Deleted.] We have some detailed work, but I have not come up with a definite answer.

Chairman NUNN. Well, just in general, did the air power on our side help impede their forward progress that would have otherwise occurred? Or let us say you eliminated both air forces. There is never anything in the air at all. There has just been strictly a ground battle. Would the lines have moved appreciably different?

Mr. HAY. I think that would have been Red's strategy, indeed, to take out Blue's air power, because if you took out both air forces it would be to Red's net advantage. And from the calculations point of view, we agree with that——

Chairman NUNN. So those lines did not move as fast as they would have without our air power?

Mr. HAY. That is correct.

Senator LEVIN. By how much?

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.] It is not catastrophic.

Captain HURLBURT. The regulatory of models with which we are looking at this scale of an operation do not allow you to answer a question like that.

Mr. HAY. As I was saying to Senator Glenn, I think the Air Force and USAFE have some ideas here that are more potent than we are capable of gaming at the present time.

Senator GLENN. Did you in the middle of this declare any fair weather periods? And if so, did the combat change?

Captain HURLBURT. No, sir, we lived with the real weather. We took the weather from 2 years ago. It was a bad winter.

Mr. HAY. There were some periods of VFR weather, and when that occurred Red took good advantage.

Chairman NUNN. You are saying that bad weather worked in our favor?

Mr. HAY. Bad weather basically favors defense. Bad weather basically favors Blue air as a matter of training and practice and working in VFR (IFR) weather. We are in that instance, better than our counterparts.

Senator EXON. How does naval aircraft figure into this thing in the interior of Europe? Do you employ any of our strike forces from carriers?

Captain HURLBURT. In this particular game, they have been employed in the northern region. The carriers are fighting to maintain their superiority [deleted].

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. How many times have you played that global game?

Mr. HAY. We have played the global game eight times.

Senator LEVIN. In what period of time?

Mr. HAY. 8 years.

Senator LEVIN. How would those maps look different in those other eight global games, the lines, the four lines and the 42 days?

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

This game was an effort to look out longer, so it can explore what those differences might be.

Senator LEVIN. Did you make the same assumptions for 1979 or 1980 when you first started as you do now?

Mr. HAY. No.

Senator LEVIN. I do not mean in terms of the quantity of hardware, but in terms of qualitative assumptions or tactics. Are they the same? Psychology?

Mr. HAY. I think our refinement of quality for both Red and Blue is better today than it was in 1979. I think our assessment of Red ability and Red intentions is more normalized now than it was then. We thought they wore a black hat and were 10 feet tall. We have kind of whittled them down to 6 feet tall now.

So I think there is better analysis and argument on the relative strength and weaknesses of both sides.

Chairman NUNN. What is the warning time assumption here? That is rather crucial, is it not?

Mr. HAY. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. And how quickly did Blue react to warning?

Mr. HAY. As I said earlier, we gave the Blue and NATO a fairly aggressive reaction to the warning. When there were already things going on in the world, [deleted].

Chairman NUNN. So NATO reacted [deleted].

Mr. HAY. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. How long from that warning was D-Day?

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. What did you do with command and control as far as communications? Did you keep satellite communications inviolate or did you make a rule for only direct communications, ground links, or what?

Mr. HAY. No, sir. [Deleted.]

Neither side totally appreciated until after the event. And that is another good reason for games. In midnight, some of their clandestine activities, their C&D activities, played out and the other side did not even see them. They were worthless because of the lack of reconnaissance.

Senator EXON. Let us go back to aircraft carriers. You played this global strategy eight times, I believe you said in the question by Senator Levin?

Mr. HAY. Yes, sir, eight times.

Senator EXON. In all eight times, did you always have the carriers pledged to that forward Lehman-type deployment, strategy in or around Norway?

Mr. HAY. No, sir. In all eight games, the senior players always were playing inside the national forward defense strategy. But that line was in different places. Early on in the game it was just below the GIUK gap.

Senator EXON. Have you ever played the game without the forward strategy being involved?

Mr. HAY. We played the game one time with National Defense University and a very conservative Blue NCA. [Deleted.]

Senator **Exon**. I am wondering, what would happen if we did not have that forward deployment. Then I assume that the carrier aircraft could be used in central Europe; is that right?

Captain **Hurlburt**. Yes, sir, that is correct. And that has occurred, if I am not mistaken, on at least two occasions. I know in the 1982 game there was major use of [deleted] in the central region.

Senator **Exon**. Did that significantly slow down the red advance?

Captain **Hurlburt**. [Deleted.]

There has been debate about whether bringing them in later, say at [deleted].

Senator **Exon**. I am trying to understand all of this. In these eight games that you referred to, what was the lead time that we had and anticipated? Was it always the same, a bolt out of the blue?

Mr. **Hay**. No, sir. It ranged from [deleted].

Senator **Exon**. But obviously we had 20 days warning. You can get all the carriers afloat in the area that you would want. I would think that would make a significant difference in your decisions in the conflict, would it not?

Mr. **Hay**. The arguments with SACEUR and SACLANT in this game in the last 2 years, and it is a continuous game, is by putting the Marine MAB into northern Norway and moving the carriers up there, it allows the Norwegian air to move a little further south and the blue air up there remains a bit further south, ultimately protecting the MAF, the U.K. and the British position on the northern flank [deleted].

Senator **Glenn**. [Deleted.]

Mr. **Hay**. [Deleted.]

Senator **Levin**. How many troops of ours do you assume are in Europe at this time, in [deleted]. Are you assuming about the same number that we have now?

Mr. **Hay**. About 300,000.

Senator **Levin**. And how many troops do you assume reached Europe from our shores here and actually became engaged before the end of 42 days?

Senator **Warner**. I think that is important. What did come across the ocean during this operation?

Mr. **Hay**. [Deleted.]

Senator **Levin**. [Deleted.]

Mr. **Hay**. That is right.

Senator **Levin**. Can you give us a rough number that reached Europe from some other location of our forces?

Mr. **Hay**. [Deleted.]

Senator **Levin**. [Deleted.]

Mr. **Hay**. [Deleted.]

Chairman **Nunn**. I am informed—I have had this before and I think John Hamre reminds me—[deleted].

Mr. **Hay**. Several of the divisions were already there because of Reforger. It was the 1986 Reforger package as will happen in the real world. That Reforger package is heavy mech.

Chairman **Nunn**. So we are looking at Reforger going on when they hit?

Mr. HAY. Yes, sir. Interestingly enough, whenever something happens in the world there are going to be exercises going on. You cannot find a time when there are not some exercises.

Senator WARNER. But Reforger is a major one [deleted].

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

Captain HURLBURT. That is correct, sir. That was deliberate. Remember, this is a two-game series that started in 1985 and was running in 1986 and will again in 1987. One of the things we wanted to look at in 1985 was would Red be deterred under these conditions if Blue acted promptly, and so we had Blue act promptly.

Red concluded they did not under those circumstances want to start the war. And we would have a war game without a war had we not had the control group not forced Red to start under those conditions.

Chairman NUNN. So this is really almost a best case for NATO?

Captain HURLBURT. That is correct.

Mr. HAY. It is an optimum case for NATO.

Senator LEVIN. You assume the same number of troops in NATO under this game as NATO has there now?

Mr. HAY. Yes, including the CAS, which is up for debate. We also include the territorial armies, which a lot of analyses do not include.

Senator EXON. Would that include the Blue side bringing all of its Reserve and Guard units to Europe?

Mr. HAY. Yes, sir. You mean the allied reserve units? Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. Allied reserve units were, I assume, being called up. I suppose they would not have time to get many of our Guard and Reserve forces over there. Would we have our Reserve air power and other Reserve forces in that battle in the first 42 days?

Captain HURLBURT. Yes.

Colonel JOHNSON. (Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC) [deleted]. As the war wore on, to get back to your earlier question [deleted].

Senator EXON. You got them over there?

Colonel JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. [Deleted] days?

Colonel JOHNSON. That is right.

Chairman NUNN. We are going to hear from Bernie Rogers' people on their NATO war games that they did last year, and I think at some point later on one of the things that is important to the committee to understand here is the Rogers assumption when you get [deleted]. Is that correct, in this game?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Chairman NUNN. His assumption is [deleted]. That is not 1990. So that is a very big difference.

Mr. HAY. We have explored various ways of moving them over there. But like the Colonel says, it is pretty tough. We have done that with Time Phased Force Deployment Lists, TPFDLs.

Colonel SIMS. It is a gross movement feasibility estimation that lists by unit, destination, and time sequence, everything that is going from a squadron to a division.

Chairman Nunn. The only reference media-wise to that was when 2, 3, 4, or 5 years ago, when they had the pianos going in the first 2 or 3 days. A lot of things have probably happened since then, but I remember when that came out.

Senator Exon. What about the war at sea? Did we lose anything going over there?

Captain Hurlburt. [Deleted.]

Senator Levin. That is shipping, personnel, or both?

Captain Hurlburt. [Deleted.]

Mr. Hay. [Deleted.]

Chairman Nunn. We protect our lines of communication very well, do we not?

Captain Hurlburt. Yes. There are two factors that influence that. [Deleted.]

Senator Exon. How effective were we in blocking the Soviet fleet in the North Sea? Are you going to get into that?

Captain Hurlburt. [Deleted.]

Senator Exon. [Deleted.]

Captain Hurlburt. [Deleted.]

Senator Levin. How many days supply of munitions do you assume that we have?

Captain Hurlburt. I forget the exact logistics figure on that. The ships themselves were loaded out for [deleted].

Senator Levin. No, no. In your store there, how many days of supply?

Captain Hurlburt. I defer to the Army on that.

Colonel Johnson. [Deleted] except for U.S. forces. U.S. forces we carried at [deleted].

Senator Levin. The rest of NATO [deleted]?

Colonel Johnson. Generally speaking, yes, sir. The British were a little bit higher. French, we were not sure.

Senator Levin. How about the Soviets?

Mr. Hay. I would guess 60 to 90 days for the Soviet land forces. What we see—there is an asymmetry, however, because of the way they are running the forces. And let me pick air, for example. They are running through a regiment a day. So they are not going to run out of fuel or ordnance; they are going to run out of airplanes if they keep the strategy up that they are running.

Senator Levin. Do we run out of munitions?

Colonel Johnson. [Deleted.]

Senator Levin. I know we are not supposed to look at this game as though it proves anything in the real world, but we are human. We cannot just sit here and look at this and pretend it does not prove a damn thing. I know that was your first principle here, that it does not prove anything regarding the real world.

Captain Hurlburt. That is correct, it does not. And you should not conclude—you should not leap from this to programmatic actions.

Now, over a series of time you get to see trends and you can then start making those kinds of decisions.

Senator Levin. Are you telling us what the trends are over time? [Deleted.] And that if we had more troops or if NATO had more troops, or if this or if that?

Are you going to give us those kinds of trends over time or not?

Mr. HAY. I would not come back with that kind of answer. What I would say to define that point is that we used games—I said study-games-study earlier, and this slide depicts just the Marines and the amphibious Navy. There is a whole series of games workshops that are supported by studies with fleet planners that work both Atlantic and Pacific across the year.

We work in some instances with allies and some with major commands. We work with both General Al Grey, FMFLANT and Dwayne Grey of FMFPAC and their planners, and then we use Global as a key point to anchor some of that work. During that work—let me just pick the Atlantic and the Med here—we will try a whole series of options, and that is the point. [Deleted.]

We do this with the Navy and we work via Carlisle and Maxwell and Checkmate for the Air Force to carry on this kind of discussion. That is how we interact with the strategy with the fleet.

Senator WIRTH. What are the assumptions under which the Soviets deploy their submarines?

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Senator WIRTH. What would happen if you changed the assumptions related to how many troops you get into Europe, how quickly, and the deployment of the Soviet submarine forces?

Mr. HAY. Off-line we have played several different versions of that. One is that if they started off with the way we think they are going to play the navy battle [deleted].

Captain HURLBURT. It is also an option that we have recently been exploring and still are exploring. So we do not really have a good answer on that yet. The initial indicators are, as Bud was mentioning, [deleted].

By the same token, if they find a solution to it it can make life a lot more difficult for us, no question about it. On the other hand, if they have got a battle on their hands in their own back yard, they may be loath to want to do that.

[Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. Could I ask the question I asked before in a different way, Mr. Chairman. I do not think I asked it clearly.

You say there are certain trends which we identified over time, rather than lessons that we should take too literally from any particular war game. If over a period of time you put in different assumptions—let us assume that, instead of the [deleted] of supply, you put in an assumption of 60 days for United States and 30 days for NATO and left everything else constant. Presumably you will see an impact on the outcome, either the number of days before we lose or maybe tipping the balance.

If you put in different assumptions in enough games, such as Blue forces operating fewer carriers, more or fewer submarines, more or less this, more or less that, over time trends will emerge which would lead you to reach different conclusions. Do you do that?

To ask it a second way, has any of this affected policy in any way or budgets in any way over 8 years you have conducted global war games? Could you identify the trends that emerged from these games which led the services or a little less emphasis there? Could you answer either one of those questions for us?

Mr. HAY. I think it is indirectly. I think that our work with the CINCs and the fleets and other planners over time and sometimes quite directly, but generally over time, shapes their contingency plans and their war plans. So we are working at the war-fighting side of it.

As those plans change and they put in their inputs to Op Nav and fleets and CINCs argue back and forth on how they want to look forward, that is where you see the influence indirectly coming from this.

Senator LEVIN. Finally, can you identify the most significant shifts in emphasis over time that have resulted from these games—I do not want to make it too dramatic, but shift in emphasis—in our plans, our actual war games, or in our material requests or productions?

Mr. HAY. I am afraid my answer might sound much like motherhood. But what I see is a willingness of the services to work more joint and more combined. Just on the Navy side, 9 years ago when we started out some of our controllers and umpires even called Europe the littoral of the Mediterranean. We were in deep, dark blue, middle of the ocean thinking.

Now we are thinking not only that we can aggressively control the ocean pretty much, we are looking at how to work with the Army, the Air Force, and allies in dealing with things. Just that one change, although it does not sound like much, has really, I think, aided the services in coming to a more aggressive approach and a more realistic approach in their strategy.

Captain HURLBURT. And I think also we have educated a significant number of people in terms of the complexity of this kind of a war and in how you can fit things together that lead to more success than other sequences. I think that is probably one of the big values of the game.

Again, it is very hard to say that, as a result of the game, we have seen changes in the budgets per se. It would be hard to track that and say you could definitely do that. But in terms of how people are thinking about global war, in terms of how they are thinking about fighting in various theaters, we can track that, the changes in that thinking.

Mr. HAY. In our tactical aspects, we can in fact try to reach out ahead and do a little bit better than it sounds like we say from our statement. [Deleted.]

So we brought them into the game. We brought the technical people in to work with the players. We let the players look at how they might use these, Amber being kind of a long range system. And it actually played out the way it might be, and this is just one example to work with.

[Deleted.] So it made the players work on it more seriously.

Out of this kind of play, and with the program manager there in this instance, we came up with some recommendations. Again, this is real world, this is not the way it was, but there are some interesting insights.

[Deleted.]

Now, these are some things that were not in the program. Some of them will find themselves in the program and some will not. But whatever the case, they allow the Op Nav talk with the fleet in our view about how they want to field these systems. And so in that respect, it is one way of helping.

I will pick up the Navy at large and general questions if you choose. But I guess the bottom line I wanted to say was these games as process are more important than coming out with a bottom line product. In plans, as Eisenhower said, the plan is nothing; it is the planning that is everything. We want to keep the dialogue with the CINCs and other planners going on as they refine their plans over the years.

We find that we get much more mature and sophisticated play. We tend to want to work them in—they have to work over time and against opposition and in relation to other events, because when we sit down at a table with our shirt sleeves we tend to be pretty straight line. We do not understand the total complexity.

We put them in an environment that is dynamic. The best description of this is when [deleted] don't you understand? The difference is that in the game you are sweating, and then you have to put your logic to it.

And that is the environment we want them to have to deal with, because that is the environment, with all that uncertainty and never enough facts, that we are going to be in a war.

And then the exchange of ideas. At the high tech level, for example, I had some engineers from foreign technology division, [deleted], some folks from industry, and some flyers. And we all got together and we were just talking [deleted] in one of these instances.

All of a sudden the guy from foreign technology says: [deleted]. So that kind of exchange of ideas, whether political-military level or down at the technical/tactical level, we do not always see the whole elephant. That is what we are about in the game.

Senator WIRTH. When you talk about this game as process—and back to the question about what you have learned over time—what have you learned over the 8 or 9 years about problems of coordination between the services and what has come out of all of that?

Captain HURLBURT. One of the things is that the coordination has gotten better.

Senator WIRTH. I knew you were going to say that. But keep going.

Captain HURLBURT. I do not know of a major naval exercise that is run these days that does not—is not run jointly, principally with Air Force support, which was not the case in the past, particularly AWACS.

Senator WIRTH. I am trying to get a sense of over a period of time, of what you have learned coming out of this——

Captain HURLBURT. One of the things, for example, that you learn coming out of this is that increasing your area of surveillance and increasing the depth of your battle space helps you win battles. And you look around and you say: Well now, how can I do that? And by the way, by playing these as research games the approach you can take is, that we would like to take and to try to get out of the programmatic issues, what can you do with what you have got, not how can I prove you need something else? But how do you win in the battlefield with what you have got?

You look around in the game and you say, the Air Force has AWACS system that can see a long ways; maybe if we found a way to work with them on that we can improve the depth of our battle space. And now, frankly, we do that. We look at solving the problem of some of the new Soviet surface ships that have significant AAW capabilities, and which it gets a little bit tough for an air wing to go in and go after a surface action group like that.

And you say to yourself, now, how are you going to solve that problem? And you look at it and, guess what? If a submarine gets in there and sinks a couple of those guys with torpedoes, against which they have much less defense than they have in the way of air defense, it turns the whole battle into a different situation.

You basically begin to now say: OK, if I use forces at the front end that give me a good exchange ratio, I can then begin to pile on other forces. And you begin to identify what those forces are. And then if it turns out that they belong to one of the other services, you start talking to that other service about, is there a way we can work together, work to our mutual benefit.

It turns out that the Navy's role of setting the stage, if you will, for the Army and the Air Force to fight the battle in the central front means we have got to gain sea control. How do you do that? Well, it turns out that if you force the other guy to fight in the Barents and northern Norwegian Sea, then you are not fighting him in the Sloc, and indeed the reinforcement and resupply shipping gets there.

Those are the kinds of things that you begin to learn over time with these games, and they lead to things, I guess, if you will, like the maritime strategy, where it says it makes sense to fight forward. [Deleted.]

There are a number of war-fighting things that you learn, I think, as a result of these games. Maybe I am overspeaking.

Chairman Nunn. How about the other services? What about the cooperation? What are you learning about the coordination and cooperation?

Colonel Pappas. Senator, I would like to give one example of some things that we have learned by working together. I think it tells the story better than anything else.

Terminology. It is very difficult to understand the cooperation process if we use different terms. We had been working with a Navy group to establish a secure or classified link, and when we achieved a link, our people called the Navy and said, "The line is secure". We meant that the classified link was good. But in Navy terminology, "secure" means lock it up and go home. So all of a sudden the line was not working.

We found out later that that was the problem-terminology.

In talking with our friends in the Army and working with the Army War College at Carlisle for about 5 years now in the joint senior service games, we find that terminology sometimes causes misunderstanding, because we use the same word for two different things.

For example, the term "apportionment" is an Air Force term that talks about how one will use the force: for offense or defense or close air support or interdiction. I think the Army and Air Force always understood that one.

But when we used the term "allocation," the Army was talking about how much of that close air support was going to a certain division and the Air Force was talking about how they were going to use their F-16s. In gaming together, we learn where these problems can occur. I can assure you that it is possible to talk for months using the same words without knowing that we are not communicating with each other.

In that respect, joint gaming helps a lot.

Chairman NUNN. Is that spreading out? Once you find that out, is that then spread out to the forces out there in the field?

Colonel PAPPAS. Yes, because the students at the war colleges are the very ones who modify and change the doctrine manuals which define the terminology.

Mr. HAY. These are not students like college students. These are 30 to 45 year old men who are key leaders in the services.

Senator WIRTH. Do you want to respond to that?

Colonel KIELKOPF. It would be three bags full, sir, because what Captain Hurlburt and Colonel Pappas have said is exactly the case. In the Army we have tended to think at corps level and below, because in the field right now that is all we have got. And our officers coming in as students are familiar with those levels. Now we bring them up to high levels and cause them to have to think about organizations that, one, are not on the ground per se—we do not have any field armies deployed, but we are going to be at the stage where, when we come to fighting, and so they have to think in the broader terms and they have to understand the decisions, for example, on where the air power is going to be used, are made at very high echelons, not even at field army or comparable level. At the theater level is where those decisions are made.

So they have to come to grips with that and realize that the decisions are being made at the appropriate level, and that the right dispersal or disposition of forces is going to occur. And that such things as counter-air, offensive counter-air missions, are very helpful and very useful to conduct of the land battle.

I could go on in that vein.

Mr. HAY. The factor that they are talking about occurs at all levels of the game. That is one of the learning points.

Senator WIRTH. The story you hear over and over again is about the fellow on Grenada using his credit card to call Fort Dix to call back to Grenada. How can that sort of thing transpire if you have been working out that kind of cooperative arrangement, if in fact that did happen?

Are there technical components of this? You are talking about talking the same language, Colonel. I would think the same language would be a technical interface as well. Does that get sorted out and smoothed out?

Colonel PAPPAS. I think it does. But one also has to consider the words of Clausewitz on war—"no other activity in human endeavor is so filled with chance and uncertainty as war". And if Murphy's law can attack every institution, it certainly can attack combat, because as Clausewitz said, "no other endeavor in humankind is so fraught with chance and uncertainty."

It may happen that the particular piece of equipment needed to communicate is not available at that particular time. So somebody uses ingenuity to address the problem. But the short answer to your question is, we do work together, we do find problems and incompatibilities and we try to solve them.

Colonel KIELKOPF. Sir, I think you will find that this occurs on a somewhat different level. Whereas the War College involvement is not in developing the technical requirements, establishing these requirements and the systems to do this, that, and the other thing, is in fact going on.

And I know, particularly between the Air Force and the Army, we try to come closer together in establishing a common set of requirements where there needs to be an interface. And that it is expanding into interaction with the Navy.

So that, yes, it is going on. To give you particulars, I am unable to do so, sir.

Captain HURLBURT. I do not know the answer to the question of how that might have happened in the first place. But I do know that in a game within the last year CINCLANT has looked specifically at how far they have come in solving that problem.

Senator WIRTH. That is the thrust of my question. It seems to me you are talking about—and this is your summary slide—that this is a process, there is a dynamic to this. And part of the dynamic has to be all of the language that you were talking about, Colonel, bringing together various planning aspects that you were talking about. And I assume that there is a technology side of that as well.

Captain HURLBURT. That is correct.

Mr. HAY. I can give you one specific example. General Al Grey, FMFLANT, and General Lindsey, 18th Airborne Corps, did come together with an MOU, memorandum of understanding, of common terms to be used if the forces worked together. That was a first that used gaming techniques, part of which have—when I laid out that amphibious slide, it said, how do you work with the fleet. It came out of that process.

Chairman NUNN. Could you show us any kind of results of the sea battle in terms of the losses of ships and so forth?

Mr. HAY. Yes, I can.

Chairman NUNN. Will you assume a different kind of warning time next year in this war game?

Mr. HAY. This following year we will move on. We will start probably around D plus 40 or D plus 42 and move on out plus——

Chairman NUNN. Oh, you will continue this one?

Mr. HAY. This particular game is a continuing game.

Chairman NUNN. In the 8 years, what is the worst warning time that you have given us?

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Where we see the Navy battles really taking some hits is in the submarine battles. Now again, these may be optimistic, and this is the same point that Senator Glenn and I were chatting about earlier. But I do think that the reality will look like this, over some period of time, based on the way they have laid out their defenses, the way Blue and NATO plan on penetrating them.

[Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. Why did we lose [deleted] submarines? What were we doing, [deleted].

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

[Deleted.]

The primary killers for submarines was counter-fire inadvertently [deleted]. Those were the two primary factors for Blue.

Chairman **Nunn**. How many carriers did we lose?

Mr. **Hay**. [Deleted.]

Chairman **Nunn**. All right. Now let me ask you this question. I guess that would be answered in the next war, [deleted].

So I guess what I am asking is two questions: One is what role does naval warfare play in helping the ground? Surely protecting the sea lines of communications is one, although we already have Reforger over there. And second, [deleted]. Where do you go from here?

Mr. **Hay**. Let me try to answer that question, sir. Indeed, in a conventional battle, as this situation is, the linchpin [deleted].

Chairman **Nunn**. In other words, you have prevented it [deleted].

Mr. **Hay**. That is right.

[Deleted.]

Also in this area are strategic defensive picket ships and what have you that he would like to have out forward, so that if SAC comes in he could help to pick off some of those strategic systems. So as the Navy has moved into these regions, the Navy has also started picking away at his strategic defense network.

So basically, his capability to go out over all the rest of the seas with his merchant ships, with his fishing fleet, and with his men of war has basically been cut off.

Chairman **Nunn**. [Deleted.] It seems to me no one has achieved their total objective. We have achieved some and they have achieved some. But in terms of objectives, would it not be fair to say, even under the best of conditions, that they have achieved a whole lot more of their objectives than we have? [Deleted.]

Mr. **Hay**. I think what you are saying is——

Chairman **Nunn**. [Deleted.]

Mr. **Hay**. [Deleted.] So each CINC commander has his own region for which he is responsible.

Captain **Hurlburt**. I would like to try to answer that in a little different way, if I may. The first thing that the Navy did [deleted]. How that battle came out in this game is problematic.

There are people who said it would be different if they did this or if they did that it would be different. The point is that the conditions were established for the Army and the Air Force to have the wherewithal to conduct the battle.

On top of that, basically we have access to the rest of the world now and the Soviets do not.

Chairman **Nunn**. Is that what you are saying?

Captain **Hurlburt**. I am not sure that I would make that——

Chairman **Nunn**. [Deleted.]

Captain **Hurlburt**. Yes, sir, so far. [Deleted.]

Chairman **Nunn**. And what would our objectives be the next go-around? When you say "we" you are talking about maybe the United States, but you are certainly not talking about allies, [deleted].

Captain **Hurlburt**. "We" could be the United States alone, if indeed we concluded that.

Chairman **Nunn**. Then what would——

Captain **Hurlburt**. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. What would our goal and objective then become? There are a couple of options?

Captain HURLBURT. Yes, sir. One of the most interesting aspects of this coming game is going to be struggling with that very thing. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. What do you mean by "closed"?

Captain HURLBURT. Come into contact along the front.

Colonel SIMS. Quite to the contrary with that, I would agree with the Senator. We would look at a situation or crisis and ask: what are the Soviet objectives? [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

But I think it seems to me in a geostrategic sense, unless you can figure out—and this would be a fascinating stage in this next war—that they have achieved their goals. [Deleted.]

I am just trying to promote thinking here. I may be absolutely wrong and I may change my mind. I am just throwing it out for you all to chew on.

Mr. HAY. The aim of the game this year is to see what the political-military dimensions of what happens, and if the players indeed, the European players, back off [deleted].

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

Captain HURLBURT. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

Captain HURLBURT. [Deleted.]

Senator WIRTH. How many people play this, and how long does this go on?

Mr. HAY. The game this last year was about 1,000 people, not all at the same time; about 300 to 500 at any given time. The game itself runs for 3 weeks at a game speed of about 2 game days per real day, and then we study and have seminars and workshops throughout the year to take the information apart and work on it and then put it back together again to improve the game.

Senator WIRTH. And who are the officers that are chosen to be among that 1,000?

Mr. HAY. Well, they are not just officers. We get people from various agencies, retired Congressmen, Democrats and Republicans. We bring over some of the British people from all four services. We like to go after the planners, primarily from the fleets, and also the intel officers and the logisticians. Those three functions are important.

And also, we find that that pumps it most directly back into the planning cycle.

Down here we work with various agencies like OSD, A&L, working with logistics and mobilization, with FEMA, some of the planners over at FEMA. We work at the umpire level primarily with Carlisle and Leavenworth, and Jim and I are working at the political-military level trying to figure out how to put that together.

So there is lots of different kinds of answers to that question. The planning echelon at whatever level is what we are after.

Chairman NUNN. Do any of you others care to venture an opinion?

Colonel KIELKOPF. Sir, if I could come back to your question and really put it from the educational institution's perspective. What we carry back to the Army War College is exactly the sort of debate that we are just conducting here, [deleted].

What these experiences have given us too are the insights of having a defense planning council representing the NATO nations and how they influence the action. So there is a lot of food for educational debate for our students and our faculty to engage in as we try to come to grapple with these problems.

No solutions, but certainly getting ourselves focused at these high levels for our students, who have been focused on troop leading procedures at the lieutenant colonel level.

Chairman NUNN: One other question on the Navy. [Deleted.] Did you do that in this exercise?

Captain HURLBURT. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Did you have a strike force that hit home?

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. With aircraft carriers?

Mr. HAY. Yes, the air power from aircraft carriers and conventional cruise missiles.

Chairman NUNN. How did that situation play out?

Mr. HAY. If I could generalize, one of the larger issues still being worked moving to the campaign level is what are the appropriate targets, depending on the appropriate phase of the war and what else is going on, to hit. You cannot just go to large areas like the Kola or the Shakalin Peninsula and randomly hit targets. You have to look at what targets are important.

It is a tough issue, because in those regions some of the target complexes may not affect the direct day to day battle of the war for a week, a month, or even a year. Some of the targets are very hard. On the other hand, some of them are extraordinarily soft.

And I would say that none of the services and CINCs have a total answer for that that they can play at a secret level. But going back to the last point the colonel made, this gives some insight. Well, let me go ahead, let me look at an ammunition type of target, or let me go after the air fields, or let me go after this, and see what is worthwhile.

Players tend to try to go after the jugular: What one thing can I do to win? And there probably is no such thing. There is probably no one thing you can go and get and win the war. So they have to expand their perspective and that is a good lesson to learn.

Now they have to step down and say: OK, what are the costs, what is the time to do it over time, and therefore what are the tradeoffs versus other tactics and campaigns that might solve the problem. And we are in the middle of that kind of debate. We do not have an answer.

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

So I think both Blue and Red have the sense that the carrier battle forces are pretty tough to reckon with.

[Deleted.]

On the other hand, when he goes at it correctly and takes the weather and the limitations of the Red players in that region into account, they tend to do quite well.

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

Captain HURLBURT. [Deleted.]

Mr. HAY. In terms of technology, another way of getting at that question, there are windows of things that occur over time and close again. [Deleted.]

In this game, the players worked at that. We see this as a problem for Red that over the next decade he will probably—probably is working on it and will solve it, which will change the technical counterplay and will change therefore the tactics and even perhaps the strategy.

Senator EXON. Could you put that graph up again that you had earlier, [deleted]. Could you put that back up.

Now, before I get into that, let me ask this. I assume you have never played these games with all the NATO members. This is only our forces that are involved in the war colleges?

Mr. HAY. We have played with U.S. [deleted] players in this game only.

Senator EXON. In other words, you said that you had—something about [deleted].

Captain HURLBURT. That is correct. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. Why?

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

Mr. HAY. We play a whole series of games bilaterally with other countries. For example, we play games with [deleted].

But when we work with this kind of material and sensitive material——

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

Captain HURLBURT. Yes.

Mr. HAY. This is the way the 1986 game ended and the 1987 game will start.

Senator EXON. It will start from there. Now, in that scenario that you have up there you, number one, assume, [deleted].

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Then another one—well, you get the idea.

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. Just two more quick questions, Mr. Chairman.

By history, are not the Soviets much better defensive fighters than they are offensive fighters? Or do you not play out history when you get into these?

Mr. **Hay**. Yes, we do. In fact, we try to set the scenario both for Jim's games and my games to take advantage of some of the historical ways that both players have done things.

I would put that slightly different. I would say that Red comes from a strategic defensive mind set and therefore that tends to color the way he does his business.

Senator **Exon**. And he would not have any problem with supply, logistics, moving that rapidly?

Mr. **Hay**. [Deleted.]

That does not play out. And so we have to pull that off-line and figure out what in the world to do with it.

Senator **Exon**. One last question, Mr. Chairman. How much of the SAC bomber force were used in this conventional war, and what was held back for potential nuclear strategic missions? And were the SAC B-52s used, I suppose, with standoff conventional cruise missiles?

Mr. **Hay**. Those B-52Hs, I guess in this timeframe, that are designated for conventional use by the other CINCs, were used. The ones on strategic withhold were maintained on strategic withhold.

Senator **Exon**. [Deleted.]

Mr. **Hay**. [Deleted.]

Senator **Exon**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. [Deleted.]

Mr. **Hay**. [Deleted.]

Chairman **Nunn**. [Deleted.]

Mr. **Hay**. [Deleted.]

Chairman **Nunn**. [Deleted.]

Mr. **Hay**. [Deleted.]

Chairman **Nunn**. [Deleted.]

Mr. **Hay**. [Deleted.]

Chairman **Nunn**. [Deleted.]

Mr. **Hay**. [Deleted.]

Captain **Hurlburt**. [Deleted.]

Chairman **Nunn**. As to whether they really could intercept?

Captain **Hurlburt**. Yes, sir.

Chairman **Nunn**. [Deleted.]

Captain **Hurlburt**. Yes, sir.

Mr. **Hay**. To generalize the point, early in the series, back in 1979 to 1980, the Red players were arguing, hey, we know what the Soviets say in their open literature, that they are going to win in 5 to 10 days; so why do you not just pre-script it that way and let us win?

We say: Now wait a minute; we have got to take a look and take those ideas and march them across the events and time and see if it works. And all of a sudden when things start bogging down, they did not like it. They got irritated.

But now they started saying: Well, gee, maybe it is tougher. And that is part of the debate on the intel side of the discussion.

Senator **Wirth**. Do the Soviets do this sort of thing as well?

Mr. **Hay**. Yes, they do.

Senator **Wirth**. Do you exchange information about how you do this sort of thing?

Mr. HAY. They do not exchange it with us. But it is amazing how much open literature there is on almost anything you want to look at about what the Soviets do. [Deleted.]

Senator WIRTH. When NATO games this out, what are their results? Are they parallel to yours?

Mr. HAY. Let me give an anecdote from Admiral Moreau. I am talking about just this theater, but I think it is applicable in general. [Deleted.]

Senator WIRTH. So the answer is that they are not parallel exercises? The games are not parallel because the perceptions of the players on the NATO side are very different from the perceptions on our side?

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Senator WIRTH. Going back to Senator Exon's question, in your earlier slide the most important part about this as you summarized it was process.

Mr. HAY. Not procedure, but process. Yes, sir.

Senator WIRTH. It seems to me that that process again goes back to if in fact one of the things that we are trying to do is to coordinate better, not only internally but to coordinate better with our allies, [deleted].

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. No. But the point is for the life of me there must be something that I am totally missing here. These are games, you say do not draw any conclusions from them. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. Let me say, [deleted].

Mr. HAY. The data bases that the military uses for its forces and firepower.

Chairman NUNN. But the conclusions are not classified, are they? [Deleted.]

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. Why?

Mr. HAY. I think the staff would feel that it is undermining his position.

Chairman NUNN. Because it shows us better off than he shows?

Captain HURLBURT. It does not play his policy, either.

Chairman NUNN. That is right. It is a whole other different set of assumptions, I realize that. [Deleted.]

Captain HURLBURT. The other thing I would like to go back and reemphasize is this is one out of 50 games that we do, and we do numerous games with NATO. As I mentioned, there are more than 300 NATO officers at Newport right now conducting Open Road, which is a major game.

[Deleted.]

Senator WIRTH. [Deleted.]

Captain HURLBURT. [Deleted.]

Mr. HAY. Each service takes its part of it, and works it internally, and then they come back and tell us—[deleted]—what they liked and did not like and what they suggest in the future, and then where we should go with some of the joint study, and we go back and forth.

Just like I am showing with the Marines, we do that across the board.

Senator WIRTH. Is Red Storm Rising required reading for all of your planners?

Mr. HAY. No, but that is an interesting book. There are some elements of it that I find intriguing in terms of what we are doing here. But I would say that the book overall has been super because it is getting people to think about the dynamics that we are trying to portray.

Captain HURLBURT. I should mention, that sort of Red Storm Rising scenario has been played several times in prior years. I do not doubt but that one of the players who played in one of those games was the shadow author.

Chairman NUNN. He had to get information from a number of sources.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, before we close I want to give Colonel Sims a chance. I have heard what the Navy and Air Force and Army intend to do. I have never seen an operation where the Marines were not involved. What are the Marines doing in this whole proposition? Do you want to sound off on the Marines' role a little bit more, colonel?

They are there, are they not?

Colonel SIMS. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. He has on his joint hat also.

Colonel SIMS. The Marine Corps plays very closely in the global game and other gaming activities. Within global games there have been a number of aspects of amphibious warfare that have been played out [deleted].

Senator EXON. That sounds like the Marine Corps.

Senator WIRTH. Mr. Chairman, I found this very helpful. I thank you very much for doing this.

Gentlemen, from my perspective as a newcomer to the committee, it has been very useful, and thank you all.

Senator EXON. Gentlemen, I want to thank you. I think it has been a tremendously interesting exercise, and I certainly appreciate your coming over. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. We might try to have a time when the committee gets up there while you are playing the game. I doubt, given our time schedule, whether we would ever have time to participate. I know that takes a lot of time and thinking. You might keep us informed at some point when one day it might be particularly meaningful. We might try to take a plane and go up there.

Senator WIRTH. Do you have a game of short Monopoly?

Mr. HAY. [Deleted.] It would be wonderful.

Chairman NUNN. We thank all of you very much. This is the first time we have done this, and it begins to stimulate our minds, in the right direction. I am very grateful to you for coming. You have been extremely helpful. We appreciate you and your whole staff. We hope you will convey that to your staffs.

And Colonel Sims, if you would also tell the Chiefs that there is no permanent damage done to the institutions that we know of. We appreciate it very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

TUESDAY, JANUARY 20, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

COALITION ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Levin, Bingaman, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Quayle, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Robert E. Bayer, Richard D. Finn, Jr., Judith A. Freedman, John J. Hamre, William E. Hoehn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Gordon G. Riggle, Mark B. Robinson, and Patricia L. Watson, professional staff members; Russell C. Miller, research assistant; Karen A. Love and Pamela G. Powell, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Ken Heith, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Pat Buckheit, assistant to Senator Glenn; Leon Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; Jim Sayer, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terry Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Samuel J. Routson, assistant to Senator Symms; and Loren Kraner, assistant to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. Our hearing will come to order. Senator Warner will be here momentarily, but I thought we would go ahead and get started. I have a few brief opening comments before we talk to our first witness this morning, Dr. David Abshire.

The Armed Services Committee meets this morning for the sixth in a series of hearings on U.S. strategy. I am especially pleased to welcome today's witness, Ambassador David Abshire, our ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels, an individual who I think has served with great distinction in that capacity with a number of innovative initiatives we will hear more about today.

Dave Abshire is one of a very small group, unfortunately small in my view, of people who have spent a substantial amount of time thinking about coalition warfare, the role of alliances in our overall military strategy, and the management of the problems that arise in alliances like NATO.

Unlike the Warsaw Pact, NATO is a voluntary association of 16 democratic states, banded together to further their mutual security interests. In such an alliance, there are bound to be differences of views and opinions among the member nations, and yet NATO is an alliance which is completing its fourth decade of existence, during which it has an unequalled record of keeping the peace in Europe.

Nevertheless, there are, in my view, a number of concerns about NATO's continued viability and vitality. One need only note that the enormous increase in U.S. defense spending over the past 6 years seems to have provided, at least in overall macro terms, little additional defense capability to the NATO alliance.

General Bernie Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, continues to advance the gloomy forecast that if NATO were to be attacked by the Warsaw Pact using conventional forces alone, a nonnuclear conventional Warsaw Pact attack on the NATO alliance, as Supreme Allied Commander he would still have to request NATO's political leadership to give him authority to escalate to the use of NATO theater nuclear weapons within, and I quote him, "days, not weeks or months".

If this is an accurate assessment by our top military leader in Europe, then it is clear that the mismatch or gap between strategy and forces as far as NATO is concerned is unacceptably wide. As Ambassador Abshire well knows, we are committed to provide to our European allies as reinforcements within the first 10 days of mobilization a total of 10 U.S. armored and mechanized divisions and in excess of 1,500 first-line U.S. tactical aircraft currently based in the United States.

If our allies do not want or will not pay for a conventional defense capability adequate to meet a Warsaw Pact conventional attack with some prospect of at least holding up for weeks, not days, to reverse General Rogers' assessment, then NATO's real strategy becomes what we had hoped years ago we had agreed, at least conceptually, to move away from, and that is a nuclear tripwire capability. That is a very hazardous strategy. It is a very high risk strategy, and to make it very important to the U.S. taxpayers, it is not the strategy the U.S. taxpayers are paying for.

We are paying for what we hope will be a viable conventional capability, but if we are never going to get it, and if we are in a nuclear trip wire position, then the very least we can do after taking due note of the high risk position we are in is to cut down the expenditures and put those dollars in some other meaningful military capability.

If it is our real strategy, the last thing the United States should be planning to do, if all we are is a tripwire, is to insert 6 more U.S. divisions and 1,500 tactical aircraft into a theater that is about to escalate into a nuclear conflict because our allies have no more capacity to fight a conventional war.

I do not think you have to be much of a military strategist to understand the common sense of that. Why should we be inserting a huge amount of American military power in Europe at the very point in time where the war, as far as conventional capability is concerned, is over. The war is over if our allies no longer have the ability to sustain their forces independent of what the U.S. forces may be able to do. We cannot fight alone in Europe. That has never been part of our strategy. I have never known any American military commander that believes we can fight for very long after our allies on the flanks quit their conventional capability.

Thus, I will have a number of questions for Ambassador Abshire on the progress our allies have been making in laying the foundations for a more effective conventional defense. I do not think we have ever had a NATO ambassador who has done more in this respect and tried to stimulate more activity and thinking. I may not agree on the results, but I tip my hat, Ambassador Abshire, for your leadership and for your diligent efforts.

I intend to continue to monitor such progress closely, even while working to facilitate more efficiency and greater cooperation in the ways in which the alliance acquires its military capabilities. Several of us worked on that last year. Senator Warner, Senator Quayle, Senator Cohen and I all had amendments together and separately that addressed these concerns.

In the longer term, problems of burdensharing and of the allocation of defense missions loom large for the alliance. As most of us are by now aware, the European part of NATO spends a far smaller percentage of its gross domestic product for defense than does the United States. It has been argued by some that we are essentially stuck with that situation, since it is in our vital interest that Europe remain free and independent. Even more so if that is the case, and I think it is, Europe is certainly an interest in our security and survival, though I do not share the view that we simply sit back and say because it is in our vital interest to see Europe free that we should forever accept the status quo. I think that is untenable.

The second long-term issue continues to be the so-called "out of area" problem, and that is a more difficult problem with less clearly defined lines. That is how our allies deal individually and collectively with security threats beyond their immediate borders. Certainly, the area of the Persian Gulf comes to mind. Ambassador Abshire, I would welcome your views on this point as well.

In a moment, I will call on Senator Warner for his comments. Senator Warner, we have Ambassador Abshire here this morning, and I have gone ahead with my opening statement. I would like to hear from you.

I do want to make one point before we begin the proceeding with our witness this morning. Ambassador Abshire was invited to appear before the committee as our Ambassador to NATO prior to his accepting the additional position or supplementary position as Special Counselor to the President. He has graciously consented to keep this appointment with our committee, despite the competing demands of his new duties. I think that reflects his deep interest in this subject.

We are most grateful to have this opportunity to engage him in a strategy discussion of alliance matters and coalition defense issues, and I certainly urge my colleagues and hope that all of us will keep our questions confined to those issues and will not extend to questions about the subject matter of his new assignment at the White House.

Frankly, in my other committee assignments we may be hearing from Ambassador Abshire on that subject, but this morning's hearing has nothing whatsoever to do with that new assignment and everything to do with NATO strategy or, I might add, the lack thereof.

Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Ambassador and I have had a personal and professional relationship for well over a decade. We welcome him this morning. I think the chairman has outlined the framework and objectives of this committee, and we look forward to the testimony that you will provide.

Senator **Gore**. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Gore.

Senator **Gore**. Mr. Chairman, I would like the privilege of welcoming a fellow Tennessean as a witness to the committee. Ambassador Abshire is known for many things, but back in our home State we are very proud of the fact that he is a native Tennessean. I think it is a testament to his abilities that even as he has been tapped for this important new assignment, we are asking him to come and enlighten us on the aspects of his former assignment. We are glad to have you here.

Chairman **Nunn**. I might say just to emphasize that we are here talking about military strategy and not about Washington's current dilemma. We are not even going to swear you in this morning, Ambassador Abshire. So you are on your honor but not on your oath.

You might want to introduce your companions this morning. I know both Mike and Dennis, and I am sure that they have been invaluable to you as well as to others who have dealt with them. For the record, would you introduce them.

STATEMENT OF DAVID ABSHIRE, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO NATO, ACCOMPANIED BY MICHAEL MOODIE, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO AMBASSADOR ABSHIRE; AND DENNIS KLOSKE, SPECIAL ADVISOR TO DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NATO ARMAMENTS

Ambassador **Abshire**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. On my right is Dennis Kloske, who was with me at CSIS and went to NATO 3½ years ago, as our armaments advisor, and who is now working with Deputy Secretary Will Taft in the NATO Cooperation Committee, which I think is making enormous progress.

On my left is Mike Moodie, who was also with me at CSIS. He went to U.S. NATO and helped frame our public diplomacy program across Europe to involve intellectuals, thinkers, and experts in a dialogue with our mission.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind remarks. I wanted to note to Senator Gore, that until my 3½ years in Brussels I kept my Tennessee accent. It did not change a bit. It did affect my French.

Senator GORE. I hear no accent.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Mr. Chairman, let me applaud this committee for calling these hearings on national security strategy, the military strategy component. The hearings are timely and important in reexamining and validating the principles and character of national security strategy. In your letter, Mr. Chairman, you asked me for my views on strategic concepts, the coalition aspects of U.S. national strategy, and the need for a resources strategy. I am honored for the opportunity to share these thoughts.

In reaction to America's attrition strategy in Vietnam, there has been a revival of classical thought about military strategy and the employment of "forces in being". Members of this committee have made significant contributions to that revival. What this return to classical strategy has lacked, in my judgment, is the corollary, the application of strategic principles to "forces in the making" in peacetime. The essence of national strategy should be the coordination and harmonization of resources to fulfill objectives and meet commitments.

This is true both of our national strategy and our coalition strategy on which I will concentrate. Any strategic approach in peacetime planning must implement what I in my NATO work have named a resources strategy. The goal of this strategy is getting the most out of our limited resources and maximizing the return of defense investment.

Now, let me illustrate my fundamental point by comparing classical military strategy and this proposed resources strategy. The classic strategic principle of economy of force should be central to both. In war, the principle means to apply the right combination of forces in being at the right place and the right time. In peace, the principle means to develop the right combination of forces from the right financial, technological and industrial resources. In war, the objective is to concentrate resources on the enemy's vulnerabilities and your own objectives. In peace, the objective is to concentrate resources to reduce your own vulnerabilities and strengthen your commitments.

In both peace and war, it is vital to take a strategic approach to managing resources. The basic idea of a resources strategy is not to throw more money at our problem. A resources strategy must be, in essence, designed and disciplined to correct specific vulnerabilities and develop force multipliers.

Let me try to take a famous historical example, the Maginot Line. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it was a good idea. It worked. It was never breached. However, while the Maginot Line accomplished its narrow purpose in 1940, it did not prevent the defeat of France. The Germans outflanked this strong line and broke through a front of only 1½ miles at Sedan. If any of you had been the prime minister of France in the 1930s and had become convinced that France was vulnerable, investing more money in the Maginot Line would have accomplished nothing.

A proper peacetime defense resources strategy beginning with an accurate net assessment would have specified that the weak front opposite Belgium was to be fortified and that maneuver forces be developed to chop off any columns breaking through. The defense challenge then, and now, is not just more investment but more effective investment in the right places.

The lesson for NATO is that it must not be lured by the attraction of reinforcing strengths. It must bolster areas of weakness, including the creation of a better maneuver capability it does not now have. The NATO problem is not that it is uniformly weak. It is uneven, and redressing its shortcomings must be the top priority.

Now, this amoeba chart that Mike is putting out. My staff cautioned me against calling it an amoeba chart, but it looks like an amoeba. They looked up amoeba, and it says a microscopic onecelled animal consisting of a naked mass of protoplasm constantly changing in shape as it moves and engulfs food. Mr. Chairman, that is not NATO.

I think what this chart does illustrate is the point I've made that it is necessary for us to determine areas of weakness and shortcomings in our theory of resource allocation and to discipline, through our resources strategy, our future investments to close off those vulnerabilities. As we said of France in 1940, if you increased strength it would not help. You must close off vulnerabilities. This is a very rough chart taking force readiness, sustainability and armaments, and I think we are now developing a strategy to deal with those vulnerabilities, as I am going to try to explain.

Building more platforms has strong constituencies in NATO's navies, armies and air forces. Increasing stocks of ammunition and spare parts does not. Nevertheless, NATO must put its money where there are shortcomings, pushing the amount to meet our determined needs. That discipline is the element of a resources strategy and will be the key to NATO's future success. After all, NATO nations together enjoy 2½ times the GNP and 1½ times the population of the Warsaw Pact. We invest about the same amount in defense, yet NATO faces the potentially precarious position I have just described. It is outproduced in almost every area of defense production.

To me, NATO's greatest challenge, therefore, is to organize effectively our superior resources. NATO must improve its conventional capabilities and do so by getting more out of the dollars, marks, pounds, francs and so forth that are being invested.

The resource approach must also assess national commitments, for these commitments will discipline primary resource allocations. The fundamental aim of a resources strategy is to ensure that there is no mismatch between commitments and resources and that the two are harmonized.

The first task, then, is to determine the purpose of our commitments. My view of the American commitment to Europe has little to do with domestic, economic and demographic trends, with balances of trade and investment, or attractions between the Pacific versus the Atlantic. It has everything to do with deterring world war III. The primary security commitment of the United States must surely be the prevention of world war III and political coercion and intimidation short of war. To be sure, we comfront many dangers in the Third World, but none comparable to a third world war in a nuclear age. It is for this reason, not trade, not investment, not cultural and historic ties, that no region in the world beyond North America is more important to this country than Europe.

Europe is strategically important to us because if World War III were to begin, history shows it is likely to begin in Europe, where World War I and World War II began, although, of course, that conflagration could move from the Middle East area.

Moreover, a war in Europe would quickly become a global war, extending to the Pacific, the Persian Gulf and the Caribbean. In such a global war, the fate of Europe would be decisive. A Soviet victory in Europe would mean the loss of America's only significant entry into the Eurasian land mass. That is why Japan and our allies and friends outside of Europe have as great an interest as the NATO allies themselves in NATO's success.

If I could stick to page 6, otherwise, sophisticated people will ask can war really erupt in Central Europe? Should this ever be a worry? If not, should we not give priority to other areas of the world? I say flatly it can. Nuclear weapons have not produced some failsafe rationality in decisionmakers that rules out all miscalculation and misperception.

Furthermore, in the 1990s, nuclear deterrence through threatened first use will not have the same deterrent effect it did in the 1960s. The experiences of World War I and World War II suggest three lessons relevant to our current commitments in Europe. First, the United States learned that if it could not avoid involvement in Europe's wars by withdrawing from Europe; it would deter World War III only by being in Europe before a conflict emerged. This is why we joined NATO.

Second, we learned that unclear alliances and ambiguous commitments lead to misperceptions and miscalculations with devastating consequences. I have a much longer piece on this if somebody is interested. In the summer of 1914, alliances were secret and commitments often ambiguous. Not one leader believed that a World War would result from his decision. Their assumptions, based on inaccurate perceptions and ambiguous commitments, proved tragically wrong.

This is why Article 5 of the NATO Treaty states the unambiguous commitment that an attack against one ally would be considered an attack against all. Such a commitment by allied powers prior to World War I would have prevented that catastrophe.

Third, one of the most serious misperceptions that led to World War I and World War II was that a quick victory could be achieved with limited war. It was believed that the adversary would back down. If not, objectives could be secured through a short lightning-like military effort. I do not rule out such a perception reemerging in the 1990s if NATO becomes ceremonial with extremely uneven military capabilities and U.S. troops withdrawals, or if NATO became an alliance à la carte with allies choosing which responsibilities they will accept and which they will leave to others.

The Soviets study very carefully blitzkrieg warfare. They are working to operate outside their nuclear umbrella. It is not that I believe that Moscow would set out on a war policy, but as in 1914 and the late 1930s, an intimidation and blackmail policy could lead to miscalculation.

Some critics of the American commitment to Europe and advocates of troop withdrawal contend that the policymakers who took us into NATO never visaged U.S. forces remaining in Europe almost 40 years after they arrived. They did not, however, have an accurate assessment of the 1990s as we do today.

In my view, the situation in Europe today requires NATO urgently to bolster its conventional capabilities—I do not believe in the status quo—and eliminate its major vulnerabilities. It is a requirement made more critical by the arms control regime discussed in Reykjavik by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. For me, it is an urgent priority both in a less nuclear world or in a world of no nuclear reductions but where the nuclear deterrent, in fact, is in decline. If NATO does not act today to bolster its conventional forces, it could confront a more precarious situation in the mid-1990s, reminiscent of 1914 and the 1930s.

These are my judgments based upon my study of history and my projection of trends as we move into the 1990s.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I devoted my 3-day weekend to the next 25 pages of this statement, which I am going to take you through in about 5 minutes. I do hope that you distinguished gentlemen will read it in detail and will get back to me with your individual questions. When I get released from government, which is my objective, and go back to CSIS, I want to do 2 years of research in much greater detail on these things that I am talking about and their broader application.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Ambassador, you are our witness this morning, and this is an important part of our hearing, so if you could disregard Mr. Kloske's advice and read fast, we would like you to go right on through it.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. He says go up to the chart. I will do some more reading in a minute. I do not know about my amplification, but I will speak loudly.

I have placed here the elements of a NATO resources strategy. Could I have the chart? Why we need such a resources strategy; I have already said we have the superior resources. Our job is to make better use of those resources.

Mr. Chairman, I believe very strongly that as we look at strategic requirements, the first step is a better integrated net assessment. The Europeans have a fancy genteel name for that: military appreciation. I like to call it a dynamic net assessment. That goes beyond simply technological trends. I think the intelligence communities made a lot of progress in that. I think where we have not gone far enough is looking at operational considerations in given geographic areas.

I am not, Mr. Chairman, talking about another threat assessment. I am talking about how we stack up and where the weak points and the vulnerabilities are, particularly as viewed by an opponent. We know those great commanders like Napoleon and Robert E. Lee talked about getting into the mind of the opponent and how he views such situations, and this is what we are attempting to do through an improved integrated net assessment.

Our U.S. Mission started on such improvements, working with the Pentagon 2 years ago. We have seen great improvements in the work of the military committee in their risk assessments and in the combat effectiveness reports that are given by SACEUR and also the reports by CINLANT and SACLANT. They are coming before us more often.

We are trying to push these discussions to a higher level, and I think we have had a resurgence of activity in the military committee. I think in Brussels we are getting more out of the military committees than we have ever gotten before. That is a very important development.

So it is critical to have an improved net assessment as we look forward to the 1990s. But we have accomplished nothing if that integrated net assessment stays on the military level or simply on the level of ambassadors and does not go up to the very top level of defense ministers meetings and carried over, with the problem of the French, into some discussions, into the foreign ministers meeting.

And as I am going to indicate shortly, I believe such things should be discussed at the level of heads of government meetings at NATO. Now, out of such an integrated net assessment, one can come up with critical deficiencies.

And when Peter Carrington, 2 years at NATO, undertook the most intensive conventional defense improvement effort since 1950, we were able to come up not just with something under a dozen critical deficiencies, but did what some people told us it would be impossible to do: get agreement of all 15 countries in the defense planning committee.

Now, it would have been very easy to have stopped there with your critical deficiencies, and have no long range strategic thinking. Manfred Woerner has a strategic mind and a strategic approach, and it was he that first suggested we should have a conceptual military framework which should extend NATO's thinking from 6 to 20 years ahead.

Chairman NUNN. You are speaking of the German defense minister?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. The German defense minister, Manfred Woerner. And he made the suggestion at the defense ministers meeting in December 3 years ago, and the success of that conceptual military framework, has gone far beyond what he anticipated.

General Bernie Rogers, with his characteristic honesty, when he briefed SHAPE's conceptual military framework, at the end of it said: Why did we not do this before? So NATO, through the conceptual military framework in its projections, is now thinking 20 years rather than 6 years ahead.

And in my paper that you have, the mission components of that conceptual military framework are listed. This is the first year that we have been able to take those mission components and look at the performance of certain countries with regard to those mission components.

We have made great steps forward in the last 2 years of doing those report cards on NATO nations in terms of these things that I am talking about. Now, out of this conceptual military framework we are truly in a position of improving planning priorities and goals.

For example, the agreed critical deficiencies were written into force goals, and we are able to measure performance. And we are critical about the performance of some countries. In my paper, I have indicated where some have done well and some have not.

And NATO is a club, and the more you get these things discussed at the highest level of the club, those that are not adequately paying their dues get the message. And it also gives the politicians the leverage to go back home and say, we are not adequately performing.

So as we turn from planning priorities and goals, we are in a position then to start acting smarter and thinking smarter in our approaches to develop more coalition solutions. And by this, for example, I take the multiple launch rocket system phase three, terminally guided warhead, where we put in 40 percent of the cost and the Europeans put in 60 percent of the cost.

We are reversing Tom Callaghan's double structural disarmament. I am not talking about a lot of areas; I am talking about some areas. And we are all getting better return on investment, better commonality of weapons, and more effective abilities to carry out our operational and technical considerations.

If the NATO frigate program of the nineties, works as we hope, we would be able collectively to buy 125 frigates for the price of 100—reversing structural disarmament. I can take plenty of cases, and I have done it in my speeches, where we are going in the other direction.

I do not mean that we have a total correction. I am saying we are developing a total methodology to get at these problems and a better return on investment.

Chairman **NUNN**. Ambassador Abshire, let me interrupt you just one moment for clarification of term. Structural disarmament, I know Tom Callaghan has written on that extensively, but for the benefit of those who may not have read that would you define that term for us?

Ambassador **ABSHIRE**. Fewer and fewer weapons systems, at increasing cost, so that we price ourselves out of the defense business.

Chairman **NUNN**. Are you convinced that the Callaghan premise is basically a sound premise? That is what is happening?

Ambassador **ABSHIRE**. Yes.

Chairman **NUNN**. That is across the lines?

Ambassador **ABSHIRE**. Yes. Through duplication and inadequate competition, lack of long-range planning. And I am saying, Mr. Chairman, we have got a handle on it.

Chairman **NUNN**. Unless we reverse course, though, we are, in effect, as an alliance slowly but surely structurally disarming because of what we are doing and the way we are managing our resources?

Ambassador **ABSHIRE**. Absolutely. If we do not get more momentum behind what I am talking about, yes.

So we now can move to the next area of what I have termed the resources strategy, better technology management. We can all go broke throwing money at technology. And great developments have taken place in this area of NATO.

For example, the conference of national armaments directors has in their meetings begun to talk about such things as follow-on forces attack, the conceptual military framework. And by the way, this is with the French present. In our armaments work, the French are present. I am not saying they are active participants in those discussions, but they are present.

When we look at that historic problem of disciplining technology for the battlefield, if I can get very historic for a minute, you know, Gustavus Adolphus was the first to develop the theory of combined arms, and what really counted was not the introduction of new technology but being able to translate technology into operational and tactical considerations on the battlefield.

U.S. superiority in technology means little if it is not translated to the battlefield. So I am saying that in the conference of national armaments directors a lot of work is going on now in this kind of discipline. And I cannot emphasize strongly enough that we have moved from the armaments cooperation of the 1970s, where we talked simply about the two-way street, to the armaments cooperation of the 1980s, where we are talking about better total return on investment and better combat and deterrent capabilities.

In the armaments cooperation area, one of the most important things that has been done has been to push the discussions to a higher level. And we took the initiative with Will Taft in the Pentagon when he came to NATO and revived something that had not been used since 1950: a meeting at the deputy defense minister level to discuss armaments cooperation and better use of resources.

We have been through three of these meetings. We have another one coming up on the 27th of February. We have taken this issue out of the level of the bureaucrats and moved it to the level of the politicians, where it has to be, particularly if Europe is going to end this wasteful duplication in the armaments field.

And here in the Pentagon, I think something that is a huge step forward has also been accomplished, because Deputy Secretary Will Taft, who comes to our reinforced North Atlantic Council meeting, also chairs the NATO committee on armaments cooperation, which for example takes the programs that have come about as a result of the initiative of this committee and the fund which you gentlemen set up.

They monitor those candidates and interface with the North Atlantic Council. And by the same token, Will Taft chairs the Pentagon's defense resources board. So there has been a bridge created between the Taft group with NATO and the Taft group on defense resources, so that we get a better connect-up.

Now, I use this as an example as I talk to the other ambassadors, hoping that they will do more to follow suit in their own ministries, where in many cases the Army, Navy, and Air Forces are all fighting their own wars, their own resource allocations, without a central concept and without adequately relating these things to NATO.

Let me say with regard to the programs—and we can discuss these more later—that came as a result of the initiative of the chairman, the ranking member of this committee, and others, we now are in an unprecedented situation that a year after these were introduced at NATO we now have 7 memoranda of understanding that are signed and a total of 12 that are in the offing. That is 1 year later.

Now, gentlemen, I can turn around and I can criticize parts of this and I can give you our shortcomings, and they are there and I talk about those all the time at NATO. I am simply trying to say, we have got a strategy and I think we are making progress and we have got momentum if—if—we do not lose it.

Chairman NUNN. With the committee's permission, let me ask you one question on that point, because I think that is the key. It is probably a boring subject to a lot of people and it is probably a subject that is not commonly understood.

But the structural disarmament is a trend that has been in effect for the last 20 years, and it has now hit the United States. We are not big enough alone, unless we combine our purchases and our research with our allies, to sustain even the force structure we have now in terms of modernized equipment.

We have got to have commonality and we have got to have cooperation. So I congratulate you.

I had a note here that we had five memorandums of understanding on these cooperative R&D projects, and you are saying now we have seven. Is that right?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Yes.

Chairman NUNN. I might ask you one question on that point, and that is the administration, instead of requesting $200 million this year, which it has done for the last 2 years, they cut that down to $60 million, and they have cut the services out of it altogether.

So what we have is what you have highlighted, properly so, as one of the most important things in the coalition alliance that we are dealing with to prevent structural disarmament, and the administration has cut back drastically on that in terms of about $140 million.

Do you agree with that budget request?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. We at U.S. NATO do not prevail in everything. I believe in a priority to this program. I recognize that the view of the Pentagon was that so much was under way that the absorptive capacity might not be there. Will Taft has programmed out to 1991 and comes up with something like about $3 billion, $2.9 billion.

So if you look at the magnitude of what started with the concept of a $200 million fund, over time it is enormous. I would have preferred to have more funding this year and not wait. But the decision was made to cut that funding because of an estimate of the absorptive capacity.

Chairman NUNN. What happens when you cut the services out on that all together?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is not my desire. I think we have made tremendous progress with the services because, for example, the chief of staff of the Army—I think I phoned you from NATO when I got it—sent a cable to all of his commands on the importance of this program for getting better return on investment for the Army.

That statement would never have been made 10 years ago by an Army chief of staff or a Navy chief of operations. But I do think it is that absorptive capacity—and I see Dennis scribbling. Since he is over in the Pentagon, maybe he has something to say later.

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Ambassador, on this point, the purpose of the hearings is to pose substantive issues which we have covered this morning and preceeding. To what extent did you participate in that decision to go from 200 to 60, and did you have an opportunity to reclama? Did you have the opportunity to be heard?

Ambassador **Abshire**. I am fully heard in the Pentagon, Senator. My voice is fully heard there. It does not carry on every issue, but let me say, on the majority of the issues related to NATO it has carried.

And I have received magnificent personal support from the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. And they have supported the raising of NATO to the Deputy Secretary level, which has helped us enormously in cutting redtape. We would not be where we are today without it.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you.

Ambassador **Abshire**. So Mr. Chairman, I have been talking about improvements, our improved armaments cooperation, and if we have still some problems on the American side they are nothing compared to the problems on the European side. I have got figures in my testimony of the duplication that we have got in a range of areas, such as 10 companies in 7 countries trying to produce an antitank weapon.

The Independent European Program Group, which was formed in 1976 but was not operating effectively, until 2 years ago. And they are doing things such as studying the structure of European industry and determining how that structure can be made more efficient.

If we were to get an A on items A through F, and we do not, but if we were to get an A grade and still could not deploy our forces in times of crisis soon enough, we would not make it.

And I think that there are too many people that look through the rear view mirror of the 1960s, which is something that, if you go back to history, happens time and again or happened, to use my illustrations, in France in 1914 and France in 1940, and they do not understand the difference between the conditions of the 1960s, when Robert McNamara set up most of the thinking in terms of flexible response and the reinforcement of Europe, where we assumed we had 30 to 45 days to carry out that operation.

With reduced warning time, the Soviets have the ability to move into the Norwegian Sea under exercise conditions before NATO is at any kind of alert; to carry out those exercises in the 1990s, and yet in effect to have outflanked NATO; to be in a position to block the reinforcement of Norway, isolate Denmark, and be down on the G-I-UK gap. That "fleet in being" would give the Soviets enormous political leverage.

I simply give this as one example of how conditions have changed since the 1960s. Or if you take the operational maneuver groups, where the Soviets have copied blitzkrieg tactics—they have studied Gudesion and Mannstein and others—and where they are able to reduce warning time enormously, our old concepts of the reinforcement of Europe, 30 or 45 days, could well be out of the window.

What we are now attempting to do with NATO, is to look at that crisis management machinery. And our own Secretary of Defense is taking a lead in this, and we have new studies under way so as to project us in the management of those resources and forces in being to complement this improved effort of our forces in the making.

And last, Mr. Chairman, if I move to the link of economics and security, which ultimately is important, this gets into such issues as burdensharing and industrial base. This gets into such issues as whether Europe will turn more protectionist or whether trans-Atlantic protectionism will end up destroying the defense markets and our ideal of reaching longer production runs and greater efficiencies.

Some of you have attended the conferences that we do in Brussels between our Mission, our OECD Mission and our EC Mission, so that we break out of just the NATO context and look more broadly in the areas of technology, economic growth, and security policy.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion I would like to make first a comment or two on conventional arms control, because in facing the new and destablizing Warsaw Pact military options, Western conventional arms control must tackle head-on, rather than gloss over, militarily significant issues.

And as we talk later, I will quote, if I get a question on it, some of the work that is being done in this area.

If I could move to the next page, on troop withdrawals, I have attempted to lay out here some of my considerations why this is not the way to go. But I want to make it very clear, going back to the chairman's opening statement, I am not a status quo man.

I think those troops should stay for reasons that I have given. I do not think we should accept the status quo. I think there should be a greater European investment. I think that unilateral troop withdrawals by the United States could serve as a declaration by the alliance leader that NATO has become an alliance à la carte.

It would undermine NATO's confidence and cohesion, which serves us so well in our arms control negotiations. It would undermine our recent efforts to move forward on conventional arms control negotiations leading to greater stability in Europe, as called for by the Halifax foreign ministers meeting.

Each nation increasingly would pick and choose which responsibilities it would assume and which ones it would leave to others. Our leverage as NATO's leader to develop a common resource strategy would deteriorate, and structural disarmament would grow.

Our military strategy could become a sort of a bluff. We could well return to the conditions of 1914 and the 1930s, where the only way to avoid war would be to give in to coercion.

Like advocates of troop withdrawals, I am not satisfied with the status quo. In contrast to their solutions, however, I say let us bolster NATO's conventional capabilities by effective methods, building on our past momentum.

Finally, let me suggest to you a paradox, one that captures the nature of our current challenge. The Western alliance writ large, the relationship between North America and Western Europe that goes beyond NATO's business to include our economic, political, and cultural ties and conflicts, is having difficulties.

In contrast, thanks to the leadership of Secretary General Lord Carrington, the treaty organization is in better overall shape than it has been for years, I say perhaps ever. NATO has a new sense of priorities and a strategy to achieve them.

NATO now knows that business as usual will not work. It is thinking more creatively and long term than ever before. NATO is insisting on delivering greater return on our defense investment, and we can get even more. We have the leadership, we have the resources strategy in the making, and we have got the organization.

Properly used, these assets can generate even more European investment in defense. The NATO machinery exists to solve problems, including burden sharing disputes. That machinery includes meetings of heads of government if necessary. There are problems. Using that machinery is the way to deal with them.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Abshire follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID M. ABSHIRE, UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Let me applaud this committee for calling these hearings on "National Security Strategy: The Military Strategy Component." These hearings are timely and important in re-examining and validating the principles and character of U.S. national security strategy. In your letter, Mr. Chairman, you asked for my views on strategic concepts, the coalition aspects of US national strategy and the need for a Resources Strategy. I am honored for the opportunity to share my thoughts on these issues with the committee.

In reaction to America's attrition strategy in Vietnam, there has been a revival of classical thought about military strategy and the employment of "forces in being." Members of this committee have made significant contributions to that revival. What this return to classical strategy has lacked, however, is the corollary—the application of strategic principles to "forces in making" in peacetime.

The essence of national security strategy should be the coordination and harmonization of resources to fulfill objectives and meet commitments. This is true of both our national strategy and our coalition strategy, on which I will concentrate.

Any strategic approach in peacetime planning must implement what I, in my NATO work, have named a "Resources Strategy." The goal of this strategy is getting the most out of limited resources, maximizing the return on our defense investment.

Let me illustrate my fundamental point by comparing classical military strategy and this proposed Resources Strategy. The classic strategic principle of "economy of effort" should be central to both. In war, the principle means to apply the right combination of forces in being at the right place and at the right time. In peace, the principle means to develop the right combination of forces from the right financial, technological and industrial resources. In war, the objective is to concentrate resources on the enemy's vulnerabilities and your own objectives. In peace, the objective is to concentrate resources to reduce your own vulnerabilities and strengthen your commitments.

In both peace and war, it is vital to take a strategic approach to managing resources.

The basic idea of a Resources Strategy is not to throw more money at our problems. A Resources Strategy must be, in essence, designed to correct specific vulnerabilities and develop force multipliers.

Let me take a famous historical example—the Maginot Line. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it was a good idea. It worked, it was never breached. However, while the Maginot Line accomplished its narrow purpose in 1940, it did not prevent the defeat of France. The Germans outflanked this strong point and broke through a front of only 1½ miles at Sedan.

If any of you had been the Prime Minister of France in the 1930s and had become convinced that France was vulnerable, investing more money in the Maginot Line would have accomplished nothing. A proper peacetime defense Resources Strategy—beginning with an accurate net assessment—would have specified that the weak front opposite Belgium be fortified and that maneuver forces be developed to chop off any columns breaking through. The defense challenge, then as now, is not just more investment, but more effective investment in the right places.

The lesson for NATO is that it must not be lured by the attraction of reinforcing strengths. It must bolster areas of weakness, including the creation of a manuever capability it does not now have. NATO's problem is not that it is uniformly weak; it is uneven, and redressing its shortcomings must be the top priority.

This "amoeba" chart depicts schematically NATO's requirement. Clearly, NATO should not invest in those areas that push Alliance capabilities beyond what is required. Building more platforms has strong constituencies in NATO's navies, armies and air forces; increasing stocks of ammunition and spare parts does not. Nevertheless, NATO must put its money where there are shortcomings, pushing them out to meet our determined needs. That discipline is the essence of Resources Strategy.

Implementing an effective Resources Strategy will be the key to NATO's future success. After all, NATO nations together enjoy 2½ times the GNP and 1½ times the population of the Warsaw Pact. We invest about the same amount in defense. Yet, NATO faces the potentially precarious position I have just described; it is outproduced in almost every area of defense production. To me, NATO's greatest challenge, therefore, is to organize effectively our superior resources. NATO must improve its conventional capabilities and do so by getting more out of the dollars, marks, pounds, or francs invested in defense.

A resources approach must also assess national commitments, for these commitments will discipline primary resource allocations. The fundamental aim of a Resources Strategy is to ensure that there is no mismatch between commitments and resources, and that the two are harmonized.

The first task, then, is to determine the purpose of our commitments. My view of the American commitment to Europe has little to do with domestic economic and demographic trends, with balances of trade and investment, or with attractions between the Pacific versus Europe. It has everything to do with deterring World War III.

The primary security commitment of the United States must surely be the prevention of World War III and political coercion intimidation short of war. To be sure, we confront many dangers in the Third World, but none comparable to a Third World War in a nuclear age. It is for this reason—not trade, not investment, not cultural and historical ties—that no region of the world beyond North America is more important to this country than Europe. Europe is strategically important to us because if World War III were to begin, history shows it is likely to being in Europe where World War I and World War II began (although a Middle East confrontation could spark a conflict in Europe).

Moreover, a war in Europe would quickly become a global war, extending to the Pacific, the Persian Gulf, the Caribbean. In such a global war, the fate of Europe would be decisive. A Soviet victory in Europe would mean the loss of America's only significant entry into the Eurasian land mass. That is why Japan and our allies and friends outside Europe have as great an interest as the NATO allies themselves in NATO's success.

Militarily, Central Europe is the most dangerous place on earth.

Central Europe has the highest concentration of nuclear forces anywhere in the world.

It has the highest concentration of conventional forces anywhere in the world.

Central Europe is the only region where troops of the two superpowers face each other across a frontier, day in and day out.

It is the only area where potential adversaries, including four nuclear powers, exercise contingency plans for the first use of nuclear weapons.

Central Europe is the region where the Soviet Union has deployed the majority of its forces in peacetime; and, over the last 20 years, as an admission of the priority they afford Europe, the Soviets have added four conventional weapons for every one added by NATO.

Otherwise sophisticated people ask, "Can war really erupt in Central Europe?" I say flatly that it can. Nuclear weapons have not produced some "fail safe" rationality in decision makers that rules out miscalculation and misperception. Furthermore, in the 1990s nuclear deterrence through threatened first use will not have the same deterrent effect it did in the 1960s.

The experiences of World War I and World War II suggest three lessons relevant to our current commitment in Europe.

First, the United States learned that if it could not avoid involvement in Europe's wars by withdrawing from Europe, then it would deter World War III only by being in Europe before a conflict erupted. That is why we joined NATO.

Second, we learned that unclear alliances and ambiguous commitments lead to misperceptions and miscalculations with devastating consequences. In the summer of 1914, alliances were secret and commitments often ambiguous. Not one European leader believed a World War would result from his decisions. Their assumptions, proved tragically wrong. That is why Article V of the NATO Treaty states the unambiguous commitment that an attack against one ally would be considered an attack against all. Such a commitment by allied powers prior to World War I would have prevented that catastrophe.

Third, one of the most serious misperceptions that led to World Wars I and II was that a quick victory could be achieved with limited war. It was believed the adversary would back down. If not, objectives could be secured through a short, lightning military effort. I do not rule out such a perception re-emerging in the 1990s if NATO became ceremonial, with extremely uneven military capabilities and US troop withdrawals, or if NATO became an alliance "à la carte," with allies choosing which responsibilities they will accept and which they will leave to others. The Soviets study blitzkrieg warfare assiduously. They are working to operate outside the nuclear umbrella. It is not that I believe Moscow would set out on a war policy, but, as in 1914 and the late 1930s, an intimidation and blackmail policy could lead to miscalculation.

Some critics of the American commitment to Europe and advocates of troop withdrawals contend that the policy makers who took us into NATO never envisioned US forces remaining in Europe almost 40 years after they first arrived. They did not, however, have as accurate a net assessment of the 1990s as we do today. In my view, the situation in Europe today requires NATO urgently to bolster its conventional capabilities and eliminate its major vulnerabilities. It is a requirement made more critical by the arms control regime discussed in Rejkavik by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. For me it is an urgent priority both in a less nuclear world or a world of no nuclear reductions but where the nuclear deterrent effect is in decline. If NATO does not act today to bolster its conventional forces, it could confront a more precarious situation in the mid-1990s reminiscent of 1914 or the 1930s. These are my judgments based on my study of history and my projection of trends as we move into the 1990s.

ELEMENTS OF A RESOURCES STRATEGY

1. *An Assessment of the 1990s.*—I would like to share with the Committee the rough outlines of my assessment for NATO in the 1990s, because this is the first element of my Resources Strategy. Let me state my basic conclusion at the outset: By the mid-1990s, NATO could be vulnerable to a Soviet attack before allied mobilization and reinforcement are fully effective. Soviet capabilities could also force a pace of combat which NATO cannot match, thereby robbing NATO of many of the conventional options of its flexible response strategy and placing on NATO the burden of escalation to the nuclear level. As General Rogers has said, the Soviets are developing greater flexibility than we.

Several elements of this potential Soviet threat should be highlighted.

First, for some years, Soviet doctrine has stressed the benefits of keeping conflict below the nuclear threshold and developing a conventional war-winning capability.

Second, what is new in the Soviet effort is an increasing capability to fuse its quantity of forces with technological improvements and organizational innovations. Soviet organizational concepts, for example, are seen as the way to facilitate the rapid commitment of in-place forces to the battle, minimize pauses between operational echelons, and enable deep and rapid penetration of defenses.

Operational Maneuver Groups are an important part of this plan to limit NATO's response capability. They are designed to conduct swift and decisive penetrating operations with targets such as NATO's command-and-control structure, theater nuclear assets, air defenses, and key ground facilities.

As yet another example, the increased Soviet attention to improving their shorter-range tactical ballistic missiles (SS-21s, SS-22s, and SS-23s)—with greatly improved accuracies and armed with conventional, or chemical or nuclear warheads—gives us further concern, especially for the 1990s. In combination with other offensive capabilities, such TBMs could be used against NATO's critical assets—such as airfields, nuclear delivery systems and storage sites, C^3 facilities, and troop concentrations. We can expect the Soviets to continue to improve the effectiveness of their TBMs, and NATO will have to find smart ways to counter this capability.

Third, the preemptive incentive for the Soviets will be substantial. The future face of battle will be one that is extremely destructive and highly resource-intensive. Sustaining such a battle over a long period may be difficult for either side.

Under these conditions, maintaining effective C^3I will assume unprecedented importance. Conversely, early destruction of these capabilities of the enemy will also assume heretofore unparalleled significance. Thus, the incentives for pre-emption are heightened.

Fourth, the Soviets' growing maritime strength contributes to its potential for preempting NATO's options by outflanking NATO before war ever begins, or before NATO forces go on even simple alert. Improvements in the Soviets' ability to project naval power could afford them a "fleet in being" in the tradition of Mahan, which could possess enormous political utility without even firing a shot. The Soviet Navy has already demonstrated that it could deploy half of the Northern Fleet with 3 days' notice; about 70 percent within two weeks. Soviet exercises show that a submarine barrier can be placed across the G-I-UK gap within three days, the Soviet warships can be in the western approaches to the UK in 8 to 10 days. Trends suggest the Soviets are moving to shorten this time even more.

Even before a crisis, therefore, under the guise of exercises, Moscow could deploy its naval forces astride NATO's vital SLOCs, threatening NATO's ability to reinforce Europe. Successful Soviet attacks in the northern region prior to reinforcement could give them control of key airfields and greater capability to interdict NATO's prepared resupply ports, while offering a secure flank for Pact operations on the Central Front.

The net effect of these trends could be to isolate NATO Europe, increasing the likelihood that in-place NATO defense would be overwhelmed. The ultimate impact would be to shift to NATO the burden of deciding to escalate the conflict to the nuclear level at a time when we have lost escalation dominance. If these trends are left unaddressed, the Soviets might conclude in a crisis that they possessed the necessary elements to succeed in a conflict of short duration, confined to the non-nuclear level. If Soviet adversaries recognize this situation, then such military power can be translated into the potential for exerting substantial political leverage in situations short of crisis. I believe that the potential political leverage and the possibility of successful blackmail from such a Soviet conventional advantage would far exceed the blackmail potential from SS-20s or other nuclear capabilities, if only because conventional forces will be more visible and more usable.

This long-term assessment is sobering. It does not, however, justify profound pessimism. Such an unfavorable situation is not pre-ordained if NATO gets its act together. The Alliance has already begun to examine systematically its vulnerabilities, and it has taken steps to rectify its deficiencies. Then problems can be solved if we develop and implement an appropriate peacetime NATO Resources Strategy.

What is NATO doing institutionally to develop this first element of a resources strategy, what NATO calls a "military appreciation" or what I would call a "dynamic net assessment—how we stack up against the Warsaw Pact now and in the next decade?

NATO's improving military appreciation is based on three documents which give political authorities the military estimate over the next five and over the next 20 years. These are:

The Combat Effectiveness Report which is the view of NATO's major commanders on how their forces would fare today;

The Military Suitability and Risk Assessment which provides the commanders' opinion of how forces projected over the next five years would stack up; and

The Conceptual Military Framework which takes a 20 year look, about which I will say more in a moment.

The impact of these assessments will be felt, however, only if they are read and digested at the political level. It is in this regard that considerable progress has been made, but we have not gone nearly far enough. Ministers must have more detailed discussions and, in my judgment, sooner or later the Council should meet at heads of government level to discuss the assessments. The NATO machinery is all there. We only need to use it more fully at higher political levels.

2. *Understanding Critical Deficiencies.*—Defense Ministers have already agreed to a list of the most serious problems that need urgent attention. These problems are:

A shortfall in standing ground forces;

Too many differences in the levels of training, equipment, manning and availability of mobilizable reserve forces;

Inadequate means to defeat, disrupt, or destroy the enemy's reserves;

Serious deficiencies in the number of suitable aircraft, modern munitions and supporting systems for effective offensive counter air operations;

Deficiencies in air defense, including the absence of a system to identify friendly and hostile aircraft;

At sea, the need to improve ASW, maritime air defense, and mine countermeasures.

Insufficient stocks of simple, but essential, things such as ammunition.

This year electronic warfare and C^3I could be added to that list.

How is NATO coping with these shortcomings?

First, Ministers have agreed that nations should make a special effort to implement force goals that are specifically directed to resolving the agreed areas of deficiency. Our recent analysis of the answers to this year's Defense Planning Questionnaire shows that the U.S., U.K. and Germany had largely succeeded in implementing the CDI-highlighted force goals with implementation rates of over 90 percent. Italy and The Netherlands also achieved good implementation rates, and the aid-receiving countries—Greece, Portugal, and Turkey—are in a separate category. The other allies, however, showed disappointing implementation rates.

These are the kinds of issues that Defense Ministers should be reviewing in more detail and much more specifically at their twice yearly meetings; our Secretary of Defense wants very much to do this.

Second, the senior committees of the Alliance are making efforts to sharpen their focus on remedying deficiencies.

The NATO Air Defense Committee (NADC), for example, is pursuing implementation of the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) which will provide modern C^3 in the air battle. The NADC is also working on anti-tactical ballistic missile issues and addressing the critical deficiency in offensive counter-air as that deficiency affects air defense.

The Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee has placed special emphasis on force goals that support rapid reinforcement, planning for reception, and the onward movement of reinforcements and supplies.

The Infrastructure community has revised procedures and expedited implementation to provide the aircraft shelters and other facilities to support reinforcement of Europe. In an important related development, SACEUR has agreed to devote additional infrastructure funds to begin the most urgent improvements to NATO's P-O-L storage and distribution system in Central Europe beginning in 1987.

In another important development, eleven nations have signed a statement of intent to develop cooperatively the NATO Identification System.

3. *Conceptual Military Framework.*—The Conceptual Military Framework lies at the heart of the resources strategy. It is a much needed instrument to provide greater coherence and vision to NATO's long range planning process, moving NATO's planning horizon from 5 to 8 years to 20 years. The CMF is designed to discipline NATO's military thinking, tactics and technologies to the battlefield of the 1990s and beyond. SACEUR's comment when shepherding the development of the first CMF was that NATO should have had it before.

Key mission components in the CMF include "Defeat the Lead Echelon," "Follow-on Forces Attack," "Attain and Maintain a Favorable Air Situation," "Sea Control," "Maritime Power Projection," "Control and Protection of Allied Shipping," and "Rear Area Operations." In December 1986, crisis management was included as a key mission component. The NATO military authorities now use the CMF's key mission components as a measure against which to evaluate how individual nations are doing in each area.

A useful spinoff of the CMF was allied agreement to extend to 20 years the horizon of the agreed threat document. Another is development by NATO's senior logisticians of a document drawing the logistic implications of the CMF.

4. *Better Planning, Priorities and Goals.*—Better planning is the fourth element of the resources strategy. Defense Ministers have approved a report containing extensive recommendations for remedying deficiencies in the planning system. In essence, these plans will link up NATO's various dimensions in a way that makes the whole more than the sum of the parts. NATO's Executive Working Group is responsible for this greater integration, the goal of which is to ensure that the defense improvements envisioned by one part of the headquarters will be appropriately supported and complemented by others.

We are also working to link more closely the planning at NATO Headquarters with the planning in national capitals. In the last two years, the Department of Defense has made a huge step forward in this regard, and I constantly cite it as an example to other NATO nations' Defense Ministers. One relatively new DOD NATO armaments cooperation subcommittee is chaired by Deputy Secretary Will Taft who also chairs the Defense Resources Board. Three crucial things have happened: first, a vital link has been made between our defense resources and NATO armaments cooperation in our long-term and short-term planning; second, Defense Department NATO armaments planning has been placed at the Deputy Secretary level; third, Deputy Secretary Taft, working with my mission at NATO, took the lead in establishing NATO Council meetings at the Deputy Minister level. I note here we are talking about the 16 nations, including the French. Such had not happened since the very early 1950s.

5. *More Coalition Solutions.*—Deterrence is a coalition demand, and coalition solutions are the next element of Resources Strategy. We Americans need better return on our defense investment, and one way to do that is through Alliance collaboration. I am so happy that recent directives of our own services represent a realization of this point. A variety of approaches is possible. A good example of an earlier coalition approach, started during the Carter Administration, is the NATO AWACS program which has now been completed with the 18th plane delivered. After expenditures of about a billion pounds in a go-it-alone NIMROD approach, and after nearly a decade since its decision not to join the NATO AWACS common procurement effort, the United Kingdom will now purchase AWACS as its contribution to NATO's airborne early warning and control capabilities. France is also considering the purchase of AWACS. This program is truly an impressive achievement, and a follow-on tanker program should be urgently explored.

MLRS Phase III, which involves terminally guided warheads, is an example of a different cooperative effort. The United States is paying 40 percent of the cost and Europe 60 percent for the system.

Another type of coalition solution is the NATO Frigate for the 90S, or NFR-90. The NFR-90 program represents the biggest collaborative effort in Alliance history. Although we do not yet know how many frigates will be constructed, the program could give us 125 ships for the price of 100. That, like MLRS, would be a huge step forward in reversing Tom Callaghan's "structural disarmament."

A facility for the common procurement of ammunition is yet another idea being discussed at NAMSA and in our NATO Council. It is poor use of resources when various allies pay widely different prices for the same round of ammunition. A common facility, perhaps located in a southern region country to exploit lower labor costs, would provide a better return on the money devoted to this need.

6. *Better Technology Management.*—Technology is one of the West's greatest assets. NATO has neither protected its technology adequately nor shared it effectively, and a better technology management program is the next element in the Resources Strategy.

We are making progress. On the protection side, COCOM procedures have been streamlined and agreement has been reached on some outstanding issues related to sensitive technologies.

On the sharing side, NATO's "Emerging Technologies" effort is assessing how NATO can introduce relatively mature technology as timely and effectively as possible. Another example is Secretary of the Navy Lehman's offer to share Aegis technology as a way to get an anti-air warfare system on the first NFR-90 ships. Aegis software cost us about $500 million to develop, and it would be nonsense for the Europeans to try to duplicate it. Secretary Weinberger had similar motivations when he offered advanced technology for the European fighter project.

Unclear U.S. technology transfer policy, however, may be fostering internal European armaments cooperation to the exclusion of the United States. Those who argue that Europe won't turn a cold shoulder to U.S. offers to participate which do not entail significant technology sharing are living in the past. In its own inefficient way, Europe is working to develop a technology base free of American restrictions.

In another critical technological area, under the air defense rubric, NATO is examining how to counter the emerging threat from tactical ballistic missiles, both nuclear and conventional.

The ATBM issue raises another example of how we can improve our technology management. For too long we paid insufficient attention to the possible technological translations of SDI research with important implications for conventional defense. We failed to appreciate fully the benefits that derive from the synergies that could be generated. After all, 40 percent of the SDI budget was being devoted to information acquisition and management, an area clearly with potential applications in the conventional field. These possibilities were not being exploited enough to help improve Alliance conventional capabilities.

I applaud the new Defense Department emphasis on developing "competitive strategies," as well as the new committee just formed by Dr. Fred Ikle, to better integrate long-range strategy and technology. NATO will be a beneficiary.

7. *Improved Armaments Cooperation.*—As you would expect, I believe that improved armaments cooperation must be the centerpiece of any NATO resources strategy. Some figures demonstrate how we squander our resources in this area: 11 firms in 7 countries building anti-tank weapons; 18 firms in 7 countries designing

and producing ground-to-air weapons; 16 companies in 7 countries working on air-to-ground systems.

When I spoke before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during my confirmation hearing, I said that I would make improved arms cooperation one of my highest priorities. It is essential in order to reverse structural disarmament and close conventional defense gaps. In three and one-half years, we have demonstrated that the time for armaments cooperation has come; it is being pursued as a critical NATO priority.

First, we have changed our thinking. When we have a $170 billion trade deficit, we can no longer focus exclusively on a "two way street" concept in transatlantic trade. Rather, we are thinking about how to make better use of our resources throughout the entire R&D process—from research on new ideas at the start to procurement of finished systems at the end. One ultimate purpose is improved tactical and operational effectiveness.

Second, in Europe the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) has become a real player in the game. As you know, the IEPG was created in 1976 in order to improve European arms cooperation. No one, however, believed they would amount to much. Today, IEPG Defense Ministers have held three meetings, and there is every indication that such meetings will become institutionalized.

We hope the IEPG can bring about some rationalization of Europe's defense industry and harmonization of European programs and requirements. At the same time, we do not want this to be done in a protectionist manner that excludes the United States and Canada.

Third, the positive developments in Europe have been accompanied by progress in the United States. The Departments of Defense and State have made armaments cooperation a fundamental policy goal. The leverage of the DoD Steering Group, chaired by Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft, is beginning to be felt. Services are embracing the logic of armaments cooperation, as shown by the Army's purchase of the French RITA battlefield communication system. Offices of Defense Cooperation in U.S. embassies have been tasked to promote arms cooperation as well as foreign military sales. I am delighted with Deputy Secretary Taft's initiative to create 40 new manpower billets to support this effort, in our embassies overseas.

You in the Senate have become a partner in this effort. Your passage of the amendment offered by Senators Nunn, Roth, and Warner has been particularly important. Less than a year after passage of the legislation, NATO nations selected 12 high visibility programs for cooperation under auspices of the amendment. All 12 projects have been put on a fast development track by armaments staffs. Seven of those 12 are multinational programs managed at NATO Headquarters under the auspices of NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors.

In every case, good progress is being made in overcoming a not-unexpected determination to achieve the best national positions in the program management organization and the most benefits in cost and work sharing arrangements.

Compromises, of course, have been necessary in the negotiations process; yet few disagree that the Alliance has surprised itself with a heretofore uncharacteristic sense of urgency in implementing these programs under this vital legislation.

We are not pursuing these specific projects in isolation from determined military needs. All of these projects are targeted to fill a very important military requirement. Some of the Nunn projects, for example, are designed to enhance our ability for Follow-on Forces Attack. Because elimination of any one of the FOFA projects could seriously degrade, if not render useless, other parts of the FOFA package, we must take a holistic view, not an item-by-item approach.

European allies must become more competitive if future armaments cooperation is to be truly effective. Our part of the bargain to to play by the rules of competitive procurement. When we buy the best system at the best price, the whole Alliance gains. It is a Resources Strategy at its best.

8. *Updated Crisis Management.*—Improvements in our planning process are especially important in the area of crisis management, the eighth element in Resources Strategy. NATO's forces must be brought to bear at the right place at the right time. If not, our whole Resources Strategy and past investments will be made irrelevant. Improving crisis management will generate dividends far beyond the limited costs such improvements might entail.

At the December 1986 Ministerial, Secretary Weinberger told his colleagues the U.S. was examining the adequacy of the NATO Alert System and Host Nation Support arrangements to secure from NATO Civil Wartime Agencies the support needed for successful implementation of SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan. The United States is also reviewing the NATO exercise cycle to accommodate more effective tests of the Alliance's ability to transition quickly from peace to war under a short-warning scenario, and to improve its ability to test and evaluate reinforcement execution. These are all initiatives developed between Dr. Fred Ikle and my mission at NATO, and General Jack Merritt's Military Delegation.

In regard to "out-of-area" crises, such issues are of deep concern to Alliance members; however, the term "out-of-area" itself is very misleading. As you will recall, Article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty defines the Treaty area in which an armed attack would constitute a casus belli. That article does not of itself preclude collective planning or even operations south of the Tropic of Cancer in the Atlantic Ocean or in any other important security area.

The most recent statement of the Alliance out-of-area commitment is in the final paragraph of the Ministerial Communique of the North Atlantic Council, dated 10 June 1983. In that paragraph, the Alliance members recognize that events outside the Treaty area may affect their common interests. If their interests are deemed not to be involved, then it is not a NATO out-of-area crisis. If such interests are involved, Alliance nations are committed, clearly and publicly, to timely consultations.

In the same paragraph, the principle is also reaffirmed that sufficient military capabilities must be assured in the Treaty area. We have been successful in gaining Alliance agreement to compensatory force goal measures that will ensure adequate forces in the Treaty area in the event U.S. forces are used outside the area. In addition to the compensatory force goals, the Alliance has also agreed to other measures calling for the provision of combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) forces to replace U.S. CS/CSS reinforcing forces that might not be available for Europe in the event of the U.S. out-of-area deployment.

Finally, in the same paragraph is the statement that "individual member governments who are in a position to do so will endeavor to support, at their request, sovereign nations whose security and independence are threatened." The statement continues, "Those allies in a position to facilitate the deployment of forces outside the Treaty area may do so on the basis of national decision."

It is unfortunate the distinctions sketched above are all too often lost in the heat of out-of-area debates.

9. *Economics and Security.*—General economic performance and national security are more closely linked today than ever before, and better understanding of that link is the final element of my Resources Strategy.

A strong economy is essential for enhancing security both on a national and Alliance basis. Economic growth generates the necessary increased financial, technological and industrial resources that must be devoted to defense. In the area of technology, for example, Western technological power has fostered widespread breakthroughs that have been translated into potential battlefield advantages. Given the close relationship between economics and security, it is not only Foreign and Defense Ministers that must understand what NATO is doing and what it needs, but Finance Ministers, Trade and Industry Ministers, and others as well.

In times of lagging economic growth, competition for limited resources among alternative, and equally worthy, national objectives intensifies, and security is frequently the short-changed objective. This is as true for our Allies as for ourselves. Europe's economies in the early 1980s did not enjoy the strong performance we have seen in this country. That is changing, and all NATO Allies must do everthing possible to ensure that not only their own national economies, but also those of all the Allies are healthy and growing.

We must also avoid measures that might yield short-term narrow benefits, but which damage the Alliance long-term health. Protectionism is one such measure. It would destroy armaments cooperation and, ultimately, threaten Alliance cohesion. Protectionism must be rejected as inconsistent with the goals of an effective Resources Strategy.

Critics of the Alliance contend that the improving economic performance of some European allies' demands that they do more for NATO. Let me say a few words about burdensharing. Make no mistake—we must continue to press America's allies to carry their "fair share" of the security burden. However, burdensharing, properly understood, is a much larger concept than the numbers game to which it is all too often reduced. We all know there are many contributions to the common defense that are not factored into NATO calculations of defense spending.

The U.S. also needs to keep an historical perspective. We have a good recent record, but the Allies did well in the 1970s when we did not. Between 1971 and 1984, U.S. defense spending, by NATO measures, increased in real terms by 12 percent while that of the other Alliance members, taken together, by 30 percent.

The smaller nations sometime find it difficult to shoulder a just portion of the common defense. In terms of their area, Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Denmark combined, are smaller than Alabama. Norway—a huge nation in area—has a population about as large as Detroit's. The entire Belgian navy is not large enough to man a single Nimitz-class carrier. For such nations—some of which have fragile coalition governments—even a manifold increase in real growth in defense funding would not substantially affect the overall balance. The larger allies, on the whole, are doing their share—especially in terms of output if not always in real growth in defense spending. For example, although now projecting a period of little or no real growth, the United Kingdom has increased defense spending by 20 percent in real terms since Prime Minister Thatcher took office.

To achieve the best results, the U.S. must carefully target how hard, when and where to push the allies to do more. We should invoke our net assessment to pinpoint specific things that allies must do. We must communicate the problems in detail. Above all we must build Alliance-wide pressure by raising individual performance questions at the top political levels where they can be discussed by Defense Ministers.

CONCLUSION

As a final comment, it is germane to ask how NATO's developing Resource Strategy relates to two issues which have received significant attention over recent months: arms control and the level of the U.S. military presence in Europe.

Conventional Arms Control

In facing new and destabilizing Warsaw Pact military options, Western conventional arms control must tackle head-on, rather than gloss over, militarily significant issues. Whatever the post mortems of the Reykjavik summit's specific problems, the fact that the leaders of the two superpowers met to directly discuss militarily significant issues is fundamentally a healthy process, because the relationship between each side's strategy and dependence upon nuclear weapons ultimately cannot be dissociated from the conventional and chemical imbalance in Central Europe. Until we have militarily meaningful conventional arms control, NATO will need a Resources Strategy to keep that imbalance from not only becoming more imbalanced but also more unstable. Moreover, if we get our act together on a Resources Strategy, we will bolster the leverage we can bring to the negotiating table. Alliance cohesion and cooperation have been critical in fostering progress in arms control, and the implementation of a Resources Strategy will only strengthen prospects for a positive outcome.

Troop Withdrawals

Over the last year, indeed last week before this committee, a number of distinguished American strategists have argued that the level of U.S. troops in Europe should be reduced by 100,000 men. The burden of proof rests with those who propose such a fundamental restructuring of American strategy. Troop withdrawal proponents must provide convincing evidence beyond mere assertions that the results they promise would be the ones produced. To me, the opposite is at least as likely.

It is not obvious how a reduced U.S. commitment gives Europeans an incentive to do more.

It is not clear how the withdrawal of American forces enhances NATO's conventional defense.

It is not proven that such a move would generate a savings that could be directed to shortcomings elsewhere. In fact, the Department of Defense estimates that it would take 8 to 9 years to achieve any "savings" to balance off the $5 billion dollars one-time cost of bringing the troops home.

It is not assured that U.S. forces withdrawn from Europe would not be eliminated from the U.S. force structure altogether.

Unilateral troop withdrawals by the United States would serve as a declaration by the Alliance leader that NATO had become an Alliance à la carte. It would undermine NATO's confidence and cohesion which serve us so well in our arms control negotiations. It would undermine our recent efforts to move forward on conventional arms negotiations leading to greater stability in Europe, as called for in the Halifax Foreign Ministers meeting. Each nation increasingly would pick and choose which responsibilities it would assume and which ones it would leave to others. Our leverage as NATO's leader to develop a common Resources Strategy would deteriorate, and structural disarmament would grow. Our military strategy could become a sort of bluff. We could well return to the conditions of 1914 and the 1930s, where the only way to avoid war would be to give in to coercion.

Like advocates of troop withdrawals, I am not satisfied with the status quo. In contrast to their solutions, however, I say let's bolster NATO's conventional capabilities.

Finally, let me suggest to you a paradox—one that captures the nature of our current challenge. The Western Alliance writ large—the relationship between North America and Europe that goes beyond NATO business to include our economic, political and cultural ties and conflicts—is having difficulty. In contrast, thanks to the leadership of Secretary General Lord Carrington, the Treaty organization is in better overall shape than it has been for years—perhaps ever. NATO has a new sense of priorities and a strategy to achieve them. NATO now knows that "business as usual" won't work. It is thinking more creatively and long-term than ever before. NATO is insisting on delivering greater return from our defense investment, and we can get even more. We've got the leadership; we've got the strategy; we've got the organization. Properly used, these assets can generate even more European investment in defense. The NATO machinery exists to solve problems, including burden-sharing disputes. That machinery includes meetings of Heads of Government, if necessary. If there are problems, using that machinery is the way to deal with them.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

You are saying on that last statement, as I understand it, that our military relationships within the alliance, the military strategy is in much better shape than the political and economic overall relationship, is that right?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. It is in much better shape than overall relationships that go beyond the alliance, but which are frequently thought of as the alliance by the American public. The treaty organization, what exists at NATO in Brussels, and the commands are in better shape than ever before. I am not adequately satisfied with our deterrent strategy, but we have the approach, we have the organization and the strategy in the sense of knowing where we are going to go with our resources, and I am saying let us put more steam behind what we have going.

Chairman NUNN. Ambassador Abshire, what about the difference between military strategy—you are saying we really have a military strategy. There are a lot of different innovations that have taken place. You have advocated a resources strategy, and so forth. What about the question of grand strategy, which includes military but also gets into political, cultural, economic, all of those things that you say are not in real good shape?

Does NATO in your opinion have a grand strategy?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. I think NATO potentially has a grand strategy.

Chairman NUNN. Well, potentially means you do not have one but you could, right?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. That is right, we have it in the——

Chairman NUNN. It is a vision rather than a reality.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. It is becoming a reality.

Chairman NUNN. I think I get the difference.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. If you go back to Alexander the Great and grand strategy you start with values. Those are in the NATO charter. We do have a political strategy in maintaining unity, and we have maintained unity and cohesion in terms of the missile deployment, in terms of our various negotiating fora under some very difficult circumstances. I think we are developing an effective negotiating strategy for NATO, particularly now that we have moved into conventional negotiations.

We have a deterrent strategy. I think it needs to be updated, and I have talked about how that is done. We need a resources strategy. A few years ago we had none. We are getting one. We need an effective public strategy. That we do not do very well is because we have got some countries that say that such matters should be left to nations and not to any collective entity. We have a highly effective Secretary General who is articulate, but we have a long way to go on an effective public strategy. Those are the elements of a grand strategy as I see them. They are there.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner, I used some of my time during the course of the presentation, so go ahead. I will come back on mine.

Senator WARNER. I was going back to the Ambassador's reference to the Maginot Line. I studied that history extensively. I went over and visited and actually went into one of those fortifications, and as you may recall, Maginot was a sergeant in the French army in World War I and he lost a leg, and it was replaced with a wooden leg, and he later joined the French Parliament, and history recalls that he would go into the sessions of the parliament and take his wooden leg and beat the top of his desk until his colleagues voted enough money to build the Maginot Line.

Now, you pointed out the fault in his planning but those fortifications were never overcome by the German army, as you recall. They stormed them but never took one. The point of all this is that Senator Nunn and I in planning these hearings were hopeful that the results of these hearings would be our wooden leg, that we can go into our chamber and get the attention of our colleagues to support a strong defense budget.

Is that not right, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman NUNN. I did not hear it, but if you said it, I am sure it is right.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Ambassador, your thought to call on the building up of the conventional forces is very interesting. Indeed, we want to do it, but I wonder if there is not a parallel to the dilemma we have in this country today in relation to SALT II. Those who feel that our President erred in not continuing to adhere to the limits will now induce the Soviets to proliferate their weapons construction program in the strategic area and build up greater forces. If the Soviets perceive now a dramatic change and enhancement of our conventional forces, do they not have the arsenals in being to begin to outproduce any incremental achievement we may have in a short period of time?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Senator, if we take that superior resource base that I cited on the chart and effectively organize it——

Senator WARNER. That base is in the GNP.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. That is right.

Senator WARNER. But the Soviets realistically are in factories working night and day to turn out the artillery pieces and the tanks and the like.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. That is right, but when I speak of effectively organize, I carry it not just from the GNP but over into the defense area. We have got the capability. Now, it takes a continued high level of investment. It takes a greater level of investment by certain European countries. There are still areas, despite my talk about success, where we can make great steps forward in organizing ourselves operationally in terms of weaker areas. The Soviets are enormously concerned about our technological capability.

The Soviets are extremely concerned about the success of FOFA. They believe that the success of the Follow-On Forces Attack concept being turned into reality, their estimate of that happening is greater than mine because, just as with regard to the Strategic Defense Initiative technology, they have enormous respect for American technology, and they are also concerned—they have had more imagination on this than some of our people—about the translations to the conventional defense area of some of that strategic defense technology.

So, I think in this very difficult balance over which I am an alarmist, I am also optimistic in believing that, with leadership and the strategic approach in resources, we could produce something of a reversal of these trends. It will demand new investment in some key areas as well as better use of investment.

Senator **Warner**. We have observed through the years now that one of the principal Soviet objectives is to split off our NATO allies from the United States. If we were to pursue a troop withdrawal program, would not that begin to play into that grand strategy of the Soviets to split us off?

Ambassador **Abshire**. I believe it would for political reasons and military reasons because that balance is too precarious. We are too uneven. A lot of the NATO deployments, as you know, are for political reasons, who covers what sector, and there are uneven areas, NORTHTAG being one. So a pull-back of American forces is not the solution.

One can argue a different deployment of those forces in different ways, but the balance is so narrow that I think it is of great concern to any reduction of forces, but Senator, very quickly, I do not believe in staying with the status quo or having the Europeans feel that if we are not going to withdraw troops they can relax. We have got to make a new commitment. They have got to make a new commitment. And if necessary have people meet at the level of heads of state to discuss those needs.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Levin.

Senator **Levin**. Welcome, Dave.

Mr. Ambassador, you have made reference to the burden-sharing issue, and as chairman of the new Subcommittee on Conventional Forces, I am very much determined to get into that area of burden sharing. We spend roughly twice as large a percentage of our GNP on the military as does our NATO allies on the average. It is a complex subject, and this is not the place to get into it in detail. And you have given a lot of thought to it, and I know you are not satisfied with the status quo on it, either, as you mentioned this morning.

The fundamental question we face is, how do we force a fairer sharing of the burden without weakening NATO? That is the trick. And I am wondering, rather than pressing you this morning on it, whether you might be willing to come back to one of our subcommittee hearings on the burdensharing issue and help us piece our way through that question. Would you be able to do that in the next few months?

Ambassador **Abshire**. I would welcome that.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you.

Ambassador **Abshire**. Could I make just one comment?

Senator **Levin**. Sure.

Ambassador **Abshire**. What I am groping for is following in other areas the example that this committee set in setting up the $200 million fund which was an amazing catalyst at NATO, how we can develop other incentive amendments with teeth that stimulates action over there, and I also think that getting Europeans to appreciate in more depth that the net assessment that I am talking about is a key to greater defense investment.

I would welcome such an opportunity.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you. Since you mentioned that $200 million cooperative program, let me just press you with one question on that. You have been asked by our chairman and I think Senator Warner about it as to whether or not you had full access during the budget process to the Pentagon so your argument could be made. Senator Nunn, I believe, Senator Warner or Senator Quayle, I am not sure who last year took the initiative on this $200 million joint effort. It was a bipartisan effort of this committee. We felt strongly about it, our leadership. We put the money in, and lo and behold, it is this year cut to $60 million. You said, well, you have just lost that argument.

My question is this. What would have been an appropriate level for that joint R&D effort in this budget? What did you ask for?

Ambassador **Abshire**. The full amount of $200 million. Of course, the first year the Congress did not give the $200 million. The first year when we got through it ended up $90 million when it got out of the Appropriations Committee, so the $200 million was the ideal. I must say that a little bit of the difference, some of the difference that I would have had with the Pentagon on this is symbolism, to come in this year with that very strong symbolism. I realize the argument that as the funding process moves forward there is a digestion process, and it was just about a year ago that this was introduced at NATO for the first time. The amendment——

Senator **Levin**. If I could interrupt you, because I just have a couple of minutes, I take it that absorbed the capacity and does not stop you from recommending $200 million?

Ambassador **Abshire**. No.

Senator **Levin**. If they use the same absorptive capacity on SBI I assume that would be $2 billion in the budget request, but we will not get into that.

Ambassador **Abshire**. That is not my subject to talk about today.

Senator **Levin**. Now, conventional arms control, if you would. Could you tell us the status of the negotiations on it? You made reference to it in your statement on page 33. Without getting into details, can you tell us what has happened in recent months? We understand there was a meeting between Shultz and Schevardnadze in Vienna, I believe, at which that subject came up. Can you get it into a few more specifics than you did in your statement?

Ambassador **Abshire**. Sure. The culmination of the work that occurred within NATO under the Deputy Secretary General following the Halifax foreign ministers' meeting last spring ended up in the Brussels declaration on conventional arms control on December 11.

And I, Mr. Chairman, would like to send this around, because the language of this declaration is important, not only in terms of arms control, but the things that we have been discussing today, because as a result of that exercise of all 16 nations, including the French, they talk about disparities, they talk about inequities, they talk about the dangers, elimination of the capacity for surprise and for the initiation of large-scale offensive.

So, these discussions within this NATO high level task force in itself achieved some of what we were trying to do through that integrated net assessment. We are now moving into a second phase because that first phase of the high level task force was to look at the methodology. Now we are in a phase of moving forward to the negotiation of the mandate with the Soviets and with the Warsaw Pact, and following that the substantive discussions would emerge. But we are in that second phase at this point, and while at times the negotiations between the 16 have been difficult, particularly between the French and Americans, we are getting there, and we are developing a much more common base.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, in May of last year, I had the pleasure of visiting NATO. I started with the Commander in Chief, General Rogers, conferred with every top Army, Navy, and Air Force commander over there. I visited the cruise missile sites, the Pershing sites, and other important actions that were under way, including tanks and attack. I came away with the impression that we are in better shape today in NATO than we have ever been since World War II. I just wonder if you share that opinion.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. I do, Senator. But coming from you, with your military background, because I was first aide to a general at Camp Gordon when I met you, and because of your position in the reserves, I am heartened by your comment. I think it has got new life. And could I say that when Bernie Rogers was up for dinner one night I said, when do you think we will turn a corner? Do you think we will do it? And he made a very wise comment. The Soviets are total strategists. They look at the correlation of forces, and when they see new momentum developing in NATO, even though we are not entirely there, that becomes a factor in their calculation, but I am heartened by your comment.

Senator THURMOND. Do you not feel that because of that situation and the perception of strength that we have there as well as the economic situation in the Soviet Union, which is not too good, that is one reason that Mr. Gorbachev is inclined to go to the peace table today?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Absolutely. Those internal economic constraints are something in our favor. And this is why I think in the 1990s the Soviets will be at something of a crossroads, and if we can keep NATO strong in our current capability then they will have to turn more toward internal reform.

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Abshire, we have received testimony from outside witnesses, most notably Dr. Brzezinski, recommending a phased drawdown of some of our forces in Europe so that they might be utilized in other areas that are more volatile. A number Dr. Brzezinski mentioned was 100,000 troops to be withdrawn over a prolonged period of time. What would be our allies' response to such a policy?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. I have enormous respect for my friend, Zbig Brzezinski, and I do not know how in the world he got off on this subject. I have been out of communication with him. Some very bright people do not understand this 1990s situation. They just do not. First, in terms of my resources strategy, it is a false option. The Department of Defense in their estimates said it would take 8 to 9 years to achieve any savings to balance off the $5 billion one-time cost of bringing the troops home.

And this is in my testimony along with some other figures, and second, when we talk about out-of area, which I would be happy to get into—it is in my testimony but not in my oral comments—this area of the Mediterranean is the bridge to the Middle East. If we pull back troops from that bridge as compared to working on what we call at NATO our compensatory program, if we have to take earmarked troops away from NATO in a crisis for the Middle East, what will the Europeans do to fill that gap? It would be a tremendous mistake, and it would totally undercut, going back to the previous set of questions, the conventional arms negotiations, because the appropriate question on conventional arms negotiations is where do we get our leverage?

And part of our leverage comes from this new momentum and our technological capabilities, so it would unwittingly play into Soviet hands.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Ambassador, what share of the gross national product of our NATO allies is dedicated to defense expenditures.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. We are down. It is about 3.5. It is just under 4 percent, and it is very inadequate.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Ambassador, Dr. James Schlesinger testified before this committee recently and he warned of our increasing dependence on Persian Gulf oil as a result of declining oil production here in the United States. He further testified that he felt that the United States should increase its presence in the Indian Ocean with the long-term objective of stationing ground forces in the region.

Given the fact that our European allies are more dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf than we are, is it not reasonable to expect greater cooperation from them in defending this important region?

Mr. ABSHIRE. Absolutely, Senator. What we do do at NATO is discuss out-of area questions. What we are prohibited from doing at NATO is coordinating moves out-of area. In other words, if countries like the United Kingdom, France and the United States are involved in any kind of concerted efforts, those plans are outside of NATO. We constantly brief each other however. I make presentations, for example, on the Persian Gulf area, and other ambassadors do, so we keep a very high sensitivity. And as any strategist looking at Europe knows, their heavy dependence on the Persian

Gulf is much, much greater than ours, and this is a very correct question of burden sharing in the larger sense.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for coming up this morning. I found your presentation extraordinarily insightful, carefully organized and very helpful. As a new member of the committee, this is a new arena for me. So I am going to have a couple of questions for you that might appear very naive, and maybe you can bear with me in process.

As I listened to your discussion, you were talking about a quite significant shift since the 1960s in terms of Soviet capabilities and intentions and used a number of examples. That would appear to suggest that there is greater need for increasing our conventional capabilities to meet change in Soviet strategy. Coming along with that appears to be broad agreement in this country that we want to decrease our dependence on nuclear capability and replace that with an increase in conventional capability.

So both in terms of what our strategy appears to be and what the consensus of the country appears to be and what the Soviets appear to be pursuing there would therefore seem to be a consensus in favor of significantly increasing our conventional capability.

That is an expensive proposition. But as these trends develop, there also appears to be some disillusionment in the United States with the increased cost that this would require. So we have demand for greater expenditure but an eroding political consensus that we ought to be making that expenditure.

The question that then results is, are the reforms that you are talking about in terms of our better use of our economic resources within the Western alliance going to be significant enough to meet the increased requirements for expenditures on the conventional side to improve our conventional capability and to meet the Soviet threat? Or are we going to require a significant budget increase in our defense expenditures here?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. We need better use of our defense investment in the alliance and in critical areas we need more. I have gotten away from the approach of the late sixties and the seventies of just talking about more in general, because I don't think that is the way you get the people, and I think it is very difficult for politicians to sell that. If we get a better understanding of these kinds of conditions of the 1990s, and we have a sense of strategy that we are making better use of the taxpayers' investment, we start rebuilding that defense consensus.

Part of my resources strategy is to have a vision for the people of where we are going, but as we then get into the more, I see it getting into the more in certain critical areas that if you get specific additional investments in those areas you get a multiplier effect. I am talking about NATO-wide.

While I want to keep talking about the 3-percent increases annually, I think the heart of this new approach has got to be to show up certain critical areas where Europeans would come to see that, if they do not put more into those specific areas, they vitiate their investments in others. It is like going back to the Maginot Line example.

So it is a strategy of better use, but in that better use when you have done your best and you have absolutely got to have more in areas A, B and C, you go to the nations and their publics on those specific areas. In terms of a greater contribution, I think that has got a better chance of political success, but to do that you have to connect up everything I was talking about on that board. We have a massive educational job.

I am going to get out of government and do my research. That is one of the things I want to look at: how we can effectively do that.

Senator WIRTH. I happen to agree with you, and I thought that your analysis of the elements of strategy was precisely what we ought to be pursuing.

From the perspective of this committee and the Congress, we are faced with a substantial defense budget request, and we are faced in many cases with a restive public that is not willing to make greater investments, and yet there is a significant need. Are we going to be able to get through this period of time between 1987 and the early 1990s and get the efficiencies coming out of the resources strategy that you are describing, or are we between a rock and a hard place?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. It is going to take a lot of push. This committee has been very far thinking in my judgment in its call, as I have done, for net assessments, integrated net assessments. I think it was here that initiated the——

Chairman NUNN. Without interrupting, we have never received a good one, so these good ones you keep referring to, we want you to share them with us, but we are looking forward to when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs comes up to getting a much better net assessment. I know he has been working on that.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. We would be happy one of these days to come in with ours. I am serious.

So much of our intelligence work here has gone into what I call a top down approach because of arms control negotiations at the nuclear level and the numbers game involved in that. There has been enormous drama and attention to the top level of the strategic equation, and I think that top level is important. I do not want to be mistaken, but wars do not, will not start at that level. If we get into a war, God forbid, it is going to start at the lowest level on the ground or at the sea and not up there in a numbers game at the top level.

This is why I think that the Brussels declaration on conventional arms control and on coming to grips with the most basic problem at the level that a war might start where somebody might think they could make a limited surprise move and get away with it, is real progress. So I would hope that in the balance of your work you do give attention not just from a U.S. perspective but a NATO perspective at this lowest level.

We, in our mission, along with General Jack Merritt, our very able representative to the Military Committee, and working with Andy Marshall in the Pentagon have been trying to do our own work on how we put together a better net assessment of the 1990s.

At some point, we would be delighted to try to share that when it is good enough, because as we get to that lowest level where war starts, we have got new investment requirements, but by thinking smarter we can correct a lot of these things.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, and thank you for asking the Ambassador to come up and deliver this very helpful presentation.

Chairman NUNN. We will probably have another round of questioning this morning.

I agree with you completely on that analysis, Mr. Ambassador, and our committee is going to focus on that. We will welcome you coming up with—you say Andy Marshall is working on it?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. He is the keeper of this, and General Jack Merritt and things that we have done at NATO.

Chairman NUNN. We would like to have that, and we also would be requesting the NATO war game. I have seen portions of that, and we have had one war game portrayed. We would be, I think, the beneficiaries of seeing that full NATO war game at some point when we can get that arranged.

Senator Warner and I have been called on something rather urgent, and we are going to have to leave for a few minutes. I am going to leave Senator Levin in charge, and we will complete this round of questioning.

Senator Levin, I would suggest a second round. I know I have some more questions, and we will be back just as soon as we can.

Senator LEVIN [presiding]. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Ambassador, net assessments on balance, are our allies securing their fair share?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. If you look at visibles, no. If you look at what I am calling invisibles but are not invisibles to them, you get a closer balance. I do not have the new one, but I think this document report on allied contributions to common defense is a very good document.

I have spent enough time in Germany on maneuvers and visiting towns and cities to know the tremendous political strain of these people from overflights, from maneuvers, from the whole logistics of what is being done. I think that simply has to be put into the equation of what they are bearing as well as what they have done in terms of conscription.

We have had several countries that have extended their conscription, and they have done it against terrific political opposition. Belgium has done this. So when we get into the fair share thing, I would think we have got to work through this kind of process that we have talked about, and I think we have a big advantage now because the conventional defense problem is a more here-and-now problem. For years, the Europeans lived in nuclear fantasy land, and they had this escapism from meeting these problems. Now they are coming up against them, and it is easier, therefore, to understand what needs to be done.

So that is the way we get a better financial commitment at a time that they do carry a very—certain countries have very large commitments, such as the Federal Republic of Germany in the infrastructure and in the larger sense of NATO maneuvers, overflights, what is done at civilian airports and so forth.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, I understand what you are talking about in terms of intangibles, but it does seem incumbent upon those whose lives and institutions are more immediately at risk than ours are to bear a higher cost, and they certainly are in the sense of intangibles. There is no question about that. In terms of expenditure of percent of GNP on defense, our European allies are spending substantially less than we, is that not correct?

You said a moment ago, I believe, they average less than 4 percent of GNP. Ours is around 6 or so, is it not?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Yes, 6.9.

Senator HUMPHREY. Ours is around 7.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Yes, and I constantly tell them that, but that is not enough.

Senator HUMPHREY. What is sacrosanct about the present apportionment of responsibilities among the allies in terms of expenditures?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. In my judgment, absolutely nothing. I want to differentiate between allies. For example, we talk about the 3 percent, and we have several countries that make the 3 percent but have a very low percentage of the defense budget to GNP. We have certain countries that made our conventional defense improvements goals but have not done very well on the 3 percent. I think percentage of the budget going to defense is the most meaningful commitment.

From 1971 to 1984, the U.S. defense spending by NATO measures increased in real terms, while that of other allies' numbers taken together was 30 percent. In the Vietnam War, we were not beginning to do our share at NATO. So some of these things are cyclical. Now we are up, and they are down. In the 1970s, they were up and we were down.

Let me be very clear. That, to me, is not an adequate answer to shoring up that front as is needed in the integrated net assessment.

Senator HUMPHREY. You say that in the 1970s they were up? They were up only because we were down.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. No.

Senator HUMPHREY. Or had there been historical growth?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. No, they were up because we hit a period of prosperity and economic growth in Europe, and that spilled over into the defense area. We have now gone through a period of enormous economic problems which they brought on themselves. They overextended the welfare net. Where I live in Belgium, the government, some people would say, is practically bankrupt in terms of its difficulty in meeting its commitments.

I had a long instructive talk recently with their fine young defense minister, Dinea, and they have got to move into specialization. They need NATO to help them out of some of their problems. Britain has made great commitments. Now they are going to go on zero defense increases, but up until now they have done an excellent job, 20 percent under Thatcher.

Senator HUMPHREY. On page 15, you talk about some of the deficiencies in NATO. First, actually starting on page 14, the first one is force levels, ground forces. You note at the bottom of page 15 that except for the United States, U.K., and Germany, the other allies have fallen short of implementing ground force level increases to which they had agreed. Is that correct?

Ambassador **Abshire**. That is correct.

Senator **Humphrey**. What excuse do you have for them in that area?

Ambassador **Abshire**. I have none. If one takes that proceedings, which are classified, or something that we call the Defense Resources Review Committee, I have a man in my mission that is my representative. You look at the cross-examination that occurs, for example, of Canada, of Denmark or of Norway or Belgium when they fail to meet certain things. It is a very severe cross-examination, and the operational effects of these things are considered.

Now, in taking the machinery we have and making it more dynamic, what I want to see is that kind of discussion increasingly pushed toward the top, and the ultimate top are your heads of government.

So just as we have taken the armaments cooperation and we pushed it up to the deputy defense level, I think we have to push those discussions up to the level of the very top politicians who are heads of government so that they better understand that net assessment and their stake, and they develop the political ways of going to their people to get the response.

Senator **Humphrey**. Well, that is a very elegant theory. I sometimes think maybe it will take something a little more practical than theory to get the attention of our allies and to bring their commitment up at least to the agreed levels.

My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Senator **Levin**. Senator Humphrey, Ambassador Abshire has agreed to appear before our Conventional Forces Subcommittee, where we are going to devote some real time to exactly that issue as to how to force a fair sharing of the burden. As the Ambassador put it today, if in fact the percentage of the budget going to defense is the most meaningful indicator, just to bolster what you are saying here, at the moment our allies are averaging 6 percent of their budget for defense and stay steady. Ours at the moment is 27 percent of our budget going to defense, over four times as large a percentage of the budget, and it is going up.

Senator Shelby.

Senator **Shelby**. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, I will have the opportunity to see more of you since the subcommittee chairman, Senator Levin, has asked you to appear before the subcommittee. We are all interested in going into more depth concerning the spending of the United States versus our NATO allies.

When you testify before the subcommittee, will you furnish us, or even before then, a breakdown of participating countries in NATO and what each individual country is spending of their gross national product? I think you alluded to the fact a minute ago that it does vary between the nations, does it not?

Ambassador **Abshire**. Yes, performance varies greatly. I would be happy to do that.

Senator **Shelby**. So I welcome the opportunity to see you later on this.

I want to get into a couple of questions in a limited amount of time. As far as SDI is concerned, what should be the role of our European allies in NATO in the development of SDI as far as research and development?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Well, of course, SDI is a United States program with certain contracts made to Europeans.

Senator SHELBY. Participation, in a sense.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. That is right, and the reason, by the way, that I favored those contracts, and my friend, Senator Glenn, and I have had a little difference on this, but the reason I favored it is that my general concern about armaments cooperation and that the technological, industrial base of Europe not become so low that it fails even more to bear its share out of incapacity. So the contracts to Europe on a competitive basis is one rule.

Now, I want to turn around and go to something that has interested a number of Senators, the antitactical ballistic missile. In my prepared statement I discussed in greater detail the net assessment and Soviet preemptive capabilities. Now, I am not speaking of intentions, by the way. I do not know Soviet intentions. The NATO Extended Air Defense Committee is working on the problem of the preemptive capability the Soviets may acquire through improved conventional ballistic missile accuracies.

Senator SHELBY. Could this be basic application of some of the SDI research?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. There is a translation, and General Abrahamson has let a contract on theater architecture to the British companies. Two or three years down the road we will get much more cross-fertilization in the technologies that we are dealing with. I, from the very beginning, was an advocate of looking at the conventional translations of the SDI investment because we today are not looking at simply emerging technologies, but we are looking at merging technologies that we cannot compartmentalize.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Ambassador, is not some of the thrust of SDI research toward what you are talking about?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. The purpose of SDI is to spot missiles, and that applies whether over Europe or over the United States. I wish in the very beginning we had emphasized it. I think we might not have ended up with some of the political difficulties in Europe.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Ambassador, along those same lines, how do we protect our technology with our European allies if we develop some of it and contract out some of it, as we are talking about here, knowing some of the history of the leakage in Europe to the Soviet block?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Well, a resources strategy allowing the Soviets to get our technology, which they have, and which then requires us to increase our defense budget, is no resources strategy.

Senator SHELBY. But there is a history of that in European, is there not?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Absolutely, and there are a number of ways: First, through much greater education and standards within European industries. We are making progress on that. We do briefings at NATO, and then in the Paris organization there also is much more attention to this. So improved industrial security, improved security in general, better understanding about the leadership of European corporations of this standard and of this requirement. Technology sharing and technology protection should go hand in hand and work in harmony, not opposition.

Senator **Shelby**. Should that not be one of the large priorities, internal security between the NATO members?

Ambassador **Abshire**. It is.

Senator **Shelby**. Should not a lot of money and resources be spent on that?

Ambassador **Abshire**. Well, there is a lot more attention going into this now. There is a much greater sensitivity to it.

Senator **Shelby**. Mr. Ambassador, I look forward to seeing more of you in the subcommittee. Thank you.

Ambassador **Abshire**. Thank you.

Senator **Levin**. Senator Quayle.

Senator **Quayle**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. I too, want to thank you for your very thoughtful presentation which was very well organized. You have heard the expression of gratitude on both sides of the aisle, and I want to add my thoughts to that.

Let me just very quickly go to a couple of issues that have been brought up. One, the $200 million figure for the cooperative R&D which was reduced in appropriations to, I believe, $90 million, as you stated.

Quickly, can you give me a sense of it? Are we moving about in the right pace? You said seven MOUs. Could we be doing more? What is your general sense of it? I think we would all like to shoot for that $200 million if we can do it, but I am just wondering if we are going at about the right pace. I do not even know if all $90 million is going to be expended in fiscal year 1987.

What is your general sense as far as how we are actually moving in the R&D cooperative arrangements? Can we do more?

Ambassador **Abshire**. If you take the perspective that despite the talk about this important amendment as well as your amendment a year before NATO got it, this seems slow, but when you consider that it was just a year ago that NATO got it, this success with all of its imperfections is remarkable.

We have had a huge political success. We have developed now a framework of discussion of these things to include the reinforced NAC. What concerns us is when you get to the obligation of funds. I think it was $8 million last I checked.

Senator **Quayle**. That has been obligated?

Ambassador **Abshire**. So when you get back to our actual obligations, we have not had time to get the return and the obligations. This, by the way, was the justification of the Department of Defense in not moving.

Senator **Quayle**. To request the $60 million rather than the $200 million. I do not want to to take a lot of time on this.

Ambassador **Abshire**. Mr. Kloske is dying to say something.

Mr. **Kloske**. Mr. Quayle, since I happen to advise Deputy Secretary Taft on the same issue, I do not think the Department of Defense has been given a fair shake here. What was originally requested in fiscal year 1986 was $200 million, and Congress, in its wisdom, appropriated $90 million.

From our point of view the pace is a blistering one in terms of MOU negotiations, and we are riding herd over the allies. We expect by September 30, 1987, to have obligated most of the money. We have to get it out.

Senator **Quayle**. Most of the $90 million?

Mr. **Kloske**. That is correct. Now, going to fiscal year 1987, Congress appropriated $145 million. Concerning the 1987 programs, Mr. Taft will be going to NATO Brussels headquarters at the end of February to meet with his colleagues, the Deputy Defense Ministers, to address the issue of 1987 programs.

Now, the issue of diminution that we have spoken about here this morning from $200 million to $60 million begins in fiscal year 1988. I need to emphasize this because it is very important in terms of the perceptions of this room and the perceptions of the allies. We are talking about a dimunition of new R&D starts, as requested, from $200 million to $60 million.

Now, why is this and what is the rationale? The rationale is the level of absorption, first, on the part of our allies. I think our allies are absolutely overwhelmed about the blistering pace that we have imposed on them. It has never taken place in the history of NATO that seven or eight allies have gathered around a table and negotiated successfully seven MOUs. That has never happened before in a period of 9 months. So I think from your point of view and our point of view, the initiative so far has been a great success.

Now, let me return to the issue of $60 million. The total bill for the Department of Defense funding that will be presented to you gentlemen for fiscal year 1988 is not $60 million. It will be $233.4 million. That includes $60 million for new R&D starts and the follow-on bill that will be required to pay for programs initiated in 1986 and 1987.

I shall also tell you that by 1992, the bottom line bill to fund what is probably the most innovative and successful conventional defense initiatives in the history of NATO will be $2.9 billion.

So I want to make it clear for the record we are no way shifting away from our emphasis in armaments cooperation. As a matter of fact, what we would like to see is that once we get these MOUs off the ground and running, between now and 1992 you will help us fund that bill to the tune of $2.9 billion.

Senator **Quayle**. So the actual figure is $233.4 million.

Mr. **Kloske**. That is right, and in 1989 it will go up to $307.9 million.

Senator **Quayle**. That is a very important distinguishing fact. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ambassador, just briefly, could you give me the perceptions or any of the political problems that we might have in encouraging our NATO allies to increase 3 percent that we keep talking about in general terms? And I think we are going to get into it on Senator Levin's subcommittee, on what is a fair assessment of the contribution in relation to the GNP, the budgets of the individual countries to NATO as a whole.

But I wonder if you could just give me a general sense of what some of our NATO allies are saying about our commitment to increasing the defense resource investment in defense, particularly with the budget authority of the last 2 years being below zero growth.

Many say that the administration request for 3 percent real growth is not going to go anywhere, what we are really going to get is probably zero. What kind of political questions are being raised by our NATO allies?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Well, a bad perception, because if they see us falling back that is unhelpful.

Senator QUAYLE. Do they see us falling back because of the reductions we have made in defense spending in the last couple of years?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. I continually try to get them not to take newspaper publicity at face value, but to recognize what it is going to be when the year is over in terms of that 3 percent figure.

But I think the larger issue of perception, as I think you can tell, what I have been groping for here in this discussion is that I think we have simply got to push things to a higher political level in Europe, so that a comprehensive view can be taken of where we need to go.

And we have the leverage to help do that. There still is a recognition that our defense funding is strong funding. But it is not helpful as they look at these figures.

Senator QUAYLE. So from a general perception, it is not a good perception of our commitment that we have?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. No.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Senator Symms.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being with us this morning. I am another new member on the committee, and I have always found it intriguing that in all of the Western alliance, we pass laws to keep people out of our countries. However, the Warsaw Pact nations build walls and shoot the people that try to escape. Yet somehow in the propaganda war they seem to come out awfully well and we do rather poorly at times.

We are told by West German intelligence that the Soviet Union is pouring at least $30 million a year into West Germany to support political parties and disrupt NATO. The Soviet Union is encouraging the Greeks and others to constantly rally against NATO and create an illusion in the western news media that somehow NATO is not popular.

How much of an impact is that having on NATO's cohesion, and what are we doing about it? And are we trying to do anything similar?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. You are on a very important question. Napoleon said the perception is to the reality as three is to one, and that is true in non-military even more than military things. And this is what we deal with.

There is a recognition today in Europe that the East, the eastern societies, are in a drab state and human rights are constantly violated. The Helsinki Accords when they first came about were debated pro and con in this country, but there was a standard set up there that the Soviets did not keep.

And there is much better recognition——

Senator SYMMS. If they kept it they would not have to shoot people at the border.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. That is right.

Senator SYMMS. So that is the answer.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. They did not even keep it in easier ways for them.

But we do not have, I regret to say, a corresponding strong view of the United States to go with that, because we do have a great deal of criticism of the United States. Some of it is jealousy because we are doing well.

Senator SYMMS. Before I run out of time, I just want to further this question. What is the political climate in Norway, for example, for us to preposition more supplies and more materials we would need to win a war in Norway if we had to bring in more troops?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. It is not good with a lot of people, and this concerns me.

Senator SYMMS. Is this because of the propaganda from the Communist countries?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Yes, but part of it is because of editorial writers and people that do not look at the 1990s in a realistic way, as I have described it to you.

Bul Hansen, who is their chief of staff of their armed services, is very strong. By the way, he has called for a 6 or 7 percent real growth in the defense budget. But there are wrong perceptions of an increased U.S. naval presence.

And if you go back—it might have been before you were in the room, I have forgotten—but this flanking——

Senator SYMMS. I was present when you talked about their naval capability.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. In my judgment, we the United States will end up with our naval forces maldeployed in terms of the Norwegian Sea. And yet you have got Norway concerned that we are going to become too active in the area by some people, not all.

So those things need to be brought together, and we have got to do a better job on projection of what we stand for. Now, if I may, Senator, polls show that 70 percent or more of the populations of NATO's countries in Europe support NATO. That is remarkable.

But what they do not do is support the things necessary to make NATO successful. That is where we have got the large divergence.

Senator SYMMS. The polls show that people generally support NATO?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. That is right.

Senator SYMMS. That may not be true of the journalists.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Since I have got to deal with the journalists, I will not comment.

Senator SYMMS. What is your estimation of NATO's problems between Greece and Turkey and the political clout the Greek-Americans have in the United States and the perception there?

How are we doing in the southern flank?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. The southern flank, which I did not touch on, has its own set of problems. And its military problem is an aging military infrastructure that is most serious, and this is true in both of those countries.

The Greek-Turkish issue is one on which, as it impacts on NATO, Peter Carrington's extraordinary leadership has been very helpful, and we work with it constantly. Some of those issues are outside of NATO, as you know.

But this is a very, very important flank, and to have fully cooperative relations between the two countries ultimately is in their own best interests. And you can see certain signs, maybe, that as we go along that might be better appreciated.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my time has expired.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Symms.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Wilson came in and had to go to another committee. But he did ask me if I would ask you this question. I give it to you on his behalf.

When the administration took office 6 years ago, they adopted a vigorous export control policy aimed at stemming a hemorrage of NATO U.S. technology to the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Given your testimony this morning about improved technology sharing and cooperative R&D, and given our 6 year defense buildup, do you believe that our restrictive export control practices are in need of review?

Should we loosen the restrictions in the interest of economic advancement both at home and in NATO?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. First, I think that acting vigorously on technology protection was needed for the reasons I have already given: that it makes no sense to have the Soviets get from us what then requires us to make a greater investment to meet.

Second, where I think we have not come far enough—and this answers your question in a little different way—is that we must harmonize more protection and sharing and make those two things work together and bring those together more in our government.

So I do not like the term "loosen up." I answer it in a little different form. We must harmonize sharing and protection. And I have a chart called technology management, which is the greatest single challenge, because what I said earlier. If you go back to military history, you find so often that when war comes, a nation which has the best technology was not able to translate it into the battlefield and it did not mean anything.

So to translate technologies into what gives us deterrence in defense is finally what counts. And we do not want to end the next war, God forbid, if it ever came, and say we protected our technology but we lost the war.

So it is harmonization of these two requirements: protect but protect in a way that can contribute to sharing, and let our allies know that and our industries know that and give them better incentive to work toward that common objective, positive and negative working together.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Quayle.

Mr. Ambassador, you have talked about the military balance in the 1990s and you have talked about the danger points and the gaps and some of the things we need to do. You have given us your own general net assessment, in effect, of NATO's military balance.

I do not disagree with your analysis. I think it has been a very helpful presentation. But the problem is the European leaders; most of them do not agree with the net assessment, and European public opinion makers do not agree with the net assessment.

And also the problem is that the European publics don't agree, if they really concentrated on it or have been exposed to that much of it. So how do we change the European attitude toward conventional defense?

I mean, this question has been going on for 10 years, and still I do not see any real progress being made in that respect. How do we do that?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Let me take first in government and then out of government. In government, it requires pushing it to the very top. We are midpoint now. We have got these assessments pushed closer to the top.

This Brussels declaration on conventional arms control, outlining the way it talks shows that we have got a new attitude on conventional disparities and their dangers, and that has been through all 16 nations and then approved by foreign ministers, not just defense ministers.

But still, what we have done is inadequate, and I think it takes more intensive discussions on an integrated net assessment for the nineties in the defense ministers meetings. And I am very serious that I would like to see the heads of government meeting where these things are discussed at the very top level.

Now, if that is going on in NATO, that is going to pique the curiosity much more of the public and press and serve as a catalyst outside of NATO, but much more needs to be done outside of NATO.

One of my hopes when I get released from government is to work with Phil Karber and others on a book which can be sold in airports, an integrated picture of the 1990s at the conventional level. Maybe we're going to need something like Monnet's action committee that he had in the late forties and the fifties, but trans-Atlantic, where we are looking at these problems and where we rally round to a renewed commitment.

Chairman NUNN. So-called wise men?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. But as I think of it, action men rather than wise men. I want more than wisdom.

Chairman NUNN. The term may have been overused recently.

What about the action? Now, we have been talking since the 1970s, maybe even before that, NATO over and over again says that their goal is to have 30 days of munitions. And yet we find, after talking about that 10, 15, 20 years, we still do not even approach 30 day munition capability sustainability to fight conventionally for 30 days across the board.

Now, what has happened on that since the so-called "bad" Nunn amendment 2 years ago that you have been working with, under some duress? What has happened in terms of munitions? Do we have a point where we can truthfully say down the road, 3 years, 5 years, that we are as a NATO alliance going to have 30 days of fighting capability on a conventional level without having to turn to nuclear weapons in terms of simply munitions sustainability?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. I am not sure whether this is in my testimony or not, but we have made real progress over the last 2 years in terms of ammunition in several ways. We have a target toward the 1990s to reach those goals that you have talked about.

Chairman NUNN. Now, that target 1990s, is that going to be 1991?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. It is 1991.

Chairman NUNN. It could be 1999. You are saying 1991 is the target?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. That is right.

Chairman NUNN. Is that an agreed on target across the board in NATO?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Yes, it is. But agreement is not enough.

And let me talk about thinking smarter to get something done, being innovative to get something done. We have got some countries that are paying twice as much for 155 ammunition as others. So we are looking at common production facilities.

We are looking through NAMSA, the supply agency, at common procurement policies. We are looking at better ammunition planning. I would like to see us look at excess stocks that could be put in areas of particular weakness. We are looking at a special stock of ammunition under Commander in Chief SOU at NATO.

These are some of the things, as well as what the Independent European Program Group is doing looking at ammunition production. In the southern region, where you have low labor costs, it would be possible to set up a common facility where ammunition could be produced at lower levels.

So we not only have a commitment, we not only have studies, but we are trying to be innovative and think smarter in terms of greater output from our investment in this area.

Chairman NUNN. Do you believe that you would be able to come back in 1991 and testify before this committee—based upon what you now know, do you believe you would be able to tell us, ladies and gentlemen of the committee, we have achieved our goal and NATO can now sustain itself for 30 days fighting?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. I do not know whether it would be universally 30 days. But if it is pushed up 2 or 3 weeks across the board, it will be quite an achievement. But I want to underscore the importance of your question to me, because I think it is intolerable to leave those ammunition vulnerabilities the way they are.

When we get into high technology, some of those problems are pretty great. But if we cannot meet these things with regard to the innovative approaches that I have taken and the report cards that were given to countries, then next year we have got to come in and take additional looks at how those gaps are filled out in terms of collective action and operational considerations.

Chairman NUNN. How about on the tactical aircraft now? We have spent approximately $60 billion in this country to have aircraft built, not counting training and all the other expenses, to fly to Europe in an emergency. This is in addition to what we keep there.

And when my amendment was introduced a couple of years ago, the best information at that time was that almost none of those aircraft would have any shelter, most of those aircraft would have nowhere to refuel or to have any kind of maintenance. And therefore most of them would fly only one time.

Has that changed appreciably in the last 2 years?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. That was a terrible deficiency and it was an example of misinvestment, because the investment had been made in our aircraft and not in the facilities to receive them.

And in terms of the infrastructure commitments, the new priority that was given as a result of your amendment, it is between 75 to 90 percent of those investment commitments are now made. So we will be at that point as we get into the next decade.

Chairman NUNN. In other words, in 1991——

Ambassador ABSHIRE. And let me say that, unlike your ammunition question, these commitments are made out of the common fund. So it's not a question of the possibility of going back or where a certain country does not follow through. That has been voted out of the common fund.

Chairman NUNN. I believe, Senator Wirth, you are next for the next round.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, as we try to think smarter and use our resources more efficiently in viewing the conventional threat of the Soviets, one area is clearly smart weapons, another is clearly a defensive posture and not trying to perhaps match the Soviets tank for tank and so on.

There has been discussion this morning about the Maginot Line and the fact that in effect that could have been a very effective defensive position had it been properly used. There is now discussion of greater pre-positioning, I understand, of defensive capabilities along the German border; is that correct?

Ditches and tank traps and mine fields seem to be a very cost effective way to neutralize some of the offensive capabilities the Soviets may have.

Chairman NUNN. Before you answer that question, we will begin our hearings again this afternoon at 2 o'clock. We will have testifying Dr. Larry Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel; Dick Stubbing, former Office of Management and Budget official; and Col. John Collins, now retired, with the Congressional Research Service.

We are going to focus this afternoon on the budgetary aspects of strategy and constraints in budget. I think it will be very interesting testimony about our budget situation. We will not be focusing on this year's budget, but rather a broader view of how we can carry out strategy with the budget restraints and so forth.

So we will come back at 2 o'clock. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much for being here, and again my apologies for having to leave early.

Thank you, Mike and Dennis, for coming.

Senator WIRTH [presiding]. Is the installation of such barriers, one, cost effective; and second, is it politically realistic to pursue a strategy like that? Or does such a strategy run into political problems because of the statement that there is a continuing and permanent division between the people of Germany?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. This issue has got to be dealt with very carefully, for the very reason that you have mentioned. It is undoubtedly true that terrain enhancements can bolster effective defense.

When we go back to the Maginot Line, we are talking about a defensive capability, enhancing the other side of things. So there is a great deal that can be done in various ways through terrain enhancements, and those do have to be, for the reasons that you have mentioned, approached carefully, so that there is not a misunderstanding.

Senator WIRTH. What does that mean? It is a good idea to do that?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. I favor such, and I recognize that it is important that such be carried out in a way that it is not misperceived by the Germans as they look to the East and their ties with Eastern Germany and relationships and so forth.

Senator WIRTH. From a purely military point of view. But it comes along with a variety of political problems, is that it?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Absolutely. But I think if carefully approached it offers opportunities. And Dennis Kloske, of course, reminds us that a great deal has already been done in these areas.

And what I think you are talking about is stepping up what has already been done, and I think it offers great opportunities, particularly in key areas of geographic vulnerability.

Senator WIRTH. In closing may I ask you again the question I asked you in the first round, of whether or not we can achieve the cost savings out of the strategy that you were talking about to meet our conventional needs, or must we have sharp budget increases to meet those additional needs?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. It is going to take a combination of pushing forward strongly on better output and thinking smarter in terms of our NATO defense expenditures, plus new investments in certain key areas that cannot be taken care of purely through better output. A combination of both is needed.

Senator WIRTH. And where are some of the new areas that can be invested in, that have needed investment?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. If you want to take our tactical concept of follow-on forces attack, ensuring that we move forward to be effective in defeating the lead echelon—and by the way, some of the Nunn programs address that specifically—and follow-on forces attack, as we go into the second and follow-on echelons.

In terms of naval power, we have got certain situations of power projection already in terms of the tactical ballistic missiles threat. I do not know, Senator Quayle has been particularly interested in that with his amendment. But we could get into billions of dollars of expenditure, and this is a requirement that would present special budgetary requirements, and it certainly should concern the Europeans.

The Belgians have got a problem in terms of air defense and acquiring Patriot, which they have not been able to afford. These are some examples: new fighter aircraft for the 1990s, and of course European fighter aircraft.

But had I my druthers, I would wish we could get the Europeans to jump beyond that and that we could work with the Europeans; the Europeans and Americans on a fighter aircraft for 2020 with a combination of resources, rather than the duplication of resources that emerge from the European fighter aircraft.

I understand they have got political problems on this. But this would be a huge savings if we could focus on the next generation of fighter aircraft now with a common effort.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me go back to a point Senator Shelby brought up concerning the application of SDI to some of the new technology, particularly theater technology. You talked about it in your statement and you know of my interest in the emerging threat of the SS-21s, the SS-22s and SS-23s, particularly from the conventional and possibly a chemical capability.

I would like to ask you to give me a summary of how we draw together SDI applications, CDI, the conventional defense initiative that this committee was very instrumental in doing, and the enhanced air defense that the Europeans stress particularly.

German Defense Minister Woerner I know is very interested in this and has spoken out on it. To me it seems that all three of them sort of fit together, and I am wondering if in fact we are going in three different directions, that there really is a tremendous amount of overlap, and that this might be one of the areas, to use your phraseology, to harmonize a bit better, that perhaps we can harmonize at the political level.

And I wonder if we can harmonize even at this committee, because we had a big debate last year on how we were going to separate out CDI from SDI. And it seems to me as you look at the threats, particularly the short range tactical ballistic missiles threat and the intermediate ballistic missiles threat, that there is a lot of commonality.

And also, on page 11 I believe you talked about maintaining effective C^3I will assume unprecedented importance, and I would think in looking at that "maintaining effective C^3I" that we were talking about some SDI application, its relationship to CDI, and its application to enhanced air defense.

Could you summarize structurally where we're going in these areas and how we might better put them together. If I'm right on my assumption that there is a lot of overlap and a lot of spinoff, is there commonality in these three arenas?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Your assumption is correct, and it was almost inevitable that different aspects of the total would come from different directions, because the Strategic Defense Initiative had a given purpose and originated in the United States.

We have had a range of SDI briefings by General Abrahamson, who is very widely respected at NATO. And in the last one he gave, he got more into, I like to call them, conventional translations.

We also have the conference of national armaments directors who, among other things, will have any armaments problem that comes under their purview to look at military requirements and how these things are effected. We have in Paris an advanced research agency of NATO, AGAR, which has done work and done it before the recent developments, going back to 1982, on the tactical ballistic missile problem.

Due to Woerner's initiative, a year ago the air defense committee was charged with the ATBM work. Something called the executive working group at NATO attempts to do just what you said, where you have got different aspects going on in different places and also in different headquarters, such as SHAPE, the technological center, and so forth, how such things are pulled together into a whole with these many, many committees that we have got at NATO.

And of course, long-term guidelines developed in the tactical ballistic missile area with General Rogers; the conceptual military framework which, along with the executive working group in the near term, brings such issues into that long term framework of technology and strategy.

And here, Dennis Kloske reminds me that last week Secretary Taft has taken an initiative. Do you want to mention it?

Mr. KLOSKE. Well, Mr. Quayle, as you may know, Secretary Taft on May 22 of this year asked the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff to come up together with a comprehensive plan to develop an acquisition cooperative strategy, the joint development of ATM capabilities between the United States and NATO allies.

That report, which was co-signed by Dr. Ikle and Mr. Godwin, was submitted to the Secretary for our review last week. We are currently reviewing it and getting some additional inputs from the OSD staff and from the services.

And I would imagine that he will sign it some time this week, and this document will provide guidance to the OSD staff and to the Army, which is the lead service on ATM capabilities to develop and seek out cooperative agreements for an extended air defense approach to the NATO allies.

Now, I think the thrust of your question is how do we balance our SDI, conventional defense improvements, and defense against anti-tactical missile capability incoming from the Warsaw Pact.

The recommendations which have been submitted to Mr. Taft are that we approach the ATM question as a comprehensive package, and the comprehensive package will be divided into the following components:

First of all, we have to build on what we have in terms of hardware and software. We do have the available NATO C^3 capability which is available to us, and we will have the introduction of the Patriot I and the improved Patriot II.

Going beyond that, one of the things that we have to do right away is make sure we invest in passive measures. i.e., that means that we have the capability to protect our C^3 capability and also whatever interceptor capability we have available to us.

An additional portion of that will be counter-battery fire. We do not want to get ourselves in a situation where we allow the Warsaw Pact to target our capabilities without escaping retribution. And we are working on hardware introduction of that and that will probably be called the ATACMS, which will be the fourth phase of the MRS component.

And finally and perhaps the most important area of your interest and concern will be the eventual, highly sophisticated development of an interceptor capability. It is at that stage where we expect that conventional research and SDI research will eventually merge into an interceptor capability.

And finally, you had mentioned C^3 sensors and so forth. We expect to see combined research on whatever outcome, positive outcome comes from the SDI projects and also in conventional defense to make sure we have an effective and comprehensive battle management capability.

Senator QUAYLE. I guess the thrust of my question is I know and I follow what we're trying to do here in getting the coordination, but my interest is how we're going to get that coordination here and to make sure that it interrelates to what we're doing in Europe, because I know that when you start talking about SDI, CDI, enhanced air defense looking at the ballistic missile threat there is a little bit of confusion out there exactly what you are talking about. I know there are some political problems with Patriot, the super upgrade of the Patriot, whether we go on to try to get that kind of interceptor.

I think that is one of the classic candidates for this R&D cooperative effort, that we should in fact be looking at that, and I think that we are. I guess my concern is and my question, Mr. Ambassador, is there anything that we might be able to do from here to help along that harmonizing effect on these three areas, that each are developing their own constituencies here and also their own perceptions of what their role and mission really is?

That is my concern, because I think, looking at this thing in strictly the narrowest context, I go back to your very important statement on the SS-21s, SS-22s, and SS-23s, and also trying to maintain this effective C^3I, which I think all meshes together.

And I do not think that there is that much difference, and yet if we get in here in our discussion you will see the constituency, whether it is in this country or whether it is in NATO, where the Germans want to go one way and the French want to go another way, that we have really got to cope with this thing.

And I am just trying to seek out some ways that we might in a meaningfully constructive way help out.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. I am not sure. Your amendment has helped. I am not sure now how else you might be able to help out.

I would like to communicate with you, but let me say that Lord Carrington has been very concerned about such integration, and part of his genius has been pulling together what when I arrived at NATO was a very disconnected organization.

And as we look at the conference of national armaments directors, the work of the air defense committee, the executive working group, the conceptual military framework which is updated every year, and interrelated to the commands and the military committee, these things working together serve as a catalyst for bringing into focus various efforts.

Now, as we go further down the line there will be other things that go beyond the TBM problem. Rail guns, sensor technologies, robotics will have great impact if we use them properly on enormous conventional defense enhancements which could help tilt that balance as we go into the 1990s.

Senator QUAYLE. I think that is a very essential point that you just made, that there is that potential that is going to work for increasing and augmenting, which a lot of people are concerned about, the conventional deterrence and our conventional capability.

I just think that point needs to be emphasized over and over again as we go through this.

Ambassador **Abshire**. And our integration and harmonization has got to be there to turn these efforts into a common reality, which is your concern.

Senator **Quayle**. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. My time is up.

Senator **Wirth**. Senator Warner, do you or Senator Thurmond have some questions?

Senator **Warner**. I have one question. Before proceeding, though, Senator Nunn and I, as we departed momentarily from the hearing, commented to one another about the superiority of the testimony that you have provided today. We have both known you for a long time, but this has to be one of the hallmarks of this series of hearings, and we thank you.

Now, Mr. Ambassador, as the Congress embarks on this enhancement of the conventional defenses, and indeed I am in support of that goal, we should try and set some, shall we say, goals.

Is it to become superior? Is it to reach parity with the Warsaw Pact? What sort of a goal would you recommend that we try to achieve, and over what period of time, recognizing the shortage of resources?

Ambassador **Abshire**. Senator, I refer again to this Brussels declaration on conventional arms control, which I want to send around because I'm so proud of NATO for the language it got in there, because it has some of these goals.

And for example, it notes: statements by Eastern spokesmen sometimes imply that the present military situation in Europe is stable and balanced. It is not. All 16 nations agreed to this statements. On the contrary, it is marked by asymmetries, disparities which vary from region to region, but which are detrimental to western security and which are a source of potential instability.

And then it goes into a range of these: weapons, geography, predictability, doctrine, and strategy, the danger of surprise attack which the Soviets are building from, the lack of a verification regime.

And so to the elimination of existing disparities from the Atlantic to the Urals and the establishment of conventional stability at lower levels between the countries whose forces bear most immediately upon the essential security relationship. In light of the foregoing, we are ready to initiate discussions on enhancing conventional stability in the whole of Europe.

These are excellent goals. And I think to have 16 countries sign onto those kinds of goals is a realism that we simply did not find in the NATO community a few years back.

Senator **Warner**. Acknowledging there is some instability, which implies some inferiority, if the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact perceive this buildup what do you think their reaction will be? Just to stand there and watch it happen? What are they going to do?

Do they have an advantage now? Are they going to lose that advantage?

Ambassador **Abshire**. Well, our dream scenario would be for the Soviets, with their internal difficulties and with their empire in trouble, to come to the conclusion that we were going to get our act together in the 1990s and could prevent them from ever using their capabilities for a blitzkrieg-like attack to present us faits accomplis or exercise diplomatic leverage against the alliance. We would hope that the Soviets would realize that such designs are impossible and that they would put their resources into correcting their own internal deficiencies.

Senator **Warner**. You mean domestic or military deficiencies?

Ambassador **Abshire**. Domestic. For them to recognize that their hope of gaining what I fear new conventional leverage in the 1990s cannot be achieved because of what we are doing; and that they would decide genuinely to go the negotiating route.

This does not mean that they give up their ultimate designs, but that that particular option was not going to work.

Senator **Warner**. Let us differentiate. That would be in the MBFR type of theater?

Ambassador **Abshire**. We are merging into a larger forum. We will take the total conventional situation.

Senator **Warner**. I indicated here to your colleagues—would they want to amplify on that?

Mr. **Kloske**. Well, Senator Warner, I think one of the most important things that we have to do and be very careful and sensitive about is I think we have to manage our overall investment account in the NATO alliance in such a way that we can build on what we have.

I think one of the things that we need to make perfectly clear is that we do not have a phantom alliance in terms of military capability. I would just like to remind everyone in this room that the First German Corps, deployed in the central region, is the largest corps in Christendom. And any Soviet field commander would think twice about taking them on singlehandedly. I think we are all aware of that.

I think what is very important is that we identify the deficiencies, that we work toward those deficiencies, so that those deficiencies do not vitiate the tremendous strength which is deployed by NATO militarily in the field, and to make sure that those deficiencies do not become war-stoppers, war-stoppers in the sense that if the Soviets decided to put us to the test and they pressured us, that deficiency would collapse our ability to wage conventional defense for a month.

Senator **Warner**. Just quickly summarizing, you would suggest, then, that we try and achieve, although not identical force structures in any way between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, certainly perception on both sides of parity, to provide the stability that you feel is necessary? Would that be a good summary?

Ambassador **Abshire**. Eliminate instabilities. They have an offensive posture and we have a defensive posture, so it is not a matter of them being symmetrical. But to eliminate their capabilities of little warning surprise attack, introduce predictability into the military situation, rather than them having an option to move in a different direction.

Senator **Warner**. That would be stability. We are not trying to achieve any superiority in terms of their force?

Ambassador **Abshire**. Our interest is in the defense of Europe and America.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you.

Senator **Wirth**. Senator Thurmond.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ambassador, I have some more questions, but I understand you answered those while I was out. I had to run to a Labor meeting.

I just want to congratulate you for your long and distinguished service to your country. You knowledge and your dedication and your fairness have impressed people with whom you have dealt, and we are very proud of the manner in which you have served your Nation.

Ambassador **Abshire**. Thank you very much, Senator. I appreciate your kind comments.

Senator **Wirth**. Mr. Ambassador, on behalf of the committee we thank you and your colleagues for your very thoughtful presentation and great commitment to this. And we look forward to working with you. Thank you very much.

The committee will be adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

TUESDAY, JANUARY 20, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AND MILITARY STRATEGY

The committee met in open session pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m., in room SD-342 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Bingaman, Glenn, Gore, Warner, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Also present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Robert E. Bayer, Richard D. Finn, Jr., John H. Hamre, William E. Hoehn, Jr., James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Michael J. McCord, Frederick F.Y. Pang, Gordon G. Riggle, Mark B. Robinson, and Patricia L. Watson, professional staff members; Russell C. Miller, research assistant; Mary J. Kampo and Richelle M. Turner, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffery B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Edward McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach and Donald A. Mitchell, assistants to Senator Glenn; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; and William Wight, assistant to Senator Warner.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The meeting will come to order.

This afternoon the committee meets to receive testimony on the role of resource constraints in the formulation of U.S. military strategy. This is the committee's seventh hearing on U.S. national security strategy and its military strategy component.

Sir Basil Liddell Hart, the noted British military strategist, correctly observed that "Strategy depends for success, first and foremost, on a sound calculation and coordination of the ends and the means." This hearing will explore the extent to which the U.S. military strategy provides a sound calculation and coordination of the ends and the means, or in other words a balanced relationship between our commitments and our capabilities. Resource constraints are an unpleasant but unavoidable fact of life. To be credible, our military strategy must be based on a realistic assessment of our capabilities, and this assessment must be rooted in fiscal reality. The relationship between our strategy and the 5-year defense plan is therefore critical.

Are realistic fiscal constraints established before our strategic overall plan is formulated? Can our strategy be executed with the capabilities provided by the 5-year defense plan? If not, should our strategy be changed? Is the Five-Year Defense Plan including the annual defense authorization request explicitly developed from our strategy, or is the defense budget put together completely independently from our strategy?

A second fundamental resource issue is the impact of unrealistic fiscal projections on the quality of long-range defense planning. The Department of Defense has a highly structured planning, programming and budgeting system which produces the annual 5-year defense plan. However, it appears that much of the value of that system is lost when the fiscal guidance on which it is based is substantially higher than the resource levels that will be sustained throughout the budget process.

For example, last August I pointed out that there was a $325 billion gap between the spending path for national defense projected in the budget resolution for fiscal year 1987 and the levels assumed in the 5-year defense plan. This substantial gap between the fiscal projections of the Congress and the Department of Defense suggest that long-range program planning in the Pentagon is not taking place in the context of a realistic assessment of resource constraints. This gap may have serious implications for the efficient management for defense programs and the orderly achievement of goals. These concerns can be summarized in the following questions that will be very pertinent to our hearing and our witnesses today.

Do unrealistic fiscal projections permit the Pentagon to avoid setting priorities and making the tough decisions by allowing problems to be pushed into the so-called out years, a process known as getting well in the future?

Do unrealistic fiscal projections undermine effective program planning by allowing too many programs to enter the budget and forcing inefficient program stretchouts in future years? I am sure we will have some thoughts on that from our witnesses.

In focusing on these two major resource issues, this hearing will provide useful insights on overall budget issues that will soon confront the committee. This session will serve as a bridge between our strategy hearings and our hearings on the President's defense authorization request for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 that will begin in early February.

Our three witnesses this afternoon are extremely well qualified to address the relationship between strategy and resources. Dr. Larry Korb is well known to this committee. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Installations and Logistics, from 1981 to 1985. Dr. Korb, you may be interested to know that we researched our files and found that you have formally testified 22 times before this committee since 1981 on subjects as diverse as family housing, force readiness, and DOD reorganization.

Dr. Korb is currently dean of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. He has written extensively on the subjects of defense policy and defense management.

Mr. Richard Stubbing had a distinguished career at the Office of Management and Budget serving as Deputy Director of the National Security Division from 1974 to 1981. During these years he participated in several Presidentially directed studies of national security needs in addition to his role in reviewing the annual defense budget. Mr. Stubbing is currently on the faculty at Duke University.

Col. John Collins is also well known to this committee. He retired from the Army after a distinguished career and currently is the Senior Specialist on National Defense at the Library of Congress. He is a nationally recognized expert on the U.S.-Soviet military balance and has written extensively on issues of national security policy, and has been of great help to this committee over the years.

Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony and we will have questions for you after your opening statements. Senator Warner has been delayed, and will be here in a few minutes. I am sure we will be joined by other members of the committee, but we will go ahead and proceed. I do not have any particular order in mind. Dr. Korb, were you informed that you would be leading off this afternoon?

Dr. KORB. Yes, I was.

Chairman NUNN. All right, we will be delighted to hear from you. We appreciate you being here.

STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE J. KORB, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER, INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS

Dr. KORB. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a prepared statement which I would like to enter into the record.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection.

Dr. KORB. First of all, I would like to thank the committee for this opportunity to appear before you. I can tell you as someone who now lives outside the beltway that these hearings have a wide audience all over the country. I think they are just the thing that we need to do in order to decide in what direction to go with our defense program.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Korb, if you could speak a little louder.

Dr. KORB. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and I can say as someone who now lives far outside the beltway that the hearings that you are conducting are getting a wide audience all over the country. I think they contain the ideas that the American people need to hear in order to provide advice to their legislators so that they can make the right decisions with the defense program.

I would also like to congratulate you on assuming the chairmanship of this very important committee. There is no one for whom I have greater respect both personally and professionally and I wish you every success in your critical leadership role.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Dr. Korb. I would also like to thank the members of the committee, in particular Senators Glenn, Kennedy, Exon, yourself, and Senator Bingaman, who came to my defense last year when I went through a very unhappy episode when I made the same points that I am going to make today. I cannot tell you how much I appreciated your support at that time. If you have ever gone through an experience like that, it is very critical to know that other people understand the difficulties you are experiencing.

I want to make three points today. I want to talk about the mess that we are in with our defense program. I want to talk about how we got into it, then offer some prescriptions on how we can get out of it. There is no doubt in my mind that the current defense budget and the 5 year defense program situation is a mess. We have a situation in which, as I point out in table 1 of my testimony, defense authority has gone down substantially over the last 2 years.

Compared to where we were 2 years ago we are about $500 billion short in defense authority but defense outlays are actually going up and we will spend more in the second half of this decade on defense than we did in the first half. In effect you have authority going down but many people correctly arguing that defense outlays have not yet contributed a single dollar toward our very real problem of deficit reduction.

Chairman Nunn. Dr. Korb, for people who are not involved in this budgeting every day, that sentence is a maze. You talk about budget authority and outlays. We are cutting defense, not contributing to the deficit, yet people ask the question, what is he saying, what is he talking about, because I use those terms a lot, and I get those questions.

Could you tell us what is budget authority, what are outlays, and how you could possibly be cutting the defense budget and not making any indent on the deficit?

Dr. Korb. Defense authority is permission to spend money.

Chairman Nunn. That is budget authority.

Dr. Korb. Defense budget authority is permission to spend money. It is money that is requested by the administration, approved by the Congress, but spent out over a long period of time, sometimes as long as a decade. Defense outlays are a measure of the money that is spent in a particular fiscal year. In the first part of this decade, that is in the first Reagan administration, defense authority or permission doubled.

In the second half of the decade or the second Reagan administration, because people are concerned about the deficit, they are trying to reduce defense spending. However, the promises that were made in the first administration have to be fulfilled and the reductions in defense authority or permission that have occurred in the last couple of years will not really be seen until the latter part of this decade or the first part of the next decade.

Chairman Nunn. So in other words if we give defense budget authority to buy 10 aircraft, if that budget authority, let us say, is $10 million an aircraft, $100 million, those aircraft may be bought next month, they may all be purchased in terms of a contractual obligation, but the actual payment for those aircraft which is outlays as opposed to budget authority may be made over a 3 or 4 year period. Is that——

Dr. **Korb**. That is correct, and with ships it is an even longer period of time.

The budget situation is also a mess because as we have cut defense authority in order to deal with the deficit problem, the unit cost of individual systems are going up, and we do not have enough money to purchase the infrastructure, that is, the men, the materiel, the bases, the supporting equipment, to support this large number of weapons systems which were authorized in the first Reagan administration the first half of this decade.

In summary we have a situation in which the defense plan is being disrupted, the deficit is not being reduced, unit costs are going up, and we do not have enough funds to provide the proper infrastructure to support the forces authorized in the first half of the decade.

How did we get ourselves into this mess? There are basically six reasons. First, we ignored the lessons of history, and I say we because I was part of that administration, and I came before this committee and other committees in Congress and urged adoption of the plan. We know from an analysis of history that the defense budget prior to the Reagan administration had not gone up in peacetime in real terms, that is, after inflation, for more than 3 consecutive years.

Our plans assumed that it would go up for something like 12 years, which would be four times longer than at any previous period in history. We also ignored the early warning signs. It was clear by late 1982 and early 1983 that popular support for defense increases had dropped. Support for increases in the defense budget had dropped from 61 percent in 1981 to something like 17 percent by late 1982.

We failed to adjust. We kept submitting these large increases to Congress and trying to get well in the out years. Thus, we forced the Congress to make the adjustments. In the last 4 years Congress has cut something like $140 billion from the requests of the Department of Defense, and as I point out in table number 3 in my testimony, it is very difficult for the Congress to do that in such a way that the proper strategic choices are made.

The vast majority of the cuts that Congress made, for example, in the 1987 budget were program stretchouts, financing adjustments. There were very few programmatic changes.

The second reason we got ourselves into trouble is that we ignored what one of the great Presidents in history, President Eisenhower, warned us about and that is balancing the "great equation." Ike told us that national security is a combination not only of military strength but economic strength. Yet at the same time we launched a defense buildup, we cut taxes, and drove up the Federal deficit. This situation led to the passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction bill. Even after that was passed, nobody would raise taxes to pay for the defense program. Thus, the defense program had to be cut very drastically.

Third, the buildup was too rapid. The defense budget increased by a very substantial 50 percent in real terms from the last Carter budget to the last budget of the first Reagan administration. In those 5 years procurement spending doubled in real terms, that is, it grew by 100 percent even accounting for inflation. At the same time all that money was poured into the system, we adopted a strategy of management in the Department of Defense which decentralized control. The system was simply overwhelmed, and in my view that led to the procurement scandals which further undermined the confidence of the American people in the ability of the Government to spend in a wise way the large resources being devoted to defense.

The fourth reason we got ourselves into trouble is that we front loaded the buildup. We put too much into high cost, big ticket items like aircraft carriers. For example, in the fiscal 1983 budget, the first complete budget of the Reagan administration, we purchased two aircraft carriers. By that decision we committed ourselves to spending large additional sums of money for the planes, the escort ships, the people, and the bases. But when it came time for the support equipment, or the infrastructure to get its fair turn, the defense consensus had evaporatated. As I point out in table number 2 of my testimony, over the last couple of years we have had to make some very, very severe cuts in items like spare parts, ammunition and tactical missiles, and support equipment.

The fifth reason for the mess, and I say this very, very carefully, is that a bunker mentality developed in the administration in regard to those who would point out the futility of the approach of assuming that the defense buildup would go on forever even with large deficits. I know that yourself and Senator Johnston, as early as 1982 tried to introduce amendments on the floor of the Senate to get us to do some more realistic planning. I gave a brief to the Defense Resources Board in 1982 on this particular subject. But, because a story about it appeared in the *Washington Post,* the people attending the brief had to take lie detector tests and the individual who wrote the brief was fired. No one focused on the issue, raised by the brief. My own experience last year, is also illustrative of this bunker mentality. When as a member of the Committee for National Security, I urged that Congress and the administration begin to plan realistically to do with less, the result was that I lost my job. The great irony of that episode is that the people involved in that tawdry situation, including a staffer of this committee who complained to my employer, have prospered. As Senator Bingaman pointed out so well on the Senate floor last year, there is no doubt that episodes like that have a chilling effect on other people who may wish to voice those same opinions.

Finally there was simply no overall strategy that guided the buildup. It is rather ironic that the basic national security policy document, which should have guided the buildup, came out a year after the program was submitted. The Secretary's first major speech on defense strategy was not given until 1985, and a committee to develop a long range strategy for the Department of Defense was not formed until just recently.

There is enough blame for this mess to go around. The key issue is how do we get out of it? First of all, we certainly, we must accept reality. The days of getting large real increases in defense spending of the magnitude that we got in the first administration are simply over. As David Stockman has pointed out in the epilogue to his book, for every dollar that the Federal Government spends it borrows 72 cents. That is a very, very scary figure.

However, I think we must at least allow the Department of Defense enough money to keep pace with inflation. Whether one agrees or disagrees with all of the weapons that were authorized in the first Reagan administration, the fact of the matter is, they will be coming into the force, and if they are not properly supported we will have wasted a great deal of that money.

Third, we have to accept the fact that we cannot afford the force structure that we developed in the first Reagan administration. Let me make it clear, I would like to see a large force structure, in fact, larger than we have now, but we simply cannot afford it. It seems to me that if the Congress this year approves the two new carriers that have been requested by the Department of Defense we will continue down that road of building a larger force structure than we can afford to support. The other services ought to take heed to what the Air Force has done this year.

The Air Force has accepted the fact that they cannot have 44 wings or 40 wings but are building to 37 tactical air wings. I wish the Army and the Navy would follow that so that whatever level of forces we can afford will be well supported.

The fourth thing we need to do is, slow down the development of the next generation of weapons systems. There are a great number of weapons systems on the drawing board that are ready to move from research into development, or from development into procurement, and we simply cannot afford to buy them and the current programs in economical quantities. I refer to things like the advanced tactical aircraft and the advanced tactical fighter.

The last thing we have to do is that we must eliminate marginal programs. I congratulate Senator Bingaman for his efforts last year to do away with the Navy strategic home porting program. It is not that this program is harmful. The fact of the matter is that if you spend the money there, you will not be able to buy the ammunition that you need to outfit the ships that you have. Moreover I do not believe that you derive a meaningful military benefit from the program.

Let me conclude by making two comments. If in fact the Congress and the administration can agree on allowing defense enough growth to keep pace with inflation for the next couple of years, the Reagan administration will have averaged about 5 percent a year real growth over its 8 years in office. That is exactly what the President promised in the 1980 campaign. That is also the number that the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked this committee for in 1979 when they testified on the SALT II Treaty. It is also enough money to give us a high quality military force if in fact we spend the money correctly.

My second concluding point is that it is important for this committee to keep its focus on the big issues. As you yourself pointed out, Mr. Chairman, in a very excellent article last year, Congress should not engage in trivial pursuit but rather should focus on the kind of questions I discussed in the last page of my testimony. For example, whether we can restructure our strategic forces so that we can transfer money to the conventional area but still ensure that we can accomplish our strategic objectives.

Also, we need to take a close look at the strengths and weaknesses of maritime offensive strategy. Finally we need to examine, as you did this morning, at the situation in Europe, I am confident if we do that then we will not have wasted the money that was spent in the first Reagan administration.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Korb follows:]

Prepared Statement of Lawrence J. Korb

Senator Nunn, members of the committee, it is indeed an honor to appear before you today to discuss the relationship between strategy, policy and defense budgets. I can think of no subject more important to the committee, the Congress, and the nation as you meet to consider the fiscal year 1988 budget and the fiscal year 1988-92 defense program.

Before beginning my testimony Mr. Chairman, let me congratulate you on assuming the chairmanship of this very important committee. There is no one for whom I have more respect both personally and professionally. I wish you every success in your new critical leadership role.

Let me also thank the members of this committee who came to my defense last year when I endorsed a report by the Committee for National Security that angered some Navy officials. In particular, I appreciate the fact that Senator Kennedy and Senator Glenn wrote strong letters to the Secretary of Defense protesting the way in which I was treated. Mr. Chairman, I also am indebted to you for the kind remarks you made about me on the Senate floor in the course of an excellent speech on the need for DOD to face up to a difficult fiscal situation.

The defense budget situation is a mess! Because of concerns about the size of the federal deficit and the unwillingness of the administration and Congress to raise taxes, the requests of the Defense Department for fiscal year 1986 and fiscal year 1987 have been reduced by over $60 billion and the fiscal years 1986-90 5 year plan has been slashed by almost $500 billion from its projected levels.

TABLE 1.—TRENDS IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FIVE YEAR PLANS

[Budget authority in billions of dollars]

Fiscal year	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	Total 1986-90
Administration request February 1985	$314	$354	$402	$439	$478	$1,986
Administration request February 1986	278	312	332	354	375	1,651
						−335
Administration request January 1987	281	282	303	323	344	1,534
						−452
With freeze plus inflation 1988-1990	281	282	295	305	315	1,477
						−509

As indicated in Table 1, defense authority for fiscal years 1986-90; which in February 1985 was projected to be almost $2 trillion, will likely be below $1.5 trillion. Yet defense outlays, which affect the current size of the federal deficit, continue to rise. Moreover, even if defense budget authority is held constant in real dollars for the rest of the decade, which would entail an additional reduction of $50-60 billion over the next three years, defense outlays will rise by about $60 billion above their current levels. Paradoxically, we will actually spend slightly more in the fiscal years 1987-91 period than we spent in the fiscal years 1982-86 period when defense authority was growing rapidly.

In effect we have the worst of all possible worlds. The defense program has been altered very rapidly. After growing by 53 percent in real terms between fiscal year 1981 and fiscal year 1985, it will most probably decline by about 25 percent in the fiscal years 1986-90 period. This sudden shift will cause massive dislocations in the defense program. Unit costs of individual weapons will rise dramatically as the multitude of new production lines, opened in the "fat" years of the early 1980s, must be slowed down or stretched out to accommodate the new fiscal environment.

The infrastructure, necessary to support all the weapon systems procured in the "fat" years, cannot be purchased. Necessary spending for spare parts, ammunition, bases, and additional people, which was consciously underfunded in the first part of the decade with the expectation that it would be funded heavily in the second half of the decade, is no longer affordable.

TABLE 2.—REDUCTIONS IN READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY RELATED ACCOUNTS IN THE FISCAL YEAR 1987 AND FISCAL YEAR 1988 DOD BUDGETS

[Figures in millions of dollars]

	Actual fiscal year 1986 budget	Projection for fiscal year 1987 fiscal year 1986 budget	Request for fiscal year 1987 fiscal year 1987 budget	Congressional appropriation fiscal year 1987	Projection for fiscal year 1988 fiscal year 1987 budget	Request for fiscal year 1988 fiscal year 1988 budget
Army spare parts	2329.8	3238.9	1994.7	1798.5	2364.9	1823.6
(Percent)			−38.4	−44.5		−22.9
Army ammunition and tactical missiles	4647.8	5514.7	4286.4	4019.0	4887.6	4203.0
(Percent)			−22.3	−27.1		−14.0
Selected Army support equipment	2774.3	3870.5	2723.1	2359.7	3274.3	2233.5
(Percent)			−29.6	−39.0		−31.8
Navy spare parts	1733.7	2909.3	2355.4	2135.5	2365.7	1980.1
(Percent)			−19.0	−26.6		−16.3
Navy ammunition and tactical missiles	3952.8	5050.4	4006.0	3447.6	3784.2	3250.1
(Percent)			−20.7	−31.7		−14.1
Selected Navy support equipment	4893.7	5654.1	4973.1	4443.3	5948.9	3742.6
(Percent)			−12.0	−21.4		−37.1
Air Force spare parts	4603.5	6980.1	4235.4	3700.6	5204.3	3458.8
(Percent)			−39.3	−47.0		−33.5
Air Force munitions and tactical missiles	2204.0	3686.9	2815.8	1956.7	2313.3	1654.6
(Percent)			−23.6	−46.9		−28.5
Selected Air Force support equipment	1139.5	2061.9	1059.8	916.6	1231.1	780.9
(Percent)			−48.6	−55.5		−36.6

As indicated in Table 2, compared to the projections in the fiscal year 1986 budget, actual funding in the fiscal year 1987 budget for Army spare parts dropped 45 percent, Navy ammunition and tactical missiles 32 percent, and Air Force support equipment 56 percent. Moreover, while readiness accounts have faired relatively well in the fiscal year 1988 request, funding requests for spares, ammunition and support equipment in all four services are still substantially below projections made only a year ago, and this is before Congress has taken action on the request. In addition, the Defense Department is actually requesting less active duty end strength in fiscal year 1988 than it received in fiscal year 1987. Yet in spite of all these massive perturbations in the defense program, the defense budget has not yet contributed a single dollar to actual deficit reduction.

In order to understand how to deal with this current situation, it is necessary to understand how we got ourselves into this mess. In my view there are six reasons for the current crisis.

First, we, and I include myself in that group because I occupied a key post in the Pentagon hierarchy from 1981 to 1985, ignored the lessons of history. Prior to 1980, the defense budget had never increased in real terms in peacetime for more than three consecutive years. We assumed that the real growth that began in the last years of the Carter administration would continue throughout the eight years of the Reagan presidency and beyond. Since we were already into the third year of real increases when we took office, this would have meant 12 straight years of real growth, more than four times longer than at any previous period in American history.

This situation was compounded by the failure of the Pentagon leadership to adjust in a timely fashion to the deterioration of public support for the defense buildup. By early 1983, even the Republican leadership in the Cognress was telling the Secretary of Defense and the President that the Congress could not keep granting large increases in defense authority. Yet the Pentagon persisted in treating this as a transient phenomenon. As late as 1986, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy were still talking publicly about a return to the climate of the early 1980s. As a result of this attitude, no serious planning was done to deal with the new reality and no hard choices were made. Rather, thousands of programs in the DOD budget were reduced slightly with the expectation that large increases would resume in the outyears. The result is that current programs are underfunded by about $500 billion.

Moreover, because the civilian leadership in DOD focused its efforts primarily on trying to push spending levels marginally higher, rather than on how to get the military services to make do with less, Congress was forced to assume the role. In my view, that is not a job Congress can or should do if we are to have a coherent military strategy. This point can be illustrated by looking at the way in which Congress cut $25 billion in the procurement, O&M, and R&D accounts from the fiscal year 1987 request.

TABLE 3.—*How Congress Reduced the FY 1987 Military Budget*

[Budget Authority in Millions of Dollars]

Pricing and financing adjustments:	
Fuel price savings	$2,878.9
O&M industrial fund profits	1,035.4
Reestimated inflation rate	1,666.9
Revised profit policy	656.4
Reduced stock fund inventories	546.6
Foreign nationals compensation	400.0
Morale, welfare, recreation, travel	184.3
Def. ind. activity productivity	136.0
Medical and dental charges	211.9
Space shuttle costs reallocated to NASA	383.5
Army program cost savings	94.8
Navy program costs savings	842.6
Air Force aircraft cost savings	20.4
Army R&D general savings	46.0
R&D consulting	74.5
Total, pricing and financing	9,178.1
Percentage of total reductions [1]	37.0
Oversight and stretchouts:	
Air Force historians	3.3
Chemical weapons	37.3
AH-64 144/120	160.8
Army aircraft mods	140.5
Chaparral	73.7
Air defense system heavy	9.1
Stinger AP	10.3
Army missile mods	30.8
Army missile support equip	5.0
Bradley FVS 870/662 & AP	236.0
M-1 Abrams tank 840/800 & AP	182.7
Army WTCV mods	559.8
F/A-18 aircraft 120/84	686.4
Navy aircraft mods	54.0
MK-48 torpedoes	270.6
DDG-51/CG-47 trade-off (added cost)	(23.5)
SSN-21 early lead items	79.3
Ship outfitting, delivery & design	86.4
F-15D/E aircraft 48/42	209.3
F-16C/D 216/180	723.4
MX missile 21/12	303.4
AMRAAM	150.0
Air Force missile mods	5.2
Air Force space progr. adjustments	297.3
Air Force C3I adjustments	724.7
Army tech. base R&D	77.1
Army adv. tech. dev. R&D	75.8
Army tactical programs R&D	364.5
Army C3I & Def. support R&D	208.0
Navy technology base R&D	55.7
Navy adv. tech. dev. R&D	64.2
Navy strategic R&D	135.1
Navy tactical R&D	607.1
Navy C3I & Def. support R&D	121.1
Air Force technology R&D	73.3
Air Force adv. tech. dev. R&D	138.4

ICBM modernization (SICBM & MX) R&D	506.8
Other A.F. strategic R&D	289.5
Other A.F. tactical R&D	263.0
A.F. C3I & def. support R&D	347.3
Other defense agencies R&D (added funds)	(198.3)
Development test and evaluation	36.3
Chemical munitions destruction	1.4
Total, oversight and stretchouts	8,182.7
Percentage of total reductions [1]	33.0
Readiness related programs:	
Real property maintenance	200.0
Deployable medical systems	158.5
Other O&M reductions	1,913.9
Army spare parts	165.0
Army support equipment	940.8
Army ammunition and tactical missiles	190.9
Army weapons and other combat vehicles	7.5
Navy spare parts	219.9
Navy munitions and tactical missiles	68.5
Navy support equipment	418.9
Service craft (added funds)	(45.0)
Marine Corps ammunition	27.4
Marine Corps tactical missiles	10.6
Marine Corps support equipment	28.5
Air Force spare parts	534.8
Air Force munitions and tactical missiles	859.0
Air Force support equipment	444.1
National Guard and Reserve equip. (added funds)	(557.0)
Total, readiness related programs	5,586.3
Percentage of total reductions	22.5
Programmatic changes:	
3 versus 5 Poseidon overhauls	256.0
MSH-1 mine hunter cancellation	196.1
T-46A aircraft (added funds)	(151.0)
Conventional defense initiative (added funds)	(77.0)
Space defense (ASAT) system R&D	78.0
Strategic defense initiative (DOD)	1,572.2
Total, programmatic changes	1,874.3
Percentage of total reductions [1]	7.6
Classified programs:	
Air Force missile classified prog	116.7
Army classified strategic R&D	57.8
Army classified tactical R&D	88.1
Navy classified R&D	54.6
Classified A.F. strategic R&D	9.5
Classified A.F. tactical R&D	(43.8)
Classified A.F. C3I R&D	5.2
Total, classified programs	288.0
Total reductions in procurement, O&M, R&D	25,109.8
Total less classified program reductions	24,821.3

[1] Excluding classified program reductions.

As indicated in Table 3, $9.2 billion or 37 percent of the reduction came from pricing and financing adjustments; another $8.2 billion or 33 percent came from oversight and stretchouts; readiness related programs absorbed $5.5 billion or 23 percent of the cuts; only $1.9 billion or 7 percent were programmatic changes.

Second, the administration failed to pay sufficient attention to what President Eisenhower called the "Great Equation," i.e., that real national security was the sum of economic as well as military strength. By slashing taxes by 5 percent of the GNP at the same time that it launched the massive and unprecedented peacetime defense buildup, which added 1 percent of GNP to the defense budget, the Reagan administration guaranteed that the Great Equation would become unbalanced and that a reaction against the defense budget would set in. Moreover, by endorsing the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings proposal in 1985, while refusing to raise taxes, the President and his advisors ensured that the projected levels of defense authority would be slashed drastically for the rest of this decade.

Third, the level of defense spending was increased too rapidly, particularly in the procurement area. While the fiscal year 1985 defense budget was 53 percent higher in real terms than fiscal year 1980, procurement was more than 100 percent higher. The acquisition system simply was not able to absorb that much money that quickly. The problem was compounded by the fact that the management system was decentralized at the same time. Pouring in that much money while loosening control led to the procurement scandals which undermined the confidence of the American people in DOD's leadership and, along with the deficit problem, contributed to the rapid erosion of the defense consensus.

Fourth, the defense buildup was front loaded in favor of major weapon systems—i.e., major weapon systems were procured in inordinate numbers in the early years of the defense buildup. For example, the fiscal year 1983 defense budget contained a request for *two* Nimitz class aircraft carriers. When Congress approved this request, DOD and the Congress were committed not only to spending some $40 billion for the planes and ships that comprise the battle groups, but to additional tens of billions for the people, spare parts, and ammunition necessary to make that battle group militarily effective. The share of the budget devoted to readiness dropped by 10 percentage points in the 1980-85 period. The expectation was that as these weapons came into the force, manpower and support equipment would then be purchased. However, when the turn of the readiness accounts to receive their fair share arrived, fiscal austerity had set in; and until fiscal year 1988, readiness received a smaller share of declining budgets, even though its needs were greater. The fiscal austerity problem was compounded by the "bow wave" situation; i.e. funds for readiness and sustainability were routinely pushed to the outyears of the five year program even during the first part of the decade.

Fifth, the administration and DOD leadership not only refused to listen to those who pointed out the inconsistencies in their approach, they took action to silence them. This "bunker mentality" existed from the earliest days of the administration. In early 1982, I gave a brief to the Defense Resources' Board in which I argued that, even if the Reagan buildup were approved by the Congress, there was still a large mismatch between strategy and resources and that if economic conditions necessitated a slowing down of our buildup, that mismatch would only become worse. Rather than using that brief as a catalyst to deal with the situation, the Deputy Secretary of Defense made me take a lie detector test when an account of the session was reported in the *Washington Post* and, with the advice of the General Counsel, he eventually directed me to fire the member of my staff who prepared the briefs. [Happily their case did not stand up and the employee was reinstated.] When, as a member of the Committee for National Security and a private citizen, I made the same point approximately one year ago, top Navy officials, with the support of the Secretary of the Navy, tried to silence me by complaining to my employer.

Unfortunately, this attitude also penetrated into the staff of this committee. I was told by the President and a Senior Vice President of Raytheon Company that Carl Smith, a member of the staff of this committee, was so upset by my attitude that he would never deal with Raytheon's Washington office again as long as I headed it. I think it ironic that since that episode both Smith and Raytheon have prospered. Smith has moved up to the job of staff director for the minority, and Raytheon's stock is at an all time high. Moreover, Secretary Lehman and Assistant Secretaries Pyatt and Paisley remain in their jobs, while I lost mine, despite the fact that a report by the DOD Inspector General found that they acted improperly.

Unhappily, according to an article in the *Los Angeles Times*, my case was not an isolated one. Last August, the *Times* pointed out that Navy officials tried to have Edward Luttwak removed from his consulting job at Northrop after he published his excellent book, The Pentagon and the Art of War.

Make no mistake about the chilling effect these actions have. As Senator Bingaman noted on the floor of the Senate last August, when discussing why people who were opposed to the Navy position on the issue of strategic homeporting would not speak out, "Others in speaking to me or my staff have pointed to the Larry Korb affair and said they cannot speak publicly for fear of Navy retribution."

Sixth, the Reagan buildup was begun before a coherent national security strategy was developed. Neither during the transition period nor in the first year of the Reagan administration was the Basic National Security Policy Document formulated. Indeed this document was not promulgated until sometime in 1982, a year after the Reagan five-year defense program was submitted to the Congress. Rather than letting strategy guide budget choices, the situation was reversed. As is recounted in former Budget Director Stockman's book, budget totals were agreed upon first. The argument was made that in 1981, the military situation was so bad it did not matter where the money was spent. Force goals and slogans became a substitute for strategy. Rather than strategy, the air was filled with such phrases as "a 600 ship Navy" and "horizontal escalation." It is significant that Secretary Weinberger's first major speech on strategy was not given until the fall of 1985, and that the administration's first detailed exposition of its defense strategy occurs in the fiscal year 1987 posture statement.

To extricate ourselves from the present dilemma we must do several things now. These actions can be broken down into five categories.

First, Congress and the administration must accept the fact that our defense program will exist within a constrained fiscal environment for the forseeable future, certainly for the rest of this decade. Given the deficit situation, there is simply no room for real growth in the defense budget.

Second, while there is no room for real growth in the defense program, the defense budget cannot be allowed to decline significantly. Whether or not one agrees with the numbers and kind of weapon systems authorized in the 1981–85 period, the fact of the matter is that they will be coming into the force and must be supported with the proper infrastructure, viz. people, bases, spares and ammunition. The impact of failing to do that will be to waste the money that will in fact be spent.

Third, our force structure goals must be altered. However desirable, a 15 carrier battle group, 600 ship Navy, an 18 active division Army, or a 40 tactical air wing Air Force may be, this big a force structure is simply not affordable without significant real growth in the defense budget. The Army and Navy would do well to follow the example of the Air Force which will hold its force structure at 37 tactical air wings. Congress can take a gigantic step in the direction of adjusting our force goals to fiscal reality by refusing to provide long lead funding for the two new aircraft carriers requested in the fiscal year 1988 budget. By the same token, DOD cannot afford to modernize all three legs of the strategic triad, while simultaneously undertaking a large strategic defense program, without sacrificing improvements in conventional forces. As evidence, compared to projections made a year ago, Air Force and Navy research and development accounts, which are heavily weighted toward strategic programs, have gone up, while research and development for the conventional forces of the Army and Marine Corps has dropped substantially.

Fourth, development of the next generation of weapon systems must be delayed. Going ahead with such new systems as the ATF, ATA, C–17, LHX, and JVX at the present time will mean that the current generation of weapon systems will have to be purchased in uneconomical quantities. Paying $67 million a copy for an F–14 fighter or $60 million for an EA–6B electronic warfare plane is absurd. Transferring some of the funds for the next generation of weapons to these ongoing production lines will bring down unit costs substantially.

Fifth, marginal programs must be eliminated. Building new naval bases in Staten Island, the Gulf, San Francisco and Everett, or fixing up the Army bases at Fort Drum and Fairbanks made little sense in an era of expanding budgets. In the current climate it makes no sense! That money would be better spent buying ammunition for existing ships and divisions. Moreover, a 550 ship, 13 carrier battle group Navy, or a 16 division Army, will not tax our current base structure.

If the defense budget is allowed to keep pace with inflation over the last two years of the Reagan administration, average real growth in military spending for the Reagan Presidency will be slightly above 5 percent per year. This is the amount that the President pledged to achieve in his 1980 campaign and the amount that the JCS urged the Carter administration in testimony on the SALT Treaty in 1979. Such a rate of growth should allow us to have a modern, well trained, well motivated force, one that is much more capable than the one which existed a decade ago. However, the funds must be spent correctly or that capability will be hollow; i.e., the emphasis must be on ensuring the readiness and sustainability of the current force. A modern, well-equipped, and fully manned conventional force of 13 carrier battle groups, 16 active divisions, and 37 tactical air wings, backed by a strategic force of B–1 and B–52 bombers, Minuteman and MX missiles, and Poseidon and Trident submarines, capable of launching about 10,000 nuclear weapons, will provide the new administration that takes office in 1989 with a credible deterrent around which to develop a coherent military strategy.

Congress, cannot, in itself, ensure that scarce resources are allocated properly, but it can play a crucial role. The two year budget experiment will prove to be a great success if it enables this committee to explore the strategic choices our defense planners must face over the next few years. I hope this committee will devote some time to considering key policy matters such as these:

Can the United States restructure its strategic forces in a way that will save a significant amount of money (that can be used to remedy shortfalls in other areas), but still ensure that we can accomplish our strategic objectives, provide a necessary spur to arms reduction, and hedge against unexpected threats? Can we lay out a strategic force structure that would be highly survivable and able to destroy any given target set inside the Soviet Union at considerably less than the projected cost of currently planned strategic programs?

Does the maritime offensive strategy, built around a fifteen-plus carrier Navy, make sense? More important, should priority be given to the Navy at the possible expense of tactical air and land forces? Should the Navy redraw the balance between sea control and power projection missions in its force planning?

How long will the United States continue to maintain 325,000 troops in Europe? Can that number be reduced to 200,000 by the end of the century?

If this committee helps to force discussion of such issues, it will be possible for the nation to maintain the highly effective, properly structured forces needed for our national defense, while living within the constrained defense budgets that must be expected in the next few years.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Korb.

I think what we will do today, if it meets the approval of the committee, is go through each of our witnesses and then come back for questions.

Mr. Stubbing, am I pronouncing your name——

Mr. STUBBING. Yes, sir, you are.

Chairman NUNN. Is it Stubbing?

Mr. STUBBING. Yes, Stubbing.

Chairman NUNN. We are delighted to have you.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD STUBBING, FORMER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

Mr. STUBBING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This hearing addresses one of the most important yet least understood aspects of our national security program, the linkage between our military strategy and the defense program and resources, and I base my comments primarily on my 20 years in BOB, OMB. I think these comments are still valid.

I would like to first address two myths about national security planning. Myth No. 1. Each administration adopts an overall national defense strategy, defines the forces needed to implement this strategy, then totals up the associated costs to produce the budget for national defense. Sounds neat, but it does not happen that way and never has in my 20 years.

The reality is that all administrations that I have known since 1960 have adopted a defense strategy but this strategy is seldom related to the forces and fiscal needs required for implementation, and as I will say throughout, it is very difficult to do this, and that is one of the problems.

The closest we came to this was in 1969 in the Nixon administration when they conducted a study of our forces and strategy, and I found the experience—I was on the team that worked on this—highly instructive to the problem we face. The study team which was composed of top people, political, military and civil servant, from the world of defense, CIA, State, Arms Control. All the players in the system spent several months working together and we found it was quite easy after a period of time to establish a broad range of strategy alternatives. That turned out to be fairly simple.

Then the difficulty began when we tried to put prices on those strategies, and what resulted, as I suggest in the testimony, is the proof of the dilemma we have in trying to relate dollars to strategy. The military folks on the study team came up with a dollar value to implement every one of the strategies I will call 2X, and the civilian analysts came out at X. That was a 100 percent difference in the cost to implement any one strategy which truly overwhelmed the differences between the strategies.

In that particular case, in order to finish the study, David Packard, then Deputy Secretary of Defense, announced a Gordion knot solution. He established a price of 1.5X, exactly the mid-point between the military and civilian pricing. This is probably not the best way to settle the pricing difference but that is what was used in that case and shows how difficult the pricing problem is. And that problem has continued over the years since 1969.

President Ford and President Carter both conducted studies of their national security strategy and then it also tended to fall apart in this very difficult task of applying prices, and when I say prices it means the forces and the weapons and whatever else is needed to implement the strategy, a real tough area.

The current administration, by contrast, conducted no comprehensive study of its defense needs in its first year. Instead, they decided on an across the board spending increase for all aspects of our defense posture on the assumption that U.S. military capability lagged behind the Soviets in all areas. They then conducted about a year later a short NSC study confirming these findings and endorsing a multiple war capability for U.S. forces, but the Joint Chiefs rejected this approach infeasible because they couldn't perform it with the forces assigned to them.

So there was a big imbalance between the declared strategy and the ability to execute it.

In the context of this morning's hearing on NATO, one of the major failings of most administrations in deciding upon a strategy, rough as it is, for national security is that the U.S. defense posture that is adopted is considered and acted upon in isolation in most cases from the contributions of our allies. The decision in the early weeks of 1981 by the current administration to add massive amounts to the defense budget was made in isolation from our allies. They were not consulted beforehand. Consequently they could and did slow their defense buildup.

Ambassador Abshire this morning confirmed this when he said first that budgetary commitment is the most important indicator of defense commitment for any nation, and then he went on to say that our NATO allies are holding level or in effect falling further behind the U.S. commitment on defense over the last decade.

Chairman NUNN. Are you saying that the leading by example kind of demonstration that we have had for the last several years did not work with our allies?

Mr. STUBBING. Yes, I am saying that, Senator. Myth No. 2 is related to the first one but it is separate. The myth is that there is a clear relationship between an adopted defense strategy and the defense program which flows from this strategy. In reality, from my experience, the flow goes the other way. It is an upriver flow. The defense program and budget is a bottoms up process controlled in large part by the military services in which their preferred force and modernization programs are normally established independent of any overall defense strategy.

In effect, each military department establishes and follows its own strategy, and that is an important point to me. This is particularly true of the major combat units each service prefers, and they have used it over the years to set these units and protect them. This can be done, as I pointed out, because of this wide band of uncertainty between a strategy of any kind and the forces required to implement it.

I suggested in my written testimony a few examples. I will quickly go through them. The Kennedy administration committed to expanding the capability of conventional forces outside Europe. The results were very slim. A few small counter insurgency units were added to the Army, but everything else stayed the same.

During the Nixon administration, there was an attempt to move toward simpler weapons systems, but only two systems actually ever followed the new approach. All the rest stayed on the high tech, fairly complex weapons path that we have had in the past and have caused us a lot of trouble.

Finally, the rapid deployment force concept of the Carter administration in 1980 required a major commitment to enhanced sealift capability. Today, almost 7 years later, that has not happened, and we have an imbalance in our overall posture.

Chairman NUNN. Are you saying that the President of the United States, no matter who it is and what administration and what strategy has been announced, has had very little effect on the Department of Defense planning and budgeting?

Mr. STUBBING. Very little is a tough phrase. I will say there is a big disconnect between the announced strategy from the President and what actually happens when it gets down into the Department of Defense and into the military services in terms of what they do. Sometimes things are followed. Sometimes in the case of sealift, as I just pointed out, they seem not to have been followed. That is correct.

Chairman NUNN. Now, where do you fault that? The American people, I think, would be appalled to believe that they can elect a President of the United States that can come in and make a study of strategy, as you have indicated happened in the 1970s, announce what they were going to do, and yet the building just keeps going in that direction. Is that the fault of Presidential leadership? Is it the fault of the Secretary of Defense? Is it the fault of the military services? Is it just part of our system and we should just go ho hum, it has been happening, do not worry about it anymore?

Mr. STUBBING. It is a combination of things, Senator. The gut part of the problem, to me, is that whenever a president announces a strategy, seldom do we spell out the specifics that go with the strategy. and implementation is usually left to the Department of Defense. The case of sealift is a little bit of an exception, because there was clearly a need that had been established in 1980.

Most of the time, the exact programs to be implemented are left to the device of the Department of Defense, and so the disconnect is a little hard to see sometimes. The thing that shows up as remarkably consistent, at least since 1960, is that the forces whatever our adopted strategy, the forces required to implement this strategy always tend to be the same.

One point I want to drive home is that there is a slow and at times almost glacial pace of change in defense strategy and planning. Then there are pressures from the Congress to keep the status quo which reinforces the biases of a lot of people in defense. The result is very slow change. That has been the pattern over the years.

Another indicator of the bottoms up nature of the defense program is the relatively consistent share of the budget each military department receives. I show in my written testimony how remarkably consistent the share of the budget is that goes to each of the services. This leads to what I call the "rule of three".

The "rule of three" says that each military department over time, not every year, will receive about one-third of the real growth in the defense budget. This does seem to be the pattern that is followed in most years and suggests that something other than overall national strategy needs have a big bearing in defense budget and resource allocation.

I point out in the written testimony that Gen. David Jones agrees with the bottoms up nature of this budget process in his own public statements.

I go on to a second point that is a very important fact to leave before you and that involves uncertainty in defense budget planning. Uncertainty between any given defense strategy and the dollars required to is quite high. The Secretaries that were at defense in the years I was around took different managerial approaches in an effort to bring some better cohesion between the two. I would like to just briefly tick off a few of those.

Robert McNamara, who criticized the Eisenhower tight budget approach, mandated a predetermined force structure for each of the military departments with no budget constraints to accompany this force structure. In effect, he set the force structure and said to the military departments you can ask for anything you want to support that structure. This was not an open process, as I point out in the testimony. He already had cut a deal with the budget director on the total defense budget level, but within the Pentagon he laid it out as if it was.

This approach encountered severe problems. The military services prepared unconstrained budget requests. They are very good at that, and it forced the staff of the Secretary to remove some 20 to 25 percent of the budget each year in order to reach the agreed budget level. It was a tremendous shoveling process in all respects.

Also, the services, following natural incentives, since they could not move the force structure, moved toward the most expensive weapons systems that they could put together because they knew they started with a fixed force structure. There was no flexibility in quantity versus quality, so they went for quality. This policy produced a number of weapons programs that are still around today, many of which have run into lots of problems because we tried to do too much too fast.

Melvin Laird took a different tact. He issued strict budgetary totals to the services each year and then allowed the services within the totals extensive freedom, a completely different approach from Mr. McNamara. This system, I feel, proved superior to the McNamara approach and probably resulted in better overall relationship of the forces and dollars and in the way they were spent.

James Schlesinger continued the approach of established budget ceilings for each service, but he added an important innovation, the only Secretary since 1960 that did this. He established a rapport with the Services to obtain more bang for the buck. He worked out agreements with the Army and the Air Force to expand their combat forces while they, in turn, agreed to reduce their support costs or buy lower cost weapons to accommodate these changes. The result of these negotiated agreements was good for the country and probably for our pocketbook because by staying within the dollars available at that time, we were able to add three combat divisions and four fighter wings to the U.S. force structure.

Harold Brown returned more to the McNamara model, aided and abetted by the zero based budgeting system which ultimately forced almost all decisions up to the level of the Secretary of Defense.

Caspar Weinberger early in 1981 reached agreement with the budget director on a $32 billion increase to the 1981–82 Carter budget, which already had $20 billion in real growth in it. There was no strategy adopted and no clear set of priorities assigned. The military services were directed to provide programs in support of the higher budget levels with little guidance from the Secretary of Defense, in effect inviting each military department to follow its own predetermined priorities, which they are only too happy to do.

From these different managerial styles, I rate the Laird and Schlesinger approaches as superior, given the uncertainty in all aspects of defense. Its realistic fiscal constraints early in the process are a real incentive to improve the quality of decisions and what we do with the dollars allocated to our defense.

Looking to 1988 and 1989, I have a couple of points. There are two steps which I think are so important in converting defense funds into defense capability. We spend a lot of time on the first step, which is the level of defense budget, and we spend less time, in my view, on how well we spend it. That, to me, is a great need that we have as a nation.

The second or a major failing of the budget process today involves the rhetoric versus the reality of the defense budget. I point out that every defense budget without exception has a number of items that are low priority that can be moved to the next year or 2 years out. The budget sent each year from the executive department to the Congress includes cut insurance to allow Congress enough to cut out and not hurt any of the defense programs. That is a conscious effort that goes on almost every year in the budget process.

Chairman NUNN. When you really end up, though, taking very serious cuts in terms of stretching out programs and lowering the production rate, thereby raising the unit cost, something is really happening fundamentally to the budget. There has simply got to be some real damage done in that respect, does there not?

Mr. STUBBING. Again, Mr. Chairman, that is the dilemma of defense and weapons. It is very hard to tell if that has any effect. It probably adds to the cost, but in many cases we add to the cost deliberately by carrying contractors for big bucks for many years until they get a new weapon contract. Those are conscious decisions that are made not in the national defense context but maybe in the sense of economic or political realities that we have to face, so that a lot of that goes on in defense all the time.

What is wrong with the process, is that if you do have—I heard your opening statement, and I would agree with one of the points very strongly, that if we do start the process with numbers that are unrealistic, there is a much greater tendency to do a lot of things that are not so smart. If we had the realistic budgetary numbers from the beginning of the process that defense could expect to get for defense, a lot wiser decisions, in my view, would be made. More value would be obtained for any defense level.

I believe that realistic fiscal constraints need to be applied to the entire defense planning program which will improve our defense capability each year.

Recognizing that the approved defense budget for 1987 is almost 50 percent greater in constant dollars than it was in 1980, recognizing that our defense capability has increased far less than 50 percent, and recognizing that the Nation faces a severe fiscal crisis, I suggest that the defense budget for 1988–89 be held at the 1987 level in real terms.

I concur with Dr. Korb on this point. Primary attention can then be given to improving the conversion efficiency of dollars into added capability.

I suggest a couple of questions as you conduct your deliberations in the coming months that I think are important. First, greater emphasis be given to accelerating production of existing weapons while slowing the research and development on some newer systems now in development?

Second point: Can a slower phasing plan be introduced for the large number of strategic programs being proposed at this time?

Third point: Can personnel savings, both military and civilian, be achieved?

Fourth point: Will administration officials and Members of Congress commit to convince our allies that they must assume a greater portion of our mutual defense burden in the future?

I think these are critical questions as you conduct your deliberations.

Then, in closing, in an arena in which uncertainty will always present a tight correlation between our defense strategy and the resources required, we can do a far better job in relating these two factors if we follow a couple of important guidelines.

We must adopt a clearly defined national strategy with defined priorities that can be understood by all. We need realistic fiscal constraints, multiple year fiscal constraints, at the start of each DOD budget cycle. There must be congressional involvement in and support of the adopted strategy and its priority. Involving Congress is something we have not done in the past and we definitely should do in the future to have a greater consensus of agreement on strategy and resources.

Finally, we need strong top level management in DOD to assure that priorities are indeed implemented using, as Mr. Schlesinger did, positive incentives wherever possible to insure compliance.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stubbing follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. STUBBING

This hearing addresses one of the most important yet least understood aspects of our national security program—the linkage between our military strategy and the defense programs and resources. My comments reflect some 20 years experience in OMB reviewing the defense budget (1962 thru 1981). I believe these observations are still valid.

Let me first address two myths about national security planning.

MYTH 1.—Each Administration adopts an overall national defense strategy, defines the forces necessary to implement this strategy and totals up the associated costs to produce the budget for national defense.

The reality is that while all Administrations since 1960 have declared a defense strategy, this strategy is not directly related to the forces and fiscal needs required for implementation. The closest we came to this in my years in OMB occurred in 1969 under President Nixon and the experience is instructive. A major interagency study of our defense needs was conducted involving high ranking officials from Defense, State, CIA, ACDA and OMB. The study grappled with the complexities of threat projections, the military capabilities of the US and its allies, the likelihood of future conflicts and the fiscal constraints faced by the nation. The study team found it relatively easy to devise alternative defense strategies, but could not reach agreement when it came to defining the forces and resource levels required to implement each strategy option. Wide differences erupted over the combat forces and related equipment needed for each option—with the cost estimates from the military services ranging up to twice as high as those prepared by the civilian analysts. These differences demonstrate the incredible complexity and high uncertainty which surround defense planning. Then Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard became so frustrated with the pricing impasse that he simply split the difference between the civilian and military estimates to allow the study to be completed. President Nixon used this study in his decision to shift our defense planning strategy from a 2½ wars to 1½ wars and to establish fiscal planning levels for defense.

Other administrations have declared shifts in strategy but without full consideration of the fiscal constraints. President Ford in 1976 decided to place greater emphasis on US conventional force needs outside of NATO with an emphasis on navy modernization; President Carter in 1977 slowed modernization of our strategic and naval forces while increasing funds for US forces in support of NATO.

The Reagan administration conducted no comprehensive study of defense needs in its first year—instead an across-the-board spending increase for all aspects of our defense posture was pursued, on the assumption that US military capability lagged behind the Soviets in all areas; an NSC study conducted in 1982 confirmed these findings and endorsed a multiple war capability for US forces which the JCS rejected as impossible with planned forces.

A major failing of most administrations in deciding upon a strategy for national security is that the US defense posture is considered and acted upon in isolation from the contributions of our Allies. The decision in the early weeks of the Reagan Administration to add massive amounts to the defense budget was made in isolation. Our Allies in NATO and Japan were not consulted beforehand to obtain their commitment to greater defense efforts. Consequently, they could, and did, slow their defense buildup—allowing the US military unilaterally to carry most of the burden of higher defense for the entire alliance.

MYTH 2.—There is a clear relationship between an adopted defense strategy and the defense program which flows from this strategy.

In reality the converse is true. The defense program and budget is a "bottoms up" process controlled by the military services in which their preferred force and weapons modernization programs are normally determined independently of any given defense strategy. This is particularly true of the major combat units preferred by each service—heavy armored divisions in the Army, carrier battle groups in the Navy, strategic bombers and fighter wings in the Air Force. This can be done because of the wide band of uncertainty regarding the force and weapon requirements required to carry out any given strategy.

Several examples support this thesis. When the Kennedy Administration announced a commitment to enable US conventional forces to fight effectively in conflicts outside Europe, the only tangible results were a few small counter insurgency units dedicated to special operations. The rest of our ground forces changed little, retaining their primary emphasis on fighting a heavily armored foe in Europe. When the Nixon administration pushed the idea of simpler and more reliable weapons, only two programs—the F16 and the A10—followed this approach; most other new weapons programs continued to rely on advanced technology. Similarly, under the "Rapid Deployment Force" of the Carter administration, improved sealift capability became a top priority; the Navy, however, ranks sealift low in its priority and has done little since 1980 to improve its fast sealift capability required for rapid deployment of ground forces.

Another indicator of the "bottoms up" nature of the defense program is the relatively constant share of the budget each military department receives. From 1984-86 the Army averaged about 26.2% of the DOD budget; for 1987-89 then proposed share averages 26.3%. The Navy averaged just over 34% in 1984-86; for 1987-89 its proposed shared is 33.7%. The Air Force averaged 34.5% of the DOD budget in 1984-86; its share slips to 33.2% in 1987-89 primarily due to the completion of the B-1 bomber program. Clearly, each military department considers its portion of the DOD budget as a critical concern and will fight to retain its share no matter what the overall defense strategy.

In 1982 General David Jones summarized the budget process in these words: "the result of this tedious process is a defense budget that is derived primarily from the disparate desires of the individual services rather than from a well integrated plan based on a serious examination of alternatives."

MANAGERIAL STYLES USED BY SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

Recognizing the large range of uncertainty between a given defense strategy and the forces/programs required to implement it, recent Secretaries of Defense have applied varying managerial approaches.

Robert McNamara was highly critical of the Eisenhower administration for imposing "arbitrary" budget ceilings on defense. Instead, he mandated a predetermined force structure for each of the military services with no budget constraints to accompany the force structure guidance. (McNamara actually had secretly reached agreement with the Budget Director on an overall defense budget level.) This approach encountered severe problems—the military services prepared unconstrained budget requests, forcing the OSD to remove some 20-25% each year to reach the agreed budget level. Lacking any flexibility in force planning, the services decided to "gold plate" each new weapon developed—a practice which led to large cost growth and poor operating performance in many new weapons.

Melvin Laird took another tack. Laird issued strict budgetary totals to the services each year. Within the totals the services had extensive freedom to spell out their programs and priorities—with Laird demanding prior approval in select major program areas. This system proved superior to the McNamara approach, as the military services were required to set their own priorities within established budgetary constraints. Total reductions by OSD staff to the service budget requests average 4.5%.

James Schlesinger continued the approach of established budget ceilings for each military service and added an important innovation. He desired to obtain more "bang for the buck" and worked out agreements with the Army and Air Force to expand their combat forces while they, in turn, agreed to reduce their support costs or buy lower cost weapons. This use of negotiated agreements to improve overall combat capabilities within established fiscal constraints proved highly successful as the Army added three combat divisions and the Air Force added four fighter wings.

Harold Brown returned more to the McNamara model. His approach, coupled with the zero budgeting system implemented by President Carter, meant that most defense decisions were once again escalated to the Secretary of Defense.

Caspar Weinberger early in 1981 reached agreement with the Budget Director on a $32 billion increase to the 1981-82 Carter budget (which already contained $20 in real growth for the two years). There was no strategy adopted and no clear set of priorities assigned. The military services were directed to provide programs in support of the higher budget levels with little guidance from the Secretary of Defense.

From these differing managerial styles, I rate the Laird and Schlesinger approaches as superior to the others. Given the uncertainty which encompasses all aspects of the defense program, realistic fiscal constraints early on will certainly provide the proper incentive for improving the quality of decisions. Also, innovative incentives such as those practiced by James Schlesinger can improve the defense capability obtained from any given defense program or budget level.

THE DEFENSE BUDGET FOR 1988-89 AND BEYOND

There are two steps in converting defense funds into defense capability—the level of the defense budget and how well we spend it. I believe too much time goes into determining the overall budget level and too little effort is applied to converting these dollars into improved capability.

Much of the problem comes from the lack of a well defined national defense strategy, together with clear priorities for the military services to follow.

A second major failing of the budget process involves the rhetoric vs. the reality of the defense budget. For example, the Secretary of Defense will argue that every dollar of the $303 billion defense budget for 1988 is urgently needed; yet, this budget and every budget sent to the Congress contains sizable amounts of "cut insurance"—low priority programs which can easily be deferred to 1989 or later. These funds permit the Congress to reduce the defense budget each year without any real impact on DOD priorities. Another example envolves the constant clamor that the Soviets are outproducing us in aircraft, tanks and other weapons, but the 1988 budget actually cuts the production rates of many key U.S. weapons, while at the same time providing a major increase in R&D for weapons that will not enter the inventory for some number of years. And at a time when the administration speaks hopefully of achieving an arms control agreement with the Soviets, the budget contains a full range of strategic program initiatives involving strategic bombers, land based missiles, sea based missiles and SDI.

I believe that realistic fiscal constraints need to be applied to the entire defense planning and budget process to provide a better context for a defense program which will improve our defense capability each year. Recognizing that the approved defense budget for 1987 is almost 50% greater in constant dollars than in 1980 and that the nation faces a severe fiscal crisis, I suggest that the defense budget for 1988 and 1989 be held at the 1987 level in real terms. Primary attention can then be given to improving the conversion efficiency of dollars into added capability.

I close with some questions that bear scrutiny in your deliberations:

Can greater emphasis be given to accelerating production of existing weapons while slowing the R&D on some newer systems now in development?

Can a slower phasing plan be designed for the large number of strategic programs being proposed?

Can personnel savings, both military and civilian, be achieved?

Will administration officials and Members of Congress commit to convince our allies that they must assume a greater portion of our mutual defense burden in the future?

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Stubbing.

John Collins, we are delighted to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF JOHN M. COLLINS, USA (RETIRED), SENIOR SPECIALIST IN NATIONAL DEFENSE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Mr. COLLINS. Frank Perdue, the chicken man, said it does not make any difference how well the chicken is cooked if it is not worth cooking to begin with. That finding fits the U.S. defense establishment perfectly. It makes no difference how well the operators operate unless the plans that they implement are worth implementing in the first place. The programs which the American people pay for out of their pockets at great expense are cost effective only if they support sound strategies. The worst kind of waste results when there is a mismatch, too often calculated in terms of national lifeblood as well as treasure.

My invitational letter from you and Senator Warner asks whether our military strategy serves as an effective framework for development of defense policies and programs. The answer is not nearly as well as they could or should. Strategic planning is not a U.S. specialty. Doers, men of action, are most admired—but doers, you see, do not do very well unless skilled strategists think.

My presentation outlines 20-some illustrative problems in four categories: objectives; threats; strategies; and forces. I do not want you to be alarmed, because I am going to kill each one of them in a couple of sentences. You could lengthen that list a whole lot in 5 minutes, if you like.

OBJECTIVES

Category one in objectives. A lot of problems start with objectives, because some objectives are too fuzzy for planning, and some plans are too fuzzy to support objectives. The Reagan doctrine, for example, seeks to assist resistance movements around the world, like the Contras in Nicaragua and Mujahideen in Afghanistan. The basic objective in every instance is to help friends help themselves, but when you ask, "help them to do what?", it gets real fuzzy real fast. Are you going to help them win a military victory? Are you going to help them overthrow a rival government? Are you just going to help them raise rival costs? Do you want to help them harass the opposition? You are going to have to have much better objectives before you get better plans.

Solid plans do not always follow solid objectives. No one disagrees that we ought to be able to control escalation in a conflict with the Soviet Union and terminate that conflict quickly on United States and allied terms. Both are solid objectives that go way back, but I know of no one who knows how to accomplish either. Both of those objectives are basically dreams.

THREATS

Category two is threats. Unopposed objectives are self-satisfying, so you have to look at threats. Calculations surely should include intentions conditioned by context, to ascertain the imminence and intensity of perils. DOD, however, habitually describes threats almost entirely in terms of enemy capabilities, although the most dangerous enemy capability you can possibly imagine is not necessarily a dangerous threat. The Soviets have had the capability of destroying the United States with nuclear weapons for over 20 years. They have not even thought about it for very good reasons. If we go off the map, they go off the map with us. You have to look at context. You have to look at intentions.

Additional problems crop up when relationships between threats and force requirements are reversed. The likelihood of strategic nuclear war is very low according to most calculations. Strategic nuclear programs, however, are the highest DOD priority. The likelihood of low intensity conflict is relatively high according to most calculations, but special operations forces were scarcely on DOD's scoreboard until Congress put them there. They were not put there by the Department of Defense. They were put there by your committee and by people in the House.

STRATEGY

Category three is called strategy. The purpose of strategy is to match ends with means, which is a measure of effectiveness, while minimizing waste, which is a measure of efficiency, despite enemy threats and political, economic, social, geographic, technological and other constraints.

In essence, strategy is a form of intellectual judo. It makes the enemy move the way you want him to whether he likes it or not. Strategic decisions have a huge bearing on how much of what do you need, how fast, in what order of priority to satisfy legitimate interests without wasting money.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Strategic problems fit several subcategories. To begin with, we have no national military strategy. The commanders in chief of unified and specified commands prepare strategies to suit their regional and functional responsibilities. The Navy prepares a maritime strategy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (but, I am told, not the Secretary of Defense) approve each of these strategic plans individually, but neither DOD's defense guidance nor any JCS document disseminates an overarching concept that tells subordinates how they fit into the big picture. No document ties all the pieces together.

Chairman NUNN. You say there is no overall strategy in the Department of Defense that you can find?

Mr. COLLINS. I cannot identify one, sir, and I cannot find anyone who can convince me there is one. I see all the pieces, but I see nothing tying the pieces together. That piecemeal approach invites mismatches between forces, objectives, threats, and strategies in every conceivable combination. I am going to give you just one example.

U.S. maritime strategy says we are going to go in harm's way. We are going to take on the Soviet Navy, if we go to war, under conditions that favor Soviet defense. In order to do that, the U.S. Navy must have 600 ships, including 15 carrier battle groups, and they are going to cost a certain amount of money.

That maritime strategy is totally incompatible with the needs of the U.S. Army, the Air Force, and our allies, because U.S. forces forward deployed on far shores cannot even survive, much less accomplish their assigned missions, unless they are reinforced and resupplied rapidly if we go to war with the Soviet Union. Sea control, according to the maritime strategy, is probably going to take months to complete, even if terminals at both ends stay intact, which is certainly doubtful. The disconnect between U.S. continental and maritime strategies is close to complete.

Chairman NUNN. May I ask you one question on the Navy business? We will count this against my time here. The Navy would contend that their maritime strategy is basically to take the war to the Soviet Union and that by doing that, they are clearing the sea lanes.

How do you respond to that?

Mr. COLLINS. I respond to that, sir, by saying there are a lot of different ways to skin a cat, and it is just possible that your committee might find, if it examined the maritime strategy, that it is not the best way to accomplish the mission.

ASSUMPTIONS

Strategies and forces are extremely sensitive to assumptions. A lot of assumptions are suspect

Example: DOD assumes that arms control depends on superiority, but let me remind this committee that when we negotiated SALT I, there was no question that the United States was clearly superior in numbers of deliverable nuclear warheads. If that had been a game of strip poker, we would have been sitting there with a bath towel around us when it was all over.

DOD assumes that stronger conventional forces would raise the nuclear threshold, but in fact exactly the opposite would take place. Stronger conventional forces will lower the nuclear threshold, unless simultaneously we take positive steps to provide better survivability for our nuclear delivery systems and for nuclear stockpiles, which are excruciatingly vulnerable right now.

The Soviet Navy seems to specialize in nuclear warfare, but U.S. maritime strategy assumes that problem away. It barely mentions it.

MENTAL BLOCKS

Mental blocks inhibit sound strategy as much as shaky assumptions. When I was a second lieutenant before the Peloponesian War, I was told never reinforce a failure. DOD reinforces failures routinely. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, acquiesced in, even encouraged, an attrition strategy in Vietnam for many years. We won every battle, but lost the war. SALT was unsuccessful. START was a nonstarter. Present U.S. arms control positions, to me, appear unpromising. DOD, however, still sticks with negotiations as a sine qua non for arms control, although changing strategies might be a better way to satisfy objectives.

FORCES

Finally, we come to category four, which is forces.

Many force problems are products of poor planning. DOD and the Congress consistently debate what I believe are secondary issues while bypassing basics.

It seems to me that it would be very nice to know whether we need land-based ballistic missiles in our future triad at all before we get involved in arguments about MX and Midgetman. It would be beneficial to know whether we want a manned bomber at all in that future triad before we argue about B–1 and Stealth. It would be very nice, I believe, to know whether we need a chemical warfare offensive capability at all before we debate the advisability of binary weapons.

Priorities are particularly important. Neither Congress nor the executive branch can spend wisely otherwise when budgets are big, and they have to stretch or cut programs until nothing works when budgets are small.

The peacetime balance between the U.S. Army and Navy is a beautiful example of misplaced priorities. The Navy is high; the

Army is low. Now, clearly, I don't think anybody would debate that we have to win the war at sea or we lose the war, if we are involved in a major conflict with the Soviet Union. But if we win at sea and lose on land, we still lose. The Soviet Union doesn't have that problem. Their requirement for balance is a lot different than ours. A new look at the budgetary balance between our Army and Navy therefore might be beneficial.

A whole string of strategy-force mismatches and neglected needs can be traced directly to present priorities. We buy airlift, but neglect sealift. We have the capability of committing forces on foreign shores, but can't support them. We've got all the seeds of a disaster. We buy marines but not amphibious lift, although amphibous assault is the primary mission of the United States Marine Corps. Either we've got too many marines, or we don't have enough lift, or the marines have got the worng mission, but staying the way we are right now doesn't make much sense.

The U.S. Navy is poorly prepared for mine warfare. It's a Soviet specialty. Defending sealanes could be fruitless if we don't develop abilities to protect terminals against air and missile attack. Nobody's really interested in that.

I could go on and on, but I won't. These problems aren't going to disappear spontaneously, because there are very few military strategists at the top. Programs and budgets consistently seem more important. DOD's educators prepare strategists poorly. DOD's researchers provide them poor support. Defense reforms did very little to improve performance in either respect, because the focus was mainly on operations, rather than plans. I'm prepared, sir, to outline some causes and options later if you like.

Meanwhile, many thanks for the opportunity to testify. I hope I've documented my answer to your invitational letter, and I hope my answer helps. That completes my presentation.

Sentator EXON. Mr. Chairman, could I ask John Collins to give us his opinion on the forward strategy of the Navy, that of taking on the Soviet fleet in their near-home-port waters.

Do you have an opinion on that? Do you think that's good strategy or bad strategy?

Mr. COLLINS. Senator, I never spent a day at sea. I am not sure how good my credentials are to answer that question. I surely am not a maritime strategist. What I see is a high risk strategy, which I am told was poorly coordinated with other services during preparation. According to Adm. Wes McDonald, who was CINCLANT at the time, it also was poorly coordinated with the allies, at least in his area.

I think a review of that strategy would be useful. In March 1986, I published in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 20 questions about that strategy. Answers, officially, from the Department of the Navy, which did not satisfy me completely, were published in August 1986. And since those 20 questions all dealt with what was in the strategy, I thought I should submit a second set of questions about things that ought to be in the strategy, but were not. Those were published in August 1986, and there has been no response. Answers to all those questions would help answer your question a whole lot.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Korb, let me just ask you one question. If you were sitting on this committee, and you saw what you have described very visibly as a mismatch between the present plans and the fiscal reality, and you did not get any different leadership from the Pentagon; in terms of guidance from the Pentagon; than we are getting now, how would you go about trying to deal with this problem?

What can Congress do, particularly relating to the number of defense systems there are with inadequate funding?

Dr. KORB. I think there are two things that the Congress can do.

The first thing you must do is give priority in your own markup to supporting the systems which you've already authorized.

I used to come before this committee, and other Senate committees, to get manpower in 1984 or 1985 for systems which had been authorized in 1981 or 1982, and many legislators, not on this committee, but usually on the Appropriations Committee, would say, we can't afford to give you any additional manpower, because times are tough.

And I'd say, wait, you have given me a promissory note. You authorized weapons systems. Now you've got to give us the people.

The first thing you've got to do is provde the infrastructure to the weapons systems which have already been authorized. There's no sense in going back and arguing about whether they should have been authorized. They're coming, let's support them properly.

The second thing you need to do, and Dick mentioned this in his testimony, and it's also in my testimony, is, you've got to take a very hard look at the pace of development for the next generation of weapons systems.

Since we know what the defense budget total is going to be, it's going to be roughly around $295, $300 billion in defense authority, you should see if there's money you can take from research and development for this next generation and put it into the production lines which are already open. If there's not enough to buy these at economical rates, then the Congress must close down some production lines.

And I guess the other point——

Chairman NUNN. You're saying it would be fundamentally wrong to continue to stretch out existing production lines?

Dr. KORB. It's insane to be spending $70 million to buy a fighter aircraft in the budget that's been proposed.

The excellent article that George Wilson had in the Washington Post recently shows that very, very graphically. We're compounding what happened in the first administration. As John Collins and Jim Fallows of the Atlantic Monthly have pointed out, in the early 1980s we doubled the level of procurement spending but didn't double the number of systems we bought.

If we keep on doing that, we'll get even less for our money.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Senator Warner, I've asked some questions as we went along, so I'll yield at this point.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I wish to bring to the committee's attention a discrepancy between what I understand was the oral testimony of Dr. Korb and the written statement that was submitted to the committee prior to the hearing.

And I specifically refer to page 12 and 13. Dr. Korb, before asking you which version you want to have made a part of the record of the committee, I'd like to go back and refresh my recollection of this particular incident.

When it was brought to my attention, I clearly aligned myself with your interest. And I recall, I will not go into detail, making a series of telephone calls, speaking with you about it, as well as speaking directly to a number of persons both in the Department of Defense and on the Armed Services Committee staff.

Now, you have sought in this written testimony to single out one particular individual who I personally chose to be a member of the minority staff. I stand behind that decision, and I hereby state that I think this man may have made an error, for which he was most apologetic.

And he has the credentials to represent the minority staff, and also work with the minority on the Senate side.

Just in summary—and I say this most respectfully—I am thoroughly distressed that you sought this forum to re-raise that unfortunate chapter in our career together.

Having said that, which do you want, the written or the oral?

Dr. Korb. I stand behind my written statement, Senator.

Senator Warner. Now, Mr. Stubbing, I wish to bring to your attention the question of sealift. You assert that there is no clear relationship between strategy and the budget. To illustrate your assertion, you state on page 4 of your prepared remarks, "under the fast rapid deployment force of the Carter administration sealift capability became a high priority. The Navy, however, ranked sealift low in its priority, and has done little since 1980 to improve its fast sealift capability prior to rapid deployment of ground forces."

I took it upon myself to contact the Department of Defense about the accuracy of that observation. And the reply was as follows.

I was informed that the Navy has allocated $4.425 billion on sealift during the period 1980 to 1986. And that figure, I believe, exceeds all other expenditures in this category. For at least a decade or two prior, from the funds directly related to support of the ground forces, the Navy obtains the following: 13 maritime pre-positioning ships; 8 fast support ships which are all the SL-7 ships; 2 hospital ships; 3 crane ships; and the ready reserve forces increased from 20 ships in 1980 to over 100 ships in 1987.

Now, how do we square off between those two representations?

Mr. Stubbing. My point, Senator, is that since 1980 there has been little effort in there. A lot of the data that you have applies to 1980.

The President, in his announcement, got the Navy to go along with those eight SL-7 ships bought in 1980. Since 1980, there's been relatively little money put into the fast lift capability.

This is the kind of lift that we need. Some experts suggest 20 or 30 ships would help us get the divisions over within a short time to the Middle East. We have not acquired that needed capability yet, and that's my point.

And it's not, at least in my view of the scheme of the overall budget, these ships do not require big dollars and they could have been purchased. It has not been done.

Senator **Warner**. What would you have done, had you been in a position to make those decisions? What sort of ships would you have procured?

Mr. **Stubbing**. The fast sealift ships? I would support buying whatever we need to accomplish getting the ground forces that we need to get over to the Middle East and in place in the time required.

We don't have that capability, and I see that as a great imbalance, again, between an announced strategy and our capability. And the corrective action does not require huge dollars.

Senator **Warner**. Turning now to a different subject, on page 7 you suggest that the United States should place great emphasis on current capability and forego some technology improvements.

It seems to me that our Nation has followed the theory that we have a superior technological capability to the adversaries we face, and that we have purposely highlighted the technological advantage, and have surrendered, in many ways, any quantitative values we might have obtained.

Now, do you disagree with that?

Mr. **Stubbing**. Not at all. I don't disagree a bit. It's consistent with my point.

I bring to your attention the 1988 defense budget, by function, and one way of looking at the technological effort is the R&D budget.

The R&D budget since 1980 is by far the fastest growing portion of the defense budget. In fact, in real terms, from 1980 to 1988 the growth in R&D is twice that of procurement.

And I would suggest that we are not compromising our technological edge, which by everything I read from all the experts, I think is still true.

We are ahead in most aspects of the technological race. We have been spending quite a bit of money on R&D in recent years.

I would suggest, though, that the continued priority emphasis on R&D over procurement and other aspects of the defense budget is something that needs to be looked at.

That does not give up our technological edge.

Senator **Warner**. One last question to the Colonel.

Colonel, I listened very carefully to your observations, and with a considerable note of disappointment to much of your testimony.

I was trying to think of perhaps one success we have said, and I wonder if you would view the 40 years of peace in Europe, the longest in the history of mankind, as possibly owing to some decision of strategy we've had in this country?

Mr. **Collins**. Sir, I could sit down and recite a litany of things that we have done right.

Senator **Warner**. Did you include any of them in your statement?

Mr. **Collins**. I did not, because I was asked whether the strategic framework is good from a program and budget standpoint, and my answer was, it could be and should be a lot better. And so rather than recite, in the time that was allotted to me, the things we have done right, I tried to point out a smorgasbord of instances where we can do better, which might help this committee as it continues investigations. That was my rationale.

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Chairman, I would ask of the witness, so that this Senator can get perhaps a better balance of perspective of your contribution, if you would include a supplementary statement for the record indicating those areas in which you think some sound judgments have been made.

I thank the chairman.

Mr. **Collins**. Absolutely.

Chairman **Nunn**. If the witness wants to give a kind of thumbnail sketch right now, I'd be glad to yield additional time without charging anyone.

Do you have any other comments right now on that?

Mr. **Collins**. Senator Warner's already mentioned 40 years of peace. How much of this depended on U.S. deterrent capabilities, and how much of it depended on intentions of the opposition which we can estimate but cannot know, I couldn't prove or disprove. But surely we can count a considerable percentage of the success to the money that we have put into the forces to support a strategy that did deter. I think that clearly over a period of many, many years we have put together coalitions which enable the United States to carry out collective security strategies, rather than going it alone. I'll do a lot better on paper when I come back to you.

[The information referred to follows:]

Congressional Research Service,
The Library of Congress,
Washington, DC., January 21, 1987.

The following comments for the record respond to requests by Senator Warner and Senator McCain during the military strategy hearings on January 20, 1987 at 2:00 p.m.:

DOD spokesmen emphasize positive aspects of U.S. military strategy in presentations to Congress. They do not customarily dissect deficiencies. I therefore concentrated on problems, to provide the Senate Armed Services Committee some opposing views in the 15 minutes allocated for opening remarks.

Positive comments contained in my 1985 study of the U.S.-Soviet military balance still are valid:

Five years is not much time to make major improvements in the U.S.-Soviet military balance, when both sides are striving to strengthen positions. America's defense community found it doubly difficult during the period from 1980 through [1987], because the Soviets maintained momentum that was much greater at the start.

Some U.S. problems have been mitigated, but many remain, and a few are magnified.

RELATIVE U.S. PROGRESS

U.S. improvements since 1980 are more impressive in absolute than in relative terms. The most important, a serious intent to turn adverse trends around, is intangible. The remainder are still on the margin. Major limitations largely reflect inattention.

U.S. Improvements

Sustained defense spending during Fiscal Years 1980–85, the highest in U.S. peacetime history, was clear evidence of commitment. The U.S. technological base, always strong compared with its Soviet counterpart, is better able to contribute than in the 1970s, because of closer civil-military collaboration on defense related research. Overall modernization in the form of new tanks, aircraft, ships and other military hardware [still proceeds] at the fastest peacetime pace ever. The median quality of defense manpower has climbed considerably since 1980. So has morale. Readiness and sustainability problems persist, but abilities in both respects are much better, regardless of indices measured. Airlift enhancements, coupled with prepositioned supplies and equipment, enable larger U.S. forces to fly farther and faster with heavier loads than they could (six) years ago, then fight longer before they need outside support. Programs in progress will further improve performances.

Nevertheless, the study concluded, DOD's strategic planners have little cause for complacency. Superior plans are doubly important, now that resource constraints are tightening:

Critical U.S. Actions

Wise Uncle Remus once said, "It ain't the things you don't know that gets you in deep trouble. It's the things you knows for sure what ain't so." Those words, which implicitly warn against mental blocks and advocate open minds, suggest that U.S. defense decisionmakers might benefit from a fresh look before proceeding with policies and programs they set in motion about 1980.

That process could start with questions concerning critical assumptions and threat assessments related to the U.S.-Soviet military balance. A unilateral review of U.S. capabilities, individually and collectively, could follow, before factoring in allies. U.S. defense planners then would be in position to put problems and ripostes in objective priority. Subsequent actions to arrest adverse trends . . . could advance in a sequence and at costs that Congress and the public would find hard to fault.

Sincerely,

JOHN M. COLLINS,
Senior Specialist in National Defense.

Chairman **NUNN**. Senator Exon.

Senator **EXON**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Throughout your testimony you have stressed, it seems to me, that given the constraints of the budget, we are overemphasizing new initiatives.

While you take turns answering another question, I'm going to ask you each in a moment, if you had to make a decision, on cancellation or the long term stretching out of some of our initiatives, how would you prioritize them.

They are chemical warfare; Trident subs with the D-5 missile, the mobile MX; the Midgetman, the Stealth bomber, and SDI.

My other question while you ponder this one is, how serious a factor do you feel the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings approach is with regard to sound defense planning.

It seems to me that the Gramm-Rudman approach pretty much cripples the options that we have, with regard to sound procurement policies and the prioritization of defense needs.

Larry, you've had some experience. Why don't you start out on that?

Dr. **KORB**. Well, as I mentioned in my prepared testimony, I think you cannot undertake both a massive strategic offensive modernization program and simultaneously undertake an unprecedented strategic defense initiative.

I would give the lowest priority, in other words, I would put the least amount of funds in, to the strategic defense initiative. I think I would keep that at a comparatively low level, so we can see what happens at the arms control negotiations.

Senator **EXON**. Larry, my question was basically—let's get into that prioritizing later. My question was, do you feel that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings does not compound the problems that we have on this authorizing committee as far as insitituting sound numbers for recommendation to the Senate for defense appropriation?

Dr. **KORB**. Very definitely. If there are no additional sources of revenue, something must be cut from the defense; request that's correct.

Senator **EXON**. Mr. Stubbing.

Mr. **STUBBING**. I agree with Dr. Korb. If the real imbalance in the budget, which I think is not the announced budget deficit, if the real deficit which is much higher I think than we're looking at, is allowed to stand, and no revenue sources are forthcoming, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, unless that particular act is modified, is going to cause a great discomfort and have harsh effects on defense.

Senator Exon. John Collins, do you have a differing view?

Mr. Collins. Yes, sir. The Soviet Union in 1962, right after the Cuban missile crisis, began a modernization program that it has continued to this day.

They have made their estimate of the situation that there is not going to be any war, therefore, readiness and sustainability have been low priorities for them; modernization has been very high.

For a long period of time, we put most of our money into operations and maintenance, to fight a war in Southeast Asia. When the war was over, the budget was cut to the bone, because we had the no-more-Vietnam syndrome.

We started to get back into the ball game in 1980 after the invasion of Afghanistan. At that time, we began to play a game of catchup. Since then, we have spent over a trillion dollars. We are in many respects either no better off than we were when we started, or we are worse off than we were in 1980, because the Soviets had the momentum, and they've kept it going.

If we have a severe budgetary cutback at this time, then there is no possible way in the future for the United States to be militarily competitive with the Soviet Union.

Senator Exon. Listening to your statements that each of you have made, it appears to me that what you are saying is what I outlined several months ago in a letter to the Secretary. I feel that, given the mismatch or the rhetoric or the lack of planning or maybe all of the above, the next President of the United States is going to find himself essentially in a fiscally bankrupt position as far as national defense policy is concerned.

Could I get a short answer? Do you agree with that statement, or do you not?

Dr. Korb. Very definitely. If you want to get somebody for that job, you better double or triple the pay, because it's going to be a very, very difficult post.

Mr. Stubbing. Absolutely a serious problem. Again, the key to the question on how much we're going to have available for defense is the revenues; and if we can't touch the revenues in the next 2 years, I suspect we're going to have serious problems for the new President that will be hard to cope with.

Senator Exon. John, any differing opinion, or do you agree with that?

Mr. Collins. No, sir, I have no differing opinion. But I would like to establish my credentials right now with regard to programming and budgeting; I don't have any.

Senator Exon. OK, my time is up. I just want to get your quick response to my first question. Of these six items—chemical warfare, Trident submarine and the D-5, mobile MX, Midgetman, Stealth bombers and SDI—could you each give us a prioritization if you were making the decisions?

Mr. Collins. I have very strong feelings about all six of those programs. If you insist that I expose them in this open forum, that's a good way to get me fired. If you agree, I would like very much to discuss these with you privately in your office.

Senator EXON. OK, John, I'd like to have that. Let's see, Korb has already been fired.

[Laughter.]

Dr. KORB. I just hope the University of Pittsburgh has no Navy contracts.

I would give the highest priority to Trident D–5; second to chemical; third to Midgetman; fourth to mobile MX; fifth to Stealth; and SDI would be my lowest priority.

Mr. STUBBING. My priorities would be, No. 1, the Trident II program. I do not know enough about the Stealth. I think, as an old budgeteer, I would like to know the dollars and what we might be getting for it. I do not know much about that one, so I ranked in one group as two, three and four the mobile MX, Midgetman and Stealth. I do not know which one I would pick, but they are in a group that I would have a hard time evaluating without more data. Fifth would be CW, and last the strategic defense initiative.

Senator EXON. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. I will yield my time. I could ask one question and then yield. In view of the fact that you put such emphasis on D–5, what do you conclude from the fact that if the Soviets go mobile, and they appear to be going with the SS–24 and SS–25, and if in fact they mobilize even more of their strategic forces, of what strategic utility will be the D–5 missile, and why do you place such a high priority on the D–5 if in fact the Soviets are going mobile?

Dr. KORB. I think the D–5 gives us, compared to the others, a secure retaliatory capability.

Senator COHEN. Against what?

Dr. KORB. You could use it in a number of scenarios. You might use D–5 in the traditional deterrence mode. Moreover, it would give you some additional hard target kill capability while the Soviets are in this transition phase. I agree with you that if they become increasingly mobile, then you must analyze whether you want to develop additional hard target kill capability. But the question was a relative one. I think D–5 would give you, compared to the others, an enhanced deterrence right now.

Senator COHEN. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance.

Chairman NUNN. I leave it up to you, Senator Cohen. Who do you yield to?

Senator COHEN. Whoever, on the basis of time.

Senator WILSON. Mr. McCain, I think, was here first.

Chairman NUNN. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps one of my colleagues should have——

Chairman NUNN. I would start 6 minutes with Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Korb, I was a Member of Congress for 4 years, and I am new on this committee and to the Senate. I must say that I have never seen a witness who came before a committee with a personal ax to grind as you have. You have taken advantage of the committee by your self-serving and gratuitous statement and character assassination of a member of the staff who I have known for 12 years. Since your entire statement seems to be colored by that bitterness, I will not ask you any questions.

Dr. KORB. Senator, may I respond to that since it has been raised by both you and Senator Warner?

Senator MCCAIN. No, Dr. Korb. I would be glad to have you respond, but remember, you are the one who has raised it in your written statement, Dr. Korb, not Senator Warner or me.

Dr. KORB. I would like to respond if I may.

Chairman NUNN. Why not let the witness respond without taking it out of the Senator's time, and then we can go ahead with another question.

Dr. KORB. If the individual that we are talking about had cooperated with the Department of Defense's Inspector General when he asked him to tell his side of the story, I would not have raised the issue. It is not my style. I usually do not do this type of thing but, as a matter of fact, I am the one who has been assassinated by people, with no effective retort. I have offered to meet with the individual. He has turned down my entreaties. The Inspector General asked him to tell his side of the story about his role in this very unhappy episode. He refused to do so, and that is why I raised the issue here today.

Senator MCCAIN. I appreciate your response, Dr. Korb.

My opinion still is that your behavior before this committee and your statement are inexcusable.

Mr. Collins, I thought perhaps you should have come in here like an old character from 'Lil Abner, Joe Bitzelfick, who used to walk around with a cloud over his head, because I heard no good news whatsoever, and all bad things will happen, whatever part of the world or whatever part of the strategy we touch.

In some areas I am very curious. If you had heard about the rather detailed, involved and long, drawnout debate on binary weapons both on the floor of the House and in this body, I believe that issue has been ventilated both in the Department of Defense as well as in the Congress of the United States in asserting its rightful role in the formulation of national strategy.

Your statement, if I understand it right, and we have no written statement, was that we virtually passed over that issue. To many of us, the record is very clear of Soviet binary weapons. Rapid deployment force, in the opinion of many of us, emphasizing the word "rapid", although requiring sealift capability, is certainly an integral part of it. If it is going to be rapid, particularly in the Persian Gulf, it had better be brought in mainly by air to existing supplies and equipment or have a more rapid, in my opinion, state of the air sealift capability.

That is not to denegrate the role of sealift, but many of us feel very strongly that rapid deployment to a large degree is not, at least initially, based on sealift capability, although I would certainly agree that sealift capability, like some of the other areas you mentioned like binary warfare and others which are the nonsexy aspects of defense acquisition, has been left behind.

Let me just mention for a moment the business of the Reagan doctrine. You particularly commented on the situation in Afghanistan. I think our goals there are very clear, Mr. Collins. Our goal there is very clear in that we want to help the Afghan people remove the yoke of Soviet oppression from them. I, as a matter of fact, happened to visit that part of the world. Logics, as I am sure you can appreciate and I hope you do appreciate, are very difficult. The situation in Pakistan geographically, where it is threatened by its neighbors, is a very delicate one, to say the least. Mr. Gorbachov, at his first meeting with Mr. Zia, threatened him because of his support of the Mujahadeen.

I think the United States can generally be proud of the support we have provided to those who are fighting for freedom in Afghanistan.

Let me ask you a question if I could, Mr. Collins. Your recommendations concerning changes in strategy would more effectively reconcile means and ends. Recently we had Mr. Brzezinski before this committee, who recommended that one of the ways we could achieve this goal is to remove 100,000 troops from Europe and expand our rapid deployment force.

How do you view that idea?

Mr. COLLINS. I think that removing 100,000 U.S. troops from Europe might produce some results with which we would be unhappy. A possible response by European countries would be to improve their own defense capabilities. Another possible response, however, would be to accommodate with the Soviet Union. I am not in position, because I am not in the politics business, to know which response is most likely. I am not a European specialist, so I do not follow it closely, but if I were seriously considering withdrawing 100,000 troops, I would want to have a large number of questions answered to my reasonable satisfaction before I went further.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Collins. I think you appreciate, Colonel Collins, the declining manpower pool that we are facing in the 1990s.

By the way, also left out of all three of your testimony was the fact that the United States military is far more ready to carry out its mission than it has been in a long, long time. Not only do the statistics bear this out, so do my personal observations and personal contact with the sergeants and the chief petty officers. They will tell you almost uniformly that they are far more ready to fight and have better equipment to carry out their mission than they had in the 1970s and before.

I would like to hear your comments, Mr. Collins, concerning the concept of national service. Facing a declining manpower pool in the 1990s, we are devoting an ever increasing part of this defense budget to personnel costs. Some of us feel that we are facing a very big crunch as far as finding the available manpower to man these very sophisticated and expensive pieces of equipment which we have already acquired and which we, I would assume, will acquire in the future.

Could you give me your comments on that philosophy?

Mr. COLLINS. First of all, I am in total agreement with you, and I am in total agreement with Senator Warner and others, who say that I did not cover all the good things that I could have. Certainly we have made enormous progress since 1980 in absolute terms.

What I was trying to transmit to members of the committee is that in relative terms we are either no better off or worse off than we were in 1980. In absolute terms, we are tremendously better off. Readiness, sustainability, manpower, you can tick off a whole lot of them, but in relative terms, because the Soviets have the momentum, we did not gain very much, and in a lot of cases we lost.

I would like your permission to discuss national service with you in your office. I have very strong feelings about the all volunteer force, and prefer not to air them in this forum.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. I look forward to a visit with the Colonel.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Let me say for the record that this hearing is not to rehash Dr. Korb's personal problems of last year. On the other hand, I felt strongly, and I think a lot of other people do, Senator Warner said he did, that when an individual is no longer with the Government and he is basically run out of a private enterprise job by governmental officials with a threat of retaliation against the private employer, it seems to me that his rights as a citizen have been at least put in jeopardy. So I did not restrict Dr. Korb in any way for his testimony.

I think it would be the ultimate insult if this committee, after what he had been through by executive branch officials, had tried to censor his testimony. We did not get into it at all. I asked him to come and testify. We gave him the parameters.

So, Dr. Korb, as far as I am concerned, as chairman of this committee, you can say what you please on that subject, and you have said what you please. People can agree or disagree.

I might also state for the record for Carl Smith's benefit that Jim Locher, another of our staff members who was on Senator Goldwater's staff last year, spent most of last year being pillared by witnesses who very fundamentally disagreed with his position on defense reorganization. So this is not an unprecedented kind of comment on the staff. I think, Jim, you could verify that.

So we asked Dr. Korb to come testify, and we are glad he did. I think on the subject that he has addressed in terms of the defense budget, he has given us some very valuable testimony.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, just one brief comment on that. My questions are substantive on testimony relative to the readiness and sustainability accounts. I have been troubled by that incident since it happened and I read the Inspector General's report with some interest. I was very much discouraged by the fact that apparently our staffer was unwilling to talk to the Inspector General at that time, as Dr. Korb has said. Frankly, if the subject had not come up here today in your testimony and a number of our colleagues commented on it, I would not have raised it.

It has been raised. Since I feel there should be complete cooperation between our staff and the Inspector General on that issue, I think it would be appropriate for us to ask the Inspector General to make that inquiry of our staff and get it behind us; otherwise, it festers, folks. That is what it comes down to, and we have seen evidence of it here today.

The best way to do it is to have an objective person make the inquiry and let the chips fall where they may. I did not hear Senator Warner's exact words today, but apparently he made reference to an apology perhaps being appropriate. Fine. Then it ought to be made, and we ought to go on with our business.

Dr. KORB. I would be more than happy to apologize to the individual if I am proved to be wrong.

Senator LEVIN. No, the apology was the other way around. The apology which Senator Warner made reference to, as I understand it, was from our staffer to you, not from you to the staffer.

Now, has there been any conversation, apology or otherwise between you and Carl Smith?

Dr. KORB. No. After I was told by my superiors at Raytheon that he had called up and made the statements that are in my prepared testimony, I sent him a note. I offered to meet with him. I got no response at all. I placed a phone call. The phone calls were not returned.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, this is something which is going to continue to pop up unless it is handled. We ought to do it as acquaintances, friends and colleagues. We all know one another. I would suggest that if Senator Warner is willing, and I am sorry that he is not here, that the Chair talk to Senator Warner as to what might be appropriate to get this matter behind us. I think it is possible that it can be done. I would hope that the Chair and Senator Warner might discuss that possibility.

Chairman NUNN. I would be glad to discuss the issue with Senator Warner. I also think that Carl Smith should have every right to be heard, too. His side of the story has not been presented here today, and I hope we do not get off into this because I really would like to continue on the subject.

Senator LEVIN. I could not agree with you more. That is why I think the Inspector General is the right person. I will leave it at that.

Dr. Korb, my question relates to your table 2 because of what it demonstrates. You are showing us that in a number of critical readiness and sustainability accounts, there have been significant reductions from the 1986 budget amount. In Army spare parts, the actual budget in 1986 was 22 percent higher than in 1988; in the Army ammo accounts, 14 percent higher; in the selected Army support equipment accounts, 31 percent higher. So we have actually seen in those and in some Navy accounts and some Air Force spare parts and munitions accounts some significant reductions, actual reductions from 1986 to 1988.

The figures, though, that we get by title are that the operation and maintenance account has shown real growth from 1987 to 1988, of 8.7 percent DOD-wide at least according to the chart I am looking at.

I am wondering if you can tell us how that all jives. We are told that O&M has gone up overall. At the same time, your chart shows some significant and important reductions and, I think, real threats to our readiness and sustainability. Give us the macro picture between the 8.7 increase in the last year and your reductions that you show from 1986, if you can.

Dr. KORB. Yes, Senator. I pointed out in my prepared testimony that the readiness accounts did go up this year and in fact showed real growth. What I have done on table 2 is to make a comparison between what was projected 2 years ago and what is actually in the fiscal year 1987 budget.

What I have done in the chart is note that when the Department of Defense came before the Congress in testimony on the fiscal year 1986 budget, they said in fiscal year 1987 this is what it will look like in these readiness related accounts. As a result of their own actions and your actions, this is the way it came out for fiscal year 1987. For example, the Army spare parts were down about 45 percent compared to what they were projecting a year ago. The last column that you spoke about shows that they projected a year ago would be in those accounts, for example in Army spare parts it shows $2.3 billion, and what is actually in the account for fiscal year 1987.

I would like to reemphasize the point that I made in my testimony, a point you and I have discussed many times when I came before this committee, that is, we needed to provide the readiness and sustainability to that force structure that we have approved. What had happened is just when readiness' turn came then the crunch set in.

Senator LEVIN. Could you give us, for the record at least, some more specific places where we can, in your opinion, eliminate programs altogether? We want to avoid stretchouts. It seems to me that is about the most inefficient thing to do. If we are going to avoid stretchouts we do not want to starve the spares and the ammo, which is now what we are beginning to see despite our best intentions a few years ago. If we want to avoid that, we have to make some significant cuts. You have given us some new systems which you believe could be eliminated on page 16, or at least delayed new systems which you set forth on page 16.

Would you recommend any additional specific cuts which you believe can be made? We would appreciate it for the record. I do not know if this is the place to do it, but we are going to have to make some serious priority judgments, and you, in your experience, can help us make them so that we avoid some of the hollowness and lack of sustainability and lack of readiness which we all dread so much.

Dr. KORB. I would be happy to, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much.

Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am delighted to hear this testimony today. I have known two of these witnesses. I have worked with John Collins personally, and I want to say how much I respect his work. We disagree from time to time, but, Mr. Chairman, I really think he is to be commended for helping to put together a team over at CRS which is really first rate in the whole strategic military defense area. I really have enjoyed working with that team, and I appreciate your testimony again here today.

I wanted to ask just a couple of brief questions as a result of the testimony. With respect to the SDI program, we have heard statements recently about the possibility of a so-called "phased" approach. There have been arguments particularly from opponents of SDI but from others as well, arguments that there really are at least two different strategic definitions of SDI.

To put it briefly, one definition has it that SDI is intended to replace deterrence over the long haul by providing a nearly perfect defense of the country. The second version is that SDI is a program to supplement deterrence and to do so by defending our retaliatory capability.

Have you ever known of systems that were intended to have one strategic role and then, because of severe budget constraints after the programs were started, came to assume a very different strategic role due to the budget constraints?

Dr. KORB. Senator, one example comes to mind, and that is the AWACS plane. When the AWACS program was first started, it was supposed to protect the United States against bomber attacks. But, then when we signed SALT I and the ABM Treaty, the idea was that if we weren't going to protect against missile attacks, why worry about bombers. Because the AWACS was already ongoing, we built fewer numbers and used them for battle management in Europe.

Senator GORE. Do either of the two witnesses care to comment?

Mr. COLLINS. I think another good example is Sentinel and Safeguard. One was designed to provide thin protection for the American people and production base; the other was hard site defense for Minuteman missiles and silos.

Senator GORE. I have a second question in the same area. I am a brand new member of this committee. I have been interested in many of the issues with which it deals for some time, but looking at this question of SDI from the budget standpoint, I think many Americans are genuinely puzzled about what the cost of SDI is likely to be. You hear estimates ranging from $100 billion. There may be some lower than that, but from $100 billion on up to $1.5 trillion.

Based upon your cumulative experience in defense budgeting as well as strategy, how would you recommend we come up with a more accurate estimate of what the cost of this system might be? How should we judge the various claims and statements that are made? Are there any rules of thumb to use? Are there any insights you have to offer? Does it entirely depend upon the definition? If so, for purposes of your answer, assume that we are talking about the program as the President has described it to the American people.

Dr. KORB. Senator, in my view the best unclassified study that I have seen about the potential cost of everything from a limited program to what the President is talking about is the study by Barry Bleckman and Victor Utkoff that was done for Johns Hopkins, because I think they show you in there the various things that could be done and give you some timetables.

The problem with SDI from a budget point of view, however, is that you put the cart before the horse. There is a very interesting quote from a gentleman you people on this committee know well, and that is General Meyer who was quoted in an article in the Philadelphia Inquirer when they were trying to go back and say how did SDI get started. He said, well, we thought after we discussed it with the President in February 1983 he would put together a group, we would take a look at the cost and the alternatives and technical feasibility and then decide where we would go and so on and so forth.

Well, that was not done, so what you had was a program laid down without answering many of those questions, and that is why it becomes very difficult from a budget point of view to get a handle on it. I was asked to give a speech on this at the University of Michigan last November. I went back and read all the public statements, and based upon the statements I read and what I heard when I was in the Pentagon, it was very hard to figure out exactly what people had in mind.

Mr. STUBBING. I would suggest that in a major program like this, along with the fact that it is a top-down program with almost no input from the Chiefs, which is sort of surprising in something this big, that continues to plague many of our big systems and program. We are moving out too far, too fast with too many unknowns.

And perhaps the best way I can think about in approaching a system like the SDI is that we have got to go on some kind of a slow-paced, phased approach where we start to get a little bit of certainty in place of the great uncertainty which exists now. And the way we are going at it with these large budget increments each year is, based on my years of watching these programs, the absolute guarantee of ultimately big problems coming down the road.

So we are on the wrong path in terms of trying to find the answers to the valid questions you are asking.

Mr. COLLINS. Before I answer that question I would like to put the record straight. I had nothing to do with putting together the team at the Congressional Research Service. I have one desk and no research assistant; I am a one-man band. Somebody else should take all the accolades for what I think is a fantastic team.

Senator GORE. Now after all those compliments, Mr. Chairman, he goes and contradicts me and my statement. I guess I had assumed that you were helpful in putting it together because they all seem to sort of look to you as a spiritual leader of sorts over there.

Chairman NUNN. Well, he has not run them off.

Senator GORE. Go ahead.

Mr. COLLINS. It is my understanding, sir, that the figure $1 trillion for SDI, which is commonly bandied about, was pulled right straight out of the air by Jim Schlesinger, who will admit that it had no basis in fact. It is almost impossible to estimate the costs of systems that have not been invented yet. We have just started to do our technological homework.

For many years, particularly after the SALT I and ABM Treaty, we deliberately disregarded homeland defense in this country. The only research and development was related to hard site defense of missiles in silos, which is a totally different problem. It may be, as research progresses, that we will discover sensible solutions are quite different than they look right now. It may not even be high energy lasers or particle beams; it may be something so simple and so cheap you would not believe it. But we will not know until we have done a lot more homework.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I believe my time is up, but if I could make one very brief statement there, partly in defense of Mr. Schlesinger, I think if you take the number of battle stations they are talking about now, which has been published but I think is still technically classified—so I will not use that number—and then you look at what they are supposed to be capable of doing, all the various tasks of firing projectiles at hitherto unheard of velocities and maneuvering and defending themselves and having extraordinary computer capacity, and making the assumption that each one of those is going to cost at least as much as, not more than but at least as much as a top-of-the-line spy satellite—again a number that has been published but is still technically classified—you multiply those two numbers together and you get close to $1 trillion for that one component alone.

Now that string of assumptions may have serious flaws in it, but they appear to me to have some basis in reason.

Mr. COLLINS. It is entirely possible that you can arrive at $1 trillion by looking at systems at the stage of development which we are familiar right now. What I was suggesting is that maybe we have just started to scratch the surface.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Gore.

I have two or three questions, the first one to all the panel. In putting together programs and budgets each year to what extent do the military services—based on your knowledge, and if you do not have knowledge of this just say so—to what extent do the military services consider the capabilities of other U.S. military services in putting together their budget?

Dr. Korb.

Dr. KORB. Let me answer that question by relating an anecdote to you. The first briefing I ever received on the maritime strategy was given by a very capable young naval officer. One of the assumptions that the Navy makes in the maritime strategy is that it assumes that the land war in Europe will be going in our favor.

I said to the individual, "would you then be willing to give up a carrier battle group if I could demonstrate to you that we needed more ammunition in Europe in order to achieve that outcome?" He responded that is not my job. The Navy does not consider that issue.

Theoretically, the services are supposed to consider such questions but when it comes down to fighting for budget shares, the objective of the service is to maximize the forces that it has. That discipline must be imposed from the top.

I would like to disagree with John Collins' points. I believe that the Goldwater-Nunn-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 enables the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to begin to play that role, and it enables the Secretary of Defense to do that if he or she chooses to do so.

Chairman NUNN. There is nothing in that reorganization act that guarantees it, but there is a clear statutory mandate for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to get into strategic planning and he is made specifically responsible for that by law. And, frankly, I do not know what else you can do in law. You cannot implement it; all you can do is mandate it. We will see, and I think we will start tomorrow morning with the Chairman; we will be talking to him about what he is doing and it is my understanding he is going to talk more in a net assessment term tomorrow than we have had in the past.

We have had a real difficult time getting what I call a true net assessment in a dynamic sense. We get a bean count—tanks and so forth—but we do not get a net assessment. So we are going to see. Only time will tell. It will probably take us 3 or 4 years to find out.

Next, Mr. Stubbing, would you answer that question, please, sir?

Mr. STUBBING. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Do the military services consider the capabilities of the other services? Let me use an anecdote, too, since that is the best way to describe how it really happens.

In 1974 I was on a joint DOD/OMB team that was looking at a major decision on what is now called the Patriot air defense system. The decision before the House, ordered by Secretary Schlesinger, was to decide whether or not to continue with that major new system. The team consisted of Army and Air Force reps in addition to a number of civilians.

In about the second meeting we had this most unusual experience. The Air Force general who had the responsibility for requirements and long-range planning for the Air Force was on the team. He came to the meeting and suggested as we were trying to define some alternatives to the Patriot that the U.S. Air Force had a definite role in the same mission as the Patriot, which is a medium-high-altitude air defense system; the U.S. Air Force fighters also can defend against enemy aircraft as the Patriot is supposed to do.

And he suggested at the meeting that several wings of added Air Force fighters might do the job in lieu of the Patriot air defense system. Some of us civilians were shocked because we had not seen that kind of a statement made before by a representative of one service in commenting on another service's program. That was like meeting two of the study group. At the start of meeting three the same general immediately asked for the floor, and pointed out that he was all wrong in his having thought about Air Force aircraft as an option. It really was not an option at all, the Air force planes could never be committed to that kind of a single scenario and he deferred to the Army.

He had been spoken to by his Air Force superiors and told to back off. I think the message is clear that the services have their turf. They will always try to protect it and expand it where possible. The classic to me in the world of defense is the role of close air support where the Army has never accepted the fact that they have to count on Air Force airplanes to provide cover over the battlefield, and they have found every way under the sun to try, through helicopters, through semifixed wing, rotory wing devices, to do something that gives them back the control over those forces. The Air Force, on the other side, having the mission will never let go.

I think the Nation suffers, personally. But the answer to your question is turf protection first, turf expansion second. That is the way they look at it.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Collins, do you want to comment on this?

Mr. COLLINS. I have nothing to add to that, sir, but I would like to make a comment. My allegation that reform did less to improve plans than it might have related to the fact that it did not do much to change the personnel selection system at the top, did not help the education system develop strategists, and did not help the research apparatus provide new intellectual tools. That was all I was talking about.

Chairman NUNN. I think in terms of specific statutory mandate you are probably right. We did give the Chairman, though, some real stringent mandates to develop that, including the education of military officers and also including the right to select his own staff. Now if the Chairman decides he is not going to have those kinds of people and not going to make some changes, you are right; but if the Chairman decides he is going to take that strategy kind of mandate seriously, then we will get a serious product.

I guess only time will tell on that.

Mr. COLLINS. I am suggesting to you the pool of strategists that he will have to pick from is very, very small.

Chairman NUNN. You are saying he is going to have to develop some by having some changes in military education?

Mr. COLLINS. Education and research.

Chairman NUNN. Good point.

Dr. Korb, one other question here. You pointed out that 20 months ago the Department of Defense was planning to spend more than $2 trillion over 5 years—that is, their 5-year defense plan had $2 trillion in it—and that plan now has some $1.6 trillion, which is $400 billion less.

Now how does DOD make such massive changes in 20 months? Does that mean that that first $1 trillion was basically very flabby and simply pie in the sky and did not have any meat behind it? Or do you mean they really have taken $400 billion out in 20 months?

Dr. KORB. They have indeed taken $400 billion out in 20 months. I do not mean to imply that that $2 trillion could not have been well spent if we could have afforded it. The problem is that in asking for that much money or assuming you would get it, given the climate created by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, and the concern about the Federal deficit, you directed your energies toward getting that total when you should have been planning on how to deal with a lesser number.

When the Congress and DOD stretch-out most of their programs, and make a great many financing adjustments, you end up with the same type of force structure that you would have had on the $2 trillion, but the force structure becomes flabby or, to use the term General Meyers made popular about a decade ago, it becomes hollow.

Chairman NUNN. You also mentioned that we are currently underfunded by $500 billion. Now that means in addition to what they have taken out of the 5-year defense plan, the current 5-year defense plan, in your view, is $500 billion under what the programs are. What do you mean exactly by that and what is the basis for it?

Dr. KORB. I was picking up on a statement that Under Secretary of the Army Ambrose made to the Defense Preparedness Association last fall. In a speech to that group he said, given the current fiscal situation the Army and the other services, are seriously underfunded, the Army alone by $200 billion.

I assume he was basing his figure on the request that was made in February 1986, which was $1.6 trillion. If you use that as a base, DOD is probably $200 billion underfunded. This means, given the number of programs that exist and the amount you are likely to get, DOD is $200 billion short. However, to that figure you must add the $400 billion or $500 billion which you have already lost the previous year.

In summary you are talking about a shortfall of $600 billion to $700 billion, when you think in terms of the programs you have started, the production rates you would like to have, and the infrastructure that you should bring on line in order to carry out the program in a coherent manner.

Chairman NUNN. You have already touched on this and testified on it, but what are the consequences, in your view, if we keep going in this direction, if there is just no change and that is the direction we are going? What is going to happen?

Dr. KORB. You are going to have a larger force structure than you had in the beginning of the 1980s and it will be more modern. But, it will not properly be supported. I suspect that you might begin to see the reappearance of some of the same horror stories that you saw in the late 1970s because the Navy had to tie up some ships for lack of people.

If you take a look at the number of people that the Navy was projecting that they needed for the 600 ships a couple years ago and what they have actually received they simply do not have enough people to man the fleet properly. Thus, you are going to have to keep your people at sea longer. That is going to hurt your retention rates. Also, for the ships to carry out their mission. You are not going to have enough ammunition. In essence you will be back to a situation in which you will not have the ships fully manned or manned to the extent that they should be.

Unless the other services do what the Air Force has done—and I think they are to be commended for that—there will be problems. You will not have those type of stories with the Air Force because they have reduced their force goals.

But if the other services do not, you are going to be spending foolishly. For example, we are going to spend a lot of money to fix up Fort Drum but that money would be better spent to buy ammunition to deal with some of the problems that you and Ambassador Abshire talked about this morning in Europe. Those are the type of things I think you are going to see, and those are problems which I think will really get the American people excited. They are going to say we spent a couple of trillion dollars in the decade of the 1980s and we are still hearing the same stories we heard a decade ago.

It will be a larger force, but you still have the same inadequacies and hollowness that existed when you started the build-up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was very much interested, Mr. Stubbing, in your comments about the competition among the services regarding the selection of equipment. I believe that the new reorganization that was passed by the Congress in the last session makes it clear that we are going to insist on better coordination among the services given this budgetary crunch that we are in.

I listened with great interest to you talking about the Patriot surface-to-air missle, the Army versus the Air Force during its development. There is going to be a new knock-down/drag-out fight in the near future with regard to new programs and concepts for aircraft. It appears that competition among the services could grow and I hope that you experts will study these things as they come down the line and give us your advice on the issues.

I simply say that if we think we have got troubles, we had better recognize the fact that we cannot even get the three branches of the military to agree on a single basic flight trainer for pilots. You will remember that we got locked in to a 2 or 3 in the morning session in the U.S. Senate last fall when parochial interests were insisting that we buy the T-46 trainer despite the fact that the Air Force did not want it. They would have sent it to the bone pile even if we purchased it.

It seems to me that sometimes those of us in the Congress are as responsible as the Pentagon for bad decisions and wasted money. The only good thing about the budget contraints is it may force the decisionmakers to recognize that things are not as they used to be, that we basically can not write a blank check up here for the initial downpayment of new programs without acknowledging that further payment becomes due in 2 or 3 or 4 years.

We cannot run our defense establishment properly without acknowledging this. That gets to my last question today, which has to do with your recommendations regarding the triad. I think from your testimony you have all indicated that you are strong for the continuation of the nuclear triad deterrent. I think the triad is basically in good shape, but some very important decisions regarding it are going to be made in the very near future.

I thought it was interesting that in response to my question on priorities the two witnesses who answered both put the D-5 Trident submarine program as No. 1. I could not agree with that more. I think that the Trident is a capability that we need very, very badly. Certainly with the air-breathing leg of that triad, with the B-1B bomber and the Stealth following it seems like we are going to be in pretty good shape in that leg of the triad.

The third leg of the triad, of course, is one we are wrestling with right now, and that is the land-based leg. The two missiles that are presently proposed—the MX on rail cars, and the Midgetman missile are controversial. The Midgetman, in my view, has attractiveness connected with it. But I also feel that its $40-$50 billion price tag is unaffordable and may impair rather than encourage arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

I would simple say that if the Soviets are allowed to continue with their deployment of small, single-warhead ICBMs, and if we are going to follow on and respond to that with the Midgetman, I can envision in the next 10 or 15 years that each of these two superpowers would have small ICBMs running all over their rather large countries, I think this complicates the process of evaluation as to what the other side is doing and what they have in their inventory.

That brings me to the question, once again, that I asked earlier. I am going to zero in on the MX and the Midgetman. It seems to me that with the budget crunch it could be argued that there may be too much redundancy if we proceed with both the rail-based MX missile and the Midgetman both essentially at the same time?

You will notice that in the new budget sent to us by the President that most of the money in the next fiscal year is for the Midgetman, while a rather small amount goes for the R&D on rail deployment of the MX.

From the experience that you have had in this area, do you think that both the MX rail deployment and the Midgetman, moving simultaneously is too much redundancy in the third leg of our triad? If so, could you expound a little bit on what you feel would be the best choice if we had to choose one or the other?

Mr. Stubbing. All right. I will take a stab at that, Senator.

I think as one of those a little bit distant from the ongoing everyday program considerations that I have a nice easy answer to that. The first part of my answer is yes, I think we are putting too much into the third leg of the triad on a simultaneous basis right now. I think your question is fair.

The second part of it, which of these should have priority. I do not understand enough about them. I suggest a typical budgeteer's approach. Let us get some more data before we try and figure out exactly which of these is right. I think frankly these are among the programs that I think as a nation we might afford to slowdown for a while until we get some answers as to what they can and should do.

The question that you raise, which I share, of vulnerability I do not think has been aired enough on the Midgetman. I think that is a real serious constraint. I do not think we have even put in our computers yet to understand what that all means, both sides starting to have these running around the countryside, and I think this is a good yellow light signal to go slow until we get some answers to these things—things I do not think we did on SDI. I think we moved out before we even started to ask those questions.

Mr. Collins. You have touched on what I consider to be a basic issue, Senator. I am a believer in *a* triad. I am not a believer in *the* triad that we have had since about 1960. Conventional wisdom says that the triad has to have one land-based, one sea-based, and one air-based component, because that worked very well for about 20 years. In fact, there is no such requirement. You could have all systems on land, all in the air, all on or under the water, as long as you satisfy three prerequisites: you must be able to survive the other side's first strike; you must have sufficient operational flexibility with what is left; and you must have a hedge against technological surprise, so that one breakthrough on the other side will not wipe you clear out.

Right now we have the world's only seven-system "triad". It is pretty hard to do that, but we have seven systems, and are talking about more. I think the fair answer to your question is that you can have too much redundancy, that you get more capability for every system you add, but the Law of Diminishing Returns takes over very rapidly and pretty soon you are wasting money that you can use more effectively somewhere else.

Nobody in the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever sat down on a Monday morning and said, "Let's have a triad." It is an historical accident that worked out very nicely. I happen to believe that three systems which are synergistic is still the optimum number and when you get four, five, six, seven or nine you are wasting money.

Senator EXON. John, would you not say that while you are sold on the basic triad concept, that does not necessarily mean that each and every leg of the triad must be exactly the same length?

Mr. COLLINS. There is no requirement that you have a land-based missile. There is no requirement that you have a manned bomber. There is no requirement that you have a Trident submarine. The name of the game is to find out how you can improve the capabilities of your triad at a reasonable price without adding more systems, which cost more money and deprive other sectors that are really hurting. You need to make really hard decisions on what three would do the job best, go with that three, and drop the rest.

Senator EXON. In other words, get on with the prioritization of what we think we need to do it right?

Mr. COLLINS. Roger that.

Senator EXON. Larry.

Dr. KORB. Faced with a choice between the two I would leave the MX at 50 and I would go ahead with the Midgetman, pending what happens at the negotiations in Geneva. I just do not think we can afford both. I think given the existence of Trident D-5 we have enough hard target kill capability. As Senator Cohen mentioned before, you are entering a new era where the other side will have mobile missiles. I do not really see the benefit to be gained by going ahead with another 50 MX at this particular time.

Senator EXON. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. I want to thank all of you for appearing. It has been very helpful and gave us, I think, a good beginning transition into the budgetary phase, which will come later. We appreciate very much your being here.

Our hearing tomorrow morning will be in the Russell Building, room 253, at which time we will hear from Admiral Crowe, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[Whereupon, at 4:16 o'clock p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 21, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
Washington, DC.

MILITARY STRATEGY

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Dixon, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Gramm, and McCain.

Also present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, assistant chief clerk; Robert E. Bayer, Robert G. Bell, Robert F. Bott, Richard D. Finn, Jr., Judith A. Freedman, John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Gordon G. Riggle, Mark B. Robinson, Patricia L. Watson, professional staff members; Russell C. Miller, research assistant, and Lori M. Jackson, staff assistant.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; Leon Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; Jim Sayer, assistant to Senator Wirth; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Christopher Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Samuel J. Routson, assistant to Senator Symms, and Terence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The hearing will come to order.

The committee meets this morning for our eighth hearing on U.S. strategy. Previous hearings have focused on national security strategy and related broad topics. This morning the committee will receive a comprehensive presentation on the military strategy component of our over-arching national security strategy.

The witness for our session this morning is Adm. William J. Crowe, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although Admiral Crowe has appeared before this committee many times, this is his first appearance as the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. So it is indeed a unique and different role from that the Chairman has ever had before.

As the committee played an important role in having these duties, would be a more appropriate term, assigned by law to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is a special pleasure this morning to welcome Admiral Crowe in his new role. This moment would be even more special if Senator Goldwater were here to join the committee this morning, and we all miss our former chairman.

Beyond designating the Chairman as the principal military adviser, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act assigned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs a number of important duties relating to strategy formulation. Key among these are preparing a fiscally constrained strategy, preparing joint logistics and mobility plans to support this strategy, conducting net assessments—I understand that Admiral Crowe gave a net assessment before the Budget Committee and we will get into that in questions this morning and, with his permission, incorporate that part of his presentation to the Budget Committee before this committee—establishing priorities for the requirements of the unified specified commands, and recommending changes in the assignment of service roles and missions.

Now we do not expect, Admiral Crowe, all of that to have been done by this morning. We consider those tasks long-term in nature. I think they should have been going on for a long number of years, but we know in many respects we simply were not organized for those kinds of functions at least to flow through under the guidance of the Chairman. So we are looking to the reorganization bill not as an instant solution to all of these challenges, but rather the beginning of a long-term process that will better enable all of us to address these issues in a meaningful way.

We will want to get into questions with you this morning on what you are doing in each of these areas, and how you are staffing. We have already had one witness testify that no matter what the Chairman does, unless we have better education in terms of strategic thinking among our military officers at the lower levels, we are not going to have people at the higher levels that are going to be capable of doing this.

I want to ask you a question about whether you agree with that assessment. One of our witnesses said that yesterday.

During this session and throughout this year the committee will have an intense interest in the success that Admiral Crowe has had and has in the future in carrying out these responsibilities.

Senator Warner, you and I have talked about this, but certainly as we move along this year, as important as the budget considerations are and all the other things we are going to be getting into, I do not think anything is more important for this committee this year, next year, or the year after than oversight over this reorganization that has taken place. I think it is going to take a lot of attention and a lot of help, and we may have to make adjustments as we go along.

Although we are only about a half of the way through our hearings on strategy, and indeed we may have others later on this year, the testimony has thus far strongly supported the conventional wisdom strategic formulation receives inadequate attention within our overall government.

I am going to put a number of questions in the record at this point, rather than reading them, because we will be getting into them later on in the hearing.

[The questions referred to follow:]

In my opinion, there remain a number of critical questions. Have we changed our convention strategy in the last 6 years, or does it remain unaltered?

Do we have a serious commitment-capabilities' gap, or not?

Is the 5-year defense plan adequate, or do substantial resource shortfalls persist?

Will nuclear deterrence continue to be a key element of U.S. strategy for the foreseeable future, or do we plan to abandon that strategic principle?

Do we plan to simultaneously fight the Soviets in 3½ contingencies or not?

Do we hope to limit the scope of any conflict, or do we plan to escalate horizontally?

Does U.S. strategy pit U.S strengths against Soviet weaknesses, or is it the traditional approach of strength against strength?

Does our strategy reflect a true coalition approach, or is it too unilateral in orientation?

Has our emphasis on maritime capabilities improved our posture, or has it served to starve more important priorities?

The committee does not seek to find fault or assess blame during these hearings. The Congress itself, with its excessive attention to minor budget issues, is part of the problem. The committee's orientation during these hearings is to the future. We can no longer, however, afford to hide or smooth over our intellectual shortcomings. If our strategy formulation and related strategic concepts are inadequate, what must be done to improve them? In the near term, what can be done to rationalize our currently ambiguous strategy? What missions have the most serious force deficiencies? What mission and resource priorities should be established?

Chairman Nunn. During the hearing, Admiral Crowe, the committee expects to hear your personal views and your military advice to this committee. You are the principal military adviser, and we want to make sure that you feel comfortable in sharing those personal views with us because that is what we are looking to you for.

Before Admiral Crowe presents his opening statement, Senator Warner, I would be delighted to have whatever opening statement you have this morning.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our good friend. I hope at an appropriate time, however, you deal with the critical issue in these hearings, namely—there are really two—the first one being: Is there a mismatch between our resources, our assets militarily, and our commitments, and those commitments in light of the threat?

And second, are you in your present role able to influence the development of strategy as that is perceived by the President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense? After all, you are the one who has to carry out the orders.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Do any of our other members want to speak?

Senator Dixon. I have a statement to be inserted for the record, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR DIXON

Mr. Chairman, this morning the committee continues its hearings on U.S. military strategy. Our witness is Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

We have had the opportunity in our past hearings on U.S. military strategy to hear many different points of view. Admiral Crowe in his statement says that we need a "consistent and rational defense policy" which will be geared to the future. I agree with the Chairman, but I think it is necessary for the administration to define what it's policy is so that we in Congress can have a better understanding of what our true military needs are and what they should be in the future.

As the chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability and Support, I have great problems with a policy that is buying all these new weapon systems yet has constantly underfunding spare parts and ammunition. What we are faced with now is how we fund these programs. I look forward to hearing from Admiral Crowe on his suggestions on how Congress can accomplish this in an era of no "real growth" in the defense budget.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **NUNN**. Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., U.S. NAVY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral **CROWE**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your very kind remarks.

I welcome this opportunity to candidly discuss military strategy with you this morning. With your permission, I would like to submit my written statement for the record and merely summarize it over the next few minutes. Of course, I should say that my summary will make only a few of the points which are included in the fuller statement.

Chairman **NUNN**. Without objection, your full statement will be put in the record.

I would also ask that we, by unanimous consent, take the portion dealing with net assessment with the help of your staff, and insert it in the record at the end of your statement, because I think that is an important feature of what your testimony is showing.

Admiral **CROWE**. That is unclassified net assessment which I made in my statement before the Senate Budget Committee. I will be happy to submit that, sir.

[The net assessment referred to follows:]

NET ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES

This assessment addresses specifically how the capability of U.S. armed forces and those of our allies compare with those of the Soviet Union and its allies.

STRATEGIC FORCES

First, strategic forces. There is no question that in the static sense the Soviets have reached strategic parity or better. This is one of the major shifts in the balance between the two superpowers wrought in recent years. They have clear superiority in ICBM's and overall megatonnage. Hardened communications (C3) and passive defense measures give them a survivability U.S. forces do not yet have. Likewise, the Soviets are further along in shifting to mobile missiles and are posturing themselves for a possible ABM breakout.

On the other hand, the U.S. ballistic missile submarine force is less vulnerable than the Soviets and we have a more effective bomber force still capable of penetrating the USSR. Moreover, the President's strategic modernization program if fully implemented—MX, D-5, B-1, ATB, C3 initiatives and Small ICBM—will prepare us for the long haul, keep pace with Soviet improvements offensively, and correct our more glaring deficiencies.

Thus all things considered, I am relatively confident that strategic forces and programs which are being proposed will deter a direct nuclear attack on the U.S. and our allies. But I must reemphasize, for that judgment to continue to be solid, it is imperative to stay the course with our strategic modernization programs.

MARITIME

The maritime picture is the second major shift in Soviet strategic policy.

Throughout the immediate postwar period the U.S. enjoyed undisputed mastery of the seas, but the Kremlin was not easily discouraged. By the late 1970's the Russian Navy had made tremendous inroads into our margin of superiority and the trends were even more alarming. We have now reversed these curves—particularly in overall shipbuilding—but the Soviets are on the high seas to stay.

Our main concern is a "blue water" Russian fleet pushing its area of operations further and further from the homeland. By stretching our forces and tactics to the limit and working harder to understand Soviet naval thinking, we still hold a slim margin of superiority on the high seas. But whether that margin holds up will depend, in part, on our reacting quickly to indications and warnings and our willingness to match their forces and efforts. As an example, we must take full advantage of the superiority of our nuclear attack submarines and carry the battle to the Soviets in the forward areas. Without such pressure, we could expect to see a major breakout by Soviet naval units and formations on to the sea lines of communications.

While we still enjoy an advantage in seaborne air, amphibious forces, and underway replenishment, and in support we receive from allied navies, a significant challenge on the high seas is growing out of Soviet success in:

Deploying very advanced anti-ship missiles which are constantly improving;

Increasing their over-the-horizon targeting capability by exploiting space;

Improving submarine propulsion (speed and quietness) and metallurgy (depth); and

Steadily improving their ASW capabilities.

In essence, we cannot afford to relinquish naval superiority to the Soviets. To do so would jeopardize our coalitions, economic and trade dependencies (which are now necessary in war as well as peace), and capabilities to project our power overseas. Our ability to prevail at sea is a cornerstone of our overall strategy.

NATO/WARSAW PACT

Turning to the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance, major trends are generally adverse to NATO. I have already spoken to the implications of strategic parity. Moreover, we have essentially no deterrent to chemical warfare in NATO or elsewhere—this is a crucial weakness when confronting the USSR. Reinforcing this trend has been the extensive Soviet modernization, expansion, and reorganization of their theater forces.

Further, the Soviets are better able than NATO to conduct theater nuclear war in Europe. Today they possess a pronounced superiority in numbers of intermediate nuclear forces, both long- and short-range. Similarly, our one-time lead in battlefield nuclear systems has disappeared.

In light of these developments, conventional forces assume an added significance. The Soviets have always had imposing ground forces but the gap in numbers of modern weapons continues to widen. In ground equipment they lead the U.S. and also NATO in virtually every category by ratios ranging from 1.5 to 1 to 6 to 1. Moreover, we have lost our lead in surface-to-air missiles and anti-armor capability. Similarly, NATO's qualitative edge in ground systems may have eroded somewhat. On the other hand, NATO ground forces on the Central front have made progress in the use of combined arms and in the fielding of modern equipment. Similarly, the sustainability of U.S. forces has improved markedly over the last few years. Unfortunately, the stocks of certain munitions among the allies have not improved appreciably and could be exhausted too quickly.

On the plus side, the NATO qualitative edge in tactical aviation while somewhat diminished has not disappeared. It is not clear, however, what this will mean against the numerical advantages of the Soviet air forces (offensive and defensive) which run in the neighborhood of 2.0 to 1. I have complete confidence that the quality of our pilots and weapon systems would permit us to exact high exchange ratios but overcoming the impressive numbers of Russian medium-range bombers, fighter bombers, interceptors, and surface-to-air weapon systems will be a sporty course. The outcome is difficult to predict.

We will, of course, have the support of our naval forces in Europe and, as I mentioned earlier, the Soviets have yet to surpass our lead.

To put all of this into perspective, NATO capabilities are still deterring a war in Europe. Surely, the prospect of having to fight 16 nations at once remain a sobering one for the Kremlin.

But if, for some reason, war breaks out, maintaining a successful forward defense will be a "near thing." Barring a major change in the dynamics of the competition, NATO can no longer hope to offset Pact numbers merely by improving the quality of its equipment or relying on the dedication of people defending their own territory.

In the final analysis the military balance in Europe is not encouraging and needs a great deal of tending—politically as well as militarily.

EAST ASIA

Until the late 1960's Moscow paid little attention to the defense of its eastern provinces and its strength in the Western Pacific. With the PRC's breakaway from the Soviet orbit and the burgeoning affluence of East Asia, the Kremlin began to build up its forces in the region—not by drawing down in Western Europe, but by commissioning new units and increasing defense production to help them.

Overall, the balance on the Chinese border favors the Russians in every way except manpower and as yet the Chinese have been unable to turn things around—preferring to put their current priorities elsewhere. The one exception is Chinese nuclear capability which provides "minimal deterrence" of a sort.

Nevertheless, China looms large in the Kremlin's calculations—witness the gradual buildup from 20 to 50 Soviet divisions on the Chinese border.

On the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang has made a determined effort to outstrip the South's forces. Besides this general buildup several recent initiatives are particularly worrisome—the relocation of a number of 2d echelon divisions close to the DMZ and recent emphasis on improving special operations forces both quantitatively and qualitatively. However, as long as North Korea is not directly assisted by the Soviet Union, United States augmentation—especially our air power—should make the difference in deterring or, if necessary, defeating the North. The fact remains, however, the Peninsula is an unstable focal point with a significant threat of major war lingering on the horizon.

In the context of global hostilities, the East Asian area presents both opportunities and challenges to U.S. planners. We have significant leverage against Soviet naval and air forces in the region which both reduces the threat to our sea lines of communication, and constrains the Kremlin's ability to accomplish its strategic goals in the Far East.

Further, our political relationships generally work in our favor. It is clear that PRC forces tie down substantial Soviet ground and air deployments in the region and that Beijing puts considerable stock in its U.S. tie. In a similar vein, Japan is a pillar of U.S. strategy in the Pacific. Without Japanese cooperation, it would be difficult to bottle up the Russian fleet, augment South Korea, and find sufficient bases to support continuing operations against the Soviets. Likewise, the health of the U.S.-Philippine relationship, politically and militarily, impacts heavily on the regional balance. Obviously, the firmness of U.S. alliances will rest to a great degree on our ability to successfully confront the Soviets in the region and, in the event of war, to keep open our sea lines of communication to the Western Pacific.

While predicting what the Soviets will do is a hazardous business, I am inclined to believe that any U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Pacific will take its lead from events in Western Europe or elsewhere. This means that we would most likely be fighting a containing action as well as supporting our Pacific allies. While the prospects for achieving our objectives in Asia are encouraging, there is clearly a great deal to be done before we can confront the future with confidence.

POWER PROJECTION

Turning to power projection, the Soviets have long been able to project military power successfully adjacent to their borders. Basically the Russians' continental location and large resource base gives them an asymmetrical advantage vis-a-vis the U.S. when applying force in Western Europe and along their immediate periphery—witness events in Afghanistan.

In the last decade the Kremlin has increased its ability to project forces, employing cargo aircraft, naval units and non-military shipping, although Washington continues to enjoy a distinct advantage where long range lift is concerned. However, the Soviets have developed a style of power projection that avoids confrontation with U.S. units, e.g., through the use of Cuban proxies, arms sales to clients, covert operations, and intervention in areas where U.S. action is not anticipated.

In general, we still retain a distinct advantage over the Soviets in strategic lift—airlift, sealift, and capabilities to project force over long ranges. Southwest Asia, however, continues to place a heavy stress on our power projection capabilities. Gradually, we are overcoming the challenges—distance, reception facilities, and the harsh environment—with innovative planning and exercises. But more capabilities are required in a number of areas to fully meet these challenges.

Aside from Southwest Asia, I am confident that in a direct confrontation, U.S. forces, because of our lift advantages, could prevail over Soviet troops operating far from their homeland. The only question is whether we may move soon enough in response to a military challenge.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Because they so often operate behind the scenes, straight one-on-one comparisons of our Special Operations Forces and Soviet "SPETSNAZ" are difficult to derive and sensitive to portray in an open fashion. Nevertheless, several points are worth noting. Both sides depend upon such forces to complement conventional forces in general war planning. But the Soviet side tends to use its SPETSNAZ more routinely in low intensity conflict as during the Czechoslovakia invasion of 1968 and in the current Afghanistan campaign. Their capability for covert and clandestine operations also fits into the Kremlin's policy of keeping pressure on the West through state-supported intimidation, terrorism, and subversion—and making sure that no surrogate ever gets out of the Soviet camp. In short, the Brezhnev doctrine and SPETSNAZ go hand in hand.

Against this background, there is no question that our SOF have become very good at the business of counter-terrorism. In 1981, our capability was very limited; now we probably have the best in the world. But this is a rather narrow field and we are still groping to fit our SOF—and other forces—into an overarching strategy to meet the threat of low intensity conflict. Further progress should be possible with more focused organizational arrangements, including the new Special Operations Forces Command, and increased emphasis on procuring the specialized equipment and training for these types of operations.

Overall, I believe we are building a credible and effective capability against state-supported terrorism, subversion, and other forms of indirect aggression against the West. But, a great deal of hard, constructive work still lies ahead in this area.

NET ASSESSMENT

In summary, it is clear that the investments made in the last 8 years have materially improved the foregoing net assessment from the U.S. standpoint. It is equally obvious that the picture is a dynamic one, that the Soviets are working diligently to improve their position across the board, and that there are still a number of serious gaps in our own posture. On balance, we still need a number of years' growth before we can face the future with confidence. In particular, I cannot help but be alarmed by the signal which a continuing zero or negative growth defense budget would send to both our allies and potential opponents in Europe. Frankly, such a signal at this time is not justified by the threat, the political climate or the military situation.

Admiral CROWE. I commend you for the purpose of these hearings. As I understand the purpose, it is to promote a broader understanding of both the substance and the policy process of developing U.S. strategy.

I believe it is most timely and appropriate for you to survey the strategic landscape before your committee proceeds to its fiscal deliberations. I cannot help, Mr. Chairman, noting some of the people that you have called in your hearings. I have been following them closely, and it is a rather distinguished list of witnesses. I feel a little intimidated by some of those people who have such prestigious service and long experience.

I feel a little bit like the man who survived the Johnstown flood. He spent the rest of his life talking about it, he was so impressed with his experience. When he died and went to Heaven, the first thing he did was get a hold of Saint Peter and explain that he was a survivor of the Johnstown flood and he would like to tell everbody in Heaven about it.

Saint Peter was not too excited about this, but finally agreed saying we have a meeting every Friday night of everybody up here and I'll put you on the agenda for an hour and a half. And as the gentleman started to leave the office, Saint Peter said, I should warn you that Noah will be in the audience. [Laughter.]

Secretary Weinberger appeared here on January 12 and sketched in a very thorough and understandable fashion the DOD strategic planning process. This morning it is my intention to use his statement as a point of departure and to concentrate on "military strategy" as opposed to the broader subject of "national strategy." To refresh your memory, the Secretary described how the administration identifies fundamental national interests, assesses the threat, and then formulates defense policy guidelines. Within this context, military strategy has been derived.

Historically, the United States has attempted in peacetime to maintain sufficient capability to blunt attacks on our own interests and form a nucleus around which we can expand for major hostilities. We do not attempt to match potential adversaries weapon-for-weapon and man-for-man, but to develop quality forces and "edges"—that is, marginal superiorities—that will deter our enemies or allow Washington to manage crises so they do not get out of hand.

In essence we are betting that in a major war we can expand our peacetime forces and bring our total resources to bear so that we will ultimately prevail. I would suggest that this is an appropriate policy for a democracy, but that it also leaves little room for day-to-day miscalculation. More importantly, it means that seemingly small reductions in our peacetime capability may result in large increases in the risk. It is imperative that this fundamental relationship be understood by all who make policy.

Over the course of time, we have followed a number of principles in determining how to build and deploy our forces. For instance, we attempt to support U.S. foreign policy both directly and indirectly; plan in a total force context; exploit the deterrent value of nuclear forces while avoiding a nuclear war; defend forces in-being against an initial attack at a time and place of the enemy's choosing; emphasize our qualitative advantages; where possible, procure equipment and units that can serve more than one war-fighting purpose; manage acquisition and procurement programs as efficiently as possible; expand our forces rapidly in the event of major crisis, and especially in all-out war; end any conflict of terms favorable to the United States and its allies.

After that section my statement goes on to discuss the strategic environment. It treats three subjects; (1) the nature of Soviet military power; (2) the impact of alliances on our strategy; and (3) structural constraints which are built into the system. All of these impact on the way we build military strategy and implement it. I will summarize that section of my statement very quickly.

The U.S.S.R. is a power of global reach, more mobilized than most nations have been in war. Moreover, the Soviets place great emphasis on numbers, always erring on the side of building too much rather than too few. In essence they have built an impressive military apparatus on the ground, in the air, and at sea which over several years has dramatically shifted the East-West military balance. Moreover, I see no slackening in their future investment policy. These developments strongly suggest that in the military competition with the U.S.S.R., we are engaged in a full-fledged marathon, not a windsprint, and it is important to recognize that reality.

As to the second subject, we have since the late 1940s created a rather elaborate structure of security alliances to bolster our defense. The centerpiece of this effort is the NATO coalition, but we are also participating in a number of bilateral security agreements in East Asia. While these arrangements amplify the capability of each participant, they also require constant tending and restrict the freedom of member governments to act alone. Planning, operating, and fighting alongside Allied Forces presents a host of problems which the strategic planner must constantly factor into his calculations.

Last, I would like to stress that the complexity of modern military structures inhibits their flexibility. Sophisticated weapon systems take years to develop and to field. Moreover, the United States, in order to bolster its alliance partners, has had to place high priority on its strategic nuclear umbrella, its global maritime superiority, and strategically mobile ground and air forces, sometime at the expense of other forces which we highly desire. All of this means that modifying or altering the basic military strategy cannot be done as easily or as quickly as some would prefer.

Now let me move to the business of force employment in an uneasy peace.

I would divide that into categories. I am talking about "everyday deterrence," "managing crises," and dealing with state-supported terrorism, subversion, and other forms of "low-intensity" conflict. With respect to everyday deterrence, we have some well-established mechanisms: The unified command plan, missions and tasks assigned to our unified commanders, and forces made available to them to carry out these tasks. From a military perspective, we try to avoid two minefields: Stretching our forces too thin in peacetime in a particular region or area; or sending an inadequate force into "harm's way."

In my view, the unified commanders are postured well to meet their day-to-day missions. The mobility and flexibility of our air, naval, light ground, and special operations forces allow a CINC to meet his responsibilities over large areas with modest assets.

Out of the ordinary developments such as the Iran-Iraq war and Afghanistan invasion, or a troublesome Qaddafi, may require a shift of forces between theaters. We have done quite a bit of this with our carriers in the last year, cycling between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean in response to varying pressures. This, of course, illustrates the great efficacy of carriers which give us flexibility and mobility without undue political liabilities.

Crisis management is a step up the ladder. Frequently we are looking at fast-moving situations. The military objective in crisis management is a classical one: rapidly confront the enemy or other hostile forces under advantageous circumstances to prevent events from getting out of hand or escalating. To this, Secretary Weinberger has added explicit criteria: Is a vital U.S. or allied interest at stake? Have we committed sufficient forces and supporting resources to achieve victory if forced to fight? And do we have clearly defined objectives which will not unravel during the course of any military operation?

Most people now recognize that the U.S. Government must somehow come to grips with the persistent threat of low-intensity conflict. That is, state-supported terrorism, subversion, and other destabilizing actions against the West and our interests. In most cases we are talking about heavily armed surrogates of the Soviet Union—for example, Syria, Libya, Cuba, Nicaragua.

The real-world challenge is to apply the right options at the right place at the right time, for we are under no illusion that a purely military strategy will work against all low-intensity threats. A range of actions may very well be indicated—that is, diplomatic, economic, training, special forces, et cetera. Overall, I would argue that we need a broad interagency approach to this subject and policies supported by more focused organizational arrangements. As a result of recent initiatives by the White House and this Congress, we are making progress on this front. Nonetheless, I would be the first to admit that we have a great deal of hard, constructive work ahead of us.

Let me now shift to war planning. Many questions by this committee and others reflect an interest in this subject, of course. We refer to this as the "deliberate" planning process, as distinct from "crisis management." The JCS continuously review plans of this type to ensure that they are compatible with basic policy guidance, missions and tasks, assigned forces, and expected threats in our global view.

There is little I can say about strategic nuclear planning outside the Pentagon. Too much of it involves extremely sensitive intelligence. Suffice it to note that much of our planning still follows the counterforce doctrine.

We see the Kremlin not only continuously building missiles and adding to their megatonnage, but also moving toward a nationwide defense against offensive ballistic missiles, including the possibility of ABM breakout. All of this has some of the makings of a nuclear war-winning strategy.

Against this background, our own strategy of deterrence requires, as a minimum, continuation of a vigorous modernization of the triad, which is the heart of our deterrent posture, and a robust research and development program explaining the SDI.

With respect to general defense plans, our strategy seeks to keep the nuclear threshold as high as possible. Thus, a considerable effort is focused on conventional forces and bringing their capabilities to bear in a timely and appropriate manner.

Today's planner, of course, has no specific vision of when, how, or where future hostilities may commence. We do maintain, however, a "running" estimate of the situation. As to NATO, I judge that the Kremlin can mount a heavy offensive against the central front, putting some pressure on both flanks at the same time. Certainly, the Soviets have the capability to mount a simultaneous heavy campaign either in the Far East or on their South Asian border. What they actually elect to do would depend on a host of factors.

As hostilities draw nigh, a basic challenge is to reduce risks in the transition from everyday deterrence to combat. The point is that force dispositions may very well be different for these two conditions. As much as possible, we want to protect our forces in-being against the initial assault and place them in the best position to counterattack. This is easier to accomplish at sea than in stationary positions, and it is also easier to talk about than it is to do.

Next, we want to ensure that reinforcements go to the right place at the right time. That is probably the most agonizing part of conventional war planning. If, for example, we send our troops off to one theater and the major effort occurs elsewhere, we have real problems "unscrambling the eggs."

Wartime priorities between theaters are not only politically sensitive but also scenario dependent. I can, however, make some general comments.

Predictably, defense of the United States and its approaches is our highest priority.

NATO traditionally has been our next concern. Conventional wisdom argues, and with some persuasiveness, that the evolving East-West balance depends in large part upon what happens in the central part of Europe.

East Asia also ranks high in the overall scheme of things. Our posture in the Western Pacific is central to a defense of North America, China's confidence in its western ties, and our capabilities to project power into the Southwest Asia region. In global war planning, however, I am inclined to believe that any U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Pacific will normally take its lead from events in Europe or elsewhere.

With regard to Southwest Asia, the U.S. Government has served notice that it will do whatever is necessary to keep open Western access to the Persian Gulf. Additionally, we want to limit or contain regional conflicts which can threaten the supply of world oil.

In general war planning, the fact is that our current force structure would not initially permit us to fight on any fronts or to look after all of our global interests simultaneously. U.S. commanders will be faced with a number of difficult decisions and will be forced to prioritize their wartime tasks. They will of necessity initially be seeking victory through sequential rather than simultaneous campaigns.

With respect to theater concepts of operation, we rely primarily on planning initiatives by the unified commanders. The JCS support them by assuring timely movement of U.S. forces from the continental United States to forward locations, and by integrating the individual efforts of the unified commanders in a global family of plans. In addition to global war plans, the commanders in chief maintain a range of contingency plans designed primarily to deal with regional crises and conflicts not involving Soviet forces.

In this event, military strategy is likely to be bounded in several ways; for example, limited objectives like restoring the territorial integrity of an ally under attack; partial rather than full mobilization by the United States; and a tight leash on offensive operations of the type apt to have wider regional implications. The usual challenge is to find a strategy which satisfies all of these local requirements and still enables the military commander to meet the enemy under advantageous conditions.

Frankly, you can do a great deal of limited war planning beforehand, but in the actual event each case will very likely present a host of unique and unforeseen circumstances which will require modified plans. As President Eisenhower said: "A plan is nothing, but planning is everything."

Now moving to the strategy, budget and risk process, it is a fact of life that military strategy is always resource-constrained, if not in dollars, then in material and people. This means that we always stretch things out, even in war, building tomorrow what we would like to have today. But in peacetime this tendency is, of course, much more pronounced.

In peacetime, military risks are particularly difficult to manage. Certainly, we have never had much success limiting the Soviet military buildup, and as leader of the Western World we simply do not have the latitude or freedom we would prefer. We can, of course, abdicate those responsibilities and, in turn, ease our resource problem, but I do not detect much support for such a course.

In plain fact, it is very difficult to find a real substitute for peace through strength or the principle that it is better to deter wars than to fight them.

With respect to risk assessments, we have a considerable body of knowledge about the threat that we would face in case we engage forces of the Soviet Union or even its surrogates.

Given the threat, risk assessments can be facilitated by a number of analytical tools many of which I think you have discussed in the course of these hearings the last few days: static comparisons; weapon systems analyses; one-on-one and combined arms engagements; computer-supported theater campaigns and; global war games. These tools do not tell us whether we are going to win or lose wars, but they can be used to shed considerable light on concepts, doctrines, tactics, leadership techniques, technologies, and expected deficiencies on the field of battle. Also, they can aid us in making more adequate and better net assessments. I am not convinced that we can bring together these planning aids as well as we should. It is my hope and genuine belief that with the new arrangement provided by the Goldwater-Nichols bill, that I can improve the way that we do this.

Additionally, many of our studies and analyses focus on the transition from peace to war and what it would cost to rapidly expand our force in-being or replace expected losses in combat. In my experience, civilian leaders want a sense of wartime demands and these tools help us to answer such questions.

All of these considerations—our peacetime deterrent posture, transition from peace to war, and global warfighting capabilities—are addressed biennially in the defense planning process and annually by the Defense Resources Board. If you, in fact, go to a 2-year budgeting cycle, the DRB will go to a 2-year consideration as well. The DRB spends a great deal of time looking at the four pillars of defense: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability, attempting to decide what investment will give us the highest return in decreasing risks.

In my own career, I've never witnessed a risk-free defense budget. Of course, we are never able to quantify military or political risks down to the last dollars and cents. The world is too complex, the variables too many, and the future too uncertain to determine such risks with great precision. Still, we make every attempt to get our arms around the "military risk" that various policies produce, and I am confident that we do fairly well in a macro sense. This includes using not only analytical tools, but also the skill, the judgment, and the experience of the professional military. It will be a long time, if ever, before we can get away from relying on subjective and personal assessments in assessing risks.

Looking to the future, I would urge that America settle down in the defense debate and start looking seriously where we will be in the 1990s, and I would assume that is one of the purposes of the hearings, Mr. Chairman. What is most needed, in my view, is a consistent and rational defense policy geared for the long run rather than the peaks and valleys which have characterized so much of our peacetime history, and I am talking about, of course, appropriations' policies as well as other aspects of defense strategy. We have a great deal going for us in economic defense potential and in partnerships with other free nations of the world, but we must take the lead and set the pace in this long-term military competition with the U.S.S.R. If we fail to meet this challenge—and let the Soviet-controlled forces dominate the field—then we must be prepared to face the consequences of a world starkly different and less hospitable than the one we are living in today.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be glad to address your queries.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Crowe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., USN, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today and to candidly discuss U.S. military strategy. I heartily applaud the purpose of these hearings, i.e., to promote a broader understanding of both the substance and the process of developing U.S. strategy. All too often it seems to me that significant security decisions are made in the appropriation process not to meet strategic imperatives but to satisfy what are vaguely referred to as "political" or "fiscal" realities. I would argue vigorously that "military realities," or if you prefer "strategic realities," should receive equal emphasis in shaping defense budgets. So, Mr. Chairman, I commend you for returning to fundamentals and preceding your fiscal deliberations with an examination of the strategic landscape in which our nation operates. Hopefully, these hearings will facilitate building the consensus which is necessary if we are to have effective, consistent, and credible defense policies.

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND POLICIES

Secretary Weinberger appeared here on 12 January and sketched in a very thorough and understandable fashion the DOD strategic planning process. This morning it is my intention to use his statement as a point of departure and to concentrate on "military strategy" as opposed to the broader subject of "national strategy." To refresh your memory, the Secretary emphasized three fundamental steps which furnish the foundation for shaping military capabilities:

- Identifying U.S. National Security Interests--these encompass both broad ideals (freedom, human rights, economic prosperity) and substantive concerns (territorial integrity, U.S. interests abroad, access to world markets and resources, a supportive international order).
- Assessing Threats to U.S. Interests--the nature, magnitude, strengths and vulnerabilities of military forces or other conditions endangering our interests.
- Formulating Defense Policy--the broad guidelines for development of military strategy and capabilities. In this regard, some basic themes have evolved in the post World War II era:
    - -- Deter wars rather than fight them. This strategy of deterrence aims to make war or the threat of war too risky for any hostile power or combination of powers to contemplate.
    - -- Execute and optimize collective security

arrangements which support U.S. interests overseas. At the heart of this policy is the principle that the capabilities of the whole will be greater than the sum of its parts. In turn, our coalitions present potential adversaries with formidable political, psychological and ideological challenges--as well as enhanced military power.

-- Use these coalitions to establish a forward defense posture in Europe and Asia.

-- Maintain robust central reserves supported by global mobility. Many of our treaty commitments are bolstered primarily by our ability to project power to support and/or defend them. Indeed, many strategists in and out of the Pentagon now recognize that real-world deterrence depends upon our inherent capability to "get there firstest with the mostest," deal effectively with the threat at hand, and withdraw just as quickly from the scene of action.

-- Pursue a vigorous arms reduction policy which seeks equitable, effective and verifiable arms agreements with potential adversaries. For more than fifteen years, we have been trying to engage the Soviets in an accord which will sharply reduce offensive nuclear arms.

Within this context military strategy is derived and the requirements for armed forces are generated. In a similar fashion an accompanying foreign policy is developed. Of necessity military strategy interfaces with foreign policy, because the two must work hand-in-hand in achieving national objectives. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the President's forthcoming national strategy report will discuss both our foreign and defense policies, their interrelationships, and the uses of the political, economic, military and other elements of our national power.

MILITARY STRATEGY

Historically, the United States has attempted in peacetime to maintain sufficient capability to blunt initial attacks on our own interests and to form a nucleus around which we can expand for major hostilities. In practical terms, this means that we do not attempt to match potential adversaries weapon-for-weapon and man-for-man, but to develop quality forces and "edges" (marginal superiorities) that will deter our enemies by keeping their level of uncertainty high or allow Washington to manage crises in a manner that will prevent them from escalating or getting out of hand.

In essence, we are betting that in major war we can expand our peacetime forces and bring our total resources (technological, industrial, personnel, economic, political) to bear so that we will ultimately prevail. This is an appropriate policy for a democracy but it also leaves little room for day-to-day miscalculation. More importantly it means that seemingly small reductions in our peacetime capability may result in large increases in the risk. It is imperative that this fundamental relationship be understood.

Over the course of time, we have followed a number of principles in determining how to build and deploy our forces. For instance, we attempt to:

- Support U.S. foreign policy both directly and indirectly and, in particular, our security commitments.
- Plan in a total force context, i.e., active and reserve forces of the U.S. and its allies, host nation support in forward areas, various types of combat service support from civilian sectors, and military enhancements underwritten by our security assistance programs;
- Exploit the deterrent value of nuclear forces while avoiding a nuclear war;
- Defend forces in-being against an initial attack at a time and place of the enemy's choosing;
- Emphasize our qualitative advantages--technical, personnel, and organizational--to defeat an adversary who will normally outnumber us on the field of battle in both personnel and weapons;
- Where possible stress equipment and units that can serve more than one warfighting purpose (e.g., in a deterrent role, limited conflict and major war) and be utilized across the entire spectrum of geography and climates.
- Manage acquisition and procurement programs as efficiently as possible within the political constraints of our system and the technical demands of our strategy.
- Expand our forces rapidly in the event of major crises and especially in all-out war. In this regard, our mobilization machinery and the ability of American industry to convert to a wartime basis have a fundamental impact on our strategic calculations.
- End any conflict on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies.

STRATEGY ENVIRONMENT

Given the built-in pluralism of the American system and our constrained resources, it is very difficult to bring all these policies and principles together. But this is only part of the challenge since strategy must be developed in an extremely complex international and technical environment.

Nature of Soviet Military Power

Cutting across the strategic landscape--and in many ways dominating it--is the nature of Soviet military power. How do we as planners look at this menace?

In the broad sweep, the Soviet threat is different than any we have ever faced. Granted, pre-war Germany was a formidable power in Europe and Japan in Asia, but the two never successfully integrated their efforts on global military strategy--witness Japan's unilateral attack on Pearl Harbor and Berlin's unhappiness because Tokyo would not engage the Soviets in Asia.

In contrast, the Soviet Union is a power of global reach in every sense of the term: nuclear strike forces with intercontinental range; conventional ground and air forces capable of military operations across the entire Eurasian Continent; naval forces on patrol in the Atlantic, Baltic, Mediterranean, Caribbean, Pacific, and Indian Ocean; and heavily-armed surrogates near virtually every key waterway and oil artery in the world. Any U.S. military strategy must confront this reality.

As a nation, we have always been wary of military power in the hands of totalitarian regimes and the Soviet Union is no exception. In fact, Moscow has reaffirmed many times over our traditional suspicions. Of course, Mr. Gorbachev could possibly moderate some of the harsher policies of the apparatus, but what will not change is the Party's control over the Soviet Union's immense warmaking potential--the economy, industrial base, civil air transport, merchant marine, labor supply, and so on. The USSR is more mobilized and centrally controlled in peacetime than most nations have been in war. In turn, this puts a high premium on the capability and day-to-day readiness of U.S. and allied forces.

Ever since the revolution, the Soviets have had a fascination with numbers. As Lenin once remarked, "quantity has a quality all of its own." They have never departed much from this principle in building industrial centers, setting goals for military production lines, or fielding strategic, theater nuclear, chemical, and conventional forces. They always err on the side of building too many rather than too few, forcing us to constantly look for ways to offset their numerical superiorities with better concepts, doctrines, technologies, leadership, and personnel.

On the other side of this coin, we know that the Kremlin worries about its own weaknesses and vulnerabilities--a very long border and a vast airspace to defend, natural choke points constraining their access to the open oceans, an inefficient industrial plant, and the questionable steadfastness of some of their East European allies. Some of these vulnerabilities can be exploited by our own strategy.

In practical terms, the Kremlin has chosen to place overriding emphasis on military strength at the expense of every other sector of the economy--much as the Axis Powers did in the 1930's. The result has been an impressive military apparatus which over several years has shifted the East-West balance dramatically. I won't dwell on the statistics--this Committee is all too familiar with them--but cite only some highlights:

- Our strategic nuclear deterrent is neither as secure nor as dominant as it once was. The USSR now significantly outnumbers the U.S. in ICBMs and megatonnage. Equally disturbing is the Soviet emphasis on strategic defense--the steady hardening of command and control facilities, a very robust defense against air-breathing threats, and an ABM system with potentially nation-wide coverage. Concurrently, we see their large ICBM force becoming more hardened and mobile, their submarines more quiet, and their bombers more capable of intercontinental missions.

- Soviet conventional capabilities on and around the Eurasian Continent are much greater than they were two decades ago. In these forward areas, we have always been considerably outnumbered by Soviet ground and air forces. Now we are also seeing our qualitative edge steadily erode on the ground and in the air.

- At sea the Kremlin has transformed its Navy into a sophisticated blue water fleet with intercontinental reach. A constant stream of warships is coming off the ways buttressed by advanced weaponry and technology.

- Soviet surrogates in Asia, Africa, and Central America are more heavily armed and troublesome than they once were. In turn, they are much more inclined to support terrorism, subversion, and greater forms of aggression against their neighbors and the West in general.

While the likelihood of a major Soviet assault on Western Europe is perhaps remote, the coercive threat of Soviet military power will loom over the Eurasian Continent for many years to come. Moreover, the Soviet Government has never departed from policies holding that its allies and surrogates in the Third World must march in step with Moscow and that the rest of the world is an open field for destabilizing actions.

Further, we see no slackening in tomorrow's military investments. By the Kremlin's own admission, such expenditures will continue on an upward slope--just as they have over the last four decades. All of this puts an enormous burden on the economy, but I see no sign that the Soviet system cannot sustain such an effort.

In my view, these and other indicators strongly suggest that in the military competition with the USSR we must prepare ourselves for a full-fledged marathon, not a wind sprint. That thought must be the cornerstone of any successful U.S. strategy. Yet, this is one of the most difficult ideas to get across to the U.S. Congress and the American people.

Impact of Alliances

If there is one strategic lesson that stands out from all the others in the postwar world, it is that we no longer can go it alone. Commencing in the late 1940's, we created a rather elaborate structure of security alliances designed to achieve a level of deterrence and defense that would be unattainable for any one nation individually.

The centerpiece of the structure and, in turn, a dominant factor in our military planning is the NATO coalition. We have in effect concluded that the successful defense of Western Europe is vital to the security of the United States and, in turn, we have permanently committed U.S. personnel to the Continent.

Today NATO Europe accounts for about 30 percent of all military expenditures by the alliance, maintains about twice as many men under arms as the U.S., and fields some 60 percent of the ground and air combat units. The U.S. presence includes over 300,000 personnel in Europe configured to fight alongside European ground and air units. In addition, about 50 percent of our naval combatants are dedicated to the support of NATO in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

In East Asia, history and self interest have firmly tied us to Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. On the Korean Peninsula we retain a sizeable ground and air presence integrated into the ROK defense structure. Buttressing this commitment is the 7th Fleet (33,000 personnel) which ranges both the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean giving further substance to relationships we enjoy in those regions, e.g., ANZUS members, Thailand, Pakistan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, etc.

Most people look at our coalition strategy as the best of all possible worlds in the sense that it amplifies the power of each participant. This fact is, of course, the fundamental incentive for negotiating such arrangements. However, from the perspective of the nation's military planners, coalitions also pose challenges and it is important to be aware of them.

It is in the nature of a multilateral strategy that the participants sacrifice some of their freedom of action. For instance Washington pays a penalty--occasionally a military one--when it wants to do something that runs against the interests or political grain of an ally. Sometimes the fences mend; sometimes they do not. Every Administration has been confronted with this problem at one time or another.

Alliances require not only constant political tending but often transfusions in the form of new and costly initiatives. NATO is famous for this--the Alliance Defense in the 1970's program of President Nixon, the Long-Term Defense Program put forth by President Carter, and the Conventional Defense Initiative approved by the North Atlantic Council in 1984.

Participation in multilateral defense arrangements frequently require compromises which in turn complicate the military equation. Planning, operating, and fighting with foreign forces can present a host of problems--furnishing security assistance, designing equipment to be interoperable, depending on or supporting forces less capable or less sustainable, combining command structures, modifying strategy to meet national sensitivities, etc. Frankly. it has never been easy to fit some of our forces into the common NATO denominator, particularly when we want them to have global utility under a variety of conditions. These types of problems are constant, thorny and often result in considerable investment.

Very important from the standpoint of our national command authorities, a substantial military presence overseas tends to "fix" U.S. forces in place and to limit their operations to those acceptable to the host government. I need not belabor this point, but it is a fundamental consideration in committing military forces to alliances.

In sum, our great emphasis on security coalitions is well worth the time, investment, and effort we spend on it. But it carries with it some burdens which the strategic planner must be aware of and constantly factor into his calculations.

Structural Constraints

In addition to these up-front policy demands, military strategy is constrained by structural content which, in turn, limits the decisionmaker's flexibility.

In some ways our military posture is the victim of history. Certainly, where we ended up at the end of World War II has had a profound impact on where we are today, particularly in Western Europe and Northeast Asia. Our overseas base structure was largely determined by World War II events and especially our post-war occupation policies. We can relinquish such overseas bases, but once done, it is difficult to reacquire, relocate or build new ones. To a lesser extent, the same is true of our bases in the U.S. In essence, you cannot easily change base structure--even when confronted with changes in technology, tactics, or public policy.

Force complexity and investments have a similar impact. Modern weapon systems take years to develop from concept through initial operational capability. In turn, facilities in the United States and overseas are constantly updated to support these new weapon systems--runways, hangars, avionics shops, and so on. A decisionmaker, of course, can declare as a matter of policy that our forces should be altered or our activities should be located in a more convenient or hospitable location. But usually, it will take several years to get from here to there.

In a similar vein, it is important to note that few of our allies have a nuclear deterrent of their own and, in the postwar years, many stressed local ground, air, and naval capabilities rather than long range power projection in their defense planning. Thus, in the overall scheme of things, the United States necessarily must place a high priority on its strategic nuclear umbrella, global maritime superiority and strategically, mobile ground and air forces.

For the same reason, defense and foreign policy do not necessarily operate in the same time frame. Foreign policy is not as encumbered by structures, hardware, and technology as defense policy. In practical terms, this means that defense policy and military posture may lag modifications in foreign policy, or conversely, prevent the diplomat from doing what he would prefer. Dovetailing the two requires both compromise and tolerance.

Again, these matters can be managed, but those who shape strategy should understand the full spectrum of considerations.

FORCE EMPLOYMENT IN A VIOLENT PEACE

Now to the business of force employment. One of my most important duties is to assist the Secretary of Defense and President in providing for the strategic direction of U.S. armed forces in the continuum between peace and war. In today's world, the term "violent peace" seems to better characterize the climate than the term peacetime. These responsibilities tend to break down into three areas: everyday deterrence, managing crises, and dealing with state-supported terrorism, subversion, and other forms of "low intensity" conflict.

Everyday Deterrence

Strategic nuclear forces (TRIAD) are obviously a vital part of our overall deterrent stance and, I believe, well understood by this Committee (further discussed under War Planning).

With respect to conventional forces, we have some well established mechanisms: the Unified Command Plan, missions and tasks assigned to the CINCs, and forces made available to them to carry out these tasks. All of this is approved by the Secretary of Defense and, periodically, by the President. Shifts of forces between CINCs can be authorized only by the SECDEF. Most changes occur at the margin--moving forces slightly up or down in various theaters depending upon international developments. Occasionally, however, we have seen some dramatic changes, e.g., the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the Carter Doctrine of 1979.

From a military perspective, we try to avoid two minefields: stretching our forces too thin in peacetime or sending an inadequate force into "harm's way." Usually, these are arrived at through consultations with the CINCs, the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and the White House.

Day-to-day, the CINCs are postured well to meet their training goals, to keep force visibility high throughout their areas, to meet the diplomatic demands on their command, to pursue a vigorous exercise schedule with allies, to respond to natural disasters, etc. The mobility and flexibility of our air, naval, light ground, and special operations forces allow a CINC to meet his responsibilities over large areas with modest assets. The requirements of an all-volunteer force and rigorous maintenance schedules dictate that in normal operations the CINC will only have a portion of his overall forces for these duties.

Over the course of time, we have learned that some forces are better than others in responding to requests from friends or allies for help. If we want to make a substantial and enduring contribution to collective security and combined defense planning (as in NATO and the Republic of Korea) there is no substitute for a standing ground force commitment. But these deployments also tend over time to become fixed commitments--very difficult to change without all sorts of political repercussions. Conversely, transitory commitments are better managed with tactical air and naval forces and easily transported ground units. We can fly away or sail away when the situation has stabilized--move on to another trouble spot if need be. At the same time, the beneficiary understands this and doesn't consider them as strong a signal of support as a full-fledged ground commitment.

Out of the ordinary developments such as the Iran-Iraq war, Afghanistan invasion, or a troublesome Qhaddafi, may require reinforcing a particular area and temporarily increasing the tempo of operations. This would, in turn, probably require a shift of forces between theaters. We have done quite a bit of this with our carriers in the last year cycling between the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean in response to varying pressures. This, of course, illustrates the great efficacy of carriers which give us flexibility and mobility without undue political liabilities.

Above all, it is important to realize that, while our everyday dispositions are always carried out with a weather eye on the larger international situation, they are driven primarily by the need to deter Third World crises and/or foster the support of friendly powers. They may or may not be influenced by Soviet actions.

Crisis Management

Crisis management is a step up the ladder. Frequently, we are looking at fast moving situations--events which the formal planning process may or may not have anticipated.

The military objective in crisis management is a classical one: rapidly confront the enemy or other hostile forces under advantageous conditions to prevent events from getting out of hand. To this, Secretary Weinberger has added explicit criteria: is a vital U.S. (or allied) interest at stake; have we committed sufficient forces and supporting resources to achieve victory if forced to fight; and do we have clearly defined objectives which will not unravel during the course of any military operation?

In my experience, it is often difficult to square a requirement for prompt military action with concerns about where such action might take us in terms of future commitments or burdens on our forces. That dilemma, seems to be built-in to the crisis management process.

Low Intensity Conflict

Most people now recognize that the U.S. Government must somehow come to grips with the persistent threat of low intensity conflict--state-supported terrorism, subversion, and other destabilizing actions against the West. In most cases, we are looking at heavily-armed surrogates of the Soviet Union, e.g., Syria, Libya, Cuba, Nicaragua.

We have a number of options at our disposal--support for freedom fighters, economic aid, security assistance, intelligence sharing, bilateral (confidence-building) exercises, special operations forces, and the backup capability provided by our light infantry divisions, tactical air forces, and carrier battle groups. The real-world challenge is to apply the right options, at the right place, at the right time.

In the last few years, we have had some success using our military capabilities to stabilize the situation in Central America. But we are under no illusion that a purely military strategy will work against low intensity conflict--there or elsewhere. Rather, we need a national strategy and policies supported by more focused organizational arrangements. As a result of recent initiatives by the White House and Congress, we are making progress on this front. Nonetheless, a great deal of hard, constructive work lies ahead.

One further comment is appropriate. I do not believe that we will ever get our arms around this problem without a vigorous forward-looking and fully integrated security assistance program. The understanding and support of Congress are essential here.

WAR PLANNING

Let me now shift to war planning. Many questions by this Committee and others reflect interest in the subject.

We refer to this as the "deliberate" planning process, as distinct from crisis management. The process includes:

- General defense plans of the CINCs involving conventional forces, the use of tactical nuclear weapons in U.S./allied operations, or defense against first use by an adversary on the field of battle; and

- Planning for strategic retaliatory strikes in general war, conducted by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff in Omaha.

The JCS continuously review plans of this type to ensure that they are compatible with basic policy guidance, missions and tasks, assigned forces, and expected threats.

Strategic Nuclear Planning

There is little I can say about strategic nuclear planning outside the Pentagon. Too much of it involves extremely sensitive intelligence, not to mention internal assessments of strengths and weaknesses peculiar to both sides. Suffice it to note, much of our planning still follows the counterforce doctrine.

How we measure the sufficiency of our nuclear offensive forces and deterrent risks revolves largely around the numerical balance of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the sophistication of warheads, and the character of the U.S. and Soviet target bases. Over time, the Kremlin has relentlessly modernized its strategic weaponry. We see this graphically demonstrated by Soviet development of two "mobile" missiles--the SS-25 and the SS-X-24. In order to develop the former, the Soviet Union had to violate the SALT prescription against a second new type ballistic missile. In essence, it's no secret that they have a very formidable capability which could be employed with devastating effect against the U.S.

When we play "war games" we always find that both sides experience enormous damage. One of the troublesome concerns is a Soviet government which seems to believe it can survive a nuclear exchange and, by retaining a large reserve of offensive nuclear forces continue to fight. In addition, we see them moving toward a nation-wide defense against offensive ballistic missiles--including the possibility of an ABM breakout--coupled with an already robust defense against air-breathing threats. All of this has some of the makings of a nuclear war-winning strategy.

Against this background, our strategy of deterrence requires, as a minimum, continuation of a vigorous modernization of the TRIAD, which is the heart of our deterrent posture, and a robust research and development program exploring the SDI. In order to assure the quality of our strategic weaponry, it is imperative to keep abreast of Soviet advances. Again, the Soviets--by violating the SALT prescription limiting encryption--have made this a great deal more difficult. Additionally, the JCS would like to see a negotiated agreement leading to deep, equitable, and verifiable strategic arms reductions and vigorously support the President's efforts in this area.

Conventional War

With respect to general defense plans, our strategy seeks to keep the nuclear threshold as high as possible. Thus, a considerable amount of the deliberate planning process focuses on conventional forces and bringing their capabilities to bear in a timely and appropriate manner--hopefully where they can enjoy an edge.

Today's planner, of course, has no specific vision of when, how, or where future hostilities might start. We do maintain, however, a "running" estimate of the situation. We do not assume that the Soviets would take the offensive everywhere at once. It's not in the Russian character to stretch forces too thin. As to NATO, I judge that they can mount a heavy offensive against the Central front with some pressure on both flanks. In the northern region they will quickly want to push NATO units away from the Kola Peninsula both on the ground and at sea. In the south, the weight of their effort may well depend on Warsaw Pact support and developments on the Central front as well as the nature of the opening scenario. For instance, events could involuntarily draw their attention to the Mediterranean. Certainly, they have the capability to mount a simultaneous heavy campaign either in the Far East or on their South Asian border. But I will not venture to say which of these theaters would remain at low risk. That would depend upon our defensive posture at the outset and a host of other factors--not the least of which would be the international political scene.

Even before a war commences, the challenge is to reduce risks in the transition from everyday deterrence to defense (force dispositions may very well be different for these two conditions). As much as possible, we want to protect forces in-being against the initial assault. This is easier to accomplish at sea than in stationary positions, e.g., Central Europe or the Korean peninsula. However, if naval forces are being used to keep a limited crisis from escalating it may pose a difficult choice--leave them in position to deter where they are more vulnerable to a Soviet assault, or reposition to avoid Soviet surprise and raise the odds of escalation of the original crisis.

Next, we want to ensure that reinforcements go to the right place at the right time. That's probably the most agonizing part of conventional war planning. If, for example, we send our troops off to one theater and the major effort occurs elsewhere, we have real problems "unscrambling the egg" with potentially huge demands on our airlift and sealift with all the risks a substantial movement during war entails.

Theater Perspectives

Wartime priorities between theaters are not only politically sensitive but also scenario dependent. I can, however, make some general comments.

Defense of the United States clearly is our highest priority. Basically, this requires us to maintain a security zone around the United States including all of North America, Central America, the Caribbean Basin, and air and sea approaches in both the Atlantic and Pacific.

Our task in peacetime is to keep any threat in that zone under close and continual surveillance and, in the event of global war, to clear the security zone of Soviet forces and neutralize any surrogate imprudent enough to aid the Soviet war effort.

NATO traditionally has been our next priority. Conventional wisdom argues rather persuasively that the evolving East-West balance depends primarily upon what happens in the central part of Europe. Other factors also come into play--size of the NATO treaty area and number of member nations; combined economic, industrial, and military strength of the alliance; and the sheer weight of Soviet military power looming over the theater. It is the most militarized region in the world.

East Asia also ranks high in the overall scheme of things. We cannot neglect our allies or deterrent stance in this theater. Both factors are central to a Pacific defense of North America, China's confidence in its Western ties, and capabilities to project power into the Southwest Asia region.

In global war planning, however, I am inclined to believe that any U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Pacific will take its lead from events in Europe or elsewhere. This means that we would be most likely fighting a containing action as well as supporting our Pacific territories and allies. Indisputably, defense of the Pacific lines of communication against Soviet air and naval threats is a central part of the overall picture. So too is a posture sufficient to deter a North Korean attack on the South--a very tempting proposition for Pyongyang if we are heavily engaged in Europe.

South and Southwest Asia also must be factored into the global picture. Certainly, the U.S. Government has served notice that it will do whatever is necessary to prevent Soviet domination of the vital Persian Gulf. Additionally, we want to limit or contain regional conflicts which could threaten the supply of world oil.

In general war, the fact is that our current force structure would not initially permit us to fight on all fronts or to look after all of our global interests simultaneously. U.S. commanders will be faced with a number of difficult decisions and will be forced to prioritize their wartime tasks. They will of necessity be seeking victory through sequential rather than simultaneous campaigns. The alternatives are either a much larger peacetime military establishment which appears to have little appeal for the Congress or some scaling back of our commitments. I have some serious reservations about the latter course. To quote Secretary Weinberger, "What mutual defense treaties should we repudiate? Which allies or friends should we abandon? From what international cause should we retreat? What American interest should we give up? For these questions, I know of no answers that would enable America to continue the road that U.S. Presidents and Congresses have followed since 1945."

Theater Concepts of Operation

With respect to theater concepts of operation, we rely primarily on planning initiatives by the Unified Commanders. During the course of these hearings, several of the CINCs will testify on this subject, i.e., how they propose to integrate U.S. with allied forces for the common defense and the regional strategy they propose to employ.

The JCS role in this process is two-fold. First, we focus on the timely movement of U.S. forces from CONUS to forward locations. This is a complicated evolution in and of itself--making sure that all of the bits and pieces of equipment marry up with troops at the reception facilities. Many of our exercises are designed to shake down the system, e.g., REFORGER in Europe, TEAM SPIRIT in South Korea, and BRIGHT STAR in the Middle East.

Second, the JCS are looking at how the theater commanders propose to fight their forces after D-Day in a global context. This involves a comprehensive review of basic scenarios, assumptions, concepts of operations, capability assessments, sequential campaigns, and potential disconnects between theaters, i.e. forces expected to be employed, lift priorities, logistics requirements, etc. The whole process responds to recent Congressional mandates for a more fully-integrated global military strategy and more effective integration of the demands of individual theaters.

Maritime Strategy

The cornerstone of any strategy which has global dimensions must be the ability to use the oceans for our own purposes--to protect the conduits to allies and resources, to strike the adversary offensively, to prevent him from interrupting our own operations, and to deny him access to his overseas clients.

In recent years, we have benefitted from some excellent conceptual thinking by the Navy about global maritime strategy--how to phase operations in a transition from peace to war, clear the way of submarines opposing military resupply or reinforcement shipping, and use our carrier battle groups for either offensive strikes or in direct support of such allies as Japan, Norway, Greece, and Turkey. It is imperative, of course, to fold these concepts into our larger military strategy and that is exactly what we are doing.

Special mention also should be made of the U.S. Coast Guard role. In wartime, Coast Guard units join regular naval forces. They will augment the fleet's escort and patrol capability, enhance the close-in ASW posture, counter efforts to block or infiltrate our harbors, and assist the Navy with their unique icebreakers.

Limited War

Below the level of general defense plans, the CINCs maintain a family of contingency plans designed, primarily, to deal with regional crises and conflicts not involving Soviet forces.

In this event, military strategy is likely to be bounded in several ways: limited objectives like restoring the territorial integrity of an ally under attack; partial rather than full mobilization by the U.S.; and a tight leash on offensive operations of the type apt to have wider regional implications. The usual challenge is to find a strategy which satisfies all of these requirements and still enables the military commander to meet the enemy under advantageous conditions. The Korean conflict and the war in Vietnam provide both good and bad examples of such compromises.

Today, successful planning requires, first and foremost, a clear understanding of regional tensions, ambitions, and animosities. Part of the problem is Soviet surrogates seeking a wider regional role and influence through force of arms--Libya and Vietnam, for example. Other problems arise from irredentist claims--one nation seeking to recover what it lost to another nation years or decades ago. In the Middle East, we find all sorts of tensions not only between Israel and some of its neighbors but also between nations contesting each other for leadership of the Islamic community. Africa poses similar concerns and may very well consume more attention in the near future.

Frankly, you can do a great deal of careful planning before the event, but any limited war will have to be reviewed at the outset to determine what U.S. interests are at stake, how much resolve exists in the country we want to assist, and whether the military situation suggests a short or protracted conflict. As President Eisenhower said, "a plan is nothing but planning is everything."

STRATEGY, BUDGET AND RISKS

Thus far, I have identified the many factors shaping our military strategy in peace, crises, and war. Equally important is the linkage between strategy, budget, and risks.

Resource-constrained Strategy

At the outset, it is important to note that military strategy always is resource constrained, if not in dollars then material. During World War II, for example, we would have preferred to liberate France in 1943 but the resources for a cross-channel invasion were not available until 1944. When resource-constrained, we always stretch things out in war as well as peace--building tomorrow what we would like to have today.

In peacetime, military risks are particularly difficult to manage. All nations in the world look at the U.S.-Soviet military balance and, even without our saying so, have a fair estimate of where we maintain a slim advantage and where we do not. High-sounding and well-meaning declarations of policy can seldom conceal shifts in the military balance.

Certainly, we have never had much success limiting the Soviet military build-up. As Harold Brown once remarked, we build, they build; we stop building, they continue to build. Moreover, despite years of arms control negotiations--strategic nuclear, intermediate nuclear, and conventional--the Kremlin has not as yet agreed to either larger or equitable reductions. For the U.S. Government, this is a frustrating and persistent fact of life.

As leader of the Western World, we simply don't have the latitude or freedom we would prefer. We can, of course, abdicate those responsibilities, but I don't detect much support for such a course. The fact is that our ideals, affluence, and interests have projected us onto the world stage. They require that we be prepared to protect ourselves, to assist our allies and, if necessary, to resist with force those who would harm us. We learned those lessons very clearly with America's entry into both world wars and the Korean conflict.

In sum, I have never found a real substitute for peace through strength or the principle that it is better to deter wars than to fight them.

Assessing Risks

With respect to risk assessments, we try to learn as much as possible about Soviet military strategy--how they integrate policies, concepts, doctrines, tactics, hardware, and people. Volumes of classified and unclassified data deal with this subject. Additionally, the war in Afghanistan has provided some current insights about their capabilities and tactics in a hostile environment. Similarly, every war in the Middle East has revealed strengths and weaknesses in Soviet military hardware. Overall, we have a considerable body of knowledge about the threat we would face engaging forces of the Soviet Union or its surrogates.

In practice, risk assessments are facilitated by a number of analytical tools--static comparisons, weapon systems analyses, one-on-one and combined arms engagements, computer-supported theater campaigns, and global war games. These tools do not tell us whether we are going to win or lose wars, but they do shed considerable light on concepts, doctrines, tactics, technologies, and expected deficiencies on the field of battle.

Additionally, many of our studies and analyses focus on the transition from peace to war--what we would need at the outset, what sort of demands would be placed on our industrial base, and what it would cost to rapidly expand our force in-being or replace expected losses in combat. In my experience, civilian leaders want a sense of wartime demands if, for no other reason, than to judge the adequacy of our defense industrial base and specific linkages between resources, time, and risks.

Managing Risks

All of these considerations--our peacetime deterrent posture, transition from peace to war, and global warfighting capabilities--are addressed annually by the defense planning process and in particular by the Defense Resources Board (DRB). Usually, the review starts with a net assessment of military risks, i.e., whether such risks will remain about the same, decline, or increase over the five-year planning period.

The DRB spends a great deal of time looking at the "four pillars" of defense--force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability. Deep trade-offs inevitably increase risks in one of these pillars. Buying new technologies at the expense of existing forces, for example, is always tempting but, if practiced over time, can lead us down the path of structural disarmament. Similarly, across-the-board cuts have a pervasive impact on total force capabilities.

In my career, I have never witnessed a risk-free defense budget. The bottom line, of course, is that we are never able to quantify military or political risks down to the last dollar and cent. The world is too complex, the variables too many, and the future too uncertain to determine such risks with precision. Still, we must make every attempt to get our arms around the "military risk" that various policies produce. This includes using all available tools including the skill, judgment, and experience of the professional military.

CLOSING

To sum it up, I approached these hearings believing that Congress and the American people should know more about the fundamental policies, long-term challenges, and real-world factors which shape our military strategy across the continuum of peace, crisis, and war. We have burned a great deal of "midnight oil" putting our collective experience and thoughts together on this subject. I genuinely hope this effort will benefit deliberations by this Committee.

Looking to the future, I would urge that America settle down in the defense debate and start seriously looking at where we will be in the 1990's. What is most needed is a consistent and rational defense policy geared for the long run rather than the peaks and valleys which have characterized so much of our peacetime history. We have a great deal going for us in economic defense potential and in partnerships with other free nations of the world. But we must take the lead and set the pace in this long-term military competition with the USSR. If we fail to meet this challenge--and let the Soviet-controlled forces dominate the field--then we must be prepared to face the consequences of a world starkly different and less hospitable than the one we are living in today.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much. I am going to ask the staff to continue to alert us when 6 minutes have expired, and then we will hopefully have more than one round this morning.

Admiral, in talking about risk—and I think every witness we have had has agreed that we always are going to have some risk, and we always have and always will, and I suppose the goal of strategy is to minimize those risks and to mitigate any damage that comes from the risk—but when you look at risk, do you all have in your strategic planning vocabularies various ways of rating risk? In other words, do you have any scale of risk, any adjectives that tell us how great risk is on any scale? Or is it just one great big category? By that, I mean objective and not subjective.

Admiral CROWE. Well, certainly we do not make the final appraisal—as I conveyed in my statement—in terms of objective criteria, wholly or totally, and I do not think we can. We do, of course, in the course of the planning process, ask all of the unified commanders to rate the risk in their areas using every tool they have available to them.

They use the readiness reporting; they use war-gaming within their area; but this is also tempered by the judgment of the component commanders and also the judgment of the unified commander.

Chairman NUNN. Right. I guess what I am getting at is, do you have something like a high risk, medium risk, low risk? Is there any terminology that we need to be familiar with about how you rate various risks?

Admiral CROWE. We do in the force planning process come in with force estimates of minimum risk planning force which I could explain in some detail; I would prefer to go into closed session, if we do that. But then we aggregate the submissions of the unified commanders, which is a minimum risk force, a wish list of everything they want. We aggregate that to eliminate redundancies to come up with another thing called the "planning force," which entails greater risk.

We then go to a program force, which implies still more risk. And then to our current force. Then we attempt to assess what the risk is between those broad categories.

Chairman NUNN. What is the term "reasonable assurance"? That is one we have had testified hereto over 4 or 5, 6 years, maybe longer. When people talk about "reasonable assurance," does that term have a special meaning in the military?

Admiral CROWE. It certainly does not have an objective meaning, Mr. Chairman. It is very subjective.

Chairman NUNN. It is just a subjective term?

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Chairman NUNN. We asked Secretary Weinberger if the 5-year defense plan provided a reasonable assurance that our strategy could be implemented, and Secretary Weinberger said, and I quote, "If fully funded, I think it does."

Do you agree with that assessment in terms of the 5-year defense plan? If fully funded, would it give us reasonable assurance that we could carry out our strategy?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, it does, Mr. Chairman. But let me qualify that a little bit, if I might. I plan to be very candid about this, and

I hope you appreciate that every budget that comes over here, the professional military—and this has been true throughout my experience; I do not mean this year, I mean for all the time I have been in the military—the professional military would enlarge every budget request that comes to the Congress. It is an iterative process between the Congress and the administration, and between the Congress and the administration and the professional military when they are drawing up their budgets.

The fact of the matter is that judgments, and the previous year's budget, and the fiscal climate all have either a direct or an indirect effect on submissions that are made. Given all those things, when you hear the term "reasonable assurance" it takes into account many, many realities besides strictly just military realities. And I do not think you can in the real world expect anything else.

Chairman NUNN. Well, I agree, but in the past we have had witnesses who never would say that the 5-year defense plan gave us reasonable assurance. They have always pointed out that there were much higher risks in their view than that degree of certainty.

Admiral CROWE. Of course this year's submission, for example, is not risk free. I say that in my budget statement.

Chairman NUNN. Right.

Admiral CROWE. And my net assessment makes that clear, as well.

Chairman NUNN. I was reading the net assessment, and I congratulate you on that. I think that is a big help to us, and I know it is subjective. We may quarrel about some of the points in it, but I think this is the beginning of a much more meaningful dialogue. That net assessment, for the benefit of the members, was given by Admiral Crowe in front of the Budget Committee.

In that net assessment—I am reading from your statement on page 9—you say, "Turning to the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance, major trends are generally adverse to NATO." That is a quote. Then you also say, "The Soviets have always had imposing ground forces, but the gap in numbers of modern weapons continues to widen." That is another direct quote. Then you say, in another direct quote——

Admiral CROWE. That was in the ground forces section. I meant that to apply to ground forces.

Chairman NUNN. Right. It does say "ground forces." "The Soviets have always had imposing ground forces, but the gap in the numbers of modern weapons continues to widen."

Then you say on page 10 here, "Barring a major change in the dynamics of the competition, NATO can no longer hope to offset Pact numbers merely by improving the quality of its equipment or relying on the dedication of people defending their own territory.

Now of course we have other obligations other than NATO, but just looking at this one it seems to me you are painting a picture here of the gap continuing to get wider, the trends going in the other direction, and NATO not being able to use simply qualitative to offset quantitative.

Now if that kind of trend has been going on with the buildup of the last 5 or 6 years, how are we going to have reasonable assurance that we can carry out our strategy in NATO with these trends with this 5-year plan?

Admiral CROWE. Well, if you're talking about how we are going to—and you are enlarging the question to reasonable assurance how the United States can do what it wants to do, you are enlarging the question now as to how can we have reasonable assurance that our allies will do what we want them to do.

Chairman NUNN. OK, would you——

Admiral CROWE. That is a very troublesome and thorny question.

Chairman NUNN. Well, in other words I thought our strategy in NATO was the allied strategy. I did not think we viewed the U.S. as being separate. I never have viewed us as being able to carry out our strategy if our forces fought for 16 days and our allies had been overrun 6 to 8 days earlier.

Admiral CROWE. But you must understand that our strategy in NATO, at least the way I would view it, the guts and the heart of our strategy in NATO is to keep the threshold of uncertainty in the Soviet mind high enough that they will not attack NATO. Now obviously we have done well at that. We have achieved that for some 35 years now.

The one thing about NATO, while there is a lot of argument about it and you may not like NATO and you may want something to be done differently, the fact remains that it has achieved its major objective. We just do not want that major objective to get away from us.

I think the term "reasonable assurance" comes in there. If we get what we want, we can make some real inroads into keeping the threshold of uncertainty high. That is a little different than saying we are going to overcome or overwhelm the Soviet Union if it attacks NATO.

Chairman NUNN. Well, that is the difference between deterrence and war fighting. My time has expired. I will come back.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Admiral, just to follow up on the chairman's observations about NATO—we have had witnesses suggest a very substantial troop withdrawal. What are your views of changes that could be made in NATO troop policy?

Admiral CROWE. I am aware of course——

Senator WARNER. Or do you want to go back to the old addage that "if it ain't broke, don't try and fix it"?

Admiral CROWE. No, no. Let us talk about it, Senator. I am aware, of course, that Mr. Brzezinski made a proposal to take 100,000 people out of Europe. What we are really talking about here is how do we get our allies to do more?

Unfortunately, I do not have any blinding insights on that question. I served in NATO and I wrestled and groped with it when I was in NATO, and I think our allies should do more. Incidentally, I also think the United States should do more. Many people propose that the allies do more so the United States can spend less. That is not my view. My view is that we both need to do more in our own defense.

How do you get the allies to do more is a very difficult question. I made speeches in Europe: I harrangued people; I dealt with them, and I would go to NATO meetings every 3 months. The fact of the matter is that they have different views than we do, and particularly different views of the threat. I have heard it said that they depend on us to take care of them; I do not believe that is the driving force. It has something to do with it, but mainly the problem is that they have a little different view of the imminence of the threat than we do, and their perception must be changed.

Now how do you change it? I wish I could give you the key to that lock right now.

Senator WARNER. Do you feel there is a credible set of criteria by which we can judge who is doing what, and whether or not we are ahead or they are behind?

Admiral CROWE. Well, the criteria do not lead you to as precise a conclusion as you would like, but, yes, we can generally do that.

Senator WARNER. And what is your conclusion now? Are we doing more than they are?

Admiral CROWE. Well, it is mixed. We are doing more than some, and we are doing about the same as others, and there are some countries that are really contributing proportionally more than we are. I think general statements like "the sustainability of the NATO forces is poor across the board" are not right. There are some of our allies that have very high sustainability.

Incidentally, one of those is Germany. It has pretty good sustainability, and when you have that good sustainability for such a large force that impacts on all of NATO in a very favorable way.

Senator WARNER. Let me turn to another question. Recently we have had considerable attention to the possibility of incremental deployment of strategic defense capabilities. Has the JCS looked at this? Have you, personally, and the JCS, also looked at the concept of incremental deployment? And what advice have you given the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary?

Admiral CROWE. We are looking at it right now, Senator. As Secretary Weinberger has said in several of his speeches, the decision to do this has not been made. What we are doing is not only looking at it, we have to know a great deal more about the practicality of SDI, the final system that we would want, because as Secretary Weinberger said on a number of occasions, an early deployment or a first phase deployment would be a part of the final system. So we have to know a great deal more, first of all, about the technical feasibility, and second, the practicability of transferring this into a weapon.

Senator WARNER. So you do not feel it is imminent?

Admiral CROWE. Well, my own view is—and it sort of gets lost in the dialogue and the rhetoric—that SDI right now is a research program and we are exploring the possibilities of doing SDI. I hear so much said and written about it, as if it is out there in the parking lot, and we just do not know where to put it. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. Turning to a letter that you forwarded to Chairman Barry Goldwater last year on March 26, 1986, I am just wondering if the thought you expressed in this letter is consistent with your thinking today. I shall read it and just ask that the first page, Mr. Chairman, be included in the record.

You said, "Adjustments of the magnitude noted in your letter"—that is, a zero real growth or zero nominal growth budget over the next 5 years—"Adjustments of the magnitude noted in your letter, particularly if applied for several years, would have an extremely harmful effect on the Nation's defense posture. Quite simply, the credibility of Western deterrence would be shaken, and there would be no guarantee of succcess in a major conflict with the Soviet Union. America could not truly honor her global commitments."

Are those thoughts expressed about a year ago consistent with your thoughts of today?

Admiral CROWE. Did I say that, Senator? [Laughter.]

Well, we are, of course, engaged right now in the process of testifying on the current budget. I believe we have now had 2 years on either decreasing deficit growth budget or plateauing. We can live with that sort of two points on a curve. But I have said in my hearings before the Senate Budget Committee and intend to continue to say in the hearings I will be going to, over the next 5-year period either a zero-growth or a negative-growth defense budget would substantially and materially raise the risk that we run—the military risk that we are running globally—and I think it would be a serious mistake.

The essence of the problem is that if we plateau and march in-place while the Soviets continue in a very consistent, persistent, protracted manner to correct their deficiencies, our margin of risk is going to grow and with time it will grow markedly.

Senator WARNER. Essentially you agree today with what you said?

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN,
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
Washington, DC, March 26, 1986.

Hon. BARRY GOLDWATER,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Your letter of 19 February 1986 asked for my assessment of the impact on national security if Congress were to adopt a zero real growth or a zero nominal growth budget over the next 5 years. I have discussed your request and my response with Secretary Weinberger. We agree with you that it is indeed irresponsible to endorse or reject any defense budget level without first clearly understanding what the impact would be on our military capability. Adjustments of the magnitude noted in your letter, particularly if applied for several years, would have an extremely harmful effect on the nation's defense posture. Quite simply, the credibility of Western deterrence would be shaken, and there could be no guarantee of success in a major conflict with the Soviet Union. America could not truly honor her global commitments.

I recognize the pressures faced by staunch advocates of a strong defense, such as yourself. I am also the first to admit that I am neither a sociologist nor an economist, and I would not presume to advise you in those areas of concern. But as a military professional for more than 40 years with recent command experience in NATO and the Pacific, and now as the senior military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, I find the thought of major defense reductions very perplexing and dangerous when I consider the growing threat I have seen around the world. During the decade of the 1970s, our defense budgets did not increase in real terms and as a result we found ourselves falling seriously behind. Thus in the decade of the 1980s we have had to play catch-up to help compensate for the $500 billion more the Soviets spent on defense investments. Our defense must depend upon stable budget growth over time. If the defense portion of the President's budget suffers the kind of significant decrements your letter suggests, our defense posture vis-a-vis the Soviets will be profoundly and adversely altered for at least a decade or more into the future.

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WILLIAM J. CROWE, Jr.,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator WARNER. One final question. We have all followed with mixed reaction the reports of the B–1 bomber. My question to you is, do you still feel that this system—that is, the aircraft—is a major contributor to our strategic defense? What is the likelihood that this aircraft can be corrected in such a way that it will fill its role and mission as we had envisioned?

Admiral CROWE. Well, number one, I think it is a contributor, and it is a contributor in the light of just the way it was originally intended, Senator. It is a bridge between the B–52 and the ATB. One hundred B–1s were funded, or rather they have been funded, and they are intended to fill in and keep us modern through that period until we get the ATB.

As we say in the Navy, it is in the fleet today in the Air Force; it is in the inventory, and it is flying now, and it is performing its mission. I would like to see——

Senator WARNER. You mean today it is performing its mission, in your judgment?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Those aircraft that are operating——

Admiral CROWE. We do not have all 100 of them, but——

Senator WARNER. I understand that.

Admiral CROWE [continuing]. Oh, yes, but they are on the line. Yes, they can do what they are tasked to do. They could do it better if some things are corrected. However, I would like to see a little more rational light thrown on the controversy. In other words, from what I have read we get a lot of apples and oranges mixed up between fighter aircraft and attack aircraft and bombers and so forth.

The main criteria that we were interested in in the B–1 was that it could fly low; it could fly low at high speed; it could penetrate; it would have a small radar cross-section. These were all the characteristics we were trying to build into that aircraft. It has them, and it can do those things. Incidentally, if you ask pilots which they would rather fly, the B–1 or the B–52, they will tell you the B–1, despite the articles in the newspaper.

Now there are some things that need to be done better, and they are being worked out. There are some things that need to be corrected. That is the history of every modern aircraft we have developed. Of those things that need to be corrected, I think there are one or two that we are very concerned about, and those are in the electronic area.

One of those has to do with the dynamic competition in electronic warfare. We are trying now to develop counters for weapons that did not even exist when we contracted the B–1. We will be doing that with every generation of every aircraft we ever build, and we will be doing it indefinitely.

Senator WARNER. My time is up.

Thank you, Admiral, very much.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Good morning, Senator.

Admiral, first following up on a question which Senator Warner asked you relative to the phase-in of strategic defense, can you give us some idea of a timetable for your decision? You say that you are looking at it now at that phase-in. You want to know more about practicality and feasibility, and that makes a lot of sense.

Can you give us an approximate timetable for your deliberations on this? Are we talking about weeks, months, or years before you think you will be in a position to make a recommendation on that phase-in?

Admiral CROWE. Well, we have to be careful how we cast the question, Senator. If you say a decision to go ahead and explore phased deployment, or early deployment, we could probably, with an examination, fairly quickly make that decision. If you are talking about actually making the decision that it is now practical and we are going to do it and all the questions have been answered and we are going to put it in the field, it will be quite some time and it will depend in large part, of course, not on your examination but on the progress of research in the SDIO.

Senator LEVIN. Given your present view as to the status of that research, I presume you are looking at the status and you are somewhat familiar with it, is it your view that we could not decide to proceed on a phased-in deployment this year?

Admiral CROWE. My personal view would be, yes. I might very well be wrong, Senator, you understand.

Senator LEVIN. Is it possible we could make that decision next year?

Admiral CROWE. It is possible, yes. The decision, of course, does not mean the date of deployment. The date of deployment could be somewhere in the middle 1990's, at the very earliest.

Senator LEVIN. For even a phased-in deployment?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, a phased-in deployment.

Senator LEVIN. So the first phase——

Admiral CROWE. It depends on a lot of variables.

Senator LEVIN. Now a question on the trends. You have made some remarks relative to those trends, and as I understand it from your testimony I believe at the Budget Committee, but in any event prior testimony and in today's testimony you feel that the major trends at least in the NATO-Warsaw Pact are generally adverse to NATO. Is that correct?

Admiral CROWE. That is what I say in my net assessment. Incidentally, Senator, my net assessment incorporates the whole world, and it is not as pessimistic in many other areas.

Senator LEVIN. Can you give us your overall view of the trends? Are the trends, overall, looking at the whole world, and your net assessment going with us, against us, or about neutral?

Admiral CROWE. From a military perspective?

Senator LEVIN. Yes.

Admiral CROWE. Well, you are asking me quite a bit when you say "aggregate of all these trends." As the net assessment points out, in some regions we are doing well in some areas, and in others we are not. You are talking to a professional military man who always worries about the worst-case scenario. We are midstream in the President's modernization program and were correct in what 4 or 5 years ago we thought were our major deficiencies. We have done very well at that.

In the last 5 to 6 years, and I know there may be some controversy depending upon where you come from, but practically every aspect of our war-fighting capability has improved, and in some respects markedly: personnel, modernization, readiness, our training, our spare parts, our sustainability. It's a different force than when I went to CINCPAC or when I went to Italy in the early 1980s. But we are not up to where we want to be to face the future with confidence right now.

Senator LEVIN. Let me ask the question this way. Would you say that overall now our relative strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is better than it was say in 1980?

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Overall?

Admiral CROWE. In an absolute sense, yes.

Senator LEVIN. But the trends overall you can't say are either in our direction or against us at this time?

Admiral CROWE. Well, it depends. That is the reason I say where we are at right now is a critical juncture. It depends on what we do. If we plateau off and go to negative growth, I can assure you what the Soviets are going to do—the trends are going to start the other way and the risk is going to widen and it is going to go against us.

Senator LEVIN. But say we do not know what we are going to do at this point. Given what we know in terms of the 1987 budget and what they are doing, would you say the trends are overall with us or against us, just on the basis of what we know.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Levin, let me just make one suggestion. I think that perhaps we ought to talk about NATO and the Warsaw Pact instead of the United States and the Soviet Union, if you are talking about Central Europe.

Senator LEVIN. No, I did not want to limit it to that. I moved away from Central Europe, and NATO and the Warsaw Pact to an overall assessment of trends, if I could do that.

We did get a statement that overall we are stronger vis-a-vis the Soviet Union now than we are say in 1980, and now my question is: Knowing what we know, are the trends overall, and I know this is a hard question and we should disaggregate it in lots of ways, but overall would you say the trends are with us or against us, based on what we know?

Admiral CROWE. Well, let me qualify it first of all to say you know the investment we have already made will be coming into the inventory for 2 and 3 years, and I think the trend over that period will continue to get better. But if we discontinue the growth policy right now, 3 or 4 years from now we will pay a very high price and the trends will turn against us.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

One last question, and it relates to the aircraft carriers. There seems to have been a change in strategy, at least as I read the materials, on this issue. A few months ago it was your position, as I read your document, that you would not be asking for funds in fiscal year 1988, or indeed in fiscal year 1989, or indeed fiscal year 1990, for additional aircraft carriers. Something has changed relative to that in the last few months, I am wondering if you could tell us what is the change in strategy which now moves you or the DOD to be asking this year for funds for those carriers? I understand they cannot be ready until the 1990s, but we are asking this year for funds for the carriers, or you are asking, whereas just a few months ago you said you would not be asking for funds in 1988 for those carriers. What has strategically changed?

Admiral CROWE. I think two things. First of all, Senator, I do not understand why we cannot change our mind.

Senator LEVIN. You can. I just wanted to know what changed it.

Admiral CROWE. Every year we review what we are doing.

Senator LEVIN. Of course. I just wanted to know what has changed. Of course you can change your mind.

Admiral CROWE. The first thing, of course, is a change in investment strategy. We have now determined that it is an opportunity to save a lot of money by buying two carriers at a time, enough to make it worthwhile to change our minds. We are also getting a better estimate on the life of those carriers that we are going to replace, and the need for these more modern weapon systems which the carrier will give us at sea.

As I say in my maritime assessment, we do have a narrow edge at sea, but it is a narrow edge which is fragile and unless we continue to move ahead it is not going to persist. This is a very, very fundamental priority of the United States, and I think it is a dynamic equation. It is fiscal investment policy. It is also watching what the Soviets are doing. The threat is constantly increasing, it seems, and we have got to keep abreast.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. My time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Crowe, with reference to a low-intensity conflict you mentioned those countries who are supporters of state-sponsored terrorism, and I think you indicated Syria, Cuba, Libya, Nicaragua. Would you include Iran as one of those countries that sponsored terrorism?

Admiral CROWE. Certainly they have a history of having done so, and they certainly have some influence in terrorist organizations.

Senator COHEN. And I assume the Soviet Union would also fall in that category, correct?

Admiral CROWE. I do not think we are going to have a low-intensity conflict with the Soviet Union, but——

Senator COHEN. No, not that we will have a low-intensity conflict, but nonetheless they pursue policies of supporting——

Admiral CROWE. Absolutely. In fact, in my statement I say "Soviet surrogates."

Senator COHEN. Right. Last year you made a speech to the National Defense University, and I am quoting from a Washington Times piece here—and I know how you enjoy being quoted from past speeches—but you indicated——

Admiral CROWE. The reason I sort of winced, I thought speeches to the National Defense University were nonattributable. [Laughter.]

Senator COHEN. "It is becoming more and more important that Japan spend more in contributing to the Free world's defense, and they are able to do so." I think you have expressed your frustration here this morning that, yes, NATO and our allies, including Japan, can do more but the question is how do we get them to do it. Aside from how do we get them to do it, what sort of assistance did you have in mind in terms of increased expenditures by Japan? Was it more economic assistance to our allies and Third-World nations that need help? Or is it in terms of military buildup on the part of Japan itself?

Admiral CROWE. Well, I would certainly applaud those categories you just mentioned. Incidentally, I think Japan has increased their foreign assistance particularly with some individual nations but I had in mind some increased direct military expenditures.

Senator COHEN. There is, as you know, a continuing debate as to whether we want to encourage Japan to build more Sonys.

Admiral CROWE. I understand that.

Senator COHEN. But I think we ought to look at what we would like to have Japan do in terms of building up their own military. There is a serious concern about whether——

Admiral CROWE. When I was CINCPAC, we spent a great deal of time looking at that, and we had some really rather firm ideas on what Japan should be doing.

Senator COHEN. Well, probably in a closed session we ought to explore that, as well.

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator COHEN. In Secretary Weinberger's 1982 posture statement he said that "We recognize that for the foreseeable future our nuclear forces have to impose termination of a major war on terms favorable to the United States and our Allies." Apparently he came under quite a bit of editorial criticism about that statement. He continued to make that statement for the next several years until this year. There has been a change in the statement this year.

This year it says, "Should deterrence fail, the United States must be able to force the earliest termination of hostilities on terms that best protect U.S. and allied interests."

You, however, have returned to "terminating war on terms favorable to the United States." I guess what I want to know is, is there a difference between "terminating war on terms favorable to the United States" and "on terms that best protect U.S. and allied interests"?

Admiral CROWE. I don't——

Senator COHEN. Is it a change in rhetoric, or one of strategy?

Admiral CROWE. I think it is a change of rhetoric.

Senator COHEN. That means the same thing?

Admiral CROWE. It does to me, yes.

Senator COHEN. Also, in your testimony you make reference to our security coalitions being very worth the trouble, but they involve also some burdens that the strategic planner has to always be aware of and constantly factor into these calculations.

I am thinking specifically of the Labour Party in Britain in terms of what their proposal is. If that rhetoric should ever become translated into reality with an electoral victory, what in your judgment would that position being advocated by the British Labour Party do to the NATO alliance?

Admiral CROWE. It would strike a heavy blow at its unity. It might even shatter it. It would certainly put NATO in a new light, and I think it would have a heavy impact in this country.

Senator COHEN. Could you tell me whether or not a site has been selected for the headquarters of the new unified command for low-intensity conflict?

Admiral CROWE. We are very close to a decision, Senator, but we have not made a final decision.

Senator COHEN. Do you expect whether that would be located in Washington, or outside of Washington?

Admiral CROWE. Right now we are not looking in Washington. We are looking at a site outside of Washington.

Senator COHEN. I think that is all I have right now, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. On the theory that all conflict in Washington is high-intensity, I suppose. [Laughter.]

Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Senator Gore was here first.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Either way is fine with me.

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate my colleague letting me go ahead.

Admiral, it is always a pleasure to be with you.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator GORE. I am sorry that I missed your oral presentation, but I read your statement carefully and I have enjoyed it and learned from it.

The Joint Chiefs now have underway a study of the arms control options that were proposed by the President at Reykjavik. Is that correct?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Of course, under normal and preferred procedures, that study would take place before the proposals are offered to the President.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, please understand that two of the three proposals at Reykjavik we had studied at some length before Reykjavik.

Senator GORE. OK, fine. Which of the two? the 50 percent reduction you had studied extensively?

Admiral CROWE. It had been put to us in a number of ways.

Senator GORE. And which other one?

Admiral CROWE. The INF.

Senator GORE. And the INF proposal. The one that you had not studied was the proposal to do away with all ballistic missiles in a 10-year period. Correct?

Admiral CROWE. That is correct.

Senator GORE. Now, actually, the President had referred to this proposal in a speech, I think, a couple of months before. I believe he referred to it in his United Nations speech a couple of months before Reykjavik. Correct?

Admiral CROWE. But in a very different context.

Senator GORE. In a different context, and not in a form which would trigger a study by the Joint Chiefs?

Admiral CROWE. It was not a proposal. It was that we would be willing to talk about it, if he thought this was worth exploring.

Senator GORE. What is your view of the proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles within a 10-year period?

Admiral CROWE. Perhaps first of all, if I could talk about the proposal in a generic sense instead of tying it to 10 years to begin with, and then going to—I personally, and I expressed myself in testimony before the House a few weeks ago in this regard, believe that if we could fashion a world without ballistic missiles that we would be a great deal better off.

However, it will not be cheaper to do that, but it would be a dramatic refashioning of our own armed forces. This would not be a nonnuclear world. Please understand. I am just talking about ballistic missiles.

Senator GORE. I understand.

Admiral CROWE. That in terms of——

Senator GORE. We would still have sea-launched cruise missiles, ground-launched cruise missiles, although presumably none in Europe if it was accompanied by a zero-zero——

Admiral CROWE. By an INF agreement or——

Senator GORE [continuing]. By an INF agreement.

Admiral CROWE. The ballistic missile would include——

Senator GORE. But we would have SLCMs and we would have bombers.

Admiral CROWE. We would still have a nuclear deterrent, and we would have to work out the way we were going to do that. We would probably go to air-delivered weapons, both ALCM and gravity bombs, SLCMs, and it would be a major restructuring of the U.S. military.

It is my view that if we were willing to do that, we would be better off in terms of nuclear holocaust. The timeframe in which you can do that is a very critical element. I do not want to prejudge what we are now studying that is going to be out in a short time, or at least we will have concluded it, but 10 years is a very taxing, trying period and it would be very expensive.

Senator GORE. Now let me come back to your "et cetera, et cetera" and explore that a little bit. You say that putting aside the question of timeframe and the difficulties of a 10-year period, you say we would be better off vis-a-vis a nuclear holocaust, et cetera, et cetera.

Now do you agree with me that deterrence can be looked at in two categories? Deterrence, first of all, of an attack against the United States; and second, deterrence of a kind which has been labeled extended deterrence—namely, a deterrence of an attack against our NATO allies?

If we had a world with no ballistic missiles at all and we did not have dramatic changes in the conventional balance of forces in Europe, would we be better off in our ability to deter an attack against NATO, or worse off?

Admiral CROWE. We would have to replace—I am not proposing that we do away with flexible response—our capability today with something else, the INF capability, to give a nuclear umbrella with extended deterrence to Europe.

Senator GORE. Would in your view——

Admiral CROWE. And we could do that.

Senator GORE. You think bombers and SLCMs would suffice for that purpose?

Admiral CROWE. And short-range battlefield nuclear delivery systems as well, yes.

Senator GORE. I see. When do you think the Joint Chiefs' study will be out?

Admiral CROWE. Well, we hope to have it within the month. It will go to the President, though, and it will be up to him as to what we do.

Senator GORE. Now second on an aspect of SDI that has not been discussed, what is your view—well, my time is up. If we have another round, I will come back and pursue it.

Admiral CROWE. All right, sir.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Gore.

Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. I would yield to Senator Wilson who has been here some time before me.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Senator Quayle.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to see you and hear you. I am particularly interested in your views on the recent decision by the administration with respect to ICBM modernization. We are in a time when we are beset by a budget crunch. Even within the defense budget there are a number of intensely competing structural systems, weapon systems, that are going to be coming on line at about the same time. Even if you stipulate, as do I, that in terms of deterrence mobility is a highly desirable thing, I am just curious as to your own views as to whether or not there are not more effective and certainly more cost-effective ways of achieving deterrence and mobility through the use of a greater reliance upon our submarine force which would obviously involve our spending a lot of time and effort and money as we are now, but perhaps more and making a more intense effort to improve communications. I am leading the witness and not making any bones about it, but I would be interested in your views.

Admiral CROWE. I assume you are talking about replacing with submarine-launched ballistic missiles. I have spent my life in submarines, and it has a ring of appeal about it to me.

Senator WILSON. I will stipulate that you might have some personal preference, too.

Admiral CROWE. I think if we can overcome the technical problems, it would have great appeal and merit, both fiscally and otherwise. However, there are some problems that we would currently have to overcome before it could do the kinds of things that some of these other missiles do.

We would have to have, as you mentioned, communications, and that has always been considered the number one liability of a seaborne missile. In other words, to give us prompt hard-target response capability we would have to lick the communications problem.

We still have an accuracy problem at sea which we are getting very close to, and we have had some dramatic improvements. The D-5 will be a dramatic improvement over our current capability. But before we could say that it would replace either the Peacekeeper or any other land-based system, we would have to make some accuracy improvements. And that would be a challenging process.

Senator WILSON. Well, you have just said that we would still need Peacekeeper, and of course the decision announced by the White House was one that would involve both R&D to develop a rail mobile basing mode for the Peacekeeper and full development of the small missile Midgetman. The objection that I have to Midgetman I think is well known to you, and it has to do with cost. It has to do with the fact that we are looking at manpower and security costs associated with a single warhead missile, and increasing the number of launchers. That makes that, I think, an unaffordable weapon system.

Now if you take that announcement and bifurcate it, and I am not saying that you can do that politically because I have already expressed the view in print that you cannot, very likely, but it seems to me that from a purely military point of view if you are interested in achieving mobility as a means of making survivable your deterrent, that the way that you can do that affordably is by making a rail-mobile MIRV missile available through making a rail-mobile Peacekeeper, and proceeding to make these improvements in our SLBM force.

I am curious as to what your response to that would be.

Admiral CROWE. I do not believe there is any question, Senator, that with making the MX missile mobile, you can reach survivability figures that approximate or equal those of the small ICBM. There are other things you cannot do, of course.

You have a MIRV missile, the small ICBM gives you some military capability not only in terms of stability which is a very strong argument for the small ICBM, but it also gives you a strong missile to fire at a single target, which the MIRV does not give you. That capability can be used very well in a number of situations, not the least of which is the Reserve force where you will then be firing at impromptu targets, and this has military merit. There is no question about it.

But also the small ICBM is costly. We submitted it in the budget. We felt it was the sense of the Congress that we were to submit the plans and the cost figures for the small ICBM, and as far as I know this is the first time we have had a specific cost estimate on it. I would be the first to encourage you to look at the cost tradeoff in terms of what you are getting militarily for the cost.

It has been part of the modernization program from the outset, and the JCS has supported the President's modernization program consistently. But I repeat, this year is the first time we have had a specific cost estimate on the small ICBM.

Senator WILSON. Has that altered your thinking?

Admiral CROWE. It made me examine the question very closely, yes. And as we proceed, my thinking could very well alter; yes.

Senator WILSON. Thank you.

My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Wilson.

Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Admiral.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator EXON. We are delighted to have you here this morning.

I want to follow up on the general line of questioning that Senator Wilson was just on and which I think is going to be one of the most challenging propositions that our committee and our subcommittee is going to have to deal with. So I am going to try and ask you some questions to pursue further the statement that you just made that it is for us to consider here as to what should be done.

It is proper for us to consider what should be done, but I think there is mounting confusion as to what the military leadership in this country feels is best. I recognize that there is and should be a difference between the civilian leadership of this country represented by the Commander in Chief, the President, and some differences of opinion if it exist within the military leadership that is headed by you.

Most of the people that I talk to and most of the witnesses, Admiral, that we question in front of this committee seem to feel that as far as the foreseeable future is concerned—I am talking about the next 10 years—the Trident and the D-5 offer us the best of all worlds as we know now with regard to providing deterrence from the Soviet strike. In other words, I am putting it this way:

As we move forward on our modernization program for nuclear deterrence, would you agree that the Trident submarine and its D-5 missile is the best thing we have currently going for us?

Admiral CROWE. In terms of assured retaliation and in terms of survivability, yes, Senator. There are some other capabilities you want in your strategic deterrent which the D-5 does not give us.

Senator EXON. Like what?

Admiral CROWE. What I just mentioned to Senator Wilson. We do not have prompt communications with it, and we do not have the accuracy with that missile as yet that we would like to achieve all our goals.

Senator EXON. Yes, but is it not true—we do not have immediate communications with it. That leads me to another question that I asked Secretary Weinberger in open session the other day, and he declined to answer but could go into it in closed session, which we did not go into. If you cannot answer this in open session, please say so and we may go into closed session later. Is that the plan, Mr. Chairman, or not?

Chairman NUNN. We do not have any plan, but if it becomes necessary we will certainly consider it.

Senator EXON. When we talk about communication to our submarines, it seems to me that that gets back to the situation of how much warning are we now anticipating of a Soviet strike. We have been working on the theory for a number of years that a sudden strike out of the blue by the Soviet Union could come on a minute's notice. Is it not true that we now feel we have improved our overall intelligence services so that it is not likely that we would have only a few minutes' warning with regard to a nuclear strike by the Soviet Union; that it would certainly be more appropriately measured in hours, if not days?

Admiral CROWE. The way you have cast your statement, I would agree with it, Senator. It is not likely. That does not mean, of course, that we can reject all planning for a bolt-out-of-the-blue strike.

Senator EXON. Is it not true then that the earlier strategy that we fundamentally had relied upon over the last 20 or 30 years placed greater weight on a out-of-the-blue strike from the Soviet Union, and now we have at least made progress to the point that we do not consider that type of attack the centerpiece of our deterrence planning?

Admiral CROWE. I certainly think we have made progress in being able to hedge against that possibility. I am not so sure we ever thought that the bolt-out-of-the-blue was the most prominent threat, but it certainly was higher than it is now and one that we had to take very seriously.

Senator EXON. Now given that situation, then, the instant communications with the submarines, it is not the impairment that it would be for a strike out of the blue? Is that right?

Admiral CROWE. No, it is not, but it is still a problem. You would have to talk about the technicalities of a submarine, but, no, it is not as serious a consideration.

Senator EXON. Then my next question has to do with the strength of support, for midget. If we have to make decisions here, as to whether or not we should move aggressively ahead on the Midgetman, what are the thoughts of the top military leadership of this country? If we had to make a choice for Midgetman or MX rail deployment, if we had to choose between those two and those two only, which would the top military leadership in this country favor? Rail deployment of the MX, or in lieu thereof full-scale development of the Midgetman?

Admiral CROWE. Well, you are putting the blocks to me here, Senator, pretty good. [Laughter.]

Senator EXON. Well, I am trying to get an answer to a question that I think is on the minds of many of us. My time is up, but maybe the chairman would allow you to try and answer my question with blocks.

Chairman NUNN. Well, since Admiral Crowe is anxious to answer that question, we will yield whatever time it takes. [Laughter.]

Admiral CROWE. Of course, I consider number one the deterrent our highest priority, our strategic deterrent. And as I said earlier, I feel the small ICBM has considerable military merit, but at a high cost. I support the President's budget at a high cost. I support the President's budget at its present level. I would like to see us develop it. On the other hand, the way you put the question to me, if I had to make a choice between them, given all considerations, I would take the mobile MX.

Senator EXON. Thank you. My time is up.

Admiral CROWE. You did not think I would answer that, did you, Senator. [Laughter.]

Senator EXON. Yes, I thought maybe if I put the blocks to you, you might.

Chairman NUNN. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Admiral, for your very candid and open responses to some very difficult questions.

Admiral, I would like to return to what was queried of you earlier concerning this issue of burden sharing. I appreciate very much your comments about the efforts that you made harranguing our NATO allies, and that you basically said we have exhausted all possibilities as far as getting them to "do more." I also share your view that there are certain of our NATO allies, particularly West Germany, that are doing more and doing well. But I think the overall record is abysmal.

I think you made an argument, unintentionally, for trying the only option that we have not tried, and that is troop withdrawal. If we have tried everything else, then it appears to me that Dr. Brzezinski's recommendation that we withdraw 100,000—I do not know if that is the right figure; it might be something that we should explore.

Admiral Crowe. I am a little confused. Was the reason for the recommendation in order to force the NATO allies to do more, or to build up our capability to go somewhere else?

Senator McCain. I think he had a variety of reasons for it, including the fact that the United States' trade deficit is such that we have to look at the enormous expenditures that the United States of America is making in the area of defense, whereas our allies are basically getting a free ride, particularly when we look at the R&D moneys that are devoted by West Germany and Japan, roughly equivalent to that of the United States, yet the majority of ours is military.

I think you would agree that although there are certain spinoffs from military R&D, the overall value is not nearly what it would be if it was devoted simply to other areas. I am not saying that the only reason why we should consider withdrawing U.S. troops is simply because our NATO allies refuse to "do more," but I think it is one among many reasons why we should seriously consider it, and I would appreciate your comments on why we should not do that.

Before you do, though, I think it is also tied to the Japanese failure, in my opinion, to burden-share. I think it is also tied to your request for two additional carriers as replacements. I believe, as you do, that in order for us to maintain our commitments throughout the world, particularly the Persian Gulf, we will have to have those two carriers.

I think that the Japanese, by finally breaking the magic 1 percent barrier, is very unimpressive. Dr. Brzezinski, for example, recommended that an additional 3 percent of the Japanese GNP be devoted to economic aid throughout the Pacific Rim, and I think there is a third option. I think there is a major third option; that is, that the Japanese pick up the tab for us protecting their lines of communications and supply lines from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Japan, which at great wear and tear affects across the board that very arduous development situation which I think you and I are both aware are the most difficult because of a lack of port facilities and long times away from home, et cetera. I think we should urge, not only urge but require, the Japanese to pick up a much larger share of the burden.

Just as a little background, yesterday the Commerce Committee had a hearing on U.S. competitiveness, and I think it became very clear in that hearing, as it has been in many other forums throughout this country, the growing dissatisfaction on the part of the

American people about the inability of our allies, particularly the Japanese, to share the burden for mutual defense, which is of course theirs as well.

I think we are going to reach a situation which could translate itself almost into isolationism unless there are certain actions taken on the part of the Japanese. Amongst those are assuming a much larger portion of the defense burden in a variety of ways, including paying more. I would like your response to that.

Admiral **Crowe**. Senator, if I could first of all talk about troop withdrawal from NATO, as I said earlier what we are talking about here is how we get our allies to do more. A lot of people have done a lot of thinking about that and have addressed it not only on the political side of the house, but also on the military side of the house because it is a very frustrating problem and a very difficult problem.

Now it is not true that where the United States has reduced its expenditures and reduced its own defense appropriations that NATO has given up. Actually, the curve of the strengths of the NATO forces has remained relatively constant even during the period when we made dramatic reductions.

I have two or three problems with a really large troop withdrawal that is punitive. In other words, to force them to do certain things. To begin with, naturally when I am testifying we are talking mainly in military terms, what the troop commitment does to NATO in military terms. But I think when you start talking about withdrawal you have to look at it in a much larger context.

What am I saying by that? When I served in NATO, while I spent most of my waking time in the office thinking about the military deterrent and military problems, I almost concluded that the number one thing that deters the Soviet Union vis-a-vis Central Europe and NATO is the fact that there are 16 nations in NATO and they are combined together, and, at least theoretically, will respond as one in the case of an attack, or in case the Soviet Union decides to go after them. And no country, no matter what the balance of forces is, wants to take on 16 nations.

So the NATO alliance in itself, our participation in it, our leadership, our contribution to it to keep it unified and so forth, is a very, very important factor in deterrence, putting aside all the military calculations.

Our troop contribution to Europe has a great deal to do with the unity and the cohesion of that alliance and also with the influence that we exercise in that alliance. It is my firm belief that our membership in NATO has spilled over into other parts of the world in the Soviet-United States confrontation. It is a general rule, as far as third world countries in limited intensity conflicts is concerned, that the Soviets do not want to be put in a position where they will confront U.S. troops directly. And one of the reasons is that they know the United States is heavily involved and is a leader of NATO. That raises the level of uncertainty. You can confront the United States somewhere else, but you still must take into your calculations that the United States is allied with 15 other NATO countries, and if the Soviet Union is going to challenge us they are not quite sure what that means, what that will do, what part NATO will play; but it does raise their uncertainty.

So what I am saying is that if you talk withdrawal, you must consider more than just forcing them to up their sustainability rates. You must take into account that our troop presence, our presence in the line, our participation in the command setup, is a heavy political factor in keeping NATO together and in keeping the influence of NATO and its deterrence stance high.

Now if you are willing to run that risk, the biggest problem with withdrawing the troops is nobody knows for sure what is going to happen if you withdraw. You can speculate on it, but I do not know of anybody who is brave enough to tell me exactly what reaction it is going to bring and what the outcome will be. It is a very uncertain process. It is sort of like a roller coaster pushing it over the lip of the hill. When you do it, then you've got to live with the consequences.

So I think there are some very strong reasons to consider carefully before we would do anything like that for the sole purpose of trying to get our allies to make higher military appropriations.

With regard to Japan, Senator, I agree with everything you have said. I really have very little quarrel with that. I am sure you are aware that this year Japan has breached the 1 percent threshold, but that does not mean a great deal more is being expended on defense. That just means that they have broken the psychological barrier which has hindered them for quite some time.

Again, I think in trying to get Japan to do more on their own, we all share the same objective. The question is, what is the wisest way to go about it? Given the character of Japanese society, I think we are on the right track right now where we try and press very hard, but to do it government to government and behind the scenes and not make a public issue out of it that would stir up resistance, that we could not live with.

It is true, of course, that we should try very hard to distinguish between strategic and economic issues. The strategic alliance or the strategic connection which we enjoy with Japan is extremely important to the peace of the free world, and I would hate to see our economic issues jeopardize that tight connection.

Senator McCain. My time has expired, but I am afraid that unless something happens in my opinion we are going to see that jeopardized.

Admiral Crowe. We may very well.

Senator McCain. I think we agree that strategic strength rests not only on military capability but with economic strength——

Admiral Crowe. Oh, yes.

Senator McCain [continuing]. And I think an accurate perception is our economic base is being dramatically eroded without any cooperation on the part of the Japanese.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator McCain.

I certainly agree with your emphasis on the Japanese contribution. I think it is one of the major things that we in the Congress and the administration need to consider as to how to go about it and in what form of additional contribution that should be in. I do not think there is any question that Japan has to play a much more vital role in the world in terms of overall national security, Western security, and it is a question of how you balance that between military and economic.

Admiral CROWE. And I think the public sentiment in Japan, while it is not changing as rapidly as we would prefer, Mr. Chairman, is changing in that regard.

Chairman NUNN. Well, it is changing but it is glacier-like. I might just add, I do not want to get off on this NATO; I want to get back on strategy a little bit more with my questions, but on the NATO troop withdrawal I think every point you made about the alliances and so forth is a valid point. I do not disagree with any of them. But I did not hear a single point that you made that would not apply just as strongly to a 200,000-troop level in Europe by the U.S. as a 300,000 number related to the number of forces we have there, all of them related to the psychology of the presence, the cohesion, and so forth.

I also would just like——

Admiral CROWE. Well, please, Mr. Chairman, you read my net assessment where I said the trends were adversarial. As far as overall capability, if we pull 100,000 or a similar number out, the trend in NATO and the balance are going to be even more adversarial.

Chairman NUNN. That is right. If you have got a trip wire, you have got a trip wire, though. If you are not going to have a viable conventional defense that can fight beyond what our Supreme Allied Commander says, "days rather than weeks," then it really is rather academic about what level your force is; you are really talking about a trip wire policy, and I think if you are and if that is what our allies are going to only be willing to pay for, at some point we have to face up to it.

That does not mean you pull out of NATO. It does not mean you do not have an alliance. It does not mean you do not hold together. If you pulled 80,000 or 90,000 forces out right now, you would be right where you were in the 1970s where we never had a war and where we were bogged down in Southeast Asia we had close to 100,000 forces less there then and nobody ever said a word. We had a trip wire, and everybody realized it.

I am not advocating a trip wire. Of everybody in this Congress I have probably been the foremost opponent of the trip wire theory. I think it is a very risky posture. But somebody in the administration is going to have to tell us the consequences not just of alliance cohesion and all those psychological things; somebody has got to get down to the military analysis. What you have done in your net assessment statement, Admiral, is very helpful.

You said, basically, without—and these are my words, not yours—but you said, in spite of something like a trillion dollars that we have spent in the last several years, and in spite of the fact that we have improved in a lot of areas U.S. forces, but you put your finger on the real question of what effect in the overall NATO-Warsaw Pact balance does it have when the United States gets out front and leads by example?

Frankly, the lines are inverse, not proportionate, in terms of what the NATO has done. When we were in Southeast Asia and withdrawing from their in the 1970s, the allies spent more. When we started spending more in the 1980s, the allies spent less. It is also interesting to note that the two best-armed, best-prepared countries in Europe——

Admiral CROWE. I am not sure that is right, Senator. I am not sure that is correct. They may not have spent as much as you prefer, but they did not spend less.

Chairman NUNN. They had less——

Admiral CROWE. You may be talking about in percentage numbers of GNP, but certainly not in absolute numbers.

Chairman NUNN. Oh, no. Everybody goes up in absolute number because inflation takes care of that.

Admiral CROWE. They have gone from $77 to about $97 billion a year.

Chairman NUNN. In terms of real growth, I think the statistics will bear me out, but we will check it out.

Admiral CROWE. Well, the force structure has not increased very much in size. The capability of the force structure in certain countries has, as has also the sustainability. The sustainability has improved. The implication that the sustainability throughout NATO is poor is not exactly right. It is mixed.

In some countries it is poor, and in others there has been a dramatic improvement.

Chairman NUNN. Since the punitive amendment you so correctly, I suppose—I do not like the word "punitive," but you described it as a withdrawal to try to require them to do more—since that was debated and did not pass, there has been a rather significant increase. Up until that point, there has been virtually no increase in sustainability in most of the major components that we measure by.

We will check all of that out, but that is the best recollection I have. If you have got contrary information, I would welcome it.

Admiral CROWE. We did look at some of it after I heard some of your previous testimony, and also I heard some statements in previous sessions about the sustainability being 5 days. That is not right.

Chairman NUNN. You did not hear 5 days from me. I do not use numbers.

Admiral CROWE. I did not think it was you. I think it was a witness.

Chairman NUNN. There is according to particular ammunition in particular nations and particular weapons, but everything that I have cited in this regard has come from your figures, not mine. I have not sat out under any tree dreaming up any ammunition levels. It has all come from the Department of Defense.

Let me ask a couple of questions on this question of Army-Navy-Air Force and so forth. Admiral, when the services testify on their budget requests they present strategies oriented toward their service. The best known of these service-oriented strategies is the Navy maritime strategy, but the Air Force and Army have their own strategies and so forth.

My concern is whether we are able to tie all these in, and whether you are able to do that at the Joint Chiefs' level. Have you made progress in that regard?

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Chairman NUNN. Is it a problem? If so, what are you doing about it?

Admiral CROWE. I do not believe it is a problem, Mr. Chairman, but maybe I could discuss it a moment. I know that the most well-known or well-publicized is the maritime strategy, for example, and the maritime strategy was originated to do just what you described. It was a more or less conceptual scheme that was gotten together to illustrate how naval forces could be used in various types of modern warfare and why the types of equipment that the Navy was buying was a wise idea, and how it would support military operations, et cetera.

However, there is no such thing as a "maritime" or a "Navy" strategy for the United States. We have a national strategy and we have a national military strategy. I do not believe the scheme known as a "maritime strategy" is a strategy. It is a conceptual way in which you might use naval forces.

I wrestled with the maritime strategy when I was the Commander in Chief Pacific. The unified commanders take those suggestions and say, here is my problem, and here are my forces, and here are the things the Navy can do in my scheme, and they use those in building their theater strategy which includes both Army, Marine, U.S. Air Force forces as well as naval forces. That is where the marriage is made, and it is made very well.

Now there are some things that the "maritime strategy" probably does not emphasize. For example, like escorts and the reinforcement of Europe problem, the Commander in Chief Atlantic emphasizes that mission and he considers it his primary mission. He has it built into this strategy, and he picks and chooses from the maritime strategy things that he can do and use and what he cannot use. He comes up with a theater strategy which achieves what he wants.

Chairman NUNN. So if the Secretary of the Navy gives an overall briefing about how he envisions using aircraft carriers, that is not the strategy of the United States?

Admiral CROWE. I do not consider it so. That is the Secretary of the Navy's view of how we should use naval forces.

Chairman NUNN. Let me ask another question, Admiral. As you know, the Joint Chiefs traditionally conducted only what we call fiscally unconstrained strategy-making, or at least that is an allegation. Maybe it is not accurate. The new Reorganization bill requires you as the principal military adviser to formulate a fiscally constrained strategy.

Do you agree with that approach? How are you going to implement that?

Admiral CROWE. It seems to me that, as I said in my statement, all the budgets I have seen submitted are fiscally constrained. I am a little confused by that, but my interpretation of that requirement or responsibility would be to, if the guidance given to me by my civilian masters is such, to look at various levels of fiscal constraint, and see what that did for us strategy-wise, what forces we could get in it, and maybe mixes of forces that, with a certain constraint level, here are two or three things you can do, and what do each of those options give you? How much does it meet your strategy? How much risk does it involve? Up or down the risk? Et cetera, et cetera.

Chairman NUNN. Well, I think that interpretation is correct. I think that is the direction generally.

Admiral CROWE. That is the direction we are moving, Mr. Chairman. I must tell you that to improve the net assessment business, to factor into our calculations some of the things that you have seen in your hearing like war games, to do that in a formalized fashion and a rational way aimed toward whatever your problems are, is going to take some time for the Joint Staff. It will be quite some time before you realize a full return on what you have done in terms of changing the organization.

Chairman NUNN. How long will it take for you to really in your estimate fully implement the intent of the legislation in terms of the Chairman and his role and the Joint Staffs' role?

Admiral CROWE. Well, I think we will be doing these things this year, within a matter of months. How well we do them will take some time.

Chairman NUNN. Are you talking about 3 to 5 years?

Admiral CROWE. Oh, yes, I would say in 3 to 5 years. That would be a very good estimate.

Now when you get into the net assessment business, for example, to really bring together all the sources of information you have and to treat those in a sophisticated way requires people with a lot of skill and a lot of experience, and you have to build up that expertise.

As I mentioned to you the other day in our meeting in your office, we have done some reorganizing on the Joint Staff. Aside from the Goldwater-Nichols bill, we have now created a new resources analytical branch on the Joint Staff and enlarged it somewhat, which will be solely responsible for net assessments and this kind of analytical work, and we have to build up the expertise and their ability to deal with and treat these questions, and that will take time.

Chairman. NUNN. One brief question. My time has expired, but I will take just one second more.

What about the education of military officers? Is that something we have got to improve in terms of strategic concepts and unity of the services working together in that respect?

Admiral CROWE. I would say, to divide your question, my instincts tell me that our current service educational system, which is divided service-wise as well as into joint schools, treats the general subject of strategy, et cetera, very well. As far as the joint content and how they lead us to that and they educate our officers in the joint business, I convened just 2 months ago a special study group made up of some retired officers to look at the joint educational system with the very view to determine just what you asked me and from the joint perspective.

Are we doing it right? Is the input to the school right? Are we getting good quality instructors? And also the curriculum. And I expect that to report out somewhere in the March–April timeframe.

Chairman NUNN. We would be very interested in that, once you get it.

Admiral CROWE. I am, too.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Crowe, let me go to the issue on deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative. I do not know if it has come up or not, and if it has I apologize for being repetitive since I got in a little bit late. In looking at deployment of SDI, do you favor and think that it will give us enhanced deterrence to move forward, assuming the technological questions are answered, with an early phased deployment of SDI, somewhat as it was referred to and discussed on a front-page story of the Washington Post on Sunday?

Admiral CROWE. We did address this question earlier, Senator. What I said was that—you, of course, have wished this away in the way you asked your question—but I said first of all that we are looking at it, and it depends very heavily on whether we have a system that is technically feasible, and then whether it is viable as a practical weapon system proposition.

Now if we answer those questions, if you say it is technically feasible and we can have a viable SDI and then move on to the early deployment question, I think the answer is obvious. The Joint Chiefs have supported SDI at least exploring it as a research proposition, and if it proved practical and we have some hardware that can be helpful, why, yes, we would favor an early deployment.

Senator QUAYLE. Let us get out of the practical viability. We have looked at this for some time now.

Admiral CROWE. As a research proposition.

Senator QUAYLE. As a research proposition. Let us go beyond research. Do you see this beyond a research proposition?

Admiral CROWE. Well, if you are going to make an SDI, some day it has got to be.

Senator QUAYLE. I mean, you are looking at deploying a strategic defense system, are you not?

Admiral CROWE. Well, as I said earlier, I sort of object to the way the SDI dialogue is being presented. It is being presented as if we have an SDI. We have not answered all the research questions as yet—as a technical proposition, what the cost of them will be, or whether they can be translated into a weapon system.

Senator QUAYLE. OK, you have not answered all the questions.

Admiral CROWE. The SDI researchers have not answered all the questions.

Senator QUAYLE. You are in the process of doing that. What kind of a timeframe do you think that you will need to be able to make some sort of recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and to the President and to the Congress on whether an SDI system is something that we ought to go ahead and deploy to enhance our deterrence?

Admiral CROWE. Secretary Weinberger, I think, has been very consistent in his statements that if we go to early deployment it should be a system that will ultimately fit into our make up part of the ultimate system. Departing from that, that means that you have to know a great deal about the SDI system you are moving toward before you can decide what phase of it to early deploy.

Senator QUAYLE. And you are saying that as of today you do not know that answer?

Admiral CROWE. I do not think we do now.

Senator QUAYLE. What kind of a time reference are we examining, because I am under the opinion in listening to statements of the Secretary of Defense and others, that we are getting closer to looking at this first-phased option of moving beyond just the research, maybe getting into some of the testing and development. Deployment is down the road and we are going to have to answer these questions. Nobody is going to do it just to satisfy some sort of an emotional attachment, as I think Secretary Schlesinger pointed out, to an SDI system; but we are trying to in fact move toward deployment of a strategy system because of the military effectiveness and the military contribution, which I think you subscribe to.

Admiral CROWE. I think that is basically accurate.

Senator QUAYLE. I think you subscribe to that?

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Senator QUAYLE. What I am trying to do is to get a feel from you of the process and how we proceed to deploy something that is going to increase our deterrence and stability around the world.

Admiral CROWE. I am no authority on the status of the research; I am briefed on it constantly. My view is that, first of all, we probably could not have some kind of early-phase deployment in the field before the middle 1990s.

Senator QUAYLE. Before the middle 1990s?

Admiral CROWE. Until around the middle 1990s, which is a very vague estimate, Senator.

Senator QUAYLE. I understand.

Admiral CROWE. So then you back off from that as to when you would have to make a decision to go into that to attempt to do that.

Senator QUAYLE. But looking at a possible deployment in the middle 1990s, looking at what we ought to be doing this year, should we not in fact be moving the program beyond just mere research and to come up with some architectural designs to look at and start to plan for some actual testing of these systems?

Admiral CROWE. To make the middle 1990s early phase deployment, yes, we will have to. I do not know exactly what the time frame will be, but we are looking right now at the progress of research, what this would mean to translate it into production, and would have to make a decision in months, probably.

Senator QUAYLE. Yes. I was going to say, do you not think within months——

Admiral CROWE. At least make a decision to try and go toward that goal.

Senator QUAYLE. You will start to go toward that target. That is basically what I am driving at, that within the next few months that we ought to come to some sort of concrete decision, or to look at a decision on what path we would like to pursue.

Admiral CROWE. Which we would like to pursue, yes.

Senator QUAYLE. Then you are going to have all these——

Admiral CROWE. That is a little different than saying, OK, we are going to have an early phased deployment.

Senator QUAYLE. Well, I am not sure that it is; because I think what we talked about originally, and this is one of the disputes of which I know the chairman has been very, very critical and I agree with him in his criticism, on what we are really talking about in SDI.

When we were first talking about SDI we were talking about this near-perfect system that was going to be deployed, and we were not going to deploy anything until we had that. Now, fortunately, we are moving away from that, and I congratulate the Secretary and others, to say that we ought to not get rid of that idea, because if that idea is achievable certainly that is the idea that we want, but what we are talking about is in the Secretary's words "phased deployment," I would say "incremental deployment," to see what in fact we can do in the "near term."

The mid-1990s you looked at, and you are saying that in a matter of months we are going to come up with some sort of roadmap on how we might be able to achieve that. Obviously we have got a lot of room between here and there. But we are moving in a little bit different direction on the actual deployment of an SDI system than we were a couple of years ago, at least from my viewpoint.

Admiral CROWE. I think that is fair.

Senator QUAYLE. And I think that is a good turn of events, from my perspective, because I think the strategic defense systems and having strategic defense makes a lot of sense.

Admiral CROWE. On the other hand I think the Secretary has been very consistent in qualifying his statements by saying that decision will depend on the research and whether we think it is practical.

Senator QUAYLE. Oh, sure. There is a lot that can happen between 1986 and the mid-1990s.

Admiral CROWE. And particularly in a program like that.

Senator QUAYLE. But we do need some definitions. We need to see some architectural designs. We need to have some sort of a roadmap and scheme of how we are going to get from here to there, and then have the debate. And we may change our mind on what kind of system we want to deploy between now and then, but right now we are still talking in the general terms of just research. Now I see the Secretary and others getting it out of just research and saying here is the way we ought to go.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Quayle.

Senator Wirth.

Senator WRITH. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate your being here, and I look forward to working with you and your colleagues as a new member of the committee.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator WIRTH. There has been a great deal of discussion in the press about the fact that the President is being pushed to make a decision by the time he delivers his State of the Union Address on SDI and rapid deployment. Have the Joint Chiefs been consulted about what timeframe the President ought to be suggesting?

Admiral CROWE. I have not heard the State of the Union Message timeframe. No, I have not.

Senator WIRTH. Have you been consulted on recent discussions related to a more rapid deployment of SDI?

Admiral CROWE. It is a topic of some discussion in the Pentagon, yes, and what we should be doing to prepare ourselves to make or not make that kind of decision.

Senator WIRTH. And has there been a position that has been arrived at?

Admiral CROWE. No, there has not.

Senator WIRTH. Are there sharp differences of opinion now as to what needs to be done?

Admiral CROWE. I do not believe there are, primarily because this is a very exotic program and, as I said earlier, one of the biggest problems in this scheme is if you are going to pick an element that will build into and be part of the ultimate system, you have to go pretty far before you make your first technical choices, if you understand what I am trying to say.

Senator WIRTH. Well, I do. That seems pretty logical to me. Therefore it would be difficult to make a decision on deployment if you do not know exactly what the system——

Admiral CROWE. It is difficult. That is right.

Senator WIRTH. So the position would appear to be that we should not make a decision on deployment until we find out what it is we are going to deploy?

Admiral CROWE. Well, until we know more than we know now, yes.

Senator WIRTH. So therefore it would appear that making a decision on an earlier deployment now would be premature?

Admiral CROWE. As of this moment I do not think there is any argument about it.

Senator WIRTH. Is that going to change in the next few weeks or months, do you think?

Admiral CROWE. I do not know, Senator.

Senator WIRTH. Do you have a working group, that is looking at the implications of early deployment for the ABM Treaty, as we understand the ABM Treaty both in terms of its traditional interpretation and the more recent interpretation of the ABM Treaty that came out of Reykjavik?

Admiral CROWE. We have been studying that for quite some time, yes.

Senator WIRTH. Should a decision be made on earlier deployment without reference to the ABM Treaty?

Admiral CROWE. I would think this would be part of the calculus.

Senator WIRTH. Which means what?

Admiral CROWE. Well, that you would consider it.

Senator WIRTH. Should we just abandon the ABM Treaty?

Admiral CROWE. Not necessarily. There are several points of views on this. You have mentioned one, of course, the narrow and the broad interpretation, whether it is in or out of the ABM Treaty.

Senator WIRTH. But historically, as I understand it, the Joint Chiefs have supported the ABM Treaty and the maintenance of the ABM Treaty. Isn't that correct?

Admiral CROWE. That is true.

Senator WIRTH. So if we went ahead with an earlier decision to deploy SDI, that would be an abrogation of the ABM Treaty, would it not?

Admiral CROWE. It depends. Obviously, ultimately you are going to have to do something about the ABM Treaty if you deploy an SDI, but that has to do with when the research gets to that point, and so forth. You do not have to make a decision based on broad and narrow interpretation today.

Senator WIRTH. The implications for the ABM Treaty and all of the policy decisions surrounding that——

Admiral CROWE. Of course, that is in the calculus of the arms reduction talks right now. We are wrestling with that problem every day.

Senator WIRTH. But those implications have not yet been understood, either, which would seem——

Admiral CROWE. Everybody seems to think they understand them but there are differences of opinion about them.

Senator WIRTH. Well, without understanding all of the implications, it would seem to me that that would as well argue that it is premature for us to be charging ahead as a country on a decision for an earlier deployment of the SDI if on the one hand——

Admiral CROWE. We have done a number of things, Senator, that are different from positions in our arms reduction talks.

Senator WIRTH. It just seems to me there is a parallel here, if I might finish, that on the one side—on the technical side—we do not know what it is we are thinking of deploying. On the other side we do not know what the implications of this may be for a treaty which has been broadly supported by the Joint Chiefs and the military. And yet there is enormous pressure despite the lack of understanding on both of these critical issues to make a decision about an earlier deployment of SDI.

I do not understand how those two fit together. You have got two tracks. We have got an awful lot of work yet to do. How can we make an earlier decision to deploy SDI?

Admiral CROWE. I do not follow your problem, Senator.

Senator WIRTH. I do not follow the logic of how we make a decision to go ahead and deploy earlier, which I understand is now under a great deal of discussion in the administration.

Admiral CROWE. We have taken positions that do not necessarily go with arms reductions in our armament. They have to ultimately be reconciled, but this is not unprecedented where we can move ahead in programs.

Senator WIRTH. Well, clearly I have a lot to learn about how the steps go one in front of the other and I look forward to working with you. I might add, just in closing, that coming on as your deputy will be General Herres whom you know well, who is an enormously able officer and we look forward to his further contributions.

Admiral CROWE. So do I, Senator. I really look forward to his arrival. Thank you very much.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Wirth.

Let us see where we are here. Senator Quayle just asked some. I believe perhaps we are back to Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, let me just ask a question that arises from the discussion, the emphasis that you and others have given and I think quite properly to the subject of low-intensity conflict.

Senator McCain in his questioning mentioned that Dr. Brzezinski's testimony had contained a suggestion that we reduce our troop commitment in NATO by about 100,000. One of his stated reasons for doing so was his desire to see that number of troops redeployed into light divisions that could be available by airlift.

He is very concerned that, while we have been talking about rapid deployment, it is a paper capability. I share that concern, which brings us pointedly to the subject of airlift.

Are we in a position where in your judgment or that of your colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff we have anything like the airlift capability that is required to make us credible in terms of our ability to project force into those remote areas of the world where low-intensity conflict may break out?

Admiral CROWE. In my net assessment which the chairman referred to, Senator, I indicated one of the areas that I did look at was power projection. My conclusion was that as a general proposition of low-range lift we are doing very well. It is improving steadily. We have made some remarkable improvements over the last few years. Ton mileage has gone not straight up, but gradually up. If we get the C-17, we will probably reach the congressionally-mandated goal of 66 million ton miles.

Vis-a-vis the Soviets, I think that we enjoy a superiority in terms of lift probably everywhere in the world except in South Asia. I'm talking about outside the Eurasian Continent.

Senator WILSON. Well, but do we not have a different challenge? We have a greater challenge than they do.

Admiral CROWE. Oh, yes. And that is one of the reasons——

Senator WILSON. They do not need the same——

Admiral CROWE. I agree with that. And, of course, it is my contention that strategic mobility is one of our very highest priorities. I say in my statement that because of our alliance connections we have to furnish for all of our allies a nuclear umbrella, a naval superiority, and strategic mobility. So it is a very high requirement on this country militarily, and we are doing much better at it, but we have a ways to go.

As far as Dr. Brzezinski's suggestion, I fall back to one of the constraints under which we work. Theorists can desire a change in military policy and propose and suggest it, but to actually affect it is a very difficult proposition just by the inherent nature of military forces.

First of all, taking 100,000 people out of Europe will not be cheaper; it will be more expensive—bringing them back here, and setting up other arrangements, transferring them into light divisions. I got the implication from something he said that he was going to save money; it will not save money. It will be very difficult to ever get those troops back to Europe, so if we do have to reinforce Europe that will be a problem.

We have light divisions now which we can lift. We have the capability about on a scale that we are now converting to light divisions. We can put more people from the continental United States, without bringing 100,000 people back, to go to these areas. I do not want to tell you that our ability to project influence and force into South Asia, that we have got it knocked, because we do not. It is a very harsh climate, we are separated by very long distances, and it is a very trying problem, a trying challenge.

But we have made a lot of headway in that regard, and I think if we are not talking about a Soviet confrontation, we can project our influence into that area very well. A Soviet confrontation would be a different order.

Senator WILSON. I think in fairness to Dr. Brzezinski, what he was talking about was not saving money so much as recognizing that in terms of the priority of concern of actual conflict that he saw a much lesser likelihood of confrontation in the NATO theater than he did in either Southeast Asia or in the Persian Gulf where he seemed to think it was a preeminent threat.

Admiral CROWE. I do not have a quarrel with that as a general proposition. With the urging of the Congress we have begun to do a lot more things in special forces, anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism, and limited intensity conflict, both organizationally and in terms of capability.

I would say, though, that I think the reasons these kinds of conflicts are becoming more likely are because we have been very successful in frustrating the Soviets and deterring other kinds of conflicts. It would be dangerous, in my view, to say well because these are more likely we now take all our emphasis off of other matters and put it into this area alone. I just do not think we could do that. That would be unwise.

But the Soviets have now arrived at the conclusion that to confront the United States directly with troops is a dangerous proposition. That is because of our capability and because we have been able to fashion a deterrent that raises their level of uncertainty very high. So now they are going to surrogates and are going to other forms of warfare and other forms of turbulence. That is a serious concern that we must worry about and we must do things about.

Senator WILSON. So in short, to come back, you have said if we get the C-17 we can go further and perhaps achieve the 66 million ton mile airlift goal that Congress has set.

Admiral CROWE. We have also made some dramatic improvements over the last few years in our sealift.

Senator WILSON. Yes.

Admiral CROWE. Gradual, nothing precipitous but gradual.

Senator WILSON. If we do not do that, if we do not achieve that capability, then I take it that we would be disappointed in one of those areas to which you give the highest priority?

Admiral CROWE. I would certainly agree with you on the priority of the lift.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Thank, you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly want to add my support also to the statements about the C-17. I think that they are obviously going to have to be a higher priority.

I wanted to return in my questions, however, to an earlier line of questioning about strategic defense. The discussion highlighted the difference between a nearly perfect defense and an early deployment of a defense aimed at protecting our retaliatory forces.

The President, from all I can gather, still holds to the former definition. Part of his plan is that we will share the benefits of SDI with the Soviet Union. I realize that many do not take that seriously, even though the President repeats it frequently and did so in his letter to Secretary General Gorbachev in July and repeated it at Reykjavik, as I understand it.

What is your view as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs about the idea of sharing the benefits of SDI with the Soviets? What does that mean? And what would be the implications for our national security?

Admiral CROWE. First of all, Senator, as I understand the President's proposal, it was made with the intention of signaling or conveying U.S. goodwill, and that we did not have in mind, with our SDI weapon system, an offensive one that would threaten them in other ways, et cetera, and this was designed to bolster that impression or that argument.

I am also under the impression that it meant that we would be willing to discuss this with the Soviets. It was not something we were going to impose on them or be a unilateral proposition. Incidentally, their SDI program is a lot older and a lot bigger than ours—and I would anticipate a two-way exchange of benefits in this regard, which in many respects is harder for the Soviets to accept than it is for us. They have turned us down cold, and up to this point I see no receptivity for this proposal at all.

I think what the President had in mind was an offer to discuss it, and an offer of his goodwill. But until we discuss it and negotiate it and work it out, it is nothing, and the Soviets have done nothing with it.

Senator GORE. Well, that is a graceful way to deal with it, but am I safe in assuming—is it accurate to say that the uniformed military officers, and the Joint Chiefs would be extremely apprehensive about a program of sharing information with the Soviets about how an SDI system works, and how they could make more progress toward a sophisticated system comparable to the one we are trying to develop?

Admiral CROWE. I think you are accurate, in that we have a pretty deep-seated suspicion of the Soviet Union.

Senator GORE. Yes.

Admiral CROWE. Some people say it is built into our souls, whether it is wise or not, and we would have a great interest in how this was done and what information was transmitted and what was given away.

Senator GORE. Well, I do not want to kick a dead horse, but that horse keeps on making a lot of noise and I do think it is appropriate to point out some of the problems that might be associated with it.

Now on our strategic posture, you agree with other witnesses that we are likely to depend on deterrence for the foreseeable future; correct?

Admiral Crowe. That is right.

Senator Gore. Now you earlier spoke in support of a triad as opposed to a diad, and you said that problems of communications and accuracy make it essential for us to continue a land-based ICBM force as part of our deterrent strategy. Is that a fair summary of your earlier statement?

Admiral Crowe. At this juncture.

Senator Gore. At this juncture. Now in looking at that land-based deterrent, we have always had as part of our plan an effort to seek a land-based deterrence that is not dependent upon strategic warning. Do you still believe that that is a desirable objective?

Admiral Crowe. I am not so sure I—obviously a land-based deterrence with prompt retaliatory capability that could operate against a bolt-out-of-the-blue would be desirable; and, yes, we have hedged that from the very outset, and our silo force has been equipped to do that, as we felt that was necessary.

Senator Gore. Do you still believe that we should seek a land-based deterrent that is not dependent upon strategic warning?

Admiral Crowe. Senator Exon asked a similar question.

Senator Gore. I understand, and in your response you quite appropriately said that we have never considered a "bolt-out-of-the-blue" as the most lokely threat that we face——

Admiral Crowe. But we believe we are prepared to deal with it.

Senator Gore [continuing]. Nevertheless, we have always tried to prepare to deal with it.

Admiral Crowe. Yes.

Senator Gore. Do you believe we should try to deal with that threat without adopting a launch-on warning strategy?

Admiral Crowe. I would really like to go into closed session to talk about that, Senator.

Senator Gore. Well, I would be glad to pursue it in closed session, but our public policy has always been to try to avoid a launch-on warning strategy and seek a land-based deterrent that is not dependent upon strategic warning or a launch-on warning strategy.

Admiral Crowe. But we do not rule out the possibility. We still have the capability.

Senator Gore. I understand that, but our policy is to seek a——

Admiral Crowe. That is our policy; yes.

Senator Gore. Do you still agree with that objective?

Admiral Crowe. Yes, I would agree with that policy.

Senator Gore. All right, thank you very much.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Gore.

I anticipate that we will have Admiral Crowe back certainly on the budget itself at some point. We have not set a firm date. And we will have a closed session at that time after we go into open session.

Senator Gore. I will look forward to that.

Chairman Nunn. I do not plan to have one today, because I know that Admiral Crowe has another hearing following this one. What time are you due for that?

Admiral Crowe. Two o'clock this afternoon.

Chairman NUNN. Two o'clock this afternoon?

Admiral CROWE. Right.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, will you give us your views on the strategic implications of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan? And likewise, what the implications would be if any settlement there resulted in a de facto Soviet satellite, even absent Soviet troops, but a government that was a de facto Soviet satellite?

Admiral CROWE. Even after withdrawal of the Soviet troops?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Admiral CROWE. It is a very worrisome development, Senator. Assuming what you have just described, that puts one of our very close friends, Pakistan, in some jeopardy. It gives the Soviet Union access to the Indian Ocean, which they have been seeking for quite some time. It puts them in a much better position to project their influence and their power toward the Gulf, and, another access into Iran, and improves their general strategic posture in that part of the world, which is something they have been seeking for quite some time.

I would further say that they do not have that at this time. I mean, the turbulence and their inability to achieve their goals in Afghanistan I think has harmed their position currently rather than improved it in that part of the world.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, just how seriously would you view the availability to the Soviet Union for instance of the lengthened airfields in Afghanistan in the event that these U.N. talks led to some kind of a settlement which permitted the current regime there to remain in power? I would view that current regime as a de facto Soviet satellite.

Admiral CROWE. I would, too, I agree with that, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. And if these talks, if the diplomats succeed in giving away in these talks what the Mujahideen had won through 7 years of bitter struggle, and we ended up with a de facto Soviet satellite, just how serious—I mean, you mentioned the threat to Pakistan and the Persian Gulf, but can you embellish that a little bit? Can you give us some examples of the advantages that would accrue to the Soviets in that eventuality and how serious you would view those advantages?

Admiral CROWE. One of the things, of course, in terms of naval power in the Indian Ocean, they do not currently operate under air cover and you are now talking about air cover coming out in the Indian Ocean, which from a naval standpoint is of a completely different order of magnitude. I would think they would consider that a quantum step forward.

Similarly, it is going to put their air over a large chunk of Iran and just generally bolster their capability. My understanding, though, of the current Afghanistan situation, is that the Mujahideen are not about to agree to any of this.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, unfortunately they are not a party to the negotiations. There is no legitimate representative of the Afghan people in these negotiations.

Admiral CROWE. But I don't think the Soviets are going to be able to leave until the Mujahideen reaches some kind of accommodation.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do not underestimate the diplomats. But we have to watch that very closely——

Admiral CROWE. I agree.

Senator HUMPHREY [continuing]. And I would urge you, as I have urged the Secretary, to watch that situation very closely because we are approaching a critical juncture with the resumption of these talks. It is said the only remaining item is the withdrawal time for the Soviets, and the principal points of the agreements are that friendly nations, nations friendly to the Mujahideen would immediately cut off everything, all supplies, every last bullet immediately, and that the Soviets then would withdraw over some as-yet-unspecified period of time.

Obviously the Soviets are willing to withdraw only under conditions favorable to them. They will try to withdraw under conditions that will leave the Najibullah regime in power, and they will have a de facto Soviet satellite. We have got to watch that very closely and watch the State Department that they do not give in to that kind of temptation.

What is our commitment to Pakistan and how strong is that commitment, particularly under the circumstances that prevail today?

Admiral CROWE. I think it is genuine and very strong, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you feel that—it seems to me that it would be helpful to Pakistan and helpful in a just resolution of the situation in Afghanistan to have a more clearly enunciated statement of support—I am not asking you to make it now, but I would urge the administration to do this, to have a more clearly enunciated position with respect to Pakistan. Pakistan is sustaining attacks upon its territory, deliberate, daily, increasing attacks, air attacks upon its territory in which innocent Pakistani civilians have been killed, and Pakistan is really shouldering a very heavy load very bravely under the circumstances. It seems to me that we could be doing more to clearly enunciate what our commitment is to that country, particularly in these circumstances.

Admiral CROWE. Also, I think Pakistan would prefer that we move in a gradual way, Senator. They are very interested in our practical manifestations of support, but I think they would want a very thoughtful progression on anything formal. They also have some concerns about how we do that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Of course. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wirth. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I share your optimism concerning our ability to acquire the airlift capability necessary if the proper support is there for the C-17. As you mentioned, the sealift capability, however, has progressed much more slowly. Given the 5-year plan, at what point do you think that—and that is obviously the most optimistic estimate, given what appears to be at least a leveling of defense appropriations—what year do you think we would have the adequate sealift capability to respond under the contingencies that you envision?

Admiral CROWE. Well, Senator, I do not recall the exact name of our scheme, but the scheme that is equivalent to our airlift plan, raising the NDRF and the RRF, we are currently looking at 1992, if memory serves me.

Senator McCAIN. Are you optimistic about meeting that goal?

Admiral CROWE. Right now, I am. The expenditures are fairly modest to do that, and it is in our plans.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. Just a comment, which I am sure you agree with. I think it is implicit in early deployment of SDI not simply to protect our retaliatory forces, which is the physical aspect of it, but much more important than that, and the reason why so many of us are supportive of at least exploring that option to the fullest is because of the uncertainty that has been implanted in the Soviet war planners' minds, thereby reducing dramatically in the option of many of us the first-strike likelihood.

Are you in agreement with that?

Admiral CROWE. Absolutely. One of the ways I think we should look at SDI—we do a lot of talking about our conventional forces raising the nuclear threshold. SDI is designed to raise the nuclear threshold. If it is successful and it does that, that alone is a tremendous achievement.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Admiral.

Finally, I have been concerned for many years, as I know you have, about the declining manpower pool that we face in the 1990s. I certainly share your view enthusiastically that perhaps the greatest successes that have been enjoyed by the defense buildup in the last 5 years is our readiness, quality of manpower, and sustainability of spare parts across the board. But perhaps the centerpiece of all that is the quality of man and woman that is now manning the military.

Admiral CROWE. I wholeheartedly agree with that.

Senator McCAIN. And we have defied the estimates, the predictions of the experts that when we were in an economic recovery or strong period that recruitment would decline, and the opposite has been true.

But given that pleasure, the fact is that in the 1990s we will now be required to recruit one out of every three available men, and we are talking about manpower here, in order to adequately man our forces as we envision them. I do not think that is going to be easy. In fact, I think it may be nearly impossible, given certain circumstances, and I have explored in many ways the concept of national service.

I think we could achieve that goal with not the great expense which is predicted. I also feel it satisfies a number of areas not just fulfilling manpower requirements for the military, but I think correcting an imbalance when we ask only a certain segment of our population to perform service for this Nation.

I believe men and women throughout this country are willing to devote a certain amount of time, a limited amount of time in service to their country, whether it be the military or national forest, or Peace Corps, or other areas. In fact, I think it is an idea whose time may be coming. I am not an originator of this idea by a long shot.

Have you in your deliberations and planning for the eventualities of manpower reductions in the 1990s studied the prospect or ideas of a concept of national service? What is your personal opinion about that idea?

Admiral CROWE. Clearly we are looking at the demographic projections with some concern, and we do monitor them. We do not see the need at this point to do that, but if the trends bear out what you say and we do reach a point where we cannot meet our recruitment goal, we are going to have to reconsider what we do. Of course, we would, as a practical military proposition, be inclined to do whatever we have to do, and if that is necessary to keep up our strength and our viability of our forces, why of course.

We do not see that right now, but as I say we are very concerned about it. I do not share—well, I am not sure you said that, but it will be an expensive proposition. It may not be as much as people are predicting and so forth. I think it will cost us more in terms of training and recycling, et cetera, than we spend now.

I am told, well, you pay them less. I do not know that we can depend on that with national service, given the pluralism in our country, et cetera. If I had my choice and I knew that we were going to be confined to the size of services we are now, I would prefer to stay with the all-volunteer force. It may not be a choice that is given to us.

I see one tremendous advantage in large numbers, not necessarily in the efficiency of the serving forces, but in having more people in the civilian population that have had military service. That trend concerns me currently. But I should say it seems before we could consider something like that, there has to be a lot of political spadework done in this country.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Admiral, and thank you for your patience today. You have provided some very valuable information.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Wirth has not had a second round. Senator Thurmond has come in and has not had a first round. So, Senator Thurmond, let me call on you for any questions and then I will give Senator Wirth a second round. In deference to the Admiral, he has been here 2½ hours now, so I would like probably to not have a third round. But if any members have——

Senator QUAYLE. I have not had a second round.

Chairman NUNN. You have not had a second round? All right, we will go through the second round.

Admiral, do you need to take a break?

Admiral CROWE. No, I am doing fine, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. You are a better man than I am, I will tell you. [Laughter.]

Admiral CROWE. I made some preparations before I came in. [Laughter.]

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Thurmond.

Admiral CROWE. Good morning, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Crowe, I am glad to see you and glad to have you here. I feel much safer when you are in Washington and looking after this defense establishment.

Admiral CROWE. Well, you are kind, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. I just have a few questions here, and I will not keep you long because you have been here a long time. I have been out of town and just got back.

Admiral, do you continue to support the overall allocation of the defense dollars whereby strategic modernization and the direct support of strategic forces consumes less than 15 percent of the DOD budget?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, I do, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral, what priority would you attach to strategic modernization if budget considerations forced a reduction in DOD spending to something less than 3 percent of real growth?

Admiral CROWE. The modernization which the President has proposed and which the chiefs have consistently supported, Senator, I think is still our highest priority and I think it is imperative, barring some breakthrough in arms' reduction talks, that we complete that modernization program.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Crowe, Secretary Weinberger described the SDI program as bolstering rather than replacing nuclear weapons and maintaining deterrence. Do you also share this view?

Admiral CROWE. I certainly do at the outset, yes, I do, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Crowe, are there elements of the SDI program that should enjoy funding support on their own merits quite aside from their future application to a strategic defense system?

Admiral CROWE. I am sorry? I did not quite understand the question, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Are there elements of the SDI program that should enjoy funding support on their own merits quite aside from their future application to a strategic defense system?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, I believe there are, Senator. There are a number, and I am particularly talking about in the indications and warning areas, the sensor systems.

Senator THURMOND. I may submit a few more questions for the record, but I will not detain you anymore at this time. Thank you very much.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you sir.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

Senator Quayle and Senator Wirth, I really do not recall who was first on the list. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I would like for you to go back and put your history hat on for a couple of moments and to take us back and give us a bit of a perspective from your viewpoint in let's say the last 10 or 15 years, or the last two decades, on how strategies have changed and what is a change in the administration compared to the last administration.

The thrust of my question is that we have had very interesting hearings on this whole idea of strategy and what it should be, and we have had a lot of very interesting witnesses that have come forth. Just from your unique background that you have had from a historical point of view, could you sort of summarize for us how you think some of these strategies have changed, and what some of the highlighted strategies of this administration perhaps compared to the last administration is?

Admiral Crowe. That is a pretty big order, Senator. You are going to have me extemporize here.

Senator Quayle. Yes. Just go back and put your history hat on. You are back at Princeton. Just go ahead and pontificate here.

Admiral Crowe. I do not think there is any question, of course, that our concern and our attention have been steadily shifted to areas away from—well, our fundamental concern for years was, and our primary center of attention was Western Europe, the central front.

I do not subscribe, for exmple, to the proposition that the world is a lesser included case of NATO. It is a great big world, and we have very broad global interests, and I think we have seen a continuous expanding of our strategy to worry about the rest of the world, in addition to central Europe.

In turn, this has brought about an increased use of Soviet surrogates, for example. We have talked about terrorism, we have talked about subversion, we have talked about limited intensity conflict, and our ability to deal with these Third-World things; that has consumed a great deal more of our attention.

We have seen the Soviets, incidentally, go through a similar process. I saw it in particular out in the Pacific when I was the Commander in Chief of the Pacific. I would say for some 20 years the Soviets frankly ignored the Pacific and Asia. They really did not think it had great strategic interest to them, and all of a sudden they woke up and discovered that it was the most affluent area of the world, the most increasingly prosperous, and that they were not even players in the Asian market, and that they also had been mesmerized by Europe.

You have seen a tremendous shift of their attention to Asia. You have now seen their deployments to the Indian Ocean. You know, the biggest thing that has happened in my career of over 43 years, is when I joined the Navy they were our oceans. We were sort of irritated if we saw a Soviet somewhere in the ocean—what are they doing using our ocean? Now they use it all over the world, and you see them all the time in great strength. They have a blue-water fleet there, and we see them permanently deployed to areas where they never would have considered a few years ago—I am talking about the Mediterranean, I am talking about the Indian Ocean, I am talking about Southwest Asia, Cam Ranh Bay, and now clearly in the Southern Pacific.

One of the things that I have noticed—I apologize, Senator, this is sort of rambling and not necessarily cohesive—but I think that there has been a dramatic shift in military thinking, which has frankly been borne out of some of our war games, that the likelihood of a conventional war is much greater now than we had originally considered after the introduction of nuclear weapons.

Senator Quayle. It is much greater now.

Admiral Crowe. Yes.

Senator QUAYLE. Conventional warfare.

Admiral CROWE. Yes. And a long conventional war. I think in the 1950s and 1960s there was great thinking that the only kind of war that we would fight, major hostilities, would be short. I do not believe you will find that accepted in the military community today. There is a very good likelihood that if we did have major hostilities, and we certainly do not want them, that it might involve long, protracted conventional campaigns and engagements.

I understand there is controversy over that and not everybody agrees on that. Of course, our strategic thinking has been shifted against our will, really, by one item, and that is oil. Oil and petroleum and the sources of oil and the SLOC's and the arteries are now subjects of much greater attention.

Likewise, in the nuclear business, we have seen much more stress of lower levels of nuclear response, theater nuclear weapons, short-range INF, long-range INF, et cetera. That is not a comforting development, but it is a reality and it is here, and it has changed our approach to warfare.

Senator QUAYLE. Looking back over the Reagan administration, the Carter administration, for a short time the Ford administration, the Nixon administration, the Johnson, Kennedy, were there major changes in strategy from one administration to the next? Or was it one that events seemed to change the strategies?

What I am trying to get a handle on is, do administrations come in and fundamentally alter or change the strategies that have already been previously established without some intervening event?

Admiral CROWE. Just off the top of my head, Senator, I do not think they change the objectives of the United States.

Senator QUAYLE. I can understand——

Admiral CROWE. They might toy with them, but the fundamental objectives have been remarkably consistent over the entire postwar period.

Senator QUAYLE. How about the strategy of how you achieve that?

Admiral CROWE. Now the strategy of how you achieve those objectives—first of all, of course, under the Eisenhower administration in the wake of World War II, our military strategy was wedded to and practically consumed by the nuclear weapon, and we saw a dramatic increase in the ability to deliver nuclear weapons by air, a decrease in ground forces, and a decrease in emphasis on the U.S. Navy.

The U.S. Navy went to great efforts to get into the nuclear delivery business for no other reason than to get into the act and stay alive. You then saw, I think, under President Kennedy some change to flexible response, and he even went through something we're talking about now—special forces and Green Berets, and limited warfare, or at least what we would call today limited intensity conflicts.

Then we saw later a transfer in NATO to flexible response.

One of the things that I have noticed, it seems to me that at one time or another various administrations have attempted to cut—the way it is phrased is "cut our commitments." What we usually mean, at least in my view, when we are talking about cutting our commitments, is not changing our basic objectives, or not defending the United States, or not keeping deterrence or getting rid of deterrence. What we really mean by "reducing our commitments" or "changing our commitments" is what allies we are going to support or not support, or how heavily we support them or not support them.

It seems to me that several administrations have toyed with the idea of trying to do this—Korea being one example, Central America being another—and I can remember at even one point where it was seriously talked about, never implemented but seriously talked about, that we might be able to withdraw from the Mediterranean. These may have been trial balloons or something, but nevertheless it was a serious proposition and in practically every case the administration has attempted, they ultimately came around and discovered they could not do it, and that in terms of U.S. expectations and in terms of our world leadership role it was just pretty hard to do, particularly in areas where we have been there historically and traditionally and with what was expected of us.

Frankly, I think—and you are a better judge of this than I am because you have your hand on the political pulse better than I do—the American people did not want us to abdicate our leadership role, or to contract it. While they may not want to spend money on weapons, and they may not want to expand our military inventory, they still want us to have influence around the world, and they still want us to be in on everything that is happening, and they prefer that other people follow our lead.

Now matching those two is not easy, and this may not answer your question, Senator.

Senator QUAYLE. It gives me a flavor for it. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. When you say "be in everything that is happening," you are not talking about every war going on; you are talking about where the influence is.

Admiral CROWE. That is right.

Chairman NUNN. Where the power is.

Admiral CROWE. Precisely, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. I have just a brief question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Crowe, yesterday Ambassador Abshire was here and we had a fascinating discussion with him on changing strategies in Europe. The summary of that was I think his perspective broadly agreed upon the discussion I think that we were trying to raise the nuclear threshold, which was going to mean greater emphasis on conventional troops; that the Soviet threat in a conventional fashion was different and greater than it had been; and consequently we were going to be required in the United States to put a greater emphasis and greater resources into our conventional capability.

One of the ways in which he was arguing that we could do that was a better deployment of strategy of resources working with our NATO allies in terms of procurement and so on, to do it in a much more efficient fashion.

I asked him if that was going to be adequate to meet the needs that we would have for our armed forces, particularly in an environment in which the American taxpayer is becoming, as we all know, more skeptical than he or she might have been 4 or 5 years ago.

He replied that in fact he thought it would be, with the exception of a number of critical deficiencies in our armed forces, which perhaps would require an additional commitment of funds from the taxpayer.

What in your opinion would be the three, or four, or five critical deficiencies which are going to require an additional commitment of funding from the taxpayers of this country?

Admiral CROWE. Do you mean over and above what we currently have?

Senator WIRTH. Over and above where we are now.

Admiral CROWE. Well, let me say a couple of things. Number one, you are going to have the CINCs in, as well, in your hearings. Is that correct, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman NUNN. We are going to have two of the CINCs. We are going to hear from CINCPAC and CINCCENT, and General Rogers of course has had a health bout recently and I talked to him on the phone. He is coming in as soon as he can, but we are going to hear from him later.

Admiral CROWE. I think you will find, when the unified commanders come in, a different emphasis on what they testify to than you will find from, say, the service chiefs or even the Chairman, JCS. They have the responsibility for fighting today, to be ready for a fight tomorrow, and they are not nearly as interested in modernization or the long-range perspective as they are in their readiness, their training, their sustainability.

To address your question, and particularly in the Abshire context, I would go back more or less to the perspective of a CINC and I would say the very first thing we would need is more investment in sustainability and particularly in our threat-oriented munitions and our more modern, sophisticated munitions.

Right now you will find that this budget, which you are going to consider here shortly, has been slanted somewhat to protect readiness, to protect sustainability, and to do that there have been some drawdowns on procurement. I would like to see our modernization program, if we did have additional funds, be accelerated because time is risk, really. If you stretch things out, you are increasing risk. That is just like a physical principle. And to reduce the risk, I would like to see some of our modernization accelerated and completed at an earlier date than we are currently going to be able to do that. That, and the sustainability, would be my two major items.

On the other hand, I must warn you that the first priority and the one that we have stressed all along, and that I do not think of in terms of national security that we can neglect, is strategic modernization. I am talking about the President's program of MX, SICBM, D-5, ATB, and B-1, and the C3 improvements that are connected with it. That would be my general approach.

Senator WIRTH. I am sure that is going to be part of the discussions over the next months on the committee, but I wanted to get your immediate sense of priorities.

Admiral CROWE. You understand, of course, that when we are doing this, one of the main items that plagues us is we do not know when a war is going to come. If you could tell me we were going to fight in 6 months, my priorities would be a great deal different than if I do not know, when or where we are going to fight.

If you can tell me we are not going to fight for 10 years, my priorities would be even more different. But given the fact that we do not know and we are trying to cover a whole range of concerns and considerations, we are forced to march ahead to improve all of our pillars at once: readiness, sustainability, force structure, and modernization; and to try and keep a very balanced force.

Many people do not think that is what we should be doing, but you are worrying both about deterrence and also about readiness to fight tomorrow, and they are not always exactly compatible.

Senator WIRTH. Those are the ambiguities with which we all live, and you have to make a best judgment as to where we are.

Let me just finally touch on following up on what I thought was Senator Quayle's excellent question about what has changed over the last 25 years. You point out a number of factors that increase the risk to the United States around the world--the development of the blue water navy, the contentiousness and changing nature of the Middle East, our dependence on oil, and so on.

What is on the other side of the question? If you were going out and explaining to the American taxpayer again the increase of the threat and how that has grown, what on the other side of the coin has in fact helped to make our position more secure rather than less secure?

Admiral CROWE. I think while there is a strong tendency to overlook it in the push and pull of every day events and affairs, I think over the long pull that the United States has had a great attraction for a larger section of the world than the Soviet Union; that their ideology and their economic system have been discredited, and that we have—the success has had peaks and valleys—but we have acquired more and more, if not allies, friends. We are better accepted in a larger portion of the world than we have ever been before.

I can tell you from some very, very personal experience in the Pacific that I used to call on practically every leader of the Free world in the Pacific. That is a very affluent area. It is growing faster than anyplace else on the globe. It is a very successful area. You see political maturity coming. You see sociological changes that are of a high order, and, of course, their economic affluence is indisputable.

I do not know of a single one of those leaders who did not tell me that the United States was instrumental in their success in achieving, and frankly that military force, our deterrent force, was instrumental. They would say to me in no uncertain terms that your strength, your standing between us and the Soviet Union, and your forward deployed forces have made it possible for us to move forward at our own pace on our own and to achieve what we have achieved. And do not withdraw from this area, and do not get weak, because we will suffer if you do.

And our policy has achieved in East Asia the kinds of things that we want in the world. We want a pluralistic world. We want people to grow in their own way. We want them to be free of want. We want a free enterprise system. And it is happening there.

Now some other things are happening, too. We are now in economic competition with those people, and you have got to work out a modus operandi or an accommodation where we both can live in that system. So as we achieve things, other problems occur. But I do not know of an area, and certainly it was a real revelation to me, as to where our strategy, our policy had worked so as it has in Asia to achieve what we fundamentally want. It is the best marriage in my view of foreign policy, military policy, and economic—well, economic as I say problems are developing, but certainly of our foreign policy and our military policy of any place in the world.

Senator WIRTH. Well, I appreciate that very thoughtful response, and Senator Quayle's question, which really goes to the root of what these hearings are about: how world conditions have changed—not only from what the Soviets have done, but for example of the growth of wealth in Southeast Asia, the emergence of Japan, the changing nature of our relationship with China, and so on—that have all changed the situation in which we plan the strategy and develop the Armed Forces of the United States to meet what are perceived to be threats out there in a very rapidly changing world.

Admiral CROWE. Can I just reemphasize one point? One of the things that impressed me so out there was the role that our military capability had played, and that we derive a return on our investment not just when we are attacked and when we have to fend off an attack, but we derive it every day in terms of what reliance our allies put on us, in terms of deterrence, in terms of the calculations that are made around the world about the United States, and in terms of attracting friends and allies.

Senator WIRTH. If I might, the logical follow-on is that the burden of deterrence should be more broadly shared by our allies. The sharing of that burden is something that we ought to be driving toward, as well.

In any case, Admiral Crowe, thank you very much and I look forward to working with you over the coming months.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Admiral Crowe, I think that we have skirted the issue of naval forces here, and I want to come directly to the major issue in the President's budget. That is, replacing these two carriers.

You started out by saying that when you joined the Navy it was "our ocean" and now you have stated that the Soviet Union is on the high seas, the seven seas, in forces comparable in many ways to ours. They are actively building the large carrier, not by our standards but certainly large by many standards. What is the impact on our strategy if we were to drop from a 15-carrier level to something less, say to 13, bearing in mind that the carriers raised by the President in this budget are replacements, not additions.

Admiral CROWE. It would considerably reduce our ability to do the kinds of things we have had to do in the last year, Senator. I find it a little curious that some of the criticisms of the carrier come in a period and an era when we are at the same time stressing subversion, terrorism, limited intensive conflict, our ability to project influence, to move around the world and act in remote locations.

Senator WARNER. Might I add that there may have been a shift in strategic emphasis by the Soviets, to consider the conventional option more strongly than the nuclear.

Admiral CROWE. That is correct, and, of course, the carrier plays a heavy role in this. I think the military case for the carrier is indisputable. It does not solve all your military problems, but it does a number of things for you.

Number one, it has a wide breadth of usage in all the kinds of warfare that we have to be prepared to deal with, all the way from nuclear war to conventional major hostilities, through limited conflicts right down to limited intensity conflict. The carrier has a role. It has the tremendous advantage of flexibility and mobility. Of course, it does not carry 500 planes to the scene of a crisis, but sometimes 25 planes 50 miles away are a lot better than 500 planes 2,000 miles away.

These are, in this day and age, tremendous advantages. As long as I have been connected with the JCS, which now comes to about 20-some years, the first question that is asked in every crisis is where are our carriers?

Senator WARNER. Where are our carriers; yes, I know.

Admiral CROWE. Carriers are not invulnerable. Carriers can be sunk. Land bases can be destroyed. I was in Vietnam—we lost 400 planes on the ground and some 4,000 were damaged in the course of that conflict from ground action. We did not lose any planes on board carriers to ground action.

So that the various alternatives have pros, cons, and so forth.

Senator WARNER. Well, I thank you very much, Admiral. I hope my colleagues will keep an open and receptive mind on this issue as it begins to heat up.

The emphasis that the Congress will place on conventional weaponry in this coming legislative cycle, which indeed I support, should establish some goals, principally in the NATO theater. As we begin to augment our conventional forces, should we try and strike a parity? You mentioned in that our strategy does not do that tank for tank, gun for gun; nor should it. But what are the goals that we should move toward, as we enhance conventional forces to eliminate this threat that is posed now by the Soviet thinking and strategy or perhaps initiating a conventional war, of possibly a prolonged nature?

Admiral CROWE. I think the kinds of things that we are attempting to correct in our budget submissions of the last 2 and 3 years and in the current budget submission are still valid, Senator.

Senator WARNER. I was not questioning the validity. We will not try to match them tank for tank, gun for gun.

Admiral CROWE. No.

Senator WARNER. We are not going to try to achieve superiority. What is the goal that we are going to move toward?

Admiral CROWE. We are trying to flesh out and get the maximum capability out of our current force structure. That is what we want to do, in all four pillars: readiness, sustainability, modernization, and personnel. We are midstream in our modernization effort. We are not there yet. We have made tremendous advances in sustainability, but we are not where we want to go.

Senator WARNER. So what you are saying is, rather than new initiatives, new weapons, mass production of this or that, it is more of the same, trying to enhance what we have?

Admiral CROWE. That would be my general view. We have succeeded, I hope, through skill, but maybe through luck, in attracting very, very high quality personnel, and we don't want to lose that.

Granted, if I had unlimited resources I would probably have some suggestions about force structure, but given what we call a fiscally constrained strategy, and given the everyday real world limitations, I think we should try and get the maximum capability out of our force structure.

Senator WARNER. You were careful to point out that should we be drawn into a global type of conflict, we could not operate with a high degree of intensity on all potential fronts. But viewing this from the Soviet planners' perspective, were they to initiate such a conflict, they are not likely to initiate a conflict on all fronts, are they?

Admiral CROWE. I would think they would try and avoid it.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much.

Admiral CROWE. That is an option for us, of course. I mean, you can see that very easily.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

That last question is the one that I still am trying to grasp. When the American taxpayers look at what they are paying for defense, and then they hear that basically we have not closed the gap—let's say about 50 percent of it roughly of our whole defense effort goes to NATO and we have not closed the quantitative gap—and then Admiral Crowe, and I think your statement on this in your net assessment, you say barring a major change in the dynamics of the competition, NATO can no longer hope to offset Pact numbers merely by improving the quality of its equipment, or relying on the dedication of people defending their own territory.

So we are not closing the quantitative gap, and we cannot rely on qualitative to compensate for it. NATO is a major part of our commitment and "the" chief area of U.S.-Soviet forces in a conventional sense——

Admiral CROWE. It is the major geographical——

Chairman NUNN [continuing]. And we are left without anything to measure with. In other words, certainly we will not have as good a force structure and we will not have as modern equipment and we will not have the readiness, but if we do not have—it seems to me there is no hope that is being conveyed here.

We cannot do it quantitatively. The money we have spent in the past, we are not doing it. We do not seem to have a formula to do anything with the allies, and we are not going to be able to do it from a qualitative point of view. So I do not see any light at the end of the tunnel when I put all this together. Maybe that is because there is none. But if there is none, it seems to me we are at a point where we have got to really start reexamining where we are in this world, particularly in the NATO alliance.

I am not saying that leads you to a troop withdrawal kind of option. That is not necessarily the right way to go. It may be; it may not be. I am not saying it leads you to changing the commitment. I do not think we should change the commitment. A free

Europe is still important to us. But it does leave you saying that the best brains we have got in the military and in the Defense Department and around this town and country need to start saying: Where are we going? Because I just don't see any light when I put that together.

Maybe you can give me the light now. I am talking about war fighting. We can always say, well, until we have a nuclear war we have deterred it, but obviously we want to be able to enhance that deterrence by being able to fight, if deterrence fails. That is the heart, it seems to me, of deterrence, being able to have a war fighting capability.

So what are we going to do to see the light at the end of the tunnel when you add all that up? It is just not visible.

Admiral CROWE. First of all, if you go back over the history of NATO, we have been frustrated for many years. I mean, the kind of conversation we are having now is not new.

Chairman NUNN. But we had nuclear advantage, and you have spelled out very clearly here——

Admiral CROWE. We have not had it in the last few years.

Chairman NUNN. Oh, I agree. This is not a sudden frustration I have; it goes back a few years, but I just do not see any light.

Admiral CROWE. Of course, you understand that today—we have not even talked about the factor of nuclear weapons in the NATO equation, and that is quite a deterrent in itself. That should give you some cause for comfort, if you are worried about the actual hostilities on the central front.

Chairman NUNN. I agree with that.

Admiral CROWE. Second, there is something that we have not talked about. I would not suggest we explore it at any length, but——

Chairman NUNN. But it does not tell us what our conventional goals ought to be. Putting all this together, it does not seem to me we have got any statement about what our conventional goals ought to be vis-a-vis Europe.

Admiral CROWE. We have not discussed in detail how the Soviets look at our capability. Now it is my view, and as I said I would prefer we not get into this deeply, but it is my view that they have a different conception of our capability than we do.

Chairman NUNN. I hope that they do.

Admiral CROWE. I believe that, very genuinely. Now you have to make sure that they keep that conception. Also, I think you should keep in mind that NATO is not the only priority of this country from a military standpoint.

Chairman NUNN. Oh, absolutely. I do not in any way argue that, Admiral. We have improved in a lot of categories, and I have stated that, in readiness, manpower, force projection, all of those things are important in the overall balance. But when you look at the budget and you break down the Defense Department's charts to know where the money is going, a huge percentage of the money is going to NATO conventional defense, and a huge percentage of our reserve forces in this country are designed for that, not just what we have over there. And yet no one from this administration, it seems to me—maybe Dr. Abshire would be an exception; he has at least got a vision of where we ought to be going—has laid out what we are even measuring against.

When this administration came in, we had all the charts up there showing U.S. tanks/Russian tanks; U.S. planes/Russian planes; U.S. artillery tubes/Russian artillery tubes. Then occasionally we would get NATO vs. Warsaw Pact quantitative comparisons. The strong implication was that we were going to spend a whole lot of money toward closing those gaps. Your testimony clearly shows that not only have we not closed those gaps on the ground——

Admiral CROWE. On the ground.

Chairman NUNN. On the ground; well, that is where a lot of the things came from.

Admiral CROWE. I agree. But on the other hand we——

Chairman NUNN. But the gaps have gotten worse, and the trends have gotten worse, and we are told we cannot do anything unless the whole dynamics of the competition changes in the qualitative.

Admiral CROWE. I do not think the air trend has gotten worse.

Chairman NUNN. I would agree. I think we have improved our Air Force.

Admiral CROWE. In Western Europe.

Chairman NUNN. But it raises basic questions. For instance, should we begin to concentrate—this is what I call "strategy and concepts" and I think we have got to start thinking through it, and I do not propose these as answers—but should we start thinking about if the Europeans are not going to do more in Europe, forward defense is not a military strategy, it is a political strategy. I do not know of any military man who would say that we would defend every inch of that. If it was purely military, we would give up space for time, but that is a necessity in Germany, and I understand that necessity.

Admiral CROWE. And that is a weakness in an unclassified net assessment. I really do not have much choice about that.

Chairman NUNN. I understand that. But that raises a question. Why should we be assuming after all these years the heavy role in Germany, heavy, instead of becoming more flexible in terms of our force posture, having less heavy commitment, because that is where it takes us so long to get our forces across the ocean. We can get planes over there quickly. It seems to me we ought to be emphasizing a whole lot more of the tactical air, and we ought to be emphasizing a whole lot less the heavy role in Europe, saying to our allies that is a political necessity in Germany.

Now if it is a political necessity, you explain to your people why you are not doing your job with heavy forces. It seems to me we have got to start thinking along that line, instead of continuing to go down a road that has no end and yet we are spending a huge amount of resources in getting there.

Admiral CROWE. I have no quarrel whatsoever with reexamining that NATO problem time and time again, because we do have some things we have to solve.

Chairman NUNN. Well, if we have to begin with this budget squeeze restricting this force structure, we are going to have to decide how many forces, forgetting all the punitive and the burden sharing and everything else, we have got some major problems in the Army about rotational base, whether we can afford to keep as many forces as we have in Europe and still have a rotational base that makes sense.

It seems to me, I assume that kind of thinking is going on?

Admiral CROWE. It is. And, of course, practically any solution that you want to toy with is going to be more expensive than the current posture.

Chairman NUNN. I would agree with that. I think it is not going to be any cheap, easy solution. The question is whether we can take existing resources, and whatever additional resources we can get in this fiscal environment and do a better job with them. And it seems to me that particularly when we all agree that we have to do more—and Senator Wilson brought this out I thought very well, we have a real deficiency in our rapid deployment capability, and that means we have got to have more forces and more mobility that can go to remote areas.

It seems to me that also lends itself to some strategic conceptual thinking in the sense that we ought to deemphasize the heavy role which is primarily in Europe and begin to say, over a period of time, 8 or 10 years, to our allies that we are gradually going to change our own concept, and we want you to fill the gap. And if you do not, you explain to your people why you are not doing it.

I think we have got to have some creative thinking in this regard. So I throw those things out.

I want to commend you, Admiral, for excellent testimony. I think it has been very helpful. You have tackled the hard questions. You have come up with a net assessment which I know how hard that is, because I know how few people we have ever had do it in the Defense Department. So you have stimulated a lot of our thinking, and I believe that is going to be very helpful, and we hope that this committee can play a constructive role in working with you in all of your hats.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WILSON. Could I ask just one final question?

Chairman NUNN. Surely; absolutely.

Senator WILSON. Admiral Crowe, the problem that was mentioned earlier by Senator Gore and by some others having to do with a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack, I think he, you, and I would all agree that it is not the likelihood but nonetheless a contingency for which we must prepare.

One of the ways you can prepare for that is by having a deterrent that is mobile, one that can dash off-base. Another, it seems to me though, is if you are really concerned about dealing with bolt-out-of-the-blue and wish to avoid all of the problems associated with launch-on warning, that you have got a couple of obvious options.

One of those is mobility. The other is even a first generation ABM defensive system. In your judgment, which of the two, if we are compelled by reasons of cost to choose, which of those offers a much better guarantee to the American people of the proper response?

Admiral CROWE. Because of the cost implications of the question, I would like to take it for the record, Senator. My instincts tell me that once you have sunk costs in missiles and on launching mechanisms either in silos and so forth, that torques the fiscal situation considerably.

Senator **Wilson**. Let me, so that I do not mislead, obviously if we are talking about costs, the sunk costs of missiles and silos is going to beat anything. However, they are vulnerable. What I would ask you to compare really is the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of a response alternatives of a mobile deterrent capability.

Admiral **Crowe**. One that we would still have to build.

Senator **Wilson**. And a deterrent that we would provide if we have an ABM system, even a rudimentary one, a first-generation system that is discouraging to the rational Soviet war planner in the way that Senator McCain described. That is the comparison that I think we ought to seek.

Admiral **Crowe**. Well, with your agreement I would like to take a look at that and maybe answer the question for the record, if I could.

Senator **Wilson**. Fine.

[The information follows:]

We agree that a "bolt out of the blue" attack is neither our first nor only concern but it is one we cannot ignore because, although unlikely, it is potentially the most stressing threat. To consider deterrence in terms of only mobility or a first generation ABM system, however, may oversimplify the issue. Each leg of the existing Triad has its own, unique survival characteristics. Our submarine force, for example, has a high probability of survival for the foreseeable future, as does that part of the strategic bomber force maintained on day-to-day alert. We also have the capability to launch our silo-based missiles, which maintain a very high state of alert, promptly, should the situation warrant. Together, our current strategic systems already give pause to anyone considering a "bolt out of the blue" scenario. A mobile ICBM system and an ABM system will enhance the Triad's deterrent value in any scenario, not just in a no warning or short warning situation. Adding mobile missiles to compound the attacker's targeting problem and adding defenses to increase the uncertainty of a first strike outcome will enhance and preserve deterrence in the face of an ever more sophisticated Soviet threat. If compelled by reasons of cost to choose between systems, my answer would be couched in terms of timing as well as cost. In the near term, we should proceed with deploying the rail-based Peacekeeper to preserve our deterrent posture while we continue with SDI's technological research program. We have the technology for mobile ICBM systems today but are only at the beginning of a very promising path toward a future decision concerning deployment of effective strategic defenses. As SDI-related technologies mature, we should field those systems that most effectively support the President's goal of protecting the United States.

Senator **Wilson**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Admiral Crowe.

Admiral **Crowe**. Thank you, Senator.

[Questions for the hearing record with answers supplied, follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator John Glenn

Senator **Glenn**. Admiral Crowe, I realize that DOD is still in the process of implementing the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Bill; however, since this is the first time we have had the opportunity to hear from you formally since the bill was passed last year, I'm sure there are many on the committee who would be very interested in your comments. Specifically:

What is your overall assessment of the bill as finally passed?

Second, do you think the provisions of the bill related to strategic planning, advice and policy formulation will improve the JCS role in strategic and contingency planning?

Third, do you believe the bill will enhance the effectiveness of military operations?

And lastly, do you see any serious problems in the bill as you proceed to implement it?

Admiral Crowe. I applaud the thoughtfulness reflected in the document and believe the legislation is a positive step in the right direction. As you point out, we are in the early stages of implementation so it is too early to pass final judgment. I want to report early on, however, that I am extremely gratified by the commitment of the Chiefs and their subordinates to the successful implementation of the bill. Finally, I want to express my personal thanks for the creation of the Vice Chairman's position. He is due on board very soon and I am eagerly looking forward to his arrival.

I really don't see any immediate major changes in the areas of strategic planning, advice and policy formulation. The JCS have played a major role in all of those areas for a number of years. The bill codified that participation with some further refinements.

Of course, any comment I make in regard to the bill enhancing the effectiveness of military operations, will have to await further evaluation, but I would expect the legislation to make a difference since it fixes responsibility and streamlines the decisionmaking process. I believe that the several provisions of the bill which strengthen the authority of the combatant commanders will enable the CINCs to better prepare in peacetime for war and contingency military operations. I am convinced that it will thus enhance our actual conduct of military operations.

The only area of the bill that is already causing concern in implementation is the Joint Officer Management title. I am convinced that there will be a need to seek some legislative relief in that area, particularly with regard to inflexible requirements, like 3½ year tour lengths for joint duty assignments. The Conference Report on the bill acknowledges that some changes would probably be required for that title, and we plan to offer proposals for your consideration.

Senator Glenn. Admiral Crowe, you have now completed your first full year as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It has not been an uneventful year for you from either a military or political standpoint.

On the military side, you had several contingencies to deal with including the raids of Libya and the Achille Lauro highjacking.

On the political side, the defense budget has been reduced considerably from what the Administration requested. In additon, DOD and especially the JCS have been directed to carry out the most extensive reorganization since 1957.

I would very much like to hear your candid assessment of how you saw your first year as Chairman. I would also welcome any advice you might have for this committee, from your perspective, as we try to become better managers of the Defense authorization process.

Admiral Crowe. From a personal viewpoint, my first year as Chairman has been both a valuable learning experience and a period of achievement. With one or two exceptions, my advice has been sought and heard. The Armed Forces, without exception, have carried out their operational responsibilities in a very professional and effective manner. My greatest satisfaction stems from serving at a time when we were able to quickly and efficiently carry out military actions in response to extreme provocations. It takes well-trained and well-equipped forces, composed of well-led, highly motivated and skilled people to carry out such operations successfully. We have all of those qualities in our Armed Forces now and we need to sustain those qualities. If there is any advice I could give this Committee, it would be to provide the Nation's defenses with a dependable and predictable level of funding support. There are few things more disruptive to national security than to wrench the defense establishment up and down the budget ladder. What that does is to impose day-to-day managerial challenges so intense as to sap the structure of much of its creativity, to preclude meaningful long-range planning, and to prevent the employment of efficient buying practices. We can't play defense like an accordian since commitments and the threat just don't adjust to the moving train of budgets which are constantly in flux.

Senator Glenn. Admiral Crowe, last year you testified before this committee that because the youth population from which the services can recruit continues to shrink, "recruiting can be expected to become a growing challenge in the future."

There has been considerable discussion by others in Congress who are concerned over what is estimated to be a decline of approximately 10% in the number of men and women reaching the prime recruiting age during the next ten years. To address this potential problem, some are even discussing the establishment of a National Service program.

Conversely, my staff recently received a briefing from senior Army officials in which the Army stated that, as of now, they did not see an appreciable drop in recruiting for the foreseeable future. In fact, they stated that for the first time the

Army had broken "the economic barrier"; that although the civilian economy was good, recruitment of qualified people continued at a strong pace.

The Army attributed this success to such incentive programs as the Army College fund.

How serious do you see the Services' recruiting problem over the next 10 years?

Admiral CROWE. I have seen various demographic projections for the next decade which concern me. At some point the cost of keeping an all-volunteer force financially competitive with the civilian sector could become difficult, accession standards could be forced downward, and recruiting shortfalls could begin to erode force structure and readiness. I don't want to see any of those things happen and I recognize that it is necessary to begin planning now for alternatives to the all-volunteer force but I would not want to see us move precipitously away from the high-quality volunteer force we have now unless it becomes a clear necessity. I also believe that a great deal of political spadework would have to be done before the nation would accept the draft again.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you for your testimony and your patience.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you. It was my pleasure to be here.

[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
Washington, DC.

MILITARY STRATEGY IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AND IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

The committee met, in open session, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Kennedy, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Jeffrey H. Smith, general counsel; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Robert E. Bayer, Richard D. Finn, Jr., Judith A. Freedman, John J. Hamre, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Gordon G. Riggle, and Mark B. Robinson, professional staff members; Russell C. Miller, research assistant; and Lucia M. Chavez, staff assistant.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, Assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; Jim Sayre, assistant to Senator Wirth; Robert P. Savitt, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Samuel J. Routson, assistant to Senator Symms; and Bill Wight, assistant to Senator Warner.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The Armed Services Committee meets today to continue our series of hearings on U.S. military strategy. Regrettably we had to postpone Secretary Shultz's appearance yesterday, and also the hearing we had yesterday afternoon on confirmations—good morning, Senator Warner. Because of the snow, no one could get in. We will reschedule those as soon as we can.

In this morning's hearing we will take testimony from two of our warfighting commanders in the field: Adm. Ronald Hays, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command; and Gen. George Crist, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command. We welcome both Admiral Hays and General Crist back as both testified before the full committee last year.

Last year's Defense Reorganization Act gave our unified commanders the authority that the Congress felt they needed to carry out their tremendous responsibilities. These four-star officers must have the command, personnel and budgetary authority to effectively employ their large, multi-service forces over the vast geographic regions assigned to them.

The crucial role of operational commanders like Admiral Hays and General Crist in implementing U.S. military strategy was recognized in a very vivid way last year in the Defense Reorganization Act. We hope we have given you ample authority to carry out your important responsibilities and would be interested in your views on that subject, as well as your views on strategy, since the two go together.

In planning the committee's schedule of strategy and budget hearings, Senator Warner and I decided it was appropriate to hear testimony from as many unified commanders as possible before the service Secretaries and the chiefs testified. The Goldwater-Nickles Defense Reorganization Act directs the military departments to carry out their functions "so as to fulfill (to the maximum extent practicable) the current and future operational requirements" of the Unified Command.

The purpose of our military services is to carry out the future operational requirements to provide the wherewithall for our military unified commanders. In light of this statutory duty, it makes sense for the committee to first understand the unified commanders' requirements before asking the service Secretaries and the chiefs of the services how their budget requests fulfill these requirements.

As I mentioned to Admiral Hays, General Crist and Senator Warner before the hearing, we had embarked on this in November 1986, this new approach procedurally, and it is awfully hard to get it all in order the first time around because schedules have been set by so many people who would be testifying; I hope that next year we will be able to have our witnesses in a more orderly way. We had hoped to hear from Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Shultz together to set forth our foreign policy goals and our defense requirements, because we felt that was the way to start, but Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger had schedules that precluded their testifying together, althought they both were willing and anxious, they could not get their schedules together.

Secretary Shultz was scheduled to testify here yesterday, but we got called off on that one. So I told Admiral Hays, General Crist and Senator Warner earlier, that we are presuming that all of our defense strategy is in keeping and in concert with our foreign policy goals, which we have not yet identified. In a perfect world, we will know these goals at the very beginning, and we hope to do that next year. But we do look forward to hearing from Secretary Shultz at a later date during these hearings.

Before I invite Admiral Hays and General Crist to make their oral statements, Senator Warner, we would be delighted to hear from you. I might add that we, of course, wanted to hear from Gen. Bernie Rogers as our NATO commander up front, and he had had a health problem which he is now on the full road of recovery from, but we will hear from him at a later date in our deliberations.

Would any other Senators want to make opening statements?

Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Just a short one. I want to congratulate you and Senator Warner for calling these meetings, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to you, Admiral, and General. We receive an awful lot of attention to other theaters of operation. I happen to still feel that if we have a shortfall with regard to our overall planning and strategy, it is in the Pacific area. Therefore, your appearance before the committee today is of tremendous interest to all of us. Thank you for being here.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

I believe, Admiral Hays, you are going to lead off this morning. We will go ahead and have your statement, and then we will hear from General Crist, and then we will have questions for both of you.

STATEMENT OF ADM. RONALD J. HAYS, U.S. NAVY, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral HAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

It is my great honor to command the U.S. Pacific Theater, a maritime area basically that includes both the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Ashore, my area of responsibility extends to the border between India and Pakistan and abuts the area of responsibility of General Crist. It is an area that has seen dynamic change in recent years, and it is an area of growing importance to the Nation.

I would be very pleased if the members of this committee had the opportunity to visit this area and see for themselves.

As for my statement, I am particularly grateful for the opportunity to talk to you about our goals and objectives in the Pacific Theater, and about the strategy we have in place that allows us to pursue those goals.

I have, Mr. Chairman, a written statement which I would propose for the record, and a very short oral statement.

Chairman NUNN. Well, we would like for you to take whatever time you feel is necessary to delineate your own views, and we will file your complete written statement for the record. But do not feel rushed on your oral presentation, because you are our two main witnesses today, and we think the subjects you will be covering are of great importance.

Admiral HAYS. All right, sir.

Chairman NUNN. And I do not say that to all witnesses. [Laughter.]

Admiral HAYS. Thank you, sir.

Our military objectives in the Pacific Theater are essentially the same as elsewhere: to deter conflict and, if we fail in that, to be prepared to fight and win. An important part of that strategy is, of course, the continuing protection of U.S. interests throughout the theater and cooperation with our friends and allies to provide an element of stability throughout the region.

There are a lot of ways you can describe strategy, but I would attempt to do so for the Pacific by highlighting about a half a dozen of what I consider to be essential, very fundamental elements of our strategy.

The first I would highlight would be the need to continue to maintain our maritime superiority. We have had maritime superiority in the Pacific since World War II. I would also point out that, while today we have superiority in the maritime sense, it is becoming increasingly difficult to make that claim in view of the developments on the Soviet force structure side.

Another very important element of our strategy is to forward-deploy very ready forces, forces that are prepared to fight across the full spectrum of warfare from nuclear strategic operations to special forces operations.

It is awfully important, and this would be the third element of my strategy, to have the capability to reinforce those forward-deployed units with the assignment of two new squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships. In the Pacific, our responsiveness has improved impressively, but we still have deficiencies in both airlift and sealift.

Another important part of the strategy, and I would list these as number four and five, because they are very close, is a network of alliances, and we have a healthy network of alliances in the Pacific. Also, it is important to enjoy the cooperation of good friends, those that we are not formally allied with. We have those in the Pacific, as well.

The final fundamental element, which is a universal one, is to ensure that we retain complete flexibility, expect the unexpected, and be prepared for it.

In addressing our strategy, for convenience I would divide it into two categories—a peacetime strategy, and a wartime strategy. The peacetime strategy answers the question: How do you best employ your considerable military resources and assets in peacetime to guarantee you a convincing deterrence, as well as providing the best support for our Nation's interest in the theater?

As you can imagine, there are ample opportunities to implement this peacetime strategy, but in all cases that peacetime strategy is based on the availability of very ready forces forward-deployed, well trained, prepared to do the job they might be called upon to do.

There is another important element of our peacetime strategy that I would highlight. That is, the relationship with our allies and our friends. We work very hard, and spend a lot of time in establishing cordial military-to-military relationships with our friends and our allies. We employ such things as combined exercises, port visits, exchange programs, and personal contacts in this effort.

In the case of those countries which one might consider to be under-developed, civic action programs have been found to be very effective, particularly in times of crisis. I could cite ongoing actions right now to make the point. We have civic action programs today ongoing in Guadalcanal, in the Cook Islands, and in American Samoa, areas that have suffered rather devastating damage from a recent hurricane.

I would also make the point that in a peacetime strategy, a very important element is our security assistance programs, an area I feel is generally underappreciated. With a robust security assistance program, we see that it also improves the self-defense capabilities of the various countries; and, importantly, it improves interoperability, the ability of that country to operate their forces with our forces in the event of joint operation is necessary.

So far as our warfighting strategy is concerned, it must take into account the realities of the changes in the Soviet force structure. The Soviets have established a capability to intimidate our friends; they have a capability to interdict our sea lines; they can confront us on the high seas; and today they demonstrate a capability to strike targets located throughout the Pacific region, including the mainland United States.

I do believe that any conflict we might have with the Soviets in the Pacific is apt to be precipitated by events outside the theater, but I cannot imagine that the Soviets would not employ their considerable military capabilities in the Pacific against U.S. vital interests if it served their purpose, and indeed it would.

The very bedrock of our strategy in the Pacific is flexible, unified operations involving all of the forces that are highly trained, and a strategy that capitalizes on the individual unit readiness that we enjoy in the Pacific.

The optimism I have for the strategy I have described must be tempered by the realization that a war with the Soviets in the Pacific would have to be dealt with on a sequential basis. It is not possible to simultaneously do the things that would be in our best interests, and there will be a requirement to set priorities if we have a conflict with the Soviets.

As a net assessment, I can say that our forces enjoy hardware that works. Our ranks are filled with some of America's very finest. I believe that we have an excellent network of alliances and friendships that will be useful in any kind of a conflict. The nations in the Pacific continue to mature economically and politically, and there is no question that that region will increase in its importance to our Nation.

In the problem areas, I would highlight first and foremost our sustainability problem. We are good, but we cannot sustain an operation to the degree that would be necessary. I worry a great deal about the growing submarine threat in the Pacific, and we have deficiencies in air defense. There are other areas of very serious concern such as the instability and the uncertainty of the Korean Peninsula, the insurgency that is continuing to grow in the Philippines, and after the events of the last 24 hours you might add, instability to that problem.

The continuing occupation of Cambodia by the Vietnamese, and the antinuclear sentiment you so often encounter in the Pacific are matters of great concern. But as a result of this committee's and the Congress' support of budgets, I believe that today we are realizing success in the goals and objectives that we have in the Pacific.

You will be addressing a budget in the near-term that I believe contains an adequate balance. It does not contain as much as I would like to see, but the balance between the various warfighting categories seems to be satisfactory. With your continuing support, I am confident that we can continue to realize success in the Nation's objectives in the Pacific.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Hays follows:]

Prepared Statement of Adm. Ronald J. Hays, USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE,

I RESPECTFULLY CONGRATULATE THIS COMMITTEE FOR ITS FOCUS ON U. S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, THE BEDROCK OF ALL DEFENSE MATTERS. I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR INTEREST IN A UNIFIED COMMANDER'S VIEWS ON REGIONAL STRATEGY, AND WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE PACIFIC THEATER AND THE IMPORTANT PART IT PLAYS IN OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. I ALSO WANT TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR THE CLARIFICATION IN AUTHORITY OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS CONTAINED IN THE NEW DOD REORGANIZATION BILL. THIS LEGISLATION WILL CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVED JOINT CAPABILITIES AND IT OFFERS CLEAR CUT RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.

WHILE THE FOCUS IS ON STRATEGY, FORCE STRUCTURE AND FORCE READINESS, ALONG WITH STAYING POWER, DETERMINE U. S. MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND, THUS, OUR ABILITY TO SATISFY THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY. I WILL SPOTLIGHT THE STRENGTHS AND THE SHORTCOMINGS OF OUR MILITARY POSTURE IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND AREA LATER IN MY STATEMENT.

INTRODUCTION

BY THE END OF WORLD WAR II, THE UNITED STATES REIGNED SUPREME MILITARILY THROUGHOUT THE PACIFIC THEATER. THE NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE INCLUDED 26 CARRIERS, 23 BATTLESHIPS, AND ABOUT 180 SUBMARINES. APPROXIMATELY 15,000 COMBAT AIRCRAFT WERE IN THEATER AND U. S. GROUND FORCES WERE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE FAR EAST, ON ISLANDS AND ATOLLS ACROSS THE VAST PACIFIC OCEAN. WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, FORCES EBBED AND FLOWED AS CRISES DEVELOPED, PARTICULARLY WITH THE KOREAN AND VIETNAM CONFLICTS. DESPITE FLUCTUATIONS, FOR 40 YEARS WE COULD CLAIM WITH CONFIDENCE THAT WE ENJOYED MILITARY SUPERIORITY IN THE PACIFIC. THE CLAIM WAS VALID EVEN THOUGH THE PRIMARY U. S. FOCUS WAS ON NATO EUROPE. DURING THE EXTENDED PERIOD OF OUR COMMANDING MILITARY POSTURE, DRAMATIC CHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE PACIFIC. TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO WE HAD ONLY LIMITED TRADE WITH JAPAN, KOREA WAS A POOR NATION WITH A BLEAK OUTLOOK, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WAS AN AVOWED ADVERSARY, PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY WAS A PREOCCUPATION, THE SOUTH PACIFIC ISLANDS WERE MOSTLY PROTECTORATES OF THE MAJOR POWERS, AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE PACIFIC WERE SECOND-RATE WITH THE SOLE MISSION OF HOME DEFENSE. TODAY, JAPAN IS OUR LARGEST TRADING PARTNER, THE ECONOMIES OF THE REGION HAVE PROSPERED, WE HAVE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, NUMEROUS INDEPENDENT ISLAND NATIONS EXIST IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, AND THE SOVIET MILITARY HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED INTO A FIRST RATE OFFENSIVE FIGHTING FORCE WITH SEA DENIAL AND POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES. AGAINST THIS BACKDROP, DEMOCRATIC IDEALS HAVE FLOURISHED, AND OUR OWN INTERESTS IN THE REGION HAVE GROWN EXPONENTIALLY. ALL THIS HAS TAKEN PLACE UNDER AN UMBRELLA OF U. S. MILITARY POWER THAT HAS PROVIDED THE EXTERNAL SECURITY NECESSARY TO INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT. THE THEATER'S SIZE, THE SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL

MATURING, THE DYNAMIC ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND THE RESULTANT INCREASE IN IMPORTANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS SUGGEST, AS CLAIMED BY MANY, THAT THE 21ST CENTURY WILL BE "THE CENTURY OF THE PACIFIC".

THE CONCLUSION HAS NOT GONE UNNOTICED BY THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH HAS EXPRESSLY STATED ITS INTENTION TO BECOME A PACIFIC POWER, SOMETHING IT HAS NOT BEEN BEFORE. THE DRAMATIC BUILD UP IN MILITARY FORCES ALREADY IN EVIDENCE, PLUS THE MORE RECENT POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC, AND ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE THROUGHOUT THE REGION, ARE ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE PACIFIC. THE SOVIET'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE WOULD MAKE LITTLE HEADWAY, WITHOUT ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION, INTIMIDATION, OR SUBVERSION, ALL OF WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE NOW IN A POSITION TO EMPLOY THROUGHOUT THE PACIFIC. THE COMPETITION IS ENGAGED. AT STAKE ARE OUR VITAL INTERESTS. WE MUST PREPARE OURSELVES FOR THE MARATHON BY EMPLOYING A STRATEGY THAT IS FLEXIBLE AND ADAPTABLE AND ACCEPT THAT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF OUR PACIFIC REGIONAL STRATEGY MUST BE THE PRESERVATION OF CONVENTIONAL MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

TRENDS

ONE CAN BE SOMEWHAT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PACIFIC. JAPAN HAS BECOME AN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER AND, WITH A GROWING APPRECIATION OF THE THREAT TO JAPANESE INTERESTS POSED BY SOVIET MILITARY FORCES, HAS DEVELOPED A CREDITABLE SELF DEFENSE FORCE. JAPAN'S COMMITMENT TO DEFEND SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS OUT TO 1000 MILES, THE DECISION TO FUND FULLY THE SECOND YEAR OF THE 1986-1990 MID-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM, THE SURPASSING OF THE SELF-IMPOSED BARRIER OF 1% OF ITS GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT TO ITS OWN DEFENSE AND INCREASED CONTRIBUTIONS TO LABOR COST SHARING, ALL BODE WELL FOR SHARED SECURITY INTEREST AND REPRESENT MOVEMENT TOWARD THE INCREASED JAPANESE DEFENSE SPENDING WE HAVE URGED. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S ECONOMY, WITH A 12.5% GROWTH RATE IN 1986, IS THE MOST RAPIDLY DEVELOPING ECONOMY IN THE WORLD. THESE ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS PLUS SUCCESSFUL SPONSORSHIP OF THE ASIAN GAMES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE UPCOMING 1988 OLYMPICS HAVE ENHANCED KOREA'S STATURE INTERNATIONALLY. ON THE SECURITY SIDE, THE ROK IS DEDICATED TO IMPROVING AN ALREADY FORMIDABLE MILITARY FORCE AND WILL SPEND ABOUT 5.5% OF ITS GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ON DEFENSE IN 1987. HOWEVER, THE COUNTRY IS FACED WITH AN UNPREDICTABLE THREAT FROM THE NORTH THAT HAS NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN WARFIGHTING EQUIPMENT AND TROOPS. THE COMBINED U. S.-ROK FORCES, INCREASINGLY INTEGRATED AND INTEROPERABLE, ARE CAPABLE AND POSTURED TO DETER ADVENTURES FROM PYONGYANG.

IN THE PHILIPPINES, PRESIDENT AQUINO OFFERS THE BEST HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY IN YEARS, AND, DESPITE SERIOUS PROBLEMS, STEADY PROGRESS IS BEING REALIZED. VITAL TO SURVIVAL WILL BE ABUNDANT ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE FROM NATIONS FRIENDLY WITH THE PHILIPPINES. THAILAND, ANOTHER ALLY BY TREATY AND A FRONT LINE STATE, DESPITE TRADE ISSUES WITH US, REMAINS A STAUNCH FRIEND.

WE HAVE AN EXTENSIVE BILATERAL MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM WITH THAILAND, AND THE INTEROPERABILITY OF OUR FORCES HAS ENHANCED THE WARFIGHTING ABILITY IN THE REGION. THE AGREEMENT SIGNED JUST THIS MONTH TO ESTABLISH A STOCKPILE OF WAR RESERVE SUPPLIES AND AMMUNITION IN THAILAND WILL ENHANCE THAILAND'S DETERRENCE POSTURE AND THEREFORE CONTRIBUTE TO OVERALL STABILITY IN THE REGION.

A DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN THE REGION IS THE CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA BY VIETNAM, AND IT IS SIGNIFICANT TO NOTE THAT THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN DENYING A POLITICAL VICTORY FOR VIETNAM. IT CAN ALSO BE SAID THAT THE GOOD LEVEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN ASEAN NATIONS HAS BEEN A STABILIZING FACTOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

BELOW THE EQUATOR, WE BENEFIT FROM A STRONG ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH AUSTRALIA AND AWAIT WITH INTEREST THE SOON TO BE PUBLISHED GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA WHITE PAPER ON DEFENSE. EXTENSIVE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY ACTIVITY SERVES OUR MUTUAL BEST INTEREST. WE ESPECIALLY BENEFIT BY THE SUPPORT FOR JOINT FACILITIES, PORT VISITS BY OUR NAVY SHIPS, AND USE OF TRAINING AREAS. BOTH OUR NATIONS BENEFIT FROM AN EXTENSIVE BILATERAL TRAINING PROGRAM AND PERSONNEL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.

THE UNFOLDING RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, BASED THUS FAR ON HIGH LEVEL VISITS, EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, FOREIGN MILITARY SALES, AND SELECTIVE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO REGIONAL STABILITY. SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO BEIJING LAST OCTOBER AND OUR RECENT U. S. NAVY PORT CALL IN QINGDAO LAST NOVEMBER, THE FIRST TIME IN 37 YEARS, ILLUSTRATE HOW FAR AND HOW FAST THE RELATIONSHIP HAS DEVELOPED. FURTHER WEST IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, WE HAVE BEGUN TO OPEN A MORE MEANINGFUL DIALOG WITH INDIA AS EVIDENCED BY THE VISIT IN OCTOBER OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE ALDRIDGE'S VISIT IN NOVEMBER, AND CONGRESSIONAL VISITS IN MID-DECEMBER. I HOPE TO CONTINUE THE DIALOG WITH MY UPCOMING VISIT.

CONCERNS

OPTIMISM FOR THE FUTURE IN THE PACIFIC THEATER IS MODERATED BY THE REALITY OF DEVELOPMENTS COUNTER TO OUR BEST INTEREST. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, THE TRADE IMBALANCE IS OMINOUS. OUR FRIENDS IN ASIA HAVE PROSPERED THROUGH ACCESS TO U. S. MARKETS. IF PROTECTIONIST MEASURES ARE TAKEN THAT DAMAGE VITAL TRADE RELATIONSHIPS, ECONOMIES AS WELL AS POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS WILL SUFFER. SINCE A SOUND ECONOMY IS ESSENTIAL TO A SOUND MILITARY, THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR ADVERSE EFFECT ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

ON THE MILITARY SIDE, THE PREEMINENT CONCERN IS THE DRAMATIC SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN SIZE AND CAPABILITY. ASIDE FROM THE EXPANDED FORCE STRUCTURE, SOVIET INITIATIVES WHICH ARE COUNTER TO OUR SECURITY INTERESTS INCLUDE:

° A NEW PHASE IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA THAT ENTAILS LARGE INCREASES IN SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, AND EVER INCREASING MILITARY COOPERATION.

° THE REINFORCEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES LOCATED ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES OF JAPAN.

° THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SUPPORT AND OPERATING BASE AT CAM RANH BAY VIETNAM.

° THE INCREASED RESOURCE SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM THAT FUNDS VIETNAM'S ADVENTURISM.

° THE ENHANCED DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT THE REGION AND THE ECONOMIC PENETRATIONS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC.
OTHER CONCERNS OF NOTE INCLUDE:

° AN UNPREDICTABLE, BELLICOSE, FORWARD LEANING, MILITARILY STRONG DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA..

° THE GROWING INSURGENCY AND FACTIONALISM IN THE PHILIPPINES.

° VIETNAM'S CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA AND THE OCCASIONAL VIOLATION OF THAILAND'S SOVEREIGN TERRITORY.

° AN ANTI-NUCLEAR SENTIMENT IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, THE MOST VISIBLE MANIFESTATION OF WHICH IS NEW ZEALAND'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PORT VISITS BY U. S. NAVY SHIPS UNDER OUR NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY POLICY -- AND THE RESULTING SUSPENSION OF U. S. DEFENSE OBLIGATIONS TO NEW ZEALAND.

MILITARY STRATEGY

CHALLENGES TO OUR BEST INTEREST ABOUND. NONETHELESS, OPTIMISTIC TRENDS HAVE DEVELOPED, THROUGHOUT THE PACIFIC THEATER, IN LARGE MEASURE, BECAUSE OF A REASSURING SECURITY POSTURE -- A POSTURE MADE POSSIBLE BY STRONG, FORWARD DEPLOYED U. S. MILITARY FORCES; AND AN EFFECTIVE NETWORK OF ALLIANCES AND FRIENDSHIPS.

WE HAVE BEEN GUIDED BY AN OVERARCHING MILITARY OBJECTIVE IN THE PACIFIC THAT IS THE SAME AS ELSEWHERE, DETER WAR AND, IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE TO PREVENT WAR, BE PREPARED TO FIGHT AND WIN. IN THE PROCESS, ASSIST IN THE MAINTENANCE OF A STABLE ENVIRONMENT AND SAFEGUARD U. S. INTERESTS. WITHIN THE OBJECTIVE ARE TWO PREEMINENT CONSIDERATIONS:

° THE DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA, WITH EMPHASIS ON STRATEGIC DETERRENCE. KEY INSTALLATIONS IN ALASKA AND THE ALEUTIANS, SOMETIMES UNDERAPPRECIATED BY DEFENSE PLANNERS, MUST BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THAT DEFENSE.

° ASSIST IN THE DEFENSE OF ALLIES LOCATED IN ASIA AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC REGIONS.

THE PACIFIC REGION IS BY GEOGRAPHY A MARITIME THEATER AND OUR ABILITY TO PREVAIL AT SEA IS THE CORNERSTONE OF ANY PACIFIC STRATEGY. THE CHALLENGE IS GREATEST IN THE NORTHWEST PACIFIC WHERE THE PREDOMINANT SOVIET THREAT IS LOCATED.

STRATEGY

OUR STRATEGY CAN BE DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS -- A PEACETIME STRATEGY, AND A WARFIGHTING STRATEGY. WHILE WE POSTURE FOR A CONTINGENCY WE ALL HOPE WILL NOT OCCUR, YOU MAY WELL ASK HOW WE EMPLOY OUR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN THE PACIFIC IN PEACETIME. ABOVE ALL, WE MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS THROUGH CONSTANT TRAINING AND FREQUENT EXERCISES, MUCH OF WHICH OCCURS IN THE FORWARD AREAS. IN THE PROCESS WE SATISFY A CONDITION VITAL TO THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERRENT -- A CAPABLE, FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCE PREPARED TO FIGHT AND WIN SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL. BEYOND THAT, WE ATTEMPT TO USE OUR MILITARY RESOURCES AND CONDUCT MILITARY-TO-MILTARY DIPLOMACY IN WAYS WHICH ASSIST IN THE MAINTENANCE OF A STABLE ENVIRONMENT AND WHICH MINIMIZE SOVIET INFLUENCE.

AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE ACTIVITIES IS TENDING TO THE HEALTH OF OUR ALLIANCES IN THE REGION, THROUGH SUCH MEANS AS PORT VISITS, FREQUENT SENIOR AND WORKING LEVEL CONTACTS, AND EXERCISES TO INSURE A HIGH DEGREE OF INTEROPERABILITY. GOING A STEP FURTHER AFIELD, WE WORK TO MAINTAIN CORDIAL MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS WITH FRIENDLY NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES IN THE THEATER -- TRAINING AND PERSONAL CONTACTS PLAY A LARGE ROLE IN THIS EFFORT -- AND WE BELIEVE THAT IN THIS WAY WE ENCOURAGE THESE COUNTRIES TO SEE THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS AS PARALLEL TO OURS AND REDUCE RECEPTIVITY TO SOVIET BLANDISHMENTS. AN EFFORT OF THIS TYPE IS THE DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

A UNIQUE ELEMENT OF THIS STRATEGY HAS OCCURRED IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, AN AREA IN WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE SHOWING INCREASED INTEREST; THERE WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONDUCT TRAINING EXERCISES WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO DISASTER RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION AND HAVE THEREBY REKINDLED GOODWILL TOWARD THE U. S. AT MODEST COST.

THESE ARE A FEW ILLUSTRATIONS OF OUR PEACETIME STRATEGY OF USING MILITARY ASSETS TO ENCOURAGE STABILITY -- AND THUS STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AND LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT SHOULD CONFLICT OCCUR.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF OUR PEACETIME STRATEGY IS THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. MUCH CAN BE SAID ABOUT THE WAY SECURITY ASSISTANCE STRENGTHENS RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COUNTRIES, PERMITS THE INTEROPERABILITY OF FORCES SO ESSENTIAL TO COMBINED

OPERATIONS, IMPROVES CAPACITY FOR OUR OWN SELF DEFENSE, AND EFFECTIVELY COUNTERS SOVIET INFLUENCE. UNFORTUNATELY SECURITY ASSISTANCE HAS NOT FARED WELL IN THE BUDGET PROCESS. THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDIT AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PORTIONS OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE BUDGET FOR PACIFIC NATIONS WERE REDUCED BY OVER 70% BETWEEN FY86 AND 87, FROM $371.5 MILLION TO $110.5 MILLION. EVEN FOR THE PHILIPPINES, WHERE AN ACTIVE INSURGENCY POSES A CONSTANT THREAT TO A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE HAD TO BE CUT IN HALF WHILE OTHER COUNTRIES WERE ELIMINATED FROM THE PROGRAM ENTIRELY. THESE ACTIONS COMBINED WITH CUTS IN CIVILIAN AID SECTORS WEAKEN U. S. PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING MAJOR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR OWN INFLUENCE. UNQUESTIONABLY, A HEALTHY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM SERVES IN OUR OWN BEST INTEREST.

WARFIGHTING STRATEGY

IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT A CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIETS COULD BE CONFINED TO A SINGLE GEOGRAPHIC AREA. ONE MUST ASSUME THAT THE SOVIETS, WITH WORLDWIDE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS, RAPID TRANSPORT, A TWO FRONT WAR POSTURE, AND FACILITIES TO MAINTAIN CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN WIDELY DISPERSED FORCES AND ALLIES, WILL ATTEMPT TO PREEMPT U. S. CAPABILITY WHEREVER IT IS LOCATED. WITH SOVIET FORCES NOW RANGING THROUGHOUT THE PACIFIC, OUR WARFIGHTING STRATEGY IS BASED ON FORWARD DEPLOYED, HIGHLY MOBILE, INTEROPERABLE, COMBAT READY FORCES, CAPABLE OF FIGHTING EFFECTIVELY IN BOTH JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS. BY POSTURING FORWARD EARLY DURING THE PRE-CONFLICT PERIOD, BOTH DETERRENCE AND TACTICAL POSITIONING FOR COMBAT ARE WELL SERVED. IN THE PACIFIC, THIS STRATEGY PUTS ENEMY FORCES AT GRAVE RISK. IN SUMMARY, OUR MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC IS BUILT UPON THE DETERRENT VALUE OF MARITIME SUPERIORITY, FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES CAPABLE OF BEING RAPIDLY REINFORCED, STRONG ALLIANCES, GOOD RELATIONS WITH NON-ALLIED FRIENDS, AND EXPANDED U. S. INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE REGION.

U. S. FORCE CAPABILITIES

LET ME NOW REVIEW OUR CAPACITY FOR SUCH A STRATEGY. THE LARGEST MILITARY COMPONENT IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND IS OUR PACIFIC FLEET. APPROXIMATELY ONE-HALF OF THE U. S. NAVY STRENGTH AND TWO-THIRDS OF OUR MARINE FORCE STRUCTURE ARE IN USPACOM, REFLECTING THE MARITIME NATURE OF THE THEATER. THERE ARE TWO ARMY DIVISIONS, ONE BASED IN KOREA AND THE SECOND, MY STRATEGIC RESERVE, IS IN HAWAII AT SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. THE AIR FORCE HAS FIVE TACTICAL FIGHTER WINGS, ONE BASED IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND TWO EACH IN JAPAN AND KOREA. THESE FORCES ARE WELL EQUIPPED AND MANNED BY SKILLED AND MOTIVATED MEN AND WOMEN. WHILE WE ARE ABOUT AS PREPARED ON AN INDIVIDUAL UNIT BASIS AS WE HAVE EVER BEEN IN PEACETIME, THERE ARE CONCERNS ABOUT THE GROWING SOVIET AIR AND SUBMARINE THREATS AND ABOUT THE ADEQUACY OF OUR THREAT MUNITIONS INVENTORY. THANKS TO THE SUPPORT OF THE CONGRESS AND, IN PARTICULAR, THIS COMMITTEE, QUALITY IMPROVEMENTS IN HARDWARE THAT TRANSLATE INTO NEEDED MILITARY CAPABILITIES HAVE BEEN REALIZED. TO HIGHLIGHT A FEW SYSTEMS THAT HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE:

° AEGIS CRUISER - A SYSTEM THAT CAN PROVIDE A PROTECTIVE COVER AROUND A NAVAL DISPOSITION. TEST AFTER TEST INDICATES THAT IT WORKS. AEGIS IS A NEW DIMENSION IN WARFARE. WE NOW HAVE TWO IN THE PACIFIC AND MORE ARE COMING.

° TRIDENT SUBMARINE - THE MOST SECURE LEG OF THE STRATEGIC TRIAD, THE TRIDENT IS EVEN MORE INVULNERABLE AND MORE CAPABLE THAN ITS PREDECESSOR.

° LOS ANGELES CLASS ATTACK SUBMARINES - QUIET AND EFFECTIVE.

° BATTLESHIPS - PROVIDE NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT; WITH TOMAHAWK, COMPLEMENT CARRIER AIR AND IN AREAS WHERE AIR SUPERIORITY IS MAINTAINED, CAN BE USED IN LIEU OF A CARRIER; AN AWESOME WEAPONS SUITE THAT SERVES WELL IN A "PRESENCE" ROLE.

° CONVENTIONAL TOMAHAWK - WITH PRECISE ACCURACY AND STAND-OFF RANGE, ANOTHER NEW DIMENSION IN WARFARE.

° F/A-18 - INTRODUCED INTO BOTH NAVY AND MARINE FORCE STRUCTURE EASILY AND EFFECTIVELY.

° SURVEILLANCE TOWED ARRAY SONAR SYSTEM - AN ANTI-SUBMARINE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM THAT PERFORMS.

° AWACS - LIMITED IN NUMBERS BUT HAS MADE A DIFFERENCE IN ONE OF THE THEATER'S GREATEST OPERATIONAL DEFICIENCIES, AIR SURVEILLANCE.

° F-15/F-16 - SUPERB FIGHTERS, FORWARD DEPLOYED IN KOREA AND JAPAN FOR MAXIMUM DETERRENT EFFECT.

° LAND FORCES MOBILITY AND FIRE POWER - THE INTRODUCTION OF THE BLACKHAWK UTILITY HELICOPTER, THE CH-53E HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTER, THE "HMMWV" TRANSPORT, AND THE M-198 155M HOWITZER PERMIT RAPID DEPLOYMENT WITH SUPPORTING FIREPOWER IN ANY BATTLEFIELD.

FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES, SUCH AS THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A 600 SHIP NAVY, THE CONVERSION OF THE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION IN HAWAII TO A LIGHT DIVISION, BEDDOWN OF A SECOND MISAWA-BASED F-16 SQUADRON, LATER THIS YEAR, AND THE ACTIVATION OF OUR SECOND SQUADRON OF MARITIME PREPOSITIONED SHIPS (MPS) HAVE ENHANCED OUR ABILITY FOR RAPID RESPONSE. FROM TRIDENT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, WE IN THE PACIFIC ARE PREPARED TO OPERATE ACROSS THE FULL SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT -- THE ESSENCE OF OUR DETERRENCE STRATEGY.

ALLIED/FRIENDLY FORCE CAPABILITIES

UNLIKE NATO, ALLIANCES IN THE PACIFIC ARE NOW ESSENTIALLY ON A BILATERAL BASIS. NONETHELESS, THE ALLIANCE NETWORK FORMS AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR SECURITY POSTURE. WITHIN THE PACIFIC BASIN, WE HAVE FORMAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS WITH FIVE COUNTRIES - JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, THAILAND, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND AUSTRALIA. UNTIL LAST AUGUST, I WOULD HAVE INCLUDED NEW ZEALAND BUT AT THAT TIME WE SUSPENDED OUR DEFENSE OBLIGATIONS BECAUSE OF NEW ZEALAND'S STANCE ON NAVAL PORT VISITS. WE ALSO HAVE IMPORTANT SECURITY RELATED RELATIONS WITH SEVERAL CRITICAL COUNTRIES IN THE THEATER, WHO HAVE CAPABLE SELF DEFENSE FORCES. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO FORMAL SECURITY TREATIES WITH THESE COUNTRIES, MANY OF WHOM WISH TO MAINTAIN A NON-ALIGNED STATUS.

JAPAN HAS MADE IMPRESSIVE STRIDES IN THE PAST FEW YEARS TOWARDS A CAPABLE SELF DEFENSE FORCE. TODAY THE FORCE CONSISTS OF 250,000 HIGHLY QUALIFIED, WELL-TRAINED PEOPLE AND THE FORCE STRUCTURE INCLUDES SUCH SYSTEMS AS THE F-15, E-2, P-3, A NEW TANK, NEW DESTROYERS, AND CONVENTIONAL SUBMARINES. THE JAPANESE AIR SELF DEFENSE FORCE INVENTORY HAS MORE AIRCRAFT THAN DOES THE U. S. AIR FORCE IN JAPAN, KOREA, AND THE PHILIPPINES COMBINED. THE JAPANESE MARITIME SELF DEFENSE FORCE HAS THREE TIMES AS MANY DESTROYER-TYPE SHIPS AS THE U. S. SEVENTH FLEET, WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFENDING THE ENTIRE WESTERN PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS.

SOUTH KOREA IS A CLOSE ALLY WHO COOPERATES EFFECTIVELY IN MILITARY MATTERS. A 600,000 MAN FORCE STRUCTURE IS WELL TRAINED, HIGHLY MOTIVATED, SUPERBLY DISCIPLINED, AND WELL LED BY A PROFESSIONAL OFFICER CORPS. KEY TO THE EXTRAORDINARY EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR DETERRENT STRATEGY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA IS THE U. S. AND ROK COMBINED FORCES COMMAND WHICH USES COMMON EQUIPMENT, TRAINS TOGETHER, AND USES COMMON PROCEDURES AND TACTICS. THE RESULTING INTEROPERABILITY BETWEEN FORCES SERVES AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER. THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, CONSISTING OF 650,000 HARDENED U. S. AND KOREAN TROOPS, IS A TRULY PROFESSIONAL MILITARY FORCE.

THE OLD ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES WERE POORLY LED BY POLITICIZED LEADERS, POORLY SUPPORTED, AND UNDISCIPLINED. THESE FORCES WERE FACED WITH A RISING INSURGENCY AND THEIR OWN ABUSES OF THE POPULATION CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROBLEM. THE INSURGENCY REMAINS, BUT ALL ELSE HAS CHANGED UNDER PRESIDENT AQUINO. HER RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEMS FACING THE PHILIPPINES MUST ENCOMPASS SOUND SOCIAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY SOLUTIONS. WE THINK THAT COMPETENT LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO BE IN POSITION, ABUSES HAVE DECLINED, TRAINING IS BEING EMPHASIZED, AVAILABLE, BUT LIMITED, RESOURCES ARE BEING APPLIED MORE EFFECTIVELY, AND A STRATEGY TO COMBAT THE INSURGENCY IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT. THE REBUILDING PROCESS IS WELL UNDERWAY, BUT FULL RECOVERY WILL TAKE BOTH TIME AND AN INFUSION OF RESOURCES BEYOND THE MEANS OF THE

STRUGGLING GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. OUR OWN SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR THE PHILIPPINES IS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE RECOVERY PROCESS AND INVESTMENTS NOW, AT A TIME WHEN THEY ARE SO URGENTLY NEEDED, MAY AVOID THE NEED FOR EVEN GREATER ASSISTANCE IN THE FUTURE.

REGARDLESS OF THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE CEASEFIRE, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES WILL NEED CAPABLE, LOYAL ARMED FORCES FOR INTERNAL SECURITY. THE NEW ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS, CONSISTING OF 175,000 PEOPLE, IS MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF THAT NEED. IN THE INTERIM, EXTERNAL SECURITY FOR THE COUNTRY IS PROVIDED BY U. S. MILITARY FORCES THROUGH OUR MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY, THE MOST VISIBLE MANIFESTATION OF WHICH IS THE BASES COMPLEX AT CLARK AND SUBIC. A MAJORITY OF FILIPINOS RECOGNIZE THE BENEFIT OF THE BASES TO THEIR OWN INTEREST AND ENDORSE OUR PRESENCE, FACTORS IMPORTANT TO CONTINUATION OF OUR MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT BEYOND 1991.

THAILAND IS, IN MANY WAYS, A FRONT LINE STATE WITH A LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT WITH VIETNAM ALONG ITS CAMBODIAN BORDER. THE COUNTRY BENEFITS FROM MILITARILY COMPETENT ARMED FORCES THAT NUMBER 240,000, THE DOMINANT SHARE OF WHICH IS THE ROYAL THAI ARMY WITH A STRENGTH OF 160,000. THAILAND HAS TURNED TO THE UNITED STATES TO ACQUIRE MILITARY HARDWARE AND PLANS ARE IN PROGRESS TO PURCHASE THE F-16, CORVETTES, AND COBRA HELICOPTERS. IN ADDITION TO THESE IMPORTANT PROGRAMS, THE MILITARY TO MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH THAILAND ARE SUPERB AS EVIDENCED IN ANNUAL BILATERAL EXERCISES AND NUMEROUS EXCHANGE PROGRAMS. THIS RESULT REASSURES THAILAND AND PROVIDES AN IMPORTANT MEASURE OF STABILITY THROUGHOUT SOUTHEAST ASIA.

AUSTRALIA MAINTAINS AN EFFECTIVE, WELL TRAINED MILITARY FORCE OF 71,000 MEN CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING A WIDE RANGE OF LAND, AIR, AND SEA OPERATIONS. THE AUSSIE MILITARY IS BEING MODERNIZED WITH NEW SYSTEMS SUCH AS THE F/A-18 HORNET, BLACKHAWK HELICOPTER AND FFG-7 PERRY CLASS FRIGATE. EQUIPMENT COMMONALITY COUPLED WITH NUMEROUS MILITARY-TO-MILITARY FORA AND A STRONG BILATERAL EXERCISE PROGRAM CONSTANTLY IMPROVE AN ALREADY EXCELLENT CAPACITY FOR AUSTRALIAN/U. S. INTEROPERABILITY. AS EVIDENCED BY THE DIBB REPORT AND SOON TO BE PUBLISHED GOVERNMENT DEFENSE POLICY WHITE PAPER, AUSTRALIA IS DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR STRUCTURING, EQUIPPING, AND TRAINING ITS DEFENSE FORCES. AUSTRALIAN STRATEGY STUDIES, FORCE MODERNIZATION, AND REORGANIZATION EFFORTS STRESSING JOINT OPERATIONS WILL ALL IMPROVE AUSTRALIA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY AND THEREFORE PROMOTE REGIONAL STABILITY.

ALTHOUGH NOT COUPLED TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH FORMAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS, OUR NON-ALIGNED FRIENDS IN THE PACIFIC HAVE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES TO BE CONSIDERED.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THIS THEATER, AND, GIVEN THE NATURE OF ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL, AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT ALSO. ALTHOUGH THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY OF THREE MILLION, WITH ITS AIR AND NAVAL COMPONENTS, IS QUALITATIVELY INFERIOR TO THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FAR EAST, IT STILL POSES A THREAT TO THE SOVIETS WHICH FORCES THEM TO COUNTER WITH SOVIET FORCES IN THIS THEATER. WE BELIEVE THE CHINESE REINFORCE GLOBAL DETERRENCE AND THAT THE U. S. SHOULD ENCOURAGE CHINESE EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN STABILITY IN THE THEATER.

INDONESIA'S MILITARY FOCUS IS TO MAINTAIN THE INTERNAL STABILITY NEEDED TO FOSTER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. OUR MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS CONTINUE TO IMPROVE AND RELEASE OF THE F-16 AND HARPOON SYSTEMS WILL HELP FOSTER THIS WARMING TREND. INDONESIAN AND MALAYSIAN COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO INCREASE SECURITY IN THE MALACCA STRAITS OFFER OBVIOUS U. S. AND ALLIED BENEFITS. RECENT AGREEMENTS WITH SINGAPORE ENSURE SECURE DATA LINK INTEROPERABILITY AND ENHANCE OPERATIONS AMONG THEIR AIRCRAFT, AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS CENTER, AND U. S. E-2C/E-3A AIRCRAFT, AS WELL AS U. S. NAVY SHIPS. SENIOR LEVEL VISITS AND MARITIME PASSING EXERCISES HELP FOSTER GOOD RELATIONS WITH BRUNEI, WHOSE FORCES OPERATE REGULARLY WITH THE SINGAPORE MILITARY. FIJI HAS A SMALL BUT PROFESSIONAL ARMED FORCE WHICH FOR YEARS HAS BEEN PROVIDING AN INFANTRY BATTALION FOR DUTY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH UNIFIL AND THE SINAI MULTILATERAL FORCE. DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF THESE NON-ALIGNED NATIONS PROMOTE REGIONAL STABILITY AND ASSIST IN OUR OVERALL PEACETIME STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

THE SOVIET UNION'S ENLARGED AMBITIONS IN THE PACIFIC WERE FORESHADOWED BY GORBACHEV'S 1986 SPEECH IN VLADIVOSTOK, IN WHICH HE ANNOUNCED A PARTIAL "WITHDRAWAL" FROM AFGHANISTAN AND PUT FORTH A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS -- INCLUDING INCREASED SINO-SOVIET SPACE COOPERATION, SINO-VIETNAMESE AND ASEAN-INDOCHINA TENSION REDUCTION TALKS, DISCUSSION OF FORCE REDUCTIONS ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER, AN ASIAN "HELSINKI" CONFERENCE, AND NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES. AS THE "WITHDRAWAL" FROM AFGHANISTAN DEMONSTRATED, THERE MAY BE LESS TO HIS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THAN MEETS THE EYE, BUT THE SPEECH WAS NEVERTHELESS SIGNIFICANT AS AN INDICATOR OF SOVIET DETERMINATION TO BECOME AN INFLUENTIAL PLAYER IN THE PACIFIC.

THE SOVIET STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE, LARGELY UNSTATED IN THE VLADIVOSTOK SPEECH, CONTAINS A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS. THE FIRST -- AND FOR THE SOVIETS, THE EASIEST -- STEP IS TO CREATE A CONVINCING MILITARY PRESENCE, AS THEY HAVE DONE IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. WHILE THEY HAVE NOT YET MADE MUCH OVERT POLITICAL USE OF THEIR NEWLY STRENGTHENED MILITARY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC, WE KNOW FROM EXPERIENCE IN OTHER REGIONS THAT

THEY ARE PRONE TO USE THEIR MILITARY MIGHT TO ESTABLISH A PRESENCE, GAIN INFLUENCE, INTIMIDATE, AND DEVELOP MILITARY COALITIONS WITH SYMPATHETIC OR SUBSERVIENT NATIONS. IN THE PACIFIC, AS ELSEWHERE, THEY UNDOUBTEDLY SEE THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE AS THE INITIAL POWER BASE FROM WHICH TO BECOME AN INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL PLAYER IN THE REGION.

ECONOMIC POLICY IS PROBABLY THE SECOND ELEMENT IN SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC. THEY CANNOT, OF COURSE, COMPETE EFFECTIVELY IN THE ASIAN MARKETPLACE. HOWEVER, AS WE HAVE SEEN IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, THEY CAN BE ADEPT AT EXPLOITING THE ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES OF LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. WE CAN BE SURE AS WELL THAT THEY WILL STRIVE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF DISLOCATIONS CAUSED BY U. S. TRADE MEASURES AND AGRICULTURAL POLICIES -- FOR EXAMPLE, RESTRICTIONS ON TEXTILE IMPORTS AND REDUCTIONS OF SUGAR QUOTAS. ESPECIALLY IN SMALL COUNTRIES WITH FEW EXPORT COMMODITIES, A DEGREE OF DEPENDENCY COULD DEVELOP FAIRLY RAPIDLY.

CREDIBLE MILITARY CAPABILITY, FOLLOWED BY JUDICIOUS ECONOMIC PENETRATION, COULD THUS BE THE PRINCIPAL MEASURES LEADING THE WAY TO BROAD POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND A CONCOMITANT REDUCTION OF FREE WORLD POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND ACCESS.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES

UNTIL A FEW YEARS AGO, PRIORITY ALLOCATIONS IN THE SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE FAVORED THE WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS. SOVIET FAR EAST FORCES, WITH A LOW PRIORITY, WERE AT BEST A COASTAL AND HOME DEFENSE FORCE. MUCH HAS CHANGED. THE SOVIETS NOW ASSIGN FROM ONE QUARTER TO ONE THIRD OF OVERALL MILITARY HARDWARE TO THE PACIFIC FORCES AND THE UPGRADED FORCE QUALITY IS NOW NEARLY COMPARABLE TO THE REST OF THE SOVIET MILITARY.

A SUMMARY OF HIGHLIGHTS MAKES THE POINT:

° LAND FORCES HAVE GROWN FROM 20 DIVISIONS IN THE MID SIXTIES TO SOME 54 DIVISIONS TODAY PLUS A CORPS-SIZE OPERATIONAL MANEUVER GROUP. MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER HAVE BEEN ENHANCED WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF SELF PROPELLED ARTILLERY, A LARGER, MORE CAPABLE GUN ON THE T-72 TANK AND, IN THE LAST TEN YEARS, ATTACK AND HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTERS HAVE QUADRUPLED. THESE FORCES ARE CAPABLE OF LIMITED OPERATIONS TO SEIZE KEY TERRAIN IN THE THEATER, FOR EXAMPLE, THE STRAITS AROUND JAPAN WHICH LIMIT THE SOVIET FLEET'S ACCESS TO THE OPEN SEA.

° AIR FORCES HAVE GROWN FROM AN INVENTORY OF 1800 COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN THE MID SIXTIES TO 3000 TODAY. IN THE PROCESS, AN AIR FORCE ORIENTED TO DAYLIGHT, VISUAL OPERATIONS, EMPLOYING UNSOPHISTICATED ORDNANCE WITH LIMITED RANGE HAS DEVELOPED INTO A FORCE CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS THROUGHOUT THE PACIFIC, INCLUDING THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES. THE NEW FORCE IS

CAPABLE OF ALL WEATHER / ALL ASPECT FIGHTER OPERATIONS. SOPHISTICATED AVIONICS AND "SMART" WEAPONS ARE A PART OF THE INVENTORY. TO ELABORATE FURTHER ON THE FIGHTERS, THE SOVIETS NOW HAVE INTRODUCED THE MIG-31 WHICH HAS A CAPABILITY TO ENGAGE SIMULTANEOUSLY MULTIPLE TARGETS AND TO COMMAND AND CONTROL OTHER FIGHTERS IN THE AIR. STATE-OF-THE-ART SU-27 FLANKER FIGHTER, WITH ITS LOOK-DOWN, SHOOT-DOWN CAPABILITY AND ALL-ASPECT MISSILES, COMPLEMENT THE MIG-31. THE SOVIETS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF BRINGING ON LINE THE SU-25 FROGFOOT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AIRCRAFT.

TURNING TO BOMBERS, THE SOVIETS HAVE PLACED ALL OF THE NEWLY MODIFIED BEAR G LONG RANGE MARITIME STRIKE AIRCRAFT IN THE PACIFIC. THESE AIRCRAFT CARRY THREE SUPERSONIC AS-4 KITCHEN MISSILES AND HAVE AN OPERATING RADIUS THAT REACHES TO THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. THE NEW PRODUCTION BEAR H OPERATING OUT OF DOLON IN CENTRAL USSR, ROUTINELY OPERATES IN THE PACIFIC THEATER ON INTERCONTINENTAL SIMULATED STRIKE MISSIONS AGAINST U. S. TARGETS. THE BEAR H IS ARMED WITH THE NEW AS-15 AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE WITH A RANGE OF 1600 MILES. SEVERAL RECENT AIRFIELD UPGRADES ALONG THE NORTHERN COAST OF THE SOVIET UNION WILL PROVIDE FOR FORWARD STAGING OR RECOVERY AS WELL AS TANKER SUPPORT OPERATIONS. THESE NEW STRIKE FORCES AUGMENT THE 80 SUPERSONIC BACKFIRES AND OVER 200 SUPERSONIC SU-24 INTRATHEATER ATTACK AIRCRAFT.

° SOVIET NAVAL FORCES HAVE REALIZED THE MOST DRAMATIC GROWTH IN CAPABILITY. THE SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET HAS GROWN FROM 140 COMBATANTS IN THE MID SIXTIES TO 320 COMBATANTS TODAY AND IS NOW THE LARGEST OF THEIR FOUR FLEETS. ONE YEAR AGO THREE NEW CLASSES OF COMBATANTS WERE INTRODUCED INTO THE PACIFIC -- THE KIROV, THE UDOLOY AND THE SOVERMMENYY. THESE SHIPS PROVIDE FORMIDABLE DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES WITH FIVE NEW MISSILE SYSTEMS. THE KIROV ALONE CARRIES APPROXIMATELY 300 MISSILES, INCLUDING THE SS-N-19 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 300 MILES, AND BOTH LONG AND SHORT RANGE AIR DEFENSE MISSILES.

THE MODERN SUBMARINE FORCE CONSISTS OF 115 SUBMARINES, OVER HALF OF WHICH ARE NUCLEAR POWERED. THE SSBN'S OPERATE CONTINUOUSLY OFF THE WEST COAST OF THE U. S. AND IN HOME WATERS, WHERE THEY CAN ALSO REACH TARGETS IN THE U. S. THE ATTACK SUBMARINES, NEARLY HALF OF WHICH ARE NUCLEAR POWERED, OPERATE IN DEFENSE OF HOME WATERS AND OFFENSIVELY IN AN ANTI-SUBMARINE ROLE. WHILE SOVIET SUBMARINE TECHNOLOGY HAS HISTORICALLY LAGGED BEHIND THAT OF THE U. S., THE NEW AKULA CLASS IS A QUIET SUBMARINE THAT POSES A DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCES.

° EXPANDED CAPABILITIES INHERENT IN THE NEW SYSTEMS ARE BEING EXERCISED IN INNOVATIVE WAYS. FLEXIBILITY HAS BEEN IMPROVED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASE AT CAM RANH BAY. FROM THIS BASE THE SOVIETS CAN HOLD AT RISK THE SEA LINES OF

COMMUNICATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND OUR OWN FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES. JOINT OPERATIONS AMONG SOVIET FORCES ARE MORE IN EVIDENCE AND RECENTLY OBSERVED WAS A FIRST EVER COMBINED OPERATION WITH THE NORTH KOREANS. THEIR COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTION IS HARDENED, REDUNDANT, AND HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED RECENTLY WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS RELAY AIRCRAFT AND THE USE OF THE KIROV AS A COMMAND SHIP. MOBILE SS-20 INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST THREATEN OUR FRIENDS, ALLIES, AND MANY OF OUR FACILITIES. ONE THIRD OF THE TOTAL INVENTORY IS IN THE FAR EAST. THE NUMBERS OF THE MOBILE SS-25, THEIR NEWEST ICBM, ARE ALSO INCREASING.

AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THIS DISCUSSION, THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENTS IN MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE PACIFIC. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE TREND WILL CHANGE.

THE SOVIET MILITARY IS NOT THE ONLY MILITARY FORCE OF SOME CONCERN. BOTH VIETNAM AND NORTH KOREA HAVE LARGE STANDING ARMIES, AND A PARA-MILITARY FORCE OF INSURGENTS CALLED THE NEW PEOPLES ARMY IN THE PHILIPPINES CONTINUES TO GROW.

VIETNAM

VIETNAM MAINTAINS THE WORLD'S FOURTH LARGEST ARMED FORCE, NUMBERING OVER ONE MILLION MEN. APPROXIMATELY 150,000 OF THESE TROOPS ARE LOCATED IN CAMBODIA, ANOTHER 50,000 ARE LOCATED IN LAOS, AND THE PRC KEEP ANOTHER 700,000 OR SO TIED DOWN ALONG THE SINO-VIETNAMESE BORDER. VIETNAM IS ENGAGED IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT WITH BOTH THAILAND AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND WITHIN CAMBODIA. THIS ADVENTURISM IS FINANCED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

NORTH KOREA

NORTH KOREA MAINTAINS THE SIXTH LARGEST ARMED FORCE AND THE WORLD'S LARGEST UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE FORCES. APPROXIMATELY 800,000 MEN AND WOMEN SERVE IN THE FORCE. AN OMINOUS DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN THE RELOCATION OF ABOUT 60% OF ITS HIGHLY MOBILE ARMY WITHIN CLOSE PROXIMITY OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. WARNING TIMES HAVE BEEN REDUCED ACCORDINGLY. NORTH KOREA, A MILITARIZED STATE WHICH SPENDS MORE THAN 20% OF ITS GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ON THE MILITARY, IS ASSISTED ADDITIONALLY BY AID FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THIS AID HAS PRODUCED THE MIG-23 FLOGGER AND THE SA-3 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM FOR THE NORTH KOREAN INVENTORY.

INSURGENCY

THE NEW PEOPLES ARMY (NPA) IN THE PHILIPPINES NOW NUMBERS MORE THAN 23,000 MEMBERS. WHILE THE RATE OF GROWTH HAS BEEN LESS SINCE MRS. AQUINO ASSUMED THE PRESIDENCY, THE NUMBERS ARE NONETHELESS STILL GROWING AND MUSLIM FACTIONALISM IN THE SOUTH IS BECOMING MORE SERIOUS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE THAT THE

NPA IS RECEIVING SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL SUPPORT, RATHER THE MOVEMENT SEEMS TO BE FUNDED BY TAXES EXTRACTED FROM PHILIPPINE CITIZENS AND BUSINESSES.

NET ASSESSMENT

I BELIEVE THE NET ASSESSMENT OF THE PACIFIC AREA OF OPERATIONS TO BE FAVORABLE. WE CONTRIBUTE EFFECTIVELY TO MAINTENANCE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, ALTHOUGH CLEARLY, A SIMPLE STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES WOULD BE DISCOURAGING. THE RATIO OF SOVIET FAR EAST GROUND FORCES TO USPACOM LIKE FORCES IS ABOUT 20 TO ONE; FOR AIR FORCES, 1.5 TO ONE; AND FOR NAVAL MAJOR COMBATANTS, ONE TO ONE. THE SUBMARINE DISPARITY IS TWO TO ONE. IF NAVAL FORCES OF ALL TYPES ARE CONSIDERED THE RATIO IS FOUR TO ONE. THE RAW NUMBERS MUST BE TESTED AGAINST SUCH FACTORS AS INDIVIDUAL UNIT CAPABILITIES, TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES, STATE OF TRAINING, TACTICAL INNOVATIVENESS, THE GEOGRAPHY, ALLIES, UNIQUE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS, AND OTHERS. FOR EXAMPLE, MOST OF THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES AND A PORTION OF ITS AIR POWER ARE COMMITTED TO DEFENSE ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER. ANY EDGE IN VLADIVOSTOK BASED NAVAL POWER WOULD BE BLUNTED BY UNFAVORABLE GEOGRAPHY. FURTHERMORE, ALL OUR SERVICES ENJOY A TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE, ALTHOUGH THAT GAP CONTINUES TO CLOSE, AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT OUR PEOPLE ARE IN GENERAL BETTER TRAINED AND MORE INNOVATIVE.

THE SOVIETS' STRONG SUITS ARE SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AND LONG RANGE BOMBERS. ALTHOUGH OUR INVESTMENTS IN ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN PAST YEARS HAVE PROVIDED GOOD RETURN, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MAINTAIN THE EMPHASIS ON THIS WARFARE CATEGORY. THE LONG RANGE BOMBERS WITH THEIR LONG RANGE MISSILES PRESENT A NEW DIMENSION IN THE PACIFIC, ONE FOR WHICH WE ARE INADEQUATELY PREPARED AT THIS TIME. NEEDED FOR BALANCE ARE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS, ADDITIONAL AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY, AND SURVIVABILITY IMPROVEMENTS TO OUR COMMAND AND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.

ASSUMING FORCE READINESS IS MAINTAINED, SUSTAINABILITY CONTINUES TO IMPROVE, AND PROGRAMMED FORCE STRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS ARE REALIZED, WE WILL SUCCEED IN OUR PRIMARY MISSION OF DETERRING WAR IN THE PACIFIC -- AND IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF FAILURE, WE ARE PREPARED TO FIGHT AND WIN.

READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY

AS YOU WOULD EXPECT, READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY ARE TWO CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS. I AM GENERALLY PLEASED WITH THE FORCE READINESS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND. EQUIPMENT-OPERATIONAL READY RATES REMAIN WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. THE QUALITY OF OUR PEOPLE HAS NEVER BEEN BETTER, AND FORCE STRUCTURE MANNING, WHILE DEFICIENT IN SOME AREAS, IS MANAGEABLE. WE ARE FACING REDUCTIONS

IN THE OPERATIONAL TEMPO, FLYING HOURS, STEAMING HOURS, AND TRAINING AMMUNITIONS. THESE CUTS HURT, BUT WITH INTENSE MANAGEMENT, THE REDUCTIONS CAN BE ABSORBED WITHOUT SERIOUS LOSS IN READINESS. ONE TROUBLESOME DEFICIENCY IN READINESS IS THE LOW STATE OF PREPAREDNESS OF COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS ASSIGNED TO THE PACIFIC. THESE UNITS, ACTIVE AND RESERVE, ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE SUPPORT OF OUR COMBAT FORCES AND ARE NEEDED EARLY IN A CONFLICT IN A "READY" STATUS.

AN IMPORTANT DETERMINANT OF OUR OWN READINESS POSTURE IS AN EXTENSIVE AND EFFECTIVE PROGRAM OF COMBINED EXERCISES WITH FRIENDS AND ALLIES. SUCH AN EXERCISE PROGRAM IS A FORCE MULTIPLIER FOR ALL NATIONS IN THE REGION.

FURTHER, COMBINED COMMAND-AND-CONTROL INTEROPERABILITY CAN CONTRIBUTE IMPORTANTLY TO OUR REGIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE BUT IT PRESENTS DIFFICULT SECURITY, PROCEDURAL, LANGUAGE, AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS. IN OUR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE, WE HAVE RELEASED BASELINE DOCUMENTATION ON JOINT INTEROPERABILITY TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES AND ENCOURAGED PROCUREMENT OF INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS, AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS.

I AM PLEASED TO REPORT THAT THE OVERALL MILITARY READINESS POSTURE OF FRIENDS AND ALLIES CONTINUES TO IMPROVE AS DEMONSTRATED THROUGH THIS COMBINED EXERCISE PROGRAM.

WHEREAS I AM GENERALLY PLEASED WITH FORCE READINESS, OUR ABILITY TO SUSTAIN THOSE FORCES IS A DIFFERENT STORY. EVEN THOUGH IMPRESSIVE GAINS HAVE BEEN REALIZED IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, STAYING POWER REMAINS A SERIOUS CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING CONCERN. WE LACK ADEQUATE WAR RESERVE STOCKAGE OF MODERN MUNITIONS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN AIR SUPERIORITY AND TO SECURE OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS. SIMILARLY, WE LACK ADEQUATE QUANTITIES OF REPAIR PARTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT FEED OUR HIGH TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS, WHICH, BY THEIR NATURE, ARE HIGH COST, LOW DENSITY ITEMS REQUIRING LONG LEAD TIMES TO PROCURE. OF COURSE, HAVING LARGE STORES OF SUPPLIES AND REPAIR PARTS MEANS LITTLE UNLESS WE CAN MOVE THEM WHEN AND WHERE NEEDED. OUR WARTIME SHORTFALL OF INTER- AND INTRA- THEATER SEA AND AIRLIFT CAPACITY IS CAUSE FOR CONCERN. THESE SHORTAGES COUPLED WITH THE DISTANCES UNIQUE TO THE PACIFIC THEATER COMPOUND OUR SUSTAINABILITY PROBLEM.

OUR ALLIES ARE IN NO BETTER SHAPE TO SUSTAIN A WAR. MOST HAVE LESS THAN ADEQUATE LOGISTICS, TRANSPORTATION, AND SERVICE SUPPORT FORCE STRUCTURE. SOME POSITIVE EXCEPTIONS DO EXIST. THE AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH A WAR RESERVE FOR THAILAND, THE ON-GOING EFFORT TO DEVELOP AN UMBRELLA HOST NATION SUPPORT AGREEMENT WITH KOREA, AND THE EXTENSION OF THE NATO MUTUAL SUPPORT ACT TO KOREA AND JAPAN HAVE ALL CONTRIBUTED TOWARDS IMPROVING SUSTAINABILITY. ALTHOUGH THESE INITIATIVES ARE HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, A GREAT DEAL MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE TO IMPROVE SUSTAINABILITY FOR

WARFIGHTING -- AND THEREFORE, ITS DETERRENT VALUE -- OF OUR PACIFIC FORCES.

PRIORITIES AND DEFICIENCIES

A SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES AND DEFICIENCIES WHICH, IF IMPROVED, WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO DETERRENCE AND WARFIGHTING FOLLOWS:

° ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE OPERATIONS (ASW) -- THE SOVIET SUBMARINE IS OUR GREATEST THREAT AND IT'S GROWING. FORTUNATELY, WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT IN ASW IN PAST YEARS AND THE INVESTMENTS HAVE PAID OFF. THE NEW SURFACE TACTICAL ACOUSTIC SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (SURTASS) IS A CASE IN POINT, BUT THERE ARE MANY OTHER SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS. THE BEST ASW VEHICLE IS ANOTHER SUBMARINE AND IN THE PACIFIC, WE HAVE QUALITY SUBMARINES BUT ON THE QUANTITY SIDE WE ARE BADLY OUTNUMBERED. PROGRAMS WITH POTENTIAL TO IMPROVE OUR PERFORMANCE IN ASW SHOULD BE SUPPORTED.

° AIR DEFENSE -- THE INTRODUCTION OF THE AEGIS CRUISER TO THE PACIFIC PROVIDES NEEDED ASSURANCES ABOUT OUR AIR DEFENSE POSTURE AT SEA AND THE AVAILABILITY OF THE AWACS IN OKINAWA FILLS A SERIOUS AIR SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL GAP IN NORTHEAST ASIA. WITH THE GROWING LONG-RANGE BOMBER FLEET IN THE SOVIET INVENTORY, THE PROBLEM IS AIR DEFENSE OF THE REST OF THE PACIFIC -- THE ALEUTIANS, ALASKA, HAWAII, GUAM, JOHNSTON ISLAND, AND THE PHILIPPINES. NEEDED ARE LONG-RANGE RADARS, INTERCEPT RADARS, INTERCEPTORS, POINT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, AND THE SUPPORTING COMMAND AND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS STRUCTURE.

° MODERN MUNITIONS -- STAND-OFF, PRECISION MUNITIONS, BOTH AIR-TO-AIR AND AIR/SURFACE-TO- SURFACE ARE THE EQUALIZER, IF AVAILABLE IN ADEQUATE NUMBERS. IN ALL CASES, OUR STOCKAGE IS BELOW INVENTORY OBJECTIVE. TWO NEW MISSILES WHICH SHOW PARTICULAR PROMISE ARE AMRAAM AND CONVENTIONAL TOMAHAWK.

° AERIAL REFUELING -- LAND-BASED, AIRBORNE TANKERS CAN BE USED TO ENHANCE EFFECTIVENESS OF BOTH LAND-BASED AND SEA-BASED TACTICAL AIRCRAFT. AVAILABLE LAND-BASED TANKERS HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND. THEY MUST ALSO BE USED TO SUPPORT THE UNIFIED TRANSPORTATION COMMAND IN THE FLOW OF HIGH PRIORITY CARGO TO THE THEATER. IN WARTIME, THERE WILL NEVER BE ENOUGH.

° AIRLIFT/SEALIFT -- WE STILL DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT LIFT ASSETS AVAILABLE TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO A CRISIS. WHILE THE ADDITION OF A SECOND SQUADRON OF MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIPS HAS GREATLY IMPROVED THE REACTION TIME OF OUR MARINES, ADDITIONAL SHIPPING FOR THE READY RESERVE FORCE AND THE TIMELY INTRODUCTION OF C-17 AIRCRAFT INTO THE INVENTORY ARE ESSENTIAL PROGRAMS IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE THE MOBILITY NECESSARY TO SUPPORT OUR STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC.

° LONG-RANGE, ALL WEATHER ATTACK -- NEEDED IS A CAPABILITY TO STRIKE QUICKLY, AT LONG RANGE, IN ANY CONDITION OF WEATHER, DAY OR NIGHT. THE ONLY LONG- RANGE, ALL WEATHER ATTACK CAPABILITY IN THE PACIFIC TODAY RESIDES IN THE CARRIERS WHICH CAN'T BE EVERYWHERE AT ONCE. THEATER BASED F-111S, THE F-15E, AND LANTIRN PROGRAMS COULD AUGMENT THAT CAPABILITY.

°CHEMICAL WARFARE DETERRENCE -- THE SOVIET UNION HAS STOCKPILED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND IT MUST BE ASSUMED SUCH WEAPONS WOULD BE USED BY THE SOVIETS OR SURROGATES WHEN IT SERVED THEIR PURPOSE. SUCH USE CAN BE PREVENTED BY A CREDIBLE CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY. PRODUCTION OF THE BINARY WEAPON WILL GIVE US THAT CAPABILITY.

° MINE WARFARE -- A WARFARE AREA OFTEN UNDERAPPRECIATED, THAT OFFERS BOTH OPPORTUNITY AND PROBLEMS. MINES USED OFFENSIVELY HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO DISRUPT AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES. THE SOVIETS ARE WELL AWARE OF THIS FACT AND HAVE STOCKPILED A WIDE VARIETY OF MINES WITH A RANGE OF CAPABILITIES. SUPPORT FOR MINE AND MINE COUNTERMEASURES PROGRAMS IS NEEDED.

° COMMAND AND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS -- CAN BE THE ACHILLES HEEL IN WARFIGHTING UNLESS THE SYSTEM IS RELIABLE, REDUNDANT, AND ROBUST. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS NOW IN PROGRESS NEED PROTECTION. OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE IS THE ACQUISITION OF A LONG HAUL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM THAT WILL PROVIDE ASSURED COMMAND AND CONTROL UNDER STRESSED CONDITIONS. THE COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE ALEUTIANS, IN PARTICULAR, IS IN NEED OF MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS.

° PEOPLE -- WE HAVE HIGH QUALITY TODAY. SUCCESS IN THE FUTURE, DURING A PERIOD OF DIMINISHED MANPOWER AVAILABILITY, WILL BE DETERMINED BY SUPPORT FOR "PEOPLE" PROGRAMS.

° SPARE AND REPAIR PARTS -- THOUSANDS OF SEEMINGLY INSIGNIFICANT ITEMS PLAY A KEY ROLE IN SUSTAINING OUR FIGHTING FORCES. OUR POLICIES REQUIRE WE HAVE RANGE AND DEPTH IN PARTS TO SUSTAIN OUR FORCES IN COMBAT FOR 60 DAYS. WHILE OUR POSITION HAS IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS, DEFICIENCIES STILL EXIST.

° MODERNIZATION -- NEEDED FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE AND IF WE PAUSE IN THE CONTINUING FORCE UPGRADE PROGRAMS, THE SOVIETS WILL SURPASS US.

CONCLUSION

ON BALANCE, WE ARE DOING WELL IN THE PACIFIC. OUR FORCES ARE EQUIPPED WITH HARDWARE THAT WORKS, AND OUR RANKS ARE FILLED WITH AMERICA'S FINEST. WE BENEFIT FROM A NETWORK OF ALLIANCES, AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH BOTH ALLIES AND FRIENDS ARE GOOD. GOVERNMENTS AND ECONOMIES CONTINUE TO MATURE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REGION TO OUR STRATEGIC INTEREST WILL CONTINUE TO GROW IN THE FUTURE. OUR CONSTANT OBJECTIVE IS TO DETER CONFLICT WHILE REMAINING PREPARED TO FIGHT DECISIVELY IF NECESSARY. WE EMPLOY A TWO PART STRATEGY -- ONE FOR PEACETIME THAT IDENTIFIES BEST USE OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND MILITARY FORCES TO FURTHER NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, AND ONE FOR CONFLICT THAT ADDRESSES THE THREAT. CONCERNS ARE FOR THE IMPACT OF THE TRADE IMBALANCE ON OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS, THE GROWING COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, AN UNPREDICTABLE AND THREATENING NORTH KOREA, THE CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA BY THE VIETNAMESE, AND BY FAR THE GREATEST CONCERN, THE DRAMATIC GROWTH IN SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS MADE THE DECISION TO BECOME A PACIFIC POWER, A STATUS IT HAS NEVER ENJOYED. IN RECOGNITION OF THE NEW REALITIES OF THE PACIFIC, THE SOVIETS HAVE ASSEMBLED A POWERFUL MILITARY FORCE TO USE AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR A GROWING DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE. IT IS A FAMILIAR STRATEGY THAT ENTAILS ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE, POLITICAL PENETRATION, INTIMIDATION, POLITICAL COMPROMISES AND, EVENTUALLY, DOMINATION.

OUR SECURITY INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED BY MAINTAINING CONVENTIONALLY SUPERIOR FORCES, FORWARD DEPLOYED IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS, TO REASSURE FRIENDS AND REMIND THE SOVIETS. THAT WE DO TODAY, BUT TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE, WE MUST CONTINUE PLANNED FORCE STRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS, INCREASE SUSTAINABILITY, TAKE CARE OF OUR PEOPLE, AND IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITIES IN CERTAIN WARFIGHTING CATEGORIES. WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE CONGRESS AND THIS COMMITTEE TO ACHIEVE THESE PRIORITIES, I AM CONFIDENT THAT, WITH OUR TWO PART STRATEGY, WE CAN PROTECT OUR NATION'S INTEREST IN THE PACIFIC.

THANK YOU, MR CHAIRMAN, FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral.

General, we will go ahead with your statement, and then we will have questions.

STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE C. CRIST, U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

General CRIST. All right, sir.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am most pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today to testify on the U.S. military strategy within my area of responsibility. I have submitted a prepared statement which I request to be included in the record, and am prepared to make my overview statement.

Each member of the committee has been provided with a small handout for ready reference during my remarks. It has a little logo on the front.


USCENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
ROMANIA
Budapest
Vienna
ITALY
Rome
YUGOSLAVIA
Belgrade
ALBANIA
GREECE
Athens
TURKEY
Ankara
Caspian Sea
Mediterranean Sea
CYPRUS
SYRIA
LEBANON
ISRAEL
JORDAN
IRAQ
Baghdad
IRAN
Tehran
AFGHANISTAN
Kabul
PAKISTAN
Islamabad
New Delhi
NEPAL
Kathmandu
INDIA
LIBYA
Tripoli
EGYPT
Cairo
KUWAIT
BAHRAIN
QATAR
Doha
Riyadh
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Abu Dhabi
Muscat
OMAN
SAUDI ARABIA
Red Sea
Arabian Sea
CHAD
N'Djamena
SUDAN
Khartoum
PEOPLE'S DEM. REP. OF YEMEN
Sanaa
Aden
DJIBOUTI
ETHIOPIA
Addis Ababa
Socotra
SOMALIA
Mogadishu
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Bangui
UGANDA
Kampala
KENYA
Nairobi
ZAIRE
CONGO
RWANDA
BURUNDI
Bujumbura
MALDIVES
Male
SRI LANKA
Colombo
Equator
Victoria
1

With an area of responsibility shown on that first map, which encompasses 19 countries in Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa, and stretches some 3,100 miles from east to west, and 3,400 miles north to south, our strategy must be, of necessity, one of economy of force, a constrained regional strategy which incorporates the significance of the area, the threats to our interests, U.S. national and military objectives, the forces available, and finally military options which satisfy those regional objectives within a framework of limited resources. I would like to touch on each point briefly.

The primary importance of the region to the world is its principal resource: oil. Over 55 percent of the world's proven oil resources are located in the Gulf Region. As shown on chart 2, depending on future oil prices, experts forecast that an estimated 35 to 45 percent of the world's oil will come from the Gulf States by the 1990s.

OIL

PERSIAN GULF OIL AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL WORLD OIL PRODUCTION



PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS MPORTED FROM THE GULF STATES

COUNTRY / REGION	1985	CURRENT
UNITED STATES	3%	7%
WESTERN EUROPE	20%	30%
TURKEY	78%	80%
GREECE	52%	54%
JAPAN	56%	65%

2

During 1986, the free world relied on 12 billion barrels of oil a day, every day, from the Central Region to fuel its industries and economies. Clearly the trend away from free world reliance on gulf oil has been reversed. United States reliance on gulf oil also appears destined to grow.

U.S. OIL PRODUCTION / IMPORTS



SOURCE : DEPT OF ENERGY

As chart 3 depicts, for the first time since 1981 our domestic production declined in 1986 while our overall imports were up more than 20 percent. Of particular significance, our imports from the Gulf States more than doubled over the past year. These disturbing trends have prompted an American Petroleum Institute spokesman to caution that our growing dependence on oil imports could create an "oil shock" in the 1990s as great as that of the 1970s.

← 26½ →


STRATEGIC WATERWAYS
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
ROMANIA
ITALY
YUGOSLAVIA
BULGARIA
ALBANIA
GREECE
TURKEY
Ankara
Caspian Sea
Mediterranean Sea
CYPRUS
SYRIA
LEBANON
ISRAEL
JORDAN
IRAQ
Baghdad
Tehran
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN
Kabul
Islamabad
PAKISTAN
New Delhi
NEPAL
Kathmandu
INDIA
Cairo
EGYPT
LIBYA
Tripoli
Riyadh
QATAR
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
OMAN
SAUDI ARABIA
Red Sea
Khartoum
SUDAN
CHAD
N'Djamena
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Bangui
ETHIOPIA
Addis Ababa
Aden
SOMALIA
Mogadishu
UGANDA
Kampala
KENYA
Nairobi
ZAIRE
CONGO
Victoria
STRAIT OF HORMUZ: PRIMARY CONDUIT FOR GULF OIL
SUEZ CANAL: HANDLES TEN PERCENT OF WORLD'S COMMERCE
BAB EL MANDEB: INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT OIL WATERWAY
4

The region also includes several of the world's most strategically important waterways, shown on chart 4. The Suez Canal, in addition to its obvious commercial importance, also facilitates flexible employment of our naval forces by eliminating the long transit around the Cape of Good Hope. The Strait of Hormuz is the primary conduit and choke point for oil moving from the gulf fields, while the narrow Bab El Mandeb is the southern funnel of the Suez Canal and is growing in importance with the completion of new pipelines across Saudi Arabia to Red Sea terminals.



REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- IRAN/IRAQ WAR:
  - OVER ONE MILLION CASUALTIES TO DATE
    - 3 PERCENT OF IRAQ/1.5 PERCENT OF IRAN PRE-WAR POPULATION KIA/WIA/MIA
  - SHIPPING WAR ESCALATING; OVER 200 SHIPS ATTACKED
    - IRANIAN ATTACKS TRIPLED (13 IN 1985, 41 IN 1986)
    - IRAQI ATTACKS UP 60 PERCENT (40 IN 1985, 65 IN 1986)

- PAKISTAN:
  - SOVIET/AFGHAN BORDER VIOLATIONS INCREASING; THREATENS STABILITY
    - AIR INCURSIONS TRIPLED (250 IN 1985, 750 IN 1986)
    - GROUND INCURSIONS QUADRUPLED (30 IN 1985, 120 IN 1986)

- EAST AFRICA:
  - ETHIOPIA/SOMALIA BORDER CLASHES
  - INSURGENCIES IN NORTHERN ETHIOPIA AND SOUTHERN SUDAN

5

As chart 5 summarizes, 1986 was a particularly eventful year which witnessed an increasing level of tension and violence.

Chairman NUNN. General, could I ask you one question about chart 1, just looking at this map, define the exact boundaries of the Central Command? I know you have had a lot of discussion on this. My chart has a heavy ink line, and I cannot tell exactly where it is in terms of Jordan and Israel and Lebanon. What is the dividing line there?

General CRIST. Syria, Lebanon, and Israel belong to the European Command; Jordan and Iraq are within my area of responsibility.

Chairman NUNN. Is there anything new about that, or has that been the case all along?

General CRIST. That has been the case since the inception of the command. As you recall, in the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, one of the questions asked the Department of Defense was to examine those boundaries, as well as the ocean areas adjacent to Southwest Asia, and report back to Congress.

Chairman NUNN. I assume there was a rationale for that precise dividing line when it was drawn?

General CRIST. I think at the time, sir, it had to do with the Syrian-Israeli confrontation and the events in Lebanon at that particular time.

Chairman NUNN. But that is something that is under review? These lines are all under review?

General CRIST. Yes, sir. The Congress so directed.

Chairman NUNN. And when will that review be completed?

General CRIST. I believe, if I am not mistaken, 1 year from the enactment of the Reorganization Act.

Chairman NUNN. And then every 3 years thereafter?

General CRIST. Every 2 years, I believe.

Chairman NUNN. So we have a review coming up at the end of this year?

General CRIST. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Has that started?

General CRIST. I do not know the answer to that. I think they are trying to work the earlier milestones such as establishing the new Unified Command for Special Operations.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

General CRIST. As I say, as shown on chart 5, this was a particularly active year for tension and conflict in my area. The Iran-Iraq war has reached new heights of violence, with the continuing Iranian offensives, the devastating Iraqi air offensive against the Iranian economic infrastructure, and most disturbingly, the escalation of attacks against unarmed merchant ships in the gulf.

More and more of the affected countries seem to be turning toward the United States in the context of our public commitment to keep the gulf open to international shipping.

Meanwhile, the stability of Pakistan continues to be undermined by mounting violations of her borders from neighboring Afghanistan. Tensions remain high in the Somali-Ethiopian border, while Ethiopia itself, with Cuban and Soviet backing, battles insurgents in the north while underwriting a bitter civil war in Southern Sudan.


RED RUSSIAN OCCUPIED AREA 1920-1921
1916-1917
CASPIAN SEA LITTORAL 1689-1735 (PETER THE GREAT)
Black Sea
INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN 1946-1947
Caspian Sea
GILAN S.R. 1920-1921
1925
1930
1929
Ankara
TURKEY
SOVIET OCCUPATION 1941-1947
KURDISH REPUBLIC 1946-1947
Nicosia
SYRIA
KERMANSHAH
RUS
Beirut
Damascus
IRAQ
Baghdad
HAMADAN
1979
AFGHANISTAN
Islāmābād
LEBANON
ISRAEL
Amman
JORDAN
RUSSIAN
IRAN
RUSSIAN
BRITISH
BRITISH
1822-1914
KUWAIT
Kuwait
PAKISTAN
Iraq–Saudi Arabia
Manama
QATAR
Doha
OMAN
Abu Dhabi
Riyadh
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Muscat
SAUDI ARABIA
OMAN
Red Sea

RUSSIAN/SOVIET EXPANSION 1689-PRESENT

6

Against this troubled background, the Soviets continue to seek opportunities to enhance their position and influence. The Russians, motivated by a variety of security, economic, and political concerns, historically have attempted to expand their borders and influence to the south. As chart 6 shows, these ambitions date back as far as Peter the Great. In fact, it appears that during the Soviet era the desire to expand southward has grown considerably stronger. In the 20th century alone, the Soviet Union has occupied or invaded Iran and Afghanistan six times.


SOUTHERN THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
BAKU
Caspian Sea
Black Sea
TURKEY
Ankara
Bucharest
BULGARIA
Nicosia
CYPRUS
SYRIA
Beirut
LEBANON
Damascus
ISRAEL
Amman
JORDAN
Cairo
EGYPT
IRAQ
Baghdad
Tehrān
IRAN
KUWAIT
Kuwait
Iraq - Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone
BAHRAIN
QATAR
Doha
Abu Dhabi
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Muscat
OMAN
Kabul
AFGHANISTAN
Islāmābād
PAKISTAN
New Delhi
NEPAL
Kathmandu
INDIA
Arabian Sea
ORDER OF BATTLE
32 COMBAT DIVISIONS
280,000 TROOPS
5,400 TANKS
22 FIGHTER REGIMENTS
1,000 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

The invasion of Afghanistan marked a dramatic shift in the Soviet military focus on Southwest Asia. The Soviets have reorganized their forces into a new theater of operations displayed on chart 7. The mission of this new theater is to plan and exercise in peacetime for the conduct of offensive operations in war. This represents a significant change from their previous defensive posture into a command and control structure similar to those opposite NATO and the Pacific Command.

The Southern TVD forces are more than adequate to soundly defeat any regional combination of forces, and the ground and air assets continue to be both expanded and modernized.

SOVIET ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE REGION

- AFGHANISTAN:
  - 115,000 PLUS OCCUPATION TROOPS
    - 4 PLUS DIVISIONS, INCLUDING 2 SPECIAL FORCES BRIGADES
    - OVER 100 FRONT-LINE ATTACK AIRCRAFT

- PDRY:
  - SOVIET NAVAL/NAVAL AIR PRESENCE
    - 1-2 COMBATANTS, 2 IL-38 SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT
  - 2000-3000 SOVIET/CUBAN ADVISORS

- ETHIOPIA:
  - SOVIET RED SEA NAVAL SUPPORT FACILITY
  - OVER 5000 SOVIET/CUBAN ADVISORS
  - 2500-3000 CUBAN COMBAT TROOPS

- SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO IRAQ CONTINUE:
  - 40 SEABORNE DELIVERIES DURING 1986
  - 7 ARMS CARRIERS IN GULF SIMULTANEOUSLY IN DEC 1986

8

The Russians have also acted beyond their borders, as shown on chart 8. Soviet willingness to use their forces is clearly evident in Afghanistan where they are in their eighth year of fighting the Mujahideen. Through the coup in South Yemen they have significantly strengthened their military presence and access to air and naval facilities on the strategic Bab El Mandeb. Their influence over Ethiopian affairs remains undiminished. They continue to pressure North Yemen for closer cooperation and are exploring potential openings in Sudan and Somalia. By the end of the year, their naval presence had become visible in the gulf escorting arms carriers laden with material for Iraq.

Simply put, the Soviets now possess not only the desire to expand toward the south, but have established the military capability to do so as well.

Because of the region's geostrategic location, vast petroleum resources, and its proximity to the Soviet Union, the United States must be concerned not only with the Soviet buildup, but also with all the threats to regional stability.

NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

- DETER AND, IF NECESSARY, DEFEND AGAINST SOVIET AGGRESSION
- COUNTER SOVIET MOVES TO GAIN POWER AND INFLUENCE
- PROTECT FRIENDLY ACCESS TO SW ASIA OIL
- STRENGTHEN REGIONAL STABILITY
- LIMIT UNFRIENDLY/HOSTILE REGIME ABILITY TO DESTABILIZE OR SUBVERT FRIENDLY COUNTRIES

9

The national security objectives, which are shown on chart 9, are fairly well defined. Both President Reagan and Vice President Bush, as lately as the 23rd of January, have steadfastly reaffirmed America's commitment to protect U.S. and free world interests in the region.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

- PRESERVE AND PROTECT U.S. AND FRIENDLY ACCESS TO ARABIAN PENINSULA OIL RESOURCES
- ASSIST FRIENDLY STATES TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY AGAINST SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY
- PREVENT MILITARY COERCION OF FRIENDLY STATES AND DETER ATTEMPTS BY THE SOVIETS OR HOSTILE REGIONAL STATES TO ACHIEVE GAINS BY THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE

10

My mission, in its simplest terms, is to put military capability behind these national commitments. This encompasses the military objectives which I show here in chart 10.

AVAILABLE DEPLOYMENT FORCES

ARMY

1 CORPS HEADQUARTERS
1 AIRBORNE DIVISION
1 AIRMOBILE/AIR ASSAULT DIVISION
1 MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION
1 INFANTRY DIVISION
1 MECHANIZED BRIGADE
1 CAVALRY BRIGADE (AIR COMBAT)

NAVY

3 CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS
1 SURFACE ACTION GROUP
5 MARITIME PATROL AIR SQUADRONS

AIR FORCE

7 TACTICAL FIGHTER WINGS
2 STRATEGIC BOMBER SQUADRONS

MARINE CORPS

1 - 1/3 MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

1 SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
1 RANGER REGIMENT
1 SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION BATTALION
1 NAVY SPECIAL WARFARE TASK GROUP
1 AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS BASE

11

To accomplish the mission I have been apportioned for planning the forces shown on chart 11: four and two-thirds Army divisions: one and one-third Marine amphibious forces; seven tactical fighter wings; special operations forces; and supporting Navy and SAC units.

In peacetime I also maintain small forward deployments consisting of AWACS and tankers in Saudi Arabia, and the five ships of the Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf. These are augmented by periodic naval deployments into the Indian Ocean and the introduction of land-based exercise forces.

ALLIED/FRIENDLY FORCES

COUNTRY	PERSONNEL	TANKS	FIGHTER AIRCRAFT	SURFACE COMBATANTS
FRANCE	5,000	33	10	5-8
BRITAIN	500	-	-	2-3
EGYPT	449,000	2,300	400	40
PAKISTAN	488,000	1,600	140	16
JORDAN	80,000	1,050	100	6
GCC	200,000	1,025	375	39

12

Now in addition to our forces, the nations listed on chart 12 have the potential to make a contribution. France maintains the largest continuous western presence in the region, operating primarily from the former French Colony of Djibouti. The British continuously deploy a small naval presence in the Indian Ocean and conduct periodic exercises in the area.

Within the region itself, Egypt's armed forces are being modernized and are capable of defending the Suez Canal and handling the threat to its territory from unpredictable Libya. Pakistan has a highly professional, well-trained military but needs assistance in handling the Soviet Afghan threat. Jordan also maintains a small but very capable armed force. Their inability to modernize, however, leaves them vulnerable to military coercion from their large, well equipped neighbor, Syria.

Finally, the GCC states combined have an armed force of approximately 200,000 personnel, 375 fighters, and over 1,000 tanks. Their forces are being upgraded and GCC multinational exercises are becoming more frequent and more complex, reflecting the determination and desire of those Gulf States to strengthen their combined defensive capabilities.



USCENTCOM STRATEGY

- RECOGNIZES CENTRAL REGION MAY BE SECONDARY THEATER
- STRESSES COALITION WARFARE
- FOCUSES U.S. EFFORTS ON CRITICAL LOCATIONS/CHOKEPOINTS
- PROVIDES FLEXIBLE ALTERNATIVES BASED ON AVAILABLE FORCES
- SERVES DETERRENCE AS WELL AS WARFIGHTING
- DEPENDS ON COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNIFIED COMMANDS

13

Well, this brings us then to the strategy which links these discrete elements together, a strategy which must reflect that within the context of a global strategy and finite available forces, CENTCOM could well be a secondary threater until other resources are brought to bear.

This strategy then places a premium on coalition warfare in which our friends and allies assume a share of the responsibility for the defense of the region. In peacetime, we must encourage our friends to develop regional defense arrangements so they will be in a stronger position to exert a stabilizing influence and provide for their own collective defense.

In crisis of war, we must be prepared to back them up with the capabilities they lack, or meet the threats which they simply cannot handle. Our ability to influence these nations to assume these projected roles is directly dependent upon U.S. willingness to assist in strengthening their current military capabilities, as well as fostering a positive perception on their part that the United States is prepared to confront aggression in the region.

Assuming our friends and allies are capable of and willing to take on the responsibilities described, the U.S. military role could be more narrowly focused on denying a potential aggressor direct access to those critical geographic locations within the region from which they could tilt the regional geopolitical balance in their favor, or block free passage through the strategic choke points.

Our strategy must also be sufficiently flexible to accommodate uncertainty as to the forces which would actually be assigned to CENTCOM in light of what might be going on in the rest of the world. Therefore, we need to develop alternatives within the overall strategy which would provide our decisionmakers with execution options based on the forces projected to be available at the time.

Now such an approach would also serve deterrence as well as warfighting. Faced with a degree of uncertainty as to which course of action the United States might select, a potential aggressor might hesitate to commit his forces, constrain his objectives, or be forced to draw critical resources from another theater to ensure a high degree of success. Any of these actions would benefit the United States from the global perspective.

Finally, as Admiral Hays has said, the strategy is dependent upon a high degree of cooperation between the Unified Commands in supporting one another in order to maximize our constrained combat power at the point and time of decision.

As I am sure you have surmised, successful execution of constrained strategy depends greatly upon the capability to rapidly project and mass our limited forces at the key points of decision, and the support of our friends and allies in defending their territories and areas of influence.

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT



STRATEGIC SEALIFT



PRE-POSITIONING

TOTAL REQUIREMENT



SUSTAINABILITY

TOTAL REQUIREMENT



Now I must tell you, in all candor, Mr. Chairman, you know as well as I do, that in 1980 this Nation would have been hard-pressed to project air, land, and sea power into Southeast Asia in a timely and effective response. Not so today. We now have the earmarked forces trained and ready with coordinated plans. As chart 14 shows, we can get there rapidly, thanks to dramatic improvements in deployability over the past 6 years.



REGIONAL SUPPORT

- TRAVELED 140,000 MILES; VISITED 13 AREA COUNTRIES
- ENCOURAGED OVER FOWARD PROGRESS IN MILITARY-TO-MILITARY INTERACTION
- HOWEVER, PROGRESS BEING SET BACK BY REDUCTION IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE

15

Once in theater, we can sustain——

[The prepared statement of General Crist follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. CRIST
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am most pleased to appear before you once again to testify on the posture of the United States Central Command.

1986 was a particularly eventful year in my area of responsibility. A year in which we witnessed an increasing level of tension and conflict. Against this troubled background, the Soviets continued to seek opportunities to enhance their position and influence.

As unsettling as these events have been to U.S. interests in this strategic area, they are even more worrisome as they are occuring at a time when U.S. dependence on foreign oil has once again begun to grow.

In the face of these challenges, the United States Central Command has been moving out smartly in the execution of our mission to put military capability behind the national commitment to protect U.S. and free world interests in the region. As the Commander responsible for coordinating all U.S. military activities in my area of responsibility, I have traveled some 140 thousand miles within my area, visiting 13 countries, many more than once. I am pleased to report that the level of military cooperation and coordination with our friends and allies in the region has reached a new high. In the event of crisis or conflict we have earmarked forces, trained and ready, with coordinated plans and can get there rapidly thanks to dramatic improvements in deployability over the past six years. Once in theater, we can sustain, initially at least, through pre-positioned stocks. While many long poles still remain in the tent (primarily in command and control, sustainability, and security assistance) CENTCOM is no longer the paper tiger that critics would portray it to be.

The CENTCOM tiger of today has bone, muscle and sinew. As we look to the future those who might be tempted to commit mischief will have to take into account this growing, credible capability.

SIGNIFICANCE OF AREA OF RESPONSIBILITIES

Oil

The primary importance of the region to the world is its principal resource - oil. During 1986, the free world relied on over 12 million barrels of oil a day, every day, from our area of responsibility to fuel its industries and economies. Almost all (96%) came from the oil producing states astride the Persian Gulf.

PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS IMPORTED FROM THE GULF STATES

COUNTRY/REGION	1985	CURRENT
U.S.	3%	7%
Western Europe	20%	30%
Turkey	78%	80%
Greece	52%	54%
Japan	56%	65%

The downward trend away from free world reliance on Gulf oil has clearly been reversed. This is particularly true for the United States. In addition, many of our European and Asian allies rely heavily on the Gulf states to satisfy a significant and growing portion of their national requirements for oil.

PERCENTAGE OF WORLD'S PROVEN CRUDE OIL RESERVES

Persian Gulf	55.2%
Western Hemisphere	17.3%
Communist Bloc	12.6%
Africa	8.5%
Western Europe	3.5%
Asia/Pacific	2.9%

More significantly over the long term, 55 percent of the world's proven oil resources is located in the Gulf region. As world demand for oil continues to grow and smaller reserves in the US, Europe, and the Soviet Union dwindle or become economically infeasible to recover, Gulf oil appears certain to once again gain in importance. As the Wall Street Journal has cautioned, "the danger is that the Persian Gulf may move back into the driver's seat at a time when world oil reserves are more limited that at any time in recent history."

PERSIAN GULF OIL AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL WORLD OIL PRODUCTION



While the Persian Gulf's share of world production currently stands well below the 40-45% of the world market enjoyed in the 1970's, it still accounts for roughly one in every four barrels of oil being consumed today. And, depending on future oil prices, most industry sources are forecasting that an estimated 35-45 percent of the world's oil will once again come from the Gulf states by the 1990's.

U.S. OIL PRODUCTION / IMPORTS



SOURCE: DEPT OF ENERGY

US reliance on Gulf oil also appears destined to grow. For the first time since 1981, our domestic production declined in 1986 by almost 800,000 barrels per day. Industry sources and the Department of Energy both forecast a continuing decline in domestic production, even as our demand for oil, and consequently our imports, continue to rise steadily. Today, overall imports are up more than 20 percent from 1985; imports now account for more than one-third of total US consumption...a higher level than at the time of the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo. Of particular significance, our imports from the Gulf states have more than doubled over the past year. These disturbing trends have prompted an American Petroleum Institute (API) spokesman to caution that our growing dependency on oil imports could create an "oil shock" in the 1990's as great as those of the 1970's. API cautions that "we're falling into the same trap of vulnerability...the less oil we produce, the more we'll have to import, and the less control we'll have over both supply and price".

Trade

Oil may be the most important export from the central region, but other exports also feature prominently in the world economy. Of note, Jordan is the world's third largest producer of phosphates. Other significant exports include natural gas, cotton, and coffee. Taken as a whole, the region is a net exporter having a 4.5 billion trade surplus in 1985 with an import/export total of some $197 billion dollars. The two-way trade between the US and the 19 countries in our area of responsiblity was valued at over $16 billion in 1985. Of greater significance, given our balance of payments defects, we had a $7 billion trade advantage. Preliminary data for 1986 shows a similar US advantage. And there are very few regions of the world where we can make that claim.

Strategic Waterways

The region also includes several of the world's most strategically important international waterways: the Suez Canal and the Bab el Mandeb accessways to and from the Red Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. The Suez Canal serves as a critical link between the United States and Western Europe on the one hand and the natural resources and finished products of Asia and the Middle East on the other. Roughly 10 percent of the world's seaborne commerce passes through the canal--between 50-60 ships a day--over 21,000 vessels a year--carrying over 370 million tons of goods. In addition transit of US Navy ships from the Atlantic and Mediterranean to stations in the Indian Ocean, North Arabian Sea, and Persian Gulf is expedited and eased by passage through the Suez Canal vice a long transit around the Cape of Good Hope. While traffic from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz has declined some one-third since 1981, the Strait still remains the primary conduit and choke point for oil moving from the Gulf fields and terminals. The reduction in volume through Hormuz is reflected by a commensurate increase through the Suez Canal and the narrow Bab el Mandeb, as the Red Sea continues to gain in importance as an oil waterway with the completion of new pipelines across Saudi Arabia to Red Sea terminals.

THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS

Soviets

Historical Perspectives

The Soviet Union continues to pose the greatest external threat to our Area of Responsibility (AOR).

A review of history shows the Russian Empire's steady expansion southward, until it reached its present day boundary around the turn of this century.


RUSSIA
PRE-1762
1762-1796
1762-1796
1796-1878
1878-1914
1878-1914
TURKEY
IRAN
EGYPT
SAUDI ARABIA
INDIA
SUDAN

RUSSIAN BORDER'S SOUTHWARD EXPANSION

It also reveals that the Russians, motivated by a variety of security, economic, and political concerns, have not been content with remaining within this boundary, but have historically attempted to expand their influence, and their border, further into Southwest Asia.


RED RUSSIAN OCCUPIED AREA 1920-1921
1916-1917
CASPIAN SEA LITTORAL 1689-1735 (PETER THE GREAT)
Black Sea
INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN 1946-1947
Caspian Sea
GILAN S.R. 1920-1921
1925
1930
1929
SOVIET OCCUPATION 1941-1947
Ankara
TURKEY
KURDISH REPUBLIC 1946-1947
SYRIA
KERMANSHAH
IRAQ
Baghdad
HAMADAN
1979
AFGHANISTAN
Islamabad
RUSSIAN
BRITISH
IRAN
RUSSIAN
BRITISH
1822-1914
KUWAIT
PAKISTAN
RUSSIAN/SOVIET EXPANSION 1689-PRESENT
QATAR
Doha
Abu Dhabi
Riyadh
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Muscat
SAUDI ARABIA
OMAN
Red Sea

These expansionist designs date back at least to 1689 during the reign of Peter the Great. During the Soviet era, the desire to expand southward has not diminished but rather has grown considerably stronger. Each time the Kremlin has sensed an opportunity to move into the region without significant resistance, it has done so. During the most recent occupation of Iran, in WW II, the Soviets contravened an agreement to remove their forces within six months of the war's end. Only after repeated protests from the US, Great Britain, and the United Nations did the Soviets withdraw.

In sum there has been a steady, and largely successful effort on the part of Moscow to expand its borders southward from the early 18th Century to the present. In the past, the colonial powers, notably Great Britain and France, were able to contain Soviet expansion. After WWII, an implicit US nuclear umbrella and the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO, helped keep Moscow in check. It is more than simple coincidence that the dissolution of CENTO, the demise of US influence in Iran and the resulting hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan all occurred in the same year, 1979.

Southern TVD

Creation/Development

The invasion of Afghanistan also marked a dramatic shift in the Soviet military focus on southwest Asia. Since then, the Soviets have reorganized their forces under a new High Command of Forces in the Theater of Military Operations or TVD opposite Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The TVD's purpose is to plan and exercise in peacetime for the conduct of offensive operations in war.

SOUTHERN THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS


NORTH CAUCASUS MILITARY DISTRICT
TURKEY
TRANSCAUCASUS MILITARY DISTRICT
TURKESTAN MILITARY DISTRICT
SYRIA
IRAQ
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN

This represents a significant change from their previous more defensive posture, centered around the military districts, into a command and control structure similar to the other TVD's opposite NATO and the Far East.

Current Leadership/Forces

The Southern TVD's importance was clearly underscored by Moscow in July of 1985 when one of their top military field commanders, General of the Army Mikail Zaytsev, the former head of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany, was appointed as the Commander of the Southern TVD. Zaytsev, known for his aggressive, no-nonsense leadership style, commands some 32 divisions and almost 1,000 aircraft, and is the man primarily responsible for both the conduct of the ongoing war in Afghanistan and for the preparation of future contingencies involving Pakistan, Iran and/or other possible Southwest Asia objectives.

Upgrades

GROWTH IN SOUTHERN TVD GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT



The 32 combat divisions situated throughout the Southern TVD are currently assessed to be more than adequate to soundly defeat any regional combinations of forces. They continue to be both expanded and modernized with more advanced weapons systems, such as BMP and BTR-70 Armored Vehicles, SAM-8 and SAM-13 Air Defense Missile Systems and extended range self propelled artillery tubes, to include the nuclear-capable 2S5 152mm weapon system.

Tactical air assets have also been expanded and modernized and, more significantly, their composition has shifted to reflect a change in emphasis from an air defense mission to offensive tactical air support to ground commanders.


GROWTH/CHANGING EMPHASIS IN
SOUTHERN TVD FIGHTER REGIMENTS

Southern TVD air assets include all the primary, state-of-the-art Soviet fighters, including the MIG-29/Fulcrum (their most capable counter air fighter), the SU-25/Frogfoot (their front line close air support platform), the SU-24/Fencer (a highly versatile all-weather fighter-bomber), the SU-27/Flanker (their premier air superiority interceptor) and the MI-26/Halo heavy lift helicopter (the world's largest).

AOR Presence

Military Assistance/Advisors

The Soviets also maintain a significant presence throughout the Central Command's area of responsibility. They have a substantial advisory presence throughout the region; an in-road made possible in large part by their willingness to serve as an arms merchant to virtually all who are interested. For example, earlier this month a total of 15 Soviet arms carriers were afloat in or adjacent to the central region, providing arms to such traditional customers as Iraq, Ethiopia, the YAR and India. Last December, a record high seven Soviet arms carriers were sighted on a single day in the Persian Gulf alone. The steady flow of Soviet arms supports Moscow's efforts to gain influence and access throughout the region. In addition, the Soviets have established firm footholds (with accompanying basing rights) in three central region countries, to include the presence of combat forces in Afghanistan. In addition Soviet military advisors in the PDRY also saw combat during the Jan '86 coup.

Diplomatic Initiatives

The Soviets have also made numerous diplomatic in-roads in the region. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar stand alone today as the only countries in our AOR without formal diplomatic ties to Moscow. The Soviets also have "treaties of friendship" with six AOR nations (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, PDRY, YAR, IRAQ and Iran), although Iran has unilaterally renounced the article of their treaty which gave the USSR the pretext to intervene in Iranian affairs.

Bases

These military and political advances have enabled the Soviets to establish a growing network of bases and access rights which provide strategically located positions from which they could threaten critical international air and sea lines of communication.

Simply put, the Russians have long desired to expand their influence, and their boundaries, southward. With the establishment of the Southern Theater of Military Operations, their ongoing force expansion and modernization initiatives, and their growing political and military in-roads in the region, they now have significantly enhanced their military capability to do so, if and when they believe that circumstances (their so-called "correlation of forces") favor such a move.

Afghanistan

The Soviets, with their 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, clearly demonstrated their willingness to employ the military option when they believe the odds are in their favor. The Soviets are now into their eighth year of fighting the Mujahedin; considerably longer than they fought the Germans in World War II. Despite the highly publicized but largely cosmetic withdrawal of more than 2,000 non-essential personnel in Oct/Nov of 1986, the Soviets still maintain more than 115,000 occupation forces in Afghanistan.

Current Operations

The Soviets have become increasingly more aggressive in combatting the Mujahedin since General Zaytsev's arrival on the scene. They have shifted from seasonal to year round operations, and are employing scorched earth tactics that include the massive use of heavy artillery and mortars and the selective use of chemical weapons. They have also placed increased emphasis on the use of Soviet special forces or SPETSNAZ units who specialize in day and nighttime commando-type operations and ambushes. Emphasizing this point is the fact that the number of special forces units in Afghanistan has quadrupled, from 2 battalions in 1981 to 2 brigades today.

Soviet Objectives

The Soviet's overall objectives are to ensure the success of the communist regime, which they installed, and to reduce Afghanistan to a client state, economically and politically subservient to the Soviet Union and its regional interests. While the Soviet leadership in 1979 most certainly did not anticipate the costly war of attrition that has since developed, and the Mujahedin continue to demonstrate a remarkable ability to hold their own, particularly in the countryside, there is no reason to believe that the Soviets will accept any long or short term solution that will threaten or detract from their ultimate control of Afghanistan.

There is one last point on Afghanistan - Soviet forces are now 400 miles closer to the Persian Gulf and North Arabian Sea, operating from well-positioned military bases that could be used to intimidate other countries in the area.

Regional Threats

There are numerous other current and potential areas of concern in or adjacent to the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. The Soviets serve as an active participant or as a catalyst in many, though not all, of these problem areas.

Pakistan

The most immediate external threat to the government of Pakistan stems from increased Soviet and Afghan aggressiveness along Pakistan's western border. As a result of Pakistani support to the Afghan Mujahedin, the Soviets and their Afghan surrogates have applied considerable military and political pressure on Pakistan. As part of this campaign to intimidate and destabilize the Pakistan government, Soviet supported and trained members of Afghanistan's intelligence organization have conducted bombings and incited trouble among the nearly three million Afghan refugees now in camps inside Pakistan.

More overtly, Soviet and Afghan military forces now routinely violate Pakistan's frontiers.

BORDER VIOLATIONS OF PAKISTAN



Air incursions during 1986 were almost 2½ times more frequent than 1985's record high levels, while ground violations nearly quadrupled. This has prompted the government of Prime Minister Junejo to turn to the US for help in upgrading both its early warning/surveillance capabilities and its air defense systems.

Iran-Iraq

The Iran/Iraq War, now in its 7th year, preoccupies the entire gulf region. While the ground war currently appears to be stalemated, to date over 1 million people have been killed, wounded or are missing. This equates to almost three percent of the Iraqi population and 1.5 percent of the Iranian population.

One of the more disturbing aspects of this conflict is the escalating economic war which threatens the vital artery of world commerce upon which the well being of so many gulf countries, and many other free world nations depends.

Threat to Shipping

During 1986, the shipping war took a decided turn for the worse. As depicted in the next chart, Iran struck more than three times as many ships as they did in all of 1985, while Iraq greatly surpassed the previous year's entire total.

These attacks are normally conducted, during daylight hours, by either attack helicopters or fighter aircraft. However, since September of 1986 the Iranians on several occasions have employed surface ships in night attacks, thereby denying international shippers their previous nighttime sanctuary. The cumulative effect of the shipping war, if it continues to intensify, could be quite severe. At worst it could result in a de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

PERSIAN GULF SHIP ATTACKS



TOTAL ATTACKS :202

	BY IRAQ	BY IRAN
	□	■
NUMBER OF ATTACKS	132	70
DESTROYED/ HEAVILY DAMAGED	40	11

Economic War

The economic war reached another new level of intensity, beginning in May of 1986, as a result of Iraq's apparent decision to employ its air power more effectively against Iran's economic infrastructure. Since then, and continuing for the remainder of 1986, Iraq has struck numerous key Iranian economic targets including major refineries, gas-oil separation plants, and oil export facilities.

The result has been serious nationwide shortages of refined petroleum products and widely-fluctuating Iranian oil exports. On several occasions, strikes against Kharg Island halted or seriously curtailed oil exports for short periods of time. In addition, strikes against electrical power plants have created significant power shortages in Tehran. These attacks will undoubtedly impact on Iran's ability to aggressively pursue the war over the long term.

Previously, Iran was able to finance this war of attrition through oil revenues, liquidation of foreign assets and cutting domestic expenditures. The net effect of depressed oil prices, Iraqi economic attacks, and an estimated 2-4 billion dollar deficit, may prompt them to conduct a major, all out offensive in the next few months. Iran has been threatening to conduct a "final offense" for the past six months, and we have seen many indications of a major Iranian attack.

Impact on GCC

It could also cause them to lash out at those who they accuse of supporting Iraq; namely the Gulf Cooperation Council states. This in turn could prompt affected countries to turn toward the United States in the content of our public commitment, most recently reaffirmed by Vice President Bush, to keep the Gulf open to international shipping. The increased frequency and ferocity of Iranian maritime strike activity gives evidence of this, and has prompted wide spread concern among the GCC states over freedom of passage thru the straits. The GCC states, by themselves, possess a widely varying range of capabilities to defend themselves against externally directed sabotage or limited military action. However, none alone has the ability to handle a major external threat from Iran or the Soviet Union.

South Yemen (PDRY)

One of the most significant events which occurred in the Arabian Peninsula during the past year was the bloody coup in the PDRY in Jan '86. While many still debate the extent of direct Russian involvement, one outcome is very clear. The Soviet presence has become even more firmly, and permanently established. It appears certain that Moscow will continue to orchestrate events and take whatever steps are necessary to ensure continued access to South Yemeni air and naval facilities.

East Africa

Ethiopia

In East Africa, Ethiopia remains firmly tied to the Soviet Union. Addis Ababa remains totally dependent on Moscow for both military and economic support. In return, the Soviets enjoy basing and access rights to Ethiopian ports and airfields and maintain a substantial advisory presence. In addition, Ethiopia serves Castro and acts as a home base for some 2,500 - 3,000 Cuban combat personnel who not only support the Addis Ababa regime, but also can serve as Soviet surrogates elsewhere in the region as needed. Internally, despite being the largest armed force in sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia's military remains largely ineffective against several insurgent groups in its northern provinces while the country in general continues to face serious economic disorders as a result of its agricultural failures (due in large part to ill-advised government policies), forced population resettlement and severe drought.

Somalia/Sudan

To the east, tensions in the disputed Ogaden region remain high due to the continued occupation, by Ethiopia, of several Somali border towns and their support of Somali National Movement guerrilla activity. Meanwhile, to the west, Ethiopia continues to underwrite, if not control, the activities of John Garang's separatist movement in southern Sudan, which threatens to fragment that country's African south, further dividing it from its Arab north. This ongoing insurgency, when combined with continuing economic difficulties and growing Libyan pressure, provide considerable challenges to Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq

Egypt

Egypt remains concerned about Libyan adventurism on its western borders and Libyan-sponsored terrorism against Egyptian citizens internally and abroad. Egypt is also concerned about Sudanese instability and its potential effect on Egypt. President Mubarak also faces severe economic challenges due to declining oil revenues, mounting deficits and the need to initiate stringent economic reform. As a result, Egypt is looking more and more to the United States for economic help in meeting the economic challenges and for military support to face the external threat.

Terrorism

The threat of international terrorism against the US and other nations remains acute and serves as a destabilizing factor in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. Many of the terrorist groups originate in the Middle East and are influenced and supported by Iran, Libya and Syria. Some 60 groups are currently known to exist in our AOR and more groups seem to spring up daily. These groups pose a significant threat to US interests in the area, as evidenced by assassination attempts against US personnel in both Sudan and North Yemen last April and by the hijacking of a Pan Am airliner in Pakistan which resulted in 21 killed and over 100 wounded (including 2 Americans killed/19 others injured) last September. The terrorists are becoming more sophisticated in their operations, and are rapidly increasing their ability to identify, target, and successfully attack well-secured facilities. The success of these groups in recent years demonstrates their increasing proficiency and the consequences of misjudging their intentions and capabilities. More ominously, the pool of future potential terrorist recruits is growing. A high percentage of the population in many Middle East countries is under 25. This demographic phenomena offers fertile ground for radicalization; be it religious, nationalistic, ideological or economic frustration.

OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

Objectives

The United States is, of course, extremely concerned, not just with the Soviet buildup, but with all the threats to regional stability. Both President Reagan and Vice President Bush have steadfastly reaffirmed America's commitment to protect U.S. and free world interests in the region.

The National Security Objectives are fairly well defined.

- Deter and, if necessary, defend against Soviet aggression
- Counter Soviet moves to gain power and influence
- Protect friendly access to Southwest Asia oil
- Strengthen regional stability
- Limit unfriendly/hostile regime ability to destabilize or subvert friendly countries

Mission

My mission, in its simplest terms, it to put military capability behind these national commitments. From my viewpoint, this encompasses the following military objectives:

- Preserve and protect U.S. and friendly access to Arabian Peninsula oil resources

- Assist friendly states to provide for their own security against subversion and insurgency

- Prevent military coercion of friendly states and deter attempts by the Soviets or hostile regional states to achieve gains by the threat or use of force

In peacetime we are working to increase western influence and access while at the same time encouraging our friends to develop regional defense arrangements, so they will be in a stronger position to exert a stabilizing influence and provide for their own collective defense. In crisis or war, we must be prepared to back them up with the capabilities they lack, or to meet the threats which they simply cannot handle.

While we have no formal treaty obligations within my area of responsibility, several stated commitments tie us to the region nonetheless. We have a public commitment to keep the Persian Gulf open to international shipping. A moral commitment to support the Mujahedin freedom fighters and to aid Pakistan in detering further Soviet aggression. A legal commitment under the Camp David agreement to provide economic and security assistance to Egypt. And an overall American commitment to promoting regional stability and self-sufficiency.

Strategy

With an area of responsibility encompassing 19 countries in Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa that stretches some 3100 miles from East to West and 3400 miles from North to South, our strategy must, of necessity, be one of economy of force.

An economy of force strategy will place a premium on coalition warfare in which our friends and allies assume a share of the responsibility for defense of the region. Inherent in this approach is an emphasis on strengthening the capabilities of friendly states in the region to provide for their own security while concurrently encouraging the development of regional defense arrangements. If we are able to encourage and assist our friends to develop a stabilizing regional influence through a robust individual and collective defense then we can plan to rapidly project and mass US forces at the key points of decision to deter or counter Soviet moves to achieve geopolitical gains by the threat of or use of force.

Our ability to influence these nations to assume these projected wartime roles is directly dependent upon US willingness to assist in strengthening our friends' current and future military capabilities in peacetime as well as a positive perception on their part that the US is prepared to confront Soviet aggression in the region.

COUNTERING THE THREAT

Forces

In order for me to carry out my responsibilities and fulfill my mission, a number of our military's most mobile and ready combat units have been identified for priority allocation to USCENTCOM in a crisis. These forces are provided by all four military Services. I should point out that there has been no appreciable change in the numbers and types of forces since my testimony in March of 1986.

Army

USARCENT, FT MCPHERSON, GA
(THIRD U.S. ARMY)

1 CORPS HEADQUARTERS
1 AIRBORNE DIVISION
1 AIR ASSAULT DIVISION
1 MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION
1 LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION
1 MECHANIZED BRIGADE
1 CAVALRY BRIGADE (AIR COMBAT)

Commander, U.S. Army Forces Central Command, my Army component Commander, has overall responsibility for planning the operations of U.S Central Command's Army units. The airborne, air assault, mechanized and infantry units shown provide a mix of forces that are heavy on mobility and firepower, yet capable of deploying to our area of responsibility rapidly. Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces would deploy at the same time to provide sustainment for the combat units. While only one of fourteen combat brigades assigned are from the Reserve Component, over 50% of our CS and CSS comes from the reserves.

Readiness

Our Army elements overall are more ready and better able to deploy and, if necessary, fight than ever before. However, the readiness level of non-major CS/CSS units, especially those in the Reserve Component (RC), continues to be a major concern.

Limitations

Very little progress has been made in bringing USCENTCOM required Combat Support/Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) units to a combat ready status. Today, 38% of the CS/CSS units which provide the logistics backbone of our combat units are not combat ready. This situation is particularly pronounced in the Reserves which constitute 52% of our total CS/CSS forces.

Equipment. Significant equipment shortages in Army CS/CSS units adversely affect the readiness of our Army Component. Of our active CS/CSS units, 12 percent report significant equipment shortages. The problem is even worse in the Reserve, where 35 percent of the CS/CSS units apportioned to USCENTCOM report significant shortages. While the equipment readiness situation is somewhat better than last year, low equipment readiness levels continue to severely limit the full accomplishment of USCENTCOM's mission.

Although there is no single "get well" plan for the Army CS/CSS equipment problem, there are some parellel resourcing actions taking place to improve equipment readiness. First, the Army Cross Leveling Program will upgrade some non-combat ready units through equipment redistribution. Second, their Equipment Readiness Code Program will direct selectively procured items to our non-combat ready, early-deploying units. A third program, the Dedicated Procurement Program, will procure selective equipment exclusively for the Reserve Component. Last, the Army is currently conducting a CS/CSS Management Review which identifies equipment fixes and applies them to the CS/CSS problem. The budget contains $171 million for equipment for Army CS/CSS units and preservation of this funding is considered essential to improvement of our CS/CSS readiness.

RESOURCING ACTION TO IMPROVE COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT READINESS

- CROSS LEVELING PROGRAM
- EQUIPMENT READINESS CODE PROGRAM
- DEDICATED PROCUREMENT PROGRAM
- CS/CSS MANAGEMENT REVIEW

Personnel. Manning of our Army non-major Reserve Component CS/CSS units with properly trained or qualified personnel is the most significant issue we face in working the issue of personnel readiness in reserve units. Ninety-five percent of our non-major Army Reserve Component CS/CSS units reporting not combat ready cite the lack of trained or military occupational speciality (MOS) qualified personnel as a factor degrading unit readiness. This is a major concern because these units make up over 50% of our total CS/CSS capability.

USARCENT NON-MAJOR UNITS PERSONNEL STATUS

AC/RC UNIT MIX	PERCENTAGE NOT COMBAT READY
•• COMBAT	
••• 56% ACTIVE COMPONENT	0%
••• 44% RESERVE COMPONENT	0%
•• COMBAT SUPPORT	
••• 47% ACTIVE COMPONENT	18%
••• 53% RESERVE COMPONENT	40%
•• COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	
••• 43% ACTIVE COMPONENT	22%
••• 57% RESERVE COMPONENT	31%

The chart below is an accurate indicator of the kinds of units with personnel problems. Unfortunately, there are no quick answers or easy fixes to the personnel problems which it displays. Within my military intelligence units, 61% of Active Component and 50% of Reserve Component units are experiencing personnel problems. Reserve Component chemical, military police and signal units are also experiencing personnel problems. Within CSS units, 43% of the Reserve Component maintenance units are reporting not combat ready for personnel. These units play a major role in sustaining the force during contingencies. Further, the number and kinds of trained health professionals required in both Active and Reserve Component medical units result in the true capability of these units being questionable.

USARCENT NON-MAJOR UNITS
PERSONNEL

	AC UNITS NOT COMBAT READY	RC UNITS NOT COMBAT READY
• COMBAT SUPPORT		
CHEM	61	50
MP	23	37
ENGR	10	38
SIGNAL	0	33
INTEL	61	50
• COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT		
MAINT	14	43
TRANSPORT	28	30
ORDNANCE	14	29
QM	29	41
MEDICAL	23	25
CIV AFF	0	25
ADJ GEN	0	17
LOG GRP	0	0
FINANCE	0	0

When you look at major reasons units are reporting not combat ready for personnel the results are somewhat surprising. Military occupational specialty qualification is the major reason Reserve Component CS units are reporting C-4 for personnel.

ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS FOR NONDEPLOYABILITY FOR PERSONNEL (CS)

REASONS	PERCENTAGE NOT COMBAT READY
MOS QUALIFICATION	96%
STRENGTH SHORTAGE	41%
SHORTAGE SENIOR GRADE	35%

NOTE: PERCENTAGES REFLECT SOME UNITS REPORTING FOR MORE THAN ONE REASON

The same is true of MOS qualification of unit personnel in my reserve component CSS units. This situation suggests that the personnel readiness issue in CS/CSS units is more than a shortage of people in these units.

ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS FOR NONDEPLOYABILITY FOR PERSONNEL (CSS)

REASONS	PERCENTAGE NOT COMBAT READY
MOS QUALIFICATION	94%
STRENGTH SHORTAGE	37%
SHORTAGE SENIOR GRADE	33%

NOTE: PERCENTAGES REFLECT SOME UNITS REPORTING FOR MORE THAN ONE REASON

Manning Reserve Component CS/CSS units with more trained soldiers is a formidable requirement in improving personnel readiness within these units. The Army is currently operating four of 21 Regional Maintenance Training sites (RMTS) it plans to open by FY91.

These facilities will provide sustainment and transition maintenance training to Reserve Component unit personnel. I am happy to note that the President's Budget earmarks approximately 118 million dollars for this program. Regional Maintenance Training Sites should make inroads into the Reserve Component MOS qualification problem.

Essentially, the lack of trained personnel in Reserve Component CS/CSS units is a major factor degrading personnel readiness in these units. Until programs such as the RMTS are fully operational and making substantial contributions in correcting the situation, it will continue to degrade personnel readiness in these units.

Air Force

USCENTAF, SHAW AFB, SC
(9TH AIR FORCE)

7 TACTICAL FIGHTER WINGS	(F-4, F-15, F-16, F-111, A-7, A-10)
ELECTRONIC COMBAT SQUADRONS	(EF-111, EC-130)
TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRONS	(RF-4)
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND AND CONTROL SQUADRONS	(E-3, EC-130)
TACTICAL AIRLIFT SQUADRONS	(C-130)

Commander, U.S. Central Command Air Forces, plans for the employment of forces shown above, all drawn from a wide range of organizations. Tactical Air Command (TAC) units provide offensive and defensive counterair, close air support, electronic combat, aerial reconnaissance, interdiction, and airborne command and control. Combat airlift of our forces is accomplished by C-130 tactical airlift squadrons provided by the Military Airlift Command (MAC) under the operational control of my Air Force component. Like the Army, the Air Force reserve component is an important contributor to USCENTCOM. Two thirds of the C-130squadrons available to me, all of my tactical reconnaissance squadrons, and nearly 60% of our communications support come from the reserves.

I also exercise, through COMUSCENTAF, operational command of our AWACS operating in Saudi Arabia. These aircraft were provided in October 1980, in response to a formal request for defensive assistance from the Government of Saudi Arabia. USAF E-3 aircraft and crews have monitored the Saudi Eastern Defense

Sector (along the Persian Gulf approaches to Saudi Arabia) ever since. As the Saudis complete acquisition and training on their own E-3 AWACS and assume the mission of Eastern Air Defense Sector surveillance (data to be shared with us) 8% of our AWACS fleet will eventually be free for other missions. Moreover, the good will and spirit of cooperation engendered by this support increases the opportunities for my command to establish a greater degree of defense coordination and broadens the venue for increased access in the central region.

Readiness

Allocated forces, both active and reserve, are in a satisfactory state of readiness and all are mission capable.

Improvements

The highest priority force improvements are the Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for Night (LANTIRN), Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), and hardened target munitions. LANTIRN, compatible with both the F-15E and the F-16, will greatly enhance our capability to conduct night, under the weather interdiction and close air support. 700 LANTIRN pods are scheduled for purchase over the FYDP, and the President's Budget provides about 1.5 million dollars for initial buys. Procurement of these systems, together with the FY 88-89 procurement of 84 F-15E and 360 F-16 fighter aircraft, significantly improves our strike capabilities. I strongly support the Air Force program to procure 42 F-15E's each year through FY 92. This multi-role fighter will give me a greatly enhanced all-weather, day-night deep interdiction capability. I was also pleased to see FY 88-89 production funding for an improved 2,000 pound bomb (BLU 109/8), the high speed anti-radiation missile (HARM), IR Maverick, and the boosted smart munition (GBU-15). All provide marked improvements over previous weapons.

Limitations

I must point out that, until the LANTIRN system described above is operational, we lack a true all-weather day-night attack capability with our F-15's and F-16's. PAVE TACK modification to the F-111D was not funded in FY 88, delaying a needed enhancement to my long range, all weather capabilities. The aging RF-4C Fleet needs to be replaced or upgraded to improve reconnaissance capability. USCENTAF is also lacking the ability to receive a high volume of near-real-time intelligence. Acquisition of an Advanced Deployable Digital Imagery Support System (ADDISS), still programmed for FY 90, will solve this problem. Finally, our ability to conduct sustained operations is also hampered by near-term shortfalls in air-to-air missiles, precision guided munitions, and aircraft spares. Details regarding these shortfalls are covered later in my testimony.

Navy

USNAVCENT, PEARL HARBOR, HI

USS LASALLE (AGF-3)
FOUR DESTROYERS OR FRIGATES

Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, exercises operational control of the Middle East Force Surface Action Group, five ships forward deployed in the Persian Gulf. In peacetime, the presence of Commander, Middle East Force (COMIDEASTFOR) ships, together with the periodic deployment of a carrier battle group to the North Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean provide the most visible evidence of our commitment to the area, and serve as our main deterrent force.

Readiness

All ships reporting to the Middle East Force are operationally ready.

Improvements

Additional amphibious shipping such as the one Landing Ship Dock and the two Landing Ship Helicopter Docks in the FY 88-89 Budget improves our capability to rapidly project combat power. Although shortfalls still exist, USNAVCENT, my naval component headquarters, has received and is programmed to acquire several additional intelligence upgrades to meet the demanding requirements from an upsurge of naval activities in our theater. And finally, the recent acquisition of on-board air defense systems has significantly improved the defensive capabilities of the USS LASALLE, COMIDEASTFOR's flag ship.

Limitations

While COMUSNAVCENT is ready and capable of fulfilling his tasking as the Navy component commander, his operational management responsibilities are expanding exponentially, and additional headquarters manning will be required.

Marine Corps

USMARCENT (when designated), CAMP PENDLETON, CA

I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
1 1/3 MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
- AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
- MPS PROGRAM

My Marine Component for planning, Marine Forces Central Command, is provided by Headquarters, First Marine Amphibious Force at Camp Pendleton, CA, and 1 1/3 Marine Amphibious Forces. Should a requirement exist, these units could arrive in my area on the amphibious ships of available task forces, and by deploying by air and sea to join their pre-positioned equipment at a port facility in our AOR.

Readiness

Assigned units continue to maintain their consistently high levels of combat readiness, and occasionally deploy and train in the oceans adjacent to the USCENTCOM area.

Improvements

Continued emphasis on Navy shipbuilding programs described earlier, when coupled with delivery of the Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC), will further enhance our amphibious lift capability and provide a much needed over-the-horizon launch option for amphibious forces. Nine LCACs are budgeted for FY 89, and another 36 are programmed for procurement by FY 92. The Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) squadron deployed to Diego Garcia complements our amphibious lift, and gives us the capability to rapidly move a 16,500-man Marine brigade to a crisis area and rapidly marry it up with its equipment. Lessons learned through periodic exercising of the MPS has enabled us to refine procedures which continue to improve this relatively new capability.

Limitations

The development of the MV22A OSPREY tilt-rotor aircraft with its improved speed and range over conventional helicopters is necessary to further enhance the tactical mobility of our Marine forces. This enhancement will be particularly important in the USCENTCOM area, where vast distances must be covered in short periods of time and over difficult terrain. The Marines are programmed to receive their first increment of MV-22s in FY 92. Like my Air Force component, I MAF also has shortfalls in their ability to receive, process, and exploit data from some crucial intelligence systems. Continued support for development and procurement of the Joint Service Imagery Processor (JSIP) is essential. Procurement is programmed to begin in FY 90.

Special Operations Forces

SOCCENT, MACDILL AFB, FL

ARMY RANGERS
ARMY SPECIAL FORCES
AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNITS
NAVY SPECIAL WARFARE FORCES

Rounding out our forces designated for planning is the Special Operations Command, Central, my only subordinate unified command. SOCCENT forces include Army Rangers and Special Forces, Air Force Special Operations Squadrons, and a Navy Special Warfare Task Group. Forty percent of our special operations squadrons are from the reserve component.

Readiness

Ranger units are fully mission capable. USAF SOF units have experienced readiness degradations due to aging equipment, notably in SOF airlift assets. Naval special warfare units are mission capable, but have deficiencies in C3 and language training.

Improvements

Recent congressional interest has served to focus efforts at improving special operations capabilities across the full spectrum of forces, particularly airlift. SOF revitalization efforts are directed at correcting deficiencies in the areas of force structure, equipment modernization, and unit readiness. I support Air Force programs to procure MC-130 COMBAT TALON II aircraft, MH-53 PAVE LOW III enhanced helicopters, and AC-130U SPECTRE gunships. The FY 88-89 Budget will provide 9 MC-130's and

11 AC-130's. It also provides money for the upgrade of MH-53 PAVE LOW helicopters, a program scheduled for completion in FY 90. Finally, it sustains development funding for the CV-22, a SOF mission configured OSPREY.

Limitations

Speaking of the OSPREY, our most pressing problem remains the development and procurement of a long range, vertical lift aircraft. Aircraft currently in the inventory lack the capability to reach all of the required mission objectives. The EV-22 OSPREY will give us the capability we require. Current SOF communications equipment cannot provide required secure, long range, low probability of intercept/low probability of detection communications. Finally, sustainability is a concern, particularly since SOF units do not have extensive logistics infrastructures needed in supporting follow-on operations.

Allied and Friendly Forces

The United States does not currently maintain formal defense alliances with any of the central region nations. However, two of our European allies, France and Great Britain, do operate in the region and have previously cooperated with US forces in multinational efforts, such as the 1984 mine clearing operations in the Red Sea and Suez Canal. There is also a growing trend, particularly among the moderate Gulf Arabs, toward expanded interregional bilateral and multinational defense cooperation.

France

Among the western powers, the French maintain the largest continuous presence in the region. Today, nearly 5,000 French ground, air and naval personnel operate out of the former French colony of Djibouti.

FRENCH FORCES IN DJIBOUTI

Ground Forces:	3,800 personnel
	33 tanks
Air/Air Defense Forces:	850 personnel
	10 fighters
Naval Forces:	200 personnel
	5 - 8 ships

These French forces provide a very visible counterbalance to the Soviet presence in the PDRY, just across the narrow Bab El Mandeb. The French, with their significant presence in Djibouti, are the logical western power to assume the mission of safeguarding free passage through this strategic chokepoint.

French naval units also periodically operate throughout the North Arabian Sea and would be prime candidates for participation in any multinational effort to ensure freedom of navigation along the sea lanes of communication leading into and through the Persian Gulf.

The French also maintain a Rapid Deployment Force (Force d'Action Rapide) that would be available for Southwest Asia contingencies. This well armed and highly mobile five division force, comprised of marine infantry, light armor, airborne, air mobile and alpine forces, provides the French with an impressive power projection capability throughout the region.

Great Britain

While the British no longer maintain permanent bases in the area they continue to enjoy a close working relationship with many central region nations and periodically deploy naval units into the area. These British naval forces perform combined training and exercise maneuvers with friendly navies throughout the Gulf region and would be another prime candidate for participation in any multinational effort to keep the international sea lanes and strategic straits open.

British advisors and contract personnel also provide technical assistance and training in support of UK military sales efforts while some 1,000 British expatriates, both contract and seconded, play key roles in several regional armed forces. The British presence is most prevalent in Oman, where former British officers hold many key leadership positions. However, a dramatic shift toward "Omanization" is occurring, which should see an emerging generation of Omani senior leaders in the very near future.

Britain's commitment to regional security was clearly evident in November 1986 when several thousand British soldiers and marines, supported by four major naval surface combatants and both naval and air force tactical aircraft, participated in Exercise Swift Sword with their Omani counterparts. The British also maintain a Rapid Deployment Force, comprised of almost 5,000 mostly airborne personnel capable of responding to contingencies in the Gulf.

GCC

The most significant example of regional military cooperation involves the member nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council or GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE). GCC efforts, ongoing since 1981, represent the largest, most effective multinational relationship in modern Arab history. The GCC states combined have an armed force of approximately 200,000 ground, air and naval personnel.

	Bahrain	**Kuwait**	**Oman**	**Qatar**	**Saudi**	**UAE**	**TOTAL**
Army							
- Personnel	2,000	11,000	24,000	5,000	75,000	40,000	157,000
- Tanks	34	275	39	24	540	113	1,025
Air Forces/ Air Defense							
- Personnel	200	6,150	2,150	300	17,500	4000	30,300
- Fighters	4	59	51	25	208	28	375
Navy							
- Personnel	560	1,000	2,000	700	5,500	1,500	11,260
- Surface Combatants	2m*	8m	4m	3m	3M**/13m	6m	3M/36m

* m=minor combatants ** M=major combatants

GCC forces have conducted several multinational exercises that have developed joint tactics and procedures for the employment of their ground, air, and naval forces. A major step forward was accomplished in 1985 with the establishment of a 2,500 man "Peninsula Shield" standing joint land force, based at King Khalid Military City in Saudi Arabia. GCC exercises are becoming more frequent and more complex and clearly reflect the determination and desire of the moderate Gulf Arabs to strengthen their combined defensive capabilities.

Other Friendly AOR Forces

Most of the other regional countries possess only modest military forces and/or capabilities and would be hard pressed to provide assistance or support beyond their immediate border. Pakistan, Egypt, and Jordan have all demonstrated a willingness and ability to provide assistance to friendly neighbors but each faces considerable challenges along their own frontiers.

OTHER FRIENDLY AOR FORCES

	ARMY	AIR/AIR DEFENSE	NAVY
DJIBOUTI	3,700	300	50
EGYPT	320,000	109,000	20,000
JORDAN	70,000	10,000	650
KENYA	18,345	3,000	650
PAKISTAN	450,000	25,000	13,000
SOMALIA	40,000	5,500	2,000
SUDAN	51,000	6,000	1,500
YAR	35,000	1,000+	1,650

Some 30,000 Pakistani expatriates are currently serving in the armed forces of the GCC states. These well-trained troops, who comprise roughly 15 percent of the GCC's total military force, considerably strengthen Gulf security. Meanwhile, Pakistan's indigenous armed forces are fully capable of handling any confrontations with Afghanistan's depleted military but would need outside assistance in countering a combined Soviet/Afghan threat.

Slightly over 1,000 Egyptian expatriates are also serving within the Gulf Arab military services and President Mubarak has frequently expressed his willingness to expand Egypt's military assistance and cooperative efforts. Nonetheless, Egypt remains concerned, first and foremost, with the credible and largely unpredictable Libyan threat.

Jordanian advisors and expatriates also play a significant role in enhancing Gulf security, and King Hussein likewise appears willing to participate in regional defense cooperative efforts. Nonetheless, while ongoing diplomatic efforts by Saudi Arabia to bring Jordan and Syria together have resulted in some reduction in tensions between the two nations, Jordan must concern itself first with the potential threat to its own borders.

The remaining regional armed forces have varying degrees of defensive ability and little capability or desire to project power beyond their immediate borders. All of the region's armed forces would be hard-pressed to defend themselves against a concerted attack by a major military power without outside support.

Force Projection

The key elements of force projection are sea and airlift, and pre-positioning. Each one is important, and they are interrelated. Because of the time and distance factors involved in our deployments to the area, the pre-positioning of materiel, either afloat or in warehourses, greatly reduces our lift requirement. We meet the projection requirements by a careful balancing of airlift (for critical forces and time-sensitive light cargo), sealift (for the heavy and voluminous oversize follow-on materiel), and pre-positioning (for critical equipment, light or heavy, which is needed at the on-set of contingencies).

Thanks to congressional funding in the last several years, CENTCOM is now able to get to the war quickly and effectively. Our sea and airlift capabilities have seen significant improvement, and total lift is no longer a limiting constraint. The pre-positioning of stocks still needs attention, and details are furnished in the following sections.

Strategic Airlift

For the U.S. to meet its world-wide commitments, it is necessary to be prepared to move 66 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) of personnal and combat resources. The following chart shows that we stand at 85% of our mid-term objective and depicts the programs that would help resolve this shortfall by the year 2000.

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT



The C-5A service life extension program, strengthening of the aircraft wings, will be completed in July of this year. Sixty-six of the 77 C-5A's were completed as of the end of CY 86.

The C-5B procurement is fully-funded and on schedule. Delivery of nine of 50 aircraft took place in CY 86; nine more are expected in FY 87, 20 in FY 88, and the final 12 in FY 89. The C-5B buy will add 7.5 MTM/D of outsized strategic airlift capability.

The KC-10 program is on schedule. Fifty-one of the proposed 60 KC-10's have been delivered and the remaining aircraft will be completed during FY 87. When used as airlifters, these aircraft will add an additional 4.5 MTM/D to the strategic airlift program.

The CRAF enhancement program is adding "cargo-convertible" features to 20 wide-bodied passenger aircraft. This fully-funded program will increase cargo capability by over three MTM/D. Presently, eight of the 20 have been modified with three due in the remainder of FY 87, five in FY 88, and the final four in FY 89.

The FY 88 budget includes a request for $1219.9M for Research & Development and $723.7M for production to continue full-scale engineering development of the C-17 cargo aircraft. The FY 89 budget request of $982M for Research & Development and $1093.7M for production is essential to the C-17 development program. The initial operating capability is 12 in FY 92. When fully operational in FY 2000, this aircraft will allow us to reach the DOD long-term goal of 66 MTM/D of strategic airlift. Full funding of this program will bring us to 100% of our mid-term objective of 51 MTM/D by FY 92.

Intratheater Airlift

The C-17 has a dual intertheater and intratheater role. The C-17 combined with the present C-130 force provides a funded capability of 97% of our mid-term goal by FY 92.

We need your continued support for the procurement of the C-17 which is, because of the peculiar nature of our AOR, essential to meeting our airlift goals. Presently the C-17 is the only program in sight that will fulfill our intratheater payload, range and restricted landing requirements.

Sealift

In a major contingency, 95% of our forces and cargo, including much of the non pre-positioned equipment for heavy divisions and support units, and the bulk of our ammunition and supplies, must move by sea. Our objective is to have enough shipping to carry 850,000 short tons of unit equipment to the USCENTCOM AOR as depicted in the following graph.


STRATEGIC SEALIFT

Thanks to the Navy's Containership Modification Program, the seasheds, flatracks and universal adapters to be bought over the next five years will modify as many as 25 commercial containerships to handle oversized military cargo. This will add approximately 100,000 short tons of lift capacity to the US Flag fleet.

We are particularly grateful for our eight Fast Sealift Ships. We have used them periodically during our large scale deployment exercises and are impressed with their capabilties. They surely must be one of the better purchases the Congress has authorized, aseach of these ships can carry one sixth of a heavy Army division at sustained speeds in excess of 27 knots.

In the RRF program, the Navy is purchasing and maintaining dedicated shipping to be held in a reduced operational status, available for our use within five, 10, or 20 days of notification. These Ready Reserve Force ships complement the active MSC strategic sealift fleet of 56 ships currently in use around the world and compensate for the expected reduction in US Flag shipping which would be available upon mobilization.

Our specific concerns are continued expansion of the RRF and procurement of the sealift enhancement equipment necessary to the Containership Modification Program. The $114.3 million budgeted for FY 88 and $111.9 million budget for FY 89 will enable us to meet our mid-term and long-term objectives.

Army Pre-positioning of Port Clearance Equipment

Obtaining the necessary sealift is only part of our mobility picture. Once the ships arrive in the AOR, we must insure that carge is promptly discharged. The Department of Defense has established a goal of 50,000 short tons of Port Terminal Discharge Equipment and the present budget submission supports 72% funding of that goal by FY 92. The current status of this equipment is listed below.

- 7,000 short tons now pre-positioned afloat at Diego Garcia on the Heavy Lift Pre-positioned Ship (HLPS)
- 11,000 short tons of material located at Hythe, England
  - Tugboats
  - Cargo Barges
  - Delong Piers
  - Pontoon/Causeway Sections
- 8,000 short tons being provided from existing and/or new procurement if required (Roll On/Roll Off, FY 90)
- 10,000 short tons remaining will be pre-positioned by FY 92

The FY 88 budget funds equipment to be positioned in FY 90 are reflected on the chart below.

ARMY PRE-POSITION
PORT/TERMINAL UNIT EQUIPMENT



Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS) Equipment

Because of the nature of our AOR, and the large number of possible sealift discharge points, we must also be prepared to offload significant tonnages over-the-shore, across undeveloped beaches or "bare-base" ports. The Army has established 21,000 short tons of discharge equipment as the goal for LOTS capability and has made great strides in achieving that goal by FY 92.

The LOTS program is broken down in short tons as listed below.

15,500 short tons now funded
    Causeways
    Mechanized Landing Craft
    Landing Craft Utility
5,500 short tons to be funded by FY 92
    Causeways
    Mechanized Landing Craft

This chart shows our progress:

ARMY LOTS PROGRAM



Pre-positioning

A fourth, and very important aspect to successful force projection, is in-place and available War Reserve Materiel (WRM). Effective pre-positioning of WRM enhances our ability to rapidly respond during full scale operations and gives us flexibility to employ forces in a limited role. A very important side effect is that the pre-positioned WRM is available to support overseas exercises. This considerably reduces our operating costs by decreasing airlift requirements. This process was used during BRIGHT STAR 85 and we anticipate far greater use of PREPO for BRIGHT STAR 87. Thus, we have continued to place a high priority on pre-positioning WRM at or as close as possible to its point of anticipated use. Therefore, we are actively pursuing initiatives with a number of nations to increase our pre-positioning of materiel such as ammunition, POL, medical sets, communications nodes, Army/Air Force bare base support equipment and Defense Mapping Agency maps and charts.

PRE-POSITIONING

TOTAL REQUIREMENT



Supplies and Equipment

One of our more significant improvements is in the area of pre-positioning supplies and equipment; last year we reported 33% of the requirement pre-positioned and today we have 54%. This improvement is primarily the result of the continued movement of materiel into Oman where we will fill out our storage facilities later this year.

Munitions

Most of our Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force missiles and munitions are stored on PREPO ships. Limited amounts of munitions are pre-positioned in theater and CONUS facilities for USCENTCOM use. Our ashore pre-positioning posture in the AOR improved over the last 12 months with the pre-positioning of 9,000 S/T in Oman and will continue with an additional 5,000 S/T scheduled for shipment in 1987. Although pre-positioning of ammunition has increased, our on-hand fill decreased by 40% to 37% in relation to the requirement. This was due to an increase in our requirements to comply with Defense Guidance and a refinement of expenditure rates for Southwest Asia.

POL

Our status has improved by 6.5% as a result of increased port storage in Oman, Djibouti and various Pacific locations. This gradual but steady improvement in fuel pre-positioning to support our warfighting forces is expected to continue. Further improvements will be realized in 1987 through relocation of 1.6 million barrels of fuel to Bahrain. This will triple the amount of POL stored ashore in the AOR. We also anticipate pre-positioning at Diego Garcia a portable ship-to-shore fuel tanker discharge system for use in austere or damaged ports.

Water

Water purification, storage and distribution equipment is limited to that equipment presently aboard the PREPO ships and Maritime Pre-positioning Ships (MPS). In-country (within the AOR) pre-positioning of water equipment has not yet been accomplished to any significant degree. Water equipment remains with units and at various CONUS Depot storage sites until agreements for forward storage can be consumated. In that respect, we are now progressing with plans to pre-position two barge-mounted Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units, each capable of producing 300,000 gallons of potable water per day. With approval by the country concerned, we should be able to position the equipment this year.

Sustainability

The final aspect for successful force projection is sustainability. Once in theater, a flow of materiel is needed to achieve combat superiority and to protect and support our forces. The source of this flow is War Reserve Materiel (both pre-positioned stocks and those stored in CONUS).

Shown is our current sustainment posture.

SUSTAINABILITY

TOTAL REQUIREMENT



Supplies and Equipment

The first column, represents our combined requirements to sustain combat in all supply and equipment classes except munitions and bulk POL. It includes secondary items such as rations, combat clothing, packaged POL, barrier materiel, repair parts and major end items like combat, tactical and other base support vehicles. The 35% on-hand total reflects only those items actually owned, controlled or otherwise earmarked for USCENTCOM use. There has only been a 2% improvement in this category since our last report. Most of these shortfalls occur within the Army and Air Force Components.

Serious shortages exist in ground forces War Reserve supplies and equipment. The FY88 budget for these sustainability categories is considered minimal in terms of our AOR requirements. We do not attain even 50% of the requirement for supplies and equipment in either FY 88 or FY 89. FY88 equipment funding provides only some improvement. Again the the total available will be less than half of the requirement. There is no significant improvement by FY89. Supply and equipment sustainability is vital and current funding levels are absolutely essential.

The primary Aviation shortfall remains insufficient fill rates of total aircraft spare requirements, particularly War Readiness Spares Kits (WRSK) and Base Level Self Sufficiency (BLSS) Spares and Other War Reserve Materiel (OWRM). The FY 88-89 budget will only fill 52% and 45% respectively of the total spares shortage. This breaks out to 100% of the peacetime operating stocks, but only 16% in 1988 and 11% in 1989 of WRSK/BLSS requirements. OWRM, which provides follow-on spares support, is not funded at all in FY 88 or 89. We cannot satisfactorily sustain combat operations without adequate war readiness stocks. Your support is crucial.

POL

The second column in the preceding chart depicts our objective for POL. There has been a 5% improvement since last year. Congressional action eliminated FY87 POL War Reserve acquisition funding. Your support of the $160.8 million in the FY 88/89 budget for acquisition of new POL reserves is requested. Without these funds no improvement in the 37% of our requirement we now have on hand can be achieved.

Munitions

Munitions sustainability, as depicted in columns three and four of the chart, includes the aggregate short tons for level-of-effort (LOE) munitions and the quantity of threat-oriented (TO) munitions needed to sustain USCENTCOM forces. As is readily apparent, our posture remains soft. Since last year, fill rates have decreased. This is attributable to increased requirements generated by a revised Army study on ammunition expenditure rates for Southwest Asia and our refinement of munitions availability data.

Shortage of modern munitions continues to pose major concerns because of the long lead times required for procurement and associated high costs. Specifically, the termination of AIM-7 missile production in FY88 in anticipation of AMRAAM, leaves our Air Force component with only 41% of its radar missile requirement. We do not see any improvement in this area until the 1990's when large quantities of AMRAAM should become available. However, the FY88 budget will improve allocations of HARM missiles by 21% and Maverick missile by 8%. Your support of the FY88/89 budget submission of $1.2 billion for AMRAAM, $1.9 billion for HARM, and $923 million for Maverick is necessary to alleviate critical shortages for our air forces. Similarly, support is also needed for the $131 million for the powered GBU-15 (a precision guided bomb) and $64 million for the improved 2000 lb bomb. Both of these items are essential for interdiction of hardened targets.

Our shortfall in LOE munitions is primarily those items needed to support ground forces. The $4.0 billion in the FY88/89 budget for Army ammunition will provide us with 67% our requirement.

MILCON

The USCENTCOM objective for the Military Construction Program in Southwest Asia is to provide a network of dispersed facilities to support pre-positioning of materiel and predeployment, staging, and employment of U.S. forces. Examples of typical uses of these critical facilities are shown below:

- En Route Support
- Staging
- Logistic Support
- Pre-positioning
- Fleet Support
- Support of Overseas Training and Exercises
- Communications, Command and Control

Significant progress has been made with completion of projects in Kenya, Somalia, and Diego Garcia. Essential facilities throughout the AOR are estimated to cost approximately $1.4 billion. Congress has already funded about $1.1 billion of that total or 78% of the USCENTCOM requirements.

Full Congressional support over the next five years for the $300 million remainder is needed primarily for staging and pre-positioning facilities. These facilities not only house the critical pre-positioned stocks, but allow us to substantially decrease peacetime exercise air and sea-lift requirements and costs. This is accomplished by utilizing on-the-ground stocks for exercise support.

Our $125 million en route support requirement at Lajes and Morocco will be completed with the Congressionally appropriated FY 87 program.

The FY 88 program will provide $35.1 million primarily for additional staging support and maintenance in Diego Garcia and for airfield enhancements, communications facilities, and additional pre-positioning storage and support in Oman.

The $32.9 million FY 89 MILCON program is highlighted by two significant Army programs: a brigade size Intermediate Staging Facility (ISF) and a theatre war reserve pre-positioning facility. Both of these projects are the first of their kind for the Army in our AOR and will represent a significant improvement to our ability to quickly project and sustain our combat forces. The ISF will provide a location where forces can assemble, complete planning, and prepare for commitment to the combat zone. The storage facility will allow us to pre-position supplies and selected equipment for an Army division. Plans to use these sites for periodic training will also substantially decrease peacetime exercise air and sealilft costs.

Congressional desires to fund only the most critical overseas MILCON projects, are fully appreciated. USCENTCOM is examining and utilizing all possible alternatives, such as host nation support, commercial leasing, relocatable assets, and, on occasion, build-to-lease.

Host Nation Support

Host nation support resulting from alliances, and bilateral or multilateral agreements can provide readily available resources to U.S. forces during peacetime or in event of contingencies. Friendly nations throughout USCENTCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) can provide USCENTCOM forces with:

- -Facilities (airfields, ports, cantonment areas, etc.)
- -Fuel (jet, mogas, diesel)
- -Water
- -Medical Facilities/Services
- -Transportation Assets (general and special vehicles)
- -Laborers (skilled and unskilled)
- -Interpreters
- -Logistical Services (laundry, local contracts, etc.)

When such arrangements are made, the amount of material required to be transported by air/sea lift is significantly reduced and our response time is substantially improved.

Moderate to significant host nation support is provided to USCENTCOM by Oman, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and the United Arab Emirates. I am confident substantive support would be provided by Saudi Arabia and the other AOR nations when their national interests and sovereignty are threatened.

Last year we supported a legislative proposal to expand to other friendly governments the special acquisition and cross-servicing arrangements authorized under the Nato Mutual Support Act (NMSA). We are grateful to the Congress that the FY 87 Defense Authorization Act contained the needed amendment. We plan to implement this new authority with Egypt in FY 87 and look forward to expanding this process to other countries in our AOR in FY 88. This legislation enables us to arrange for local logistics support for our forces, thus improving our sustainability and war fighting potential, while reducing our own service support requirements.

Medical

Programs that support combat medical care are important to the U.S. Central Command because unlike other theaters there is no U.S. medical infrastructure in place and only minimal back-up host nation health care systems available. Although progress has been made since last year, adequate combat medical care still remains a problem. Major factors affecting adequate combat medical care for USCENTCOM forces are the readiness level of medical units, availability of in-theater hospital beds, pre-positioning, ability to evacuate patients, and availability of advanced medical technologies.

Readiness

None of our eight (8) Army Reserve hospital units are able to deploy into combat today because of major shortfalls in critical wartime medical skills and equipment. Today these units are equipped only with training sets. To address this problem the Army has added funds in the FY 88 budget to enhance reserve component recruiting for the critical skills required in wartime. To help solve the critical combat medical speciality shortages reported by USCENTCOM designated medical units, a programmed FY 88 increase of active component family practice physicians will be converted to 254 spaces for general and orthopedic surgeons and anesthesiologists. From these conversions, we hope to fill some of our 449 personnel shortages, an important first step toward improving readiness in the personnel area.

Medical equipment for Reserve Component units is being bought under the purview of the Deployable Medical Systems Program. The FY 88 - 89 budget for this program and the Secretary of Defense's decision to emphasize initial equipage over modernization will provide equipment for six (6) of the eight (8) hospital units totaling 2400 beds in FY 91, thus improving their current non-deployable status for equipment.

Hospital Beds



The number of hospital beds available in-theater is the key yardstick for measuring medical support capability. Today we have only 30% beds available for deliberate planning. During FY 87 the number of available beds will increase, but only to 42% of our requirement. Without additional resources this shortfall would require the evacuation of two and one-half times the number of soldiers out of theater who could potentially return to duty. In addition to the loss of unit cohesion, replacing these soldiers from CONUS would require five (5) additional C-141 sorties per day. The current program funding profile does not equip all of the hospitalization units designated for Southwest Asia until 1993. The FY 87 appropriation will provide 70% of the beds needed in the units by 1989. The FY 88 - 89 budget provides an additional $469 million, which if supported, will get us to 91% by 1991. We need your support of the FY 88 - 89 budget to stay on this recovery schedule.

Pre-positioning

Medical pre-positioning is required since no U.S. operating medical structure is present in Southwest Asia and significant host nation medical support is not available to U.S. forces. Today, 36% of the prepositioned requirement for Army, Navy, and Air Force hospital beds are pre-positioned afloat and ashore in three countries in Southwest Asia. Additionally, the Air Force has 600 beds in CONUS storage awaiting specific country approval before pre-positioning. As current procurement programs materialize the remaining requirement for pre-positioning beds can be achieved.

Aeromedical Evacuation

Aeromedical evacuation is the only effective means of moving sick and wounded personnel from the combat theater to the rear area medical treatment facilities. The Air Force Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a program which designates civilian aircraft to help meet our aeromedical evacuation needs, freeing C-141 aircraft for hauling cargo. In FY 88 - 89, 61 Boeing 767s are programmed to receive conversion kits which will allow us to equip each with litters, stanchions, patient oxygen, and a nurse's station. The FY 88 - 89 budget contains $31.5 million for this essential program. We need your backing here too.

Medical Technology

Finally, combat medical care will be enhanced by continuing the development and adaptation of advanced medical technologies. Currently, the U.S. Army Research and Development Command is developing an on-site oxygen generating and distribution system. This system will reduce the tremendous long haul transportation requirement to provide the thousands of cylinders of medical oxygen needed by the projected numbers of patients. This project is scheduled for development by FY 89 and requires your continued support. Another on-going medical R&D project is the Air Force Transportable Blood Transshipment Center, projected for 1990. This project envisions improving combat resuscitation through the use of a liquid-frozen blood component. The Blood Transshipment Centers are critical elements in the transportation, storage, and shipment of the liquid-frozen blood components.

Command and Control

Defense Communications System Central Area

DCS CA CONCEPT


WORLDWIDE DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
USERS
SATELLITE
HIGH FREQUENCY RADIO
TERRESTRIAL
MAJOR NODE
MINOR NODE
MAJOR NODE
MAJOR NODE
USERS
USERS

In order to provide a Command and Control capability in the AOR, a robust, survivable theater communications capability remains my highest priority. Due to the lack of in-place communications systems, the lack of U.S. assets in the region and the communications vacuum which exists over Southwest Asia in the Defense Communications System, U.S. Central Command has, in conjunction with the Defense Communications Agency and the Army and Air Force, designed a theater communications capability to extend the Defense Communications System into our AOR. Recently designated the Defense Communications System - Central Area (DCS-CA), this capability will consist of three major and nine minor transportable communication complexes referred to as nodes. These nodes consist of satellite equipment, HF equipment, electronic switching and technical control facilities that provide message service, secure voice, facsimile and telephone access worldwide for forces in the theater. The three major nodes are scheduled to come on line in 1987, 1988, and 1989 respectively. The nine minor nodes consisting of a similiar mix of equipment, but with less capability will come on line between 1990 and 1993. All these nodes will provide the backbone for the extension of the Defense Communications System across Southwest Asia. The DCS-CA program is proceeding on schedule and we expect to begin positioning new node equipment in the AOR within the next few months. This program is fully funded over the FY 88-92 FYDP at $148 million. Continued congressional support is required to ensure program success.

Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE)

In addition to an in-place Defense Communications System, my headquarters requires an assigned tactical communications capability. Currently, we must compete with other CINC's for limited JCS controlled assets provided by the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) at MacDill AFB. Because of limited assets, there is no guarantee that JCSE support will be available for USCENTCOM when required.

In August 1984, the JCS approved expanding the JCSE, with Air National Guard (ANG) augmentation, to support two simultaneously deployed Joint Task Force Headquarters. This expanded JTF and the upgrade of existing equipment will increase the assurance that JCSE support will be available upon request. It further provides an interim solution to a full-up, dedicated, tactical communications unit for USCENTCOM until required resources can be made available. The JCSE modernization and expansion program is funded at $60.4

million across the FY88-92 FYDP. Congressional funding support is required to provide this capability which is used by all the CINCs.

Combat Support Signal Units

Service Signal units tasked to support USCENTCOM must be as combat ready as the forces they support. Organic tactical communications equipment that is compatible, compact, rugged, air transportable and land mobile is required to establish communications links within the AOR to support combat operations. Army National Guard and Reserve units are in need of improved and upgraded communications equipment.

Fielding of Army Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) will significantly increase unit readiness at all echelons. As new MSE assets are delivered to Army Corps units, displaced equipment will become available to transfer to echelons above corps units. In addition, Air Force Regular and Reserve component units tasked to support USCENTCOM will benefit from the fielding of new TRI-TAC equipment. Major end-items of communications equipment such as voice and message switches, tropo and HF radio, and SHF tactical satellite communication systems are required to establish critical command and control links. Continued congressional funding support for the Army MSE program and TRI-TAC is necessary for effective control of combat forces in the vastness of the USCENTCOM AOR.

CINC C2 Initiative Funds Program

The CINC C2 Initiative Fund is key to meeting short-term USCENTCOM communications requirements with low-cost equipments and services. This fund, which provides current year dollars to buy off-the-shelf communications equipment has been critically important for meeting new requirements such as establishing connectivity between my CONUS headquarters, my airborne command post and offices and agencies in the AOR. A recent example of the use of these funds was the purchase of a compact, satellite system to improve transmission of intelligence information from national systems to deployed elements.

The terrorist hijacking of PA AM Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan again re-emphasised the paucity of communications in SWA and highlighted the need to provide rapid connectivity to a large number of command and control elements, both at MacDill AFB and within my AOR. An expanded secure voice capability for my Crisis Action Center and Secure UHF Satellite Communications for key military officials in the AOR are two other top priority projects being implemented using CINC Initiative Funds.

Funding for the CINC Initiative Fund program has been highly erratic the past two years. This program needs to be stabilized as it is the only source of funds available to CINCs for short-term command and control improvements. Of the $12 million budgeted for the CINCs, approximately one million dollars of the FY 88 program would be used to fund necessary USCENTCOM command and control improvements.

Automated Command and Control Information System

Since my posture statement last year in March, we have begun a major initiative to move USCENTCOM from a manual method of providing operational command and control of forces to a state-of-the-art capability with a deployable, automated command and control information system. Our current system is labor intensive, time consuming, has limited responsiveness and possesses an inefficient interface with our subordinate commands.

This automated command and control information system will provide realtime battlefield and situation displays as well as an automated briefing capability that will permit more timely and accurate information transfer. This new system will provide my staff with a deployable automated system that links them with component headquarter staffs to instantaneously share critical information. This system will also allow me and my component commanders to rapidly track theater-wide developments and to make timely decisions. We plan to field a portion of this command control information system in time for Bright Star 87.

We have begun the initial phase of this program with a small amount of FY87 funds reprioritized from other programs.

Simulation

Requirement

A high priority area to enhance USCENTCOM's warfighting capability is through computer assisted simulation. Simulation provides a method to accomplish several critical functions effectively and efficiently at the unified command level. First, in the area of strategy and operational plan development, the Command plans to use computer assisted simulation to compare various courses of action in order to select a proper strategy and concept of operations. Secondly, simulation is required to define warfighting requirements, particularly in the area of forces and logistics. Moreover, simulation to support analysis is also necessary to make a net assessment and to identify shortfalls. The third major area for computer simulation is exercise support. In the past, control of our exercises has been basically a manual operation requiring thousands of people. By using simulation, a significant reduction in control personnel is possible with a corresponding reduction in exercise cost without any loss in training goals or objectives. I intend to use an automated simulation system to support our next major exercise and anticipate significant savings. These requirements have taken on added emphasis in this time of fiscal austerity and due to the Congressionally mandated increases in the responsibilities of the unified commands in the programming and budget process.

Improvements

There are two programs that promise to provide the simulation capabilities needed; the Modern Aids to Planning Program (MAPP) and the Joint Warfare Center (JWC) and their Joint Exercise Support System (JESS). MAPP is a JCS sponsored program to provide computer hardware and analytical models to the unified and specified commands. Prototype models are just now coming onboard and will provide, for the first time, the capability to conduct indepth analysis to support operational planning and requirements development. JESS, which is sponsored by US Readiness Command and is still in development, will provide the capability to automate a significant part of the manpower intensive exercise control function.

Deficiency and Budget Assessments

While these initial simulation and analysis capabilities are a major first step, the models are still under development and as such require further improvements to make them fully operational. Approved FY 88-92 funding for MAPP and JWC is shown below:

	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92
MAPP	17.5	18.3	13.9	10.2	9.8
JWC	14.7	9.2	9.5	9.3	9.8

It is essential that funding for the Modern Aids to Planning Program remain as programmed. I strongly support these programs and by this time next year, I plan to use the results of the MAPP models to provide you better insight into my warfighting capabilities and requirements. Also, with a simulation capability I will be able to provide a net assessment, which I am unable to do this year.

Intelligence

Theater Intelligence Architecture Program (TIAP)

During the past year, USCENTCOM has made some great strides forward in its quest to become the premier authority on intelligence matters within our region, capable of supporting both peacetime and wartime operations.

Theater Intelligence Architecture Program (TIAP)

This effort will be further enhanced when our Theater Intelligence Architecture Program (TIAP) is completed later this year. This architecture will, for the first time, provide us with a blueprint to fully integrate our deployable intelligence system, exploit national systems from a deployed posture, develop complementary theater capabilities and translate documented shortfalls into programmatic initiatives. This should markedly improve our ability to transition the peacetime intelligence structure to support wartime requirements. Such a capability remains essential since we have few in-theater resources during peacetime.

Exploitation of National Systems

In support of this effort, during 1986 we significantly enhanced our ability to exploit national collection systems to satisfy our critical intelligence requirements. This month we achieved the ability to fully exploit electronic intelligence from all collectors with installation of an Enhanced Tactical Users Terminal. This system not only provides a near-real-time capability (NRT) to access and exploit threat associated radars but enables us to interface compatible systems assigned to our components and their operating forces. The Air Force incorporated a USCENTCOM NRT imagery receive location in their funding. This remedies a major deficiency in our ability to support critical warning, contingency and war fighting missions. We also initiated programs to satisfy our components' imagery needs. The Air Force and Marine Corps POMs each include $25M in procurement for imagery receive locations for CENTAF and MARCENT ($24M in FY90 and $1M in FY91). The Army has programmed $15M to initiate procurement of an ARCENT imagery capability ($5M in FY90 and $10M in FY91 POMs).

Analysis and Production

In 1986, we made major improvements in our intelligence analysis and production capabilities. In conjunction with the Defense Intelligence Agency, we established an Intelligence Production Element which provides an initial capability to focus on the Soviet Southern High Command of Forces and inter and intra-regional conflicts in our volatile area of responsibility. One of the production element's first products was a major revision of the theater intelligence indications and warning system. This system will help us to quickly recognize indicators of change in Soviet force readiness and intentions and support a rapid decision to deploy deterrent forces. We also established a team, from existing resources, to study on-going Soviet operations in Afghanistan and disseminate lessons learned. This fall we begin construction at MacDill AFB of a 9600 square foot secure facility to house the Production Element.

Automation Support

In conjunction with USREDCOM, we overhauled our automated Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) and developed a computer software facility for the USCENTCOM deployable version of the system which will begin fabrication this year; the Air Force FY88 POM includes $2.4M in procurement to complete this project. With this system, our analysts can access national data bases and provide better and more timely support to deployed forces. Due to careful coordination and planning, our Army component will initiate procurement of an identical system with proposed expenditures of $4.3M in FY88, and $2.5M in FY89. These new systems will provide near state-of-the-art automated support to our battle staff, analysts and collection managers.

Deficiencies

In spite of realized and programmed improvements in our intelligence capabilities, significant deficiencies identified through the intelligence architecture process still remain. Rapid access to national collection systems is critical to the accomplishment of our intelligence functions; however, we are, in fact, excessively dependent on national systems. Recent exercises illustrate that these systems will not provide adequate coverage of the USCENTCOM area during a world-wide crisis. In the absence of theater capabilities which already exist in other areas, we must focus on developing and fielding responsive theater collection capabilities. We also need an improved secondary imagery dissemination system to pass imagery from NRT sensors to war fighters at the component level. We have requested the Air Force to program expenditures of $1.8M in FY89 and $1.7M in FY90 for this purpose. Human intelligence collection is inadequate throughout the USCENTCOM area; we need additional attace representation in the review. We also need better integration of USCENTCOM and component automation systems, improved intelligence decision graphics and a more robust capability to process, store and retrieve the mass of data generated in crisis and war situations; we have requested a total of $11M in USAF funds to accomplish these goals between FY89 and FY93.

In a year of constrained resources, we seek your continued support for ongoing programs to improve our intelligence production, imagery, and automated systems initiatives that meet our most crucial shortfalls, especially in light of the significant and ongoing increase in Soviet regional capabilities described earlier. Funding requirements for other intelligence deficiencies will be addressed in future budget submissions. These will build upon the baseline capabilities already budgeted.

Exercises

The exercise program is a major part of USCENTCOM's activities to demonstrate resolve, test concepts, and practice coalition warfare and interoperability. Exercises also assist in maintaining and improving access and presence in an area of the world where US basing, facilities, and infrastructure are extremely limited. For these reasons, a strong, dynamic, continuous exercise program is critical to maintaining momentum and continued progress toward regional stability.

The USCENTCOM program alternates yearly between exercises conducted outside the continental United States (OCONUS) and within the continental United States (CONUS). This schedule allows sufficient time to execute a major exercise, evaluate performance, and incorporate lessons learned into following iterations. The development of each exercise is based on realism, in that we exercise the same way we intend to operate during contingencies. This enables us to test concepts up front and apply fixes immediately.

OCONUS Exercises

OCONUS exercises give our forces the opportunity to train in areas and under conditions approximating those in which they may be required to fight. OCONUS exercises provide the opportunity to examine vital aspects of deploying and sustaining US combat forces a long way from home bases in an austere environment. In addition to satisfying our own training requirements, exercises in the region are tailored to the needs, desires, and sophistication of each host nation. We start with low key military operations such as special operations activities. Then we increase the complexity of succeeding exercises as host countries gain experience and expertise. Our ultimate goal with each country is to be able to conduct combined operations which are necessary for effective coalition warfare.

BRIGHT STAR is our major OCONUS exercise. It is designed to practice important joint and combined deployment, employment, sustainability, and command and control activities simultaneously in several countries in the area. US and host nation staffs. participate side-by-side in combined operations, driven by realistic scenarios. BRIGHT STAR 87, scheduled for the coming summer, will provide us with the first opportunity to use an important new authority entitled "Developing Countries Combined Exercise Program". This authority was recently granted under the "Unified Commander's Conduct of Cooperative Programs with Friendly Nations" program included in the FY 87 DOD Authorization Act. Through funds allocated for this program, USCENTCOM is planning to pay certain incremental expenses of friendly foreign countries participating in the exercise. With this assistance, friendly foreign states are able to stretch their own training budgets, expanding the breadth and depth of experience in working with our forces to promote regional security. The poorer states of the region are able to sustain a level of interaction they could otherwise ill afford. More fundamentally, this gesture is concrete evidence of the value we, as a command and a nation, attach to and derive from effective cooperation and interaction with the forces of our friends in Southwest Asia and other essential parts of the AOR. Taken together with our other forms of cooperation, this constitutes a significant building block in the creation of mutual understanding and shared confidence.

USCENTCOM also conducts several smaller scale OCONUS exercises. These exercises focus on joint and combined aspects of mobilization and airlift operations, special operations, and air defense operations.

CONUS Exercises

We plan and conduct two major exercises in the CONUS during the even numbered fiscal years. GALLANT KNIGHT is a command post exercise which allows us to focus on actual warplans. It is a cost effective way to involve subordinate USCENTCOM headquarters and supporting commands in the planning details of deploying, warfighting, and sustaining major US combat forces. The exercise is structured to provide the flexibility to resolve problems as they arise.

GALLANT EAGLE is a field training exercise which employs forces in a scenario that parallels possible situations which could occur in the execution of warplans. Although the benefits which derive from OCONUS exercises in the region, such as presence, and interaction with host nation forces, cannot be duplicated in the US, GALLANT EAGLE remains an important adjunct to our OCONUS exercises. We can field significant levels of forces using realistic scenarios in an environment similar to Southwest Asia at reduced transportation costs.

We are continuing to look at cost saving efficiencies to gain maximum benefit from the training dollar. In FY88, for example, we plan to combine GALLANT KNIGHT and GALLANT EAGLE into a single sequential exercise. We will save money by reducing the amount of airlift required to transport the participants and their equipment to two separate exercises.

FY 86 Exercise Accomplishments

In FY 86, we conducted seven exercises at a cost of $52 million and trained approximately 62,000 US personnel. I believe this money was well spent as we had the opportunity to look at our ability to deploy and sustain our forces, and to operate as a joint/combined team.

Deployability

Last year's program provided an excellent test of our airlift and sealift capability. We saw many improvements and documented procedural difficulties that are being worked on now.

Airlift. During one two month period we successfully airlifted over 30,000 troops and 8,000 short tons of cargo using C-5, C-141 and C-130 aircraft. The intratheater airlift statistics were equally impressive.

Sealift. Among the highlights in this area was an effort to test our ability to offload cargo without using a port. Again, to maintain realism, one of the Fast Sealift Ships (USNS ALTAIR) was loaded with cargo on the east coast and steamed to an anchorage off Coronado, California. Using the Joint Logistics Over The Shore, or JLOTS concept, approximately 900 combat vehicles, 50 containers, and other miscellaneous cargo were unloaded from the ALTAIR at anchor and delivered over the beach. Army and Navy units worked in tandem using lighterage and handling equipment to accomplish this task.

Sustainability

We specifically stressed key points of the logistics support system to see if it could sustain our forces under operational conditions. Among those key points were:

Water. The goal was to support the forces using all the elements of the deployable water system. Water was drawn from non-potable sources and wells we drilled. It was was purified using Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPUs) and distributed to the troops. Over 3 million gallons of water was purified. That's enough to support all members of the House and Senate for 9.3 months, assuming each member used 20 gallons a day.

Support. As mentioned earlier, USCENTCOM is dependent on reserve forces for much of its combat service support. With the support burden placed squarely on their backs, they performed extremely well. There were glitches, of course, but this is expected when geographically separated units are consolidated to perform unified functional missions.

Petroleum Distribution. The Army tested a new lightweight pipeline system developed under the Southwest Asia Petroleum Distribution Project. While the system still has bugs, it represents the first major advance in tactical long-haul pipeline distribution since the Korean War.

Joint Interoperability

Interoperability between Services is extremely important because our resources will be limited and all assets will have to be used to best advantage. Consequently, we placed considerable emphasis on forcing situations where mutual coordination and cross suppport were required.

In the air, we flew air interdiction and air superiority missions using Air Force and Marine tactical fighters, and SAC B-52s controlled by AWACS. Fixed wing and rotary aircraft from all four Services provided close air support to both Marine and Army ground forces.

On the ground the Army and Marines worked together to coordinate plans, operations, and movements. Major units operated over command boundaries providing cross Service fire support, air defense and helicopter lift.

Conclusion

In summary, our exercise program sets out to accomplish many difficult tasks and is structured to provide a large measure of confidence in our capability to perform our assigned mission. Despite intraregional sensitivities and conflicts, and a difficult political environment, this program remains an effective method of improving regional defensive capabilities of friendly countries in the area while providing a presence and maintaining our access in the area. Most importantly, our exercises give real-world confirmation that USCENTCOM is capable and ready to deploy and fight when directed. The President's budget includes approximately 274 million for strategic airlift and sealift in support of joint and combined exercises. In view of the important role exercises play in USCENTCOM's multinational strategy, we intend to spend our share productively. Continued congressional support of exercise funding is encouraged.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Overview

Earlier, we described our strategy as a strategy of economy of force. It is imperative, in this regard, to encourage and assist our friends in developing a stabilizing regional influence through a robust individual and collective defense. A major tool in implementing this strategy is security assistance. A strong assistance program, along with political-military cooperation with regional countries, will ensure they can provide for their internal security and territorial integrity, and defend themselves in a small conflict. As a direct result of funding authorized by Congress in FY 85 and prior years, the countries of the area are not only more confident of their ability to contribute to regional defense, but increasingly forthcoming across the whole range of our security relationships. Additionally, we have witnessed many improvements in access, prepostioning and other such support for US forces.

General Implications of Reduced Funding

Unfortunately, recent program reductions threaten to derail the achievements discussed above. The impact of these reductions on our economically distressed friends has been directly effected by the need to maintain Egypt and Pakistan at reasonable levels. The cumulative history of these reductions, with 1985 as the baseline, is shown on the chart on the following page.

TOTAL FMS CREDITS/MAP/IMET USCENTCOM AOR



The top solid line shows that the CENTCOM totals have been fairly constant over the three-year period. However, when Egypt and Pakistan are excluded, the lower dashed line shows a dramatic reduction of 71 percent in funding for the rest of our countries. While it is too early to predict the political effect of this reduction on the region as a whole, we are concerned over possible damage to our credibility as a reliable security partner, to our access initiatives, and to overall military-to-military relationships. We will be operating in a damage limiting mode for the foreseeable future, with great concern for regional stability as well as attention to Soviet and proxy state attempts to fill the void. In a more material sense, the effect of reductions in the 1986 budget ranged from postponement of force modernization plans, to cutbacks in logistics support for existing systems. The

1987 budget has forced these countries to cancel entire programs, and has led to even more extensive erosion of support for previously purchased weapons systems. We had made substantial progress in many countries in achieving a measure of self-sufficiency and in fostering regional defense arrangements. This progress is now threatened and major capital investments will be jeopardized by a cessation of basic logistic infrastructure development and a lack of spare parts.

Regional Implications of Reduced Funding

The following table outlines the country-by-country security assistance program trends.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TRENDS*
($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88**
EGYPT	1,117,000	1,245,723 (+ 11.5%)	1,301,750 (+16.5%)	1,301,750 (+ 16.5%)
PAKISTAN	325,400	311,910 (- 5.7%)	313,400 (- 3.7%)	290,920 (- 10.6%)
DJIBOUTI	2,600	2,036 (- 21.7%)	1,140 (- 56.1%)	2,140 (- 17.7%)
JORDAN	91,750	83,020 (- 9.5%)	41,700 (- 54.5%)	53.800 (- 41.4%)
KENYA	21,700	20,767 (- 4.3%)	9,100 (- 58.1%)	20,600 (- 5.1%)
OMAN	40,150	19,284 (- 52%)	150 (- 99.6%)	5,300 (- 86.8%)
SOMALIA	34,150	20,241 (- 40.7%)	8,750 (-74.4%)	23,250 (- 31.9%)
SUDAN	46,550	17,288 (- 62.9%)	6,000 (- 87.1%)	11,000 (- 76.4%)
YEMEN	6,200	3,048 (- 50.8%)	2,150 (- 65.3%)	4,100 (- 33.9%)

* INCLUDES MAP, FMS CREDITS AND IMET.

** FY 88 BUDGET REQUEST.

NOTE: BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UAE ARE NOT SHOWN SINCE PROGRAMS ARE SELF-FUNDED.

The defense capabilities and cooperation of the key states of Djibouti, Somalia, and North Yemen, sitting astride the strategic Bab el Mandeb, have materially eroded as a result of 56-74 percent reductions since 1985. This choke point, on trade routes between Europe and Africa-Asia, is also critical to USCENTCOM if we were called to defend the region. Sudan, facing external threats from Libya and Ethiopia and a Marxist-backed rebellion in its south, has been especially hard hit with an 87 percent reduction. The largest state in Black Africa, Sudan controls the Nile River, life blood of our key mid-east ally, Egypt. Consequently, with an unfriendly Sudan on its south and Qhadafi's Libya to its west, continuation of Egypt's present role in the peace process would be problematical. All of these states are threatened by their traditional enemies of Ethiopia and South Yemen, now with Soviet-backed, Marxist governments. To the south in Kenya, the security of the only viable Black African democracy is jeopardized by a 58 percent rollback in what had been a limited $21M program. We have enjoyed especially warm military relationships with the Kenyans, ranging from support for transiting USAF cargo aircraft supporting our Indian Ocean forces and Diego Garcia, to a successful port visit program for our Pacific Fleet, and a small but important combined exercise program.

Finally, Jordan, where we enjoy perhaps the warmest military relationships in the region, has been devastated by a 54 percent cut while facing a continuing threat from a substantially stronger Syria to its north. Again, we are undercutting a key ally in the peace process and one important to successful defense of the region.

The irony of the total funding environment is that not only do the program cuts increase the risk of drawing USCENTCOM into a regional conflict, but also that it simultaneously decreases support available to us when we arrive. In this era of a fiscally constrained US military strategy, we simply cannot afford to miss opportunities to take advantage of the force multiplier effect gained by wise security assistance investments. In this regard, we strongly urge the support of Congress for full funding of the very austere 1988 security assistance budget proposal. We consider these levels as essential to achieve our national commitment to regional security for an area of the world clearly vital to US and other Western interests.

A more detailed analysis of individual country programs is contained in the addendum.

Country Catalog

Bahrain

Bahrain is an island state at the center of the Arab-controlled petroleum producing zones of the Persian Gulf, and thus occupies a strategic position of major importance to the economies of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Important components of this strategic view are Bahrain's contribution to regional Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) defense and the support facilities leased for the Middle East Force. Purchases of US military equipment by Bahrain are designed to help that country participate in a regional defense effort under the auspices of the GCC. Furnishing the requested equipment will only modestly improve Bahrain's self-defense capability; it will serve as a visible and effective contribution to regional efforts within the GCC to deter adventurism. The other vital Bahraini contribution, the support facilities leased for the Middle East Force, is crucial to our ability to maintain a naval presence in the Persian Gulf. We would hope that our maturing security assistance relationship would lead to strengthened cooperation.

Security Assistance Program

The security assistance program for Bahrain is healthy and the most rapidly growing program in the Gulf. FMS cash purchases in FY 86 and FY 87 exceeded total Bahraini FMS purchases for the period FY 75 through FY 85. We believe that a steady, well-planned expansion will continue for the near term. Bahraini purchase of the US F-5 aircraft and M60A3 tanks through FMS cash sales will provide the Government of Bahrain a significantly enhanced military capability. Additionally, we would expect increased FMS expenditures for maintenance and training for both their newly-acquired equipment, and in preparation for the more advanced equipment planned for acquisition in the future.

BAHRAIN PROGRAM LEVELS
($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 75-86	FY 87
CASH SALES:	$331,670,000	$150,000,000

BAHRAIN TRAINING

YEAR	STUDENTS	COST ($000)
83	4	67
84	1	26
85	6	68
86	25	2,708
87	42	1,014 (EST)

Djibouti

Djibouti is strategically located on the Bab el Mandeb choke-point of the Red Sea and is 20 miles across the straits from a growing Soviet presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) also known as South Yemen. Djibouti gives the US Navy access to its modern and well-located seaport and airport. As our naval presence in the Indian Ocean has been increasing in the last eight years, this access has become even more important. Additionally, the Government of Djibouti has adopted positions on most international issues compatible with those of the United States. Our efforts are intended to complement the French role in Djibouti and to contribute to the development of the nation and its military's civic action capability.

Security Assistance Program

The objective of US security assistance is to aid Djibouti in maintaining a small military force capable of successfully defending its territory for a limited time until military or diplomatic assistance from other sources can become effective. The program for Djibouti consists of a Military Assistance Program (MAP) grant and an International Military Education and Training (IMET) program grant, as shown on the attached charts. The MAP is specifically designed, in conjunction with IMET, to enable the Djiboutians to create an engineer construction company, to provide an English language laboratory, and to buy spare parts. A portion of the program has also been devoted to the purchase of wheeled vehicles and military uniforms. The engineer program will facilitate road construction in a country with a severely limited transportation network and will benefit both the military and civilian infrastructure. The IMET program provides essential training to effectively use US equipment provided through MAP. Training for the engineer company is the highest priority for Djibouti.

DJIBOUTI PROGRAM LEVELS
($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 81-86	FY 87	*FY 88
USG GRANT AID			
MAP	7,889	1,000	2,000
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	458	135	135
GRANT AID TOTAL	8,347	1,135	2,135
USG CREDIT	0	0	0
FMS CASH SALES	0	0	0

* FY 88 FIGURES FROM PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST.

DJIBOUTI TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
82	4	60	8	104	12	268
83	7	100	0	0	7	100
84	6	140	0	0	6	140
85	7	100	0	0	7	100
86	8	121	0	0	8	121
87	13	200	0	0	13	200 (EST)

Funding

Reduced FY 87 funding delays activation of the US-supplied engineer company program, and risks the loss of previously-provided equipment through effects of deferred maintenance. Lack of adequate funding has already drawn this program out over several years, and as a result, the Djiboutians have yet to begin their first engineer project. Requested FY 88 funding will allow us to provide adequate training and maintenance support to allow the Djiboutians to begin undertaking construction projects and prevent deterioration of equipment.

ACTUAL FUNDING LEVELS
DJIBOUTI (MAP)



Egypt

With over half of the world's Arab population and astride the strategically important Suez Canal, Egypt is a political and geographical bridge between Africa and Asia. Egypt has assumed a dominant role in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and is one of the keys to the maintenance of security of the entire region. Providing the moderating influence to Libyan adventurism, Egypt has been a source of influential military advice and assistance which complements our own efforts. The security assistance effort is a vital component of our national objective to develop a strong and stable Egypt.

Security Assistance Program

The program for Egypt consists of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) financing, and International Military Education and Training (IMET) grants as shown on the attached charts. Our security assistance is designed to support Egypt in continuing positive participation in the peace process and to deter Libyan aggression. It is directed toward replacing Egypt's older Soviet equipment with modern US systems to help ensure Egyptian modernization, self-confidence, military self-sufficiency, and ability to deter aggression. IMET reinforces the FMS program by training Egyptian personnel to operate and maintain US equipment, and by familiarizing them with US military management concepts and military doctrine.

EGYPT PROGRAM LEVELS
($ IN MILLIONS)

	FY 79-86	FY 87	*FY 88
USG GRANT AID			
MAP	0	0	0
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	4,634.1	1,300	1,300
IMET	12.5	1.75	1.75
GRANT AID TOTAL	4,646.6	1,301.75	1,301.75
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	4,000	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	0	0	0
CREDIT TOTAL	4,000	0	0
FMS CASH SALES	0	0	0

* FY 88 FIGURES FROM PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST.

EGYPT TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
83	338	2,000	15	64	353	2,064
84	258	2,000	7	106	265	2,106
85	203	1,800	156	602	359	2.602
86	138	1,699	185	1,719	323	3,418
87	218	2,136	64	333	282	2,469 (EST)

ACTUAL FUNDING LEVELS
EGYPT FMS (CONCESSIONAL)



Jordan

Jordan is a focal point for regional stability in the Middle East. Its role in the search for a durable peace, contribution to the maintenance of the security of its frontier with Israel, and favorable political orientation make this country critical to accomplishing our objectives. Jordan assists other moderate regimes in the Gulf states through training their forces and being active in regional defense. They have traditionally looked to the West as their primary military supplier. Our program enables the Jordanians to maintain their independence and provide a constructive influence with other countries. A strong Jordan is in our best interest, and even more so, serves the collective interests of other friendly nations of the region.

Security Assistance Program

The Jordanian program consists of FMS financing, International Military Education and Training (IMET) grants, and a Military Assistance Program (MAP) grant. In 1987, there is no FMS credit funding, although Jordan will be provided a MAP grant for the first time since 1980. MAP credit funds will be used to maintain the existing force structure with spare parts and consumables, and to acquire training ammunition. The initial upgrading of F-5 aircraft is expected to be accomplished by a third country utilizing internal funding or third country loans. US manufactured equipment will be an integral part of the upgrade. The IMET program is designed to continue the training of instructor cadres to improve the quality of Jordanian military schools and improve operations and logistic support of US furnished equipment.

JORDAN PROGRAM LEVELS
($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 75-86	FY 87	*FY 88
USG GRANT AID			
MAP	295,588	39,941	40,000
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	15,616	1,800	1,800
GRANT AID TOTAL	311,204	41,741	41,800
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	693,140	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	117,205	0	1,200
CREDIT TOTAL	810,345	0	1,200
FMS CASH SALES	1,705,754	0	0

* FY 88 FIGURES FROM PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST.

JORDAN TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
83	384	1,295	229	5,878	613	7,173
84	374	1,729	25	170	397	1,899
85	384	1,750	0	0	384	1,750
86	391	1,764	115	527	506	2,291
87	458	1,784	32	221	490	2,005(EST.)

Funding

The cutback in FY 87 funding follows a sequence of developments, including withdrawal of the arms package and disclosure of US-Iranian arms dealing, that Jordanians perceive as a decline in long-standing US support for their country's security. The FY 87 levels, as shown on the following chart, represent no more than half the amount required to meet a "bare bones" subsistence level and eliminate most modernization procurements.

ACTUAL FUNDING LEVELS
JORDAN (FMS/MAP)



With no USG credits being offered, the Jordanian Armed Forces will have difficulty obtaining the support needed without obtaining assistance through third country loans. This environment could seriously erode the excellent access, trust and working relationship that the US has built up over the years. Because of perceptions of declining credibility, more reliance on Soviet programs and equipment is possible. This was demonstrated by a recent major buy of Soviet arms and a ten-fold increase of Soviet personnel in-country since 1982. Although FY 88 levels proposed in the President's budget would provide a 30 percent increase over FY 87 allocations, it falls one-third below the FY 86 level and thus will provide only minimum support funding.

Arms Delivery Trend

Jordan, faced with increased military threats and an arms buildup in Syria, has been hard pressed to meet its legitimate defensive arms needs. The moderate, but decreasing, level of funding and deliveries by the US and other free-world countries, has compelled Jordan to look increasingly to the communist bloc as a source of supply. This trend is shown on the following chart.

MILITARY ARMS TRANSFERS TO JORDAN



Kenya

Kenya plays a key role in our security strategy in Southwest Asia and the Horn of Africa, and is one of two countries in East Africa with which the United States has formal military access agreements. During the late 1970s and 1980s, a close relationship developed between the United States and Kenya, culminating in increased economic ties, a large US aid program, and the presence of the second largest US Peace Corps element in the world. Kenya permits US military access to its airfields, ports and other facilities and provides fuel, repair facilities and resupply for US ships and aircraft.

Security Assistance Program

Security assistance contributes to regional and internal stability by helping Kenya improve its self-defense capabilities and by promoting US-Kenyan military cooperation. The program for Kenya consists of a Military Assistance Program (MAP) grant and International Military Education and Training (IMET) program grant, as shown on the following chart. The MAP is designed to provide follow-on support for Kenyan F-5 fighter aircraft and helicopter programs, and assistance in improving the Kenyan Army engineer brigade. The IMET program concentrates on aircraft operations and maintenance training and assists the Kenyan military in developing skills for the effective management of its defense establishment.

KENYA PROGRAM LEVELS
($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 75-86	FY 87	*FY 88
USG GRANT AID			
MAP	69,640	7,500	19,000
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	10,556	1,600	1,600
GRANT AID TOTAL	80,196	9,100	20,600
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	155,000	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	0	0	0
	155,000	0	0
FMS CASH SALES	0	0	0

* FY 88 FIGURES FROM PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST.

KENYA TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
82	72	927	0	0	72	927
83	90	1,400	15	2,713	105	4,113
84	126	1,621	0	0	126	1,621
85	138	1,688	4	1,776	142	3,464
86	169	1,522	17	519	186	2,041
87	146	1,309	1	471	147	1,780 (EST)

Funding

Reduced FY 87 funding will dramatically alter Kenyan plans for development of a civic action program and purchase of replacement aircraft, and will force cancellation of fighter and helicopter improvement programs. Fully funding the President's FY 88 request will permit restoration of spare parts purchases, engineer civic action and F5/500MD improvement programs. Inadequate security assistance funding jeopardizes the current spirit of cooperation we enjoy with this pro-western and stable country.

ACTUAL FUNDING LEVELS
KENYA (MAP)



Kuwait

Kuwait's location at the northern end of the Persian Gulf makes it the first line of defense in the event of a military incursion against the moderate Gulf states. The escalation of the Iran-Iraq War, to include attacks on non-belligerent shipping in the Gulf during the past year, has increased Kuwait's need to upgrade its defensive capability. Therefore, our security assistance is intended to provide defense equipment and services which will enhance Kuwait's ability to participate in regional defense arrangements with other Gulf Cooperation Council states.

Security Assistance Program

All purchases under the security assistance program are on a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cash or commercial sale basis as shown on the attached chart. Kuwaiti purchases include: follow-on support for previously purchased aircraft, artillery, anti-tank and air defense systems; components of air defense command and control systems; construction of an air force flight training school; professional military training and pilot training. All training for Kuwait is FMS funded and provides professional development courses for officers, and aircraft operations and maintenance courses for mechanics.

KUWAIT PROGRAM LEVELS
($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 75-86	FY 87
FMS CASH SALES	1,453,087	80,000

KUWAIT TRAINING

YEAR	STUDENTS	($ 000)
82	263	5,335
83	108	1,501
84	227	5,970
85	297	8,470
86	298	10,569
87	266	8,846 (Est)

Oman

As the southernmost member of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the guardian of the Strait of Hormuz, a strong and independent Oman is important to regional stability and the continued flow of critical resources. The Sultan of Oman has strongly supported peace efforts in the Middle East and openly endorses a balance of US and Soviet influence in southwest Asia. US-Oman security cooperation is key to US Central Command responses to contingencies threatening our interests in the region. Security assistance for Oman is intended to provide that country with the equipment and training necessary to deter or defend against aggression from Iran or the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Security Assistance Program

The security assistance program for Oman consists of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) financing, and International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance as shown on the chart. Oman has recently experienced significant budget shortfalls due to reduced oil revenues, and can fund no new significant FMS purchases. Past FMS credits will be used to support US equipment already in Oman's inventory. The IMET program is intended to provide professional training for mid-level military officers, as well as operational and technical skill training to enhance Oman's overall military capability. However, IMET participation is expected to be significantly reduced in the coming years due to Omani budget decreases in military spending and shortfalls in available manpower.

OMAN PROGRAM LEVELS
($ IN THOUSANDS)

USG GRANT AID	FY 79-86	FY 87	*FY 88
MAP	0	0	0
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	479	144	150
GRANT AID TOTAL	479	144	150
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	190,000	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	0	0	5,150
CREDIT TOTAL	190,000	0	5,150
FMS CASH SALES			

* FY 88 FIGURES FROM PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST.

OMAN TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
84	15	127	0	0	15	127
85	24	150	0	0	24	150
86	13	40	0	0	13	40
87	29	164	0	0	23	164 (Est)

Funding

Reduced FMS funding will have minimal impact as Oman presently cannot afford to take advantage of US loans. Brought on by reduced oil revenues, their current budget crisis has caused across the board reductions in spending.

ACTUAL FUNDING LEVELS OMAN (FMS CREDITS)



Pakistan

Pakistan is a bulwark against communist aggression. A haven for over three million Afghan refugees, it has been under intense pressure from the Soviets due to the continuing Government of Pakistan support for the Mujahedin. Pakistan's forces are large and among the best-trained in the area. Our security assistance program is designed to strengthen Pakistan's ability to resist Soviet pressure.

Security Assistance Program

US security assistance is intended to support regional stability by helping Pakistan improve and enjoy confidence in its own defense capabilities. The security assistance program consists of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit financing and cash sales, and International Military Education and Training (IMET) as shown on the charts. FMS financing helps pay for the continued modernization of the Pakistani Armed Forces, principally for the acquisition of air defense systems, aircraft, light helicopters, howitzers, armored vehicles, shipboard weapons systems and munitions. The IMET program trains Pakistanis to operate and maintain a range of US-manufactured military equipment. It provides professional leadership and management training, as well as graduate level courses, pilot training and technical training in maintenance, operations, communications and electronics.

PAKISTAN PROGRAM LEVELS
($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 75-86	FY 87	*FY 88
USG GRANT AID			
MAP	650,281	0	0
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	27,511	900	915
GRANT AID TOTAL	678,792	900	915
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	878,648	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	325,000	312,500	290,000
CREDIT TOTAL	1,203,658	312,500	290,000
FMS CASH SALES	2,954,139	0	0

*FY 88 FIGURES FROM PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST.

PAKISTAN TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
83	92	700	28	102	109	802
84	94	800	327	6,207	414	7,007
85	122	1,000	107	1,507	229	2,507
86	116	1,003	112	2,829	228	3,832
87	134	1,389	144	852	278	2,241 (EST)

Funding

Although the FY 87 program was cut $2.7M from the requested amount to $312.5M, it is slightly larger than the $311.025M approved for FY 86. Access and working relationships remain good with no adverse reaction expected. The slight reduction in the proposed FY 88 budget levels should have no significant impact on current major programs if fully funded.

ACTUAL FUNDING LEVELS PAKISTAN (FMS)



Qatar

Qatar occupies a 4,000 square mile peninsula situated on the western shore of the Persian Gulf and bordering Saudi Arabia. The security of Qatar is important to the free passage of oil through the Gulf. With developments in Iran and the Iran-Iraq conflict, the security of Qatar has become increasingly important to US national interests. Qatar is a Gulf Cooperation Council member and maintains a small military force equipped primarily with British and French weapons systems. In the event of attack, Qatar would look to the GCC for support. Our security assistance program, as shown below, is structured to enable Qatar to assure internal order, to cooperate with its GCC partners in regional defense and to promote a closer US-Qatari relationship. Security assistance to Qatar is limited to modest FMS cash purchases, mostly for technical training.

QATAR PROGRAM LEVELS
($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 75-86	FY 87
FMS CASH SALES	843	UNKNOWN

QATAR TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
83	0	0	13	209	13	209
84	0	0	2	38	2	38
85	0	0	4	15	4	15
86	0	0	6	156	6	156
87	0	0	25	475	25	475 (EST)

Saudi Arabia

As a leader in the Arab world and the key to stability in the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia commands a position of tremendous influence and strategic importance; as Saudi Arabia goes, so goes the entire peninsula. Under Saudi control are 45-50 percent of the known oil reserves in the Gulf region. Revenue from the sale of this oil enable the Saudis to play a key role in the economic life and stability of the region and have permitted the Kingdom to extend financial assistance to moderate governments throughout our area. Saudi Arabia continues its quiet but significant efforts to encourage a peaceful settlement of the Iran-Iraq War, the ongoing strife in Lebanon, and other regional conflicts. Continued US support of the Kingdom is vital to our position not only in the Gulf, but throughout Southwest Asia and the Third World.

Security Assistance Program

Military sales to Saudi Arabia, designed to improve and modernize its forces, are directed toward developing its security capabilities and encouraging a collective regional defense with other Gulf Cooperation Council states. Through FMS cash sales, Saudi Arabia purchases defense articles and services needed for its defense modernization program, as shown on the charts. The recent delivery of the E3A AWACS to Saudi Arabia further enhances its air defense capability, an important factor in containing the Iran-Iraq War. The sale is also important in our efforts to show our commitment to the defense requirements of the region, and to encourage security cooperation among moderate states. Other programs include the mechanization of additional Saudi Arabian Land Forces brigades; training and modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard; strengthening the air defense posture of the Royal Saudi Air Force through continued support for the F-5 and F-15 aircraft programs and enhancement of communication and control capabilities; and continued training on new equipment for the Saudi Navy. All training is FMS funded through cash sales.

SAUDI ARABIA PROGRAM LEVELS
($ IN MILLIONS)

	FY 74-86	FY 87	*FY 88
USG GRANT AID			
MAP	26	0	0
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	12.5	0	0
GRANT AID TOTAL	38.5	0	0
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	254	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	0	0	0
CREDIT TOTAL	254	0	0
FMS CASH SALES	55,974	4,000 (EST)	UNKNOWN

* FY 88 FIGURES FROM PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST.

SAUDI ARABIA TRAINING

YEAR	STUDENTS
82	563
83	866
84	447
85	928
86	688
87	950 (EST)

Somalia

Situated on the Horn of Africa, Somalia occupies a strategic location at the intersection of critical sea lanes. It dominates oil tanker routes from the Persian Gulf through the Bab el Mandeb and the Red Sea to Europe, and along the East African coast around the Cape of Good Hope to the US. US access to Somalia's strategically-located ports and airfields, formalized by a ten-year access agreement signed in 1980, is critical to our ability to operate forces in the region. A pro-western government is essential to preserving the security of these routes and counter-balancing the strong Soviet influence and facilities in Ethiopia and the PDRY.

Security Assistance Program

A substantial security assistance program is desperately needed in Somalia because the Somali military depends on the US to modernize its outdated, obsolete equipment and improve training of its military forces. It is composed of a Military Assistance Program (MAP) grant and an International Military Education and Training (IMET) program grant, as shown on the charts. Somalia's severe balance of payments crisis requires that military assistance be provided on a grant, rather than credit, basis. MAP grants fund the most serious shortfalls in Somalia's defensive posture. Progess is being made in logistic support, infantry training, air defense radars, communications, and small arms. IMET programs include English language training, officer participation in basic armor and infantry training, and senior grade officer attendance at professional military education courses. The program is also an investment in US regional interests and has paid impressive dividends in access rights to Somali ports and airfields for US military forces.

SOMALIA PROGRAM LEVELS

($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 80-86	FY 87	*FY 88
USG GRANT AID			
MAP	114,140	7,500	22,000
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	4,655	1,250	1,250
GRANT AID TOTAL	118,795	8,750	23,250
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	155,000	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	0	0	0
	155,000	0	0
FMS CASH SALES	0	0	0

*FY 88 FIGURES FROM THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST.

SOMALIA TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
82	26	454	8	104	34	558
83	32	600	0	0	32	600
84	46	993	0	0	46	993
85	72	957	0	0	72	957
86	59	1,107	29	280	88	1,387
87	83	1,209	42	195	125	1,404 (EST)

Funding

Reduced FY 87 funding will cancel or curtail several on-going programs, including purchase of patrol boats; improvements in air defense; command, control, and communications; and development of a sound logistics infrastructure. Requested FY 88 funding levels will allow us to support essential air defense improvements, improve the logistics infrastructure and counteract the Somali perception that the US is not a reliable source of security assistance.

ACTUAL FUNDING LEVELS
SOMALIA (MAP)



Sudan

The location of Sudan between Libya and Ethiopia, and its control of the confluence of Nile River waters above Egypt are of strategic importance to the US and Egypt. Since the accession of the present government under Sadiq al Mahdi, Sudan has again become disillusioned with Qhadafi and has realized the threat inherent in maintaining too close a relationship with Libya. As a result, Sudan is currently attempting to disengage itself from Libya, and move toward the Non-Aligned Movement and the West. Unfortunately, the combination of Sudan's pressing insurgency, and the lack of Western military and econimic support, makes it uncertain if Sudan can resist increasing pressure from its internal insurgency and interference from Libya. An immediate and serious threat to Sudan's stability stems from its chronically weak economy and from the spectre of default on a foreign debt which now exceeds the country's total GNP. By responding to critical short-term needs, the US has helped Sudan maintain international solvency and access to external credit. Without our continued economic and military assistance, there is little hope of Sudan covering its external debt gap and mobilizing assistance from other donors. Selective rehabilitation of the Sudanese armed forces, with primary emphasis on maintenance, logistics and infrastructure, will enable Sudan to present a credible deterrent to hostile regional powers. IMET program training and MAP assistance will strengthen the overall readiness of Sudan's armed forces and improve its ability to counter violations of its long borders.

Security Assistance Program

The FY 87 security assistance program for Sudan consists of Military Assistance Program (MAP) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) program assistance as shown on the following chart. The MAP money is primarily used to build and support a light, mobile, maintainable and deployable desert force able to defend Sudan's borders. The central element of the IMET program is English language instruction. Functional training by Mobile Training Teams (MTT) in logistics and maintenance is geared to improving utilization of US equipment in the Sudanese inventory. MTTs provide engineering, armor, and artillery in-country training. Additional training in the US is given to Sudanese officers in such fields as communications, maintenance, logistics and operations.

SUDAN PROGRAM LEVELS
($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 75-86	FY 87	*FY 88
USG GRANT AID			
MAP	150,860	5,000	10,000
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN	50,000	0	0
IMET	7,872	1,000	1,000
GRANT AID TOTAL	208,732	6,000	11,000
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	100,000	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	0	0	0
CREDIT TOTAL	100,000	0	0
FMS CASH SALES	0	0	0

*FY 88 FIGURES FROM PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST.

SUDAN TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	($000)	STUDENTS	($000)
82	98	1,146	131	842	229	1,988
83	74	1,330	38	232	112	1,930
84	132	1,459	17	279	149	1,738
85	120	1,407	30	411	150	1,818
86	55	876	-	-	55	876
87 (Est)	121	1,663	2	4	123	1,667

Funding

Except for the C-130 tactical airlift program, all other assistance programs will be severely curtailed or eliminated because of the FY 87 allocation. Among these are the National Logistics System, army modernization (to include V-150 armored car purchases) and the air defense program. Strengthening of ties with Libya is a distinct possibility should the Sudanese conclude that Libya will assist them with their military and economic shortfalls. US access and other programs have so far not been affected. Proposed FY 88 funding would permit a small improvement over FY 87. However, even with the requested funding, no new purchases or force modernization would occur. The next chart depicts the significant decrease in funding for the Sudan program. Should the unfavorable trend in MAP funding continue, Sudan may be forced to turn to Libya and other radical states.

ACTUAL FUNDING LEVELS
SUDAN (MAP)



United Arab Emirates

The UAE, located near the strategic Strait of Hormuz, plays a stabilizing, active role in OPEC and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Recent events in the Iran-Iraq war have graphically illustrated the potential threat to the UAE's long coastline and facilities. Further, its oil wealth and generous foreign assistance program, as well as its efforts to mediate in regional conflicts, give it more influence than the size of the country would suggest. US security assistance sales are designed to improve air defense and early warning capabilities to counter the mounting threat to Gulf security.

Security Assistance Program

The entire UAE program consists of foreign military cash sales as shown on the following chart. The majority of UAE training dollars are spent on air force pilot training, I-HAWK system training and professional military education.

UAE PROGRAM LEVELS
($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 75-86	FY 87
FMS CASH SALES	1,009,500	150,000

UAE TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
83	0	0	93	2,017	93	2,017
84	0	0	44	1,709	44	1,709
85	0	0	30	4,101	30	4,101
86	0	0	127	6,090	127	6,090
87	0	0	48	5,034	48	5,034

Yemen Arab Republic (YAR)

The YAR also known as North Yemen, is important to US interests because of its strategic location on the Bab el Mandeb. Adjacent to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), the YAR faces this Soviet-sponsored regime across a tense, volatile border. Economically, the YAR is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the Middle East. Although oil has recently been discovered, it will be several years before substantial income is realized. In the past, the Soviet Union obtained a foothold in the YAR through the sale of Soviet training and military equipment with liberal credit terms. The debt resulting from this credit continues to give Moscow considerable political leverage. While the comparatively modest US security assistance programs are unlikely to reverse the Soviet position, they do provide elements within the Yemeni government and military, which seek alternatives to reliance on the Soviet Union, the means to resist Soviet pressures.

Security Assistance Program

Specific US programs have been designed to highlight the qualitative superiority of our assistance in meeting Yemen's defense needs. US aid is also important in augmenting the assistance furnished to the YAR by Saudi Arabia. The security assistance program for the YAR is designed to assist in the maintenance of US-origin equipment provided by Saudi Arabia and the US. It is intended to contribute to YAR's stability by countering Soviet influence and deterring renewed threats from PDRY. This program consists of Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants, and International Military Education and Training (IMET) grants as shown on the chart. The small amount of MAP provided for FY 87 will be used to buy follow-on support to sustain present force levels and modestly enhance the capabilities of all three armed services. The IMET program finances operations and maintenance training on US equipment and in-country English language training courses.

YAR PROGRAM LEVELS
($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 74-86	FY 87	*FY 88
USG GRANT AID			
MAP	12,914	1,000	3,000
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	11,090	1,150	1,100
GRANT AID TOTAL	24,004	2,150	4,100
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	14,000	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	0	0	0
CREDIT TOTAL	14,000	0	0
FMS CASH SALES	375,439	0	0

* FY 88 FIGURES FROM PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST.

YEMEN TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
86	62	1,026	1	355	63	1,381
87	70	1,206	2	261	72	1,467 (EST)

Funding

The 49 percent reduction in MAP funding for FY 87 will severely curtail our ability to maintain the minimum level of support for US-origin equipment. Operational readiness rates for this equipment are dropping sharply for lack of spares, munitions, and training. Only two of the eleven programs planned for FY 87 will be implemented due to this reduction. At a time of growing Soviet pressure, this reduction will be perceived as a symbolic withdrawal of US support at the precise time the YAR is aggressively seeking to maintain an independent course. That is why it is essential that the $2 million increase requested for the YAR in the FY 88 budget be approved. This will be used to bring US-origin equipment already in the YAR's inventory back to an operational status. The FY 88 funding levels will also keep the in-country English language training detachment functioning at minimum levels.

ACTUAL FUNDING LEVELS
YEMEN (MAP)



UNIFIED COMMANDERS' CONDUCT OF COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS WITH FRIENDLY NATIONS

The DOD Authorization Act includes a program entitled "Unified Commanders' Conduct of Cooperative Programs With Friendly Nations". This program includes important new authorities for humanitarian assistance and civic action, payment of incremental expenses for developing countries during combined exercises, and payment of certain expenses of defense personnel from developing countries.

Section 333 - Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction With A Military Operation.

Section 1321 - Authority to Pay Expenses of Developing Countries for Participation in Combined Military Exercises.

Section 1322 - Authority to Pay Certain Expenses of Defense Personnel of Foreign Countries.

These new authorities are viewed as especially important to USCENTCOM. Many of the countries in our region face overwhelming economic and environmental constraints which adversely impact their efforts to provide for their own security against subversion and insurgency. Cooperative Programs with Friendly Nations is one approach USCENTCOM will use to assist our friends to develop a stabilizing regional influence through effective individual and collective defense capabilities.

USCENTCOM plans to conduct activities under these authorities that will improve our ability to influence events and key personnel in our region. Our planned use of the Section 1321 authorities in the upcoming BRIGHT STAR 87 exercise has been previously discussed. Humanitarian assistance and civic action projects not only offer a means of ameliorating potential setbacks in country programs caused by significant reductions in security assistance funds, they also offer a low-cost method of sustaining our access and influence. While anticipated expenditures are relatively small, their impact can be significant and lasting. These projects, especially when executed in conjunction with exercises, could enable us to project ourselves in a favorable light to host governments and local populations.

Finally, payment of expenses for foreign defense personnel to attend meetings and seminars at my invitation would provide a unique opportunity to include them in military discussions across a broad spectrum of issues. This, alone, would enhance our ability to influence foreign leaders and decision makers.

It is unfortunate that the FY87 DOD Contingency Fund was not appropriated in the FY87 budget. We have been forced to cancel important civic action activities which we had planned in two of the participating countries in BRIGHT STAR 87. We have also had to postpone implementation of a broader military civic action program, which was targeted at both the poorest nations in the USCENTCOM area and those which are most crucial to our contingency plans. It is important that funds contained in the FY88-89 President's Budget for Major Force Program 10 (Support to Other Nations) be both authorized and appropriated. Your continued support of the Unified Commanders' Conduct of Cooperative Programs With Friendly Nations is vital.

Chairman NUNN. Excuse me. Senator Cohen has a question.

Senator COHEN. Let me just ask a question. Are you including the deployment of the C–17 when you make that statement?

General CRIST. No, sir. I am saying the C–17's will take us into the year 2000 to 100 percent of our strategic airlift requirement. Right now we are, I believe at about 65 percent of the entire goal required. And in sealift, at about 99 percent, Senator.

So, looking at the percentages when I look at that, I am only looking at projecting forces to Southwest Asia. Clearly in time of a global war, there is going to have to be some apportionment of the airlift and sealift.

Chairman NUNN. I did not get the percentage. Where are you right now today in airlift? And where are you in sealift, today?

General CRIST. In strategic airlift, we are now at 85 percent of our mid-term objective.

Chairman NUNN. That is just for your region, or is that globally?

General CRIST. That is total, the total requirement as expressed for strategic airlift for the United States Armed Forces.

Chairman NUNN. 85 percent?

General CRIST. 85 percent of the mid-term objective.

Chairman NUNN. That is higher than I have ever heard. I am very gratified, if that is the case. If that is without the C–17, we have to ask what do we need the C–17 for, but I do not think those numbers are right.

General CRIST. And in strategic sealift, we are at 99 percent.

Chairman NUNN. And that is globally? That is not just your region?

General CRIST. In the sealift, it is my goal; which is 850,000 short tons, of which we are at 99 percent.

The national goal for strategy airlift is 66 million ton miles per day. At this point we are at roughly 41 million ton miles per day, which is 80 percent of the mid-term objective or 60 percent of the ultimate goal.

Chairman NUNN. I do not believe that percentage, 40-something out of 60-something is no more than two-thirds. I do not know. We had better check those figures.

Senator Cohen, have you heard those numbers?

Senator COHEN. They are news to me.

Chairman NUNN. That is great news, if that is accurate.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, perhaps Admiral Hays can shed some light on this, because in his statement he agreed that he feels that we have a lot further to go in this area. Perhaps we could hear his numbers.

Chairman NUNN. Yes.

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir. I, like you, am not familiar with those percentages, and I am surprised at just how high they are. My evaluation, for which I cannot give you a specific number, is just over half of what we require in airlift; a little better in sealift, but we have a long way to go, on the basis of my awareness in both airlift and sealift.

Chairman NUNN. I believe, General Crist, we may have a misunderstanding here. I think what you are saying is, as I see this chart on your statement at page 49, what you are saying is that the mid-term objective, the overall objective is 66 million ton miles per day, but the mid-term objective is about 52, the way I see this chart, by fiscal year 1993 it looks like we will be at about 85 percent of the mid-term objective, which is a long way from that, and that is 5 years from now, though. So we are talking about a measurement against the mid-term objective, and we are talking about 5 years down the road.

My real question is where are we now vis-a-vis the overall objective? If we can furnish that for the record, but I think we are a long, long way from there.

Do you want to respond?

General CRIST. About 60 percent of the total goal, Mr. Chairman; 85 percent of the mid-term total tonnage goal objective.

Senator DIXON. In all fairness, Mr. Chairman, I think the General originally testified 60 percent, before some of those papers were handed to him, and I think that was on the basis of the present time. Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to place my statement in the record.

[Prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, at today's hearings the committee will hear from Admiral Ronald Hays, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command and General George Crist, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command.

I look forward to hearing these commanders discuss how they perceive United States military strategy in the geographic areas of responsibility of their commands with an emphasis on the missions of east Asia defense and Southwest Asia defense. I also understand the witnesses will testify on the readiness of their forces, their critical deficiencies in their force capabilities, and what they consider their program priorities.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Before we completely conclude the hearing, maybe the staffs can get this up. I would like to know from both commanders where we are today with strategic airlift and sealift versus the need today. It is interesting to know what a mid-term objective is compared to an overall objective, but really what I am interested in is if war started tomorrow, what would we have in the way of sealift and airlift in your theaters. Also, the assumptions about what is happening in other theaters. That is crucial, because if it is the same airlift and sealift dedicated to more than one region, of course you have got to be able to determine what happens if you got a call on all those regions. So maybe the staffs could get together and let us have that by the end of the hearing, if we could. I will get our staff to work with you.

[The information referred to follows:]

Admiral HAYS. Our worldwide strategic (or inter-theater) airlift capability is about 42 million ton-miles per day or about 65 percent of the 66 million ton-mile per day goal established by the well-known Congressionally-Mandated Mobility Study. Today's capability represents about 80 percent of the 51–54 million ton-mile per day mid-term objective established by the Secretary of Defense in the Defense Guidance (DG) for the five year period ending in fiscal year 1992.

For sealift, we currently have 897,000 short tons of worldwide sealift capability to move unit equipment during a crisis. The DG goal is to have 980,000 short tons of worldwide dry cargo capability; we have achieved 91.5 percent of that goal.

If a crisis were to occur today, and if it were limited only to the Pacific area, I am confident that we could respond swifty and effectively. In a multi-theater scenario or worldwide war such as the one postulated in the DOD programming scenario, the availability of airlift and sealift would depend on the theater allocations made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff after they have received guidance from the national command authorities. The assumption made about what may be happening in other parts of the world will determine the amount of lift allocated to the Pacific theater.

General CRIST. We have the capability to satisfy about 60 percent of the total airlift requirement and just about all (99%) of the sealift requirements today. This assumes realistic phasing and positioning of forces and U.S. forces fighting on only one major front. Depending on the scenario, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would reallocate the strategic lift resources as required.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I must say that I am astonished. I would think a CINC should know, at this minute, what the national assets are, what is allocated to his command, and there should not be any disjointing. I say this with no disrespect, but I cannot understand why there would be this rather substantial difference of viewpoints between two CINCs on such a critical issue, because you have got to be planning today to go into combat tonight. So you should know what you have by way of air and sealift, and there should be some uniformity in the viewpoints in the availability throughout all the CINCs.

Chairman NUNN. I agree with Senator Warner. I think we will find that the airlift is dedicated to go in more than one direction at one time.

Senator COHEN. If you would yield, I think also Admiral Hays points out that if there is going to be a conflict with the Soviets, it is unlikely to be in one spot. The chances are they are going to be moving in at least two critical areas, and I would assume your wargaming would take that into account, and has taken that into account.

General CRIST. Yes, sir. We are at about 60 percent of our 66 million ton miles per day goal.

Chairman NUNN. That is nationwide? That is all theaters?

General CRIST. That is the total expressed requirement for strategic airlift.

Chairman NUNN. For airlift?

General CRIST. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. 60 percent?

General CRIST. Yes, sir, 62.4 percent which is 41.2 million ton miles per day.

Chairman NUNN. And that is today. That is not what we have contracted for; that is what we have actually got ready to fly?

General CRIST. That is today. That is in 1986. That is the figure shown on the chart.

Chairman NUNN. How about sealift? Have you got a comparable figure for sealift?

General CRIST. Yes, sir. My theater goal is 850,000 short tons, of which we are at 99 percent of the goal.

Chairman NUNN. Now what does that assume about what is happening elsewhere?

General CRIST. That assumes that the sealift that I need, 850,000 short tons, is available to me.

Chairman NUNN. It assumes no war anywhere else?

General CRIST. That is correct, sir.

Chairman NUNN. OK. I have a couple of questions, and I have already taken some of my time. Let me just ask General Crist, what happens to our strategy? What is the strategic effect, let us say, of an Iranian victory over Iraq?

General CRIST. Mr. Chairman, I do not think that the Iranians can achieve an actual military victory over Iraq based on what I know of the fighting to date in the Basrah area and what I have seen the Iranians do.

The effect, say, taking a city like Basrah would be more political than military. It could shake the Iraqi Government as a symbolic effect.

Chairman NUNN. Well, I am assuming—I would amend that and say, let us assume that they do cause the overthrow of the Iraqi Government and thereby become a dominant force in Iraq, not necessarily military, what would be the effect of that?

General CRIST. If you hypothesize the government in Baghdad dominated by a Shiite Government from Tehran, the effects would be quite serious on the gulf countries. They would be intimidated by such a power and subject to its actions in the gulf vis-a-vis their oil and threats to their installations from sabotage, and their own Shiite population.

Chairman NUNN. Would the demands on our own military forces go up? Would the dangers go up, the risks go up?

General CRIST. I think the risk would go up, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned in my statement, our strategy is to try to have the Gulf States themselves provide for their own defense, first, for which they have a sizable force; but we would undoubtedly have to provide them with the capabilities that they do not have; for instance, in surveillance. They do not have significant naval forces which can sustain at sea with surface-to-air defenses. We would have to back them up with these types of defensive capabilities.

Chairman NUNN. How about the threat to Israel?

General CRIST. The threat to Israel would depend upon Syria itself and how Syria would look at a Shiite-dominated Iraq. As you know, Syria and Iran have been cooperating. Whether that alliance, however, would remain in view of Syria's own interests vis-a-vis Iraq is a question mark, I think. Those countries historically have not necessarily been on good terms.

Israel must, of course, always watch that balance of power. I think it always favors Israel not to have a power with a predominant military capability in the area. On the other hand, Iraq has lost almost 3 percent of its population, killed, wounded, or missing. Her economy is in shambles, as is the Iranian economy. Whether in fact the country itself, even under Iranian dominance, would pose a significant military threat to the region I think is an open question.

Certainly for the Gulf States, however, a change of government in Baghdad favorable to Iran would be viewed very, very seriously as a threat to their own interests.

Chairman NUNN. Have you seen any difference in the Iranian tactics of fighting capability since the U.S. arms' shipments went to Iran?

General CRIST. No, sir, I have not. The Iranians attacked one area just north of the Shatt al Arab waterway in which only infantry troops could be employed. It is wet. It is like a grey putty. It has lots of vegetation crossed streams. It is good infantry terrain. The Iranians attacked with infantry.

The Iraqis are hesitant, as is the United States to a certain extent, to use manpower, preferring to use firepower. You cannot dislodge infantry out of that kind of terrain with firepower alone. If there has been any great effect of our TOWs, it is not clear.

Chairman NUNN. Once they take it with infantry, though, do they not then use the antitank and antiair capability? Is that not what they do? They move forward with infantry and then use that to defend against the Iraqi air and tank attacks?

General CRIST. The Iraqis have not been able to effectively use either their armor or their personnel carriers because essentially they have been used as pillboxes. I do not know, from the pictures and TV I have seen, exactly what is killing them.

Chairman NUNN. How good is the intelligence you have on that war?

General CRIST. We have——

Chairman NUNN. On a scale of 1 to 10 in terms of what you would like to know about what is going on there, what do you know?

General CRIST. About 6, I would say.

Chairman NUNN. About 6?

General CRIST. One of the problems is the Iranian Revolutionary Guards which are taking over more and more of that war. It is a little bit more difficult to get intelligence about the Revolutionary Guards.

Chairman NUNN. Admiral Hays, one questions to you. I believe I did not see this in your written statement, although it may be there, but you mentioned if I heard you correctly, that the Communist insurgency in the Philippines is still growing. Is that since the Aquino government took over, you are saying the insurgency is still growing now?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir, it is. Not at the same rate it was growing under Mr. Marcos, but during the last 6 to 8 months we have seen the official number defined by the government of the Philippines grow from 22,000 to almost 24,000 at the present time. So the rate has slowed, but unfortunately the numbers are continuing to increase.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Senator Warner, my time just expired.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I start, does the Chair wish to acquaint the membership with its intention to go into closed hearings for purposes of——

Chairman NUNN. Yes, I now intend to go into closed hearing for a further amplification of the threat assessment from both CINCs at the end of the open session. So I will ask both witnesses, if you see something that is asked that you would like to go into further, would you make a note of it and also let us know if we get into an area you would like to defer to the closed session.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have had the privilege of knowing and working with both witnesses for many, many years.

Admiral Hays, you listed in your analysis of strategy the fifth one being flexibility. Then later both witnesses addressed the uncertainty in South Korea today, the Philippines, Cambodia, and the antinuclear sentiment notably manifested by the New Zealand Government. All this leads me to the conclusion that carriers are an essential element of our maintaining flexibility under your definition of strategy in view of the precarious areas of the world both in your sector, Admiral Hays, and indeed in that of General Crist.

Would you care to comment on that, because this Congress has facing it the President's request for the initiation of programs to build two new carriers as replacements.

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir Senator.

As I mentioned, the Pacific Theater, including the Indian Ocean, is basically a maritime theater. It is important that we maintain maritime superiority. The heart of our maritime presence is the carrier. It is essential. It gives us the flexibility that we need to do the job that this Nation expects of its military in the Pacific.

We see that there is a commitment, desire to deploy the carrier that exceeds our capability today.

Senator WARNER. Even with the 15-carrier force?

Admiral HAYS. Even with the 15-carrier force. I am aware that one of your earlier witnesses, for example, suggested that we have a two-carrier presence continually in the northern Arabian Sea. We cannot do that with a 15-carrier force and still meet our other commitments around the world.

Senator WARNER. General Crist, would you characterize the carrier as the heart of your flexibility, also?

General CRIST. I think, Senator for me it takes on a different dimension. The carrier provides a clear and visible U.S. commitment in the Indian Ocean. It provides me with cover for my Middle East force ships, should the situation become volatile, as it has been continuously in the gulf.

In a crisis situation, the carriers allow the projection of Marine amphibious forces into the area, as a cover for the marines. The naval threat to lines of communications—as you recall, I mentioned the Soviet ocean squadron and their presence in South Yemen—only the carriers can really get to that problem, and I depend on Admiral Hays to provide that support.

Right now, we can maintain a carrier presence in that area, about three-quarters of the year roughly. One cannot provide more because they are not the available carriers to do so. Should Admiral Hays try to keep the commitments at a level of, say, two in the Indian Ocean, then he has to keep his carriers at sea, and they rapidly age.

Senator WARNER. In other words, they are essential to the discharge of your obligation, also?

General CHRIST. They are.

Senator WARNER. Now, General Crist, you pointed out in your map and in your charts the dependency on petroleum of other nations. Now when we examine the chart, the United States is 7 percent current from your area; Japanese, 65 percent. The command that you head up is the principal military force in that region, is it not?

General CRIST. It is, sir.

Senator WARNER. To what extent would other allies who have a larger reliance on imported oil come to your assistance?

General **Crist**. Senator, that is the heart and soul of my strategy, to develop regional alliances within the area, as well as have the European powers, principally France, assist. The French base in Djibouti is, as you see on the map, right on the strategic Bab El Mandeb. They are in a position to assist us in keeping that strategic body of water open.

The gulf nations, the GCC States, possess the forces and are capable, indeed, of defending their own oil fields, their own territorial waters, and their own areas of influence. I would look to them, and we encourage them in peacetime, to assume those sorts of responsibilities so that U.S. forces will not have to be employed in the defense of facilities or key installations within a country that is capable of supporting itself.

We are supporting Egypt quite heavily, and rightly so, because the approaches to the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean, as well as the Suez Canal all the way to the Red Sea, can be defended by their armed forces.

Senator **Warner**. Let me go directly to the next question. Recognizing that Japan is dependent on 65 percent of their petroleum needs from that area, specifically what is it doing militarily. The answer is nothing, is it not? I mean, in terms of forces, commitment of forces?

General **Crist**. Japan? Nothing, sir.

Senator **Warner**. Do you think they should come in and contribute some direct military assistance? Is it not about time?

General **Crist**. I would be delighted to have that support, but I think I should defer to Admiral Hays who probably knows more about the Japanese than I do, Senator, and what they are willing to do or not do.

Senator **Warner**. Well, essentially we are guaranteeing that free flow of 65 percent oil for Japan, are we not, with our forces?

Admiral **Hays**. Yes, sir. Of course we would like to see Japan do more, but I would point out that they are doing a great deal. I think it is very significant to note that recently Japan assumed the responsibility for the protection of sea lines out to 1,000 miles from the home islands.

Japan, although it has been restricted to 1 percent of its gross national product for defense purposes, has succeeded in putting together a very credible force, a credible self-defense force. Of course we would benefit if they did more.

Senator **Warner**. Jim, my time is up.

Senator **Exon** [presiding]. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you for being here this morning.

Admiral, let me ask you this question. You referred earlier to the growing presence of the Soviets in the Pacific. By and large, since they have no aircraft carriers are we not far, far superior to the Soviets in the Pacific at this time with regard to overall strike?

Admiral **Hays**. Sir, I would judge us to have a measure of superiority over the Soviet forces. I would point out, however, that the Soviet force structure within the last few years has grown dramatically. While they only have two carriers and they are not carriers that are comparable to our carriers——

Senator **Exon**. They are helicopter carriers, are they not?

Admiral HAYS. They are helicopter carriers that also operate the vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, the YAK-36. But by way of capability, they do not compete with our own aircraft carriers. But the surface combatants have grown in numbers and capabilities. We see the latest types in the Pacific Theater today. The submarine force has grown, and that is an area of primary concern so far as naval activity is concerned.

Senator EXON. Going back to a question asked by Senator Warner, given the fact that the Soviets have no traditional aircraft carriers in the Pacific, or anywhere as far as that goes, do you give higher priority to the procurement of additional aircraft carriers or, if you had your druthers, would you rather those funds be placed into some other parts of the budget?

Admiral HAYS. Senator, the unified CINCs, I think I can say, focus in the near term as they must on matters related to readiness and sustainability. Those are the categories that are my greatest concern. It is necessary, of course, to strike a balance between those things which are of urgent concern and the longer range health of the military structure.

I believe the budget that has been submitted strikes that balance.

Senator EXON. Could you answer my question so that I fully undertand it? Do you put higher priority on additional carriers in the Pacific at the present time or would you prefer to put that money into other areas? I am trying to get at where is the immediate shortfall, in your opinion?

Admiral HAYS. My immediate shortfall is in sustainability, but we have to face the fact that we have a 15-carrier force, 2 carriers of which are approaching age 50 and are in need of replacement. It is essential, in my judgment, that we get on with the program to replace those carriers, and I would give it priority.

Senator EXON. You are of course aware that we have now 15 carriers, and 2 new ones are coming on. Are you saying, in answer to my question, that your top priority for the immediate and long-range future for adequate defense in the Pacific would be more carriers than those we now have obligated?

Admiral HAYS. The construction of those two proposed carriers will be for replacement of carriers currently in the inventory. So there will not be a net increase in the carrier force structure. It will remain at 15. And a priority is to get on with a program to replace those two carriers.

Senator EXON. Let me——

Admiral HAYS. As unified commander, I have to say that from my perspective, what is important to me is my ability to perform my mission today. I have to focus on that. And when I look at that, I have to say that a deficiency I have in the Pacific, and I suspect one I share with the other unified CINCs, is the ability to sustain a military operation in an engagement with the Soviets.

Senator EXON. Well, I am not sure you have answered my question very adequately, Admiral. You see, I never have critized you in the military for coming to us with what you think are the total needs. That is your job.

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. But let me put this question: If you had a choice of two new carriers in addition to what we have now, or 10 additional attack submarines in the next 10 years, which would you choose?

Admiral HAYS. I would choose the carriers, sir.

Senator EXON. You would choose the carriers over the attack submarines?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. How about overall sustainability?

Admiral HAYS. Sustainability is an area of concern that is improving. We are far more capable today to sustain operations than we have been in the past, but it is still a problem.

Senator EXON. My time is up, Admiral. We will come back to this a little bit more, or maybe I can get a better understanding.

I believe Senator Cohen is next on that side. Is that right? Or is Senator Humphrey next? The chairman has left temporarily.

Senator COHEN. It depends whether you count the early rule, or whether you go by seniority here.

Senator EXON. I am going to count the early rule.

Senator Cohen.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry. Why are we arranged in order of seniority if we are not to be called upon in order to seniority?

Senator EXON. Well, because, in answer to your question, the general rule has been that we recognize the people in order of attendance, the Senators, in which they were here on our respective sides.

Senator HUMPHREY. May I say, I have been here at all the hearings of this committee, except one, so far this year and in every case the chairman has called on Senators in order of seniority.

Senator EXON. Is that the rule? I am only the acting chairman. I want to check on the rule.

It seems that Senator Nunn has done it both ways. Therefore, I will recognize the seniority rule.

Senator Humphrey.

Senator COHEN. I would move that we deduct the time taken to debate this from the Senator's time. [Laughter.]

Senator HUMPHREY. General Crist, I want to focus on the situation in Afghanistan as it affects your command, and as it affects your objectives. You have laid out those objectives in your testimony on page 23. Among those are the protection of friendly access to Southwest Asian oil, and to deter and, if necessary, to defend against Soviet aggression.

How would it affect your command, insofar as carrying out those objectives, if Afghanistan were to become permanently a Sovietized country? In other words, if these talks now underway led to some kind of agreement which had the practical effect of Sovietizing Afghanistan on a permanent basis, how would that affect your responsibilities? What advantages would that give the Soviets? What disadvantages would accrue to your command under that scenario?

General CRIST. Senator, let me leap back in time for just a second to the old Central Treaty Organization, which you will recall was dissolved in 1979. One of the major CENTO exercises assumed all thrust by the Soviets from Afghanistan through Baluchistan to the warm water off of Karachi. At that time, that exercise made a key assumption. The assumption was that the Soviets would go into Afghanistan.

When CENTO played that exercise, that was considered to be one of the weakest assumptions. Therefore this whole thrust to the warm water in the vicinity of Karachi, which indeed would split Pakistan and make Baluchistan very much like Bangladesh, was considered not to be very viable.

Today, they are 400 miles closer to that area. That scenario could be played now in reality. In addition, if you look at my first map, the Soviets could now move from Afghanistan and arrive at the Strait of Hormuz within 8 days. So their position in Afghanistan is quite excellent. They can either opt for the Pakistani route or the Iranian route. Indeed it makes the old CENTO planners reasonably farsighted.

Senator HUMPHREY. Focusing again on the historic Russian thrust toward the Persian Gulf through Baluchistan, the Soviets of course continue to be active in Baluchistan encouraging a separatist movement there. Is there not a deep water port along the coast of Baluchistan in western Pakistan that would be of great value to the Soviets?

General CRIST. There are two ports there, sir, but neither well developed.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do they have potential to be?

General CRIST. They have a potential to be, but the lines of communication across western Baluchistan are not terribly good. If one were a Soviet, you would go right to Karachi because the road south from Quetta leads there. Once at Karachi, you are up against the Indus River, and the Indian border. In this event, the Pakistanis would have great difficulty moving their forces to the south. In essence, Pakistan would be cut off to the north.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, leaving aside the drive toward a warm water port, which one would assume to be a longer range goal, immediately the Soviets have an advantage, have they not, even today but certainly on a more permanent basis if Afghanistan becomes Sovietized, becomes a de facto satellite. The immediate advantages are in the area of air support, launching aircraft out over the Persian Gulf. That is one of your primary objectives you list here, protecting friendly access to Southwest Asia oil.

What are your thoughts? What are your assessments on the advantages to the Soviets and disadvantages to the West of Soviet use of those airfields in Afghanistan, which have been lengthened, have they not?

General CRIST. Oh, yes. The Soviets have been building permanent facilities in Afghanistan; barracks, airfields, helicopter facilities, which always makes one question Soviet claims about their immediate departure. But putting that aside, their position in Afghanistan also flanks Iran. There are a million Afghan refugees in Iran right now. The Soviet position also flanks Pakistan, and places them in a position to employ airpower or deploy their forces either way. They have two airborne divisions within the southern TVD which could be used to capitalize on this strategic placement.

Senator HUMPHREY. You have noted in your handout here, this little graphic thing, that the air incursions against Pakistan tripled in 1986 from 250 attacks by aircraft upon the territory of Pakistan in 1985 to 750 in 1986. Now it is thought that some of those attacks were carried out by Soviet pilots. Is that not correct?

General Crist. It is very difficult to tell, sir, because most of the aircraft carry Afghan markings. It is difficult to tell who the pilot of the aircraft is. But the Soviets might be flying aircraft marked with Afghan markings.

Senator Humphrey. I think that is a significant statement. I hope the Senators heard that. In any case, it is perfectly clear that there is an immense and growing campaign of intimidation against Pakistan. In view of that, General, and assuming that Pakistan might be willing, is it not time that we increased our cooperation with Pakistan to include joint military planning and exercises?

General Crist. Absolutely, sir. I have been working with the Pakistanis to do exactly that. One of the problems Prime Minister Junejo encounters in allowing American forces on his soil for exercises is how to handle India on the one side, and the Soviet pressure from Afghanistan on the other. He is a little bit like the salami in the sandwich. So he is walking a very delicate line with us in how much presence he can take vis-a-vis his neighbors and how much pressure they will bring on in response.

Senator Humphrey. Thank you.

Senator Exon. My thanks to Senator Kennedy for not only being next here, but also next in seniority, which lets the acting chairman off the hook in deciding who to call. Senator Kennedy.

Senator Kennedy [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Exon.

I want to say, General Crist, I appreciated our chance to visit before this hearing. I want to express appreciation for the candor in which your testimony is posed to this committee. It may make it more difficult in responding to some questions, but I think it has been very helpful, and I did have a chance to see the Admiral's testimony this morning and he has some references in here that I will come back to.

This is focusing on some of the points that you raise in your testimony. The time is short. I will just highlight this to at least set the climate in which I am going to ask you a question.

This is on talking about supplies and equipment, General Crist. These are in your—I will not mention the references, but I am reading from your presentation—"There has only been a 2 percent improvement in this category since the last report on supplies and equipment. Fiscal year 1988 equipment funding provides only some improvement. Again, the total available will be less than half the requirement. There is no significant improvement in 1989," again on supplies and equipment. "We cannot satisfactorily sustain combat operations without adequate war readiness stocks." It continues over on munitions.

"As is readily apparent, our posture remains soft. Shortages of modern munitions continue to pose a major concern." It continues, "Our shortfall in level of effort munitions is primarily those needed to support ground crews."

The sense of urgency that comes from that report and examination of sustainability and munitions is alarming. It has to be considered alarming. That, along with the Admiral's testimony on page 15 in the operations TEMPO, flying hours, steaming hours, training munitions, these cuts hurt. And it continues with comments about the challenges in combat support.

You take that sense of both of the presentations, you look back on what was actually requested in the 1986 budget, what is requested in 1988, you find spare parts $2.3 billion-odd; this year, $1.8 billion, army munitions; tactical $4.6 billion requested in 1986, down to $4.2 billion now. Selected Army support equipment, Navy spare parts, Navy munitions, tactical missiles, selected Navy equipment. In every one of those items there has been a significant diminution.

In Air Force munitions, tactical munitions, it is $700 million less than was requested in 1986, against the briefings that we have had year after year that show that you have not got adequate supplies in the first place. Then you come on up here and ask for another two aircraft carriers.

We have had the classified briefings here, which I will not reveal the figures you are very familiar with, that talk about the sustainability in terms of munitions and the rest. We are talking a matter of days.

How can you convince us and the American people that in every one of these areas—we can go into them in detail; I have 6 minutes to ask the question—that we are really providing those people that are going to be fighting this war with the kind of equipment and munitions to be able to defend themselves and our country?

Why do you not just say what your priorities are, Admiral? You might not want to, but what are you requesting? We are trying to find out. Part of reorganization was to hear from the Unified Command. If you are not going to level with us, within the last 2 years of Chairman Goldwater, Sam Nunn's efforts, and the rest of this committee, you might as well say it is not worth the paper that it was written on.

Now are you going to level with us about what is needed in terms of the national defense? Or are we going to hear one of these statements and comments, with no disrespect, that we have to balance our needs and considerations, we have urgency here, we can deal with it there. What is the story, Admiral? What is the story? What do you need? What would you recommend?

Would you rather have the increase in every one of those areas? Navy spare parts. Navy ammunitions. Tactical missiles. Selected Navy support equipment. Or the aircraft carriers? What is the answer? Yes, or no?

Admiral HAYS. Senator, I have attempted to make it very emphatic in my statement and in my oral comments that from the unified commander perspective my number one urgency is sustainability. We have superb forces in being. We cannot sustain them on a prolonged basis, because the spare parts, the sophisticated ammunition, in the quantities that we would anticipate being required, are not available.

Senator KENNEDY. I do not want to interrupt, but "prolonged"? Prolonged? Without getting into classified, we are talking days here. We are not talking months or weeks, are we? In terms of sophisticated Navy air missiles, you are talking, without getting into the classified, "prolonged" I think means weeks to most people.

Admiral HAYS. In some cases, it is a matter of days. For some of the sophisticated ammunition.

Senator KENNEDY. Would you give us the answer in munitions in the closed session, because we are getting into the classified areas.

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. But I do not want to get away from using words like "prolonged." I would rather just have, unless you want to use "prolonged" to give a sense of urgency about trying to make decisions on requirements on these matters. General Crist's testimony is very—my time is running out. I want to give you a crack, if you want to comment on your position on the carriers, fine, but I would rather just get to you in terms of the supplies.

On the Unified Command, you have got all those units that are referenced in your testimony, and every one of those, according to these figures, have to be crying out in terms of not the World War II equipment, although that is valuable, and useful, and helpful, and no one discards it, but in terms of the modern kinds of equipment, if you would want to make what comment you would, as well.

General CRIST. Senator, sustainability is one of my long poles in the tent. There is no question about it. There is some light in the tunnel, however. Not at the end, but in the tunnel. In level of effort, conventional munitions, the $4 billion that is in the fiscal year 1988–89 budget if it is appropriated, will bring us up to 67 percent of the requirement. So that is better.

We are going to get some help in the threat——

Senator KENNEDY. I will ask you more precise questions, because I have figures that break down--my time is up—everyone of these areas. Rather than looking at what has been requested. You know, billions sound like a lot. You say you get $4 billion, these guys are really set.

General CRIST. All I am saying is that the fiscal year 1988–89 budget gives us some help.

Senator KENNEDY. But against the specific in each of these categories that your forces have to be concerned about, I want to get a comment on it. Either it is classified, or unclassified, because I do think that in terms of meeting our responsibilities and requirements in allocating resources, I think the presentation both in yours and in the Admiral's that you find there on page 15 is something that ought to be of dramatic concern and an utmost priority of our committee.

So I will pose the question for the classified. I cannot get it precisely here. I would ask the Chair if it would be available under the security.

Senator EXON [presiding]. I think we can take that up in the classified session.

Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Could I just clarify my own thinking, Admiral Hays? It was unclear when Senator Warner asked you the question about the two new carriers. I got the impression that he was suggesting we enhance our current capability to two additional ones to bring it up to 17. Then in response to Senator Exon you indicated it is not to have 17, but rather only 15. Is that correct?

Admiral HAYS. That is correct, sir.

Senator COHEN. So the arguments, or at least the problems that Senator Warner was trying to pose at least in terms of the area, what the increased commitment is going to be and the increased responsibility, there is still going to be a major deficiency in that region?

Admiral HAYS. That is correct, sir.

Senator COHEN. So the two new carriers will not correct that deficiency?

Admiral HAYS. Will not solve all of our requirements.

Senator COHEN. And as a matter of fact, when we talk about carriers, we are not just talking two ships. We are talking Aegis cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and everything else that goes with a carrier battle group.

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir. And those are programmed.

Senator COHEN. And manpower.

Admiral HAYS. And manpower.

Senator COHEN. And you are looking at——

Admiral HAYS. But again, it is a replacement——

Senator COHEN [continuing]. Declining manpower pools in the early or mid 1990s.

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir. But I would emphasize that these are replacement carriers.

Senator COHEN. A statement was made that the Gulf States can defend their own oil fields? General, I think you made that statement. Do you believe that Saudi Arabia can defend its own oil fields?

General CRIST. Senator, I did not say "can." I said "should."

Senator COHEN. Pardon?

General CRIST. I did not say "can." I said "should."

Senator COHEN. They should.

General CRIST. And part of the strategy, therefore, is to work toward strengthening the alliance between themselves and within themselves so they can do exactly that, instead of us.

Senator COHEN. Do you see any reasonable prospect that the Saudis could defend effectively their oil fields against an attack?

General CRIST. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator COHEN. With their own forces?

General CRIST. With their own forces.

Senator COHEN. That is something that perhaps ought to be explored in closed session, as well.

Admiral, you mentioned the Philippines as being somewhat unstable. You also included the same statement for Korea. Do you mean to suggest that the Korean Government faces the same sort of level of instability today that the Philippine Government does?

Admiral HAYS. No, sir. I intended to imply the instability that exists on the entire Korean peninsula is the instability caused by the uncertain leadership in North Korea. With its volatile administration we just do not know what to expect. That is the source of the instability.

Senator COHEN. But you never know what to expect from Kim Il-Sung.

Admiral HAYS. That is correct.

Senator COHEN. So that has not changed. What has changed? The increase in force structure? The forward positioning? The MiG-23s?

Admiral HAYS. The continuing improvement in the force structure is certainly a matter of great concern. MiG-23s, the SA-3s, the growing warming relationship between North Korea and the Soviet Union.

Senator COHEN. You also said in your prepared remarks that you are looking forward to Australia's White Paper on defense.

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

Senator COHEN. My understanding is that during the past year there has been somewhat of an evolution of that, or an articulation of that strategy and the principal author being Paul Dibb. He said the first is that Australia now plans on defending Australia. The second is to be more precise about the levels of threat that Australia faces.

It sound to me like they are evolving toward a nice, euphemistic statement saying that we are moving away from the kind of commitment that the United States expects us to make. I think the words that are most relevant here is the Defense Minister's statement last May that we want to focus on activities relevant to our national defense, while the United States wants to encourage us to do more in support of our common interest in deterrence on the U.S.S.R.

What is your assessment in terms of how that situation is evolving?

Admiral HAYS. The publication of the Dibb report, which will lead to the White Paper due out within the next 2 to 3 months, did indeed cause concern about the wording of some of the statements in the Dibb report. But it is my assessment that, on balance, the Dibb report emphasizes the need to improve the military forces of Australia, and that it does not represent a slackening, a backing away from the obligations that are inherent in the ANZUS alliance.

Senator COHEN. Then why were you concerned about it before? What has been said that has relieved your anxiety about the choice of words? Words are important. There are changes in the wording from the Secretary of Defense's statement from one year to the next. It has certain connotations. We have picked up two new carriers, for example.

Admiral HAYS. I think the basis of my reassurance has been extensive dialogue with the Minister of Defense, Minister Beasley, with the Chief of the Defense Staff of Australia, the reassurances we got at the Ministerial conference held in San Francisco in August, which all point to the fact that the relationship with Australia and the ANZUS alliance is in good shape.

Senator COHEN. General, you devoted about a third of your prepared testimony—did you read all that, by the way, that prepared statement?

General CRIST. I hit the main points.

Senator COHEN. About a third of the statement was devoted to security assistance. As a matter of fact, that security assistance was dramatically cut within the last year, significantly cut, and I think that if we are looking to somehow bolster our allies and non-allied friends in the region, that security assistance is going to be one of the best areas to look at.

To what extent do you coordinate your requests for security assistance with the State Department? What is the relationship you have, and what sort of input do you have? Senator Kennedy sort of touched upon it in terms of the Defense Reorganization, but if that is one of the major goals of your command to get money into those particular countries that need it, we are not doing very well.

General CRIST. Unfortunately, Senator, we are not. Without forces in my area, one of the great leverage factors is security assistance, particularly for the small countries; the ones that do not have much money but are still strategically important. If I take out Pakistan and Egypt, the security assistance budget for my area dropped 71 percent. This left me facing a potential of zero funding for some of the small countries such as Somalia, which has a very important role to play in our strategy.

I work with the ambassadors directly, and with my security assistance people, and with the State Department's Africa, Near East, and Politico-Military Bureaus working out the security assistance. And in fact, when I was being zeroed in a couple of countries I got reasonably upset, asked for reconsideration, and got some money back in the pots.

So I believe very strongly in security assistance.

Senator COHEN. My time is up.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Senator Dixon.

Senator DIXON. Admiral, you made a couple of statements, I must say, as ranking member of preparedness for the last couple of years, and as chairman this year of Readiness, Sustainability, and Support, that I think I have some problems with. You indicated, and I wrote it down, that you think there is an adequate balance here. I think in another place you said in your testimony that sustainability is improving.

I would like to respectfully suggest that most of the evidence that I have seen over the last several years is to the contrary. Actually, most of the evidence I have seen in the charts we have looked at shows that spare parts and ammunition are actually declining in the outyears over the next several years through 1990 or so.

I just wanted to make a record to show that on page 15 of your statement you say, one troublesome deficiency in readiness is the low state of preparedness of combat support and combat service support units assigned to the Pacific. In another place you say, staying power remains a serious conventional warfighting concern. We lack adequate war reserve stockage of modern munitions needed to maintain air superiority and to secure our lines of communication.

Our wartime shortfall of inter and intra sea and airlift capacity is cause for concern.

General Crist on spare parts shortage on page 59 of your statement notes: The fiscal year 1988–89 budget will only fill 52 and 45 percent respectively of the total spare shortage. This breaks out to 100 percent of peacetime operating stocks, but only 16 percent in 1988 and 11 percent in 1989 of WRSK list requirements, which of course are the spares needed the first 30 days. Other war reserve material which provides follow-on spare support is not funded at all in fiscal year 1988 or 1989, and on modern munitions' inadequacy you say on page 60, General: Shortage of modern munitions continues to pose major concerns.

You say sustainability. Under that, you indicate that you have only 38 percent of your threat-oriented munitions, the sophisticated high performance missiles and torpedoes you need to execute your mission.

I would like to ask both of you, and my colleague from Massachusetts points out on sustainability, page 152: On the other hand, fiscal constraints, Cap Weinberger says, fiscal constraints have caused us to reduce funding for Army and Marine munitions 9 percent in fiscal year 1988, 7 percent in fiscal year 1989 below budgeted 1987 levels.

Now in view of all of this, in view of what I think is clear evidence that all of us see and are concerned about, about the lack of spare parts, the lack of ammunition, the real classic evidence here that we have got the finest equipment and hardware in the world but we do not have the ammunition and the spare parts to use it for any appreciable length of time, I want to ask you all, both of you, Admiral and General, in all fairness, whether it is reasonable to suggest if we have to prioritize, that we ought to look at two more carriers as simply replacements and continue to have a force structure which will remain at 15 carriers, or whether we ought to do the right thing and look at the spare parts and ammunition requirements?

Admiral HAYS. Senator, I would disagree that we have not improved our performance in sustainability over the past years. It is my impression that the investments made in the sustainability category since the early 1980s are paying off, and our inventories are improving today.

Now, it is very true that there has been a cutback in the investment in future years, which is unfortunate, but improvements in our sustainability, that generic category, are being realized. Of course, we do not have all the ammunition that we would like. We do not have the ammunition of choice in the quantities that we would like. But we have ammunition.

It may not be what we prefer, but we have ammunition. A good indicator of the spare parts situation I think is the operational ready rate. We have an excellent operational ready rate in the Pacific forces today, in all services.

Now, if we had to surge to wartime tempos, then there is no question that, in a given period of time, a serious deficiency would be the availability of spare parts and ammunition. We can go into more specific details in closed session.

But, I think in addition to the emphasis which General Crist and I have put on sustainability, it is a serious concern and it must be a continuing concern for the unified CINCs. There is also the requirement to focus on what is needed for the military forces in the future. We cannot ignore that requirement.

Senator DIXON. Well, Admiral, the last several budgets I looked at over the last several years in the subcommittee where I have been ranking that I will chair this year, they indicate continued increases in the purchase of a lot of sophisticated equipment, weaponry, hardware, things of that kind, continued maintenance of the levels that we have had in the past several years in spare parts and ammunition. I will ask you whether if that continues in the next several years, we are not going to have a rather serious readiness and sustainability problem?

Admiral HAYS. We will have to maintain the benefits, the advantages that we have realized. There must be an investment, a continuing investment in sustainability. I believe, given the circumstances that exist, that we see an investment that represents a balanced approach to defense programming.

Senator DIXON. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Dixon.

I understand there was a little discussion about the order of recognition. I have served notice before, but let me reiterate, that we will vote on this. I am going to leave it up to the committee. We will vote on whether we do it on seniority or the first one who comes in. We will vote on it, and we will vote on it Wednesday afternoon. We are going to have a hearing tomorrow afternoon with the new Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, so everyone who wants to be heard or be recorded on that will be given a chance to vote.

Senator Quayle, have you already had your turn? Or is it your go?

Senator QUAYLE. It is my go.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle.

Senator SYMMS. According to that rule. [Laughter.]

Not so.

Senator QUAYLE. I am sure Senator Symms and McCain would like to trade places with me, but I sat down there for quite awhile.

Senator SYMMS. Mr Chairman, I might say that there is no question about which way the ones at this end of the table will vote. [Laughter.]

Chairman NUNN. I have got a feeling this is not going to be a partisan split. [Laughter.]

Senator QUAYLE. General Crist, I would like to ask you to elaborate a little bit on your statement on terrorism on page 21. I would like for you maybe to explore with us some strategy options for deploying any kind of a surgical response in a military way against say terrorist camps or identified areas that we might serve as a retaliation for some strikes against the United States or other western countries.

What are some of our strategy options of deploying a military retaliation against terrorism?

General CRIST. It is tough, because the terrorists swim in the sea of the population in which they come, such as Lebanon, Beirut, and Kuwait. So it is very difficult to fix them. There are very clearly identifiable terrorist training camps. We have been looking since early Lebanon for a place where one can say. "Aha, there they are. That is the place where the terrorist training is going on." So it is difficult to find a suitable target.

It is difficult to find where their headquarters are. This situation does not lend itself readily to air strikes, to the clean, surgical kind of action that this country prefers.

Senator QUAYLE. It does not lend itself?

General CRIST. It does not lend itself to that.

Senator QUAYLE. What kind of a strike does it lend itself to?

General CRIST. It lends itself to unconventional warfare type of operation.

Senator QUAYLE. Meaning?

General CRIST. Clandestine, small forces which can locate the specific targets to go after, strike, and rapidly withdraw. I have some 60, or thereabouts, terrorist organizations operating in my area. None of them can be clearly located, exactly where are their headquarters; where precisely does the man put his head every night.

Most of the terrorists are being drawn out of the camps in Lebanon. There you have a population under 25 who has done nothing but carry rifles or experience war, and have no future. So it is a great recruiting area. They are being shipped all over, and are constantly moving. So it is hard to say, as you could in a target in a conventional war, there is the camp; I can go take that out and deal the terrorist some sort of severe blow.

It is the kind of job that lends itself to unconventional warfare operations, perhaps the kinds of operations which, in some cases, would not sit well with the United States, because we do not engage in terrorism ourselves. So it is a very difficult problem.

Senator QUAYLE. So our strategy now is to look at some unconventional warfare options, rather than the surgical air strike that perhaps is most thought of and talked about on a surgical basis? What I am trying to do is get a feel for what you really feel, and what you can articulate for us, some of our strategy options are in this particular area of the world which you are familiar with.

General CRIST. Our strategy has been two-fold, Senator. One, we have a very, very good intelligence network which tips us off when a terrorist threat builds. That is a defensive strategy. We are not bad at that. We are certainly not perfect, but we are not bad.

Senator QUAYLE. You think we have pretty good intelligence operations?

General CRIST. Yes. One cannot get it down to the hour and the day, but we can get pretty close.

Senator QUAYLE. Well, if we have that kind of intelligence capability, would we not have the intelligence capability to really identify who these folks are, and also who are supporting these people?

General CRIST. No. We can get intelligence as to where the terrorist target might be. The difficulty is to get the intelligence, which will define the source. That sounds perculiar, I know. We get reports from intelligence when the terrorists start focusing on somebody or something. It is a little harder to figure out exactly where the actual threat is coming from, particularly if the people involved are moving.

So basically our strategy now is one of defense against terrorist attacks. And then reacting if they are successful or they get an incident going. The other option is, as you say, the surgical strike; trying to find the target, the place to deliver the surgical strike.

In that regard, my own personal opinion is that we have been less successful.

Senator QUAYLE. Admiral Hays, looking at our fleet in the vast range of area that you have in the Pacific Command, what kind of requirement do you have that deals with the Soviet satellite capability of targeting our fleets? What is our requirement that we have in say a wartime situation that we would actually deal with in Soviet reconnaissance and the satellite capability of targeting our fleet?

Admiral HAYS. If I might, Senator, may I defer that until we get to closed session?

Senator QUAYLE. OK. Let me ask another question.

Looking at the Pacific area, and particularly Korea and Japan, do you see a ballistic missile threat from the Soviet Union emerging in the early 1990s that would target command and control centers, military targets, in those countries from say the SS—not the 20s but the 21s, 22s, 23s, and the 30s, that will be deployed, not on a nuclear basis, but a conventional basis as well?

Admiral HAYS. There is the possibility, although quite frankly, I do not rate it very high. I think it is important to note that roughly a third of the SS-20s in the Soviet inventory are deployed to the Far East district.

Senator QUAYLE. Their targets are more in China, at least as we know? But I am looking at the emerging ballistic missile threat beyond the SS-20s that might be used on particularly some of our military targets in Korea and Japan. You do not regard that as an emerging threat, I gather?

Admiral HAYS. Not of any imminence.

Senator QUALYE. Not of any imminence.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Kennedy, you have already had your round, have you not. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Both of you have addressed the importance of the carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean. In December the decision was made not to have a carrier battle group in place in the Indian Ocean on a full-time basis. Did you agree with that, both of you?

Admiral HAYS. If I might respond first, I recognize the price we were paying to maintain a carrier battle group continuously in the Indian Ocean. It is a task we met for many years, and the price was quite high so far as the demand on the material condition of the ship, and on our people. While it would be advantageous to have a carrier battle group present in the Indian Ocean, circumstances were such that we just could not continue to maintain that continuing presence.

So I reluctantly agreed with the reduction in the carrier presence to a bit more than half-time.

Senator GLENN. Well, I think with that being the tinderbox that the place is over there, I cannot think of a better place in the world if we are going to have a carrier commitment. That is it. We are committed to keeping—we are publicly committed to keeping the Persian Gulf open. You have got forces actually ready to go, General, zilch. Actually ready right now. I mean ready right there right now that if people started shooting in the gulf, who would shoot back today, not tomorrow, not after an airlift, or not after we had brought prepositioning in and things like that. Who shoots back tomorrow, or today?

General CRIST. My five ships in the Mideast force. That is who shoots back.

Senator GLENN. Well, that is inside the gulf?

General CRIST. Yes.

Senator GLENN. I have been on those ships. Well, they are not much, as you are well aware. The chairman has been on those I think, also, there if I am not mistaken. So that is not much. That is popgun type stuff we are talking about that is inside the gulf, more for monitoring than anything else.

So last year, Admiral, you testified—and I read from your testimony: "In peacetime, the presence of Middle East Force ships in the carrier battle group operating in the North Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean provide the most visible evidence of our commitment to the area and serve as our main deterrent force." That was General Crist, I am sorry. That was your testimony of last year.

I think you made a true statement there, and I just did not agree with us pulling out of that area at all, or putting it on a half-time basis. I think the nations there really see our commitment tied up in what we have just over the horizon just outside the strait. When we withdraw that commitment there, why they get a little nervous about whether we are really committed to that area or not, particularly in light of what has happened with regard to Iran and so on with arms sales back and forth, which is another subject.

Let me ask something on that. Are you aware of whether any F-14 spare parts were in the shipments of arms to Iran?

General CRIST. The ones that purportedly the United States shipped?

Senator GLENN. Yes.

General CRIST. I am not, sir.

Senator GLENN. Are you, Admiral?

Admiral HAYS. No, sir.

Senator GLENN. Because it is a little incongruous to think that we have F-14s sitting out there that would be our main fighter force to protect the Persian Gulf, and yet at the same time we may be sending parts for the F-14s the Shah had that are not part of Khomeini's forces in Iran. It must be very comforting to our fighter pilots abroad ship to know that we may be supplying parts to send their F-14s up against our F-14s. I have asked that a couple of times, and I have not gotten an answer yet from the administration as to whether any F-14 supplies were actually sent as part of that.

General, let me ask another thing here. The rapid deployment force that was called, now CENTCOM and so on, you are completely dependent on prepositioned supplies. Right?

General CRIST. Not completely, sir.

Senator GLENN. Well——

General CRIST. It is a combination, as you well know, of prepositioning and being able to move supplies and equipment by sea and air to the region.

Senator GLENN. By sea and air. OK, that is right. Now we have our stocks, though, of POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants, and parts, and some basic equipment over there at Ras Binas and upper Egypt, some over on Oman.

General CRIST. We have them in Oman. We do not have them in Ras Banas, sir.

Senator GLENN. That was planned at Ras Banas?

General CRIST. It was planned, but never eventuated.

Senator GLENN. Are those supplies protected in any way, except just pilfering protection?

General CRIST. Yes, sir. Where we have munitions, we have security forces surrounding them provided by the host nation. We have our own small quality assurance people to watch them.

Senator GLENN. But there is no protection from an air attack or anything like that?

General CRIST. No.

Senator GLENN. There is not protection except for pilfering and to prevent people from just walking in off the desert.

General CRIST. Or against somebody physically coming in and trying to seize them forceably.

Senator GLENN. I have not been a big fan of the RDF since its original concept, because it was not rapid, not deployable, and not a force, as I saw it. We had to bring the forces from the United States. It was not something that was deployed. They were supply dumps basically out there that would be highly, highly vulnerable.

How many days do you estimate it would be before you would have forces adequate out there to use those supplies with the existing airlift we have right now?

General CRIST. Well, sir, I have already within my theater sufficient supplies for initial active forces for a short period of time right now, which is quite a bit better I think than the last time perhaps you were looking at it.

Senator GLENN. But in getting real protection in there within a short period of time, would not most of those supplies already be gone if there was any real attack in that area?

General CRIST. I do not think so, sir. They are in protected locations, such as Oman. The supplies are protected.

Senator GLENN. Well, they are protected against pilfering. They are not really protected——

General CRIST. They are protected against air attack because they are on Omani air force bases, air defense bases, adjacent to them. I can have my aircraft there, as I think you know, within 48 hours, my aircraft——

Senator GLENN. Yes, but if you had long-range bombers coming down in that area, would not most of your supplies be gone?

General CRIST. No, sir. They are not within range of the Soviet long-range aviation unless they flew without fighter protection. They are not.

Senator GLENN. Well, what we are trying to protect against is a real takeover of the Persian Gulf, and the times just do not fit, to me. They never have. But that is another situation there.

Just one other question, because my time is up. Both of you expressed serious concern over the manner and equipping of the Army's combat support and combat service support force structure and its readiness to go. In your figures here, the percentages of readiness are way, way down. Now without that coming up, do we really have a force? Do we really have anything that can work over there? It would seem to me that that it very, very doubtful, because we are talking about our dependence upon reserves, the time to mobilize reserves. It just does not look to me like—is this a paper tiger that we are putting together over there?

Admiral HAYS. In the cases of forces presently located in Korea, the combat support and combat service support forces are adequate. They are combat ready. The great concern, and the deficiency that was highlighted there, is the reserve and other active combat and combat support units intended to support other operations.

Senator GLENN. So this is a logistics tale that you cannot operate without beyond a day or two.

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. Then are we really capable of providing any real protection for the Saudis, and Qatar, and Bahrain, and the others that are friendly to our side?

General CRIST. Yes, sir, I think so. I have 47 percent of my forces in the active component. So I am greatly dependent on my reserve forces. The initial forces deploying, however, are active forces which are in good shape, and can be sustained for a short period of time. Beyond that, however, Senator, I do have a problem. For example, 52 percent of my combat service support forces are reserves, and about 38 percent of those units are not combat ready.

So after a short period of time in the area of sustainability, I have a serious problem, no question.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

Senator KENNEDY [presiding]. The Senator from California.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Hays, first a question for you. Given the antinuke hostility that exists in the Pacific and the uncertainty of port availability that you have commented upon, I would assume that that only enhances the value of the AOEs in terms of being able to extend the endurance of the carrier battle group. Would you care to comment on that?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir. That is a factor, and a deficiency that we have in the Pacific Fleet is the availability of AOEs. The AOE has the capability of transiting—staying with the task force are providing the essential ammunition and other supplies, oil and what have you. It would be preferable to have AOEs to assign to each of our six carrier battle groups. We do not have that number. It would certainly be desirable to have more in the inventory.

Senator WILSON. We are currently looking at the possibility of four, if the Navy exercises its contract options.

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

Senator WILSON. But that was my point. It would seem to me that given not only that hostility, but just the uncertainty of port availability and the need to keep these groups on station, that there is a great deal to be said for having one with each one of those battle groups.

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

Senator WILSON. Let me ask you now to shift your attention. I am sorry I missed Senator Quayle's questions, because it seems to me he was touching close to where I wanted to go. What is the strategic significance in your view of an arms control regime that would allow the, as I understand it, 140-plus SS-20s that the Soviets have deployed in the Asian area? What kind of stability does that produce?

Admiral HAYS. The Asian countries are very mindful and very anxious about the 150 or so SS-20s located in the Far East district. It may well be that the primary targets assigned to those missiles are in the People's Republic of China, but they have the capability to reach all of the countries in Northeast Asia, as well as a portion of Alaska.

Any arms control efforts would have to take into consideration the balance between the East and the West.

Senator WILSON. General Crist, I am aware of the fact that the southern flank of NATO, which obviously includes Turkey, has implications beyond the immediate member nations of Turkey, and yet as I look at the map one of the charts in your presentation, I find that CENTCOM does not include Israel, does not include Jordan, does not include—excuse me, does not include Lebanon, does not include Syria. Why is that?

General CRIST. Why indeed, Senator? I obviously was not there when they drew the boundaries, so I am not quite sure. I believe, to the best of my understanding, at the time that the boundaries were drawn, there was a confrontation between Syria and Israel, and a tumult in Lebanon which involved Syrian troops. At that particular time, the planners wanted to put that confrontation under one command, the European Command, which had in fact been working the problem prior to the creation of my command in 1983. I believe that was the rationale behind it. Jordan however, is within my AOR.

Senator WILSON. So what you are saying is that it is not falling through the cracks. This is not a crack between NATO and CENTCOM, it is an extension; that the responsibility for oversight in those three nations is an extended responsibility of the NATO commander?

General CRIST. It is extended to the European commander, in his EUCOM hat as a U.S. commander, where he is responsible for portions of the Mediterranean littoral outside of NATO.

You make an excellent point also, Senator, about Turkey. Turkey sits on both sides. It is a NATO country, of course, but it also is very much on the border of the Southern Theater of Military Operations, the Soviet Command that also faces Iran. Turkey has historically looked toward the gulf, and was in fact a member of CENTO before that organization was dissolved.

So Turkey is very much a linchpin between our two theaters, and it does require me to talk with General Rogers about how one works the synergism between our two theaters. What can I do to help him? What can he do to help me? Since the Soviets are looking at both sides of our boundary, and the Turks are looking not only north but south toward Iraq and those areas which traditionally they have been interested in.

Senator WILSON. General, I will only say, because my 6 minutes have expired, that in one of the other hearings we have had on strategy, the second, at which our witness was Dr. Brzezinski, among the many interesting things that he said, he said that he thought that there was a far greater likelihood of confrontation of a serious kind developing within your command than in NATO. So

I have looked forward to the opportunity to get your presentation, and I think that your responsibility is a very heavy one.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have more questions, if there is a second round.

Chairman **Nunn** [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Wilson.

What I am going to ask, since we want to get to the closed session as soon as possible, is one round for everyone, and then if you have a question you really need to ask in open session, we will do it; but I would rather not go to a second round. Otherwise, we will lose our time for closed session.

Senator Gore.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have certainly enjoyed the hearing so far, and one of the benefits of being down at this end of the table is you are forced to listen to all of the interchanges, and you learn a good deal. I appreciate the responses so far.

First of all, following up on my colleagues' question about the significance of SS–20s left in the Asian area following an arms control agreement, leaving aside the question of the so-called two-phased agreement, is there, Admiral, an area in which the Soviets could deploy a limited number of SS–20s giving them the capability of reaching mainland China, but not posing a threat to northeast Asia with those SS–20s if they remained in that deployment area?

Admiral **Hays**. No, sir. That capability comes automatically with the disposition of the SS–20s.

Senator **Gore**. Where they are deployed now, it comes automatically.

Admiral **Hays**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Gore**. What I am asking, are you saying there is no area within the Soviet Union where they could deploy them that would give them the ability to reach China and not reach Japan?

Admiral **Hays**. It is certainly possible for them to redeploy further inland in the Soviet Union and reduce their capability to reach out, and it may well be, trying to visualize the map, that they could pull those back far enough so that Korea, Japan, and Alaska would not be within the arc of capability. I just cannot answer that question specifically without a more detailed look.

Senator **Gore**. I think there has been discussion of that. We may want to pursue that in another forum, but let me follow on another question that was asked earlier, as well. Senator Kennedy asked you about readiness and sustainability. I got the impression from your responses to him and your responses to Senator Dixon that you are making a distinction between readiness and sustainability——

Admiral **Hays**. Yes.

Senator **Gore** [continuing]. And you are saying that you think our readiness is just fine, but our sustainability is not fine.

Admiral **Hays**. Our readiness is superb, today. Our sustainability is not in the same category.

Senator **Gore**. OK. I have a little problem with that distinction because taken to an absurd extreme, you could be quite ready to fight for an hour and then be overwhelmed after 2 hours, and the distinction betwen readiness and sustainability in that event would be absurd, would it not?

Admiral HAYS. Yes.

Senator GORE. Unless you were making a specific command the kind of trip wire that NATO forces have become in some areas.

Admiral HAYS. Yes sir. You point out a very important point. We talk a great deal about distinct categories of readiness and sustainability, and it serves the discussion so far as programming and budgeting is concerned. In the theater, there is a merging of the two, and you are quite right that if a ready force can fight only a very brief period of time, it is not all that ready.

Senator GORE. Well, is that not the situation we face?

Admiral HAYS. We have a situation where the day-to-day readiness is superb, and we are unable to sustain the tempo of operations of that very ready force for as long a period as we would like, and as called for in our planning parameters.

Senator GORE. Well, I am not sure I heard the response earlier. Do you endorse the proposed figures for readiness and sustainability in the budget presented to this committee?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator GORE. And if the current level of sustainability is below the point where it keeps our forces capability of continuing a conflict as long as you think is feasible, and if in some cases it is so low that it cuts into the definition of readiness, then how can you endorse cuts below what that level is now?

Admiral HAYS. Our planning guidance is for a specific time of operational tempo. Anything less than that represents an inherent risk.

Senator GORE. OK, let me go to the next question, because I think the answer is that you——

Admiral HAYS. Accept the risk.

Senator GORE [continuing]. Not accept the risk of making waves with the budget process?

Admiral HAYS. I accept the risk associated with less than a full capability to sustain the forces.

Senator GORE. All right, let me ask you about the Philippines briefly. Two questions.

First, how do you assess the current government's ability to contain the insurgency there if the current cease fire does not hold? And second, how do you evaluate the importance of Clark and Subic in our ability to carry out our longer term strategic goals?

Admiral HAYS. I believe that very significant strides have been made in the capabilities of the new armed forces in the Philippines. We see in place now competent leadership which was missing before. We have a rather aggressive assistance program under way which is improving the capabilities of the armed forces in the Philippines. The training, the equipment, their pay have all improved and, as a result of these improvements, they will have a capability to cope militarily with the insurgency that country faces.

I think that an insurgency unfortunately will continue to grow for as long as the economic situation that now exists prevails, and the political uncertainty that exists there will contribute to the insurgency as well.

So far as the importance of Clark and Subic, they are almost in that category that you can term "vital." Strategically, they are of great significance. We have air space, sea room, and facilities which are essential to our forward-deployed posture. If we did not have those bases, we would have to replicate them elsewhere, and there is no geographic location as attractive as is the Philippines.

Of course, there are options, but they are not very attractive, and they will be very expensive.

Senator GORE. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Senator Symms left the room and missed his turn, I understand. I am kidding.

Senator Symms.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you General and Admiral.

But right along the line of questioning that Senator Gore just asked about in the Philippines and the insurgency, Admiral, what kind of information do you have about how much the insurgents are now in the process of rebuilding, retraining, recruiting, getting ready for the day that they decide to try to break the cease fire and go back to war? And are they going to be able to, during this time, get strong enough that it will be a bigger threat?

Admiral HAYS. All of the indications coming out of the Philippines during the first weeks of the cease fire favored the insurgents, the Communist party, because it did give them the opportunity to recruit more freely, to get organized, to collect the taxes on which they are dependent. In the propaganda field the attention that they gained was of tremendous importance to the Communist party.

It would appear, however, that there is a great appeal among the peoples of the Philippines for a continuation of the cease fire. It is my impression at the present time that the pendulum is swinging to the other side wherein the Communists, the insurgents are arriving at the conclusion that a continuation of a cease fire is not in their best interest.

So the indicators now are that, if there is to be a termination of the cease fire, it will be initiated in all likelihood by the new people's army.

Senator SYMMS. A termination of it? You mean by Ms. Aquino's government? Or by the Communists?

Admiral HAYS. If the cease fire does not continue beyond the February 10 date, the 2-month period, it will probably be at the instigation of the new people's army, rather than the government.

Senator SYMMS. At this point, in other words, you think the Communists want to start the activity up again?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMMS. But you basically stated that the bases in Clark and Subic are almost invaluable to the security of the Pacific Rim and the United States?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMMS. With respect to South Korea, is there any—you know, if one were to just read the western news media you would think that President Chun Doo Hwan is as big a despot as has ever lived. How long can he sustain these attacks from the American and other western free presses without creating problems? And is there really any comparison in terms of corruption or with Chun Doo Hwan and Marcos, former President Marcos?

Admiral HAYS. Sir, I see very few direct comparisons between the political situation in South Korea and that which existed in the Republic of the Philippines. I think it is to President Chun Doo Hwan's credit that he has said repeatedly that he intends to preside over the first peaceful transfer of power on the Korean peninsula. I think it is to his credit that he has shown a certain amount of flexibility in dealing with the demonstrations occurring in South Korea today, and his response to that most unfortunate torture casualty has been very aggressive.

Senator SYMMS. Is there anything that we can do in this idea struggle in the propaganda? I asked one of the Secretaries that was here earlier—I think it might have been Secretary Weinberger—the question that what concerns me is that even like in Korea where, by comparison to North Korea, South Korea is really a free country, most of the Western countries are passing laws to keep immigrants out, and the Communist countries are building walls and shoot them when they leave the border, yet in the propaganda war we have a difficult time.

Is there anything you can do in your command to help in that effort, or that we should be doing here in the Congress to help in that effort so that we do not see an upheaval in South Korea that would not be in the best interests of our security in Northeast Asia?

Admiral HAYS. I think we are making an important contribution right now with the military relationship that exists between South Korea and this country. It is very good. It is a totally integrated operation. I believe that it does contribute in a very significant way to stability on the Korean peninsula.

In response to your question, I would propose from a military perspective that we continue doing the things we are doing very well right now in that relationship.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much, Admiral.

General, I was interested in an article that was recently carried in the Armed Forces Journal based on plans that were captured, incidentally, clear back in World War II from the Soviets about a possible Soviet move into Iran. This move was designed to take Tehran by a massive air and ground force strike.

Now you mentioned that we are making headway with the Central Command in order to resist and preserve the Persian Gulf region, but if something like that were to happen today, do we have any capability to project force north of the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, the Bandar Abbas area?

General CRIST. Into northern Iran, sir?

Senator SYMMS. Well, north of Bandar Abbas, in the mouth of the gulf.

General CRIST. We have the capability, yes, sir.

Senator SYMMS. It would take a long time, would it not?

General CRIST. I think the question is whether we would want to. We can explore in closed session, a little bit more about what we do understand about that situation.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Symms.

Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here.

Can you, Admiral, describe very briefly for us how our strategic goals in the Pacific have changed in the last 6, 8, 10 years?

Admiral HAYS. Sir, I do not believe there has been any significant change in our goals and objectives in the Pacific.

Senator WIRTH. Have the Soviet goals changed at all in the last 6, 8, or 10 years?

Admiral HAYS. Yes sir, I believe they have.

Senator WIRTH. How has Soviet strategy changed?

Admiral HAYS. I believe that there has been a fairly recent decision on the part of the Soviets to become a Pacific power, something they have not been before. You can look at the tremendous buildup in their force structure. The Vladivostok speech by Mr. Gorbachev where he laid it out rather clearly that they were going for the brass ring with a diplomatic and economic offensive that we see unfolding in the Pacific Theater.

Senator WIRTH. What form does that change in Soviet strategy take?

Admiral HAYS. A buildup of their forces, economic——

Senator WIRTH. On that point, what is the most marked symptom of the buildup of those forces?

Admiral HAYS. I would say the naval buildup is the most significant.

Senator WIRTH. And of that, what is the most threatening or the most problematic part of the buildup of their naval forces, from your perspective?

Admiral HAYS. From my perspective, the submarine threat. The submarine capability is the most worrisome aspect. But I would also point out that the increased capability in their air forces is of great significance.

It is interesting to note that they have emphasized the long-range bombers. There is a new Bear-G that came into the inventory, a modification, first about 1982. All of the Bear-Gs in the Soviet inventory are in the Pacific Theater.

Senator WIRTH. From your perspective, what should we be doing, to counter the sharply increased Soviet submarine capability in the Pacific?

Admiral HAYS. Continue supporting those programs which are designed to give us a good antisubmarine capability, and we have many of them.

Senator WIRTH. What form does that take?

Admiral HAYS. We have a variety of programs which are focused on the antisubmarine warfare problem, and it runs the gamut of new attack submarines, which is the best vehicle for attacking other submarines, to airborne systems like the P–3.

Senator WIRTH. Are carriers an effective defense against the threat of Soviet submarines?

Admiral HAYS. Carriers have a credible antisubmarine warfare defense that is integral to the air wing. You have antisubmarine aircraft in the air wing.

Senator WIRTH. But that is to defend themselves against the submarine, rather than to take on and counteract that growing submarine threat?

Admiral HAYS. That is correct.

Senator WIRTH. I walked through all of this, Admiral, just—we have been talking a great deal about the request now for two additional aircraft carriers, and you had mentioned in your opening testimony the threat of submarines. You have mentioned that, as well, in response to Senator Exon's question. Now as we walk through this in terms of overall Soviet strategy, I have trouble, understanding your approach. I obviously have a lot to learn about this. But in understanding threat, the number one threat is the Soviet submarine capability, how does that in turn get met by the addition, or the moving up in priority of two aircraft carriers?

I have trouble seeing the overlap of our strategy and what the Soviets are doing.

Let me go to a different question. Clearly part of our overall strategy has to be an assessment of our own capabilities in the United States. What can we do? What can we afford to take on?

Part of that is a defense strategy, and clearly part of that also has to be an economic strategy. I was on the House Budget Committee for 6 years, and I am on the Budget Committee here in the Senate. As we look at the budget over a long period of time, we see that even if we started no new programs at all in the military, that we would see a very sharply increased Department of Defense budget going up by 1990 to some $350 billion. That is without any new starts, without any new initiatives at all. We would be sharply increasing our expenditures.

Those numbers are consistent with your understanding of the budget, are they not?

Admiral HAYS. In general.

Senator WIRTH. That is the so-called "bow wave" of new procurements. My concern is two-fold. One of those is the reluctance, or the seeming reluctance of the American public at this point to pay a higher and higher cost.

Second, part of that reluctance comes out of the American public's concern with the so-called fraud, waste and abuse, the $7,000 coffee pots and all of those sorts of much-publicized numbers. But an even greater concern is the cost stretchout if we are trying to build all of these new weapons programs that are currently in the pipeline, and to afford them within the constraints of the budget. We are stretching out a lot of these weapons systems, and they are becoming more and more expensive.

Now it seems to me that if we add to that the accelerated cost of two new carriers, starting those this year at a small amount, and that bow wave comes through very sharply into 1991, we are exacerbating the problem of our own capabilities and exacerbating the kind of political problems that we face in trying to develop a reasonable defense budget.

Under the new reorganization legislation, it is my understanding that you all as Commander in Chiefs were asked to comment on the budget submission before it came in and give your best reading on that.

One, did you look at this sort of situation of what happens in terms of our capability, where that budget appears to be driven?

And second, in terms of looking at the sustainability issue raised by so many members of this panel here this morning, is your reaction to the balance in the budget the same today as it was when you initially saw the budget submission?

Admiral HAYS. On the issue of the growing defense budget and the Nation's commitment to defense, it seems to me that as long as the Soviets continue to grow at the rate that they have been growing, so long as they continue to devote 15 to 17 percent of their gross national product to defense matters, if we are going to remain competitive, if we are going to maintain superiority in the Pacific, it is necessary to allocate more of the Nation's wealth in our own defense.

Now, I believe that all things considered, we have established a reasonable balance in the defense budget, not as much as I would like to see, but all thing considered, looking to the future and what our needs will be then and today, our warfighting capabilities today, we have a good balance of programs.

Senator WIRTH. Admiral, I realize the answer is easy to say "more is better." One can always say give me more, and we will be in better shape, but we do not live in that world. We live in a world of inevitably having to make choices, and that is one of the responsibilities we have, and presumably under the reorganization legislation, one of the responsibilities that is increasingly being given to you.

Is your response to the panel today related to sustainability the same as your initial response when you first saw the budget?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir, it is. Sustainability is my number one concern.

Senator WIRTH. Is your response today to the panel here, which is effectively that there was a reasonable balance—that, yes, we ought to go ahead with the two aircraft carriers, and yes, that the cuts in sustainability were appropriate and that there is a good balance between the two—was that the same as your response when you first saw and were asked to comment upon the draft budget when it came over to you for comment from the Department of Defense?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir, it is.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you.

Senator KENNEDY [presiding]. The Senator from Arizona.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Crist, and Admiral Hays, I am also concerned about the apparent difference in your opinions about our airlift and sealift capability. General Crist cites some pretty impressive numbers, and Admiral Hays in his statement says that, of course having large stores of supplies and repair parts means little unless we can move them when and where needed, our wartime shortfall of intra and inter-theater sea and airlift capability is cause for concern. I hope you two will be able to resolve this and supply it for the record, exactly what our capabilities are, because if they are as General Crist describes, then perhaps we ought to reevaluate our budget as far as what we are earmarking for strategic airlift and sealift.

But more importantly I would like to go back into this issue of sustainability. It is patently obvious here that the argument against the two aircraft carriers, which I have not taken a position on, will be that those monies should be spent on sustainability.

And to make the argument that sustainability has declined over the last few years is either made by Rip Van Winkle or someone who has not had any interaction with the men and women who serve in the Armed Services of the United States.

Because it is very clear, I am not just talking to you, Admiral, and to you, General, that the Armed Forces of the United States are dramatically better able to fight both in readiness and in sustainability than they were say 6 years ago, or let us just pull a number out of the air, 1980.

I would like your opinion as to the United States' sustainability as compared with 1980, because I find it almost unconscionable to make an argument that we have declined in sustainability or readiness. We seem to forget that first you have got to be ready, and then you have got to be sustainable.

If you are in a position like you were in 1977-78, 1979 and 1980, that ships could not leave port for lack of parts and trained personnel, and airplanes could not fly, then it was very hard to address the issue of sustainability when you could not even be ready for any contingency, as we proved in Desert One and other operations.

So would you please give your opinion as to whether our sustainability has improved over the last few years? Admiral.

Admiral HAYS. Senator, I will be very happy to provide for the record the precise data which will reflect a dramatic improvement in both readiness and sustainability over the period of time that you have indicated.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. General.

[The information follows:]

Admiral HAYS. Our readiness status in 1980 reflected inadequate numbers of people, training, spare parts, and ammunition. Personnel readiness suffered because we could not keep middle and senior level people. Operating hours and flight hours were at too low a level to train for satisfactory readiness. We simply were investing inadequately in readiness related categories. With this realization, readiness and modernization became the focal point of increased national and administration attention within the budgetary process. Thanks to congressional support, there has been a dramatic change. Emphasis on readiness has payed off. The quality of our people has never been better. We are receiving modern, maintainable, and increasingly interoperable equipment. Today, we enjoy the highest level of readiness in our peacetime history.

As for sustainability, the Services have dramatically improved the posture of their prepositioned war reserve stocks for the U.S. Pacific Command forces since 1980. Of particular importance are the stocks of munitions, repair parts, medical supplies and petroleum. We recognize there is still much to do. A random comparison between 1980 and today can make the point.

	1980	1986	Percent increase
Munitions:			
AF AIM-9L/M	[Deleted]	[Deleted]	229
AF AIM-7F/M	[Deleted]	[Deleted]	201
All other AF	[Deleted]	[Deleted]	12
U.S. Army-Korea	[Deleted]	[Deleted]	85
U.S. Army-WESTCOM	[Deleted]	[Deleted]	100
Navy (worldwide figures):			
Harpoon (all models)	[Deleted]	[Deleted]	222
Tomahawk (all models)	[Deleted]	[Deleted]	100
Captor	[Deleted]	[Deleted]	1,680
HARM	[Deleted]	[Deleted]	100
AIM 7-M Sparrow (NATO)	[Deleted]	[Deleted]	200
Sonobuoy	[Deleted]	[Deleted]	96

	1980	1986	Percent increase
Gun ammo CIWS	[Deleted]	[Deleted]	2,450
Repair parts:			
U.S. Army-Korea	$10,300,000	$55,900,000	443
Air Force (WRSK/BLSS)	$42,700,000	$290,000,000	581
Medical supplies:			
U.S. Army-Korea	$1,200,000	$2,400,000	100
U.S. Army-WESTCOM	$112,000	$733,000	554
Air Force	$6,696,000	$15,135,000	77
Petroleum:			
Bulk theater	[1] 13,658,000	[1] 23,883,000	75
War reserves			
Navy nonmunition: War reserves	$254,000,000	$443,000,000	74

[1] Barrels.

Vital to readiness, we are receiving modern, more maintainable, and increasingly, interoperable equipment. The incorporation of F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 squadrons give us an increased, potent punch with the requisite longer range and simplified maintainability. Also, Air Force studies show that combat capability of our fighters in the air-to-air role is one-and-a-half times what it was in 1980, while air-to-ground capability has almost doubled. In the 1986 Top Gun competition, the last place F-16 team would have won the air-to-air competition in 1981, while in the air-to-ground role, today's F-16C has proven to be three times as effective as the F-4E was in 1980. The expanding fleet of modern ships is more capable and survivable with weapons systems to match. Since 1980, we have had a net gain of [deleted] surface combatants and [deleted] submarines.

With the Services meeting, and in some cases exceeding recruiting objectives, new recruits have achieved record enlistment test scores. Our people programs are also paying off as we see improvement in retention figures of critical enlisted middle managers; in 1984 their career retention rate peaked at 86 percent. We have made solid gains in retention in both the first term enlistment and mid-career re-enlistments and now maintain steady figures of almost 50 percent retention for first term personnel and 83 percent for our key mid-term non-commissioned personnel. Today, our training through joint and combined exercises highlights our emphasis on interoperability. This emphasis has resulted in the highest sustained level of readiness in recent history.

A substantial effort has gone into medical readiness. The end result is a substantially improved in-theater wartime bed capacity which is augmented by the addition of the USNS Mercy. Other medical equipment has been moved to better support our operations. Efforts have resulted in a gain of 2,834 wartime bed spaces and construction is underway on facilities that will provide an additional 689 bed space. Some of our facilities are being modified to allow for continuing operations in a chemical environment. Construction is underway on facilities to allow the relocation of a medical logistic support unit within Korea.

While our war reserves are growing, so is the threat. It is important that you continue to support the Services' proposed budgets for prepositioned war reserves, so that we can obtain our full requirements. With your continued support, we can maintain a balanced military capability in the Pacific sufficient to carry out U.S. objectives.

General CRIST. There is no question, Senator, that my readiness is as high as it has ever been. Having served with the forces in the late 1970s, I know what it was then. We did not have a sustainability question in those days, because there was nothing to sustain. As you remember, we were taking our sustainability from our training stocks and from our ready stocks. There was no war reserve munitions and no sustainability.

One just cannot compare today with those days.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much.

General CRIST. I might make one small comment, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. Yes.

General CRIST. The reason I speak very highly about sealift and airlift is because that has been one of Congress' great successes. It is an achievement that the Congress of the United States has accomplished. We are within a very short time of achieving an objective that I do not think anyone 6 years ago would have believed could have been reached. If I feel optimistic, it is because I am not a paper tiger. I can get there. But it would certainly scare me if suddenly, three quarters of the way through one of the most extraordinarily successful programs that the Congress has inaugurated, that it was stopped.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, General.

I also do not wish to editorialize on the very important things you said in your statement, but I think it is also well to point out that one of the reasons why we have such a shortfall in the support personnel and the reserve personnel is because we are in an all-volunteer force, and the reserves are in very bad shape. I know of no one who sees our reserve forces improving as long as we maintain present all-volunteer force policy.

I also would like to have Admiral Hays submit for the record a little more elaboration on the Soviet naval buildup in the Pacific, because I think that is an important factor in the carrier program, not just the two Soviet carriers that are presently, in the Pacific, but what their very ambitious naval buildup portends. That is an important factor in this discussion.

[The information referred to follows:]

ELABORATION ON PACIFIC SOVIET NAVAL BUILDUP

Admiral HAYS. The Soviet Pacific Fleet (SOVPACFLT) has evolved into a modern blue water navy capable of conducting operations throughout the Pacific command area of responsibility. Since the late 1970's, qualitative upgrades have been the most salient feature pertaining to SOVPACFLT. These upgrades have primarily occurred through the transfer of [deleted] assets to SOVPACFLT.

Since 1979, 18 major surface combatants have transferred to SOVPACFLT significantly upgrading the capabilities of this force. These included two of the three operational Kiev class carriers in the Soviet naval inventory and six cruisers, including the nuclear-powered cruiser "Frunze." These ships introduced Soviet state-of-the-art weapons system and technology to the Pacific and improved the Soviet capability to perform their assessed wartime mission of protecting Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in waters contiguous to the Soviet land mass. Additionally, these transfers illustrate the importance the Soviets place on the SOVPACFLT.

MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANT TRANSFERS TO SOVPACFLT SINCE 1979

1979: CVHG "Minsk" 2 Kara Class Cruisers, Krivak Class Frigate.

1980: Kresta I Class Cruiser, 2 Krivak Class Frigate.

1981: Krivak Class Frigate.

1982: Kara Class Cruiser, Krivak Class Frigate.

1984: Kiev CVHG "Novorossiysk", Kara Class Cruiser, 2 Krivak Class Frigates.

1985: Kirov Class Nuclear-Powered, Cruiser "Frunze" Sovremennyy Class Destroyer, Udaloy Class Destroyer, Krivak Class Frigate.

[Deleted.]

QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON OF MAJOR PLATFORMS IN SOVPACFLT 1976 AND 1986

	1976	1986
Carriers	0	2
Cruisers	9	16
Destroyers	29	23

QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON OF MAJOR PLATFORMS IN SOVPACFLT 1976 AND 1986—Continued

	1976	1986
Frigates/Corvettes	39	61

[Deleted.]

Senator McCain. Because of a shortage of time, I would like to also, Admiral Hays, address this question to you today. A lot of us are very concerned about the future of the bases in the Philippines. I understand that in the new constitution that is going to be accepted we hope, is a national referendum on whether the U.S. bases remain in the Philippines or not.

I recently visited Micronesia. It does not appear to me that there is anything in that area that would be suitable for the kind of support that the Philippines now provide.

What would be our options in case of loss of the bases in the Philippines?

Senator Hays. Let me first, Senator, make the point that I am certain that a poll of the Filipinos would show a vote overwhelmingly in support of the continuing access of the United States to those bases. I do not believe that our access in the future is in jeopardy. I think we will have very difficult negotiations in 1988 or 1989 when the negotiating process gets underway, but those negotiations in my view will be successful, and access beyond 1991 will be available to us.

Now so far as alternatives in the event that does not happen, there are a number of areas you could look at. Guam is the area that first comes to mind. But there are alternatives that I would prefer not to go into in open session that you might look at.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Admiral. I certainly would not want to provide ammunition for the Philippine negotiators. I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator McCain.

We have made round one, now, and I have had a couple of requests for questions in the open session before we go to the closed session. I would ask all members to ask only essential questions in this round, because we would like very muck to go into closed session in the next 5 or 10 minutes.

Senator Warner has a question, and Senator Kennedy, and if there are others we will entertain them, but I would like to limit them.

Senator Warner. I will be here, if Senator Kennedy wants to go ahead.

Senator Kennedy. That is all right.

Senator Warner. Senator Nunn and I, when we instituted these hearings, were as much interested in substantive issues which we have primarily covered today as we are in procedural ones. So my question is one on the procedural side of the ledger.

Under the new legislation passed last year, the purpose of which was to give you as CINCs greater involvement in the formulation of our strategy. Do you feel that you are getting that now? Or, is someone receiving your input, and then just overlaying that, which you have to do whether you have the forces to do it or not?

Admiral HAYS. Senator, I am very grateful for the actions taken by the Congress, because I have seen the opportunity to influence strategy, to influence the budgeting and programming process far beyond that which unified commanders had in the past.

I have seen a clarification of the duties, responsibilities, and the accountability of the unified commanders as a result of this new legislation.

Senator WARNER. My last question, then, and General Crist you can answer both, do you have adequate forces to meet the commitments now imposed upon you?

Admiral, why do you not lead off with that one, and then the General can take both questions.

Admiral HAYS. I was hoping you would ask that of General Crist.

Senator WARNER. It is coming his way. [Laughter.]

Admiral HAYS. The forces we have in the Pacific today are adequate to achieve, on a day-to-day basis, our goals and objectives in the Pacific. My caution is that in a conflict with the Soviets it will be necessary to manage that very carefully, to set priorities and to proceed in sequential fashion. That introduces more risk.

Senator WARNER. Both questions, General. First, the procedural one.

General CRIST. Senator, for the first question, you have passed landmark legislation and there is never going to be any argument from this corner. It is a great thing you did for the combat commanders. It is going to take a bit of time. There are a lot of directives that have to be changed. There are a lot of bureaucratic ways of doing business that also have to be changed. There are a plethora of things that must be done to implement the legislation and that is going to take a bit of time.

So not everything has changed overnight dramatically. There is still a lot of business as usual, but it is beginning to change. It is going to take awhile for us to get to where I think you want us to be and where I would certainly like to be. But there is one little aside that should not be overlooked here. That is, the enthusiasm of young officers to go into joint billets.

Senator WARNER. Go into?

General CRIST. Joint billets, sir. A year ago I had no volunteers for my headquarters. Now I do. Good quality, high caliber young men who want to come and serve some time in the joint establishment. That has been one immediate effect.

The second part of your question, Senator is a tough one for me to answer, because I do not have any significant forces assigned. What I have been apportioned for planning ranges up to 4⅔ divisions or could be as small as a few squadrons. Consequently, I am dealing with a variable force level against a potential of 28 Soviet divisions coming South. Therefore, I am not developing my strategy or deploying my forces in light of being able to defeat the Soviets in northern Iran. Rather I am developing my strategy so as to be able to deny the Soviets those objectives or key locations that they must control in order to be successful.

With a 4⅔ division force, I can accomplish that objective, providing we can get there before he does. It would be a footrace. I think we can win that footrace right now, but it could be very dicey.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator Exon.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. There are just a couple of points I want to cover. I think you probably ought to be asking us what we want to defend, instead of us asking you whether you can defend everything, quite frankly. I think we are putting you in a very, very difficult situation. I think that is part of what these hearings are all about.

I think we have got to try and work this out together. I think part of the difficulty that we have is if you have in the statements a defense of allies located in Asia and the South Pacific regions, if we ask you whether you have got everything, you ought to say: Well, what do you want? What is in our national interest as a matter of national policy?

Then when we describe it, you make a judgment, a military judgment, whether we can do it. I think part of our problems are that we have this general debate, we are going to defend everything everywhere all the time with every kind of threat, and have you got enough to do it, how the hell can you tell us that you either do, or we are going to be able in God's name to afford it?

I think that is part of the thing that, as I understand, these hearings are trying to deal with.

General Crist, you indicated in your testimony last year the importance of that aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean. When they decided to move that for budgetary reasons, which you testified to here to that effect when you said last year about its presence, when they decided to move it, were you consulted?

General CRIST. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. You were?

General CRIST. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. You approved of it?

General CRIST. No, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. You did not?

General CRIST. I did not agree, but——

Senator KENNEDY. Well, that is good to know, because you said "In peacetime, the present carrier battle groups operating provide the most visible evidence of our commitment." But you were consulted, and you indicated disapproval.

General CRIST. That is right.

Senator KENNEDY. I am on a short tether here in terms of time. Would you explain that further?

General CRIST. Yes, sir. A carrier battle group presence makes a considerable difference in terms of what our friends perceive as U.S. resolve, in terms of what the Soviets see as deterrence to their expansionism, and in terms of the military flexibility the carrier battle group brings with it. Overall, it is a very impressive presence in the region.

On the other hand, I recognized that the Navy was having retention problems and maintenance problems. Trying to keep carriers out there all the time was causing significant difficulties. These problems concerned me, for if we got in a shooting scrape, I wanted a fully ready carrier. The compromise was to make up for the absence of a carrier by deploying land-based exercise forces and TAC air forces to provide the same sort of presence in the region that might otherwise be gained with the carrier.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, if it was probably justified a year ago, it sure as hell would be more justified now, I would expect, with what is happening out there.

The second point is on the question of the nature of the commitments. I think most Americans think commitment means American troops. We can talk about moral commitment, legal commitments, other facts, but I think most Americans think, when we say we have a commitment in the defense of the deterrence in Western Europe, I think they think we are going. If something happens over there, that we are going. Therefore, I think it is very important that we have at least some idea as to what you understand to be our commitment, and we understand what you understand.

General Crist talks, in the only part of his lengthy statement, on the top of page 8, about assisting in the defense of allies located in Asia in southern Pacific regions. General Crist talks about—that at the end of page 4 in terms of military strategy—Admiral Hays, excuse me.

General Crist points out in his testimony on page 24, "While we have no formal treaty obligations within my area of responsibility, several stated commitments tie us to the region nonetheless. We have a public commitment to keep the Persian Gulf open to international shipping. A moral commitment to support the Mujahideen freedom fighters and to aid Pakistan . . . . A legal commitment under the Camp David agreement to provide economic and security assistance to Egypt. And an overall American commitment to promoting regional stability and self-sufficiency."

Well, I think we ought to ask what the Nation's, as you understand our Nation's commitment, either public or private, is and what we are going to promise to do there, and for whom. I mean, does that include what we are going to do in Thailand, and in Singapore, and in Malaysia? What are we preparing to do now, and with whom? How extensive? Are you planning to—What is your understanding of that nature about where we are going to be involved with Americans?

Maybe I would ask General Crist, certainly in terms of the gulf, in your command.

General CRIST. Yes, sir. First, I do not automatically equate a commitment, Senator, as a commitment of American forces, and particularly American ground forces. A commitment——

Senator KENNEDY. Well, where are we going to use them, and where are we not, as far as your command? Where do you see that?

General CRIST. I see them operating first against the Soviets, if the Soviets decide to invade. We would then have to pick the specific locations where they would go in order to deter the Soviets as I cannot meet the Soviets across a 3,000 mile front. We do not have the forces to do that.

Senator KENNEDY. Any place the Soviets go, we are prepared to put American——

General CRIST. No, only those places the Soviets go, Senator, that will threaten our own interests. We have stated our interests are

Western access to the gulf oil, freedom of navigation through the strategic choke points, and preventing hostile military coercion over those nations which possess the resources.

These national interests begin to confine the problem in terms of where one has to put U.S. forces. The first thing to do before committing U.S. forces is try to strengthen our allies so they will help deter the Soviets.

Senator KENNEDY. I understand your objective.

What about you, Admiral, and then I know the chairman wants to go. Where do you understand that the American servicemen will be involved in your area?

Admiral HAYS. Sir, in the Pacific Theater, our commitments are more precise. We have mutual defense agreements, bilateral mutual defense agreements with five countries there: Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia.

The terms of those treaties are explicit as to what we will do, what our responsibilities are, and the first item of each of those treaties is that we will consult to determine the appropriate course of action.

Senator KENNEDY. Let me just ask, and then my time is up, about what has been the impact of the withdrawal of New Zealand from ANZUS in terms of this general strategy?

Admiral HAYS. There has been a very profound adverse impact with the withdrawal of New Zealand for the reaction it has caused, the anxiety and uncertainty it has caused throughout the South Pacific which looked to the ANZUS treaty as a very stabilizing influence. The countries of the South Pacific view what is happening with great concern.

Senator KENNEDY. Let me just ask you about how the U.S. views it there? What has it meant in terms of our strategic capability or our strategic planning or our strategic interests? What has it meant?

Admiral HAYS. Well, access to New Zealand is important. The forces that New Zealand brought to the table were not all that significant, quite frankly. The total size of their force was something like 12,500 people, including the army, navy, and air force. So militarily, it did not represent a lot of capability.

But it does represent a setback so far as the policy formulation in the South Pacific is concerned, because New Zealand is a big factor in that area.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Senator McCain had a question.

Senator MCCAIN. I have one brief question, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. We will go to closed session after this, and I will ask the staff to clear the room.

Senator WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have one question.

Senator EXON. I have one quesion.

Chairman NUNN. I think we are not going to have a closed session, Senator Warner, because we are going to run out of time.

Senator WILSON. This is just a question for the record.

Chairman NUNN. Well, we will go ahead in open session as long as we have to. We may have to schedule a closed session another day.

Senator MCCAIN. I withdraw my question, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. No, go ahead.

Senator MCCAIN. No, I will withdraw.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, let me ask a very quick question. There has been a lot of discussion here today about the quality of the service, the quality of the men and women power that we have. The question has been brought up about the future. Both you, Admiral, and you, General, have commanded troops and sailors under both the all-volunteer service and under conscription.

Looking to the future, do you feel it is necessary to go to conscription? Or do you feel that the all-volunteer service is working well and should be continued as far as we can now see into the future?

Admiral HAYS. Sir, I believe the all-volunteer force is working exceptionally well at the present time. On the basis of what I see today, I could not be persuasive in arguing that we ought to go to a different system.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Admiral. General.

General CRIST. Sir, we have never had better Marines than we have under the current system. Until we see it is not working, I think we ought to stay right where we are.

Senator EXON. Thank you. No further questions.

Senator WILSON. Mr. Chairman, just one for the record.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Gentlemen, would you be kind enough to respond for the record as to the priority that you attach to the production and the development of the C-17? Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

C-17

Admiral HAYS. As I pointed out in my prepared statement, we do not have sufficient intertheater lift assets to repond quickly and effectively to a major crisis. I consider enhancement of airlift and sealift to be among my top four or five priorities for preserving deterrence and contributing to our warfighting capability. The C-17 program is the cornerstone of the Air Force's airlift master plan, designed to achieve a total intertheater airlift capability of 66 million ton-miles (MTM) per day which was established by the Congressionally-Mandated Mobility Study. The C-17 will also reduce the existing shortage of intertheater airlift and offset much of the capability which will be lost as older C-130 and C-141 aircraft leave the USAF inventory. I view the timely deployment of the C-17 as absolutely essential if we are to achieve the mobility necessary to support our strategy in the Pacific.

General CRIST. As you know, the aging C-141 and C-130 fleets will require replacement in the future which will worsen the impact of growth in the airlift needed. To me, this means C-17. Additionally, my forces must now fly into improved and modern airfields and then be moved again into combat zones. That causes delay when speed is essential. The C-17, when it becomes operational, can fly my forces into unimproved airfields forward in the region. That is what we need in the Central Region as well as replacing the aging C-141's and C-130's.

Senator EXON. Did you have a question, Senator McCain?

Senator MCCAIN. I withdrew it.

[Questions to be answered for the hearing record follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

MUNITIONS STOCKAGE LEVEL

Senator NUNN. Admiral Hays, would you please tell the committee, as of this date, January 27, 1987, what is your stockage level for the following munitions: HARM missile, Sparrow missile (AIM-7), Harpoon missiles, MK-46 torpedoes, Sidewinder missile (AIM-9), Maverick missile (Laser and IIR guided), Standard missiles, MK-48 torpedoes.

Express the answer in terms of percentage of inventory required to support your operations.

Admiral **Hays**.

	Requested [1]	On hand [1]	Percent [1]
HARM (AGM-88)			
Total USCINCPAC			
AIM-9 Sidewinder (all mods)			
Total USCINCPAC			
AIM-7 Sparrow (all mods)			
Total USCINCPAC			
Maverick (AGM-65D)			
Total USCINCPAC			
Harpoon (AGM-84)			
(Air) (surface) (SBU)			
Total USCINCPAC (all)			
Standard missile			
PACFLT:			
SM1 (MR)			
SM1 (ER)			
SM2 (ER)			
Total USCINCPAC			
Artifically high due to			
MK 46 Torpedo			
MK 48 Torpedo			

[1] Deleted.

Senator **Nunn**. General Crist, for the record, would you please tell the committee as of this date—January 27, 1987—what is your stockage level for the following munitions: HARM missile, Sidewinder missile (AIM-9), Sparrow missile (AIM-7), Maverick missile (laser and IIR guided), Harpoon missile, Standard missile, MK-46 torpedo, MK-48 torpedo.

Express the answer in terms of percentage of inventory required to support your operations.

General **Crist**. The stockage levels for the threat oriented munitions in question are as follows (these are Service allocations):

Weapons:	*Stockage* [1]
HARM	(2)
Sidewinder	(2)
Sparrow	(2)
Maverick	(2)
Harpoon (air)	(2)
Harpoon (surface)	(2)
Harpoon (sub)	(2)
Standard missile (medium range)	(2)
Standard missile (long range)	(2)
MK 46 Torpedo	(2)
MK 48 Torpedo	(2)

[1] Since Navy support is provided to USCENTCOM by the Pacific Fleet, stockage levels for Navy munitions are based on the requirements for the Pacific Fleet regional threat.

[2] Deleted.

Senator **Exon**. We will now move to closed session. We will ask the staff to make sure the room is cleared.

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene immediately in closed session.]

EXECUTIVE SESSION

The committee met in executive session, pursuant to recess, at 12:26 p.m., in room SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Kennedy, Wirth, Warner, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Robert E. Bayer, Richard D. Finn, Jr., David S. Lyles, Gordon G. Riggle, Mark B. Robinson, professional staff members; Lucia M. Chavez, staff assistant.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn, and Samuel J. Routson, assistant to Senator Symms.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Could I inquire of the staff if the room is cleared?

Mr. PUNARO. Sir, we are in the process of doing that now.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. The committee will come to order. Can the staff assure us that the room is properly secure?

Mr. PUNARO. Sir, it is from the Senate Armed Services Committee personnel. Admiral Hays and General Crist are going to have to vouch for the Department of Defense individuals as to their clearances.

General CRIST. They are cleared.

Admiral HAYS. Yes.

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order in closed session. Turn the mikes off.

Senator Warner, why do we not start with you.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When we established these hearings, we decided for the present time that we as a committee would not go into extensive briefings on the worldwide threat other than to receive that from the individual CINCs.

I would suggest that we now allow them to take a few minutes to give us their perceptions of the worldwide threat in their sector of responsibility, and invite them to provide for the record a brief, but nevertheless expanded version, so we can have an entire threat presentation from the CINCs viewpoint worldwide.

Chairman NUNN. Good. Let us start with Admiral Hays, if you would.

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

In general terms, and I would like to provide the details for the record, you see in the Pacific Theater today about one-third of the Soviet Navy. The Pacific Fleet is the largest of the four fleets that they have. In air combat power, again about one-third of the Soviet inventory is located in the Far East region.

[Deleted.]

I would cite such things as the new AKULA class submarine, which, according to the USSR, is the world's quietest submarine. It compares in quietness with [deleted].

We see that the Soviet Pacific Fleet has all of the latest surface combatants, the Kirov, the Sovremennyyi, the Udaloy, are all located in the Pacific Theater now.

On the air side, I mentioned the concentration that the Soviets are making on long-range attack, and that is expectable. We expect it because of the nature of the Pacific. The distances are great. So they have concentrated their Bear-Gs, their Bear-Hs, the Backfires in the Pacific Theater.

They have introduced the SU-27 look-down/shoot-down, the MiG-31, [deleted]. It is a dramatic change that a lot of people have not really appreciated.

Senator **Warner**. Admiral, this has come about, in my judgment, in a very brief period of time.

Admiral **Hays**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Warner**. I think that is what you meant by "dramatic."

Admiral **Hays**. Absolutely.

Senator **Warner**. We are talking about several years, are we not?

Admiral **Hays**. We are talking about the last half dozen to 10 years.

Senator **Warner**. Certainly for naval. Now land forces have been fairly static for some time.

Admiral **Hays**. Actually, in the last 20 years in the case of land forces we have seen the Soviets go from 20 divisions to the 54 we have today.

Senator **Warner**. Naval forces, in what period of time?

Admiral **Hays**. The naval buildup has been more dramatic in recent years than is the case for either the air force or the land forces. I think it is in recognition of their understanding that it is a maritime theater.

Senator **Warner**. It is also now the United States' largest trading partner in that area.

Admiral **Hays**. That is right.

General **Crist**. Senator, I think the most disturbing threat to me is the creation of this Southern Theater of Military Operations, opposite of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. This dramatic change has happened since their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and most notably since 1983.

They have created an offensive command and control structure headquartered at Baku, centered around military districts which heretofore have been independent and pretty much defensive backwater. Since 1985, the former chief of Soviet forces in Germany, General Zaytsev, one of the best they've got, has been in charge. They have been upgrading their divisions with new equipment, to include new nuclear capable weapons systems which we have seen for the first time, and new tanks, missiles, and artillery pieces. They have done the same with their aircraft.

[Deleted.]

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Chairman, that finishes my questions.

Senator Exon [presiding]. First I would like to ask the basic question to both of you.

A couple of years ago, this committee recognized the serious problem with regard to forces in the Indian Ocean, and provided some money for our Diego Garcia base. Some of it was intended to improve the quality of life of the servicemen on the Diego Garcia. Is that still a problem? Is it as serious as it once was? Or has the situation been alleviated somewhat as far as recreational opportunities for those on that Island are concerned?

Admiral Hays. Yes, sir. Well, thanks to your support, conditions are very good on that island right now. It is still an isolated island, and it is an unaccompanied tour. In many ways it is a hardship, but the facilities that are available there are adequate to the need.

Senator Exon. Do you have any comment on that, General?

General Crist. Sir, we have put in military construction not only in Diego Garcia, but also enroute staging facilities in Lajes and Morocco, and storage in Oman, all of which has improved my position. The sorts of things that allow me to say I can now get there is due in great part because we have accomplished military construction, put in the seed money, if you will, to get the materiel there.

Senator Exon. Thank you.

My next question has to do with Australia. Given the antinuclear sentiment in New Zealand that seems to be spreading to Australia, [deleted]. Do you see that that could be a problem in the future with the present trend in Australia?

Admiral Hays. It certainly could be a problem, Senator, but I do not envision a problem developing in the near-term. I believe that it is significant that Prime Minister Hawke, head of the Labor Government, has been very supportive and has prevented any kind of a problem similar to that developed in New Zealand from occurring in Australia.

Our relations with Australia are superb at the present time. We have no hassle with our port visit requests; neither confirm nor deny is not an issue; the joint facilities there that are important to our space systems are functioning properly. We continue to send B-52 flights to Australia for low-level training.

So I am high on the relationship between Australia and the United States. That is not to say it could not change, but I do not see the indications.

Senator Exon. Do you have anything to add, General?

General Crist. I would not add to Australia, sir, but I might add a postscript to the last comment regarding Russian movements into South Yemen (PDRY) and Ethiopia. While we have been looking at Iran and the gulf, the Russians have been moving to control the backdoor. We worry about the Suez Canal. But if Soviets control the narrow Bab El Mandeb, which can be closed with a 155 gun fired from an island, they have got the whole thing.

Very quietly they have been increasing their presence in South Yemen, and are already established across the way in Ethiopia; a beginning to try to tie the Red Sea exit. It is beginning to bother me. I am now having to look to the rear, something that I did not have to do before.

Senator Exon. My final question in closed session will be with regard to Subic Bay. We are all concerned, and it has been discussed here this morning briefly, about what is going to happen or not happen in the Philippines. That would be a tragic loss we all recognize.

What backup long-range plan, or off-the-wall thinking, have we come up with if in some event, we should have to give up Subic Bay and Clark Field? Where would we go, and what would we do?

Admiral HAYS. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. I was going to ask you [deleted].

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir. Strategically it is very attractive.

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. This is addressed to either one of you. Do we have any private agreements with the Pakistanis about involvement of the United States if the Soviets move on Pakistan?

General CRIST. We do not, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. There are no private agreements?

General CRIST. [Deleted.] But to my knowledge, Senator, we have no assurances or agreements with them.

Senator KENNEDY. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator KENNEDY. [Deleted.] My question deals with bilateral agreements. Is it your answer that there are no bilateral agreements now between the United States and any other country involving American forces should the Soviets move into Pakistan?

General CRIST. To my knowledge, that is correct.

Senator KENNEDY. I do not know if there is anything, Mr. Chairman, that they could tell us in closed session that they did not tell us in open session with regard to the Iran-Iraqi war, but is there anything else that you could tell us?

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator KENNEDY. One final question. What is your assessment of the threat in terms of the other Gulf States, Kuwait, for example? What is your own intelligence, your own military assessment—if this offensive is successful—as to whether it will pose any kind of a threat to the security of the other Gulf States?

General CRIST. More likely, Senator, even if it is not completely successful. The Iranians accuse Kuwait of supporting Iraq, [deleted].

Senator KENNEDY. So your general conclusion is that one way or the other there is going to be more destruction, and more confusion?

General CRIST. I am afraid so, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. And more interdiction.

General CRIST. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask a followup question? We have heard reports of the problems this administration has incurred from the Iran arms sale, and that there was some intelligence given to both sides. My questions to you are: One, did you know as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces in that area that intelligence was being given? Did you know it on a realtime basis?

Second, do you think that intelligence in any way has assisted either forces, Iraq or Iran, in achieving their goals?

General CRIST. [Deleted] of course.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Including Iran and Iraq?

General CRIST. On the Iran-Iraq situation, sir, not to Iraq. I do not supply intelligence to Iraq.

Chairman NUNN. How about to Iran?

General CRIST. I do not supply intelligence to Iran, [deleted].

Senator WARNER. This comes to the heart of U.S. strategy. You are the CO of U.S. strategy—we are talking in a generic sense. It seems to me that if any branch of our government, department, or agency, is supplying intelligence to your theater of responsibility, you ought to know about it. Do you agree with that?

General CRIST. I agree.

Senator WARNER. And right now as it is set up you do not know about it.

General CRIST. Well, I do not know if I do not know, Senator.

Senator WARNER. That is a good response. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. That is correct.

Senator WARNER. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. Senator, I picked that up looking at the map, based on my own background as a professional officer.

[Deleted.]

I do know that within the last 6 to 8 months, Iraqi air has been exceptionally effective.

Chairman NUNN. Has what?

General CRIST. That within the last 6 to 8 months, Iraqi air has been exceptionally effective, Mr. Chairman, almost a classic Douhet campaign.

Senator KENNEDY. As I understand your response to the Senator's earlier question, we were not providing intelligence directly to Iran or Iraq. Is that correct?

General CRIST. That is correct for USCENTCOM.

Senator KENNEDY. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator KENNEDY. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator KENNEDY. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator KENNEDY. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. Is it fair to say that no one told you in the government that we were providing intelligence directly to Iran or Iraq?

General CRIST. That is right.

Chairman NUNN. You have never been told that?

General CRIST. That is right.

Chairman NUNN. Is it fair to say that whatever you have picked up has been on your own?

General CRIST. That is right.

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

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General CRIST. [Deleted.]

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General CRIST. [Deleted.]

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General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator KENNEDY. [Deleted.]

But we will leave it to you, Senator Nunn, to work that out.

Chairman NUNN. What time would you like it? [Laughter.]

Admiral Hays, did you have any knowledge of this intelligence going to Iran or Iraq?

Admiral HAYS. No.

Chairman NUNN. Did your intelligence people pick it up?

Admiral HAYS. Not to my knowledge.

Chairman NUNN. It was not your area of responsibility?

Admiral HAYS. No, sir.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question?

I have always been very fearful that if things get to where one side might be winning that war the losing side might fall back on chemical or biological weapons, whatever. I do not know if we are at a high enough classification for you to comment on that, but if you could, would you answer the question? What do we know about whether such weaponry is available to either or both sides? And is that not a possibility?

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator WARNER. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator WARNER. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator WARNER. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. They have not.

Senator EXON. But they have that capability.

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

General **Crist**. [Deleted.]

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Wilson. Senator Symms. Do either one of you have closed-session questions?

Senator **Wilson**. Mr. Chairman, this may have been asked. I apologize for being absent from the room. What is your assessment, General Crist, of the role that U.S. weapons have played in the Iran-Iraq war? Has it been a significant factor as far as your intelligence sources have been able to determine?

Senator **Warner**. Senator, does the question relate to those arms that were transferred as part of the present scenario?

Senator **Wilson**. Yes.

General **Crist**. [Deleted.]

Now, with regard to the parts that supposedly were sold, F-14 parts and other things, we have certainly seen some effects, such as a P-3 returning to operations.

Chairman **Nunn**. [Deleted.]

General **Crist**. [Deleted.]

Senator **Wilson**. What is your assessment of the final outcome of this war? And if the Iranians win, what does that portend in terms of your responsibilities and the threats to the United States' interests in the region?

General **Crist**. I think either way, for the moment, we are going to have chaos and great fear.

Senator **Wilson**. Whichever side wins?

General **Crist**. That is right. I do not think the Iranians can win militarily, but they can inflict political woes on Saddam Hussein. [Deleted.]

I do not think that the Iraqis can defeat Iran. There are too many people. But the Iranians are running out of steam. Their economy is collapsing. They are not able to get the oil out. They are having problems.

We are winding down in terms of intensity. They cannot keep the intensity up, either side.

Senator **Wilson**. If you were asked by the President to select a target in the event that there were a determination of Iranian culpability on a scale which would warrant such an attack, if you were asked to find an equivalent target in Iran to that of the attack on Libya, would you be prepared to do so? Is there a similar opportunity?

General **Crist**. [Deleted.]

Chairman **Nunn**. What if you did want to send a strong message in terms of Iran? Let's say they do some terrorist act. What target would you recommend? I think that is what Senator Wilson is asking.

General **Crist**. [Deleted.]

Senator **Wilson**. What if you were asked the same question with respect to how to send a strong message to retaliate against Syrian sponsorship of terrorism?

General **Crist**. [Deleted.]

Senator **Wilson**. General, do you see the same kind of buildup occurring [deleted].

General **Crist**. [Deleted.]

Senator **Wilson**. What would be your assessment overall of the theater ballistic missile threat to Israel?

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator WILSON. Currently my impression is that the Israelis are attempting to develop a defense to this, and that they presently perceive such a threat.

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. I do not want to cut anybody off, but we have got to start back at 2 o'clock.

Senator SYMMS. I just want to ask one question.

Chairman NUNN. We did not get back to airlift/sealift, but if you would for the record furnish your percentage that you now have of your present need on a today, real-time basis if we went to war today. The second part of that question is, the assumptions under which that is formed about what is happening in other areas of the world. I will ask the same thing about the 5-year defense plan, what percentage do you have, again with the assumptions about what is happening in other parts of the world.

Senator Symms.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I just want to ask one question about Afghanistan. It has been very frustrating to me that we have been so slow to react, to really make it more difficult for the Soviets in Afghanistan. In your view in planning this area, how effective is the support that the United States and the other friendly nations are giving to the Freedom Fighters in Afghanistan? Are they in fact inflicting any losses on Soviet helicopters and jet aircraft?

General CRIST. In answer to the first part of your question, Senator, without such support there would be no Mujahideen. They would not be able to survive. The Soviets have been pouring in weaponry. As you know, they have five divisions, plus, in Afghanistan now. Spetsnaz strength went from two battalions to two brigades. That gives you a feel for what the Soviets are investing in the place.

The Mujahideen are an absolutely remarkable group of people. They have a fighting tradition. If they were not fighting the Soviets, they might fight each other. They are fighters by nature, but they need the wherewithall, and that is being supplied to them. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMMS. What is the principal weapon the Mujahideen are using now?

General CRIST. The AK-47.

Senator SYMMS. And how about for light machine guns?

General CRIST. 12.7—Dashaka.

Senator SYMMS. Soviet made?

General CRIST. Mostly old Soviet weaponry.

Senator SYMMS. What about anti-aircraft?

General CRIST. Besides Soviet anti-aircraft guns, you saw the public statements that the Stinger is in, and the British Blow Pipe.

Senator SYMMS. When you say there are "some," is it four or five, or 4 or 500? Are they able to really inflict damage?

General CRIST. Yes, they are. Yes, they are. They have shot down transports. They have knocked down helicopters. They have taken out aircraft making final approaches at the fields. They are remarkably good with a pretty complicated weapons system. The Stinger is not an easy system.

Senator SYMMS. Are they going to be able to sustain enough opposition so that sooner or later the Soviets will go back home, for political reasons?

General CRIST. I do not think the Mujahideen can drive them out militarily.

Senator SYMMS. No, I did not say that. I mean, there could be a point in time even in the Soviet Union, possibly, when they would lose—cause enough objections at home that they might.

General CRIST. Well, the Mujahideen just do not have to lose. I think that is the key. They might not have to win, but they just do not have to lose. As long as they do not lose——

Senator SYMMS. How long can they continue this scorched earth policy and have anybody left?

General CRIST. They have been at it 7 years.

Senator SYMMS. What is their capability today compared to 7 years ago?

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMMS. Because there are less people?

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMMS. Well, dollar-for-dollar is there any place in your command that we could spend more money and have a bigger impact?

General CRIST. Well, the Mujahideen are tying down over five Soviet divisions.

Senator SYMMS. That is what I am getting at.

General CRIST. That is a pretty good investment, in my mind. And there is not an American trooper involved.

Senator SYMMS. That is my whole point. It seems to me this is the place where we ought to really pour the equipment in there and give them support.

General CRIST. Senator, I think any time we can get the people, whose problem it is, to fight for themselves, with our support, that is the best thing.

Senator SYMMS. Well, are you satisfied with what we have done? Or has it been frustrating for you as a professional military officer to see how slow it has been?

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

It must be very frustrating for the Soviet combat commanders using the best equipment they have got, developing new tactics and still not to be able to defeat this elusive——

Senator SYMMS. In other words, you do not mind keeping it going the way it is?

General CRIST. No, sir.

Senator SYMMS. See, I had a cab driver tell me that. It was an Afghan cab driver, which we have all had the experience of riding with. He said the only reason that we do not give the support any faster, which he would like, he said it is too costly on the Soviets and too dollar saving for the United States. But do you think we could put enough in there to make the price just so high that the Soviets would simply have to get out?

General CRIST. I cannot answer that one, Senator. I think they might continue to up the stakes. Afghanistan is pretty important for them, too. They have put a big investment in. They are additionally investing in the economic infrastructure. There is a lot of money the Soviets are putting into Afghanistan which we do not see on the military side.

They have a big stake in that country. Whether they might ratchet up the stakes along with us is a question. Although they appear to be feeling some of the heat now.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

I have one other question about the Iranian arms sale. Have you seen, since all of this came out, or even before it came out, let us say in the last year or 18 months, have you seen more arms flowing into Iran from other people around the world? Are you seeing an increased arms flow?

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. Have your intelligence people picked up reports of Israeli shipments of arms into Iran?

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. I would have to answer that for the record, because I just do not have it in my head.

Chairman NUNN. Would you send that, for the record?

General CRIST. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. I would like it classified.

General CRIST. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. One more question.

When we were discussing what possible targets we might view as particularly vulnerable to Iranian attack, we have been very much concerned about the vulnerability of Saudi oil fields. If the President of the United States wanted to punish Iran for whatever reason, including future terrorist activities, how effective and how risky to our airmen would an attack on the Iran oil fields be? And are they as vulnerable to such attack as we seem to think the Saudi oil fields are to an Iranian attack?

General CRIST. That is a good question, Senator. Kharg Island is basically the source of about 1.5 million barrels per day they are shipping out now. [Deleted.]

If you could take out Kharg's Sea Island Terminals or the pumping station at Ghanaveh Bay which is just on the shore and pumps all the oil to Kharg, you have cut them off. That would hurt. That would hurt very severely.

Senator EXON. What kind of a target would it be?

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. [Deleted.]

General CRIST. [Deleted.]

Senator EXON. Any comment, Admiral?

Admiral HAYS. I would prefer they did not have the [deleted] capability, if we are speculating an attack against the Iranians.

Senator EXON. Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. General, Admiral, thank you both for being here. It has been a very helpful hearing. You did an excellent job, and we appreciate your coming. I should have given you a break somewhere along the way. I have taken a couple since you have been here.

Thank you very much.

General CRIST. Thank you.

Admiral HAYS. Thank you.

[Whereupon at 1:14 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS TESTIMONY ON STRATEGY

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Robert G. Bell, Richard D. Finn, Jr., John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Gordon G. Riggle and Mark B. Robinson, professional staff members; Kathleen L. McGuire, staff assistant.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gordon Kerr, assistant to Senator Levin; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; Leon Feurth, assistant to Senator Gore; Jeffrey Hyche, assistant to Senator Shelby; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm, Samuel J. Routson, assistant to Senator Symms, Bill White, assistant to Senator Warner; and Ken Heith, assistant to Senator Bingaman.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The hearing will come to order.

This afternoon the Armed Services Committee convenes to continue its current series of hearings on U.S. strategy. Today we have the opportunity to hear testimony from two respected experts on strategy, Dr. Jeffrey Record and retired Army Col. Harry Summers.

At this early date in its schedule, the committee has held nine strategy hearings in which 23 witnesses representing a broad range of views have testified. Unfortunately, the heavy snow yesterday required us to postpone the appearance of one of our most important witnesses, particularly in the foreign policy goals and objectives area and how that relates to military strategy; that is, Secretary of State Shultz. We hope to hear from him at a later point.

In addition, the committee will be conducting more hearings on strategy this week and throughout the course of this year. Although additional hearings are yet to be held, the body of testimony thus far is large enough for us to want to step back for a moment and try to analyze it, and that is the purpose of today's hearings. That is what we have asked Dr. Record and Colonel Summers to do.

They have been closely following our series of strategy hearings in order to present their views to the committee on the testimony we have collected. Of course, they will have their own views about our present strategy. We would like their comments on that and any other ideas they may have.

We also have invited the witnesses to give us their views on things that have been omitted, so in effect we have asked them to help us analyze and critique what we have heard from all the other witnesses.

Dr. Record is now Senior Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. He has written extensively on foreign policy and defense matters, including the book Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends.

Colonel Summers' distinguished career in the U.S. Army included combat duty in the Korean and Vietnam wars and service on the faculty of the Army War College. Like Dr. Record, he has written a great deal and he is especially well known for his study of U.S. strategy in Vietnam entitled Own Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. He is currently Contributing Editor of U.S. News and World Report.

I would like to welcome both of our witnesses to the committee today. Senator Warner will be here in a few minutes and if he wants to make any statement at that time he is certainly welcome to do so. I do not know what the order of witnesses is today, but I understand perhaps that Dr. Record is going to lead off with his statement.

It would be my idea to have both of our witnesses present their statements and then we will go to questions.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, this afternoon the committee will hear from Dr. Jeffrey Record and Col. Harry Summers. These gentlemen have been asked to analyze the testimony which we have received from preceding witnesses. I also understand they will offer their own views on strategy issues that have not been fully covered in the previous hearings.

During these strategy hearings we have heard administration experts state that our country's military strategy and capabilities are worldwide and aimed at a war with the Soviet Union. Yet some of our witnesses have indicated that the conflicts we might face will be low intensity conventional operations. Given the state of the budget requests in the areas of ammunition and spare parts procurement over the last 6 years I am greatly concerned as to whether the United States could sustain any prolonged military engagement at the present time. This committee must come to grips now with our military's readiness and sustainability problems so that we can assure the American people that our military forces will be able to fight for more than just a few weeks.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Record, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. JEFFREY RECORD, SENIOR FELLOW, INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Dr. RECORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For the sake of time I will give you an abbreviated version of my opening statement.

It is certainly an honor and a pleasure to appear before this committee to discuss so important a matter as our national strategy. You and the committee are to be highly commended for attempting to broaden the focus of your annual examination of the defense budget from line item minutia to the larger issues related to the deployment of our military and other means to achieve basic national security objectives.

You have asked me and Col. Harry Summers to comment on the extensive and diverse testimony this committee has received during the past 2 weeks on the subject of our national strategy.

Given the constraints of time, I shall attempt to do so within the context of my own thoughts on strategy. My focus will be on military, rather than grand strategy, and on the conduct of war rather than its deterrence. To be sure, one must be forever mindful of Clausewitz's distinction between preparation for war and war proper, a distinction similar but not identical to that in contemporary Western parlance between "deterrence" and "defense."

Mr. John Collins, who testified before this committee on January 20, observed that while the East-West military balance looks pretty good in terms of deterrence, the wartime balance does not. He went on to say that "If deterrence fails for any reason at all, we have troubles. The forces we have bought for deterrent purposes probably are not sufficient to execute our stated strategies successfully."

The late Sir Basil Liddell Hart defined military strategy as "the art of distributing military means to fufill the ends of policy." Hart further declared that "strategy depends for success, first and most, on a sound calculation and coordination of the ends and the means." I share Hart's definition.

Whatever the substantive content of any specific strategy, there must be a healthy relationship between the strategy's declared ends and its military means. It is not enough simply to say that strategy involves ends and means. Means must be adequate to accomplish the ends.

Strategy is the calculated relationship between political purpose and military power. As such, it involves hard choices within the framework of invariably finite resources. It involves an ability to distinguish between what we would like to do and what we can do, as well as between the essential and the expendable.

Not every corner of the world is vital to our national security, even though virtually every corner of the world, from Vietnam to Beirut's international airport, from Grenada to Quemoy and Matsu, has been declared so by one administration or another during the past 40 years. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger commented to this committee on January 14, "the term 'vital interest' is an easily debased coinage"—so much so that "everything becomes a vital interest."

A sound sense of priorities and a willingness, if necessary, to sacrifice the nonessential for the indispensable are the essense of a sound strategy.

Unfortunately in my view, what has passed for American military strategy during the past two decades or so, far from reflecting a sound calculation of the ends and means, has all too often amounted to little more than periodic professions of ever-expanding ends, undisciplined either by a realistic appreciation of the finite limits of U.S. military means and their effective application in the nuclear environment or by effective accommodation to fundamental changes in the global geostrategic environment.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, before this committee on January 12, evinced little concern over what he termed "the 'so-called' strategies capabilities gap." He stated the obvious: that "we do not live in an ideal world where our interests, strategies and capabilities are exactly matched." He went on to concede that "there is a difference between what we need and what we have for a successful defense;" and that the difference "entails some measure of risk."

I fully agree. Rarely has any major power maintained military forces in peacetime sufficient to cover any and all assumed commitments and possible challenges, in part because major powers rarely expect and rarely are challenged simultaneously on more than one front, and in part because the costs of maintaining a perfect match between commitments and capabilities are prohibitive.

In our own case there has since 1945 always been a gap between our declared military goals and our actual military capabilities. In the postwar era, we have never had enough military power to deliver simultaneously on all of our defense commitments. Realization of stated force planning goals for a 2½ or even a 1½-war capability has consistently eluded the Defense Department. We should remember that Vietnam was but a half-war; that it was waged with the benefit of conscription and higher force levels than we have today; and that the Pentagon nevertheless had to dig deeply into its strategic reserve forces withheld here in the United States even to postpone what became ultimate defeat.

The issue is neither the inevitability of some measure of disparity between our military ends and means, nor the fact that such disparities entail strategic risks. The issue is whether the present disparity between U.S. military means and ends poses unacceptable strategic risks to the security of our country. Secretary Weinberger apparently does not so believe, even though the Defense Department over which he presides has adopted force planning guidance that envisages what amounts to a 3-war requirement.

The United States today faces a disparity between its military obligations and power not unlike that which plagued Great Britain 50 years ago. Like Britain, the United States today is perilously overcommitted and we have succeeded in avoiding strategic catastrophe only because our adversaries have not challenged our major overseas defense commitments simultaneously. Britain, as we know, was not so fortunate.

During the past 40 years, successive political administrations in this country, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, have accumulated one overseas defense commitment after another without undertaking the increases in military means necessary to fulfill those commitments.

Some of those commitments, such as the SEATO Treaty, were assumed with little thought given to how they might be defended or to their long-term strategic consequences. The most recent example of what I would term strategic irresponsibility was the Carter administration's extension of containment to the vast and logistically remote region of Southwest Asia, a commitment that has yet to be accompanied by appropriate increases in our military power.

The Carter Doctrine—and it seems that every administration must have its own doctrine entailing new defense commitments—the Carter Doctrine widened an already large gap between U.S. military responsibilities and resources by imposing a new and demanding set of obligations on a military already overtaxed by traditional commitment in Europe and Northeast Asia.

We are now formally or otherwise committed to the defense of 60 countries in the world, even though according to our Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, we and our allies would be hard put to defend Europe alone, to say nothing of the United States mounting a simultaneous defense of U.S. commitments elsewhere.

We would do well to remember Frederick the Great's caution that "He who attempts to defend too much defends nothing."

The disparity between U.S. defense commitments and military power is today so large as to constitute a clear and present danger to the Nation's security. If strategy involves a sound calculation and coordination of ends and means, then we are in deep trouble.

Take, for example, the administration's declared goal of being able to wage a protracted, multifront, worldwide war against the Soviet Union. Secretary Weinberger claimed before this committee that our strategy "is to deter aggression against the United States, our allies and our interests so that we will never have to fight anywhere in the world."

He went on to assert that it is not our strategy "to fight everywhere around the world at once." But what if deterrence fails, as it has so often in this most violent of all centuries? According to Secretary Weinberger in his Annual Report to the Congress for fiscal year 1984, "Our long-term goal is to be able to meet the demands of a worldwide war, including concurrent reinforcement of Europe, deployments to Southwest Asia and the Pacific, and support for other areas."

It is Secretary Weinberger's view, again in his own words, that "Given the Soviets' capacity to launch simultaneous attacks in Southwest Asia, NATO, and the Pacific, our long-range goal is to be capable of defending all theaters simultaneously."

It is difficult to know what to make of so militarily ambitious a declaration. It seems, among other things, completely to ignore the ongoing decline of U.S. military power in relation not only to that of the Soviet Union, but also to that of our European and East Asian allies. As Dr. Schlesinger pointed out to this committee, the favorable strategic conditions the United States enjoyed in the immediate post-World War II era—preeminent economic power, nuclear supremacy, unchallenged control of the seas—have long since given way to much less favorable conditions, including an enduring nuclear stalemate in which "the full power of the nation-in-arms cannot be rationally employed."

And how, exactly, are we to go about defending all theaters simultaneously? Put aside for the moment the question of whether a worldwide shooting war with the Soviet Union could remain nonnuclear for more than a few days or weeks—after all, NATO's own doctrine of nuclear first-use suggests that the side that started losing decisively at the conventional level would be sorely tempted to escalate. Also put aside the fact that it might not be in the Soviet interest in the event of war to launch simultaneous assaults in Europe, Southwest Asia and the Pacific.

The Soviets have an abiding fear of a two-front war. They have never launched one and may today lack the resources to wage one. Soviet strategic interests probably would be far better served by sequential assaults—say, first in the Persian Gulf in order to draw off and tie down our strategic lift assets and our rapidly deployable ground forces, followed by a main blow in Europe.

The fundamental reality of the matter is that a simultaneous and effective U.S. defense of Europe, Southwest Asia and the Pacific is simply beyond the present and planned military resources of the United States and its allies. As such, the worldwide war strategy is not a strategy, but rather testimony to an absence of strategy. Even had we the military resources to do what we would like to do, it would be strategically nonsensical to attempt to wage what amounts to three geographically separate wars on and along the periphery of the Eurasian landmass against a numerically superior opponent that enjoys the advantages of interior lines of communication by virtue of its central position on that landmass.

In his testimony before this committee on January 21, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. William Crowe, Jr., noted that "historically the United States has attempted in peacetime to maintain sufficient capability to blunt initial attacks on our own interests and to form a nucleus around which to expand for major hostilities."

He further stated that "even today we are betting that in a major war we can expand our peacetime forces and bring our total resources to bear so that we will ultimately prevail."

I question whether this bet is a wise one. To be sure, it paid off in World War II. But times have changed since then. In World War II we had the time and the geographic distance to mobilize effectively for global conduct. Tomorrow, we probably will not have either.

In World War II we entered hostilities with a peacetime conscription system and a wartime mobilization system already underway. Today we have neither.

In World War II we had the vast human and industrial resources of the Soviet Union and the British Empire on our side. Today, Soviet military power is arrayed against us and the British Empire is no more.

In World War II our war effort commanded the support of the entire American public. Today, that support can no longer be taken for granted.

In World War II we faced in Germany, Italy, and Japan adversaries that were themselves strategically incompetent. Today, we face an adversary whose careful and cautious employment of military power suggests a clear recognition that gross imbalances between military obligations and capabilities court strategic disaster.

Those who profess not to be unduly troubled over the present gap between U.S. military ends and means often cite 19th century Great Britan as an example of a great power that succeeded in preserving its extensive security commitments overseas with a minimum of military means.

The analogy is a poor one, for a number of reasons. First, 19th-century Britain, unlike the United States today, did not have a standing commitment to Europe's defense and certainly one entailing the indefinite deployment of 350,000 troops on the continent. Second, Britain's imperial commitments overseas, though extensive, were fulfilled in large measure by police and military forces raised indigenously within the British Empire. A 20th-century equivalent of Britain's imperial forces is not available to the United States. Third, Britain never faced, as does the United States in the Soviet Union today, an adversary capable of challenging both her land power and sea power simultaneously. Finally, the application of British military power in the 19th century was not constrained by her adversary's possession of nuclear weapons capable of destroying British society within a matter of hours.

Our current strategic insolvency is nowhere more evident than in the Pentagon's plans for Southwest Asia's defense. Both former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and former Presidential National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who testified before this committee on January 12, have rightly identified Southwest Asia, especially the oil-bearing regions of the Persian Gulf as an area of critical and even vital interest to the United States.

Dr. Schlesinger has characterized our growing dependency on Persian Gulf oil as fast becoming "the Achilles Heel of Western society." And Dr. Brzezinski has identified what he calls "a perilous strategic paradox;" namely, that "U.S. conventional forces are weakest where the United States is most vulnerable, along the Southwestern Eurasian strategic front, and strongest where its allies have the greatest capacity for doing more on their behalf, and where the risk of a United States-Soviet clash is lowest, along the far western Eurasian strategic front."

Dr. Brzezinski is correct. Nowhere in the world is the U.S. strategy/force mismatch greater than in Southwest Asia, notwithstanding the formation of the U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for that region's defense. It is one thing to declare U.S. military intentions in the Persian Gulf; quite another to come up with the military means to fulfill those intentions.

The U.S. Central Command continues to base its force planning on the worst case scenario of a full-scale Soviet invasion of Iran. While the possibility of such an invasion should by no means be discounted, the feasibility and strategic implications of an American attempt to counter it deserve thorough examination.

Leaving aside the question of whether any Congress or President would be willing to shed American blood on behalf of a murderous and viciously anti-American government, it is not at all obvious that the U.S. military could defend Iran against a Soviet attack. Against two dozen or so Soviet divisions deployed opposite Iran, the

United States still cannot count a single ground combat unit stationed anywhere ashore in the Persian Gulf region.

To mount a defense of Iran, forces assigned to the Central Command, almost all of which are based in the United States, would have to be flown or shipped to the gulf. Even today, however, some 7 years after the Carter doctrine's proclamation, the United States lacks the necessary airlift and sealift to move forces to the gulf on time. Our current strategic airlift capability goal of 66 million ton-miles per day is but two-thirds of the 98 MTM/D requirement postulated for Southwest Asia by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1980.

A defense of Iran would also require prehostilities access to Iran itself, as well as to the Arabian Peninsula, since no major U.S. fighting forces in Iran could be supplied without creating a logistical infrastructure on the peninsula. Access to air bases in Turkey also would be required to mount an air interdiction campaign against Soviet forces moving southward across Iran. Additionally, the U.S. Navy would have to keep open the Strait of Hormuz against certain attacks by Soviet bombers and submarines.

In my judgment, these are mind-boggling assumptions. To date, no country on the Arabian Peninsula has been willing to permit the United States to station forces on its territory. The Central Command is headquartered in Florida and, as such, remains the only U.S. unified command not located in this designated area of responsibility. And surely it would be imprudent to assume that the Turks, the Saudis, the Omanis and others would willingly expose their countries to Soviet retaliation for the sake of helping us to defend Iran.

Even more fantastic is the assumption that Iran, certainly its present government, would be prepared to invite onto its soil military forces of the "Satanic" United States. Nor is self-evident that the U.S. Navy could gain and maintain control of any body of water within such easy reach of massive Soviet land-based air power as the Strait of Hormuz.

But let us assume for the moment that a U.S. defense of Iran is politically and militarily feasible. It would nevertheless invite strategic catastrophe. The Central Command's force list today includes several Army and Marine Corps divisions, nine Air Force fighter wings, and three carrier battle groups containing a total of around 220,000 men not counting support forces. Additional units to be assigned to the Central Command by 1989 will raise the total to 440,000 men, again not counting support forces.

Yet, commitment of these forces to combat in Southwest Asia automatically would place Europe's defense in great danger. Why? Because most of the ground and tactical air units at least that are assigned to the U.S. Central Command are also earmarked for NATO's reinforcement.

No military force can be in two places at the same time, and it is difficult to envisage a major shooting war with the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf remaining confined to the gulf alone. Such a war probably would spill over into at least the European theater, confronting the United States with the grim prospect of a war on two independent fronts against an adversary having larger forces on both and able to move those forces as needed from one front to another faster than could the United States.

John Collins observed before this committee that:

> Sometimes we talk about horizontal escalation. It could be a Soviet strategy. It could not be a U.S. strategy. We have 32 divisions, active and reserve. They have 200. Guess who has the most forces in uncommitted reserve to play horizontal escalation?

The question remains of how the potential for strategic catastrophe inherent in the vast disparity between our military commitments and capabilities can be reduced to an acceptable margin. There are at least three approaches to bringing our means and ends into reasonable harmony. First, a reduction in U.S. defense commitments. Second, a substantial increase in U.S. military capabilities. Third, a redivision of military labor within the Western alliance along both functional and geographic lines, a redistribution entailing allied assumption of greater responsibility for military tasks heretofore borne largely or disporportionately by the United States.

Let's take the first one first—a reduction in commitments. This is far easier said than done and could undermine confidence in remaining U.S. commitments. Dr. Schlesinger stated before this committee that:

> The act of withdrawing forces may reduce one's prestige so much that it actually weakens one's position. The withdrawal of forces, if one has become overcommitted, is not an easy task for a great power that depends on prestige as well as the physical instruments of power.

Secretary Weinberger was characteristically more dogmatic on the matter. "Scaling back U.S. interests," he said, "is not a possible option if we want to keep our freedom." He went on to declare that "To those who say we should scale back U.S. interests, I would ask: What mutual defense treaty should we repudiate? What allies or friends should we abandon? From what international clause should we retreat? What American interests should we give up?"

These are fair if somewhat misleading questions. Our strategic interests overseas are not synonymous everywhere with our existing commitments. Since 1945, as Dr. Schlesinger has said, we have had an abiding interest in preventing the domination of the Eurasian landmass by a hostile power. Dr. Schlesinger observed that though our basic security interests remain more or less unchanging because they are determined by geography and other relatively immutable factors, our alliances and specific defense commitments shift according to changing political and other circumstances.

Distribution of U.S. military assets around the world reflects historical accident, he says. Of course, he goes on to say, "Each of Secretaries of Defense provide you annually with a document that explains the present necessity of those assets being in whatever place they are, but we must recognize that there is a good deal of historical accident."

Thus, Germany and Japan, once enemies, are now our allies. Thus, the Soviet Union, which once fought alongside the United States to prevent Germany and Japan from controlling the Eurasian landmass, is now our principal adversary.

To repeat, fundamental strategic interests are not the same as defense commitments. The latter are but transitory expressions of the former and can and have reflected profound misjudgments, as we learned in Vietnam and more recently in Lebanon. This means that no particular defense commitment can be regarded as permanent, and that all commitments must be periodically reviewed to make sure that they continue to foster basic security interests.

Is each and every one of our present defense commitments forever sacrosanct simply because they were asserted at one time or another by one administration or another?

The inherent impermanence of commitments also means that great caution must be exercised in undertaking new commitments, especially in the absence of sufficient means to cover the ones you already have. Such caution was not evident when the Carter administration proclaimed its determination to defend all of Southwest Asia using basically the same military means that in 1980 were already hard put to meet traditional U.S. obligations in Europe and the Far East.

To their credit, Secretary Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are known to have opposed the dispatch of U.S. Marine forces to Lebanon in 1982-1984 and continue to oppose direct U.S. military intervention in Central America.

The second approach to reducing the gap between our military ends and means—a large increase in means—would seem utterly infeasible for the foreseeable future. I share the view expressed before this committee by John Collins, Richard Stubbing, and Lawrence Korb that the massive increases in defense expenditure undertaken by this administration, though long overdue and clearly enhancing deterrence of war, have not yielded nearly as much in the way of actual warfighting muscle as they might have.

We seem to model the defense sector of our economy on the Soviet civilian economy, whereas the Soviets seem to model their defense sector on our private sector.

More to the point, the public and congressional consensus on defense spending the Reagan administration enjoyed during its first term has disintegrated against a backdrop of unprecedented Federal budgetary deficits. This suggests that significant increases in U.S. military capabilities are not in the cards.

In fact, if we have learned anything during the last several years, it is that while most Americans today still favor a strong defense, many—maybe even the majority—want a strong defense only if it costs nothing in the way of additional taxes and only if their sons of military age are not personally inconvenienced by having to serve their country in uniform. It is hardly a viable basis for a sustained expansion of U.S. military power.

The third approach—getting our allies to assume a larger share of the common defense burden—would seem most attractive. Our European and Northeast Asian allies have long since recovered from World War II and together have a population base, skilled workforce and economic might surpassing that of the United States.

Americans today have every right to expect Western Europe and Japan to contribute far more than they are now contributing. Most of our NATO allies continue to devote to defense proportionately less than one-half of the respective GNPs as does the United States. As for Japan, its percentage GNP defense expenditures is about one-third that of Botswana.

The time has come for our allies to increase their efforts to a level more commensurate with their economic power. Both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations regarded a major U.S. ground and tactical Air Force presence in Europe as a temporary expendient, a removable military shield behind which Europe's war-devastated economy, with the help of the Marshall Plan, could be restored, at which time it would be up to the Europeans to shoulder the burden of their nonnuclear defense.

The endless presence of 350,000 U.S. troops in Europe also breeds among our allies an unhealthy pyschological dependence upon the United States, especially upon the U.S. nuclear deterrent whose invocation on their behalf is becoming less and less credible. Evidence of this psychological dependency was noted before this committee on January 20 by Richard Stubbing, who made the significant observation the Reagan administration's defense budgetary increases "actually encouraged our allies to slow their defense buildup, allowing the U.S. unilaterally to carry most of the burden of higher defense for the entire alliance."

Allied foot-dragging on defense also undermines public and congressional support for NATO. It is the long-interest of neither the United States nor of our NATO and Pacific allies for them indefinitely to remain American military protectorates, particularly in an era in which American economic and military power are steadily declining in relation to that both of our allies and, of course, of the Soviet Union.

We have never been in a position to defend Europe by ourselves and unless our NATO allies are prepared to do more for their own defense, then a strategic redistribution of U.S. forces deployed overseas may become unavoidable.

During the past year, Henry Kissinger, Dr. Brzezinski and many others have called for unilateral troop withdrawals from Europe. Dr. Brzezinski has called for a gradual withdrawal of perhaps 100,000 troops on the grounds that the U.S. strategy force mismatch is far more acute in Southwest Asia than it is Europe, where our allies can and should assume more of the burden of Europe's conventional defense.

Predictably, proposals by Dr. Brzezinski and others to pull some troops out of Europe have drawn fire from those who, like Ambassador David Abshire, believe that even modest unilateral withdrawals would neither enhance NATO's conventional defenses nor spur our European allies to do more for those defenses. These judgments reflect valid concerns of a gifted public servant for whom I have the highest personal and professional respect, but they deserve serious and impartial examination.

If our NATO allies have a tendency to do less for their own defense in response to our doing more, then perhaps they would do more—as was the case during the Vietnam war—if it became apparent that we were prepared to do less. It is certainly difficult to accept Ambassador Abshire's characterization of Dr. Brzezinski's proposal as "a fundamental restructuring of American strategy."

To my knowledge, neither Dr. Brzezinski nor any other responsible American who has proposed limited and selected U.S. force withdrawals from Europe for the purpose of bolstering Western defenses outside Europe, favors tearing up the 1949 NATO Treaty, abandoning our commitment to Europe's security, or retreating to Fortress America.

It is to be noted that the withdrawal of 100,000 troops would still leave in Europe 250,000 U.S. troops, more than enough credibly to underline our commitment to Europe and to guarantee the heavy engagement of U.S. combat forces in Europe's defense within the first hours and even minutes of hostilities.

It is also to be noted that no specific U.S. force level in Europe has ever been regarded as sacrosanct except by those who believe that NATO's complete disintegration would follow the unilateral withdrawal of a single American platoon. On the contrary, overall U.S. troop strength in Europe has fluctuated substantially since 1949. From a low of 145,000 in 1950 to an all-time high of 427,000 in 1953, troop strength declined to 379,000 in 1960, only to rise in the following year to 417,000. From there, it declined to another low of 291,000 in 1970, steadily to rise again to the current 352,000.

Paradoxically, we maintained approximately 80,000 more troops in Europe during the era of massive retaliation than we have since the adoption of flexible response in 1967. This suggests, in my view, that little correlation exists between U.S. troop strength and the ostensible requirements of declared NATO strategy.

To be sure, a withdrawal of most or all of our troops from Europe would render meaningless any continued U.S. commitment to Europe's defense and could drive Europe into disastrous political accommodation with the Soviet Union. But would the gradual and selected withdrawal of less than one-third of the force we have there now spell the end of NATO? Might it not, if properly handled, lay the foundation for a new and more effective geographic and functional division of labor within the West? Do we lack the courage to make the hard choices imposed upon us by the increasingly perilous disparity between our military responsibilities and military resources?

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. I welcome the opportunity to answer any questions you or the rest of the committee may have.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Dr. Record.

Senator Warner, do you have any comments you would like to make?

Senator WARNER. No, thank you.

Chairman NUNN. I think we will go ahead with Colonel Summers' full statement and then we will get to questions for both Dr. Record and Colonel Summers.

STATEMENT OF COL. HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR., CONTRIBUTING EDITOR, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT

Colonel SUMMERS. Senator Nunn and members of the Armed Services Committee, I am deeply honored by ths invitation to testify before this body. It is not my intent today to recommend any specifics or to go into the sort of detail that Dr. Record has gone into.

Chairman NUNN. Colonel Summers, if you would pull that mike up a little bit and point it downward.

Colonel **Summers**. As far as recommending specific legislative remedies, not only would that be presumptuous, but as a journalist I think it would also be most inappropriate.

Rather, what I would like to do this afternoon is to offer some observations based on my almost 40 years' active military service, including two wars and some 10 years teaching stragetic fundamentals at both the Army Staff and War Colleges.

My first observation is that whatever strategy we adopt, it must be an American military strategy. While this may seem obvious, the fact is that in the last 30 years we seem to have strayed and continue to stray from that fundamental precept.

Without consciously meaning to do so, we have taken on some of the characteristics of our primary adversary, where self-appointed "vanguards of the proletariat" figure out what's best for the American people and give it to them good and hard whether they like it or not. Such policies came to grief in Vietnam and they have come to grief once more in the present arms-for-hostages fiasco.

Both are evidence that some basics seem to have been forgotten. Some 36 years ago, following his testimony before this committee, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur commented that his oath was not to the President per se, but to the Constitution. As you can imagine, he was roundly criticized for challenging civilian authority over the military.

In fact, while testifying before the Joint Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee in 1951 following his relief from command, General MacArthur was reminded that in 1932, while serving as Army Chief of Staff, he had emphasized that the national strategy of any war must be made by the head of state, acting in conformity with the expressed will of the Government.

His answer was classic. "As I look back, Senator, on my rather youthful days then," he said, "I am surprised and amazed how wise I was." General MacArthur knew full well that Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states unequivocally that "The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States." But he also knew, as many so-called strategists tend to forget, that Article I, Section 8 of that same Constitution places the very existence of America's Armed Forces in the hands of the Congress. In Alexander Hamilton's words, "the representatives of the people, periodically elected."

Unlike most foreign militaries which are instruments of the executive, the American military was deliberately constituted as an army of the people. This is a profound difference.

One example is particularly timely. Last week, while lecturing at the Marine Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, a senior marine officer brought up the Oliver North case. "In swearing fealty to the Constitution," he emphasized, "the American military also swears fidelity to the highest law of the land, and thus is honor-bound to operate within the law," As we can see today, straying from that oath can have disastrous consequences.

Would-be Metternich's who would devise American strategy in the grand European manner do not seem to understand that the United States deliberately set out to march to a different drum. But as we have found, we ignore that drum beat only at our peril.

How then should American military strategy be constructed? A useful framework is provided by the principles of war, principles that grew out of American experience in the First World War and that have been part of American military doctrine since the 1920s.

These principles ask three fundamental questions, questions that are as applicable at the squad level as they are at the national level. The first is, what are we trying to do? The second is, how are we going to do it? And the last is, who is going to command and control it?

The first question, what are we trying to do, is encompassed by the first principle of war, the principle of the objective. It is a principle so basic that one would naturally assume that it would always be addressed. But the fact is it is routinely ignored, especially at the strategic level. In a laudable desire to keep our options open, strategic guidance to the Armed Forces is woefully inadequate. A former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff once told me that he had to detail a crew to read through Presidential speeches and pronouncements in order to get some general idea of what he was supposed to do.

As Senaca said some 2,000 years ago, "When you don't know what port you're sailing toward, all winds are foul." We have seen his words revalidated all too often. And the adverse effect on military operations is only part of the damage. The objective not only determines direction; it also fixes the value of what you are trying to do. And that value determines the sacrifices that will be made for it, both in magnitude and in duration.

In World War II, the objective was survival of the Nation. The value was so high that the American people were willing to pay more than a million battlefield casualties. In Vietnam the objective was never fixed, the value never determined. It is no wonder that the price soon became exorbitant. Any future strategy must have clear objectives and must have a clear value. Without them, public support is impossible.

The second question, how are we going to do it, encompasses most of the remaining principles of war. First is the principle of the offensive. It holds that the best way to gain your objective is to take the war to the enemy, destroy his armed forces, occupy his territory and seize his capital. But the fact is that today in a nuclear age, the offensive is not a viable strategic option. The United States deliberately rejected an offensive policy when we rejected rollback and liberation in favor of containment. And our military strategies have been in consonance with that policy. Both the Korean and Vietnam wars were fought on the strategic defensive.

The best outcome you can get on the strategic defensive is stalemate. That's exactly what we got in both of those wars, and that means that diplomatic, not military power, has to be used to bring the conflicts to a resolution. And that, in turn, means a long, drawn-out period of negotiations where, among other things, our prisoners of war became hostage to the negotiating process. The American people, as well as the American military, have found this to be an extremely frustrating experience. But as long as nuclear annihilation is the only alternative to containment, it is an experience that we must expect to be repeated in any future conflict.

The next three principles—mass, economy of force and maneuver—are relational. Simply stated, "mass" means that you should put your major strengths against the main adversary and use lesser power—an "economy of force" against lesser threats. "Maneuver" is how you do it.

These principles are key to any strategy. Since American power is finite, we must assure that it is focused on primary threats to American survival and well-being. That raises the problem of simultaneity. American military forces must simultaneously defend the Nation against nuclear war, against major conventional war, against minor conventional war, and against terrorism and insurgency. We cannot, as some recommend, uncover one to deal with the other; that is, scale back our conventional defense in order to meet unconventional threats, without risking the encouragement of aggression at higher and more deadly levels.

Complicating the problem of simultaneity is the fact that in strategic terms, America is a world island. Some have complained about the Army disease of jointness, but the Army knows full well that it is dependent on sea and air lift to get it to the point of decision, and that air and naval support is essential to its survival on the battlefield.

There have been many esoteric theories of "maneuver warfare," but for the American military the first essential in maneuver warfare is strategic lift. Unfortunately, cargo ships and tankers and cargo aircraft are not as glamorous as battleships and tanks and fighter planes. But combat forces are useless unless they can be brought to bear at the point of decision.

The next two principles, security and surprise, are also relational, for without security, surprise is impossible. Although battlefield security has not caused any major problems in America's past wars, strategic security has been almost nonexistent. While strategic objectives must be clearly and publicly articulated, both to gain public support at home and to deter potential adversaries abroad, the operational details of their execution must be kept secure. Without such security, there is no time for the scrub of operational plans that is essential to eliminate deficiencies and no time for rehearsals which are essential for optimum performance.

How to square the public need to know with the need for operational security is a major strategic issue. Doing it is incredibly difficult, but failure to do it will be paid in American lives.

The final principle of the "How are we going to do it series" is the principle of simplicity. In a real sense it is a kind of litmus test for all other principles and it is a litmus test that American strategy has consistently failed. Our system for strategic planning and execution is so layered and so convoluted and so complex that failure is almost guaranteed. While recent congressional initiatives on reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were a step in the right direction, much remains to be done to streamline the system.

The primary thrust of JCS reform is in the area of the final question posed by the principles of war: who is going to command and control? That is, the principle of unity of command. As the principles state, "For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible command." Increasing the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Unified and Specified

Commanders-in-Chief in the field was a major improvement in the area of unity command, but much remains to be done.

One of the major problems in our Armed Forces today is the divorce of authority and responsibility. Thanks to the trend toward centralized government, as well as technological advances in communication, centralized controls have eroded commanders' authority in the field. The effect has been deadly.

When General MacArthur, in President Truman's eyes, exceeded his authority, the solution was simple. Fire him and replace him with someone more in tune with the President's policies. Today when something goes wrong, there is no one to fire because everybody and nobody is responsible. At the risk of less efficiency through centralized management, authority and responsibility must again be married up from the squad leader through the Commanders-in-Chief.

Giving authority back to commanders in the field may not seem like a strategic issue, but in fact combat effectiveness is the heart of military strategy. There used to be a poster on the wall of the War Plans Directorate in the Army General Staff. It was a picture of a World War II infantryman with a fixed bayonet moving against the enemy. The caption was, "At the end of the most grandiose plans and strategies is a soldier walking point."

I hope you bear that poster in mind as you work to improve the formulation of American military strategies, and for the sake of that soldier on the point, I hope that my testimony here today has helped you in that endeavor.

Thank you very much for your attention.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Colonel Summers. We appreciate yours and Dr. Record's testimony and I think you have given us a lot to think about in both of your statements.

Colonel Summers, you mentioned on page 9, "While recent congressional initiatives on reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were a step in the right direction, much remains to be done to streamline that system." You went on to say, or earlier you said, "Our system for strategic planning and execution is so layered, so convoluted and so complex that failure is almost guaranteed."

If you were Secretary of Defense now, or if you would rather put on the Presidential hat I will give you that one hypothetically—what would you do to begin correcting the problem with strategic planning?

Colonel SUMMERS. I think the first thing I would do is make the unified commanders truly commanders. That is, I would charge them with the formulation of strategy for their region; give them the authority commensurate with their responsibility; and of course have an override—they would have to be submitted to Washington for approval—but I would certainly give the commander in the field the authority both to plan his strategy and the wherewithal to execute it.

I think that layering, as we go back, as you take responsibility away from the commander in the field, the nuances of what he is trying to do get lost and some of the specifics get lost, and you end up with the kind of failures it would seem to me we have had just recently.

The idea that because you can talk to someone on the telephone, you can immediately and instantaneously understand the problem that he faces, I think is a major error. The advantage of that, of course, is if you give a commander in the field the responsibility and the authority commensurate with his position, then if something goes wrong you can fire him and put someone else in there to correct it.

As it stands right now, everyone and no one is responsible for everything, and it is impossible to fix the formula.

Chairman NUNN. We tried to do that in the Reorganization bill in terms of the Commanders-in-Chief. That doesn't get it all the way down to the unit level and I am not sure there is any kind of law that does.

Is there anything in the law that needs changing now in regard to that, or is this primarily a management executive function?

Colonel SUMMERS. I think more so than the law, the sort of business management ethic that has come to such grief in some of our major businesses has also been incorporated into our Armed Forces and we have got to get away from it.

We have to decentralize authority at the risk of less accountability to some degree. They will not be able to tell you the exact number of widgets and all the rest of it if things are decentralized. But the advantage of it is, it improves combat effectiveness because if we fight a war, the commander on the scene has to have the authority necessary.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Record, you say "The most recent example of this irresponsibility was the Carter administration extension of containment to the vast and logistically remote region of the Southwest area, commitments yet to be accompanied by appropriate increases in military power."

But then you go on to say that, Brzezinski, who testified before this committee, and Schlesinger "have rightly identified Southwest Asia, especially the oil-bearing regions of the Persian Gulf as an area of critical, even vital interest to the United States."

It seems to me that that is in conflict. If Carter made a very big mistake in declaring that part of our vital interest or part of our defended interest, then Schlesinger and Brzezinski are correct in saying it is vital.

Are you distinguishing between Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf or just how you reconcile it?

Dr. RECORD. I think that all three of those gentlemen would agree—Dr. Schlesinger, Dr. Brzezinski, and the people who devised the Carter Doctrine. I have no quarrel whatsoever with the judgment that our interests in Southwest Asia, particularly in the oil-bearing regions of the Persian Gulf, are very important or even vital.

The essence of the irresponsibility was not in the declaration or the recognition that we have important to vital interests there, but rather in having made that declaration, having stated that it was our intention to deter additional Soviet aggression there and, if necessary, to defend against it—in the failure to come up with forces sufficient to defend that commitment.

Chairman NUNN. Do you think we have done that yet as we sit here today?

Dr. Record. The U.S. Central Command over the last several years has made great strides in terms of knowledge and intelligence gained about that area of the world, and has made vast improvements in terms of our strategic lift assets.

Programs initiated by the Carter administration and carried on or expanded by the Reagan administration have clearly expanded our ability to move forces to that area of the world in the event of trouble. So we are better off now than we were in 1980 in order to deter and to defend there, but in my judgment we are still strategically insolvent there because I do not think that we have the capacity, certainly in the worst case of a major Soviet invasion of Iran, to do much about that.

Chairman Nunn. Now, how do you view what we have committed to? Is our definition of vital interest just the Persian Gulf and the flow of oil, or is it all of Southwest Asia? Where do we draw the line in terms of your interpretation of what both Presidents Carter and Reagan have defined as our vital interest?

Dr. Record. Senator, as you know, the geographic definition of Southwest Asia, according to the U.S. Central Command, covers a host of countries including Afghanistan, Kenya, Somalia. I don't believe that in some of those countries that we have anything that could be remotely characterized as a vital interest.

I think that we do have trouble about what the word "vital" means. We do have profound interests in the Persian Gulf. Dr. Schlesinger pointed out that we are becoming more dependent upon Persian Gulf oil. Our allies have always been very dependent and in many cases are becoming more so on Persian Gulf oil.

If the flow of that oil to the United States and to the West were for some reason or another to be interrupted, a major threat to the health and well-being of the Western alliance would be presented.

As for other particular interests that we may have there, such as preventing the Soviets from obtaining a warm-water port in the Persian Gulf, I view that as an ancillary interest. If the Soviets have enjoyed their stay in Afghanistan over the past several years, I am sure they would find it even more enjoyable in Iran.

Chairman Nunn. What would you, in answer to the question I posed to Colonel Summers, do if you were Secretary of Defense or President in terms of changing our military strategy now? How would you change it?

Dr. Record. I think we are going to have to go back for a fundamental reassessment. It is not so much whether we are prepared to abolish the North Altantic Organization or whether we are prepared to abandon the U.S. Japanese Mutual Defense Treaty or whether we are prepared to abandon all of those other formal commitments that we have made.

I think the real issue is, given the scarcity of deployable military power that we have to cover these commitments, one of proper distribution. In the case of Europe, I can certainly sympathize with Dr. Brzezinski's view that the scarcity of U.S. military power in Europe is less disturbing than it is, for instance, in Southwest Asia—if in fact we intend to defend Southwest Asia—and therefore that some redistribution on the margin can be made from Europe to Southwest Asia. There is nothing sacrosanct about the 352,000

Americans that are in Europe now. Back in 1970 we had about 290,000.

Chairman NUNN. What changes in military strategy do you believe have taken place in the Reagan administration? I will ask both of you that question.

Dr. RECORD. I am not so sure that the Reagan administration inherited a coherent strategy and I am not persuaded that it improved on what was absent to begin with.

If one defines "strategy" as basically investing more money in military power, then of course there has been a major change. We are spending more on defense and have been for the past 6 years than in previous administrations.

But so far as I can see, there has been no major reassessment of what amounts to a network of defense commitments overseas that we basically inherited from World War II.

Chairman NUNN. Colonel Summers.

Colonel SUMMERS. I would agree with Dr. Record. One of the reasons I was so pleased to see this committee in session is that I don't think that for many years we have ever stepped back and said, "What are we doing all this for?" That is, essentially the definition of military strategy, the application of means to geopolitical ends.

Having served some 8 years in the Pentagon, I know the attention over there was more on budget and line item numbers and the rest, and no one is asking the question, "To what end?"

So I think one of the things we need to do that has not been done in a long time is to step back and say, precisely what are we trying to do; what is America's role in the world; what should we defend; where should we mass, if you will, and where should we use an economy of force?

Things have just taken on a life of their own for a great many years and I think it is time now for a fundamental reassessment.

Dr. RECORD. Which is, I may add, Mr. Chairman, not to say that there hasn't been a basic continuity in our strategy since 1940—indeed even before. We went into World War II, even though it was the Japanese who attacked us in the Pacific, with a "Germany first" policy for the same reason that we now deploy against the Soviet Union.

At the most fundamental level, we have had a very consistent strategic objective, and that has been to prevent any major hostile power—in the 1940s it was Germany and Japan; today it is the Soviet Union—from dominating the Eurasian landmass. This is a more or less permanent strategic interest for this country because it is dictated primarily by immutable factors such as geography.

Colonel SUMMERS. Some 12 years ago I was on a Strategic Assessment Panel with Gen. Creighton Abrams who was then Chief of Staff of the Army. When we issued our findings after about a year they essentially validated the status quo. General Weyand, his deputy, defended that finding by noting in T.S. Eliot's words, "by arriving where we started, we knew the place for the first time." But essentially, this was right at the end of the Vietnam war, where doom and despair were very much in the air, and as we took an overview and looked at it, we found that the United States was in a somewhat advantageous position in the world, relatively speaking. We were allied with the two major economic powers of the world, Western Europe and Japan. Our adversaries at the time, the Soviet Union and China, were adversaries of each other.

And General Abram's conclusion at that time from the Army's point of view was that our strategy ought to do with maintaining ourselves in that position of relative advantage.

I think to some degree that is still true; that there is an awful lot of doom and gloom about our strategy, but as a matter of fact in the major issues of the world we have done fairly well over the last—since World War II.

Chairman NUNN. Over the last?

Colonel SUMMERS. Since World War II. That is, we have maintained ourselves in a position of relative advantage, allied with the two major power centers of the world. And although there are troubles at the periphery, the center of the strategy seems to be—I don't think it has been thought out that well, but I think it has been rather coherent.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome our witnesses. They are among the best. They didn't disappoint us today with these statements.

My question will be directed to both. I will start with Dr. Record. As I look through your testimony, it seems to me you lay the foundation that if the Congress cuts back the defense request of the President, we had best do it in a manner so that our allies can pick up the slack.

Now, putting aside the NATO scenario—because I think that is an easier case in terms of whether we have got fixed contributions. We know exactly what each partner is doing and not doing, and we have a long record there.

A tougher one is Southwest Asia, and we look this morning in connection with the Central Command's responsibility at our petroleum requirements from that area being about 7 percent of our total; Japan, 60 percent of our total.

Then you go over to the Pacific. You see it is now our major trading partner. Within that spectrum of trading partners, Japan of course is among the foremost.

What are we going to do to get Japan to pick up some of this slack? In other words, if we were to pull out of NATO tomorrow, which I am not suggesting, we know basically what could move into the vacuum for a period of time. We would impose on our allies in Southwest Asia who are beneficiaries of the flow of petroleum or in the Pacific, a similar burden. They just do not have the military assets to move into the vacuum.

Consequently, what should we do? What short of realistic policy should we begin to initiate toward Japan and when should we do it?

Dr. RECORD. I wish I could tell you that I had discovered a method of getting the Japanese to do more than they have been doing in terms of their contribution to the common defense, at least in the Pacific.

I don't think that we can realistically expect Japan to undertake a major rearmament—to say, 4 percent of its GNP. It has been hard enough to get them to go over 1 percent—they will be running at $^{4}/_{100}$ of 1 percent over the 1 percent goal.

I think Japan's potential contributions, to be realistic, are probably more in the area of economic assistance targeted to countries that are in trouble in Southwest Asia, perhaps more in the way of assistance that could be translated into security assistance.

Part of the problem with the Japanese military is as much the structure of their military forces as it is how little they spend on them. The Japanese maintain a fairly large army within the framework of what they devote to their defense, an army which some people think could be much smaller without any threat posed to Japan's ability to defend itself either in the air or in concert with other allies.

This is an issue that has not been looked at, I think, very carefully—the allocation of what the Japanese do spend on defense with respect to ground, air and naval power. We really do not have an interest in seeing a large Japanese army, even as large as they have today. We do have an interest in terms of our common interest with Japan in seeing an expansion of Japanese naval and air power. That is an issue I think that deserves more consideration, perhaps even as much in the short term, as the kind of consideration that has been given to the exact percentage point of its GNP that the Japanese are devoting to defense.

Senator **Warner**. Suppose we said to the Japanese, why don't you go into noncombatant forces? I know from experience in the Navy, the hardest ship to get through the Navy budget is an oiler. I mean it is always dropped out. Yet, our carriers are totally dependent on those oilers. Hospital ships, supply ships, logistical ships.

I just think that we had better awaken Japan to the realities in Europe to pick up some of the share, it seems to me we have got to compel Japan to start being more realistic about its benefits.

We are guaranteeing a pipeline that provides 60 percent of the fuel. Is anybody else doing it? France has two or three ships in there, but that is all.

Colonel, do you have a view on that?

Colonel **Summers**. I have two views. One, the problem the United States faces—one of the questions I ask at the War College—in fact, I asked some marines the other night the same question—what would you go to war for? And the answer you get, as you might expect is, I will go to war if I am ordered.

Then you ask the question, what would you send your son or daughter to war for? And the answer to that question is "Not much." It better damn well be worth it.

And I just say for myself, it is more than an academic question, since I have two sons who are captains in the Army and a daughter-in-law who is a chief warrant officer.

But the point is, can we get the kind of public support necessary in Southwest Asian intervention without, as we heard a few years ago, "I'm not sending my son out to die for Exxon." That is a major problem.

If seems to me to be able to convince the American people to sacrifice their sons and daughters lives in the pursuit of 7 percent oil in Southwest Asia, it is going to be very difficult to do.

Dr. **Record**. If I may add, Senator Warner, you raised a broader question, and that is one that does relate to Europe. We and our allies have long understood it is extremely important on the first day of a war in Europe that a substantial number of Americans be engaged and, quite frankly, be killed, in order to underline the commitment of American military power of Europe's defense.

Unfortunately, our European allies, who are far more dependent, as you point out, on Persian Gulf oil than we, do not seem to understand that public support in this country for a major U.S. military intervention in Southwest Asia to protect access to oil, may be sustainable only if at least one European somewhere gets shot on the first day of hostilities.

Senator WARNER. You talk about the Central Command not even being located where its primary responsibility rests; and second, you point out the fact that we don't really have any pre-positioned troops.

Have you looked at the issue of whether or not we should have a pre-positioned ground troop element over there, and where should it be?

Dr. RECORD. I am opposed to pre-positioning U.S. ground forces ashore in Southwest Asia, which is not to say that the penalities of not having them pre-positioned aren't obvious.

Senator WARNER. Even a brigade or a regiment size?

Dr. RECORD. I think if we have learned anything in the last several years—especially from the slaughter of the marines at Beirut, as well as other events more recently—it is that at least for the foreseeable future, to deploy U.S. ground forces ashore in Southwest Asia on a permanent basis is to invite exactly the kind of violence presumably that we seek to deter.

We can deploy forces ashore in Korea. We can deploy, and have for years, forces ashore in Europe. In Southwest Asia we run serious risks. Even in Vietnam, the first marines that were sent to Vietnam were not sent there to fight the North Vietnamese; they were sent there to protect American air bases from local attack.

I welcome the maritime pre-positioning initiative of the Carter administration and carried out by the Reagan administration. Maritime pre-positioning has excellent advantages over shore-based pre-positioning in Southwest Asia because if you keep the stuff on ships offshore, you are much less vulnerable to truck bombs and other kinds of terrorist attacks, in addition to which you don't know where the event is going to take place that might elicit American intervention.

If you put two division's worth of stuff ashore in Oman and the event occurs in Somalia or some other place, you might as well have it back in North Carolina and ship it straight from there.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. I, too, want to join in welcoming our witnesses to the committee this afternoon. I think you are really challenging the committee the way that we should be challenged. I gather, viewing both the record of the hearings and the responses that we have had, that we ask the military to do everything.

Wherever the Soviets are, we want them to take it out. And then most of our attention is whether you have got everything you need to be able to do it.

It seems to me that the questions ought to be put to us in terms of the political issues no matter where we come out as a country, and say what it is that we really want to defend and what kind of resources we need to be able to do it. And, if not, then they are the ones that are going to suffer if we have some conflict, but we are the ones that are going to lose the election. That may seem crass, but that is the way that the Founding Fathers formatted it.

It seems to me that what you are doing with your testimony is sharpening our own kind of tough choices and decisions, and saying in terms of military strategy that we ought to expect the Europeans to come forth; if they don't, that is our problem. It is a political issue, a question.

But in terms of defining what we do have, what we are able to do, where we need to do it, that ought to be something. We need to more carefully define where we want to be in the world and what is essential to us.

Let me sharpen where I would like your attention. One of the problems is we say we can get them to do more. I have always felt that once we got rid of the radical left in Japan, we could have been a lot tougher with them, quite frankly, "tougher" in quotes. I mean you could have worked out trade. All the parties were pro-West in terms of our security interests and we should have been able to deal with it much more effectively than we have under Republican and Democratic administrations.

We have eliminated what was really a threat in terms of their own internal kinds of security. Also, there is a hesitancy about supporting our general strategic interests in the Pacific.

But defining what is really in our interests. First of all, how do we do that? How do we get to that point now without inviting potential interventions by our adversaries, Soviets and others, if we say, look, we will do the Suez Canal and the straits, but we ain't going up to the north part of Iran?

Now, if you make that a judgment in terms of responsible decisionmaking and an allocation of resources about what is necessary for the straits in trying to meet our responsibilities of national security, what are the dangers that we provide in terms of providing miscalculations of American intentions similar to what has been alleged was the case after Acheson's speech and what happened in Korea?

Number two, what do you really think are areas that are essential for commitments? I would be interested in the Central Command.

Then the third thing I would like to get a touch on is the Special Forces, whether it is a little different. If I have the time I will come back.

Dr. RECORD. On your first question, you are right I think in that we can't be in the business of making public declarations of what exactly we will defend and what we will not defend. We will run into the old Acheson problem, as we did in 1950—whatever is outside of our declared defense perimeter is taken to be fair game.

There is another way, I think more forceful as well as more subtle, of signaling your intentions, and that is how you distribute your forces. If you take 100,000 men out of Europe and put them in the U.S. Central Command and do a lot of other things—reprogramming of heavy ground forces into amphibious assault forces or whatever—you are in effect signaling in a serious way your intention that you feel your defenses out there are inadequate and that you are going to put more in them, even at the expense of some modest reduction in your capacity to defend Europe.

With respect to your second question, I think virtually everybody who has appeared before this committee, be they maritime strategists, or continental strategists, agrees that outside of North America the defense of Europe, the prevention of Western Europe from becoming dominated by any hostile power is the single most important strategic interest that we have.

That is why we went to war in World War I. That is why we went to war in World War II, regardless of who the enemy was, and why we will probably go to war if we are so misfortunate in the next one.

Beyond that, I think the Far East is in second order of importance, with its trade, Japan's industrial plant and on on. But it is very hard to come up with a really major threat to our interests there. The Japanese are not directly threatened, certainly from the Soviet Union. It is a very low-cost policy to deter in the Far East. Times could change, particularly with the Chinese strategically outside the Soviet camp and perhaps ultimately in ours.

This leaves Southwest Asia, and I think that deterrence in Southwest Asia is both important and complicated for a number of reasons. One is we don't have any forces out there except for occasional naval forces and maybe a Marine battalion landing team that goes in once every 6 months. We have to start from scratch from the United States if we intervene there. It is the most distant place in the world that you can be militarily. It is a tough place. We don't have powerful allies there and we don't have the kind of access ashore that we enjoy in Europe and in Korea and in Japan.

Not only that, the importance of Southwest Asia, certainly in terms of oil, is also complicated by the fact that we are much less dependent upon oil than are our allies; yet we are really the only people in the Western alliance, the only force, with the exception of the French to some extent and to a much lesser extent the British, who are capable of defending or at least playing militarily in that region.

I would certainly place Southwest Asia behind Europe and Northeast Asia in terms of its long-term strategic importance to the United States.

Whether or not we are prepared to take away some forces from Europe and/or from Northeast Asia in order to give us some kind of marginal increase in our capacity in Southwest Asia is a judgment call. There is very little that we can do. I think there is a very low ceiling for our military capacity there, simply because we have not found, some would say, any Southwest Asian country stupid enough to permit U.S. forces to be stationed on its own territory.

Colonel **SUMMERS**. But there are some complicators involved in this thing, it seems to me—your point on being not favorably disposed toward forward stationing, which I tend to agree with in Southwest Asia. But with the rapid redeployment business, you have another problem and that is the classic Catch-22. You can only send troops overseas when you don't need them. When you need them you can't send them, because to send them into the area would be to heighten the crisis. We have had that happen to us several times, the inability to reinforce at precisely the time we need to reinforce.

The second issue is we keep talking about the Soviet threat to Mideast oil. It seems to me a much more likely threat is the Iranian threat to Mideast oil and the massive amount of combat power that Iran has generated in this Iran-Iraq war. And if they broke through—that is, if Iraq suddenly collapsed—the amount of combat power they have would virtually——

Dr. **RECORD**. We are already providing Iran security assistance, Harry.

Colonel **SUMMERS**. Well, as I said, the people whose sons are in this Marine attack battalion that is going in there might not be too thrilled to go up against American TOW antitank missiles.

But the real threat, it seems to me, a much more credible threat in the immediate future, is the threat of Iranian fundamentalism, and we seem to be rather skirting around that issue.

The other great complicator is that the United States has divergent interest in the area in the Near East; that is, our interests with Israel that are very strong and very positive, work against our interests with the Arab States and inordinately complicate any attempt to come up with a coherent strategy.

So back to your original point. The main problems are political, not military. But the military problems are gigantic.

Senator **KENNEDY**. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I will not be here for the second round. Could I submit a question on the structure for the Special Forces? I know both have written about it and I would like to be able to submit that and get their response and have it a part of our record.

[The information requested follows:]

Dr. **RECORD**. The importance of effective special operations capabilities continues to grow as terrorist and other unconventional threats to U.S. interests abroad proliferate. Unfortunately, the performance of U.S. special operations forces in both the Iranian hostage rescue mission and the invasion of Grenada suggests that we have yet to master the art of special operations. The problem is not money—the Reagan administration has lavished vast sums on our special operations forces. The problem is one of organization and doctrine. Our special operations forces are fragmented among the various services and have never commanded high priority among their parent services in terms of either money or professional career advancement. Moreover, special operations continue to be treated doctrinally as conventional operations writ small, when in fact they are quite different in substance. One hopes that recent legislation aimed at bringing U.S. special operations forces together under a single organization will promote both their coordinated training and employment as well as formation of a common doctrine, but I for one am not optimistic.

Chairman **NUNN**. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Senator Thurmond.

Senator **THURMOND**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Colonel Summers, in a piece published in the Los Angeles Times, I believe you discussed the strategy of containment as it applied to the Korean war and the Vietnam war and indicated that policy made at that time was a very deliberate decision not to widen the conflict.

How does the concept of horizontal escalation or, for that matter, the maritime strategy conflict or coincide?

Colonel SUMMERS. I think both horizontal escalation and the maritime strategy rest on the pre-supposition that containment has already failed and we have gone beyond containment to a major war with the Soviet Union. Both of them rest on that premise.

I think containment has to do with avoiding just that kind of a conflict, so I think that horizontal escalation pre-supposes that containment has already failed and we are now in a major war with the Soviets.

Senator THURMOND. How do you apprise the situation? Are we still following a policy of containment?

Colonel SUMMERS. Yes, sir; I believe we are. President Reagan some time ago was asked about Secretary's Haig's comment that we ought to go to the source, and he was asked why didn't we go to the source in the Caribbean.

His answer seemed to me to be very much a statement in favor of containment; that he did not want a wider conflict and he wanted to keep it localized and all the rest.

Containment has caused us some major complications in our military strategy, there is no doubt. I think a convincing argument can also be made that it has worked in our interest. That is, in every area of power save military power, the situation has almost reversed in the last 35 or 40 years. Where in 1947 and 1948 people thought that the Soviets were about to sweep over the world, their ideology was all-powerful, that the greatest threat to world peace was that capitalism in its death throes was going to lash out at the world—we come ahead 40 years after containment, and we find out that it is now the Soviet Union on the ash heap of history; that their system is not very attractive to anyone else in the world.

The kicker in that, of course, is that in terms of military power, they are infinitely stronger now than they were then, but in other elements of national power, certainly containment has worked in the U.S. interest. So if we attempt to move away from it, especially in the nuclear age with the threat of nuclear annihilation, it seems to me very difficult to do, because one of the things most people seem not to have come to grips with is what nuclear parity means. It is a different world and it has been a different world for the last 10 years than it was 20 years earlier.

Senator THURMOND. Would you say we have followed a policy of containment since World War II?

Colonel SUMMERS. I think it really came into effect, it seems to me, when the decision was made not to bomb the sanctuaries in Manchuria. I must say I was a sergeant in a rifle company at the time and I was not all that in favor of it.

Anyway, the decision was made, and that was the precipitate cause, of course, of General MacArthur's relief—a disagreement over the strategy that was followed.

Then President Eisenhower, with the Hungarian uprising, also opted for containment rather than rollback or liberation; President Kennedy did the same thing in the Cuban missile crisis, and every President since World War II seems to have followed it. Whether it is the announced policy of the United States, it has certainly been the de facto policy.

Senator THURMOND. Now, with regard to the war in Korea and the war in Vietnam, if a policy of containment would be sound to follow ordinarily, would it be feasible or practical to follow it once a conflict begins?

Colonel SUMMERS. I think that is the major issue. I had a conversation in Hanoi right before the fall, and a North Vietnamese colonel said to me, "Well, this just proves you can't stamp out an idea with force."

As I said, "That's baloney and you know it. History is replete with examples of stamping out an idea with force." And I said, "You knew we had the capability to destroy you anytime we wanted to." And he said, "Yeah, we knew that. We also knew you would never do it."

So, so much for deterrence if it doesn't work. That is, we were the ones that were contained, in a sense, by the threat of Soviet or Chinese nuclear power. They had written our power off. So I think that once the conflict begins, you have to again reassess your objectives, reassess the situation and figure out some way to achieve your goals, through military means.

But I think that one thing we are not going to do is march on Moscow and I do not think the Soviet Union is going to march on Washington because of the threat of nuclear annihilation on both sides. So with the United States, vis a vis the Soviet Union, one of the traditional goals of military strategy—that is, to destroy the enemy's armed forces, to seize his capital and his territory—is not a viable option for either side, given the nuclear standoff that we now have.

So we are going to see conflict in the periphery rather than the central issue.

Senator THURMOND. I believe it has been the general opinion that if we had won the war in Korea, we would not have had to fight the war in Vietnam.

Do you have any comment on that?

Colonel SUMMERS. We made a major miscalculation in Korea, it seemed to me, failing to understanding that the traditional invasion route to China which had been used time and time again by every invader was very near the North Korean border. And our signals, our political signals if you will, to China of our intentions were ambiguous.

Once the Chinese intervened, certainly after the spring offensive of 1951 we certainly had the capability to move north to what had been called the MacArthur line and get a much better resolution of the war. But for political reasons, the United States decided to go for a stalemate.

Chairman NUNN. To do what?

Colonel SUMMERS. To go for a stalemate, to stalemate the war essentially is what we did with military forces, and then throw it on the negotiating table which dragged on for several years.

Senator THURMOND. Would you say we had a stalemate in Vietnam?

Colonel SUMMERS. Very much so. By their own admission, the Viet Cong——

Senator THURMOND. Could we have won that war?

Colonel SUMMERS. We could have certainly obtained our objectives if our objectives were to keep South Vietnam an independent state, but we could not have won it with the strategy that we choose.

Senator THURMOND. Not with the strategy we chose, but did we choose the wrong strategy?

Colonel SUMMERS. Very much so.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

I believe my time is up.

Chairman NUNN. What would have been the right strategy?

Colonel SUMMERS. As I have argued in my book, it seems to me if our intention was to maintain South Vietnam as an independent country, the strategy we followed in the Korean war, although it was unsatisfactory to a great many Americans, at least South Korea is an independent country today and I think we could have done the same thing in Vietnam.

The main thing we should have done was to cut off their logistics and their lines of communication and supply. And we had that within our capability to do. In fact, it was recommended by both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by General Westmoreland in several instances, but because of the agreement we reached on Laos, that was not a politically viable solution.

So I guess, as I have argued in my book, we never sat down and thought the thing through from beginning to end, precisely what we were trying to do and how we were going to do it, and I think the main thing that we didn't do—we had no idea that we could possibly lose the war until we lost it.

If you talked to General Westmoreland, you talked to the senior people, they said, "Oh, yeah. We had better strategies, better ways of doing it," but it really didn't matter. After all, the United States couldn't possibly lose. I mean it was no contest.

By the time it suddenly came to us that we could lose, it was too late because we had lost the support of the American people, which is absolutely necessary for the conduct of military operations.

Chairman NUNN. Let me ask just one other thing. Do you think our strategy in Korea was right or wrong, looking back on it?

Colonel SUMMERS. If we were not willing to expand the war into the bombing of China, which our allies were not willing to put up with that time—were adamantly against—and if NATO, again which was pushing us in Korea, if we needed the European allies and support of our NATO commitments, which we thought, as Dr. Record said, were more important, then the restoration of the status quo, which is essentially what we settled for, was probably the correct strategy.

Chairman NUNN. So you would say we were wrong in Vietnam in our strategy, but probably correct in Korea?

Colonel SUMMERS. Interestingly, in Korea, we started off to restore the status quo. That was our first objective. Then after MacArthur's invasion at Inchon and the collapse of the North Korean Army, the objective changed to the liberation of the entire country.

Then when the Chinese intervened, again our objective changed back to the restoration of the status quo. So our objectives, I think it is clear, were very much changed in accordance with the changing situation and the changing circumstances, so that at least we achieved our original objective in the Korean war. That is, we did restore the status quo.

In Vietnam we had, it seems to me, the capability to do that if we had applied our enormous resources in pursuit of that objective, but again going back to the principle of the objective, we had 32 different official objectives in Vietnam, most of which were mutually exclusive. So we didn't really settle on the most fundamental issue of all in any strategy: What are you trying to do?

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Record, do you want to comment on something?

Dr. RECORD. I wanted to add, basically, to support what Colonel Summers said, that we had two separate objectives at two different times in Korea. The official objective going into the war was to restore the 38th parallel; later it became the wider objective of reunification.

So you won or lost the Korean war depending upon which objective you selected.

Depending upon what objective you assumed we were fighting for in Korea, and we had two separate objectives—the initial objective was simply to restore the territorial integrity of South Korea, which we succeeded in doing. After the collapse of the North Korean Army, we then had an objective of the reunifying of the peninsula. We obviously failed to do that.

I would point out that in June 1950 when the North Koreans attacked South Korea, the U.S. Army consisted of 10 divisions, only one of which was combat-ready and that one was in Europe. That was the real basis of not just President Truman, but also of the Joint Chiefs' of Staff decision not to accede to MacArthur's request for an open-ended war in Korea. We had no strategic reserve, virtually none at the time, and an open-ended war in Korea would have uncovered to an unacceptable degree our position in Europe and elsewhere.

Colonel SUMMERS. I think Korea is important. One very important aspect of the Korean war. It was the first time in United States' military history we changed our national military strategy from the strategic offensive to the strategic defensive. And we have been on the strategic defensive ever since, with all that that implies, and it has major ramifications—the idea that we are now and have been, since the Korean war, on the strategic defensive.

Senator THURMOND. When did that take place?

Colonel SUMMERS. It took place when the decision was made—at the time of the relief of MacArthur when the decision was made to stalemate the war to change their objective to the restoration of status quo in 1951, and that has been our policy ever since in both wars.

Chairman NUNN. When were we on the strategic offensive, other than in World War II.

Colonel SUMMERS. In the Spanish American War, we certainly were; World War I, World War II. We carried the war to the enemy. Our objective was to destroy his armed forces, seize his territory, seize his capital.

That is the traditional way that wars are normally waged.

Chairman NUNN. Did we do that in World War I?

Colonel SUMMERS. I think it was our objective in concert with our allies. An armistice prevented that, of course.

Chairman NUNN. Of course, there were 30 years in between the two wars where we were virtually disarmed. The same thing occurred after World War II. It seems to me, to say that we went from strategic offensive to strategic defensive is only in the war sense. It certainly would not be in any peacetime sense.

I mean we dismantled after World War I. We dismantled after World War II. We really dismantled after every war. So perhaps maybe in war, you are saying. Is that what you are saying—strictly in war?

Colonel SUMMERS. Yes, strictly in war. I am saying that if our national policy is containment rather than rollback or liberation, which I think it is——

Senator THURMOND. Rather than what?

Colonel SUMMERS. Rather than rollback or liberation our policy is containment, then the military strategy that flows from that, as it must, has to be the defensive rather than the offensive.

Chairman NUNN. Are you saying that in your view, that is a fundamental error, or do you think that we made a fundamental error in Korea or that we should be on the strategic offensive now?

Colonel SUMMERS. Oh, not at all. Not at the risk of nuclear annihilation. It seems to me that the policy and the strategy is in consonance with the realities that we face.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, I did not understand the witness's answer to your question about what would have been the right strategy.

Would you repeat that again?

Colonel SUMMERS. In Vietnam?

Senator MCCAIN. Yes.

Colonel SUMMERS. I think the right strategy would have oriented U.S. forces, as it did in the Korean war, on repelling the external aggressor, on cutting his lines of supply and communication, and on providing a barrier to further infiltration of the South.

Whether or not the South Vietnamese would have been capable then of dealing with the internal war is an unanswerable question. But it was certainly one that they had to do and the degree that we tried to do it seemed to me just diffused our resources, rather than focusing them on the enemy.

That is, in my tour in Vietnam, 1966, 1967, the primary enemy was the Viet Cong regular forces. I went back there in 1974, 1975, the Viet Cong to all intents and purposes were no longer a major threat. The major threat then came from the North, the North Vietnamese regulars.

The decisive force in the Vietnam war was not the guerrilla forces: it was the regular armed forces of North Vietnam. And the irony is, at the very end they were fighting our war. It was the kind of war that we would have licked them at hands down, but of course they were wise enough not to fight that kind of war as long as we were involved.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, would the witness characterize Grenada before we leave the record?

Colonel SUMMERS. I think Grenada was more an incident or an exercise. That is, the major powers were not involved. I think the remarkable thing about the Grenada operation was not the military portion of it. That is, no one doubted we had the military capability to knock over Grenada anytime we wanted to.

What was remarkable, as Charles Krauthammer has said, was the will to use that power in pursuit of the national interest and the ratification of that will be the American people. I think that was strategically significant.

Senator **Warner**. Senator Glenn, you are now acting Chair.

Senator **Glenn** [presiding]. I would just like to comment on your remarks regarding traditional war-winning methods. There is a new factor I think that has come into this equation, and that is the nuclear factor. It overshadows everything else. I think that means that we must operate with different kinds of restraint than we ever had to in the past.

But first I want to congratulate both of you for your statements here and for sharing your views on this issue. I think both your statements are excellent. I have long been an advocate of combining the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee although I am under no illusions we will.

I think we should combine them to avoid the battles that normally go on around here over national security issues.

Let me ask one thing. Jeff, on the third page here, you comment about the "vital interests." I would like to ask you to expand on that idea.

Jim Schlesinger commented earlier on the "debased coinage" when referring to vital interests. We all talk about wanting to protect the vital interests of the United States of America, and that is fine. But when it comes down to prioritizing these interests which you have to do if you are really going to set up a military establishment to carry out our objectives, then you must be precise in defining our "vital interests."

Are our vital interests just natural resources? Is it oil, for instance, or other commodities? Are our vital interests the historical alignments we have had in the past because of our heritage. In this regard, we turn toward Europe more than we do any other direction.

Are our vital interests the maintenance of free trade and keeping the sea lanes open. Are our vital interests anything that has to do with the ideology of communism? These are all things that can be considered under the rubric of vital interests.

Could you prioritize them in one or two sentences because that is what we have to do when we vote here on the military hardware to protect those vital interests.

So unless we can define the vital interest we cannot develop a national military strategy to protect these interests.

Dr. **Record**. I have never found an adequate definition of the term "vital interests." I think everybody would agree that it has become, as Dr. Schlesinger said, "debased coinage." Is Grenada truly vital to the United States? Was South Vietnam in the 1960s? It is a judgment call.

I generally place greater weight on geostrategic factors than on factors of ideology, or aid or trade. We did go to war in 1917 in part because German submarines were attacking our commercial vessels on the high seas. I have a feeling we probably went to war for a lot of other reasons than that.

Perhaps the best backhanded definition is that a vital interest is that for which you are prepared to fight, for which you are prepared to go to war. There is nothing in, for example, Berlin in the way of resources, in the way of trade, in the way of territory, in the way of geostrategic position, in the way of anything else that one could consider vital to the United States. It is nothing that you can get your hands on.

Berlin has become vital, or at least it used to be, because an attack there would be considered an attack on Europe. It was a symbol of our commitment to Europe—to the same extent that our commitment to other intrinsically worthless pieces of territory over time has come to be assumed to be a symbol of other things.

We went to Vietnam, presumably, not because we had any measurable interests in Vietnam itself. We didn't. We shot up more ammunition on a Sunday afternoon than we had ever traded with that part of the world in 50 years. We went there because we saw an indirect interest. We saw that our world interest would be served by making a stand there. Unfortunately, we picked the wrong ground, the wrong enemy.

Senator GLENN. Let me ask you to comment on page 4 of your testimony where you say that:

> Periodic expressions of ever-expanding ends, undisciplined either by a realistic appreciation of the finite limits of U.S. military means and their effective application of nuclear environment, or by effective accommodation to fundamental changes in the global geostrategic environment.

Could you define those changes that you feel have been fundamental in the global geostrategic environment, because that would also give us another perspective on how to structure our military forces.

What are the new fundamental changes?

Dr. RECORD. Since we in the late 1940s adopted a forward policy first in Europe, we have come today to preside over today the same fundamental defense commitments. Most of what we have inherited today we started in the late 1940s or early 1950s.

What has changed since the late 1940s? The emergence of another adversary with nuclear weapons. We don't enjoy nuclear supremacy. That imposes an enormous amount of caution when one is considering using one's military force against the Soviet Union or, for that matter, against any other nuclear-armed state.

We don't account for half of the world's GNP anymore. We don't have the kind of unchallenged ownership of the world's oceans anymore. Our power, military and economic, has declined not just in relation to that of the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries, but significantly in terms of the power of our allies. We are not looking at a Europe anymore that has to have a Marshall Plan just to be able to get its car industry started up.

Our allies now have greater economic and military potential than we do.

Senator GLENN. Harry, would you want to comment on this issue of vital and strategic interest?

Colonel SUMMERS. Yes, sir. One vital interest that is unquestionable is the safeguarding of the American homeland. Unquestioned vital interest.

After you get beyond that, then you get not into tangibles but into the intangibles of protection of American interests.

General Weyand, when he was Chief of Staff of the Army, once said, "A vital interest is that interest the President says is vital when he orders American troops to defend it." And that leaves the military really up in the air.

I think that is true to some degree. As Dr. Record said, world conditions are in a constant state of change. One of the things that we ought to do with our military strategy to my mind, is to provide for the defense of the homeland without question, and then maintain the flexibility in the organization and structure of our Armed Forces so that we are able to respond to the unknowables that we are going to face in the future.

That is, give us the flexibility to respond in a wide variety of directions. To the degree that we commit forces to specific localities, we lose our flexibility to some degree.

Senator **Glenn**. This puts a priority then on mobility of forces beyond anything we have ever known in the past. And we are not adequately moving in that direction.

Colonel **Summers**. I guess as an Army officer—I was talking to Secretary Lehman about this—I made the comment in my statement about this army disease of jointness, which I got from Secretary Lehman. But he didn't seem to understand that from an Army point of view, the Army is a joint service. It knows it cannot get to the battlefield without the Navy and Air Force to get it there, and it can't survive on the battlefield without naval and air support.

So that maneuver, if you will, maneuver in a strategic sense, the ability to get to the scene of the action, is critical. We are back in a strange way to the conflict between Great Britain and France; that is, continental power versus an island power. And the United States in strategic terms is an island. And our major adversaries are continental powers, so that the McKinder Theory may be a hundred years out of date, but it is still true.

Senator **Glenn**. My time is up, but the strategic importance of Southwest Asia, which you both address with great concern here is critical because we have no forces there. Moreover, you are critical of the RDF which I have said many times it is not rapid, nor deployable, nor an adequate force. Also, despite the pre-positioning of supplies and equipment, these forces are extremely vulnerable.

For us to put massive amounts of equipment there, virtually unguarded and expect us to be able to protect this vital area is just ludicrous.

You have put a different perspective, too, on the defense of Iran, which most Americans are probably not prepared to accept in the current situation.

Dr. **Record**. Even though we may be providing them security assistance, we are not going to defend them.

Senator **Glenn**. This is a very good point because you look at the larger strategic picture, particularly the Soviet Union's historical efforts to secure warm water ports in this region.

We are accustomed right now to thinking of Ayatollah Khomeni as the enemy. And we are currently trying to protect the Persian Gulf against what Iran might do in that area. However the bigger threat might be the Soviet Union and the need for us to fight on behalf of Iran if it comes to that.

For this reason, I was glad you put this perspective in your testimony.

Senator McCain, I believe it is your turn.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to also express my appreciation to the witnesses here today. I was thinking while I was listening to Dr. Record, I have had the pleasure of reading or listening to his forensic fights for over 10 years now. It certainly wears very well.

And, Colonel, I have appreciated everything you have written, including this very important book, "On Strategy." I, like my predecessor, Senator Glenn, have a number of questions. But in your book that I am sure I don't have time for, in your book you state:

> Perhaps the most dangerous misuse of military force is the attempt to bluff a potential adversary when they do not have the necessary combat power, combination of both material and moral strength to carry out the threat if the bluff is called.

Yet, just the other day, Secretary Weinberger said, and I quote him:

> Our strategy is not to fight everywhere at once to deter aggression. We and our allies do not plan to maintain all the forces required for simultaneous offense against Moscow-directed attacks in all threatened or potentially threatened areas. To deter convincingly we must have the military strength for actually carrying out credible responses.

Does that sound to you like we are perhaps the most dangerous misuse of military power?

Colonel Summers. I thought the Lebanon thing was just an example, although that was written before Lebanon—certainly an example of the kinds of traps you would find yourself in.

When President Eisenhower decided to intervene in the Lebanon crisis, the perception was that he was serious about it. I was in an infantry brigade at Fort Devens at the time. We were packed up and moving to Boston, on the way to Lebanon, and they were moving divisions out of Germany to Lebanon. The perception was that we were serious about it and we were going to carry it through.

On the most recent Lebanon thing, there were statements made that we are not serious, that we were not going to put anymore combat power in, that we were really trying to avoid it, and it was revealed as a bluff and the bluff was called.

I think it is very dangerous for a power like the United States—and as I said in my opening statement, there are peculiarities about the Americans. We are an open society. Where a closed society may be able to bluff with military force because you can't read their intentions, you certainly can't do that with the United States when you pick up a Washington Post or New York Times and see the composition of force, what the restrictions are, and all the rest of it.

That is part of living in an open society. I was on "Meet the Press" with Dr. Schlesinger, and they asked him the lesson of the Vietnam war. He said he could sum it up in two words: "Get serious."

If you are not serious about what you are doing, don't do it. And if you are serious, carry it through to its conclusion. So I think that is a pretty good lesson. And to use military force to attempt to bluff on the part of the United States is to invite disaster. We ought not to do it.

Senator McCain. Perhaps that lesson might be applied to Central America as well.

Both of you have been concerned with strategic aspects, not only from a military side, but also with the effects on the American people, as well as our ability to sustain combat and the problem of getting the United States' people to support military involvement.

I would like to address a question to you that I have to other witnesses. My colleague from Nebraska earlier this morning asked the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific and Central Command about the viability of a national service or, his description, a return to the draft—although I don't envision national service as that.

Both Admiral Hayes and General Crisp said they were happy with the All Volunteer Forces that exist, and General Crisp said "I never had better marines, and yet I am deeply concerned about the decreasing manpower pool as we go into the 1990s."

I am deeply concerned about the increasing amount of funding that goes strictly to personnel costs, particularly in these days of either capped or reduced defense spending. I am also sympathetic, to the stated feeling of most young Americans today, as opposed to 10 or 15 years ago, that they would like to serve this Nation in some capacity.

What I envision is not original, but perhaps we should allow Americans to serve in many capacities, not just in the military, but others—perhaps providing special incentives for military service.

I would like both of your views on that issue, whether you think that it is a compelling issue because of certain demographic factors that exist as well as budgetary ones, or whether it is just something that is nice to debate in various forums throughout the country.

I would like a response.

Colonel Summers. One, I would agree with the witnesses that say that the All Volunteer Army, although that is not the phraseology—the All Volunteer Forces are working very well. As I said, both my sons and my daughter-in-law are serving military officers. They would testify to the quality, if you will, of the force we have.

But I think the issue is larger than that. It is not that the Army needs the draft or conscription. I think the Nation needs it. We have lost something of great value if we break the connector between the common defense and the average person.

The common defense, as the Preamble in the Constitution says very clearly, is the responsibility of every American. It is good that when Garrison Keeler talks in Prarie Home Companion he can say, "Well, when I was in the Army," and so on. It is good that Senator Kennedy served in the Army during the Korean war. It is good that we had this kind of military experience in our country. And I think we have lost it and we are losing it.

We are losing it in areas we have never thought about. In journalism, for example. The people who had served in World War II and the Korean war are by and large gone from the scene, so we have young journalists now who have no practical experience in the military. I think that is harmful.

I think that the Nation needs some kind of national service, and I think the mood by and large is supportive of that. Most young Americans do want to do something, not necessarily military service, but some kind of national service. And I think we ought to tap that enthusiasm for the good of the Nation.

Senator McCain. Dr. Record.

Dr. Record. I agree with everything that Colonel Summers has said. So far as other statements that may have been made about the All Volunteer Force being in fine shape, it has always been in fine shape as long as there is no war on.

The All Volunteer Force is a peacetime force. The only reason that it has even done as well in peacetime as it has is because of progressive reductions in authorized end strength from the services; we have about one-half million fewer people in the military today on active duty than we had in 1964, which was the last pre-Vietnam year.

Eleven percent of the people in the force are women. Without reliance on women, the All Volunteer Force could not possibly have achieved current force goals. There is nothing wrong with that, except that I do get the distinct impression sometimes on Capitol Hill that people think that somehow in the next war, that there will not be any women getting killed. There will be. You can't have a force of 10 or 11 percent women, particularly where the women are, without placing them at risk in combat. Again, I have no objection to that, but it ought to be recognized, I think, by everybody concerned.

I think one can make a very strong strategic case for returning to some form of compulsory military service alone or as part and parcel of a larger national service obligation in which an individual would have free choice.

I do not think that we can begin to cover our commitments even partially without some form of conscription. There is also, I think, a more fundamental issue, the one that Harry touched on regarding who we are as a nation. You may recall that during the Civil War, the Federal Government had a conscription policy that allowed those who could put up $300 to buy a substitute to serve in their place. This in effect allowed all of the middle class kids, the then-equivalent of middle class kids, to get out of military service if they so chose.

In many respects, the All-Volunteer Force is exactly the modern day equivalent of the old Civil War purchase system. The great American middle class—largely whites—that after Vietnam, said never again are our sons going to be put in this situation, and in effect went out and hired an army from the less privileged segments of society to do its fighting for them. They will come forward and take their king's shilling, in part because they have fewer choices in life than we do.

I think it is exceedingly dangerous for a mass democracy like our own to rely upon that kind of force, particularly with the commitments that we have.

One other point. If the Russians were to attack us tomorrow in Europe in a big way, somewhere between 30 and 40 percent of the casualties would be minorities. My problem is not who is in the military. It is who is not. And I think if you will recall, that back during the Vietnam period when black and other minority casualties exceeded their representation of the population as a whole by 2 or 3 percentage points there was, rightfully so, a major hue and cry in this country about disproportionate losses—a rich man's war and a poor man's fight.

In the absence of even a standby draft worth the name, in the first 6 weeks or 6 months of casualties in a European war, we are going to be looking at percentages of minority casualties that will be vastly disproportionate to those that were suffered in Vietnam, and this would call into question our strategic stamina as a nation as to whether we could continue such a war.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate those responses.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate hearing from both of our witnesses today. I have had an opportunity to visit with Colonel Summers before and have read his work, and I am an admirer of his ideas. And, Mr. Record, I appreciate the chance to hear you and read some of the things you have written as well.

I would like to ask just a couple of brief questions. First of all, Secretary Weinberger testified here that there are several options for reducing threats to U.S. interests, and one option was, in his words, "align enduring U.S. strengths against enduring Soviet weaknesses."

I would like to ask you, Colonel Summers, what your view is of that statement as it applies to our current maritime strategy; specifically, what do you think about the idea of sending our carriers around northern Norway to attack the heavily defended Kola Peninsula.

Do you think that is an example of aligning our enduring strengths against enduring Soviet weaknesses?

Colonel SUMMERS. I guess to the first part of that question, I think we have done very well with that. As a matter of fact, that is, that our enduring strengths, our political, economic, and sociological systems have shown up the basic weaknesses of the Soviet system.

Again, to put this in about a 40-year perspective, if you were reading literature 40 years ago, you would think that the West was in an inevitable decline. Certainly no one today in his right mind would pick the Soviet Union as a model.

Second, I did an interview with Secretary Lehman and asked him the very question that you asked. "Is attacking the Kola Peninsula the official operating tactic of the Navy, or is it just a shorthand way of saying that if the Navy goes to war we are going to put you in harm's way? That is, we are going to have the offensive spirit."

He said, "Well, first it is to instil the offensive spirit. To get them off their duff, thinking offensively, we are going to go out and seek the enemy and run him down." Then he said, "Of course, then I do think that attacking the Kola Peninsula is a good idea."

Chairman NUNN. I didn't hear that.

Colonel Summers. Attacking the Kola Peninsula was a good idea.

Senator Gore. You don't, do you?

Colonel Summers. No, I really don't, as a matter of fact.

Senator Gore. It is kind of crazy, isn't it?

Colonel Summers. Well, I understand the shorthand. I understand telling the Navy to sail in harms way. I happen to be an Army officer. A British soldier in the Falklands said that the Commander of the Navy in the Falklands ought to have been given the Star of Burma because he kept his ships to far to the east. [Laughter.]

Since Senator McCain is no longer here, I can say that it seems to me that the Navy is inordinately proud of never hazarding a ship.

But I think the message to the Navy was, we are going to go carry the war to the enemy. I think that was a good message. I think the operational tactic of planning for it and locking in concrete the attack of the Kola Peninsula makes no sense because you can't do that ahead of time in the first place.

So I think the psychological effect of it was probably beneficial.

Senator Gore. More bravado than strategy.

Colonel Summers. Yes. But bravado has its uses. But certainly it is not a strategy by definition. It is, at best, a tactic; maybe an operational mission, since we are going to a three-tier definition of military planning. Strategy has to do with the achievement of ends, and certainly you could seize the Kola Peninsula tomorrow and you would not have achieved an end. There is no end result.

Senator Gore. Let me ask you, Dr. Record, about your statements with regard to U.S. troop withdrawals in Europe. We have had quite a discussion of that during this series of hearings on strategy. You seem in your testimony, which I read carefully, to support Dr. Brzezinski's basic notion that we should withdraw a sizable number of U.S. troops and somehow convert the resources so recovered into additional strength that could be brought to bear in Southwest Asia.

Is that a fair characterization?

Dr. Record. That is a fair characterization.

Senator Gore. You seemed to qualify it with an assumption that our European allies could and would fill in where we withdrew; correct?

Dr. Record. That is a question that nobody can answer. Those who oppose withdrawing any troops always say that any kind of even modest withdrawals will prompt a comparable reduction on the part of our European allies.

There are those who claim that exactly the opposite would be the case; that if we pull out a bunch of troops, that the allies automatically would increase their forces. I don't think anybody knows the answer to that question. We do know that during the Vietnam war, a time during which our military resources were sorely overtaxed in Southeast Asia, and in its aftermath, in particular in the 1970s, as our real annual increases became real annual decreases in defense spending, we do know that our European allies increased their real defense expenditure.

We could not do more for Europe's defense. They did more while we were doing less. This does not automatically suggest that all we have to do tomorrow is simply announce that we are going to spend less on Europe's defense and that they will automatically fall into place and do more for their own defense. But it is a question that, given the acute strategy force mismatches that we face in Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia and elsewhere—it is a question that ought to be examined seriously and one that, certainly against the backdrop of U.S. troop strength in Europe—which has fluctuated quite widely over the last 40 years with no visible effect on deterrence—is something that can be explored.

Senator **Gore**. What I am getting at is whether or not your recommendation is contingent upon the assumption that Europe would fill in where we withdrew, or not.

To state it another way, if you had incontrovertible evidence—which you will not get—but if you had incontrovertible evidence that the void left by U.S. troop withdrawal would remain a void, and there would be no concomitant increase in NATO troop strength, would you still recommend that we go in that direction?

Dr. **Record**. Yes, I would, because we would still have 250,000 troops there. If you were to ask me whether or not we should take out 300,000 the answer would be no if there was going to be a comparable buildup on the part of the Europeans.

I think one could safely withdraw—certainly not precipitously and certainly not in anger with the Europeans—100,000 U.S. troops out of Europe in a selected withdrawal without compromising either the current deterrent balance in Europe or really significantly the current defense balance, even if the European allies spent not another mark or another franc to make up the difference.

Senator **Gore**. My time is up. But if my colleagues would indulge me with 1 additional minute, I would just like to say that several witnesses have discussed this basic idea of withdrawing troops from Europe and using the resources to beef up our military capabilities in the Persian Gulf area.

And I am troubled by it. I recognize how long it has been since the war. I recognize how many troops we have. I recognize a lot of the very cogent arguments that are made, and I may be prepared to agree with some of them, but I am troubled by two assumptions.

Number one is that there will be some serious damage done to our ability to continue performing NATO's main mission. And, second, that there is some way for us to disembark troops into the Persian Gulf area at a time when they would be needed; that there is some way, in other words, to translate that 100,000 troop strength commitment into anything comparable that could be used effectively in the Persian Gulf area.

I will just say that I want to defer to my colleague here, but let me just give you a chance to briefly respond if you would to the second assumption there. Where would you have in mind troops being used in the Persian Gulf? How would we go about that? Where would they disembark? How would we put them there without any country being willing to take them, et cetera?

Dr. **Record**. The kind of forces that we deploy in Europe—and again, the kind of withdrawals that I would focus on would be heavy ground forces, not nuclear, tactical air or naval—are heavy ground forces.

Theoretically, one could bring those back to the United States and convert them or some portion of them into forces more suitable for combat in Southwest Asia, perhaps lighter forces. The Army is already moving in that direction. We have the problem of how do you get over there—we don't have the kind of shore-based prepositioning that we have in Europe, so you have got a real logistical problem.

There is a risk, of course, that if you start withdrawing troops from Europe, people in the Congress will say, "Ah, ha, here is an opportunity to save money. We are going to cut those 100,000 men out of the U.S. Army's end strength, take the money and do something else with it." And so you could end up with a net reduction in your total forces that you have deployed around the world, be weaker in Europe, and not have done anything with respect to bolstering your defenses in Southwest Asia.

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of questions. I want to go and revisit the Persian Gulf with you for a minute.

It has been talked about in the committee and it has been talked about by others who talk about strategy, from Dr. Schlesinger on down. Let us talk about unknowables. Was that your word, Colonel Summers?

Colonel SUMMERS. Yes.

Senator SHELBY. What if we miscalculate on the Iranian strategy? We have been told by some of our advisers in the last several months that there is a real stalemate there; that nothing is going to happen. Yet we see the Iranian army beginning to move again and they have not given up, and they say they are moving whether we like it or not; whatever the consequences.

But there will be, in the opinion of a lot of people, including myself, profound changes if there is any kind of Iranian victory in the area because of fundamentalism.

If we did miscalculate would that victory upset our strategy in the Persian Gulf countries. Are they really able to defend themselves, or would they be subordinated to a new emerging power like Iran?

Would you comment on that Colonel?

Colonel SUMMERS. If Iraq collapses there is no countervailing power in the area. Certainly the Gulf States are not. Certainly Saudi Arabia does not have the necessary power. There is no other power in the area to counterbalance Iranian power.

I see that personally as a much more probable threat to U.S. interests in the area.

Senator SHELBY. That is the immediate threat?

Colonel SUMMERS. Exactly. And I see it much more profound than a Soviet threat because of the Arab fundamentalism issue. I think Arab fundamentalism is much more diametrically opposed to the United States and U.S. interests than Soviet communism.

Senator SHELBY. Also we keep talking about the Soviet threat. It is there, and they have an interest, we all have an interest in the gulf. Europe has got a bigger interest, as has been pointed out, than they would like to tell us or tell the world or try to defend.

But the immediate interest should be what is going to happen in the Iranian war? Is that right?

Colonel SUMMERS. I would see that, yes. And the limitations on what the United States can do about it are enormous. We lack influence with Iran. Evidently, if the reports are to be believed, our attempts to gain influence have gained us nothing but contempt, and we are having difficulty getting other states in the area to give us basing rights because they are afraid we will not stay the course and we will not be there when we are needed. That is part of the fear.

Senator SHELBY. Has much thought gone into the probability, as you use the word, of an Iranian movement in the area—and here you would be facing the most populated nation—a battle-seasoned army.

Colonel SUMMERS. The combat power they have is enormous and I think if we put the American army in there today on that southern front we would be hard pressed.

Dr. RECORD. I might add that the Soviet Union has no interest, anymore so than we do, in seeing a triumphant Iran that ended up controlling Baghdad and the Shatt-al-Arab and putting pressure on Kuwait. If there is one area of the world where we might even speak to the possibility of some kind of United States-Soviet strategic collaboration, it might be in the upper gulf in the event of a major decisive Iranian victory.

Senator SHELBY. Let's talk about Kuwait a minute. How would they defend themselves against the Iranians? They couldn't, could they? No way.

Colonel SUMMERS. They would be overrun.

Senator SHELBY. In 24 hours, 90 minutes.

Colonel SUMMERS. One thing that disturbs me in some of the scenarios from that—in fact, I wrote a letter to the editor of the Armed Forces Journal about it. At one time there was a discussion—well, if the Soviets come into Iran, we will put in the 82d Airborne, and then if they start to get overrun, we are just going to have to use tac nukes. That was being said publicly.

I thought, my God, people have not come to grips with the change in the strategic correlation of forces.

Chairman NUNN. I didn't understand that last part. If we could overrun what?

Colonel SUMMERS. If they got overrun, we would just have to use tac nukes. And I thought, my God, people have not come to grips with the change in the correlation of forces. That is, the Soviets have got as many tac nukes as we do, maybe more, and if we used tac nukes in Iran, certainly they would respond in kind.

Then you ask yourself, who is more vulnerable, us or them?

Senator SHELBY. Colonel, let's go back a minute to my first observation that we had a colloquy on. Let's forget about the Soviets in the Persian Gulf temporarily, but the Iranian threat, which is a more immediate one. And at the moment it is a deeper threat and it could really upset a lot of our basic strategy that we have been pushing for years right there in the Persian Gulf, couldn't it?

Colonel SUMMERS. Yes, sir; very much so. And yet, as I said, nuclear weapons are not usable against the Soviet Union because they can respond in kind. We would certainly not use nuclear weapons against Iran. I don't see that as even a remote possibility.

American conventional combat power—one, almost impossible to get there, and two, even if we could get it all there, there is the question of its adequacy, given the nature of combat power that Iran has already generated.

It seems to me that is the major issue.

Senator SHELBY. There is the probability that there could be a de facto domination in the Persian Gulf by the Iranians in a real way, couldn't it?

Colonel SUMMERS. There is a probability of that certainly; yes.

Senator SHELBY. Gentlemen, I thank you for coming before the committee today. I don't know if Senator Nunn is going to have something else for you or not.

Chairman NUNN. I just want to ask two or three other questions. You all have been patient with your time. We very much appreciate it. We have talked about strategy and where we are and so forth.

Would either of you comment on the question of strategy-making in the Defense Department and whether you believe we have adequate procedures for strategy-making, let's say, in the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense's Office, and, if not, what should be done to improve them?

Colonel SUMMERS. My own firsthand observation, from working there for some time, is that the building was so dominated by the force planners, by the budgeteers, by the people concentrating on program analysis and evaluation, there is not time for strategy.

In fact, the Army staff combined the force planners with the strategists. Hard data always drives out the soft data, so the hard data people were in control.

One of the things that concerned me very much until my retirement last year was this lack of strategic thinking, if you will. I just had breakfast with Secretary Marsh on Christmas Eve, and he tells me that one of the things that the Army at least is trying to do is to resurrect strategic planning within the Army staff and which, of course, would translate into the Joint Staff as well.

But there is a fundamental—I think we see it in the Congress, I think we see it in the Pentagon and throughout the services—is that hard data tends to drive out soft data. More people are interested in what can be quantified, what you can get a figure on, the quantified analysis, the budget, things like that, and the intangibles, if you will, of strategy find it very difficult to compete.

So someplace in the Government has to be someone pushing the Pentagon in strategic thinking. One of the reasons why the Pentagon is so oriented toward program analysis and evaluation and budget and line items is that is the kind of questions asked by the Congress. And if the Congress would ask strategic questions, they would, of necesssity, have to build a corps of people to be able to respond to them.

So, in part, that is why I said earlier that I so welcomed the direction of your committee to move in this direction, because there is a void here that has not been filled for a long time.

Chairman NUNN. I hope that every 2 years, we can begin our budget process by looking at strategy. I doubt we will do it each year, but we are going to try and give an awful lot of oversight the second year. This year we are going to try to go for milestone authorizations and hopefully at least large components of a 2-year budget. So we are going to try to change the way we do business and change the way we focus, and perhaps that will, over a period of time, move the building some.

Colonel **Summers**. I think it will.

Chairman **Nunn**. Dr. Record, would you like to comment on that?

Dr. **Record**. I very much agree with what Colonel Summers had said. I would be less than optimistic to assume that one could simply pass another reorganization bill and out comes effective strategy. This problem goes far beyond the way we organize. As a matter of fact, the way we organize for defense is part of the function of who we are.

I think it was Gregg Foster of the National Defense University who pointed out we are really not a strategically minded people, in part because until the last 40 years never had to think about strategy because of our geographic isolation.

Chairman **Nunn**. Do either of you have anything else you would like to add? We have covered an awful lot of territory. You have done an excellent job and been a great help to us.

Do you want to add anything that has not been covered? Do you want to ask yourself a question so we can hear the answer to anything we should have asked but didn't?

Colonel **Summers**. One of the dangers is to get so immersed in the ongoing situation that you get caught up in the process. I think one of the great benefits of your committee is to be able to step back two or three steps and look at it in its totality and ask some basic and fundamental questions.

One of the reasons I structured my testimony the way it was is that I think there are some fundamental questions that need to be addressed, at least the problem of an American strategy and what that means. It seems to me that some of the people that have been devising strategy for this country would very much like to be a Metternich. But unfortunately they don't have Austria to work with; they've got the United States.

We have our own ideas about how to do these things. But those kinds of questions tend to get lost.

Just as an example, to close, I was in the Army Chief of Staff's office and a guy came up with—this was during all the commotion during the Vietnam war—and a guy came up and said "Well, we've got this proposal on hand. We are going to do away with troop barracks and allow troops to live out in the surrounding communities, and we can save X number of dollars because we don't have to provide a building for them."

I said, "Do you know the reason why they moved troops into billets to start with? Why there's that little phrase in the Constitution about billeting soldiers in private homes?"

Of course, he didn't know at all. It is interesting that during the Jacobian problems in England, they were so afraid that the troops would rebel and overthrow the Government—because they were all living out in taverns and places like that—that they put them all in barracks to keep them away from the agitators.

So just at the time we had all this agitation in the Armed Forces, this guy in the name of budgetary efficiency was going to move troops out of barracks back into the public community.

But the point is that no one is asking the larger questions. They were all looking at the cost-benefit ratio and all the rest of it, and no one was looking at the underlying philosophy, if you will. I use that word hesitatingly because, teaching at the Army War College, I knew anytime I mentioned the word "philosophy," all the students' eyes would glaze over immediately. It is a very dangerous word.

But it the philosophy of our strategy is not correct, nothing that flows from it will be correct. So one of the things it seems to me the committee is doing to your great credit is to look at the underlying fundamentals of our strategic process. I think that is absolutely necessary.

A lot of people get turned off by it. They want to get out and count the number of widgets, but it you don't have the fundamentals straight, nothing is straight.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Dr. Record, do you have anything else?

Dr. RECORD. I have nothing further to add.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you both for being here. We hope you will continue to give us the benefit of your wisdom as we go along. We may have another series of strategy hearings before the year is over. We are not going to be able to complete them all before we get thrown head over head into the widgets.

The widgets drive the process up here.

[Whereupon, at 4:33 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 1987

U.S. Senate,
Armed Services Committee,
Washington, DC.

MILITARY STRATEGY FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Stennis, Exon, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Wirth, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Cohen, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Judith A. Freedman, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, Gordon G. Riggle, and Mark B. Robinson, professional staff members; Kathleen L. McGuire, staff assistant.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; Jeffrey Hyche, assistant to Senator Shelby; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Samuel J. Routson, assistant to Senator Symms; Lorne Craner, assistant to Senator McCain; and Bill White, assistant to Senator Warner.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Nunn. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning for the 11th hearing on U.S. national security strategy and its military strategy component. The focus of this hearing is U.S. strategy for low intensity conflicts.

The committee is fortunate to have Gen. Paul F. Gorman, U.S. Army (retired), as the witness this morning. General Gorman is well known to this committee. He has had a very distinguished military career, serving in his final assignment as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command.

Since his retirement, General Gorman has served as a key member of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, known as the Packard Commission. At present, General Gorman chairs the Regional Conflict Working Group of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. I might add that he was also very helpful to our committee last year in our deliberations on the Defense Reorganization bill.

On behalf of the committee, I extend a warm welcome to General Gorman this morning. We appreciate your appearance today, and we look forward to your testimony.

It is instructive that in the 10 preceding strategy hearings low intensity conflict has not been mentioned very prominently. The testimony has focused almost exclusively on nuclear deterrence or fighting the Soviets in a large scale war. This raises the question of whether our military establishment, or whether any of us, place sufficient emphasis on the organization, training, planning, and preparing for low intensity conflicts.

Congress has been giving this subject a great deal of attention over the last 2 years, and I think our interest in it is going to continue. Senator Cohen, particularly, has been a leader in this on this committee, and I know that he is looking forward to this hearing and will be back in a few minutes.

The U.S. military appears to view low intensity conflicts as a lesser included case of major conventional warfare. This orientation may be based on the belief that if we can fight the Soviets we can handle any less demanding scenario. This point of view needs to be rigorously examined during this hearing.

Is that the correct point of view? Beyond this issue, there are numerous other fundamental questions concerning low intensity conflict. There are questions of terminology. What do we mean by "low intensity conflict"? There are questions about Vietnam. What did we learn from that conflict? Are those lessons accurately reflected in the six conditions that Secretary Weinberger has prescribed for future U.S. involvement in low intensity conflicts?

There are questions about vital U.S. interests. Do low intensity conflicts threaten the United States? Is American involvement in such conflicts essential? These are only a few of the questions we will be exploring this morning.

Beyond low intensity conflict subjects, the committee would also like to hear General Gorman's view on the quality of strategy making in the Department of Defense. The Packard Commission was critical of U.S. strategic planning. The committee would appreciate a fuller explanation from General Gorman of the Commission's concerns.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would join in welcoming our witness, and am prompt to say that whatever delay he incurred this morning was as a consequence of after he crossed the line into the District of Columbia, not the roads in Virginia. [Laughter.]

Chairman NUNN. I heard him say "inside the Beltway." I probably misunderstood. [Laughter.]

General Gorman, we will hear your testimony, and then go to questions.

STATEMENT OF GEN. PAUL F. GORMAN, U.S. ARMY (RET.), CHAIRMAN, REGIONAL CONFLICT WORKING GROUP, COMMISSION ON INTEGRATED LONG-TERM STRATEGY

General **Gorman**. I have provided the committee, Senator Nunn, a fairly extensive statement, so I am not going to take up much time at the outset. I apologize for the length of that statement. That is what comes from being snowed in in Nelson County, Senator Warner. [Laughter.]

Chairman **Nunn**. You take whatever time you need this morning, because you are our main witness.

General **Gorman**. I would like to make four points by way of beginning.

First of all, in answer to your query of whether this is a lesser included case of dealing with the Soviets, it is important to realize that many of the difficulties that the Government today considers under the rubric of low intensity conflict proceed from causes and sources that the Kremlin does not control, and of which the Kremlin may in fact be from time to time as unaware of and as surprised as we.

The fact of the matter is that the United States faces a range of difficulties over the years to come, for generations, arising out of local and regional causes, economic causes, demographic causes, social mutations of one kind or another that may present opportunities for the Kremlin, may offer them chances that they would otherwise be denied but which are in no sense their doing or under their control.

Having said that, I need to add the point that while it is true the Soviets are very much a one-note society, as some of your earlier commentators have pointed out (they are very good at producing large military machines), the bad news is that they are getting better in their approaches to the Third World. They have made many mistakes there, particularly in the Middle East, but of late their policy is showing an adroitness that has surprised many commentators.

The Soviets do in fact learn from their mistakes. One thing that they do much better than the United States of America is mobilize their allies. Call them proxies, call them fraternal nations, call them clients, but the fact of the matter is that all over the Third World there are East Germans, Bulgarians, Poles, Czechs, and others doing the bidding of the Kremlin, and doing so fairly effectively.

With respect to your question on definition, what I mean by "low intensity conflict," which may not be what the Government means, is that genre of problem which sweeps across the range of violence from sabotage for political purposes, to terrorism—the use of violence for political purposes directed against persons—to the sort of paramilitary narco trafficking that you see among the cocaine traders of this hemisphere, to include guerrilla warfare, insurgency, the sort of phenomena that afflicts most of the nations in the Third World today and will afflict them increasingly in the future.

Part and parcel of this entire skein of problems is the systematic training and equipping that the individuals who, for whatever reasons, want to associate themselves with this violence receive from the proponents of such violence. That includes the Soviet Union. It includes the radical Arabs in the Middle East. It includes the Cubans. Suffice to say that anyone who for whatever reasons, for whatever ambitions, for whatever misguided reasons may wish to perpetrate violence for political purposes, can receive a high degree of professional training. And indeed it is clear that in most cases where governments have attempted to come to grips with this sort of violence, the opposition is better trained, better equipped, more resourceful, more maneuverable than the government forces.

Well, this then brings us to the fundamental issue: What should the United States do about this? Now every President since President Nixon has espoused an approach to the Third World which says fundamentally: we will help those who are willing to help themselves. We will help those who are prepared to defend themselves. The problem before us today, and the problem I submit that will be before this country for the foreseeable future is how to be useful to countries that are attempting to come to grips with this sort of violence.

Now the instruments that are available to the President of the United States, or indeed to the Congress, are not very well suited for the sort of problems that I have just described. Certainly the traditional military establishment of the United States is maladroit in coming to grips with any of the sorts of difficulties of which I have made mention. And albeit exceptionally well equipped, very well trained, and very well motivated, our forces frequently cannot position themselves where they can put to good effect, for lack of intelligence, for lack of political access, or for simple inability to get there in time to be of use.

So we go back to the fundamental premise of the strategy that the United States embarked on now 17 years ago. How can we help others better to face this sort of threat? The Security Assistance Program of the United States, I submit, is no better answer than our traditional military establishment. In fact, this country is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the countries of the Third World. I suggest to you on this committee and to your colleagues in the Congress as a whole, that one of the problems to which you should turn your attention most urgently, as you think through American responses to this sort of challenge, is how to make the Security Assistance Program of the United States more relevant.

Finally, I want to make the point that in dealing with these problems, the critical commodity is intelligence. We cannot devise an adequate strategy, we cannot use our resources in time and with good effect, unless we have a much better understanding of what the opposition is up to, and how best to come to grips with it.

We have been caught out time and again by the perpetrators of violence in the Third World for the simple reason that most of our intelligence community is directed against the Soviet Union. We are very good Soviet watchers. We are very poor watchers of Colombians, or Iranians, or anyone else, for that matter, in the Third World. We have got to get a lot better if we are to be forearmed and are able to take effective preemptive action, or to assist better an ally to take such action.

Intelligence is a strategic commodity in a sense. It is probably the sort of assistance that the United States can be most useful with—not military equipment, not helicopters, not guns, not ordnance, but intelligence. We could be very good at that. If we could but direct our resources to the problem, I am convinced that we could get much better, and we could become much better in a hurry.

With that, sir, I would invite your questions.

Chairman NUNN. Your written testimony is so good, I want everyone to benefit from it. Could you start about page 10 where you address the changes in law and at least go through that.

General GORMAN. All right, sir. I would be glad to.

The basis for this paper is really the lesson I learned from one of my mentors, Gen. Andy Goodpaster, who taught me that lesson long ago when we were sitting in Paris trying to puzzle through the next moves of the North Vietnamese during the peace talks of 1968. General Goodpaster taught me that the national strategy is really the answer to three questions:

What is it that you want to have happen?—Objectives.

How do you go about doing it?—Concepts.

And what are you going to do it with?—Resources.

If you can answer those three questions, in terms that the ordinary American can understand, you have got a national strategy. If you cannot, you do not.

Now this paper attempts to talk to this issue of low intensity conflict in those terms. There was passed in the last session of Congress, thanks to the leadership of this committee in no small part, a law which addressed itself to low intensity conflict. It was a bill that dealt with Special Operations Forces and low intensity conflict.

I think that the bill gave a much-needed boost to Special Operations Forces. There is no question about that. But if you had asked me before that bill was passed what I thought of it, I would have said something to the effect that the last thing the United States needs at this juncture is another Assistant Secretary of Defense. Maybe the next lowest priority is yet one more unified command. I think we could do with fewer of both. And the issues addressed are problems, Senator Nunn, that I would have put to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and said, fix it. Then if they did not, hold them accountable.

I think that the sorts of discussions that we had back during the consideration of the Nichols-Goldwater bill bears directly on this proposition. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, certainly under that legislation, have all the authority they need to deal with a problem like readiness of Special Operations Forces, and it ought to have been very possible to address this without the legislation.

Nonetheless, as I say, the legislation did do a good deal for Special Operations Forces. It gave them a prominence, a visibility, a budget structure, a way of addressing resources that they have never had before, and I suspect that the Nation will be well served. But the responsibilities of this Assistant Secretary for low intensity conflict are quite a different sort of consideration.

In the first place, that Assistant Secretary is going to discover that his responsibilities for low intensity conflict overlap the responsibilities of virtually every one of his colleagues on the Secretary of Defense's staff. Moreover, he is going to discover that there is virtually nothing that can be done under the rubric of low intensity conflict without involving the Department of State. And if the sort of business that we are talking about bridges, as they usually do, international borders into the United States, involved also are the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Customs Service, the Coast Guard and a range of other governmental agencies well outside of the traditional national security community.

So this Assistant Secretary in his role as the proponent for low intensity conflict in the Department of Defense has a very tough row to hoe. Now I applaud the provision of the law which enjoins that there be designated someone in the White House, in the National Security Council staff to concern himself with the phenomena full time, and I think that the establishment of a board or a committee at the National Security Council to overwatch these matters is also sound.

Clearly this is not a matter that can be addressed by the Department of Defense exclusively, or indeed optimally. This is a governmental problem. In the foreign country of interest, it is the Ambassador's charge, and the Ambassador does or should report to the Secretary of State on all of his various undertakings.

The military is definitely in a supporting role, and that makes it very difficult for the Department of Defense to address itself to the range of difficulties that emerge under the rubric of low intensity conflict.

One other point on this issue: The law has confused some, I know from my conversations with them, to believe from its title that Special Operations Forces are the answer to low intensity conflict. They are not. In many respects, they are the most useful kind of force for dealing with some kinds of low intensity conflict. But Special Operations Forces have missions across the spectrum of war, and most of the force structure and most of the equipment that we have purchased for Special Operations Forces were for the sorts of contingencies for which the rest of the force structure was brought into being—that is to say, a major war against the Soviet Union.

Special Operations Forces in fact are not the answer to the intelligence problem to which I earlier alluded, and they are only a partial answer to the security assistance difficulties to which I made reference. They can be extraordinarily useful in both respects, but telling off large numbers of our Special Operations Forces for the purposes of training foreign forces, assisting communications, or gathering intelligence is not a good use of a rare strategic resource.

It is interesting to me to note that although the Soviets in their single-minded devotion to building a massive military machine have put a lot of emphasis on this sort of force, the Speznaz, or Special Operations Forces, one rarely sees or hears of their being employed in Third World nations. Afghanistan, of course, is the specific exception.

I think a way of dramatizing that point is to note that most of the Soviets in Nicaragua are in the military hospital at Chinandega. One of the first things the Soviet Union did when it moved into Nicaragua after the revolution was to put up a military hospital.

When a Sandanista soldier falls in battle wounded, he is evacuated to that Soviet field hospital, and if the treatment there cannot solve his problem, he is evacuated to East Europe by air through an evacuation chain that in every case puts him under the care of the best medical authorities that the Soviet Eastern bloc nations can command.

The Soviets, you see, are sensitive to the Nicaraguan antipathy to foreigners, and to the notions of threatening some sort of new imperialism, and have therefore presented themselves to the Nicaraguan people as benefactors. This is political use of military medicine I believe that the United States should look at very carefully as one of the ways that we could make ourselves very relevant and very useful in the Third World, and as a form of competition with the Soviets in which we clearly would have the upper hand.

The paper here goes into the questions of definitions at some length, Senator. The fundamental point on definitions, however, is that whatever you call it, whether you want to avoid the definition all together and just use terms like "terrorism," "sabotage," "insurgency," or whether you need a more embrasive term for the purposes of devising a national policy, it is important to understand that when the United States commits its Armed Forces to combat anywhere, you have transformed the war or the event. I doubt if there were any large-scale commitment of U.S. forces we would be in what anybody would regard as low intensity operations for very long.

I can see, in low intensity conflict as we have discussed here before, the commitment of a team from the Joint Special Operations Command for the express purposes of a surgical strike to rescue a hostage, or some similar raid. But if we are talking about the commitment of American infantry or American marines anywhere in the world, I submit we are outside of what I would refer to as low intensity conflict.

If we are not at the time we go in, we shortly will be because of the propensity of our commanders to use whatever means are at their disposal to provide security for their troops, and to deal with the situation in front of them. Thus, Vietnam, the war in Southeast Asia, was not, as I would define it, low intensity conflict. I was using B-52s for fire support out there, and that sure as hell is not very low intensity conflict when you are out in the jungle under those Mark-82s raining down.

In any event, whether I am right, or those who would sweep into low intensity conflict the use of U.S. combat forces are right, it is crucial to grasp that you cannot advertise every new force structure fad as an answer to low intensity conflict. I am specifically critical of the propensity among my Army colleagues to refer to the Light Infantry Division as the answer to low intensity conflict. It is not. The Light Infantry Division was designed to fit in an express number of C-141s for strategic mobility purposes, and it is in fact a division that is very poorly structured to deal with a situation such as another, God forbid, Southeast Asia kind of contingency. It does not have the mobility, the staying power to cope with that kind of situation. We have better force structure answers, for example in the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

In any event, I go back to my point that committing American infantry is not, in my view, the way to deal with low intensity conflict. You start with intelligence. You start with your Security Assistance Program. You do that right, you will not have to use your forces in combat except, as I say, for the occasional Special Operations Forces team.

Over to you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Gorman follows:]

NATIONAL STRATEGY
AND
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee
28 January 1987
by
Paul F. Gorman
General, U.S. Army (Retired)

Among the tasks before this Committee, none is more difficult than ascertaining what strategies may be appropriate over the long run for the U.S. in responding to terrorism, insurgency, and the regional wars of the Third World --that genre of recourse to violence for political purposes referred to these days as *low intensity conflict*.

What should be U.S. objectives?

What concepts or premises should guide us?

What shall be the means to our ends?

Strategic Challenges

I can not start our discussion, as some who have spoken before me have, with a brief characterization of principal threats to U.S. interests, because interests and threats relevant to my topic are so diverse as to defy compact generalization. The strategic challenges which I have been asked to address are surely not simply manifestations of the relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Rather, I might usefully begin with a reminder that no President since Franklin Delano Roosevelt has been able to avoid serious domestic political problems arising from involvements with the Third World. Moreover, a significant number of these difficulties, however aided and abetted by the Soviets, had origins in, and derived perpetrators from, radical political, religious, or racial forces beyond the Kremlin's control. And I might observe that Presidents Carter and Reagan have had to cope with some such non-Soviet crises which were without precedent. Trends are adverse. Future Presidents, with less relative national power at their disposal, will face larger numbers of Third World antagonists with access to sophisticated armaments, impelled by militant nationalism, ethnocentrism, and sectarianism.

As I understand the trends --and I hasten to disclaim expertise concerning most-- we can expect, among the "less developed nations" of the Third World, future troubles which will stem from:

1. Industrialization. It is not clear how the fundamental economic transformations ongoing within the advanced industrialized countries --the substantial conversion from hard-good manufactures to service industries will affect Third World futures, but there is definite potential for presenting new military threats to U.S. interests, for exacerbating have/have-not differences, and for inducing high-volume migrations, as well as for opening new opportunities for trade. It is already evident that the growth of arms industries indigenous to the Third World has contributed to the worldwide proliferation of advanced conventional weapons; while the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. continue to be the main suppliers, Brazil, Israel, China, and India are now capable of exporting armament and munitions competitive in quantities and quality with those manufactured in NATO or in the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, it seems just a matter of time before a number of Third World nations will possess both nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them over ranges of a thousand miles or more.

2. Unbalanced growth. There is already more socio-economic dynamism among such rapidly industrializing giants as India, Brazil, or the People's Republic of China, or among industrializing mini-powers like South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, than in either the stagnated communist-bloc, or the much-slowed free, industrialized nations of the northern hemisphere. Controversy over markets, tariffs, credit, and international money management seems likely to heighten, and even to dominate other aspects of U.S. policy toward industrializing states. Perhaps as importantly, our progressively more aged population will contrast with their characteristically young populations, and we are apt to be perceived as a "status quo" power, obstructing rather than facilitating a brighter future.

3. Oil supplies and oil prices. The Middle East remains the only major source of petroleum fuels without substantial local claimants, and without high accessibility costs. Exploratory wells there typically produce 100 times what flows from similar wells in the U.S. The chances are that OPEC will reassert itself as a major political-economic factor. But even OPEC reserves are limited, and the entire world is going to have to confront the reality that petroleum can continue to serve societies as it has over the past century only for a few decades to come. A shift to natural gas, coal, and nuclear power is inevitable, and is bound to have profound implications for U.S. national strategy.

4. New and more restive neighbors. The prowess of air transportation and modern information media have brought the U.S. into unprecedented intimacy with peoples worldwide. The recent waves of immigration, and the newsworthiness of Third World developments attest to these transformations. We live in an ever-smaller, ever more interdependent world, and find ourselves caught up in national, racial and religious quarrels for which our geography, history and mores have not prepared us. Even the most familiar international relations require redefinition in the light of current and portended realities: the premises which have heretofore governed U.S. relations with Mexico are questionably relevant for the future,

for Mexico faces political, economic, and social urgencies which auger for both more internal instability and increasings tensions with the U.S.

5. Smuggled drugs. Most of the illegal narcotics sold in the U.S. come from Third World countries. The U.S. has not been able, as yet, to curtail illicit drug consumption at home, or to develop techniques for decisive intervention, on behalf of a friendly government, against narco-traffickers abroad.

6. Shrinking base structure. The divestiture of U.S. overseas military bases, which has been a hallmark of U.S. experience in the Third World over the last two decades, is likely to continue, and we are likely to become ever more dependent militarily on naval power and force projection from the U.S. itself to protect our interests abroad.

7. Exported violence. Whatever their rhetoric about "peaceful competition", the U.S.S.R. and its client states behave as though they are deeply committed to future political violence, and are determinedly preparing to foment, to augment, to support, or to capitalize upon it. The Soviet Union and Cuba, in particular, continue to train, year by year, thousands of young men and women from Third World nations for terrorism, insurgency, and subversion. Moreover, over the past decade, the presence and influence of Soviet Bloc nations has grown substantially in the Third World, as the following charts attest:



Figure 1



MILITARY ADVISERS AND TROOPS IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

FIGURE 2

Figure 1 and 2 suggest that sometime in the mid-'70's, strategists of the U.S.S.R., seeing the United States in the throes of Watergate, and perhaps encouraged by the War Powers Resolution and the Clark Amendment to believe that the U.S. did not intend to contest a more aggressive policy in the Third World, launched a vigorous effort to suborn developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Like their war materiel, their undertakings were initially clumsy and trouble-prone; but they retrofitted in service, and today their overseas operations are quite serviceable. From the strategic point of view, the Soviets have managed "low intensity conflict" far better than the United States. They prefer to work low profile, preferably at the top. They are particularly adroit at installing their own or proxy command, communications, and intelligence systems. Their hand is often hidden, or clad in the velvet of humanitarian aid. They have an effective coalition strategy; their use of "fraternal nations" has been masterful. While their political and economic doctrines are patently vapid, and while association with them seems to offer to any Third World country only subjugation to a new, more oppressive form of imperialism, they probably consider it significant that the number of Marxist-Leninist garrison states in the Third World has grown. And now a Cuba-like Nicaragua is on the same continent with the United States.

But I hasten to reemphasize that the future security environment in the Third World can not be assessed only in East-West terms. There are ample indigenous causes for tension and violence, and year by year, armaments increase in range and lethality. It is possible to anticipate a time when nuclear weapons will be in the hands of Third World nations, such as Libya, Iran and Iraq, whose recent history has been marred by instability and international ruthlessness. For example, the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College published last summer a paper entitled: A World 2010, A Decline of Superpower Influence, in which the author, Charles W. Taylor speculates that national holdings of nuclear weapons might look like this:

YEAR 2010

POSTINDUSTRIAL
FRANCE [1]
JAPAN [3]
UNITED KINGDOM [1]
UNITED STATES [1]
WEST GERMANY [3]

ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL
ISRAEL [2]
SOUTH AFRICA [2]
TAIWAN [3]

TRANSITIONING INDUSTRIAL
ARGENTINA [4]
BRAZIL [4]
CHILE [4]

INDUSTRIAL
CHINA [1]
INDIA [2]
PAKISTAN [2]
NORTH KOREA [3]
SOUTH KOREA [3]
U.S.S.R. [1]
VIETNAM [4]

PREINDUSTRIAL
EGYPT [5]
IRAN [5]
IRAQ [5]
LIBYA [5]
SAUDI ARABIA [5]

Weapons
[1] 2000+
[2] up to 1000
[3] up to 500
[4] up to 100
[5] up to 50

The implications of these speculations are not pleasant to contemplate: a world in which trained terorists and subversives abound, operating in league with drug cartels, in which irresponsible nations will possess devastating military power. There will probably be a decline in the ability of any U.S. President to influence events abroad, and an increase in the risks to national security with which our leaders, and the American people, will have to live. Sound strategy will be more important than ever.

Strategic Objectives

As you know, the President's Commission on Defense Management, the Packard Commission, recommended revision of the procedures by which defense budgets were prepared to emphasize the importance of the Commander-in-Chief's first eliciting from his principal advisers recommendations on national strategy, and his providing them guidance relating strategic ends to means. I believe that the Republic is indebted to the leaders of this Committee not only to the attention they are directing to these matters in this Congress, but to their role in enacting the Nichols-Goldwater legislation on national security management, and on national readiness for Special Operations and low intensity conflict. Clearly, to arm for the future, we need to bring to bear all we can learn from the past, all our intellect, all our ingenuity.

Many Americans, and some Senators, believe, since violence is inevitable in the Third World, so inflexible are societies and governments there, so intractable are the problems of overpopulation and livelihood, that the objective of the U.S. should be *non-involvement.* But we live today in a world so interdependent as to involve this nation with violence there, whether the President intends involvement or not, whenever:

☐ American citizens are assaulted, killed or held hostage.

☐ A representative democracy, respectful of human rights, faces violent extinction, or such a government might emerge from ongoing violence.

☐ American economic holdings are seriously threatened, or the regional climate of investment is severely impaired.

☐ It causes a considerable flow of refugees to the U.S.

☐ It facilitates international criminals' preying upon U.S. citizens, as in cocaine trafficking.

☐ It engagés significant geostrategic imperatives, such as access to fuels or raw materials, protection of sea or air lines of communications, or denial of military bases to the U.S.S.R. or its proxies.

To illustrate one approach to devising national strategy, let me offer an very hypothetical example, simply to show how one might proceed from presidential generality to budgetary specifics. A President might want to establish national objectives something like the following:

Illustrative Strategic Objectives

....

L. Optimally, a community of free nations committed to open political systems, to eschewing political violence, and to respecting individual rights and freedoms. Minimally, reliable friends and allies committed to political ideals similar to our own, willing to act to preserve their independence and to help others whose freedom is threatened. As a corollary, fewer states affiliated with Moscow, or governed in ways inconsistent with our precepts of human rights and dignity, or wedded to political violence in any form.

M. Equitable trade, financing, emigration and aid policies within the community of free nations, coupled with concerted action against international criminality, especially illegal narcotics trafficking.

N. Concerted security arrangements within that community which shield political and economic developments consistent with Objectives A and B above.

O. Reduction in the risks to American citizens at home or abroad from international terrorists.

P. Security for international airways and waterways, and for access to fuels and raw materials.

Strategic Concepts

Objectives say what we want to do, but strategy also requires articulating broad principles of how to do it, and considering with what to do it.

What concepts might be relevant to achieving the foregoing objectives? The President might want to consider some like these:

Illustrative Strategic Concepts

....

17. Intelligence will be central to ascertaining the best course of action for the U.S. in any nation or region, and in any given contingency. Intelligence is what we can best provide any threatened friend or ally. Accordingly, first priority should be given to collecting and analysing information about people, places and events likely to affect achieving our objectives, and to disseminating intelligence to underwrite effective planning, diplomacy, and other actions.

18. Outside NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with few exceptions, the United States role should be to support another party, or a regional group, willing to act on its own behalf. Our main contribution should be to help others to help themselves. But our deeds and our word should leave no doubt in Moscow that use of Soviet military forces anywhere in the Third World will precipitate prompt counteraction, at a time and place of our choosing.

19. In supporting developing free nations, we must proceed conscious of the real limitations upon our ability to act alone. Our aid should be selective, calculated to effect maximum deterrence among our antagonists, and greatest encouragement among our friends. We should try to obtain the cooperation of all advanced nations in proportion to their wealth, and to their

economic and military capacity. Moreover, we should seek acceptance of responsibility by any free nation, whatever its wealth and state of development, to help another with money, manpower, or materiel, even if the donor can afford no more than token aid.

20. We should seek to obtain the cooperation of all nations to stop international terrorists, illicit arms shippers, and illegal narcotics traffickers. Particularly vulnerable terrorist targets, such as airliners and airports should be hardened by international compact. We should be prepared to support nations willing to cooperate, primarily with intelligence. And we should be prepared to act unilaterally as necessary ourselves.

21. We should maintain military readiness to attack with precision and discrimination to eliminate any direct threat to our homeland, but we should do so with mobile forces as independent of foreign basing as possible.

....

Strategic Means

How can these concepts be translated into national power? Past Presidents, and occasionally the Congress, have translated a strategic idea --or "doctrine", as these are sometimes referred to-- into a capacity for action by one or more of the following:

(1) Reorganization. Setting up a special command apparatus to signify to prospective foes, and to Congress and the American people, watchfulness, and intent to use force if necessary. Examples are President Carter's establishment of the Joint Caribbean Task Force at Key West to meet anxieties generated by "discovery" of Soviet troops in Cuba in 1979, and President Reagan's assumption of the Carter Doctrine on the Persian Gulf by establishment of the U.S. Central Command. An even more recent, and perhaps further reaching example, is the law establishing a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and authorities within the National Security Council to overwatch interagency actions on Low Intensity Conflict.

(2) Funding. Seeking extraordinary resource allocations to build new capabilities, as in the drive for a 600 ship Navy, or the Strategic Defense Initiative, or by canceling or postponing programs (e.g. B-1, Sergeant York).

(3) Diplomacy. Initiating action to alter strategic relationships by forming new alliances, revising old ones, or negotiating arms control agreements.

(4) Restructuring. Directing alterations of force structure as in the case of the recent Army initiative to form light infantry divisions, or the recent Congressional action to bolster Special Operations Forces.

(5) Redeployments. Changing the disposition of U.S. forces, such as moving the 7th Fleet to the Indian Ocean, or withdrawing a division from Korea.

This Committee has been at the center of strategic concept and action for the past several years. The attention you have directed to management of the Department of Defense, to the capabilities of our unified and specified commands, and most recently to organization to deal with SOF and LIC, has provided us all renewed strategic vision, and heightened awareness of what is necessary to pursue strategy, and, as importantly, what is superfluous or disfunctional.

Since my charge was to discuss strategy appropriate for Low Intensity Conflict, I want now to focus on the recent legislation pertaining to that matter. The law gave a much needed boost to Special Operations Forces. It was an excellent example of addressing "how" in strategy, in that Congress mandated the establishment of a new unified command with a Commander-in-Chief, and a new Assistant Secretary of Defense, both charged with seeing to it that Special Operations Forces were properly funded, structured, and readied for employment. If these do their job, they will also assure diplomatic action to guarantee access for SOF as needed.

But I doubt that the law did as much to enhance U.S. readiness for Low Intensity Conflict. The new Assistant Secretary of Defense has a legislated charter to concern himself with Low Intensity Conflict, but then virtually every other DoD official of comparable rank has overlapping responsibility, and Low Intensity Conflict is the concern of a number of Cabinet Officers other than the Secretary of Defense. The mandated Deputy National Security Adviser for Low Intensity Conflict is in a better position to deal with the interagency issues which LIC presents, and presumeahly the advisory board established by the law can assist the NSC in laying down a long range strategy for LIC. But unresolved are a wide range of questions, including how to organize to implement LIC strategy, how and for what to obtain funding, to what ends diplomatic action, and what forces where. To be sure, better SOF will help our LIC posture, but Special Operations are not synonymous with Low Intensity Conflict, and I fear that making SOF a better competitor for defense resources may make LIC less likely, in the shouldering among claimants, to receive the support it deserves within DoD, and less likely to attract Congressional interest.

As you well know *Special Operations Forces* are a unique set of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, with specialized training and equipment. *Low Intensity Conflict* is a form of warfare in which the U.S. deliberately accepts limits on the kind and amount of force it brings to bear. These distinctions occasion very different requirements and attitudes within the armed services, within the Department of Defense, and within Congress, as the following indicates:

	Armed Services	DoD	SOF/LIC Law
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES	Requires elites; services abhor elites	Prime actor	Supports, promotes; Provides ASD, CINC
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT	Requires non-elites; low priority	State Dept in charge; DoD in supporting cast	Constrains; provides NSC staffer, Board

Special Operations Forces have missions across the entire spectrum of war. Both U.S. SOF and their Soviet counterparts were conceived for the apocalyptic contingencies of World War III. Much of the capabilities with which we endow our SOF have little or nothing to do with combatting terrorists, or training Third World forces to cope with guerrillas. Rather, SOF are organized and trained to lend an unconventional dimension to deterrence, and in particular to pose a threat of exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities to nationalist dissidence. To be sure, they are manned by the sort of individuals one would want on his team in any dangerous, chancy, unstructured operation, of the sort we have often had to mount in the Third World. But we must not equate SOF with counter-terrorist forces --although counter-terrorist forces are SOF-- and we surely must not consign them to the dustbin of "counterinsurgency". SOF are assuredly more catholic than "low intensity conflict."

It was the British, I believe, who first pointed out how useful it was for a nation possessing nuclear weapons to remind itself in its strategic doctrine that there are forms of conflict for which the possession of nuclear weapons is simply irrelevant --a number of possible cases of recourse to violence for political purposes which are unlikely to be deterred by a nuclear arsenal, nor resolved by its use. Frank Kitson's 1971 book, Low Intensity Operations, is a case in point. I do not know whether those who teach strategy at the Soviet equivalent of our War Colleges point out that the USSR's supporting international lawlessness, terrorism, and insurgency is a low risk, low cost way of achieving the stated objectives of Leninism. Soviet strategy in the Third World would certainly suggest that such is the case.

But note that the Soviets have not made extensive use of their "special operations forces" outside their borders (with the significant exception of Afghanistan). Rather, they have pursued their ends indirectly, through training, aid, and advice for Third World proxies, avoiding the employment of elite combat forces. The telling fact about the Soviet role in Central America is that two-thirds of their nationals in Nicaragua are in a military field-hospital in Chinandega: they appear before a people sensitive to foreign domination as benefactors.

The United States ought to approach low intensity conflict no less thoughtfully. We can not pursue our objectives in the Third World exclusively with the Peace Corps on the one hand, or the Green Berets on the other. We need a broader range of instruments for creating and maintaining the security shield for development than recourse to Special Operations Forces alone.

Two years ago I imposed on this Committee the following chart, a depiction of a continuum of possible wars, or war-like uses of violence in which U.S. interests might be involved:



FIGURE 4

The continuum is shown as broken to suggest that there is a categorical difference among conflicts pitting U.S. forces against those of the Soviet Union, or of another power armed with weapons of mass destruction and intercontinental ranges, and conflicts with lesser adversaries. After all, U,S. troops have not exchanged shots with the Red Army since it skirmished with the Michigan National Guard in the winter of 1918-1919, and going to war against the Soviets themselves would be to cross a significant, long-standing "firebreak." Similarly, we may be confronted with other enemies who could attack the U.S. itself with chemical or nuclear weapons. In this paradigm, "low intensity conflict" occupies the left sector, where probability of occurrence is high, but intensity, referring to use of weapons of mass destruction, relatively low.

"Low intensity conflict" then includes both terrorism and guerrilla warfare, as the following diagram suggests (Figure 5):



FIGURE 5

Note that I categorize any use of conventional forces for fire support or maneuver as mid-intensity; hence, as I see it, Grenada and Tripoli are outside the rubric of "low intensity conflict" (but I know that there is not general agreement on that point).

We can now visualize what sort of forces one might need to enact the concepts for achieving our national objectives. There are two contextual imperatives: (1) strategic or national intelligence, which provides a means of assessing threats, of anticipating their actualization, is essential for deciding if, when, where, and how to commit U.S. forces; (2) mobile forces, especially naval forces which can collect intelligence and convey to potential adversaries our potential for using force should our interests so require. Admiral James Watkins, the former Chief of Naval Operations, used this construct for naval contributions to Low Intensity Conflict (Figure 5A):



Figure 5A

But if our fundamental goal is to help others to defend themselves, then our own forces would avoid direct action except in those rare circumstances where speed, surprise, or lack of alternative dictates the use of our own Special Operations Forces. Rather than engagement (fire support or maneuver), the force functions most likely to be needed ashore are security assistance, intelligence, and communications. On the following diagram (Figure 6), I have portrayed U.S. force functions in the order in which they are likely to come into play inside a country afflicted with Low Intensity Conflict:



FIGURE 6

I believe that adroit use of U.S. forces capable of performing the cited non-combatant functions in Third World countries might obviate the need to proceed beyond logistical support of indigenous forces to use of U.S. General Purpose Forces for fire support or maneuver.

I regret to say that professional colleagues have obscured this issue by justifying the Army's new light infantry division on the grounds of utility for "low intensity conflict." One way the Army's natural repugnance for elites manifests itself is in a propensity to advertise all infantry as elite, and to claim for light infantry attributes one would be pleased to have in Rangers or Special Forces.

The facts are, of course, that light infantry divisions were built for strategic mobility, designed to deploy in a specified number of C-141's for use in intercontinental force projection to meet conventional threats. Their training may harden them to SOF standards, but I find it hard to conceive of useful missions for light divisions in "low intensity" conflict. It is fallacious to assume that readiness for one form of warfare automatically insures readiness for another; I suspect that readiness to defend the defiles of the Zagros is questionable preparation for serving on a Mobile Training Team in El Salvador, or even for securing an airbase in Honduras. As for fighting, we would no longer be talking about LIC. U.S. combatants would transform the intensity of any conflict. Any time a U.S. infantryman dies in combat anywhere, we will be impelled to wage mid- or higher intensity warfare, to use ordnance in quality and quantity which almost surely will escape sensible definitions of "low intensity."

The diagram emphasizes the importance of Security Assistance, Theater Intelligence, and Communications, and each deserve comment as elements of readiness for Low Intensity Conflict:

Security Assistance. The second of the "Illustrative Strategic Concepts" set forth above stressed helping others to help themselves. That is, of course, the fundamental premise of the "Guam Doctrine", a strategic concept which President Nixon and every President since has espoused. Given the increasing diversity of the world, and the growing limitations on American military power, such a concept reflects the only realistic way we can play an active role in the Third World. We and our friends face increasing threats from internationally supported subversion, terrorism and criminality. As a strategic response, we have little recourse beyond helping those friends to deal with the perpetrators within the framework of their own laws and culture. Our alternatives, passivity or unilateral action, are unattractive, and would almost surely eventuate in more violence, at higher levels of intensity.

My impression from teaching and speaking around the country is that most Americans agree that we ought to provide Security Assistance. But it does not seem to have solid support in the Congress. Security Assistance is provided for under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, as a part of "foreign aid." In the Budget, it is classified as "International Affairs" (Budget Function 150), not "national defense" (Budget Function 050). Twenty-five years of Congressional compromises have layered over the procedures for devising, reviewing, and justifying expenditures under the law to the point that, in my judgement, the resultant program is overly rigid, and no longer responsive to strategic reality. Let me be clear, however, that I believe that the several Administrations must bear responsibility for this state of affairs with the Congress.

In recent years, most Security Assistance funds have been spent as quid pro quo for overseas bases (e.g., Spain, Portugal, the Philippines, Korea), or to Cain/Abel pairings in which we seek to bribe one of a fraternal pair to eschew attacking another (e.g., Egypt/Israel, Greece/Turkey). Very little is left for Third World nations struggling with Low Intensity Conflict. The following chart (Figure 7) portrays how little is set aside for Africa and Latin America; the diagram is based on figures which exclude Economic Support Funds, but show funds for Military Assistance, Foreign Military Sales Financing, and Training:



Figure 7

The Administration's total proposal for Fiscal Year 1986 Security Assistance (which are the latest figures I have to work with) amounted to some $6 billion. But within that amount just 6 nations were allocated over 80%; Egypt and Israel received more than half:

FY 86 SECURITY ASSISTANCE

	% Total Program
Egypt	22.0
Israel	33.0
Greece	7.6
Turkey	10.8
Portugal	2.7
Spain	6.7
Subtotal	**82.8%**

Figure 8

But issues concerning Security Assistance are much more profound than simply cutting the resource pie, or arguing over whether the pie should be bigger or smaller. Even if budgets were not likely to grow smaller over the coming years, the United States can no longer be of much material help to any Third World nation wrestling with Low Intensity Conflict because this nation no longer produces the sort of inexpensive, simple, rugged military equipment they require. Even more crippling, we charge too much for services, such as training and transportation.

Let me give an example: anyone who travels in the Third World appreciates that in most countries the sinews of nationhood include a fleet of rickety, but still-serviceable C-47 (DC-3) aircraft, built in the U.S. 3 or 4 decades ago. LIC crisis thrusts on any developing nation urgencies for use of air transportation --for them, those old two-engined, unpressurized C-47's constitute strategic airlift. But we now have no American-manufactured aircraft which is a modern equivalent of the C-47 in versatility of operations, simplicity of maintenance, ease of manning, or cost of operation. The current U.S. Air Force counterpart, the C-130, is much too complicated and demanding for most Third World countries, and when we present aid-clients C-130's, as we did to Chad a few years ago, we hang an economic millstone around their neck. Since 1966 there has been a recognized requirement within the U.S. armed services for a fixed wing air transport capable not only of freight and transport duty, but also use in medical evacuation, communications relay, reconnaissance, and fire support. Because of competing demands for funds, and the lack of a constituency for so modest an airlifter within the Air Force, we still have nothing to fill that requirement, a "Third World airlifter" to offer LIC-beleagured friends anywhere.

I do not see how any Administration could implement the "Illustrative Strategic Concepts" above without some substantial revision of the Foreign Assistance Act as it now stands, a revision which would permit the Administration to engage our military professionals and American industrialists in imaginative, extended research and development programs seeking rational sets of equipment germane to LIC, some of which might then be manufactured overseas by one of the industrializing nations of the Third World. The strategic objectives and concepts under discussion would be the more viable were we thus to extend the notion of collective security within the Free World to include cooperative programs for integration into our Security Assistance --meaning that we ought to set out, deliberately and energetically, to help others help others.

Theater Intelligence. That intelligence plays a critical role in Low Intensity Conflict seems a truism, but there is a difference between the sort of intelligence which is available to the United States on a day-to-day basis, from our national collection systems or from our military forces in their normal pursuits, and the kind of detailed, fine-grain intelligence which can be generated by activating an intensive collection and analysis effort within one of the regional unified commands. The United States has had among its armed forces resources which might be used for such purposes, of proven efficacy, but currently scarce. By and large, they were brought into being for other purposes, chiefly as a hedge against high intensity conflict, and their diversion to LIC tasks entails acceptance of risk. Military intelligence units are often awkward to host abroad, equipped and manned as most of them are for missions in more intense warfare. Non-military intelligence services, and some Ambassadors, are understandably often reluctant to employ them. But I believe that developments in communications and processors (computers) now make it possible to contemplate new, economical intelligence architectures very different from the past.

Communications. To meet the exigencies of LIC, the President should seek, and the Congress should support, a National Command Communications System which makes possible secure image-conferencing among Ambassadors and CINC's abroad with officials of the several Departments and agencies in Washington, the better to exchange information and judgements, and to evaluate collectively fast-moving situations. State Department communications have, in my experience, been inadequate for the task; DoD communications are more versatile and reliable, especially for intelligence dissemination. Intelligence is, after all, information that has been sifted, transmitted, and placed between the ears of a decider or operator. But we will not have effective intelligence for LIC, in my view, until we remedy three major deficiencies in DoD communications:

(1) Most DoD assets have been reserved for the contingencies for mid- and high intensity conflict, and have been only reluctantly and sparingly made available for LIC situations.

(2) Most are expensive, complicated, and manpower intensive, buttressed as they are against electromagnetic pulse and the energetic high technology countermeasures of a world-power adversary.

(3) Most are not welcomed in Embassies; diplomats have been prone to resist installing communications which they do not directly control.

But we are entering into an age of communications plenty; we need but a plan for exploiting technology. Communications for supporting LIC functions need not be provided at the expense of other missions, and need not be either expensive or complex.

Other Force Functions for LIC. **Civic Action**, the provision by military forces of aid to the populace, is a contentious undertaking. Most Ambassadors and AID Country Directors look upon it with suspicion that it lead to the military's usurping projects which should properly be performed by civilian agencies or the private sector. When it comes to using U.S. forces in civic action, these complications multiply. But if civic action projects be carefully selected, military forces will be assigned tasks only when and where there are no civilians to perform them. As far as U.S. forces are concerned, civic action projects overseas often provide opportunities for training unavailable in the U.S., given the EPA and other constraints on what military units, such as engineer battalions or well-drilling detachments, can do at home station.

I have mentioned four other "force functions --possible U.S. force contributions to coping with low intensity conflict:

Construction
Medicine
Mobility
Logistic Support

Were the Administration so to direct, and the Congress to support, I am convinced that the United States could:

☐ Acquire capabilities to communicate broadly and effectively with peoples anywhere on the surface of the globe.

☐ Greatly increase our own capabilities, and those of foreign governments, to develop and act on intelligence on terrorists, guerrillas, and international criminals.

☐ Develop and teach pioneering and construction techniques which could significantly change the orientation of foreign armed forces.

☐ Create similarly useful medical cadres and medical service organizations within foreign armed forces.

☐ Modernize and rationalize logistics within foreign forces, to the betterment of their military efficiency, and the improvement of their nation's economy.

The payoff for such a strategy would be more free nations, and confounded and deterred terrorists, insurgents, and traffickers. The payoff would be diminished chances that U.S. armed forces, SOF or any others, would have to be committed to combat.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, General Gorman.

I am going to yield my time, or maybe I will take his place when it comes, to Senator Cohen since he has been a real leader in this area, and I know he would like to get right into some of the questions regarding the Gorman testimony, so I yield my time. We will go by the 6-minute rule.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate, General, your testimony. I am glad I did not call upon you to give reasons for not creating the new legislation that we adopted last year, because we had a tough enough time in dealing with the Pentagon to even discuss the matter I think in a rational way.

General GORMAN. You may have been in one of those situations where your sole recourse was just to hit them alongside the ear and see what happened.

Senator COHEN. Well, frankly, I must tell you that it was my intention, and I believe Senator Nunn's at that time, to simply use the proposed legislation as a prod to see if the Department of Defense would not undertake to do the kind of reforms, or take the initiatives that we thought were necessary. And what was a turning point, at least in my judgment, was it came to the revelations about some of the things that took place during the Grenada operation. The kind of conflicts, rivalries, planning and misplanning that took place contributed to some of our losses during that particular operation persuaded me that, rather than simply being advisory, we ought to make it mandatory.

So we started out as a prod with that in mind, but it quickly evolved into something that was much more important in terms of seeing some action. I bring this up, because I think you used the words, "The traditional military establishment's reluctance to come to grips with low intensity conflict." That is what we ran into, and we had a DOD report last year which essentially concluded the same thing.

> Our current defense posture reflects our inability to understand the form and substance of the direct challenge to our interests. Our lack of understanding is manifested in a lack of unity of effort by doctrine, training, organization, or material to execute operations, and a lack of a sustaining support system. Short of war, we have no strategy or comprehensive plan to address the challenge of political violence.

So we kept coming into contact with statements coming out, fairly authoritative, that we are ill prepared to cope with the most likely types of challenges that we face in the coming decade, and nothing we seem to say or do was going to move the bureaucracy as such to come to grips with it. I had asked you, for example, what do you suggest are the reasons for the inability to deal with low intensity conflict which everybody from Secretary Shultz, Kissinger, Kirkpatrick, on down recognizes that this is the type of conflict that is we are most likely ill prepared to deal with?

General GORMAN. Grenada is a poor example, in my view, of low intensity conflict, but it gets sort of into that definitional area that we are talking about.

Let us stand back for a moment and take a look at where we were with that operation. First of all, I was a supporting commander. I happened to be in Washington while the planning was underway, so I was able to follow it fairly closely. My contributions were to send a couple of AC-130s over to help the Atlantic Command. Now you may recall that in one of their rare bursts of strategic clarity the JCS removed the Caribbean islands from the purview of my predecessor, USCINCSO and, but for that stroke of genius, I would have been in command of Grenada and far more responsible for the outcome. Irresponsible onlooker that I am, I would comment that here was a case that we clearly should have foreseen.

I mean, this damn pot had been boiling for years—months, certainly.

Chairman NUNN. The President of the United States had been on television identifying that air field on national television as a threat.

General GORMAN. Sure. And we had a command established, a joint headquarters established in Key West, FL in 1979—you will recall when Senator Church discovered the presence of the Soviet brigade in Cuba. We ended up with yet one more unified command headquarters down there, with express responsibility for commanding and controlling contingency operations on the Caribbean islands. Yet, when we came to the point of having to commit forces, we were foundering, looking for maps, trying to get together some kind of a command structure that made sense, and ultimately ended up using the Second Fleet Commander.

Now given the time deadlines under which everything was moving, that may have been the best we could do, but it does seem to me that you can fault the whole mechanism for lack of prescience. You should have seen that problem coming. In my view, for example, having dealt with a number of comparable sorts of contingencies while I was commander, the United States should have put at the disposal of the President not only a plan and all of the supporting intelligence for a plan, but a rehearsed force.

I cannot emphasize enough the criticality of actually going out and running rehearsals. You do not need to do this in any kind of showy way. Senator Thurmond may know that there were some curious maneuvers on some of the military posts in his State some years ago. Those were rehearsals for contingency plans in my command. I also believe that a unified commander worried about an upcoming problem in low intensity conflict has got to start with the intelligence base, build that, and keep building it; focus a lot of tactical intelligence on the whole area, so that when somebody up here decides, as they will from time to time (usually when the CINC is out of theater and in Vermont skiing at Christmas time, or something like that) they will decide that we have what we need to implement that plan.

You then do not need to do the sort of scrambling that took place here in town on the eve of Grenada.

Senator COHEN. Grenada may be a poor example of low intensity conflict, but I think the use of the Special Forces in that case was also a poor use of the Special Forces that we had, subjecting them to a risk that they need not have been exposed to.

General GORMAN. Granted.

Senator COHEN. May I just switch for a minute. My time is running out. We talked about the deficiencies and how the Soviets do in fact learn from mistakes and how they approach it in terms of getting assistance that is significant, not only symbolic but significant, to their allies in the countries that they support.

What about El Salvador? We have had a measure of success in how we have dealt with El Salvador, and as no small result of your own actions in advising in that regard, but there as I understand it you have special forces people who have really agreed with the congressional limitation of no more than 50. Congress was concerned for different reasons, of committing a large number of troops, letting the Army perhaps do what it likes to do best, and that is to build up an infrastructure and really gear up for some type of war. But Congress said, no, you have 50 and that is all you are going to deal with, and the special forces people I think at that point thanked us for doing the right thing. This is their war, not ours. If we want to lend assistance, advice, some training, but basically not to become involved.

The biggest problem I saw when I was there back in 1983, to contrast that to the Soviet experience, the Salvadorans did not have any helicopters to get their wounded out of the jungle. They would die almost within a few hours. They needed helicopters. They needed that kind of military assistance. So the fact is that Congress was a little bit ahead, I think, of the military establishment in terms of limiting our involvement.

Would you just comment on the seeming success of El Salvador so far?

General GORMAN. Well on the issue of 55, it is an irrational number. It did not make any sense at the time that it was whomped up——

Senator COHEN. It was political.

General GORMAN. It was a political number. And as the Commander in Chief—I took over in May 1983, as you will recall—I would have much preferred simply to have gotten some guidance to do it with minimum force. Sometimes the answer might have been 32. The next Thursday it might have been 74. I have absolutely no problem at all with the idea that we had to do it with minimum presence.

That gets right directly to what is it that you are trying to do? We certainly did not want the Salvadorans to assume, as they were prone to, that if they screwed it up enough we would come in and rescue them. One of the first things that I got across to my colleagues in the Salvadoran armed forces was that there was not going to be any rescue operation. They were going to sink or swim on their own.

And I must say that it was helpful to me in that respect to have a congressional set of positions expressed in various laws and budgetary allocations which made it very evident that I spoke for you. You could point to any number of statements on any given week which made it quite clear to the Salvadorans that whatever else happened down there, they were the architects of the future, not the United States.

Now you mentioned Special Forces. There was one battalion of Special Forces in Panama that was a prime source for trainers, but you should appreciate that most of the people of the 55 who were in-country at any given time under the Security Assistance Program were not from Special Operations Forces, not Special Forces, Army, or other Special Operations Forces like SEALS.

A number of the key players throughout the period, many of them NCO, were Special Forces people. They are great for specific roles. When you are, for example, trying to get the Salvadorans to understand something about public relations, you do not tap somebody in a Green Beret, and send him in to do that. Or if you are trying to teach them how to reblue their old rifles—they were continually showing up at my doorstep saying we need more rifles; the country was practically sinking under the weight of the ordnance that had been shipped there in previous years. There were about three weapons per capita in the country, most of them unuseable. In San Salvador, there were whole warehouses of old largely German-made rifles. Well, we tried to show them how to get into the business of reconditioning weapons. Or, to take another humble example, you mentioned helicopters. Yes, I agree completely on the point of medical evacuation. That was a good investment. We reduced the mortality in the Salvadoran army from about 50 percent wounded to dead, to around 10 or 11 percent in 2 years, and that is a pretty dramatic kind of change. The Army's Medical Service Corps and Medical Corps, the U.S. doctors we put in there, deserve a lot of credit for teaching them how to build that kind of capability.

It is the sort of service that we ought to perform. But that was not Special Forces. Looking at the larger issue of the mobility of that army, what they needed more than helicopters was just good boots. They were operating up in the volcanic parts of the country where the soil and the rocks are very tough on boot soles. They had a locally manufactured boot that resembled our jungle boot, but the sole of which was about like an ordinary sneaker.

Senator **Cohen**. We tried to tell you to buy from L.L. Bean, but you would not do it. [Laughter.]

General **Gorman**. Senator, L.L. Bean and the United States Army are just too expensive for the Salvadorans. They cannot afford either. They could make those boots themselves, if we showed them how to do the sole part of it. That needs technicians for a technology transfer, not Special Forces.

To take another point, the Salvadoran army's mobility was impaired by the lack of a field ration. The usual way of operating when I got there was to issue a bag of gold to a commander. He would pocket some of it. He would go down into the village and buy the food for the operation, and enemy agents down there could determine on the basis of what he purchased how many soldiers were going out in the field, and generally speaking from talking to the shopkeepers ascertain virtually every detail of the operation.

The idea of putting the Salvadorans onto some sort of a storable portable field ration was a kind of a revolutionary idea, and we brought some people from Natick, MA, to show them how to do that kind of thing. They can put up their own beans and chili and sort of business. They are perfectly capable of doing that. It had just never occurred, in the kind of professional scope of those people, that that is the kind of business they ought to be in.

Now I must tell you that helicopters are faddish. You present any U.S. ambassador, political appointee or foreign service officer, with a low intensity conflict situation, and his first recourse is to fire off a message to the State Department asking for helicopters. We are shipping these damn things with gay abandon all over the world.

We do a major disservice to many countries in burdening them with that maintenance nightmare. Now we have got El Salvador struggling to its feet with 60 helicopter millstones around its neck—too many. Too many, by far.

I think the Security Assistant Act ought to be amended to permit us to lend, just so that we could have not only a mobilization plan to get an attacked country moving, but a demobilization plan to pull our equipment away when we no longer need it. Above all, we must not breed into such armies the notion that there is always going to be that kind of transportation available to them.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I would defer to the chairman.

Chairman NUNN. No, I waive my time. You go ahead. I will come back to mine later on. Go ahead.

Senator WARNER. Several members of the Senate Intelligence Committee are here, and we have a varied interest in your response. You are quite pointed in your observations. What sort of intelligence collection are you proposing we engage in?

General GORMAN. I want to direct your attention to at least three areas where we need dramatic improvement.

I was, as you know, at one time a National Intelligence Officer. I sat in the councils of the intelligence community at the top late in the Carter administration, and heard at that point in time, numerous assertions that, boy, this terrorism thing is really going to be important, and we therefore have got to get ready, and we need people.

We need to set aside some bright people, train, educate, direct their attention, get them the lingual skills and the sort of background they need to be either good collectors in the field, or shrewd analysts here in Washington.

That apparently did not take place, and I know from having been associated with those in charge of the counterterrorism business here in the United States over the years that they are still saying, gee, we really need to set up a professional cadre of people that are steeped in terrorist threats, and stay with it for years. Only by that way are we going to be able to get head of Abu Nidal or any of these other international terrorist groups that are well funded, organized, and have a scope that is not only transcultural, and transnational, but intercontinental in reach.

So we need to build the intelligence cadres. We need to take a hard look at our manpower. Going back to your question on El Salvador, the roots of success in El Salvador, if there can be such a label applied to an ongoing war, the outcome of which is still uncertain, the change for the better really began here in a decision taken in 1981 to establish a special overwatch committee at the Intelligence Community Staff, an interagency group, that would ask the hard questions of the several intelligence agencies of who is analyzing the problem of Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador? Who is there? How many? How well trained are they? What are we going to do to fix the shortages that are identified?

That committee under Adm. Al Burkhalter did yeoman service for the United States very quietly by prodding the intelligence community to put people in place where they could do some good. In that respect, the Defense Intelligence Agency in a very exceptionally perceptive move agreed to establish over in the basement of the Pentagon something called the Central American Joint Intelligence Team. All in the world that was, Senator Warner, was just a-collection of people who had their head in El Salvador. They lived El Salvador, breathed El Salvador, read every bit of stuff out of El Salvador, talked with us in Panama and with my folks in San Salvador day in and day out. They assembled, after a couple of years very, very detailed kinds of information on the guerrilla movement down there.

Let me tell you one anecdote.

Senator WARNER. And it is positive, a good one.

General GORMAN. Yes, sir.

One anecdote. I was visited by an East European Ambassador in Panama, a courtesy call. I wanted to ask my visitor what he knew about the activities of his countrymen in Nicaragua and in El Salvador. I had received a batch of documents written in the language of his country, along with translations taken from a prisoner in El Salvador which had names, places, dates, a sort of a laying out of the network that run from his capital to a squad of his countrymen who were carrying guns in El Salvador. And the documents talked about recruiting more, and getting money, and all the usual sorts of things.

This Ambassador came in, and we sat down and talked. He deplored the violence in the region, and I let him do that for a bit, and then I said, well, you know, if that is the position of your government, Mr. Ambassador, why is it that you allow your nationals to operate in Central America with guns? Why are they out there killing the innocent. And he denied that that was the case.

Whereupon, I laid the documents out. Now that kind of a play in 1983 when we started, Senator Cohen, would have been simply beyond the capability of the American intelligence establishment.

So the first point, Senator Warner, build your cadres. That goes to the Grenada point. We should not have been caught up by that one. That was signaled too far in advance. It is inexcusable that we let it happen.

The second point, we have a great deal of capability under the aegis of our national collection systems, but you will discover that as there is an iron rule of war that says that infantry battles always take place on the edge of the map where maps butt together, there is another rule in the intelligence racket that says that the crisis is going to come up in a place with 90 percent cloud cover, and you are just not going to be able to rely on those national means all the time.

More importantly, the national means are primarily dedicated to watching the larger issues of national security, and they do not pay enough attention to the kind of detail that you need to come to grips with a terrorist group. What house might they have the hostage in? How do you maintain 24-hour-a-day surveillance over the house?

You need tactical intelligence, and much of the work that was done vis-a-vis Central America——

Senator **Cohen**. Do you mean human intelligence?

General **Gorman**. Human intelligence, and technical intelligence, but at the tactical level producing detailed order of battle, the kind of routine military business that leads to your understanding of what your opposition is up to on an hourly basis—I mean it, literally hourly—and we got very, very good at it.

I think we are getting better all the time. We have certainly demonstrated to ourselves that with the Central American Joint Intelligence Team, Senator Warner, and the tactical intelligence means that we put in place in Central America, that we could track in some fine-grain detail specific guerrilla groups, and use that information for whatever tactical advantage we wanted, or whatever leverage we wanted to exercise over the Salvadoran armed forces.

But, you know, that effort in Central America pretty well exhausted the capability of the United States' intelligence community. If you asked them to do another one just like that for Grenada, Senator Cohen, the answer would have been, can't do it. We've got everything committed; we are turned on full time, full up, we are going all out.

Now, you know, you can think of four or five places around the world where there ought to be a comparable effort underway. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the answer is still "we can do one; any more than that, we cannot," and you have got to fix that.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you very much, General. My time has expired.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Exon.

Senator **Exon**. Mr. Chairman, if I might I would yield to my colleague from Massachusetts, who by his earlier presence here this morning indicates he has had more experience driving in snow than I have in Nebraska. [Laughter.]

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Kennedy.

Senator **Kennedy**. Thank you very much.

General, do we not have a number of agreements with countries not to use intelligence operatives? Has not that number grown in the period——

General **Gorman**. I do not know the answer to that question. I think the agreements with the countries that I am familiar with were fairly specific on what we could or could not do in-country. In all cases, however, when I increased intelligence collection in a given country, I did so with *(a)* the approval of the Secretary of Defense; *(b)* the approval of the Ambassador, and presumably therefore the Secretary of State; and *(c)* almost invariably the head of state. And I personally briefed the head of state in most countries where those operations were undertaken.

Senator **Kennedy**. Do you suppose it would be worthwhile for us to find out about them, if there are strictures? As I understand, there were a number that were placed in the period of the 1970s, a few in the 1960s, but a good deal more in the period of the 1970s. Obviously it ought to be treated sensitively.

Let me ask you what is the nature of our training program for intelligence operatives that can work with the military personnel? How well are we doing in that? Perhaps you could tell us a little bit about the past, the present, and I would be interested in what you think we ought to be doing now.

General GORMAN. There are at least three general disciplines that are worth citing here. There is first the sort of general area familiarization, cultural affinity, lingual skills that you see best exemplified in the Army's foreign area specialist training program. Now that is not an intelligence collection program. It is a way of developing individuals usually with long periods of residence in a given country who have a good feeling for the people, the culture and how it all goes down, and those individuals, when they emerge from their training, then can become first-class intelligence officers.

There is of course a second category of individuals who are the manipulators of technical intelligence, and we are much better at training them than the former.

It is a rare service who will countenance taking quality people and setting them aside for years for the purposes of teaching them about a foreign culture.

The Army does it more willingly than the others. On technical training, we get a lot of help from the services, as far as the manipulation of the equipment is concerned, but not as much help as we ought to on lingual skills.

And there, of course, again and again we get caught out. We just don't have enough lingually trained, culturally sensitive people to interpret the take from the technical business. We could do a lot better in that respect.

Finally, there is the training which should be given to any military person who is in a Third World country, under whatever rubric, that sensitizes him to the collection of information that subsequently can become intelligence.

That doesn't make him an intelligence collector; it simply makes him a better observer and leads to better debriefings when you get him in hand. Again, we're not doing all that we could in that respect.

But the kinds of problems to which I allude when I appeal for better intelligence go also to research and development of better technical capabilities, and better ways of dealing with the human problems.

Let me see if I can dramatize this a little bit for you. One of the things we discovered in 1983, anent the El Salvadoran problem, was that there were no less than four different map scales in use down there. Trying to get everybody literally on the same sheet of music was one of the first undertakings to which I directed my attention.

Then I discovered that even having everybody using the same sort of grid reference system for referring to places didn't help much, because most of the Salvadorans couldn't read maps in any event.

And the abstraction that is a map is not very relevant to their way of doing business, or that of most Third World people.

What we needed were more graphics, more pictorial ways of communicating with them in the way they in turn could communicate with us.

There are technical ways of helping a great deal in this respect; kinds of graphic projects that the Defense Advance Research Project's agency has had underway for years, which have never come out of R&D because there has never been any service stand up and say, there is something that we need.

And Senator Kennedy, I would tell you that that is but one example of 20 or 30 that I could name right offhand, but in an open hearing, would prefer not to.

Senator KENNEDY. Risking the antagonism of my chairman, and realizing that my time is up, let me just ask one final question, and that is, could you define for us sort of when and where we ought to be using those military advisers, and for what?

General GORMAN. Well, first of all, I would agree with the earlier suggestion that we should do that very selectively, very charily, with a great deal of care.

I suspect that my friend and West Point classmate Eddie Ramos in the Philippines could be better served by the U.S. Security Assistance Program out there. I don't know the facts of the matter. Obviously, I'm just an external observer.

But it seems to me that if we want democracy to succeed in the Philippines, there is a prima facie case where some better help could be well placed.

For example, I wouldn't be surprised to discover that there isn't a problem in the Philippine military medical service something analogous to what there was in El Salvador. But that's a good case in point.

The Saudis and others who are facing the aftermath, the potential problems of the aftermath of the Iraq-Iran war, they too are going to need help.

As you go around the world, you can ask yourself where are the strategic zones or areas where the United States is strategically in difficulty, and certainly Southwest Asia and Central America are the places that come readily to mind.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Gorman, I want to thank you for your long and faithful service to your country.

You mentioned recruitment of individuals for intelligence purposes. Are you aware that the Department of Defense has consistently opposed bringing back the Lodge Act to recruit foreign nationals for that purpose? I introduced a bill in 1983 along that line.

Do you have any comment on that?

General GORMAN. That's one of the cases in point that I was alluding to in my response to Senator Warner's question. You're exactly right.

Senator THURMOND. Without elaborating, do you think this ought to be done?

General GORMAN. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. Now, I have a number of other questions here that I may submit for the record. But I would like to ask you this practical question.

I think most people would like to see the government of Nicaragua that's now dominated by the Communists changed and relieved of the orbit of the Soviets in which they now find themselves.

If you were Commander in Chief, what would you do to accomplish that? Now the President has advocated aid to the Contras. That's fine, if we can give them enough aid, but should we go all out to give them enough aid to do it? Is that the best way to do it?

They are a cancer, in my opinion, in the Carribbean today. And if you had the power, what would you do?

General GORMAN. In the first place, the response of Senator Byrd last night in my view is a better characterization of what the United States ought to do than the President gave.

I think that to see the problem in Central America as one of aiding the Contras is to undershoot your strategic mark; that what we require is a regional approach in which the United States uses its total power, its economic, its moral, its political, its social power, which is very extensive in that region, closely affiliated as we are with most of those peoples

The problem presented by the Nicaraguan Marxist-Leninist garrison state, Senator Thurmond, which is abhorrent to me, is a regional one. And our first concern ought to be for those neighbors of Nicaragua who are most threatened by that phenomenon.

We had our eye on El Salvador in the years 1983, 1984, and 1985. I had any number of you come down to Central America and visit me, or travel up through the region. And some of you will recall, when you told me that you had to get into San Salvador so you could get a good feel for the situation, that my advice was to go also to San Jose in Costa Rica, because I felt that the latter was a better place to come to grips with the strategic realities of Central America. And that advice is still sound.

Costa Rica represents, far better than El Salvador, the problem occasioned by the implantation on the American mainland of a Communist Cuban-style Marxist state.

It is the fate of Costa Rica and the fate of Honduras, and the fate of El Salvador and Guatemala that the United States should turn its first attention to. (I must say parenthetically I have not been briefed and I am not privy to any of the current intelligence; I haven't had any information later than February of 1985 when I left command). But it seems to me that what is missing in all of this rhetoric is a way of dealing with the harsh realities that these friendly democratic states are facing.

Costa Ricans have 200,000 Nicaraguan refugees on their soil. Costa Ricans with a democracy par excellence, which is now facing the prospect of internal turmoil, unrest, in addition to all of the human problems associated with services for the refugees. Costa Ricans are cataclysmically unprepared to deal with this.

They need a lot of help. They need economic help. They're all groaning—all of the nations named are groaning under heavy debt. Some kind of systematic bailout for them would help a great deal.

On the question of what the Commander in Chief ought to do about the Contras——

Senator THURMOND. Or about the whole problem of Central America. What should we do?

General **Gorman**. Well, you're not going to knock off the Sandinistas with conventional armed force. And that, I'm afraid, is what the Contras have been in my ken. That is to say, as far as I know, they were organized, trained and equipped for conventional military operations; not unconventional warfare.

And unless and until we are able to launch a genuine unconventional warfare campaign, the decisive use of that kind of a military instrument is not an option that the President of the United States has.

We do not have the intelligence apparatus in place inside of Nicaragua. We do not have the political infrastructure to wage that kind of war.

And I, therefore, wouldn't put a great deal of hope that the Contra operation is going to succeed.

Senator **Thurmond**. I believe my time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman **Nunn**. General, could I follow that just with one interjected question here? Does that mean you think that what we have set up with our own military training and CIA is a force that's not prepared to fight the kind of war down there, that is, the Contra force, the kind of war that's necessary to win, or to ever prevail? Is that what you're saying?

General **Gorman**. I do not see—from where I sit, I do not see such a force. And again, I have no information later than 1985. There was no military training for that force up to that time. It was a CIA operation. And CIA built largely a cross-border raiding force. That is what I was observing with my intelligence apparatus, not a UW force.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Wirth.

Senator **Wirth**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Gorman, I hear you saying in response to the last questions and the earlier questioning that we have to do a much better job of developing trained personnel in the areas of intelligence, foreign language, and training in unconventional warfare and so on, than we're doing today.

Was that historically something that the CIA was supposed to be doing?

General **Gorman**. Well, the history of these operations, as many of you here will recall, is that CIA would launch operations, and then ultimately, the military, the United States Armed Forces would go in and take them over once they became too big or too complicated for the Agency to run.

The CIA has redoubtable capabilities in the field of human intelligence. And my view is that we ought to keep them doing what they're good at.

I believe that we have within our own Armed Forces individuals, teams, capabilities, to plan and conduct unconventional warfare. We haven't used them in Central America, and that, in my view, is a mistake.

Senator **Wirth**. If you were trying to plan the development and training of the groups of people necessary, would you be doing this predominantly within the Pentagon, or would you be putting greater emphasis, for example, on foreign language and area training?

I cite that as one area that has been discussed a great deal as we talk about competitiveness; we note the decline of foreign language and area training centers in the country, which have declined by at least a third in the last 6 years.

General GORMAN. Two separable issues. One is the strategic asset, which is the group of individuals that have got a capability that you can put into a country and have them operate effectively.

You don't need many of those, Senator Wirth. A few men, a few women, can make a great deal of difference. And the problem is always when one of these emergencies confronts the United States to find the right people and get them in the right positions.

We do not do, in my view, anywhere near an adequate job of identifying them, fostering them, protecting them, promoting them, keeping them on hand so when the time comes they can be put in the right place.

All kinds of artificial barriers are raised against this. And to go to a point that Senator Kennedy alluded to, I got myself into a situation in Honduras where I wanted to make the army attache the commander of my military group there. Now, that means the position to which he was moving came under the Security Assistance Program, it was funded by the Security Assistance Program.

And the people back here in the Pentagon responsible for security assistance cited an agreement with the Hondurans that we would not use intelligence personnel in such assignments, to foreclose my moving this lad in the right place.

And that was a case where literally I had to go to the Chairman, to the Secretary of Defense, and then to the Chief of State, and say look, we're going to do this with your approval, but he is the right man for the job; knows the language; knows the people; been there for years; understood the background; and was willing to serve.

That kind of exceptional management at the top is the way we have to operate in these circumstances, and I just think it ought to be a hell of a lot easier.

Senator WIRTH. Finally, could I ask you if you would be willing to expand on a quote that was in the New York Times attributed to you, which said, quote: I do not believe the Central Intelligence Agency is capable of mounting a successful insurgency, or supporting one, for that matter. I don't see the Nicaraguan rebels as a likely alternative to the present Sandinista regime.

What does that suggest?

General GORMAN. We're a day late and dollar short trying to get an unconventional warfare campaign launched there. And throwing money at the problem at this point in time isn't going to produce, in my view, the kind of results that are required.

Where are the intelligence networks inside Nicaragua? Where do we have the kind of networks that would permit us to infiltrate the cities of Nicaragua, which are the places that count. The Sandinistas understand that. Not the mountains. Not the jungles of the eastern portions of the country.

We haven't taken the steps that would make it possible for us to view such a campaign as having a reasonable prospect of succeeding.

But again, I underscore, I don't know when that quote was taken from or what the context of it was. It's certainly the kinds of things

I've been saying. But I urge on you the notion that I'm 2 years out of date. My judgments were based on what I saw in 1985.

Nothing I've seen in the press would lead me to believe it's different.

Senator WIRTH. Therefore, what steps ought we be taking?

General GORMAN. Either change the modus operandi and gear yourselves for the long haul, or cut it off.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Wirth.

Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Sorry I haven't been able to be here. I had a conference in the adjoining room with a constituent of mine. I suppose the question has been asked: Given your expertise in Central America, what is your prognosis for Nicaragua?

Much is made of the shortcomings of the Contras, and yet the Sandinistas are not that classy an outfit either.

General GORMAN. That's right. But they are very well backed, and very well advised.

Senator HUMPHREY. Now, you're speaking of the Sandinistas?

General GORMAN. Yes, and they're a tough nut to crack. So my prognosis would be that unless there is some kind of dramatic change along the lines that we were just discussing, you're going to be living with that problem for a long time, and you better start looking to the security of our friends who are going to be most threatened by their continued existence, the Hondurans and the Costa Ricans.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you see as evidence of the administration ambivalence, on the one hand arming the Contras, on the other hand maintaining diplomatic relations with the Sandinista government?

General GORMAN. It doesn't bother me as much as it does some people. It is certainly not in keeping with the traditional ways of doing business among states. But we are dealing here with a very extraordinary set of problems, and they're going to be becoming more and more unusual over the years.

None of the traditional mechanisms of diplomacy really fit the kinds of situation that Mr. Waite today finds himself in in Beirut. And I think something like that is going on in Central America.

There is always an outside chance, Senator Humphrey, that the Sandinista Directorate could be brought to some kind of terms. And I believe that we ought to keep diplomatic channels open. We ought to keep talking. We ought to give them every opportunity to explore their way out of the difficulty.

But it ought to be crystal clear to them that they are embarked on a path which, if it leads to adventurism across the borders of their neighbors, is going to bring them into collision with the United States.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, can we have it both ways? Is it possible to achieve something? Odds are already long because of the entrenchment of the Sandinista regime, because of the Soviet advisers, military personnel, materiel; odds are very long.

Can we approach this thing on a half-hearted basis? Is that not what we are doing?

General GORMAN. Yes, we've been doing it for years. Nothing is unchangeable in Central America. And that government in Managua could be changed. I wouldn't try to maintain to the contrary.

Just as the governments in Tegucigalpa and San Jose and San Salvador could be changed.

The question is, in my mind, is whether cutting relations would really do any good. If you had any alternative prospect of bringing about the change, which I don't think you have in the Contras, but if you had such a way—let's say the Contras did have a capability of bringing severe military pressure against the Sandinistas, if you thought that there was going to be a new flag in Managua next year, you might very well want to cut your relations.

But I would maintain that just in order to—to avoid the bloodshed of fighting in the urban areas, and to make it possible to settle the thing short of a bloodbath, you ought to keep your diplomatic lines open.

Senator HUMPHREY. You mentioned the changes of government in El Salvador. What was the other example you gave?

General GORMAN. In Honduras and Costa Rica.

Senator HUMPHREY. But those were not Communist regimes.

General GORMAN. No, but they are democracies that we're supporting, and should be supporting. And in the case of Costa Rica, one of the rare instances of a regime over the years has made the American democratic dream a reality.

Kids are trained in Costa Rican schools in how to use the voting booth. I mean, those people live democracy. And that's something that ought to be protected.

And they have no army. There is no shield there. All they can do is invoke the Rio Pact if they are attacked.

But a more subtle problem is going to manifest itself there, it seems to me, in the form of sabotage, terrorism, kidnappings, that genre of problems; and they are cataclysmically unprepared to deal with that.

Senator HUMPHREY. What happens if the Contras fail and the Sandinistas become ever more entrenched in that region?

General GORMAN. We're going to be, if we honor our commitments to these friends of ours, we're going to be committed there for a long time, trying to cope with the resultant security problems.

There is a distinct prospect in my mind, for example, that in Tegucigalpa you could get one of two manifestations. One is a distinct drift to the left, some sort of accommodation with the Communists, some sort of a sellout. And the other, perhaps more real is a drift to the right, the military reasserting control on the grounds of a threat to national security, and a kind of a rightist nationalist regime coming in there, which is again, antithetical to our hopes and aspirations for the region.

Senator HUMPHREY. No reason to suppose the Sandinistas will be satisfied to be a self-contained revolution? They're going to make trouble one way or the other?

General GORMAN. That's an open question in my view, Senator. I think the question has always been, what are their alternatives? Right now, I don't think they regard the Nicaraguan rebels, the so-called Contras, as a serious threat. I think they believe they've got that situation under control. Therefore, why should they even be considering changing their way of doing business.

Senator HUMPHREY. My time is up. Thank you.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Humphrey. I believe my questions are next.

I have been listening with keen interest to your testimony here this morning, and it's very enlightening. I want to thank you for coming and add my remarks to those who congratulate you once again for the great service you've provided over the years to the United States of America.

Let me follow up on the question that's been advanced in one or two ways.

You feel that the CIA should be limited to intelligence gathering, analyzing and dispensing that information to the proper authorities and agencies of government, including the military, but that the CIA should not be involved in military actions on their own. Is that a fair summation?

General GORMAN. You draw the line a little bit differently than I would, Senator Exon. The way I would put it is that they do the intelligence job best. They have not been particularly successful at the unconventional warfare or paramilitary operations. The more conventional or paramilitary the thing gets the less adept they are. I would not want to say that always and everywhere you are going to rule out CIA operations that involve the use of guns and violence. I think that particularly in dealing with terrorism that may be the only recourse you have in a number of circumstances, but as a general rule I keep them in the intelligence bracket.

Senator EXON. Thank you. Let me expand if I can on the answer you gave to a previous question that I think needs further explanation. You said, if I properly interpreted your statement, that we either ought to quit sending money to the Contras given the present situation or prepare for the long haul. What do you mean by the long haul?

General GORMAN. You are not going to win a campaign against the Sandinistas in 1 year, 2 years, or 3 years. The Sandinistas are an entrenched, organized, Cuban-style state. They have a security apparatus which is—well, not by any means as effective as some that you might be aware of. It is still effective enough to work in Central America.

I just do not see the Contras being in a position to challenge that apparatus for some time to come. The necessary precursors would be a penetration of the urban areas with Contra organizations so that at least they were getting direct intelligence out of those areas. That, to my knowledge, has never been done. That is going to take a long time to get in place, but it ought to be possible. It is not a hopeless cause, but it is not a quick fix.

The money you spent last year is not going to do it. The money you might be asked to spend this year is not going to do it. But you will have to go the long haul and I do not see yet, I have not heard anyone describe a plan that would in the long haul say that we are going to have an alternative to the Sandinista regime. I do not see yet a way out of our present difficulty.

Senator EXON. Are you saying then, General, that we should be assisting the Contras to do the things that you think are necessary, which you have just outlined to some degree as opposed to supplying them weaponry? Or are you saying you think that some other agency, either foreign or internal, in Nicaragua over the long pull, is the way to make that present government there more responsible?

General GORMAN. Again, respectfully, sir, I am 2 years off the beat. I cannot really tell you what is going down except again what I read in the newspapers, but my answer would be something like this. A sound, unconventional warfare campaign does not involve people with guns up front. It involves a lot of patient preparation of the battlefield. Unless and until you have got the ability to move at will in the society that you want to attack you are not going to be an effective insurgent.

The lessons of repeated instances of unconventional warfare would tell you that unless you are able to move around better than the government, you are not going to best government forces. The Contras do not have that capability. We are talking about a cross-border raiding force. We are talking about people that have received a modest amount of weaponry training, and a lot of fancy web gear and that sort of business, some training, but I do not think they have got the apparatus in the country that would enable them to be militarily efficacious. I am confident that they can go out and sit on some remote mountain in North Central Nicaragua. There have been guerrillas up in that part of the world for all this century. But their raising a flag in Managua? I do not see it.

Senator EXON. We respect you as a well-balanced individual who has a basic grasp of both the military situation in Central America and a grasp of the diplomatic situation. Recognizing that you have been out of the area for 18 months now, from what you knew when you were there on the spot as a commander and what you have read from the newspapers since, do you feel that the majority of the people in Nicaragua today still support the Sandinistas? Or putting it another way, if it was possible to conduct a public opinion poll, an honest public opinion poll in Nicaragua today, do you think that the majority of the people there would vote to oust the Sandinista government, or would they likely vote at this time to maintain it?

General GORMAN. In 1985, if I could qualify it this way, the information I was receiving from Nicaragua (and it was extensive and, I believe, reliable) would indicate to me that the Sandinistas had a hold on only a very small fraction of the Nicaraguan people, and that if they had to face some sort of a ballot box test they probably would have failed. I think the longer they remain in power, the broader the control that they exercise over the people, the block committees, the ration cards, the rest of the Cuban nine yards.

I think that if you could extract from them, let us say, a promise of an election at some hypothetical date in the future like 1995, they could probably point at that with some assurance that they could bring it off, but the answer to the question you asked, the sort of the now question, is, remember that a lot of Nicaraguans already expressed their views on this with their feet. They left the country. And nearly a quarter of a million are now in neighboring countries, which says something about the regime and their abhorrence of it.

Last year, at the Senate Democratic caucus breakfast last spring, I guess it was, Tony Motley and I came over and talked to the caucus. I went from there across to the House, where they had assembled a group of Nicaraguans who were still in Managua or just recently come out, who represented the opposition, if you will, people from La Prensa, from the church.

It was at that session that Bishop Pablo Y Vega, the Bishop of Managua, was asked why, Bishop, is it that we are hearing from you up here today what we never hear from all U.S. reporters that are in Managua? You know, we have a large press corps there. Why do people in Managua not come up and tell our reporters what you have just told us here about the oppressive, reprehensible nature of this regime. The Bishop's response was to put his finger over his lips, and I think this is what got him exiled.

The Bishop's response was to put his fingers over his lips! He responded, and I am paraphrasing, when I was a young priest and men came to me from the Somoza prisons they would come to me to plead to make public what had happened to them, to get to the press and the world the story of the infamies, the tortures, et cetera. Now men come to me under the seal of confessional, and they do not want me to tell what happened to them in prison because they know that those revelations are going to bring violence on their family or other retribution. The words used by the Nicaraguans at this meeting last spring were "white torture."

They don't beat them up. They just take their mind and surround it with a series of dreadful alternatives, or subject them in instances to sexual abuse so that they are thoroughly compromised, or they feel that their family is compromised by their experience. So Pablo y Vega said, silence is the rule in Nicaragua now. Nobody talks. And I think that if you were therefore to put that regime to a fair and democratic test they—the regime—would have a damn hard time getting the ballots.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much, General. I appreciate you being here.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General Gorman, you know my great and personal admiration and gratitude to you for the long service you have given. Let me pick up with this line of questioning. You have indicated that as long as the Contras are engaged in conventional warfare you do not think they have got a very high prospect of success, and you said that our alternatives are either support for the long haul or cut it off.

General GORMAN. Change the modus operandi.

Senator WILSON. And yet in response to Senator Exon's questions you do not apparently see the Contras as very easily capable of engaging in the kind of unconventional warfare that you think is necessary. We have got in the Sandinistas a Marxist regime, avowedly Marxist, and by public statements made repeatedly over the years one dedicated to expending their violent revolution beyond the borders of Nicaragua. They have been, in my judgment, shrewd enough to recognize that the tremendous arsenal of military might that has been built up there by the Soviets cannot be used directly, but can be used to intimidate and exploit. They have done that very successfully. They know they should not let the Soviet tanks role into El Salvador or Honduras because that would activate both provisions of the Rio Treaty. That would necessitate, whether we want it or not, our own interjections. It would appear they are prepared for the long haul as most of them that exist are hoping to wait out a U.S. administration that is hostile to them. It seems to me that they are also clever enough to recognize that by this intimidation and by subversion of the kinds that you have described, they can gain the same result through patience and different tactics than they could through some kind of a blitzkreig up the Central American isthmus.

So what you are telling us is that in order to prevent that ultimate result from becoming inevitable we have to prepare these fledgling democracies—they are fledgling democracies, to resist.

In your judgment, have we done anything like the job that it requires to give heart to the small democracies surrounding Nicaragua so that they will not one day find themselves outlasted. In short, is it simply a matter of time before they are worn down? If that is your opinion, I would be interested in your elaborating and really getting a description as to what we ought to do to avoid that inevitable result.

General GORMAN. Well, as you know from your travels in the region and the time we have spent together talking about the issues, one of the aspects of this situation which has redounded very much to the advantage of the United States is the new expression of interest and understanding here for the problems of the Salvadorans, the Hondurans, and the Costa Ricans. They have been genuinely grateful for, despite all of the difficult circumstances that occasioned it, for the new attention that they have received. But they are as easily alarmed by vacillation.

If they sense that the United States is faltering or uncertain they will begin to look for other alternatives, and your characterization of them as "losing heart" is, I think, right on the mark. I do not think they need to fear the Soviet motorized rifle division equivalent that has been put in there. One would almost hope that that is the way the problem would present itself, because it is so much easier for us to deal with, and so much more dangerous for the Sandinistas to operate abroad through the more traditional mechanisms of subversion. The Cubans have certainly been training in Cuba over the years enough Costa Ricans, Hondurans, and Salvadorans to fuel violence in the region for the next generation, and guns there are plenty, and money there is plenty from the Eastern bloc. So I think your long-term visualization is accurate. What I believe is required, regardless of what Washington decides to do about the Nicarguan rebels, is, that the United States has got to look to those democracies and do all we can to keep them on the democratic path, moving ahead economically and socially despite this threat.

With respect to the Nicaraguan rebels, I reiterate we have got to change their way of doing business. We have got to train them how to make their force more effective than the kind of clumsy attacks on fixed points and sort of crude ambushing that has characterized their operations to date. If it is true, and I believe it is, per my response to Senator Exon, that there is a substantial amount of disaffection among the Nicaraguan people, they ought to be operating far more broadly in the country than in the uninhabited fringes, which has been their wont to date.

Senator WILSON. My time is up, unfortunately. Maybe we will get a second round.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Symms.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you for your excellent testimony. I sit here and recall that approximately 25 years ago, we went through the same thing, and there were opportunities to liberate Cuba, and those were passed up. Now we have this contingent situation with Cuba. I look at the situation in Nicaragua when we sent the fleet down there. I think you were in command of the Southern Command then, and I said at the time, if the fleet goes down and comes back and the Sandinistas are still in power, we weaken the role of the United States because it shows that we are all bluff and no delivery. As commander of the Southern Command at that time, did you ever make a recommendation or feel that we should break diplomatic relations, recognize a provisional government, use military power, and get it over with in a very quick operation? Is it impossible to do that, or are we just going to sit here and watch while they educate these kids to hate Americans, be Communists, worship the Communist materialism and be against our basic Western beliefs so that 20 years from now the young people today are the middle aged people and they despise us. What is our recourse?

General GORMAN. I opposed the entire time that I was in office and still do, Senator, the use of U.S. military forces in Central America. I believe that our going in there with military force ourselves to resolve the situation would be a strategic setback for the United States that would write fini to what remains of the OAS after the Malvinas War.

You talk about cutting diplomatic relations, recognizing the provisional government, and proceeding on that basis. I think that that would have brought us to war in Central America in short order, and probably on some disadvantageous grounds. I believed at the time, and I still believe, that Sandinista regime to be vulnerable, but that it had already acquired such strength that we had to deal with it with the full range of our policy instruments including diplomacy, and I am back to the statements I made to Senator Humphrey that I do not see much advantage then, or now, in cutting diplomatic relations.

Senator SYMMS. How do we express this resolve that the President spoke of last night? How do we demonstrate the resolve to the surrounding countries so they do not become fainthearted and either revert to a military, extremely authoritarian regime or go to the left to a hard line authoritarian Communist regime to ingratiate themselves to the Sandinistas?

General GORMAN. That goes to Senator Wilson's questions. One of the reasons we brought the fleet to Central America was not to impress the Sandinistas. I think they and the Cubans understand we can use naval power. We can take care of them fairly readily. But to demonstrate the proximity of American military help to the Costa Ricans or to the Hondurans or indeed to the Salvadorans, in short, it was our answer to the Soviet mechanized rifle division, the threat of invasion.

Senator SYMMS. Of course that discouraged them from doing what you said would make it easier; if they would go ahead and take the mechanized rifle division and run it across the border into Costa Rica or Honduras. Then we would have, as you said, a clear-cut situation to invoke the Rio Treaty and——

General GORMAN. Right, and that is the relevance of the fleet. That is the counter to the mechanized rifle division threat, if you will. A question of their own internal security, which is the more serious problem, is a much more difficult and much longer lasting problem, a much tougher nut to crack for the United States, and it will take a long, patient effort on our part to keep them with us.

Senator SYMMS. You said you did not think the CIA was equipped to do a proper training role, but the U.S. Army is equipped to train the Contras to do the unconventional warfare and infrastructure to do this mission and be successful?

General GORMAN. Yes, I think we could do that.

Senator SYMMS. Would that include the necessity, then, for some U.S. Army personnel to be in the country in Nicaragua to do that?

General GORMAN. I do not know. I do not know enough about what kinds of nets you would have.

Senator SYMMS. The reason I ask, is it just seems to me that our goal should very clearly be to rid ourselves of another Communist Soviet puppet government in Nicaragua and not end up like we did with the Cuban fiasco.

General GORMAN. If you were, as President, as Commander in Chief, to tell me that is what you wanted to bring about, I know how to do that, and it does not involve having to put the American marines in Managua again.

Senator SYMMS. That is what I have been trying to get done ever since I have been in the Senate, to get the President to issue those orders and have somebody that can accomplish it. We did not, however, give you the wherewithal when you were there to get it done. Did you ever get those orders?

General GORMAN. I certainly did not get any orders like that, no sir.

Senator SYMMS. Well, I think the statement that you just made is what is wrong with our foreign policy. Leadership starts at the top, and we have to tell the troops in the field what their mission is.

General GORMAN. The guidance I got from the Congress of the United States was all in the opposite direction. They wanted to know how many people I had in El Salvador and how many in Honduras and how many in Costa Rica, et cetera.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Symms.

Senator McCain, our most patient member. Senator McCain, you may go right to the head of the list this afternoon if we decide to go for that first in/first question rule. It may be the most important decision we make this year.

Senator MCCAIN. I think you may be the only one up at that end that may be with us, Mr. Chairman, but I hope we can prevail. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General, for being here and for providing very important testimony, particularly on this whole aspect of low intensity conflict.

I do not mean to sound rude, but I have always shied away from high intensity conflict, the nuclear aspect, because I think you can count missiles with a sufficiently sophisticated computer.

I think one of the reasons why we have not focused on the issue that you bring here today is because it is so complex and very difficult to get a handle on what areas. You mentioned the five areas in the world where you would be concentrating with an intelligence team at this time. I think there would be somebody, particularly here in Congress, who would see that as a great waste of money because nothing happened.

Perhaps this will be repetitious to my previous questioners, but you present us with a set of very unpleasant choices, General. Basically, you are saying that in our present configuration, the Contras cannot win. I am not questioning that judgment, but at the same time you advocate that we do more to help their neighbors. Yet, the trend that I see is a reduction in the security assistance throughout the world with the exception of Israel and Egypt. I see nothing to reverse that, particularly given the pressures of Gramm-Rudman.

You mentioned the invocation of the Rio Pact. The invocation of the Rio Pact to most Americans means U.S. troops. You and I both rule out that likelihood if only for political reasons, leaving aside the military aspect.

You mentioned that we need to do what we can to foster and build up these democracies, and the great CBI in your command which has such great prospects is basically dried up. It is now an issue or a program that has lost its glamour, certainly around here, and yet at the same time the only option you provide us, as I understand your testimony, is that we change the training and methodology of the Contras.

At the same time, in response to Senator Exon's questions, you accurately pointed out that time is not on our side. The revolution will consolidate. The block watchers will become more vigorous, and the disappearances and the concentration camps will grow. We have no reason to suspect this model will be any different than previous Marxist models.

So my question to you is, is it realistic for this country to change the method of training? If so, how? We ruled out the CIA as implementing this policy to some degree. The example of 55 advisors which my esteemed and good friend mentioned in El Salvador is a dramatic example, in my opinion, of the absolute micromanagement of people like yourselves.

We pay a great deal of money to investigate and be able to make these kinds of decisions. How can we accomplish this change in training of the Contras, and how long would it take before they became a viable force? Your view is, given all the preceding comments that I have heard, that that is also a viable option, unless you are sooner or later faced with a major confrontation, whether it be in Nicaragua or Guatemala or Mexico.

General GORMAN. There are a lot of questions in there. Let me see if I can pick out a couple of the salient ones, and you can tell me if I am right.

First of all, I disagree with you on the question of the Rio Pact, at least on Costa Rica. It happened once before. They rolled the T-55 tanks up to the Customs House on the Interamerican Highway, the border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and all of the Costa Rican border guards withdrew in alarm, which is understandable. If, as one Sandinista official, one of the Ortegas, threatened a Costa Rican diplomat about that time, they might have just kept going for San Jose, I think you would get a vote from the Congress of the United States for war in a trice.

Senator McCain. We have already agreed in your previous statements that that is not the scenario. The scenario is intimidation followed by bombings followed by assassinations followed by——

General Gorman. I am just telling you that if Costa Rica invokes the Rio Pact, we are going to be for it, and we would be for it on dramatically disadvantaged grounds, nothing in place.

Senator McCain. OK.

General Gorman. The second point, yes, I would agree with your assumption that security assistance budgets will go down but, you know, you give 82 percent of what you have in the budget to just eight countries in the world, and the Central American program is somewhere down around 2, 3, 4 percent. I do not know what the current figures reflect. But it is peanuts compared with the way you are allocating the funds otherwise. I am saying that you ought to take a hard look at that one.

Moreover, I believe that you could get a lot more for your security assistance dollars than you have been getting, thereby laying off the high-dollar, glamorous stuff, like jet airplanes to the Hondurans, and focusing on the kinds of things that they need to deal with that mechanized rifle division threat, and by teaching them how to come to grips with the more likely problem, which I think we both agree is what we are really going to have to deal with, how to cope with an insipient insurgency, or would-be terrorist movements sponsored from Nicaragua.

Now, this is the sort of an issue that brings dramatically to the fore the difficulties that the Congress has presented to us all of trying to implement foreign policy. You have the security assistance pot over here under one set of committees, one budget category, and then you have defense, if you will, over in another pot, a different group of players in the Congress, a different group of committees. Yet, when it comes to dealing with a country like Costa Rica, which has no army and therefore is not addressable through the normal mechanisms of security assistance, we are really talking about a novel form of aid to a country that is facing a security threat.

I would hope that as a result of the recent law on low intensity conflict, the board that has been set up at the National Security Council, and the deputy to the President's National Security Advisor, will turn as a matter of priority to the question of how in the world are you going to deal with low intensity conflict in places like Costa Rica and Honduras, and bring Congress some proposals for fixing the problem.

Let me give you, at the risk of taking too much of your time, a couple of ideas that I think would help.

They need antitank weapons. There are any number of people over in the Pentagon that are slabbering to sell them TOW missiles. I do not think you should put TOWs into play down there, or at least I think you ought to do so only as a last recourse.

They have 106 millimeter recoilless rifles, effective answers to T-55s, but these are not capable of firing at night, and they do not have enough accuracy, probability of hit. The Swedes recently figured out a way to take our old 106 recoilless rifle antitank weapon and, by putting an applique of high tech on the sighting and aiming devices, gave it a 24-hour-a-day capability and greatly increased probability of hit. The round will readily penetrate the T-55.

Now, if we could get at a development like that through our Security Assistance Program, we could help the Hondurans to a great deal of self-sufficiency with their existing weapons systems; not new jets, but upgrade their existing weapons systems.

In both countries, there is a crying need for air transport. The sinews of government in both Costa Rica and in Honduras are C-47 aircraft. Literally, they are tied together with baling wire, and you have seen them down there, Senator Wilson. They are scarcely believable as a flying machine. It has been 30 years since C-47s rolled out of the factory, but that is the way the government there gets around to the people. That is the way the political campaigns are conducted. That is the way you move troops. That takes the place of a road infrastructure which they do not have.

We have no aircraft up here that we could give them in their place. If we give them a C-130, they would consume their entire annual defense budget to fly the thing for a week. It is too complicated for them to own and operate. The same thing is true with our helicopters. We just need to learn how to be relevant to those people on their terms, and a modern C-47-like rough-field-capable airlifter would be one of the things I would go for as a way of demonstrating to them that the United States is with them.

There are 20 or 30 other things that you could do as a practical matter. It is not that you have no options. It just takes a long time to talk your way through it.

The main thing you would gain by all of that is convincing them, to go back to my answer to Senator Wilson, that you are still with them, that you are going to stand with them.

Now, the best document in town which lays out a plan for doing all of this, is still the work of the President's Bipartisan Commission on Central America, the so-called Kissinger Report. That was on the mark, and it talks about the allocation of sums of money vastly in excess of what the Congress has thus far elected to appropriate, either economic aid or security assistance. I think you ought to turn back to that report and go after it. That is on the money.

Finally, with respect to the rebels, if you are going to back the rebels, let us get serious about them and give them a chance to win. I just do not think we have been that serious about it.

Senator McCain. General, I am sorry, My last question was if we went to the unconventional warfare mode, which you stated was the only viable tactic, who would train them and how long would it take?

General GORMAN. I think you ought to give the job to the Commander in Chief in the region, and the answer is years.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Mr. McCain. I have just two or three questions here for the General. Then we have other hearings at 2 o'clock. You have been extremely gracious with your time and very helpful here.

We talked about the definition of low intensity combat. Your definition, as you stated it, is a narrow definition. Other people have a broader definition. In terms of the effect of this definitional difference of opinion, how significant is it?

General GORMAN. It is significant enough, in my view, to threaten to underwrite a lot of dumb force structuring. I can see low intensity conflict being used by people who want to build barracks in Alaska or Fort Drum, New York or all sorts of curious places.

Chairman NUNN. I am shocked, General. [Laughter.]

General GORMAN. That is what I am arguing against on the definitional issue. It seems to me that your work which is attempting to clarify what is it that we set out to do as the United States, by way of strategic objectives, is right on target. What is the purpose of these forces? When I hear people telling me that we are raising these divisions to deal with the problem in Central America, they leave me in the dust. I think that that is a justification for actions that have a whole range of other reasons for being brought into play, but have nothing to do with the strategic objectives of the United States in Central America.

Chairman NUNN. Are you involved in an effort now, a strategy effort, in the Department of Defense? Could you tell us generally about that?

General GORMAN. There is not much to tell because the commission was just formed. The first meeting was December 15 over in the Executive Office Building, in the old Secretary of State Office there. The commission consists of a group of prestigious Americans: former Chairman Jack Vessey; the former Chief of Naval Operations, Jim Holloway; General Shreiver of the Air Force; General Goodpaster; some academics, Joshua Lederberg and Sam Huntington; Ann Armstrong, the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; three former National Security Advisors, Judge Clark, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, and others.

Chairman NUNN. What is the charge? What is your mandate?

General GORMAN. The commission has been asked over the coming year to consider the strategies which the United States should pursue over the next 20 years, in other words looking into the next century, and lay out for the President a series of recommendations for appropriate strategies. Basically, it has just begun its work.

Chairman NUNN. Does that mandate include force structures to go with those strategies?

General GORMAN. The initial discussions established no limitations. They were free to talk to the whole range of problems. I presume that many of the issues that they will address will be those that you, yourself, have dealt with extensively over the past several years. For example, questions came up on force structure, resources for defense, et cetera.

You would not be at all surprised to hear that many opined that it is not the amounts of money that Defense gets from year to year but the funding stream that really in the long sense makes the difference, and that we could probably do more with less if we had some sort of assured funding from year to year.

So I suspect there is going to be a lot of restating of some of the arguments with which you are probably more familiar than any other American.

Chairman NUNN. I am delighted you are on that commission, General Gorman. I think that is enormously important. Do you have a timeframe for completion of that?

General GORMAN. Yes, sir. It was stated to be 1 year. They met on December 15. Their work will presumably finish in December 1987.

Chairman NUNN. Now, I am the last one to criticize outside commissions because I think most of them have been very helpful in the last 2 or 3 years that I have been connected in one way or another, but in an ideal world you would not need an outside commission to come in and tell us what our strategy should be.

Why do we need a commission? What is wrong with these thousands of people we have over there in the Pentagon in terms of their ability, or is it lack of ability, lack of education, lack of training, lack of strategic thinking, or is it just the way we are organized? Are we just organized in a way that we cannot focus on strategy?

General GORMAN. I think the latter is probably as close a characterization of it as you need. I would comment that in all of my years close to the top of the military structure over there, there was relatively little discussion beyond the kinds of generalities that you would see in the Chairman's statement, or in the Defense Guidance, of what U.S. strategic objectives really ought to be.

Almost all of the discussions were related, as you remarked earlier, to the apocalyptic contingencies of a major war with the Soviet Union. There were almost never any connections drawn between the objectives and the resources. General Goodpaster's triad of questions were rarely asked and even more seldomly answered.

So, in the sense that you are inviting commentary here in these hearings, at least in my experience up through 1985, there just was not much of that. It was getting better. I think General Vessey and his colleagues in the JCS deserve some degree of credit for the steps that they took to bring about a better dialogue.

For example, each of the CINCs, regional CINCs, were required to come in for show and tell before the JCS on their plans, but that is hardly the level of debate you asked for. It was the operational art that we are discussing there at that kind of a meeting. That is hardly the kind of high level discussion that you are inviting.

So, to sum it all up, I think you are right, that we have had a dearth of such discussion here in Washington. It is high time that we brought it to pass. The Packard Commission began, as you know, with reservations on the difficulties we were facing with allocating resources for defense, but we began our observations to the

President in our initial report with the advice that he should, at the outset of any budget cycle, enunciate a set of objectives and provide some resource guidance so that the Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense could then address such issues as force structure within a framing strategic context. I hope that that is happening. I do not, of course, have any way of knowing.

Chairman NUNN. I would imagine the average taxpayer would have assumed that would have been the starting point for the last 40 years. It is amazing how you get into bureaucratic habits and do not ask essential questions.

General GORMAN. I think that like most other aspects of American life, we sort of all learn to play the ball where it lies. When a man becomes a member of the JCS or, indeed, the Secretary of Defense, he sort of has to start with the force structure he has got, and he is usually handed along with that a whole set of presumptions about what is in existence, and a whole group of bureaucrats whose very existence depends on not only keeping it there, but making it grow.

So the institution discourages a kind of fundamental reappraisal of the sort that you are advocating. I think it is a very healthy development, Senator.

Chairman NUNN. General Gorman, thank you very much.

Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. General Gorman, let me just ask you a question on your last comment. I think that is an interesting cue.

You said that whoever it is has to play the ball where he finds it. That has been more or less true. You would expect choices that have been available to Congress, so it has largely been self-proposed. I quite agree with you. We have not done the Kissinger Bipartisan initial report which should have been done, and instead the focus has been almost exclusively on whether we support or fail to support aid to the Contras for its so-called nonlethal, which is an amazing euphemism by itself, and second, actual arms assistance.

It seems to me that you are speaking with good sense, as always, and I think a lot of us who have fervently supported aid to the Contras have never been under any illusion that they were going to roll into Managua. But the symbolism alone has been an argument in favor of voting for that aid simply to give some reasonable assurance that was otherwise almost totally missing, to the Costa Ricans, to the Salvadorans, to the Hondurans.

My concern is that we will not undertake the kind of good advice that you have given us, and that the comments you have made in all candor this morning will be seized upon by some. Simply saying there is no point in supporting the Contras without saying, as you have very clearly, that there is a necessity to take action; that the situation is not unchangeable; and that if we do not take some kind of action to resist, we look forward to a result that ultimately the Managua regime is going to outlast this administration and, by subversion of its neighbors, prevail in a way that will never invoke the provisions of the Rio Pact.

So to be clear, it seems to me that what you have said this morning is that instead of arming the Contras for a conventional attack, we should undertake a conscious strategy decision in the U.S. national security interest, and in the interest of the democracies surrounding Nicaragua, to engage the Contras in a program that will prepare them for a successful unconventional warfare in actual practice.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wilson, I am going to have to leave. After this question and answer, would you, close the meeting.

Senator WILSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. General Gorman, thank you very much for being here. You have been a great help.

General GORMAN. Thank you sir. Thanks for inviting me.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General GORMAN. Senator Wilson, there are three essentials for U.S. policy, it seems to me, at this juncture. One is some kind of a coherent regional policy, political, economic, military, along the lines of that recommended by the President's Bipartisan Commission, which will reassure our friends, preserve democracy, and do all we can to offset the malevolent influence of the Sandinista Regime.

Second, we have got to have a coherent strategy for the Nicaraguan rebels. Clearly it is going to take years, and I mean literally years. All of the questions I got from the Congress in my previous appearances, and some of these quotes that were used here, were in the context of discussions of can we win this year. You know, when is it going to be over?

Well, the answer is that it is not going to be over, not for the foreseeable future. I cannot tell you when it is. You are just going to have to face the fact that if you want to back them, you are going to have to do it right, and you are going to have to play it for many years to come.

But the third component of U.S. policy ought to be a systematic approach to the Sandinistas confronting them with our resolve to remain in the region, and to oppose use of their position and capabilities to intimidate or actually to subvert their neighbors. Certainly to communicate our resolve to oppose their invading their neighbors, and our long-term intention to support Nicaraguans who want to oust them to see if we cannot bring about some settlement along the lines that have already been proposed: a cease fire, an internationally supervised plebiscite, or elections, which would put the Sandinista government through some form of test under guarantees that the opposition parties would be able to bring their message to the people, and that the polling would be conducted under reasonable security.

That may still be doable. But if we let the situation go on as it has been with this half-help, no help, the amateur night kind of debacle that we have had down there lately, you simply strengthen the hands of the Sandinistas, and you make coherent policy of the sort that I have described impossible for the next President, whomever he may be, to pursue.

Senator WILSON. Based on your long observations both as CINC of USSOUTHCOM and also since, could you tell me that level of confidence you have in the Contadora process to bring this about? Can they do the kinds of things you have been talking about? Or are they necessarily initiatives that have to be undertaken by the United States?

General GORMAN. Well, none of us have had any strong sensing that the Contadora process, so-called, was going to get us where we wanted to be, but it has had the useful effect of obtaining a consensus that was not there before among the nations most affected by the outcome: the Costa Ricans, the Hondurans, and the Salvadorans, and the Guatemalans.

These external Contadora group nations, Mexico and Venezuela and Colombia, Panama, et cetera, should be applauded for their attempts to intervene diplomatically in this very difficult issue, but the best thing they did was to get the Core-four together, countries not part of the original group, and to develop a consensus among the latter on what it is that they would settle for.

The terms that they have come up with, in my view, are reasonable and they, if pursued, might even open up the prospect of some kind of strategic tradeoff of the sort that Mr. Brzezinski refers to, where as part of the resolution of the difficulties vis-a-vis Afghanistan, there would be some associated formula applied in Central America.

The test which one should bring to such a formula—you have already sort of outlined. The test should be, in the aftermath of such a settlement, will Honduras and Costa Rica remain democratic? Will they have the requisite self-confidence, economic viability, and effective internal security to survive as nascent democracies?

If the answer is no, then we should reject the proposals. Nonetheless, that kind of idea, that kind of linkage is not all bad, and probably at least ought to be thought through and talked about here in Washington in the months to come.

To sum up, you have been asking, as usual, a set of very perceptive questions, and you have correctly pointed to the fact that the issue cannot be understood simply in terms of voting yes or no on are we going to send more money to the Contras. It is a far more complex set of issues.

Senator WILSON. I do not want to detain you longer, but having you here is a rare opportunity, so I may abuse it slightly if you are good-humored enough.

General GORMAN. Certainly, sir.

Senator WILSON. Let me just ask you this. You have mentioned something that takes me to another comparison that I would be interested in having you make. I assume that the Sandanistas are not as good, and certainly no better than the Red army.

Would you compare the performance of the Contras and that of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Russians? Also, I would be interested in a comparison of the effectiveness of the Contras as compared with the insurgents against the government in El Salvador.

General GORMAN. Let us take the Afghans first. As I understand Afghan tribalism, the first sign of manhood is the presentation of a weapon and the use of a rifle and the skills associated with combat are part and parcel of the upbringing of those young men. There is nothing like that in Central America, where martial skills are largely unknown.

The Central American is not sociologically a fighter. Now there are some reservations one can make, particularly in El Salvador, but by and large they are quite different societies from the Afghans with respect to their attitude toward violence, death, et cetera.

On the other hand, there is a long history, as you know, of revolution, changing governments, particularly in Nicaragua. There have been people in the hills, as I remarked earlier, in arms against whatever government was in Managua since the turn of the century, and some of those were pretty tough hombres. But they are by and large a different kind of a fighter than what I understand the Afghan to be.

Now you asked about the Salvadoran guerrillas and their contrast with the Contras. The difference is the difference between the amateur and the professional. The Salvadoran guerrilla commandantes have been trained for their position. Many of them have been at war for years. You may recall my bringing up and showing you one time a map that we had picked up on a battlefield up near the border. It was a plan drawn out on a sheet of paper for an attack on a government-defended bridge.

The notations on that plan were right out of the Soviet Field Manual. Symbol for symbol, this was a plan drawn by somebody who had been educated to the standards of the Soviet General Staff College. It was a first-class professional piece of work. He had the communications plan, the fire plan, the maneuver schedules for all of the various elements, the rendezvous points, the fallback positions—it was as complete a plan as you could see out at Fort Leavenworth, and all done in Soviet symbology.

Now in the Contras you are dealing with a force that is about 90 percent illiterate, and in a military sense largely untrained. It is not just that they did not have any military education, in other words, they cannot read or write. Maps are incomprehensible to them. They do not understand fire and movement. They do not have a fundamental grasp of how to put together an attack like those guerrillas in Salvador, and they just have not had practice.

Unlike Salvador's guerrillas, the Contras are not a force that has been subjected to a great deal of military duress, and the natural leaders have not bubbled up. It is a very different kind of a proposition.

Senator WILSON. So it is not simply a question of the level of arms.

General GORMAN. No, sir, by no means. I think you could double or triple the level of arms, and you would not get an iota more effectiveness.

Senator WILSON. General, thank you. You have been more than generous and, as usual, have been provocative and have provided us with valuable testimony, and we are much in your debt. Thank you.

General GORMAN. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1987

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The committee met, in open session, pursuant to notice, at 3:03 p.m. in room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Stennis, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, McCain, and Pell.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Jeffrey H. Smith, general counsel; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Robert E. Bayer, Robert G. Bell, Robert F. Bott, Richard D. Finn, Jr., John J. Hamre, William E. Hoehn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, Frederick F.Y. Pang, Gordon G. Riggle, Mark B. Robinson, Patricia L. Watson and Daniel J. Wildfong, professional staff members; Lucia M. Chavez, staff assistant.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gordon Kerr, assistant to Senator Levin; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Edward M. McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Patricia Buckheit, assistant to Senator Glenn; Leon Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Samuel J. Routson, assistant to Senator Symms; and Loren Craner, assistant to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Nunn. This afternoon, the committee conducts its 12th hearing on U.S. national security strategy and its military strategy component.

It is a privilege to welcome Secretary of State George Shultz as the witness for this afternoon's session. Mr. Secretary, the committee appreciates this opportunity to hear your views on our strategy and, in particular on the security interests and foreign policy objectives that our strategy is designed to protect, promote or achieve.

You have already been kind enough to give us another date when we all got iced in that day and had to postpone, so we appreciate your being here today, particularly when we know you have a very busy schedule.

Last Wednesday, the President submitted to the Congress his first annual report on U.S. national security strategy. Although there has been only a limited period of time to review that report, I am certain that it is the beginning of a joint effort between the Congress and the White House to promote a more effective formulation and articulation of our strategy.

I believe that report came from the Defense Reorganization bill last year. Senator Warner had an amendment which required a foreign policy and defense coordinated report each year, and we are pleased to get that under way.

Many of us are concerned that the United States does not have a clear, coherent and consistent strategy. The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, chaired by David Packard, raised serious questions about our military strategy making last year. That report states, and I quote:

> There is no rational system whereby the executive branch and the Congress reach coherent and enduring agreement on national military strategy, the forces to carry it out and the funding that should be provided. . . .

The committee's hearings on U.S strategy have three purposes. First, Senator Warner and I hope that the hearings will help the American public to better understand our country's foreign and defense policies, and I note that one part of your report deals with that component of public understanding and the necessity of greatly improving this public understanding.

Second, these hearings are designed to stimulate more thinking and work on strategy, both in the executive branch and in the broader national security community.

Finally, these strategy hearings should help to build a framework within which the committee can examine the President's defense authorization request for fiscal years 1988 and 1989.

Since World War II, our national security objectives have remained fairly constant. But during this period, our commitments have expanded, and our power and influence to fulfill these commitments in relative terms, that is compared to our potential adversaries, have really decreased. There is no question that there is a gap between our commitments and our capabilities.

The critical questions are: How wide is the gap? What risks does this gap pose? And, are we developing strategies and budgets to begin to close that gap and to diminish the risk?

It is especially important that the Secretary of State address the relationship between foreign policy and military strategy. Too frequently, we speak as if foreign policy and military strategy are entirely separate. They are not. In fact, they are intimately related and should be complementary parts of an overall national security strategy.

For that reason, Senator Warner and I have invited Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger to testify jointly on U.S. national security strategy. They both agreed to that request, but their schedules and the early beginning we had of this Congress prevented that joint appearance. We hope in the future that we can have that kind of joint appearance and joint dialogue.

With the same thought in mind, Senator Warner and I invited the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senators Pell and Helms, to attend the hearings with both Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Shultz. Chairman Pell is here.

Chairman Pell, why not come up and sit with us at the table up here. We are delighted to have you.

Mr. Secretary, we look forward to hearing your testimony and having a dialogue with you. Before we begin, I will ask Senator Warner if he has any comments he would like to make. Senator Warner has been a leader in trying to promote this idea of getting the foreign policy part of our governmental policy together with our national security strategy.

Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, we welcome you here today. This week, as you know, the President provided the Congress with this document, the National Security Strategy of the United States [indicating]. This is an historic first, and I want personally to thank you and the members of your department for your cooperation in making this report possible. I hope as the years go on that it will continue and that it will be provided to Congress in a timely fashion with the State of the Union Message.

Under our Constitution, the President and you, as his chief executive under that, are the spokesmen for our external affairs, and the report sets forth his perspective of our national goals and how we plan to achieve them and the costs in terms of our national resources. The National Security Strategy Report becomes a foundation document for Members of Congress as we measure the value and relevance of individual programs ranging from Department of Defense spending to the Foreign Assistance Program. It will enable those of us in the Congress to assess how each of these programs contributes to our overall national and military strategies.

The document is of equal value to the American public. As the chairman said, this has been one of our joint goals as we have proceeded with these hearings. The people expect and deserve a clear statement of our national goals and the way in which we, as a nation, intend to make them a reality. Informed public debate on the goals, strategies and available options must reflect an awareness of the dangerous, complex situation facing our Nation. The President's report provides an excellent means for understanding the strategic direction of this country as articulated by the administration.

Finally, the document describes for our friends, allies and potential adversaries a coherent American strategy to advance goals of world peace and freedom by providing a clear view of an America committed to the prevention of conflict but realistically prepared to defend freedom. We strengthen links with our friends and allies while reaffirming our resolve to the rest of the world.

I would like to recognize my colleagues, Congressmen Dick Cheney and Bob McEwen, who joined in this effort in introducing this legislation, and also Senators Nunn, Lugar, Pell and our former chairman, Senator Goldwater.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Secretary Shultz, we are delighted to have you. We appreciate your coming. We look forward to your testimony, and then we will have questions following your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee. I welcome this opportunity to meet with you to discuss the role the United States seeks to play in the world and our strategy for achieving the Nation's basic foreign policy objectives.

Overall, our foreign affairs situation is good and our prospects bright. We have a strong hand with which to influence world affairs to our benefit, if only we are persistent, use our advantages wisely, and apply the necessary resources to the conduct of our foreign relations.

Today I want to review with you just where we are and where we are going, the problems we face and the strengths we have for dealing with them, and, finally, the challenges that we should be focusing on right now.

Much of what I have to say may not sound very new to you, and for good reason. This administration did not suddenly discover national security strategy in preparing for these hearings. We have a strong and broadly based bipartisan foundation on which to build and much of which we inherited. For the past 6 years, we have been following a steady and consistent approach in our efforts to advance U.S. interest, to support the cause of freedom and to make the world a safer place.

In the field of foreign affairs, I have laid out the rationale and the specifics of our policies on many occasions in testimony here before the Congress, most particularly in the Senate or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in a series of speeches over the past few years at Rand, Harvard, in San Francisco, at the University of Chicago, Atlanta and elsewhere. So this afternoon should not be seen as an occasion for breaking dramatic new ground but rather for reviewing and reaffirming the essentials of our national strategy.

We begin with the question of the goals of our foreign policy. What are we, as a people and a nation, seeking to accomplish? There is a strong national consensus on our basic objectives. They are widely understood and supported by the American people. I think all of us can agree that we serve the interests of the United States when we seek to: protect the safety of our Nation against aggression or subversion; promote our domestic prosperity; foster the values of freedom and democracy both at home and abroad; act in a manner consistent with our humanitarian instincts; and combat those activities which would undermine the rule of law in our domestic stability, particularly right now terrorism and narcotics trafficking.

Over the past four decades, both Republican and Democratic administrations have come to agree on these goals. They are not the source of divisive partisan debate; but for that very reason, we sometimes take them for granted. We should not. We should keep reminding ourselves of them, for they represent, in effect, the compass of our dealings with other nations.

How are we doing in accomplishing these broad objectives? Clearly, we face a number of serious and immediate challenges in the world today, ones that directly affect our national interests. In the Middle East, in Africa and elsewhere, persistent tensions threaten regional peace and stability. The continuation of conflict in the Persian Gulf raises the possibility of wider escalation of a war that threatens our energy security and that of our allies. In Central America, democracies are struggling to eliminate externally supported aggression and subversion. In Afghanistan, Angola and Indochina, the Soviet Union and its proxies are using military force in the most brutal manner to maintain and expand their influence and control.

Elsewhere in the developing world, the efforts of local governments to address the root causes of their economic and social malaise have been hampered by large foreign debt and disappointing growth rates. The transition to greater political freedom in many of these countries continues to be a fragile process. In the current tragedy of Sri Lanka, for example, movement toward stability and growth on the basis of economic freedom has been undermined by violence arising out of longstanding communal grievances.

Current events in Beirut yet again illustrate that no single country or its citizens are exempt from the scourage of terrorism. Combatting that threat will continue to demand steadfast courage and expanded cooperation on the part of all civilized nations.

Among the major industrialized democracies of the world, we confront persistent pressures for thinly disguised protectionist measures. These short-sighted actions would only stimulate political confrontations among trading partners and have the effect of dismantling the open trading system which has helped to generate so much of the West's prosperity and technological advantage of the past four decades.

More than balancing these various problems, however, is the increasingly clear evidence that we are making significant progress in the world and that trends are in our favor. For all its fragility, the movement toward expanded political and economic freedom is real and growing.

The world is already in the midst of a new scientific and technological revolution, one whose social, economic political and strategic consequences are only beginning to be felt. Time and space are contracting as instantaneous communications makes business, politics and culture truly global for the first time. Familiar measures of economic development—and, by extension, military and political strength—are becoming outdated. This new information age is bound to have, and already has had, a profound impact on world politics and economics.

All of this seems to confirm that this new information age has the potential to be our age, a period which plays to the greatest strengths of the West. The productivity and competitiveness of a nation will be far more dependent on how freely knowledge can be used and shared. And, unlike oil or mineral wealth, knowledge is a research which does not diminish, but rather increases with its use. In this sort of environment, open societies such as our own will thrive. Closed societies will fall behind. What is more, this lesson that freedom and openness are the wellspring of such technological creativity and economic dynamism is increasingly well understood throughout the world.

Recent events in the Philippines have once again demonstrated the persistent power of the democratic idea. Throughout Latin America we have seen a remarkable resurgence of democratic governments. Contrary to the expectations and predictions of so many just a few years ago, the percentage of Latin America's population living under freely-elected governments has grown from 30 percent in 1979 to more than 90 percent today. In witnessing these events, we cannot be indifferent to just how positive and important a role the United States can play in supporting such hopeful developments.

At the same time, there is an equally encouraging trend on the part of many nations away from central planning toward greater economic freedom for the individual, and increased reliance on free market-oriented solutions to the problems of economic growth. Few countries around the world now dispute that entrepreneurial initiative in a market environment is the engine of development and growth. These truths are now being acknowledged in the Communist world, as demonstrated by economic reforms in China and Hungary.

All this reflects the reality that the great ideological struggle that has marked this century ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 has essentially been decided. In the contest between the Western values of democracy and individual freedom and Soviet style party-dominated centralized collectivism, the trend in our favor is clear. In contrast with earlier decades, no one speaks today of communism as the wave of the future. The battle of ideas will doubtless continue, but we have the winning hand.

As a consequence, it is the Soviet Union's massive military establishment alone and not any inherent economic advantage or political appeal that underlies its status as a global competitor. The Soviet Union poses a clear and sobering strategic threat to the United States and its allies. It has the capability to intervene with conventional military force, directly or through proxies, in many regions of the world and to threaten and try to intimidate our allies and friends in these areas. It commands a nuclear arsenal, and in particular an offensive ballistic missile force, able to inflict massive destruction on the United States and our allies.

We must be prepared to counter these threats. We must be prepared to deter Soviet aggression against the United States or its allies by whatever means. We must have the defensive strength necessary to deter the Soviet threat by clearly demonstrating that we and our allies would be able to respond instantly and with enormous effectiveness should we be attacked.

As a nation, we have the ability to meet these challenges and to capitalize on the foreign opportunities before us. To do so, we must have the patience and determination, but we also have powerful strengths and advantages in our favor.

The first is our democratic vision and our commitment to give reality to our ideas. The effectiveness of our foreign policy will reflect our confidence in our beliefs and values, and in our purposes and priorities as a society. Our tradition of pluralism and openness shapes the content of much of our foreign policy. We support democratic institutions in the world, where free peoples can join together in resisting threats and intimidation from nondemocratic forces.

Traditionally, people throughout the world have regarded America as a land of opportunity and looked to us for a vision of the future. They know that American society has its faults, in part because we, ourselves, are always ready to proclaim them. We are never afraid of criticism, and we tend to measure our performance through our proclamations. Throughout our history, so many individual Americans have worked tirelessly to extend the promise of our beliefs to everyone regardless of race, creed, or class.

One week ago—well, that was when I was supposed to testify, sorry about that—our Nation paid tribute to one such American, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Dr. King's legacy and the epic poem of the black civil rights movement have made America much stronger in the world, stronger in our own sense of solidarity as one people and stronger as a precious source of hope, realistic hope for oppressed people everywhere.

We gain strength from our tremendous economic capabilities. Here again, we are perhaps too familiar with our own economic success story or preoccupied with problems of the moment to sense our true power and potential. But America's economic capacity, its ability to support ambitious national objectives to advance the edge of technological creativity and to support increased domestic prosperity can only be described as awesome. Right now, interestingly enough, the so-called Misery Index, if you remember the one that Art Okun created some years ago, is at its lowest point in 18 years.

There is, of course, an irony here. Our national economy is enormous and sound, over twice the size of any other. But the Government is broke. The Federal budget deficit is a major problem for us. It affects our ability to grow and to compete. It is a drag on all our efforts, and we must address it properly and effectively. I am confident that we can, and by doing so we will be better able to draw upon the powerful economic advantages that we possess in the pursuit of our foreign policy objectives.

Now, we are benefiting from a renewed sense of hardheaded realism about the importance of our own military strength. A healthy American defense establishment serves as the indispensible underpinning for any American foreign policy seeking a safer world and a more durable peace. Our weakness invites challenges; our strength deters aggression and encourages restraint and negotiation on the part of our adversaries.

We are already seeing the positive results of that renewed realism. The rebuilding of America's defenses in the early 1980s has given the Soviets the necessary incentive to begin serious negotiations, not just on limits to the future growth of our nuclear arsenal but on their substantial reduction from current levels. Improvements in our ability to project power abroad have helped us protect our vital interests and defend our friends against subversion and aggression. And our willingness to use that power when necessary—as against Libya, as a last resort after years of Qaddafi's terrorism—has sent a powerful signal to friends and enemies alike.

We face entirely new challenges to American interests as well, and in today's world these are often less clearcut than the traditional examples of aggression we associate with World Wars I and II. So, we require not only the military capabilities but also the patience and the flexibility necessary to deal with protracted armed subversion, state-sponsored terrorism, or the political disruption and violence associated with large scale narcotics trafficking. These new threats are sometimes referred to as low intensity conflict. I don't particularly like that term. There is nothing low intensity about them for those who must join the battle. The stakes of these challenges to our security are high.

If the United States is to be effective in addressing these threats as well as in deterring military aggression, we have to be steady in supporting our commitments and ready to act decisively when necessary. Our military must have the capabilities to perform a variety of missions across the spectrum of security challenges.

Just as importantly, we have to show the political will needed to use our military strength intelligently and effectively in defense of our most vital interests, and we have to be clearly perceived by both friends and adversaries as having that will.

Now, let me turn to our diplomatic efforts. Americans have sometimes tended to think that power and diplomacy are two distinct and conflicting alternatives in our dealings abroad, but power and diplomacy are not contradictory. They are complementary. Both are necessary and reinforcing components of our foreign policy, as you said in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman.

Military preparedness alone is not enough. Power must always be guided by purpose, and quite often diplomacy is an essential and cost effective means of accomplishing our objectives, but diplomacy that is not backed up by strength is usually ineffective.

As a nation, we learned from bitter experience during the first half of this century that we can retreat from the rest of the world only at our own peril. Today we can see with even greater clarity that what happens in distant regions of the globe has an important bearing on our safety and wellbeing. So as a first resort, we seek to meet our objectives with diplomacy without having to use military force. Successful diplomacy encourages like-minded nations to join with us in common effort, and it brings a greater sense of predictability and stability to our relations with potential adversaries.

The United States could attempt to deal with the diverse threats to our interests on a unilateral basis, but that would demand great effort and enormous expense on our part. There is a more efficient strategic alternative, as we have agreed upon as a nation for more than four decades. Our diplomacy along with its various tools, such as security assistance and economic support funding, seeks to maximize our effectiveness in the world through cooperation with those nations with whom we share basic values and common interests. But to conduct an effective diplomacy and to make best use of all our advantages requires that we sustain our efforts.

This afternoon I have spoken about America's winning hand in world affairs because I am personally confident about our national strengths and the wisdom of our general approach, but I also have to sound a warning note as well. Just as we should be consolidating our recent gains and building on important opportunities, we are in danger of undercutting our position in the world by denying ourselves the necessary resources.

Any strategy is only as good as the tools provided to work toward its objectives, and we are fast approaching a situation in which the United States will simply not have the foreign policy tools needed to get the job done.

Earlier this month the President submitted the administration's fiscal year 1988 and fiscal year 1987 supplemental request to the Congress for the foreign affairs budget. Responding to congressional concerns, our fiscal year 1988 budget request was lower than that requested for fiscal year 1987 and, I might say, lower than that appropriated for fiscal years 1985 or 1986. Our total request amounted to less than 2 cents of every dollar proposed to be spent by the Federal Government.

I am dismayed that over the past 2 years Congress has made devastating cuts in our foreign affairs budget proposals. Last January our international affairs budget for fiscal year 1987 was cut by Congress by over 20 percent, reducing our operating base by $1.8 billion. After accommodating earmarked items which had to be funded, the effective reduction for the bulk of our operations was more on the order of 50 percent, and that was on top of the $1.5 billion cut from prior year levels that we had suffered in the fiscal year 1986 congressional appropriations process.

Over the last 2 years we lost over $3.3 billion from the resources we were operating with in fiscal 1985. These cuts were more severe in percentage terms than the reductions in any other function in the President's budget requests, and for our posts in Europe and Japan these cuts have been even more damaging as a result of the recent huge changes in currency cross rates. Just call up your friend, Mike Mansfield, and ask him how he is doing taking those dollars you appropriate, changing them into yen, and trying to run his embassy.

Let me be blunt. Those Draconian budget reductions are forcing us to play Russian roulette as we shortchange our various foreign policy interests. If these massive cuts are continued this year, they will directly threaten our ability to exercise our effective leadership in the world. This budget crisis is perhaps the most urgent and least recognized foreign policy challenge facing our Nation today.

Mr. Chairman, the pursuit of an effective foreign policy, one that seeks meaningful progress toward our basic goals does not lend itself to quick fixes. Americans have to be prepared to conduct foreign relations on a coherent long term basis.

That requires a special steadiness and persistence on our part. A world of peace and security will not come without considerable exertion or without our facing up to some tough choices. In particular, we cannot allow ourselves to lose our sense of focus and what we are seeking to achieve in the world and what is required to reach those ends. It would be all too easy for us as a society to become distracted from what is truly important and at stake in the most urgent foreign policy challenges now facing us.

The first such challenge lies in how we continue to support the cause of democracy and freedom in Central America. As a nation we have long sought to advance national self-determination and individual freedom in the world and today we see the power of the idea of freedom calling into question the old assumption of the inevitable permanence of dictatorships of the left or right in various countries, not just in Nicaragua but in Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia as well. Marxist-Leninist oppression and aggression have given rise to resistance movements.

These men and women are struggling for the rights denied them by Communist rule, and as such they deserve our support. We should be under no illusions in this regard. Over the long term, our reliability in supporting those who believe in freedom in the face of Communist totalitarianism is an important element in ensuring our own security. It encourages our friends and gives our adversaries a reason for restraint. And conversely, if we fail to support those struggling for freedom in their own country, we will only face more daunting challenges to our own security.

The second pressing challenge is that of our response to terrorism. In recent years, we have seen new and ever more virulent forms of this modern day barbarism. These include the emergence of narcoterrorism, the use of such violence in association with narcotics trafficking to undermine local governments. The narcotics traffickers provide the money and the terrorists provide the muscle, and they work together, and they are an extremely subversive element, and that is particularly so right in our own neighborhood, in the Andean countries, for example.

Quite simply, terrorism is war. It is a shadow war involving direct and brutal assaults on the lives of our citizens, on our national interests overseas, and on our basic values. It is vital that we win this war, but to do so we have to be prepared for a long, tough effort. It is inevitable that as a people our hearts go out to the individuals directly affected by terrorism and to their families and friends here at home.

But we cannot allow our sympathies to overshadow the pressing need for us to stand firm behind our principles and to deny international terrorism further leverage against us. Our foremost priority must continue to be to demonstrate through word and action that there are no rewards for terrorist violence. We have to redouble our cooperative efforts with other nations in dealing with this scourge.

The third pressing challenge we face lies with the management of our relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union poses the primary threat to our security, yet our two countries share a basic interest in ensuring that as the President and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed at their Geneva summit in 1985, quoting from their statement, "A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought." In our dealings with the Soviet Union we have pursued a four-part agenda of issues that are important to us, including arms control, regional conflicts, bilateral matters, and human rights.

In the field of arms control the President's discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev at Reykjavik last October revealed potential areas of agreement on substantial and verifiable mutual reductions in offensive nuclear weapons that would enhance strategic stability. We are committed to pursuing these opportunities at the negotiating table even as we will also continue our efforts consistent with the ABM Treaty to research ways of strengthening that stability through greater reliance on defense.

But this places special demands on us. We need a sustained effort that is firm, realistic, and patient. We cannot afford to become either disheartened or euphoric with each week's propaganda effort out of Moscow. Agreements for their own sake are of no interest. It is the content that counts. Our negotiating objective of strengthening strategic stability at substantially reduced levels of nuclear arms is a sound one, and we must stick to it. Our guiding objective continues to be to persuade the Soviet leadership through the evidence of our own determination that excessive military buildings on their part will offer no easy rewards and that negotiated restraint and reciprocity will be to our mutual advantage.

Mr. Chairman, we have our work cut out for us. We have to use our power and our diplomacy with exceptional skill and determination in the service of peace and our democratic ideas. But if the problems before us are great, so, too, are our strengths and opportunities. Our political and economic freedoms are those which hold the greatest promise for the future. We have a diplomacy that has moved toward peace through negotiation. We have rebuilt our military strength so that we can defend our interests and discourage others from violence, and we have allies with whom we share common purposes and ever more effective cooperation. Our challenge is to use our strengths wisely on behalf of the interests of the American people.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate that statement. I think it is an excellent statement, and it is very helpful to us. The very basic question is, how does the Defense Department interrelate with the State Department in formulating U.S. foreign and defense strategy? Do you have regular meetings? Is there a formal process? Is there a formal institutional mechanism, or is this an informal mechanism? Can you tell us how it works?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, there are both. There are formal papers prepared through the NSC process that bear on various subjects in the foreign policy field and defense field, and those are worked through in various interagency groups and reviewed and brought to the point of discussion, and then in the end signed off on by the President, and there are enumerable informal gatherings of one kind or another, different groups in which people discuss issues and share ideas and I dare say the informal probably is as important as the formal.

Chairman NUNN. Do both informal and formal come together at the National Security Council level or do they come together in direct contact between the two agencies or both?

Secretary SHULTZ. Both.

Chairman NUNN. Is it primarily dominated, though, by the National Security Council process both formally and informally? Is that the main meeting of minds between Defense and State at that level?

Secretary SHULTZ. That certainly is the formal structure as it comes before the President, but we have lots of informal and semi-institutionalized ways of dealing with each other. One of the institutions I find in Washington these days that was not particularly prevalent when I was here before is a new barbaric custom of the working breakfast, and so we have a working breakfast probably every day, and those are systematic, and they are kind of prepared, and we try to have an understanding ahead of time what subjects might be discussed, so you do have that.

Chairman NUNN. I want to give you a real softball right across the plate. What do you think the role of the National Security Council should be?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think just about the way Frank Carlucci is designing it, which is to emphasize its role as a coordinator of these views as a provocateur in a sense, to see that we focus jointly or department by department on important issues as an institution and as a person who is there in the executive office of the President and in the case of the advisor in the White House who sees the President all the time and who is there all time to interact with him. Those are the sorts of things that should be in its role.

Chairman NUNN. Do you agree with what I understand is the new directive that the National Security Council will not be involved or should not be involved in covert operations?

Secretary SHULTZ. I agree with that. Of course, it depends on what you mean by involved. I think it should be involved in the process of examining what is proposed and in reviewing it on a regular basis, but as far as conducting operations themselves, I think that is a mistake.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, on page 18, you state here, "We are committed to pursuing these opportunities at the negotiating table even as we will also continue our efforts consistent with the ABM Treaty to research ways of strengthening that stability through greater reliance on defenses." It is the U.S. position now that we still are going to abide by the ABM Treaty?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Is that the restrictive version or is that the more expanded version? What is our position on that at this time?

Secretary SHULTZ. The President's position on that at this time is that we feel examination of the negotiating record, careful examination of the negotiating record supports an interpretation of what is permitted under that treaty on what has become known as a broad basis. However, the program has been designed and is being conducted at this time within the framework of what has become known as the narrow definition, but that is a decision that the President has made, and obviously is subject to review.

Chairman NUNN. At Reykjavik we proposed as I understand it or agreed to a 10-year extension of the ABM Treaty. Is that still a negotiating position that is formally our position on the table at Geneva, to agree to abide by the ABM Treaty for the next 10 years?

Secretary SHULTZ. We tabled a proposition among other propositions and nothing in the end was agreed although there were some things out that I think are very prospective myself, but we tabled a proposal that each side agree not to withdraw, exercise its rights of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for 10 years with the understanding that at the end of the 10 years either side would have the right to deploy unless it was mutually agreed to something else, and we link that to an agreement to eliminate ballistic missiles and that position is still on the table.

Chairman NUNN. We have gotten testimony and heard comments outside the formal hearing room from Secretary Weinberger and others that there is under active consideration an early deployment decision. Now, is that position that the administration has decided on, and if so, how does that square with your statement that our position is to remain consistent with the ABM Treaty?

I guess my question is, will an early deployment conflict with the ABM Treaty and our present policy?

Secretary SHULTZ. Consistency of deployment with the ABM Treaty depends upon what kind of deployment it is. As you know, the Soviet Union has deployed an ABM system around Moscow, and of course our belief is, and I believe that their Krasnoyarsk radar is a violation of the treaty, and some questions have been raised about other aspects of their activities, but basically the system around Moscow is in conformance with the ABM Treaty, and if we wish to deploy a defense around a certain point with no more than 100 missiles and so forth as defined by the treaty, that would be consistent with it.

Chairman NUNN. I do not think that is what the Secretary has in mind. I am speaking of what he is describing.

Secretary SHULTZ. Other kinds of deployment would not be consistent with the ABM Treaty.

Chairman NUNN. What is your view on whether at this stage we should be embarking on early deployment decision of the Strategic Defense Initiative system?

Secretary SHULTZ. We undertake the process of research about the possibility of strategic defense presumably in the hope that we will find a positive answer, and in the knowledge that the Soviet Union is working very hard and has for a long time on the same thing.

Presumably if we were to find a positive answer that would serve our country's security and interests, then we should consider whether or not we should deploy, and I think that makes perfect sense, and under the ABM Treaty each side has the right to withdraw upon 6 months' notice. However, I am just describing in a sort of technical sense what the situation may be, and there has not been any decision made about deployment of any kind.

Chairman NUNN. You are familiar with—I believe it became a Presidential directive. It was recently, I think, Paul Nitze's view in his speech, the criteria that is set forth for deployment of the strategic defense system. As I understand it, the criteria were cost effectiveness at the margins, survivable and technically feasible.

Do you agree with those criteria in the way we would measure whether we are ready to deploy a system?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir, I do, and those are part of the President's policy.

Chairman NUNN. Is that still our policy?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Would that apply to any deployment decision as far as you know now?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, it would, and should.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it was an excellent statement, and we thank you again for appearing today, As a follow-on to these questions, there are certain people in the administration who feel that we should be moving toward some form of deployment now in an accelerated way. Do you see any urgency at this time as a consequence of the status of the arms control talks for this Nation to be moving toward an earlier deployment date with SDI?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, what I can do is basically describe the situation and where the President is. The situation is, as I have been able to sense it, from discussions with the people running the strategic defense program.

Senator WARNER. And you are a full participant in this decisionmaking, are you not?

Secretary SHULTZ. If it comes to such a decision, I am sure it will be discussed in the NSC process, and I will be there, so I will participate, but while I do not pretend to grade scientific expertise and the amount of time that I can spend on it is limited, nevertheless I have tried hard to be broadly informed about the strategic defense research program. I have visited laboratories and talked to lots of people, as I know you have, and had to spend a lot of time with General Abrahamson, including recently, and it is my sense from those discussions that the research program is going quite well, perhaps better than many expected it might, so it is something to keep careful track of. As far as any Presidential decision on the question of deployment, there hasn't been any such decision.

Senator WARNER. How would that, in your judgment if such a decision were made, impact on the current status of the arms control talks?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, it is quite clear to me anyway that the Strategic Defense Initiative has already been deployed in the sense that it has made a major impression on the Soviet Union and is a big consideration in their minds as they approach those negotiations on whichever of the groups you may think about. Of course, they appear to be quite anxious to get us to accept things that at least in our judgment, and I think it is true would cripple the program, and so we will not do that.

Nevertheless, I have some hopes that it will be possible to work out some general agreement with them that will be mutually satisfactory. So I think basically the existence of the SDI program, its prospectivenesss, is a positive development, first of all, from the standpoint of our ability to protect ourselves against ballistic missiles, and second of all from our ability to be effective in our negotiations.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner, if I could interject, we have a vote on. Evidently the lights are not working. I would ask that some of the Senators who feel so disposed go over and vote, and when you come back we will continue the questioning so that we will not have to interrupt. I know the Secretary has a tight schedule. We may have several votes and we may have to interrupt because of the votes. We may be very, very late tonight, so we will do it in shifts. We will try to keep the questioning going as best as possible.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, a second question relating to our ability to deter the taking of hostages and indeed terrorism, particularly American citizens. You spoke the other day on this subject, at which time in certain respects you addressed a possible relationship between the policy of this country not so many months ago of exchanging arms for hostages with the current seizure of several Americans that took place——

Secretary SHULTZ. No, I did not say that.

Senator WARNER. Would you clarify that?

Secretary SHULTZ. In my opinion these recent hostage takings in Lebanon are directly related to the arrest of Hamadi, the Hamadi brothers in Germany.

Senator WARNER. And do not bear any relationship with the policies that we had at one time of exchanging arms for hostages?

Secretary SHULTZ. We never had that policy, and the President has stated publicly that he decided to sell some arms to Iran as a signal in an effort to create a different kind of relationship with them, and that he did not want to see that equated with arms for hostages. At the same time there is no question about the fact that some people may make the equation in their minds, but anyway the President's view was as I stated it.

Senator WARNER. Thank you for those two clarifications.

Mr. Secretary, lastly, on the procedure by which foreign policy decisions of his administration have been derived, would you suggest any changes in that procedure now?

Secretary SHULTZ. I imagine that such things go through a kind of cycle, although I was not here at the beginning of the administration. I have been here now for 4½ years. But at the beginning of an administration you need to have a process of examining everything across the board, and looking at what you think you should do and what the opportunities are, and so forth. So there tends to be a very broad review.

Then these policies get set in place and directives get signed, and so forth, and you have established what amounts to guidance, and people then are more in the mode of carrying out the things that have been set out. However, the world changes and events come along and you need to review, and so that process of review goes on. So I think that there is a certain rhythm to it, and you are not doing the same thing all the time, and should not.

I think one of the things that is good, as Mr. Carlucci comes in, of course, was here at the beginning of the administration, but as a very broad experienced person is initiating, the President through him is initiating the kind of reexamination of many of the areas that we have been working on a long time, and I think that is a good idea.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, our country, I think, owes you a great debt of gratitude. You have become, in my opinion, a most knowledgeable, a most seasoned officer in this field, and that is not an unfavorable comparison to the President of the United States. He has a host of other duties which take up so much of his time. But you are a seasoned, wise man. I am not trying to flatter you. I am glad I got to hear directly from you these words you have said and these same messages going to the people of the United States. They have such little chance to hear a statement from you of such depth and importance, you and others in your field.

Now, you need not think that we on the Hill here do not worry and think about these same problems that you deal with every day and night. I remember when the Korean war started, when the war in Vietnam started we were all waiting and hoping for something to happen to prevent the actual war, but it happened just the same. Along with a lot of other people I was hopeful that weaponry itself had outlawed war, but we cannot depend on that. You have given the people of the United States a fine talk and discussion along with an understanding of the problems, and there is a lesson in that. I am grateful for what you have done, and commend the chairman here for asking you to be here. I feel more comforted by having you present at these vital sessions and dealing with these problems directly. I will read this further with profit, and I think it will have influenced literally thousands and thousands of people, this statement of yours.

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, sir.

Senator STENNIS [presiding]. I will not take up any more time. I will call on Senator Quayle next.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I want to congratulate you, too, on a very fine statement. I would like to go back to Senator Nunn's questioning on the deployment of SDI. Do you anticipate a decision reasonably soon within the administration to make a decision on the possibility of a near term deployment of SDI?

Secretary SHULTZ. Any such decision has to be based on a careful appraisal of where we are in finding out about the feasibility, the survivability, and the cost effectiveness at the margin of such a system. As I said earlier, it is my general impression from my contacts with the program that it has been going quite well. But I do not have any sense that there is, as I think Admiral Crowe said to this committee, something in the parking lot that you can decide about.

Nevertheless, there has been a lot accomplished in the program.

Senator QUAYLE. There has been a lot accomplished. Do you not believe as we go through the whole decisionmaking process of near term deployment and using your criteria of cost effectiveness and technological——

Secretary SHULTZ. They are the President's criteria, not my criteria.

Senator QUAYLE. OK, the President's criteria and technological survivability that as you march down that road are we not looking at that very, very closely, and as you indicate today, that we are further ahead than perhaps many had anticipated? Your recent conversations that you have had with General Abrahamson and others that maybe things are going quite well and that there is a possibility that there might be a decision to look at some near term deployment options in the short term in the next few months.

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not know of anything at hand that would allow you to make a decision to actually deploy something that you can identify in the next few months. But I think it is a matter that needs to be continually reviewed and appraised, appraising the program and seeing where it stands.

Senator QUAYLE. Do you agree generally with Admiral Crowe's contention that we are going to have to make a decision reasonably soon on deployment of SDI in the near term if we expect to get anything in the early 1990s or before the mid-1990s that if we want to look at that kind of timeframe and time reference that we are going to have to look at these issues and make a decision. He made that statement. I wonder if you generally share that time reference.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think it is clear that the pace of the work will reflect in part the resources made available to the program and given the demonstrated ability of the program to use resources effectively I think it is—well, I will say I hope that the Congress will fund it fully and provide for the requests that have been made. Obviously, there is also the question of what kind of activities you can conduct in doing your research and testing, and so that raises questions about the interpretation of the ABM Treaty that we were discussing earlier. At this point in time the President's position is as I stated it, but still that is obviously a subject for review.

Senator QUAYLE. If in fact we make a decision to deploy, whether it be in the near term or beyond the near term, a strategic defense system, at some point do we not run head into the ABM Treaty and at some point will not that treaty either have to be either withdrawn from or let it lapse or greatly modified to accommodate a deployment of a strategic defense system?

Secretary SHULTZ. If we or the Soviets wish to deploy something other than the point defense of the nature of the one they deployed around Moscow, we would either have to get agreement to modify the treaty or exercise our rights to withdraw from it, or they would. That is, such a deployment would not be consistent with the treaty.

Senator QUAYLE. Do you think that in your criteria of cost effectiveness, survivability, and technologically feasible that just one system, say, deployed around Washington or in Grand Forks really meets that criteria? Are we not talking about something more?

Secretary SHULTZ. The reason why the United States backed off after spending, I do not know, $1 billion or so over a decade ago from that point defense system was that it was judged not to be an effective system. That is, it was subject to being overwhelmed by offense. So you want a system that is not so subject. That is the meaning of cost effective at the margin. That is what that is about, and we want to have that kind of criteria.

Senator QUAYLE. Yes. A lot of the assumptions that we made in 1972 that we would have, you know, a decrease in offensive weapons, a lot of assumptions on what the technological capabilities since 1972 have really changed. There has been a dramatic change since 1972.

Secretary SHULTZ. Of course. Absolutely.

Senator QUAYLE. So I think we are talking about a different thing, and I really feel that if we are really serious about a deployment, and I think, you know, you research things to get into testing and development, that at some time that there is no doubt about it that you are going to have to either modify, let it lapse, or withdraw from the ABM Treaty. I really do not see any other way around it. I do not think anybody is really talking about in the long term just and deployment of one sight within the terms of the ABM Treaty, at least from my point of view.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, let me add my words of welcome and tell you how much I respect the work you are doing at the State Department, and I think Americans in both parties are grateful to you in spite of many disagreements that a lot of us have from time to time. I would like to continue the questions that have just been asked and that were pursued earlier by the chairman and ranking member about the idea of early deployment of SDI and its relationship to the ABM Treaty.

Let me ask you a theoretical question to get at what I view as a central point. Let's say that the President signs a treaty and then you come and testify before the United States Senate and explain the meaning of that treaty to the Senate, and let us say the record of your testimony and the questions you have answered clearly illuminate the fact that the Senate has gotten a particular understanding about the meaning of that treaty from you as spokesman for the administration.

Now, let us say that years later the executive branch wants to unilaterally change the meaning of the treaty and assert a new meaning that is contrary to the understanding given to the legislative branch at the time of ratification. Legally can the executive branch change the meaning of a treaty unilaterally without the acquiescence of the Senate once the Senate has acted according to Constitutional procedure on the basis of a clear understanding given to it about the meaning of the treaty from the executive branch?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, that is a kind of question for constitutional lawyers rather than a curbstone ex-economist.

Senator GORE. It may be more topical than we know.

Secretary SHULTZ. But I would say that in judging the meaning of a treaty in a sort of technical sense there have to be a lot of considerations taken into account. Certainly you have to examine the negotiating record and the treaty itself. Presumably that is the source of the understanding that the other side of the treaty has of that treaty. So that is highly relevant, whatever else may have taken place. It is also relevant to know what has been the pattern of conduct during the period between when the treaty was signed and some other moment of time down the road.

Now, I would think that if you got certain answers out of such an examination as that and the President reviewed the situation, he would be in a position to say here is from my constitutional point of view what I believe this treaty means. It seems to me he is in a position to do that. Otherwise I do not quite see how else you interpret such a document.

Now, I do not presume to speak as a constitutional lawyer here.

Senator GORE. Would the President be free to ignore the representations made to the Senate at the time of ratification as to the meaning of the treaty when it was ratified?

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not think he could ignore them, but I do not think he necessarily has to be bound, and no doubt statements are made that are not necessarily always consistent with each other. Just as we are surrounded all the time by inconsistency from one thing to another, and we have to find our way through those inconsistencies.

Senator GORE. Now, if both signatories have established a pattern of observing a particular part of the treaty in question for a period of, say, 14 years, would that have legal significance for the President's decision to unilaterally change the meaning of that particular part of the treaty. If the executive branch had affirmed to the Congress and represented to the Congress at the time of ratification that it means one thing both signatories had abided by that interpretation for 14 years, both signatories have discussed the ambiguity in the body set up under the treaty for resolution of disputes and had again agreed that this was the meaning of it, would all of those things be legally relevant to a Presidential decision to unilaterally change the meaning of that part of the treaty?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, again, I want to duck out on presuming to be a constitutional lawyer and expert, but I think the common sense of something is that you have a document and you have a negotiating record and you have a certain common law that develops, and you have to examine those things, but then the President has to come down and make this decision.

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate and respect the statement you made earlier about the so-called Nitze criteria, and I want to join with some others in urging the administration to continue applying the Nitze criteria, and if I could ask one final question briefly on another subject, we have had much discussion during these hearings on strategy about the importance of U.S. troops in NATO and some witnesses, at least one in particular, proposed the idea that this country seriously consider withdrawing 100,000 troops from NATO and converting the resources those troops were consuming into, say, light divisions and airlift capacity to beef up our strength in the Persian Gulf area.

What would be your view of a withdrawal of 100,000 U.S. troops over the next several years from NATO? What do you think would be the detrimental effects of a proposal of that kind?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think it would be a very bad mistake for the United States to do that. The NATO alliance is a cornerstone of our work with friends and allies around the world, and the fact that there has been peace in Europe basically since the end of World War II but certainly as a result, I think, very clearly of NATO should not lead us to think that therefore we can weaken NATO. That is the reason why we have had the success, and we have strong obligations to NATO, and one of them is our troop presence, and I think to draw it down in any sharp fashion, and that would be roughly one-third, would be a severe blow.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Gore.

Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, this, of course, is the last hearing on the strategy of deterrence. In that context, I am sure you would agree that deterrence and other U.S. interests would not be served if the Soviets were permitted to succeed in Sovietizing Afghanistan. It would appear that we are coming up on some kind of critical crossroads in the negotiation process, and it would be a great shame, I am sure you would agree, if the gains purchased at such high cost over the last 7 years were to be lost at the bargaining table.

Therefore, I want to address the agreement as it has so far been hammered out at the U.N.-mediated talks. Is it correct that only one principal item remains, namely, the withdrawal schedule of Soviet forces?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I would say you would have to say it is the centerpiece. That is if the Soviet forces are gone, then you have a different situation in Afghanistan, drastically, so that is really the ball game. Now, other things can surround that but are not of anything like the Soviet troops.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that the major sticking point now?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, it certainly is the major one, I would say, but in saying that it is such a massively important consideration that it dominates everthing else?

Senator HUMPHREY. Are the reports correct that the agreements already reached specify that aid, outside assistance to the Mujahideen will be cut off at day 1. Are those reports correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. If you had a proposition of something like this, and I do not want to act like I am the negotiator, and I have every facet and detail under my control here, so I need to be a little careful about it. But if you had a Soviet withdrawal schedule that was front loaded and was fast, that is to say, a withdrawal schedule paced according to logistical considerations, in other words, how logistically fast can you pull up stakes and leave, if you had that then you would have in place the freedom fighters who have a level of armaments and would be able to give an account of themselves without being continuously further supplied so I think you would be safe enough in saying that you probably would turn your resources in a different direction.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand your answer.

Secretary SHULTZ. But you have to be very severe about your withdrawal schedule in its rapid pace, its basic criteria, and its up front loading.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are you saying then, are you affirming then by that answer that is agreed that assistance to the Mujahideen will be cut off on the first day that this arrangement begins?

Secretary SHULTZ. It depends heavily on the nature of the arrangement and the question of what kind of assistance. I would assume that if the day should emerge when the Soviet troops are out of Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan are able to construct their lives themselves in their own country, given the devastation that has been wreaked there, that we would want to shift resources, not stop the flow of resources, but have them go to a different kind of purpose.

Senator HUMPHREY. The Pakistan Government has been holding out for a maximum of 4 months. Are we supporting that timeframe?

Secretary SHULTZ. We support the efforts of the Pakistan Government and I think the key concept is withdrawal governed by logistical considerations, and that means it has got to be short, on the order of magnitude that you suggested.

Senator HUMPHREY. In your letter of January 17, in which this matter was discussed, you said that we must have a settlement that provides for a rapid withdrawal. Can you define rapid?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, a rapid withdrawal would be one that is front loaded and consistent and governed by logistical considerations.

Senator HUMPHREY. Strictly logistical considerations?

Secretary SHULTZ. So it would be short. And I suppose the nature of logistics would depend somewhat, for example, on what time of year it was and things like that, but in any case those would be the considerations.

Senator HUMPHREY. Strictly logistical?

Secretary SHULTZ. That is our view.

Senator HUMPHREY. I would like to focus in the little time I have remaining on the security——

Secretary SHULTZ. I might just add——

Senator HUMPHREY. But I do not have much time.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir. Well, it is sometimes alleged that the United States has an interest in prolonging that war. That is categorically wrong. We would like to see that Soviet invasion of Afghanistan end and the people of Afghanistan stop being killed and maimed and given a chance to reconstruct their own country, and I want to make that absolutely clear because sometimes the reverse is stated, and even stated by the Soviet Union, so in saying this I want to assure them that we have no interest in prolonging that war.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you. In your eloquence you ran out my clock, but I will be here if you are. I wanted to turn next to our commitment to Pakistan's security, if we have a second round.

Senator STENNIS [presiding]. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Senator Stennis, our chairman, and welcome to you, Mr. Secretary. We had a chance to discuss some things when you appeared before the Budget Committee. I compliment you, as others have, for your statement today and the good overall job that you are doing. We have some important decisions to make in this committee especially in the strategic area. Some of the things that we are going to be working on there, of course, include the responsibility of our committee with regard to arms control as well as the purchase of new weapons. The Strategic Subcommittee, all of the programs that have been discussed here so far in our interview with you and SDI is high up on the list. May I ask this question to see if we can get from you your views on SDI?

Has the National Security Council discussed in depth or detail the initial deployment mode for SDI, and if they have at how many meetings?

Secretary SHULTZ. I am thinking about how to answer that question, and I am also thinking about my responsibilities to the President and the nature of my exchanges with the President and my colleagues in the National Security Council, because I do not think that elaboration on those discussions is proper for me to do.

Senator EXON. Mr. Secretary, I recognize that there are things you cannot tell us. Is there anything more you can?

Secretary SHULTZ. Naturally when you discuss a research program the object of which is to find out if something can be done which, if possible, would enhance the security of our country, you appraise it from that standpoint, and that is why there are the criteria that have been referred to here, and as the subject is discussed, as I tried to find out about what is going on and talk with those who are managing the program, that is one of the questions that I ask. How prospective is this? By what time do you think you will have in hand the kind of information that a President would need in order to make such a decision? And that question, I cannot tell you offhand how many times it has been addressed in National Security Council meetings, but that is part of the implicit question all the time when you discuss the program.

Senator EXON. Well, maybe I can rephrase my question so that you can answer it. The Secretary of Defense has been in front of this committee very recently, and he testified to the fact that a decision on early deployment is going to be made in the near future. There have been several questions that you have answered here today that would lead one to believe that that is not necessarily the case. I am wondering if we are not possibly being confused on the testimony we are receiving and if the correct situation is not that a decision will be made very soon on the method of the first deployment of SDI but rather the moving ahead significantly of the original deployment date? Is that a fair assumption?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think as the program goes along and you get a better feel for what is being produced, then you can shape up more authoritatively how you think the use of the research might go, so you discuss that. You also see that there are certain things that are critical path items, that is, things that if you think you might be able to deploy something by date *x* then certainly you have to be able to accomplish task *y* by that time and so you focus in on certain critical path things. That is not by way of saying that you have made a decision. It is by way of saying that in order to keep the President's options open or some subsequent President's options open, you had better do *x* and *y* or you will have foreclosed them because you cannot get there from here unless you start.

Senator EXON. Mr. Secretary, I think I agree with what you are saying. That does not seem to coincide with at least my interpretation of what the Secretary of Defense told us. Let me ask the question this way. There is rampant speculation in the press today that you and the Secretary of Defense have significantly different views on how fast and how far we should move in the near term future on SDI. Is that a fair statement that the press is saying, or is that inaccurate?

Secretary SHULTZ. I doubt it very much, but I do not want to comment on what this person thinks and that person thinks. The differences between us are usually exaggerated.

Senator EXON. The reason I am trying to get at this is not to cause problems but because we would like to know. We have to make some important decisions here on authorization and we are getting somewhat of a conflicting signal or message, if you will, from the two key players in this, the Secretary of Defense and you, the Secretary of State.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I believe what I have stated is consistent with what he stated.

Senator EXON. That may be, but maybe these big, ugly ears of mine do not hear very well. It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that we are getting quite a different opinion from the Secretary of Defense, but I will be glad to look at it. One last question in this round. From your vast experience, and from an arms control standpoint, do you favor rail deployment of the MX or the Midgetman or both? Of those three combinations, which would make your job of trying to come to some kind of agreement with the Soviets easier—How does the issue of verification affect this?

Secretary SHULTZ. I support the President's decision to go forward with a rail mobile system for the MX and to proceed with the Midgetman, having that mode of deployment in mind on the grounds that that would enhance the survivability of the system and, therefore, the stability of the system.

Now, I think the possibility that we might be able to do something like that probably enhances our position at the bargaining table where we are concerned about the Soviet present capability to impart a degree of mobility to their missiles. That not only makes them more survivable but also makes them more difficult to keep track of and to verify what's going on, and I think that is a very troublesome and difficult point that we must pursue.

Senator EXON. I have been warning some people that as attractive as a single warhead Midgetman is, it complicates a great deal the matter of verifiability as to how many weapons exist, who has them, and where they are placed.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, you can imagine regimes that would enhance verifiability, but they would have to be pretty intrusive regimes, but the question is how do you get the Soviet Union to confront such a regime and be willing to talk about it.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it was recently suggested that our allies have been unable to use such words as "cheating" or "violations" with reference to the Soviet Union's behavior, and instead they engage in the sort of dance of diplomacy and employ words like "concerns" or "possible violations".

It was suggested that they have been less than either courageous or candid in pointing to Soviet violations, and this in turn only encourages the Soviets to continue their wanton ways and ironically makes the United States look more belligerent in pointing out their violations.

Do you agree with that statement?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think that our allies have been wonderful in these last few years, and I believe the process we went through and as I experienced it myself, particularly in 1983 where we had a very strong negotiations going on in INF and START, the so-called dual track decision, and as the Soviets were not willing to really negotiate with us effectively, we came to the point on the schedule where deployment was called for. The Soviet Union did everything it could to threaten, bluff, cajole, interfere, propagandize or whatever.

Senator COHEN. I take it you disagree with the statement. [Laughter.]

Secretary SHULTZ. Italy, Germany, the UK, Holland, and Belgium came through, and I think that was a great moment for the alliance, and in an ironic way the need to stand up to what we had said we would stand up to back in 1979. I mention that because that is by way of pointing out that this was a bipartisan, in a sense, decision which was taken during the Carter administration with the alliance and carried out subsequently.

Senator COHEN. I think I have the gist of your answer.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think it was a pretty good thing, and it made a big impression on the Soviet Union, too. I am sure of that.

Senator COHEN. Let me respectfully suggest that there is perhaps a less exaggerated difference between yourself and Secretary Weinberger in the way in which you are able to clarify an answer for the committee. You are very complete in your response, and I appreciate it.

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not say that diplomats are not occasionally on the mealymouthed side, but by and large I think we are reasonably forthright in our way.

Senator COHEN. Thank you. Let me ask you directly, Mr. Secretary. Do you think the Soviets have cheated on SALT II, specifically with reference to the second new missile and encryption and whether they have violated the ABM Treaty on Krasnoyarsk?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, I do.

Senator COHEN. On both counts.

General Gorman appeared before the committee this past week and gave a rather bleak assessment of the opportunities of the Contras to have either a military victory as such or to gather the political support that would be necessary to make them an effective fighting force as such. I think he pointed out there was a great need to have economic assistance to that region. I think you correctly pointed out that it was Congress who cut back substantially, as I recall, some $300 million last year in that economic assistance area.

What is your current personal assessment or professional assessment of what the opportunities are for the Contras to wage an effective effort against the Sandinistas?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, first of all I think our broad strategy in working with the problems of Central America needs to be kept in mind. We are trying to help countries develop democratic processes, the rule of law, and economic development that can be shared. That was what was recommended in the Bipartisan Commission report. That is what we have advocated, and that is what the $300 million you referred to was supposed to help do.

It got voted, and then somehow it went down the drain, and it is in the President's supplemental request, and I think it should be appropriated so that those purposes can be served. So I think it is very important to help the emerging civilian elected governments in that region. They need a certain amount of security assistance, but the biggest thing they need is help for their economies.

Now, the better they do, the more the contrast there is with what is going on in Nicaragua where freedom has gone down the drain, where freedom of religion has gone down the drain, where freedom of the press has gone down the drain, where there is safe haven for the terrorists I referred to, and where there is a strong effort to impose a totalitarian form of government.

So we, on our own behalf and on behalf of the other countries, I think should support those who are willing to fight for freedom and the independence of their country. Now, what will happen in the next 2 months? I cannot say for sure. General Gorman is an experienced military man and knows the area well, so anything he says has to be taken with great seriousness.

At the same time, I think those fighting for freedom have not had support of any substantial size for a long time, and they seem to be getting off the ground pretty well. So I think the answer is that we have to stick with it and with them and try to help them.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Secretary, Japan recently decided to alter its historical formula of 1 percent of GNP for expenditures of defense, and of course many people feel that has been long overdue. There is also, however, a concern about whether or not this would set Japan on a path toward militarization.

Would it be fair, in your judgment, to ask nations like Japan who are experiencing some prosperity, who enjoy the benefit of U.S. assistance in terms of our force projection to protect their vital interests in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, perhaps to increase their foreign assistance programs to Third World nations that need this kind of injection of capital if we are going to help maintain an effective counterforce against the terrorist activities?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think it is fair, and we do it. The Japanese have been responding, not as much as I would like but they have been responding. For instance, on the IDA-VIII they responded, and they responded in terms of various particular things that we have talked to them about.

I noticed that one of the things they do often with their aid is they tie it in very heavily to trade with Japan, and that is always a temptation. They have less need to do that right now, given their balance of trade, than other countries do.

I think it is a fair point to make. We have made it, and they have responded.

Senator COHEN. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen. I have lost track of things on our side.

Senator Levin, have you had your round yet?

Senator LEVIN. I have not.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, welcome. I have listened intently to your testimony on the question of early SDI development, and I am unclear as to what your own position is. Let me ask the question this way.

What is your position on the effort by some officials at the Defense Department to get the President to commit to an early phased in SDI deployment?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think the question of deployment has to be governed obviously by the content of the program and the consistency with the criteria that have been set out by the President.

As I understand the program, and I have tried to be somewhat abreast of it, it has been quite prospective. They have learned how to do some things perhaps faster than they thought they might, so that is encouraging. At what point there will be the material in hand to be able to make a decision, yes, we should go ahead and deploy. I do not know the answer to that question, but it is not right now.

Senator LEVIN. Do you have any idea whether it could be this year?

Secretary SHULTZ. I should not think so, but it is not in hand right now so they are working hard. I do think that a decision has a lot of facets to it, and if you think that there is conceivably a chance that at date *X* out there in the future, say 5 or 6 or so years in the future, a president might want to decide on the basis of what he knows to go ahead and do something but there are certain items that would have to be put in place in order for that to be possible and you know how to do that, then I think you ought to consider clearing that critical path.

So that it is not that you make a decision, it is that you keep the options for a future president open to make such a decision.

Senator LEVIN. Your answer that we are not at the point now that we can make that decision, in your opinion, is a very helpful one and reassuring to at least many of us. I cannot say all of us most of us necessarily, but I know there are many of us who feel very strongly about this point. Your clarification that we cannot make the decision now to make an early deployment of SDI is reassuring news.

Secretary SHULTZ. At the risk of getting in trouble, let me disagree on the comfort level.

Senator LEVIN. We take some limited comfort.

Secretary SHULTZ. I would wish very much that the program had worked so well that we would have in hand all these answers, and if we had them I think that would be better, not worse.

Senator LEVIN. Well, we take limited comfort.

Secretary SHULTZ. OK.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, in your view, must the first phase of any SDI deployment itself meet the Nitze criteria which have been described, or would it be sufficient to say that the first phase would be part of an eventual total system which meets the Nitze criteria?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think it is hard to talk about something when you do not know exactly what it is; however, if you are going to deploy something, you are not going to do it instantaneously. It is impossible. So it has to go in increments, and as you go in a field like this where the security of your country and your allies and the world generally is at stake, you certainly want to proceed carefully and you want to proceed in a manner that at each point in time as you go along, you, if possible, enhance the stability of the system.

The criteria that have been put forward and that are part of the President's program are designed to enhance the stability of the system. That is cost effective at the margin. What is the purpose of that? That is to say that you have something that makes it basically unproductive to try to overwhelm the defense with the offense and so on. That is why. Certainly, you want something that is survivable. If it is not survivable, it is not going to work. It is not going to be stable.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, there has been reference made to a broad and a narrow interpretation, and I think we all know what those terms mean. That new or so-called broad interpretation was announced in October 1985 on a "Meet the Press" program by Bud McFarlane.

My question is this. Did you approve of that new interpretation prior to its being announced publicly in October 1985 on Meet the Press?

Secretary SHULTZ. There had been a great deal of discussion of the subject, and subsequent to the statement on Meet the Press which kind of came out in response to a question and reflected the general conclusion certainly now in the executive branch that a review of the record of negotiations would warrant such an interpretation, that was reviewed carefully, and the President decided formally in the manner that has been described here, the NSC process, that while a review of the negotiating record shows that it would be perfectly proper to go to a broader interpretation, he was not choosing to do so.

That was stated publicly, and the vehicle that he chose to state that I think was a speech that I made, but it was a heavily cleared speech, you can bet.

Senator LEVIN. In all fairness, my question was whether at the time that the statement was made on Meet the Press you had previously approved that new broad interpretation.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, it was not a question of taking some formal step. There was a broad discussion going on, and I think the reason why the President felt it was wise to review the situation was to be sure that as we moved along on this subject it was done in a formal and careful way.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator Wilson, I do not believe you have had your round, have you?

Senator WILSON. No, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you have stated clearly what is known that the administration is on record as stating, that our interpretation of the treaty is a so-called broad interpretation but that we have unilaterally determined that the program with respect to SDI will continue to function within the constraints of the narrow interpretation.

If you were persuaded that advancing to a position where we in fact were confronted with the option to deploy or not to deploy, were not technology constrained but were instead constrained by that narrow interpretation, would your advice to the President be that we should move as we have maintained we are entitled to do to the broad interpretation?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I have been in the Cabinet for about 10 years, and I just hesitate to discuss my advice to the President. I think that is for me to give to the President. The only occasion on which I have deviated from that is in connection with the Iran matter, and I have done so on instructions from the President.

Senator WILSON. Let me put it this way. In terms of the desire that we have to secure the deep reductions of the kind that we have striven to obtain in offensive ballistic missiles, do you not agree that an evolutionary program with respect to SDI, one that is marked by clear milestones and one that preserves the option of going forward to deployment, inevitably must produce far greater arms control leverage than a rather vague and ill-defined program that is simply identified as pure research?

Secretary SHULTZ. As I have dug into the current program, I do not find it to be vague and ill defined. It seems to me that it has moved quite well and that it is increasingly well structured as they find out more. I had the occasion to, as an example, raise what I thought was a rather important issue having to do with the criteria that have been discussed here a lot with General Abrahamson recently and spent quite a long time listening. I thought that he showed that he had thought it through very carefully and had a lot of concrete things to say on the subject, so I was rather impressed.

So I would not accept the characterization of the present program as vague and ill defined.

Senator WILSON. Your experience, I think, has been my own, and I am much encouraged by the progress that has occurred within the past year, and I have every reason to feel that even greater progress can occur. I think that what we are also confronted with as a result is the virtual certainty that at some time in the near future we are going to be compelled to make a decision as to whether or not we are willing to be constrained artificially in a way that advancing technology does not constrain us.

Secretary SHULTZ. You mean in what we consider to be permitted activity?

Senator WILSON. Exactly.

Secretary SHULTZ. That may be, and it may be that the President will change his view at some point in time, and I will certainly want to be part and parcel of that process. Maybe he will want to do that sometime soon, but at any rate when he decides whatever he decides, he will announce that. In the meantime, I will tell him what I think about the subject.

Senator WILSON. I understand that you intend to keep your counsel to the President as a privileged communication, and I can respect that. Let me simply ask you, though. As someone who is concerned with achieving serious arms control and specifically serious reductions in offensive weaponry, if we were to be able to assert that we are not technology constrained and that we are able to deploy what I will term a first generation antiballistic missile defensive system, would that not inevitably be a far more persuasive lever to bring about those serious reductions than the kind of program which heretofore, looking at simply the budget presentation, has presented to many in Congress who have not been to the labs with the idea that this is simply a research program in which there is no great loss if we say we will not deploy for 10 years?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, there is a sense in which the SDI Program, as I think I said earlier, has already been deployed; that is, that clearly the effort that is being made and the sense of motion in that effort has got the Soviets' attention, and they constantly hammer on it. It was a preoccupying matter in the discussions at Reykjavik.

So certainly, the fact that that program exists and has the strength that it has is important to them. It is also important to us that they have one that seems to be, from all we can tell, quite strong.

Senator WILSON. I thank you for the last, in particular. I think that you are absolutely right on both points, but I do not think that the American people have begun to understand the magnitude of the Soviet advance in the very technology that they are seeking to have the United States abandon.

If I may say so, I think that it is incumbent on the administration to do even more than has been done in making clear to the American people precisely what the threat is, because I think that inevitably, whether we like it or not, and whether someone characterizes this as a race or not, there is a contest to achieve this kind of defensive capability, and it makes a great deal of difference who achieves it first.

We do not have a goal of world hegemony. The Soviets do. We are not, in my judgment, anywhere nearer to being moral equivalents, and I think that needs no elaboration. It seems to me that if they achieve it first, they have both the shield and the hammer, and while I do not think they are irrational enough to want a scorched earth policy, I do think they want to reach the kind of position from which they can extort unacceptable political concessions.

So I think your comment about the magnitude of their capability is one that has not received nearly the attention from the public, from the media or from Congress that it should, and I would hope the administration would assist in giving it that kind of attention.

My time is up. If there is a second round, I would like to pursue something that we were discussing with General Gorman the other day in terms of unconventional warfare capability.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you Mr. Secretary.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Wilson.

Senator Kennedy, have you had your round? I do not believe you have.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to insert my prepared statement in the hearing record.

Chairman NUNN. It will be done.

I want to welcome Secretary Shultz.

My opening statement will be brief, but I want to set forth a number of concerns about our foreign policy that I hope Secretary Shultz will address in his testimony today.

First is the continued, systematic attack that members of this administration have launched against virtually every arms control agreement ever negotiated with the Soviet Union. After the fiasco at Reykjavik, the administration seems more determined than ever to dismantle all existing restraints on nuclear weapons and to plunge ahead with a full-scale arms race with the Soviet Union.

After 6 years of compliance, the administration unilaterally decided to break out of the SALT II Agreement, and now it has the ABM Treaty in its sights.

Second, I am concerned about the administration's unwillingness to level with the American people about Star Wars. The notion that Star Wars is a shield that can protect the American people from a nuclear ICBM attack from the Soviet Union is a fraud. For the administration to continue to defend Star Wars as a population defense is to continue to deceive the American people.

Third, I hope that Secretary Shultz will address the issue of nuclear testing. The administration has refused to make any progress in our Nation's 25-year bipartisan commitment to end nuclear testing. Last year, this committee was told by administration spokesmen that, even with adequate verification, the administration would oppose any additional limits on nuclear testing. This represents a reversal of policy supported by five prior Presidents—Republican and Democratic alike.

Fourth, I have great respect for Secretary Shultz, but I would like some sign that he is actually in charge of foreign policy. Is George Shultz the Secretary of State or is Don Regan, or the CIA, or Richard Perle?

Fifth, I am deeply concerned about this administration's continued commitment to a policy in Central America that has no hope of success without direct involvement of U.S. combat troops, that will only result in additional, futile bloodshed, and that has been counterproductive to our national interests in the region.

Finally, all Americans are concerned about the administration's disastrous policy on terrorism. More American hostages are being held by terrorists today than at any time in the past 6 years. Isn't that a direct result of the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran?

I look forward to hearing from Secretary Shultz on these issues.

Senator KENNEDY. In your statement, you talk about the importance of supporting the cause of freedom and democracy in Central America, and I am sure everyone on this committee and in the Senate shares the objective.

I think the real question is whether that objective is advanced by our continued support for the Contras or whether our resort to military means to achieve the political objective is, in this instance, a terrible mistake.

Reference has been made to the testimony of Gen. Paul Gorman, who was Commander in Chief of the Southern Command until 1985. He is one of the most distinguished and experienced professional soldiers. He said the following about our Nation's support of the Contras, and I quote:

> I don't think the Sandinistas regard the Contras as a serious threat. I think the Sandinistas have got the situation under control. You're not going to win a campaign against the Sandinistas in 1 year, 2 years, or 3 years. The money you spent last year is not going to do it. The money you might be asked to spend this year is not going to do it. The Contras are a cross border raiding force. I'm confident that they can camp out and sit on some remote mountaintop in North Central Nicaragua, but raising a flag in Nicaragua, I don't see it.

Mr. Secretary, I believe the administration's policy of continued support for the Contras has been an unmitigated disaster. It will only lead to more bloodshed, I believe, and the ultimate involvement of U.S. combat troops, and I want to indicate to you here today that I intend to introduce a resolution of disapproval that will halt the expenditure of the remaining $40 million from last year's appropriation. The money should be spent here in schools, in health care, on the unemployed, on the farmers of our country. It ought to be spent here and not in Nicaragua.

I would like, if I could, to just take up a different point and ask a different question.

Secretary SHULTZ. May I just make a comment?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes, but we are operating under 6 minutes. And I would like to give you the other question and then have you comment on both questions.

Chairman NUNN. We will give the Secretary some time, after the end of your 6 minutes, to comment on that.

Secretary SHULTZ. I don't like to leave these statements around without commenting on them.

Chairman NUNN. Go ahead, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. I understand that this morning the Department of Energy detonated a nuclear device in Nevada. And this is the first test of 1987; while the yield, as I understand, was relatively small, it will be a shot that's heard round the world, because the Soviet Union said that it will end it's 18-month moratorium on nuclear testing when the United States tests in 1987.

I think the administration's decision to pursue nuclear tests rather than a test-ban negotiation really is an appalling mistake. I also think it's totally inconsistent with the 25 years of treaty commitments, a 25-year-old policy in support of nuclear test ban, pursued by Republicans and Democrats alike.

My question is, were you consulted in advance about the implications of this test in foreign policy, given the commitment of the United States to Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty that states, "the parties agree to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and to the Threshold Ban Treaty," which the administration has indicated it could support with some questions on the verification?

But the treaty itself says, "the parties shall continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution of the problem of cessation of all underground nuclear weapons tests."

Those are Republicans and Democratic Presidents that have committed us to that objective. What was your response, and were you willing, to basically what I would think would be a basic flouting of our treaty commitments, certainly in those two areas.

Secretary SHULTZ. There has been a great deal of discussion of the question of nuclear testing, and I've taken part in it.

I support the President's position, which is, first, that as long as we have nuclear weapons as the basis for deterrence, we will have to conduct tests.

Second, that insofar as the two treaties that have long since been signed but not ratified, we go forward and seek their ratification with certain reservations, as was agreed toward the end of the last session in discussions between the executive and legislative branch.

And we also are prepared, and there have been a number of meetings recently, maybe one actually going on right now, or just concluded, discussing the question of further negotiations about nuclear testing.

And we're prepared to have such discussions. The President is prepared to see the question of nuclear testing reflect what happened to the existence of nuclear weapons. And if we have less of them, and less reliance on them, then that will make a difference.

So we're prepared to start those discussions. We think the way to start is in trying to work out improved means for verification of testing magnitudes, and then to proceed on from there.

Senator KENNEDY. I'm interested in your earlier response. The only point, in response to your earlier point on the testing, if you say, as long as we have nuclear weapons, is that your position? That as long as we have nuclear weapons, even though the Soviet Union has nuclear weapons, you're still prepared to go ahead?

And the thing that I find absolutely amazing is that we're not going to test a Star Wars system, and yet you seem to have extraordinary apparent confidence in terms of what that is going to mean in terms of American security and strategic interest.

You can't have it both ways.

Secretary SHULTZ. I don't know where you got the idea that as the Strategic Defense Initiative proceeds there won't have to be various kinds of tests.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, you're not going to test the whole system, Mr. Secretary. And you don't even test the whole system; you test certain components of it.

But Presidents have said, Republicans and Democrats, have said that we're for getting a joint treaty with the Soviet Union. Republicans and Democrats alike. In these treaties that I mentioned, it didn't say, with the exception of tests.

It didn't say, to pursue negotiations in good faith and effective measures relating to the cessation of nuclear arms race at an early date. It didn't say what you just said.

The Republicans and Democrats have stated that the American position was to get a treaty with the Soviet Union to halt tests that could be verified.

Now, I understand your statement is to say, as long as we have nuclear weapons, the position of the United States is, continue to test.

Secretary SHULTZ. That's correct. But in response to the statement you read, we have been energetically negotiating for large-scale reductions in nuclear weapons, particularly the most threatening kind of ballistic missiles.

And contrary to the expectations of many some years ago, the President seems to have made a considerable amount of headway in that regard.

So I think that that has been carried forward, and I regard it as a very prospective and important development.

Senator KENNEDY. Which regard? My time is up. If you want to address the Central American thing, please do so.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I don't want to have a long discussion. I did discuss it already a little bit.

But I would say with respect to General Gorman, as I said earlier, he's a professional soldier; he's experienced in the region; and anything that he says deserves careful consideration and respect.

Having said that, he's not the Pope, so it isn't necessarily definitive.

Now, as far as our program is concerned, we think it is essential to support people who want to see things change in Nicaragua.

And it would be altogether in the interests of the region and in our interests to see that happen.

And it is against our interests to see their and our security threatened.

I think that one of the things that government is responsible, perhaps a prime thing government is responsible for, is our security. And we spend a lot of money on it, and we should.

And this is an example.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Kennedy, thank you.

Senator Thurmond, I believe it's your round.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that one of the weakest points in our national security strategy is in the way that we confront what is referred to as low-intensity conflict.

We have consistently deterred a major conflict for more than four decades, but we have failed to deter and prevail in low-intensity conflict situations.

How much of our strategic planning do you feel is dedicated to low-intensity conflict?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I don't know how to put a proportion on it, but it certainly has gotten a lot of attention, particularly in the last few years.

The military have developed forces of various kinds that are appropriate. Sometimes you fight it with relatively dramatic means, as in the case of our action on Libya.

And in other cases you fight it much less dramatically, that is, in terms of your developing intelligence capability and ability to interdict and abort and stop terrorists and other type instances, or to counteract and work against the drug traffickers.

So we devote a lot of attention to that, and I think with a considerable amount of success. But obviously, the problems are large. We have them with us. And we're far from being in a position where we can feel good about it.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, this committee recently received testimony from Gen. Paul Gorman, who is a former Commander in Chief of the Southern Command.

General Gorman pointed out that one of our most effective weapons in combatting low-intensity conflict is our Security Assistance Program.

He also pointed out that in fiscal year 1986 approximately 83 percent of our security assistance went to just six countries: Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Greece, Spain and Portugal.

How are the levels of security assistance we provide to various countries determined? And do you agree that these funds are effective in helping combat low-intensity conflict?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think he should have had Pakistan in that list. And the Israel, Egypt, Pakistan are far larger than the others. Turkey is fairly substantial. Spain and Portugal, unfortunately, have been very badly shortchanged in the drastic budget reductions that we've sustained.

But clearly the capacity of countries around the world who are our friends and allies to develop their own security forces and to help us through the provision of bases and working relationships helps us with respect to this gray area kind of warfare, as well as to the general problem of deterrence around the world.

So I think these cuts in the budget that have been sustained, which have been quite severe, are unfortunate from this and other regards.

What happens is, as the question suggests, that we have certain countries that we feel we simply must fund fully. So in a total budget, roughly speaking, the President's request this year is a little less than $20 billion.

And if in that total budget, say half of that is fixed, and if it were to be cut the way it has been cut in the past, than all of that cut is borne by everything else.

So you have cuts as we did in the fiscal 1987 period, in half. And in the case of Spain, which was on your list, I think the cut was something like 73 percent. Our ability to come through on what we said our best efforts ought to yield was meager.

And here we are in Spain, we're in the midst of negotiating a renewal of our base agreements. So that's a pretty tough hand to play if you're the negotiator.

Senator **Thurmond**. Mr. Secretary, several months prior to the time that Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev met at the summit, seven other Senators and I went to Russia, and we conferred with Mr. Gorbachev for about 3½ hours.

The thrust of his entire conversation was that we ought to demilitarize space. And he dwelt on that subject. We could see he was bitterly opposed to the SDI, because he wanted to demilitarize space.

And he indicated that he didn't object to research, but he said research is what's in a scientists mind or what goes on in a laboratory. But he said that what we were doing was beyond research.

We explained that we were merely researching and developing the SDI. President Reagan, I am very pleased, did not agree with him to withdraw SDI. Personally, I favor SDI. It's a purely defensive weapon. It doesn't kill anybody or destroy any property. It merely knocks down missiles that do kill people and destroy property.

And I feel we should go forward with that.

Now, I want to ask you this question. In your opinion, if we continue with SDI, would that assist us in reaching an agreement with the Soviets on reducing armaments?

Secretary **Shultz**. Yes.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you.

I think my time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Stennis** [presiding]. Gentlemen, I am not certain about who is next. Frankly, I'm going to tell you that Mr. Bingaman is here and Senator McCain is here.

Senator **McCain**. But I think someone on the majority side is next, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Stennis**. Very well, Senator Bingaman.

Senator **Bingaman**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, if I could, the statement you made on testing, my understanding is, and maybe you could just tell me whether you agree with this characterization, my understanding is that the policy of our Government, really from Eisenhower's administration until the present has been that we would pursue arms control for restraints on testing, to the extent that we could verify those agreements, and that that was in our national interest.

I'm understanding you to say today that regardless of whether verification is possible, it is not in our interest to enter into a comprehensive restraint on testing, as long as we depend on nuclear forces, nuclear weapons for deterrence.

Am I overstating what you said?

Secretary SCHULTZ. Not particularly. I would just say that if you're going to depend on nuclear weapons for your security, then you need to conduct tests to see that the weapons continue to work, that you develop them not only from the standpoint of what's called modernization, but also from the standpoint of their safety and other such matters.

So that's the main point.

Obviously, whatever is agreed to, as in for instance, the 150 level, you want to have a satisfactory means of verifying that the treaty is being lived up to.

Senator BINGAMAN. But I do understand you to say that even if we can have a satisfactory means of verifying, as you see it, it's not in our interests to agree to cease testing——

Secretary SCHULTZ. That's correct.

Senator BINGAMAN [continuing]. As long as we depend on those nuclear weapons for deterrence.

Secretary SCHULTZ. But the President has stated his readiness to see us enter into a negotiation with the Soviet Union, but start with satisfying what are the reservations that have been put forward, as we hope that those treaties will be ratified, and then as we make progress in reducing nuclear armaments, we can see how the nature of nuclear testing could be reduced.

Senator BINGAMAN. So the entering into of any agreement on restraint of testing would be conditioned not only upon adequate verification, but also upon a large reduction in the level of armaments?

Secretary SCHULTZ. I think, broadly speaking, it's the level of armaments that's the dog and the testing is the tail. And you don't want to have the tail wag the dog.

Senator BINGAMAN. OK, let me ask on another really very broad issue, I think a year or two ago when you appeared before this committee, I got general agreement from you on the statement or the suggestion that the momentum in developing new technology, and the increased difficulties of verification made arms control propects quite dim.

And I was pessimistic. I don't know that you agreed with my pessimism, but I expressed some pessimism about our prospects for arms control.

Since we talked, there have been a series of things, and I'll just mention a few of them, that make me even more pessimistic about the prospect for arms control today, and I'd like to get your reaction on that.

The SALT II limits, of course, have been exceeded. The ABM Treaty appears to be under more and more threat with the talk about early deployment. There's been really no progress on nuclear testing restraints. No progress on ASAT arms control.

I'll skip over Reykjavik, because everybody's got a different view there as to what the fallout of that is.

But there's certainly been at least as much technological momentum as before, and we have at least as difficult a series of verification problems as we had before.

In light of all that, do you think our prospects today are better or worse, our prospects for reaching meaningful arms control are better or worse than they were a year ago?

Secretary SCHULTZ. I think you have to identify what area of arms control you're talking about. I'd just take note of the fact that in Stockholm last fall—September I think it was—we and our allies reached agreement with the Warsaw Pact countries and the neutral and nonaligned countries of Europe on a set of confidence-building measures that I think are a positive contribution.

And they bring about a greater ability, a greater transparency, of what's going on than we have ever enjoyed before. So I think that's a plus.

The negotiations in Geneva that we have with the Soviet Union we are pursuing very energetically. We have a fine team of negotiators there.

And for the first time, really, we have up and on the table, in the INF and START talks, numbers, at least, that represent very large reductions from what is presently deployed.

So I regard that as a positive thing. But of course we are a long ways from having a genuine agreement. But I think the stakes are so large in this nuclear world that it is incumbent upon us to work at these possibilities, and try to turn a possibility into a probability, if we can.

Senator BINGAMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much. I gather Senator McCain is next.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Secretary. I will try to be very brief.

Senator WARNER. Excuse me, but in talking with the chairman, it is my understanding that there will not be a second round of questions. And therefore, Mr. Secretary, upon the conclusion of Mr. McCain's questions, we will thank you very much for your appearance here today.

It has been an excellent presentation.

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, we obviously have a vote going on, so I will try to be as brief as possible.

Let me try what a lot of other Members have tried. Would you support, Mr. Secretary, at this time, testing which would be in violation of the so-called strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, the President's posture has been stated formally, and I'll restate it, that we believe a broader interpretation is fully justified by examination of the negotiating record and the terms of the treaty.

And the President has decided that we would nevertheless conduct our research within the framework of what's known as the narrow interpretation. But obviously, that decision is subject to Presidential review.

And if he makes a different decision, if he does, why, he'll let you know.

Senator McCain. I see that I've failed like all the others. [Laughter.]

Mr. Secretary, I was a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee when you came over shortly after this crisis began. And at the time you volunteered the information that Ambassador Kelly of Lebanon, in response to a query that was sent out to all the embassies—this was in open session—had responded that he indeed had had negotiations without informing you or the State Department, and that, as a result, you were recalling him, immediately for consultation.

That's all we heard. Ambassador Kelly, obviously, returned to Lebanon. Was it indeed the fact that Mr. Kelly was acting under order from the White House?

Secretary Shultz. Ambassador Kelly returned. He was available to the FBI and to the congressional committees conducting investigations.

I believe he met with the staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee at their request, and is available to others who want to question him.

He has returned to his post in Beirut. And his activity in connection with the late October matters, as we questioned him about that, seemed to be much less than what was suggested by his cable, and really, it was focussed on the figuring out how to make arrangements for Mr. Jacobson literally to make his way out and become free, which of course he would naturally want to do in any case.

He was being instructed directly by the White House, or by the National Security Council staff Admiral Poindexter, without going through me, or anyone else in the State Department.

And we have tried to make it plain to everybody that we don't appreciate that procedure.

Senator McCain. Well, I understand that. And let me say, Mr. Secretary, I've never laid eyes on Mr. Kelly.

Secretary Shultz. He's a very good man.

Senator McCain. Well, the statement and the impression that I and the media was left with was that Ambassador Kelly committed a grave breach of conduct. And I think it's important that this issue be ventilated, to leave the correct impression that he really didn't do anything particularly wrong.

Secretary Shultz. Well, we feel that he did make a mistake, and we said so. And a statement was made when he returned to his post.

I would say that I regard him as a very strong ambassador, and capable, I have every confidence that he will carry out his duties in accordance with the instructions that I've given him, and for that matter, the President has given them.

They're written instructions, and we've reviewed them all carefully. They go out to all posts.

Senator McCain. Well, I don't want to beat it to death, Mr. Secretary. We have an old saying in the military you're familiar with.

We praise in public and censure in private. And it seems to me that you did exactly the reverse of that.

Today, we are faced with a new trend in the terrorist situation, which has been not as well noticed as I would hope.

We now see a blatant act of a hostage being taken by the Iranian Government—I'm speaking of the Wall Street reporter Mr. Seid. Before, it was some shadowy group or organization that we couldn't fully identify. Here we have an American citizen, a journalist, who was invited to Tehran by the Iranian Government, showed up, and is now being held hostage.

I think that as this sinks into the consciousness of the American people, there's going to be a very large sense of outrage. I'd be interested in knowing what course of action we intend to pursue as a government.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, of course, we are expressing our views to the government of Iran through our protecting power, which is the Swiss. And we are making our views known also through many other governments and sources of contact, in an effort to have Mr. Seid be freed, and promptly, and we are very clear about that.

I think that this is the kind of behavior that is bound to work against Iran. After all, as you pointed out, he was their guest. They invited him to come. He came on a valid American passport, and there was no justification whatever for detaining him, and there is not.

We hope it is perhaps a mistake or will be rectified shortly, and we are making our views very plain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I hope we are also making it very clear that we rule out no option in order to gain his return if he continues to be held captive by the Iranian Government.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. McCain.

Mr. Secretary, we have two other Senators. They have not yet had their round. I do not know what your timeframe is, but we would like very much to get through one round with everyone. We will not ask you to stay for another round.

Senator Dixon.

Senator DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement I wish to include in the hearing record.

Chairman NUNN. It shall be done.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, this afternoon the committee will be receiving testimony from the Honorable George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, on United States National Security Strategy.

It is my understanding that Secretary Shultz will focus on the political, diplomatic and economic components of our country's security strategy. We have had a number of witnesses tell us that there is no national consensus on our country's foreign policy or our military strategy.

The questions I have for Secretary Shultz will stress whether or not our country's international commitments exceed our capabilities to fulfill all of them simultaneously. Should this country take a hard look along with our NATO allies and redefine our international commitments?

I look forward to hearing from Secretary Shultz on how he views this country's foreign policy objectives and how our defense policies are to be pursued to safeguard our national security interests.

Senator DIXON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, there has been considerable discussion today of the whole question of Contra assistance. Some of us who have supported the administration's position on this as recently as the last session of the Congress, when the administration's victory was a very narrow one, are quite concerned about a good many things that are happening.

You have heard the questioning of other members of this committee about the testimony of General Gorman, who indicated, first of all, that he thought the military organization, that the Contras have down there was not the appropriate organization, that the training they were receiving was not the right training, and that the result in his view would not be a good result.

We have had testimony before this committee by Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Brzezinski indicating that they support Contra assistance, but that they think the goals should be better known, that we should be making it clearer that we want free elections down there, and that the perception by the citizens of this country is that the administration wants to overthrow the government by force of arms.

In view of all of that, what would you tell those of us who in the past were members of the loyal opposition, but have been supportive of the administration policy in Central America, about how you can make a better case for Contra aid with the Congress and with the country?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, first of all, I would say to you, hang in there, you are on the right side.

Senator DIXON. I think there is some question about that from recent testimony. That is why I want to hear from you.

Secretary SHULTZ. Insofar as the questions you raise, the people fighting for freedom in Nicaragua have put forward a program. They have said not only what they are against--they are against the kind of regime that is there—they have also said what they are for.

They would like to see a kind of government where those running it stand for election. They would like to see an environment in which those elections take place, that allows for freedom of the press and freedom of assembly. And they would like to see freedom of religion.

They would like to see a different approach to the management of the economy than is being taken. They have put those things forward.

So there is a positive program that is there. They have their difficulties. There is no doubt about that. On the other hand, insofar as what they can do with some real support from us is concerned, they are really just getting started.

And we think there have been a number of milestones that have been met successfully. And the number in the country have increased and the broadcasting has started and so on. So there have been a lot of things that have gotten going.

Senator DIXON. I have heard you say that on several prior occasions. What do you say are the limited successes we can point to down there by the Contra forces?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, as I say, they are really just getting started. They go on the fiscal year, so what we see so far basically is input. There have been people trained, there have been more people in the country, and so on. We hope that at some point there will be some output.

Senator DIXON. Are you aware, Mr. Secretary——

Secretary SHULTZ. Certainly, if the reaction of the Nicaraguan Communists is of any significance, their concern about it ought to tell you that they are noticed.

Senator DIXON. Are you aware, Mr. Secretary, of the testimony of General Gorman, who is immensely respected by this committee, that organizing those folks as a regular army, rather than as a guerrilla force, is a mistake and they cannot succeed?

I mean, is the Government conscious of the fact that this is the attitude of a very respected military commander who understands that part of the world?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, General Gorman's testimony, we read it at the time and quite a few members of this committee have read it to me. I will say again, General Gorman is a professional soldier who has served in the region and is extraordinarily talented and able, and anything he says has to be taken very seriously and any suggestions that he makes worked in.

But as I said to Senator Kennedy, he is not the Pope. So what he says is not necessarily definitive.

Senator DIXON. No, he is not the Pope, Mr. Secretary. But he knows a little bit about the subject matter, and he is suggesting that we ought to change our methods down there. He is suggesting the training ought to be done by Special Forces, rather than the CIA.

And he suggested that we are on a wrong course. And for some of us that support the money being used, we are concerned about his testimony and wonder whether the administration is willing to be flexible enough to determine that there are new courses we ought to be following down there.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, of course we examined what is being done. We have thought about it a lot. And insofar as the tactics and strategy to be used, I think it would not be proper for me to get into a discussion about that here.

Senator DIXON. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Dixon.

Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I am new in the Senate. I have come from the House after four terms. I have been a supporter of aid to the Contras. But I am concerned, just like a lot of other people over here in this committee, other members of this committee.

We are interested, as you, as the administration is, in success as far as what we are doing: Is the money being spent well, is it being spent wisely?

My colleague from Illinois, Senator Dixon, just raised some questions: Is the CIA training adequate for the situation? Should there be Special Forces training? Those issues will be discussed, I am sure, in the Pentagon and among other higher councils there.

Secretary SHULTZ. If I could just interrupt, I believe they are regularly discussed in the Intelligence Committee, and there is a regular process for that.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the support that we have given through the Congress, through the Government, to the Contras, and the pressure that we have put on the Marxist government there has restrained them from spreading or trying to spread revolution throughout Latin America?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir.

Senator SHELBY. Would you call that a positive thing as far as spending our money?

Secretary SHULTZ. Absolutely.

Senator SHELBY. OK. What would be your assessment at this point of what might happen or would happen in Latin America if we were to abandon the Contras? One, as far as their group is concerned, I would assume it would disintegrate.

But what about the other governments around there?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think they would be very alarmed.

Senator SHELBY. And should they not be?

Secretary SHULTZ. And I think they should be. They would be alarmed because it would exhibit a lack of staying power on the part of the United States. And they would be alarmed because they would then see in their midst, with no real prospect of getting it out of there, a Communist government supported strongly by the Soviet Union, with lots of arms, an aggressive stance.

They know very well that this is a country that gives safe haven to terrorists who operate. Look what those terrorists have done in Colombia recently.

So they would regard it as bad news. And they speak about it privately, and I might say they also speak about it publicly. And you have to go no further than to look at the very courageous speech that President Arias of Costa Rica, who has this nervousness about our program as such, but he expressed himself in clear and unequivocal terms in the United Nations on the nature of the Nicaragua regime and the fact that unless it is changed it is bad news for Central America.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Secretary, when you are looking at Latin America and Nicaragua in particular we are talking about, are you not in fact looking at the whole group down there? You are talking about El Salvador, you are talking about Guatemala and Honduras and so forth?

This is because if Nicaragua survives as a Marxist regime, freestanding, with no pressure, then it is going to be hell down there, is it not?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir. I think so.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Secretary, I want to switch to another area of the world temporarily, to the Persian Gulf area. What is your assessment, if you can give it here, of the Iranian military offensive and the effect that it is having or will probably have on the Gulf States in the area?

They would seem to me to be basically defenseless to a battle-hardened army.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, the Iranians have been very aggressive. They are the country that refuses to sit down and try to negotiate an end to the war. They have made some gains recently in their offensive, although in the last day or so the battle has moved somewhat in the other direction and the Iraqis have taken some territory back.

Senator SHELBY. How much territory?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, it is a particularly important piece of territory adjacent to a place called Fish Lake, and also having to do with the side of the river where Basra is. So I regard that as a positive development myself.

Senator SHELBY. It is a dangerous situation, is it not?

Secretary SHULTZ. Nevertheless, yes, it is a dangerous situation. The battle rages and the killing is immense, and the situation is uncertain.

So far as the Gulf States are concerned, of course, they are concerned about the spillover of the war in their area. And there are known instances of Iranian use or attempted use of terror in those states, even during the Haj. And obviously, as we all know, Iran has tried to stop or interrupt the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf by attacking shipping.

And one of the things that we have done—as is known, we have some capital ships in the gulf and some in the Indian Ocean, and we seek to give protection thereby.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Secretary, my time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, we are not going to start another round, but I think I will ask you one question. You have been asked on a number of subjects today. But after Reykjavik you made a number of statements that suggested—and I am not trying to quote you directly here, but suggested that you doubted that the Soviet Union had the capability of successfully launching a conventional attack against Western Europe.

And you also suggested that, even if we went to zero nuclear weapons within 10 years, the allies and the United States could make corrective actions to overcome the Soviets' very strong conventional superiority.

On the other hand, looking just at the present, General Rogers, our Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, has repeatedly said that if the Soviets launched a nonnuclear conventional attack that the Western allies would have to resort to nuclear weapons in a matter of days, not weeks. That is his exact term.

Now, it seems to me that is a question of our military policy and strategy, or at least statements by our top military, and our political arms control policy being totally on different wavelengths. How would you respond to that?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think there is certainly potentially a difference between what the situation is today and what it might be 10 years from now.

Chairman NUNN. Well, let us just take it today first, and then I will come back with a second question on 10 years from now. You seemed to imply that you do not believe that the Soviets could launch a successful conventional attack on Western Europe today. And General Rogers says that they would not only be so successful, but we would have to respond, because we would be overwhelmed with conventional forces, and we would have to use nuclear weapons first.

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not recall him making a statement of that kind about today. If I did, I certainly would not take issue with General Rogers.

What I do believe, however, is that it is possible to overrate the ability of Soviet conventional forces around the world. And we have some instances of that. I observe the Afghanistan situation is right next door. They have well over 100,000 troops there and have had for a number of years.

They have poured a lot of weaponry in there, and the guts and fiber of the people of Afghanistan have stood them off. So I think you have to scratch your head about that.

I think the German soldier is a very high quality soldier standing there on the border, as ours are. So I would not sell them short. However, the analysis that General Rogers has made, I would not dispute it.

Chairman NUNN. Well, I will not pursue this further at this time, because I know you have got to go. We will wait for another day on that one.

Senator Wirth, the Secretary has a real time problem, but if you would like to ask a couple of questions, please go ahead.

Senator WIRTH. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I know you do have to go. I wanted to just touch very briefly, if I might, on changes that you perceive may be going on in the Soviet Union. I know it is not a small question, but there has been a great deal of discussion among many Soviet experts in the United States that in fact very significant changes may be out of the bottle in the Soviet Union in terms of democratization, a word that Gorbachev has used, a significant amount of decentralization ongoing there.

If in fact that is the case, how do we go about rethinking, if we should, our reaction and our response to the Soviet Union? And how does that then play out in terms of the kind of discussion on strategy that we in the United States ought to be pursuing?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think we should keep track of what is going on with great care and interest, of course. There clearly is a new dynamic there, and Mr. Gorbachev is an energetic, smart and capable person. There is no question about that. Anyone who has met him would recognize that fact.

The changes that are coming about are, so to speak, changes from the top, and seem to be motivated by the desire to make their system work better. And in that process, Mr. Gorbachev has made a number of startling statements about the bureaucracy and so on.

So we need to watch that with great interest and appraise it. I do not see anything that would tell us that there has been some fundamental change in the Soviet system brought about, or in its outlook. But nevertheless, it is certainly not correct to say that Gorbachev has come and nothing has happened.

A lot seems to have happened, and we watch it carefully and with fascination.

Senator WIRTH. I would hope that as you and the State Department are looking at this, there are others in the Government, obviously, who would not view any kind of changes as being of some significance—there are those in our administration, I would gather, who would not view changes as being something that could be helpful or who would not believe in them or would view them with an enormous amount of cynicism. And I understand that.

We are sort of accustomed to being anti in every possible way. I just have a sense that maybe this is of such historic significance, that it might cause us to—even more than looking at, watching it—to encourage perhaps what efforts may be made in Afghanistan, to push the Soviets in terms of human rights policies, to make them make an even greater statement.

There might be in this opportunities for us in the United States.

Secretary SHULTZ. We certainly press. You mentioned human rights. We press that very hard. And I think it is important to notice and to say that, on the one hand, we can see important steps having to do with some well known individuals.

And we have also seen the resolution of a pretty good proportion of identified family unification cases that we have brought to their attention. So that is a plus.

Alongside that, you have to say that so far as we can see the repression of religion, the persecution of people who want to practice their religion, Jews but not just Jews, other religions as well, is fierce. And the safety valve for that, namely emigration, has been practically nonexistent.

Now, we keep hearing rumors that perhaps that will change. I hope it will change, but as of now it has not changed.

And we must notice, along with the release of some dissidents and the return to Moscow of Mr. Sakharov, Dr. Sakharov, which we welcome, that Mr. Merchenko died in jail or was murdered in jail. Anyway, he is gone.

So it is a picture that you have to look at with some hope, but also with realism.

Senator WIRTH. I appreciate that, and I also appreciate your marathon session here this afternoon, Mr. Secretary. Thank you very much for coming.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much.

Because we did not have a second round for anyone, we will leave the record open for questions for 48 hours. But they will only be essential questions. We are going to make sure that we do not proliferate the questions.

[Questions for the hearing record, with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Would you be willing to meet with ABM negotiators Gerard Smith, Raymond Garthoff, Sidney Graybeal and Harold Brown to hear their views, based on their direct involvement in the Treaty negotiations, on the new versus the traditional interpretations of the ABM Treaty?

Secretary SHULTZ. In October 1985 the administration reviewed the ABM Treaty and the associated negotiating record and, on the basis of that review, concluded that a broad interpretation of the treaty is fully justified. This judgment is based in part on the fact that, during the negotiations, the Soviet Union did not agree to foreclose the possibility of development and testing of new defensive systems based on other physical principles.

In addition to the negotiating record, however, there are other bodies of records with a bearing on this issue, specifically, the ratification debates in the Senate and the record of subsequent statements and practices by the two sides. The Department of State is undertaking a comprehensive study of these records. We will consult with the Congress on the results of the study. Judge Sofaer as Legal Advisor is directing this legal analysis. He has participated in panel discussions of these issues which included Gerard Smith, Raymond Garthoff, Sidney Graybeal and Harold Brown, he has read their writings, and he is familiar with their views.

Senator LEVIN. Will Congress be consulted in advance of any decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty? If so, how far in advance of such a decision would Congress be consulted?

Secretary SHULTZ. The administration is not planning to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. All of our activities, including the SDI research program, are fully consistent with it.

The SDI research program was designed to be consistent with the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Following our review of the ABM Treaty negotiating record in 1985, the President directed that, as a matter of policy, the program should continue to operate as originally structured. Now, however, given the progress that the program has made, it is clear that we could pursue the program more effectively if a different pattern of testing were permitted. Therefore, the issue now is whether we should restructure the SDI program in accordance with the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

We recognize the importance of this issue. In the process of reaching decisions on it, we will, of course, continue to consult closely with the Congress and our allies.

Senator LEVIN. Would the announcement of a decision to proceed with early deployment of an SDI component or components constitute a decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty?

Secretary SHULTZ. At the outset of the SDI program, the President established certain criteria for evaluating the results of the program: any strategic defense system would have to be militarily effective, survivable, and cost-effective at the margin. In making any decision to deploy a strategic defense system, we must be confident that we will meet these criteria. At this point, despite the progress that has been made, we are not in a position to make such a decision and will not be for some time.

If, at some future time, the United States, in close consultation with its allies, decides to proceed with deployment of defensive systems, we intend to use mechanisms for United States-Soviet discussions provided for in the ABM Treaty. Through such mechanisms, and taking full account of the U.S.S.R.'s own expansive defensive system research program, we will seek to proceed in a stable fashion with the Soviet Union.

Of course, under the ABM Treaty the United States is permitted to deploy an ABM system consisting of no more than 100 launchers centered in the Grand Forks ICBM base.

Senator LEVIN. Were you personally surprised when then National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane announced the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty on the October 1985 "Meet the Press" program?

Secretary SHULTZ. The decision in October 1985 that the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty is fully justified was the result of a review done not only by Defense Department lawyers, but also by Judge Sofaer, Legal Adviser of the State Department, and his staff. The review included the ABM Treaty, its agreed statements, and associated negotiating record.

Senator LEVIN. Are there any disagreements between you and the Secretary of Defense on the ABM Treaty? If so, what are those disagreements?

Secretary SHULTZ. Up to this point our research efforts have been carried out within the restrictive interpretation. The question now is, should we change the SDI program in accordance with the broader interpretation. So we are not making any fresh judgments on the treaty interpretation issue. Both Secretary Weinberger and I agree that now, given the progress the program has made, it is clear that we could pursue the program more effectively if a different pattern of testing were permitted. The President, of course, will make the final judgment on these issues, and he will closely consult with the Congress and our allies before doing so.

Senator LEVIN. Are there any disagreements between you and the Secretary of Defense on the Strategic Defense Initiatives? If so, what are those disagreements?

Secretary SHULTZ. The Secretary of Defense and I fully support the President's SDI research program and how it is being conducted. The President said in October 1985 that the broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty is fully justified. We agree with that.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

Senator KENNEDY. Would you please tell us what other countries were approached by U.S. officials—either directly or indirectly—to seek support for the Contras?

Would you also please tell us what other countries, to your knowledge, provided such assistance to the Contras?

Secretary SHULTZ. The Secretary addressed this issue in his testimony before the December 16 closed session of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Information obtained by the Department of State since that time was transmitted to the Select Committee on Intelligence, which we understand has forwarded all information to the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We refer you to this new Select Committee for these materials. Any new information obtained by the Department of State regarding this matter will be sent to this committee.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Secretary, other than possible Soviet noncompliance with the TTBT, what kinds of "Soviet efforts to subvert our deterrent" would justify our resuming high-yield tests above the 150 kiloton limit?

Secretary SHULTZ. I can't predict for you what other challenges to our national security the Soviets may present in the future. At the present time, however, there is no justification for conducting tests above the 150-kiloton limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. We are able to maintain a strong and effective nuclear deterrent while conducting nuclear tests within the limit of those treaties.

Senator KENNEDY. In your view would it be in the interests of the United States now to conduct tests in excess of the 150 kiloton limit?

Secretary SHULTZ. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are obligated by international law to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the threshold Test Ban Treaty [TTBT] and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty [PNET]. These treaties limit underground nuclear tests to a yield of 150 kilotons. The United States, for its part, plans to conduct its nuclear testing program now and for the future in full compliance with its treaty obligations.

I understand that the Department of Energy can meet all currently identified warhead requirements and remain in compliance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty [TTBT].

Senator KENNEDY. Do you agree that allied forces should be present in the area in the event of a serious contingency in the Gulf area? To that end, does the United States have any assurances from our allies that they will participate in the defense of continued access to Gulf oil?

Secretary SHULTZ. Cooperation with our allies is a key element in our Near East and South Asia security strategy. NATO policy, expressed through successive communiques, has consistently affirmed the need to meet threats, vital to Western interests that emerge from outside the immediate area of NATO member nations.

The British and the French maintain forces in the region, and both uphold security commitments in parts of Southwest Asia. There are French military forces stationed in Djibouti. Alliance members furnish military supplies to several Persian Gulf states. The UK and France maintain a naval presence in or near the Persian Gulf and have upgraded their abilities to carry out rapid deployment of forces beyond Europe.

Senator KENNEDY. We have heard testimony that for the present Rapid Deployment Force to be effective, it must have unimpeded lines of communication to the Persian Gulf area during a time of crisis. Do you agree that it is no less imperative that our allies be willing to render the United States all forms of direct and indirect assistance in planning for such a contingency? To that end, does the United States have any assurances that we would have overflight and transit rights over and on Allied territory in the event of a contingency in the Gulf area?

Secretary SHULTZ. Our allies recognize clearly that events outside the NATO treaty area may effect their interests. NATO Defense Ministers have agreed that members of the Alliance should enhance, to the extent possible, out of area deployments and other actions in support of vital Western interests. Allied responses to peace keeping efforts in Lebanon, to the Libyan challenge in Chad, and to the Red Sea mining affair demonstrate their support for out of area military action when events so warrant. Of course, both the United States and our allies would make any such deployment contingent on an invitation from the concerned regional states.

Senator KENNEDY. Does the United States have any assurances that the European Allies and Japan will help finance projects related to the defense of their vital interests in that area of the world?

Secretary SHULTZ. Our NATO allies make direct contributions to regional security through deployment of forces and security assistance programs which enable states in the region to form the first line of defense. In addition, we are working closely with our NATO allies to determine how to compensate for U.S. forces if redeployed, for example, to Southwest Asia. Japan, constitutionally prohibited from committing troops abroad, recognizes the importance of the region to its own security interests and contributes to regional stability through substantial economic assistance programs.

I feel it important, however, to note that our joint efforts are not limited to contingency situations. We consult regularly with our NATO allies and Japan on the Iran-Iraq war and general Gulf security issues, particularly in regard to shipping. We and our allies support diplomatic efforts, including those of the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, to seek a peaceful resolution of the Iran-Iraq war. So far, collaborative efforts with our allies and friends have helped prevent a spread of the war to the Arabian Peninsula.

Senator KENNEDY. Did you argue in favor of the decision to cease compliance with the SALT II Treaty's numerical limit on MIRVed launchers?

Secretary SHULTZ. I fully support the President's decision to end U.S. unilateral adherence to SALT II and to base U.S. strategic deployments strictly on the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat. Prior to taking this step, the administration studied carefully all the relevant national security and foreign policy considerations bearing on this issue. Particularly important in this review was the lack of meaningful Soviet corrective action or other, substantive response to his—and congressional—calls for genuine, mutual restraint and an end to the U.S.S.R.'s non-compliance.

Senator KENNEDY. Did our NATO allies support or express misgivings about the decision to cease compliance with that limit?

Secretary SHULTZ. We consulted with our NATO allies extensively and at all levels. While some allies have expressed misgivings about the effect of the President's June 10 decision, they understood the reasons behind our decision. We and our allies share the objective of moving as expeditiously as possible to an agreement on significant and equitable arms reductions. I believe the progress made in Geneva in recent months has confirmed our view that our decision in May to set SALT II aside need not impede forward movement on arms control. We believe the continuing—and, hopefully, increasingly productive—dialogue with the Soviets over the past several months vindicates this approach to interim restraint.

Senator KENNEDY. CIA Director-designate Robert Gates told this Committee in June 1985 that the Soviet Union would be able to deploy three to nine thousand more warheads by the mid-1990s if the SALT II limits were not in effect. Can you explain how this development would contribute to U.S. security?

Secretary SHULTZ. The administration's views were detailed in the June 19, 1986 report to the Congress entitled "U.S. Interim Restraint Policy and Representative Soviet and U.S. Dismantlement and Strategic Force Projections With and Without SALT." That report, which is consistent with Mr. Gates' earlier testimony, concluded that the SALT I Interim Agreement and SALT II had not prevented a very substantial Soviet build-up within SALT II's numerical sublimits and, even if fully complied with, would not prevent a very substantial further expansion of Soviet capabilities. It further concluded that, absent SALT II, the Soviets would not necessarily expand their forces significantly beyond the increases already projected with SALT, since the Soviet forces are very large and would appear more than enough to meet reasonable military requirements. While we welcome any indications that the Soviets are prepared to exercise restraint in their strategic force posture, recent Soviet statements that they will continue to abide by SALT II are disingenuous in the extreme, because the Soviets have long violated key provisions of SALT II and continued to violate them right through to the end of our technical compliance last November.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PETE WILSON

TREATY INTERPRETATION

Senator WILSON. What are your views on the technically correct interpretation of the treaty? Do you agree with me and Judge Sofaer? Are there any reasons beyond those of domestic politics that we do not behave in accordance with the only technically correct interpretation? Do you support asserting all our legal rights to pursue all the testing and development of ABM systems allowed under the treaty?

Secretary SHULTZ. Judge Sofaer examined the text and negotiating record of the 1972 ABM Treaty and concluded that the Soviet Union had never agreed to be bound to the narrow interpretation of the treaty, an interpretation that would prohibit development and testing of space-based ABM systems or components based on other physical principles. I agree with Judge Sofaer and with President Reagan that this conclusion was fully justified.

However, as Judge Sofaer has indicated, other factors may also have a bearing on whether an interpretation of the treaty is legally supportable, and whether that interpretation can lawfully be implemented. Among these are the record of Senate ratification, and any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty that establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. We are now making a comprehensive study of these issues, and plan to share our findings with the Congress.

Our research on SDI is progressing more rapidly than we originally anticipated. We are approaching a point when it would be helpful, and perhaps even essential, to conduct tests that would be permitted only by the broad interpretation. Before we take such a step, however, we intend to consult with the Congress and with our allies.

A NEW REGIONAL TREATY ON COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

Senator WILSON. Last week General Gorman testified before our committee that in his judgment we are wholly unprepared to fight an unconventional war in Central America owing to our outmoded style of warfare. My question to you is, aren't we similarly unprepared to wage successful diplomatic initiatives owing to outmoded regional agreements? Specifically, don't treaties like the Rio Treaty that require overt military attacks in order to trigger alliance response fail to adequately account for subversive activities and terrorism that have as their purpose the overthrow of Rio Treaty nations? Do we, in your opinion, need new agreements that reflect the modern situation?

Secretary SHULTZ. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) was drafted in the aftermath of the Second World War to provide for collective self-defense. The contemporary phenomena of state-sponsored subversion and terrorism were not significant problems at that time and thus were not specifically referred to in the Rio Treaty. However, the references in Article 6 of the Rio Treaty to "aggression which is not an armed attack" and to "any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America" are sufficiently broad to cover such activity.

We do not believe that the Rio Treaty is inadequate to deal with the current problems. Take the case of El Salvador, where Nicaragua and Cuba have provided various forms of assistance—including weapons, ammunition, training, and command and control facilities—to the Communist guerrillas attempting to overthrow the democratically elected government of President Duarte. The absence of an express reference to externally supported insurgency in the Rio Treaty has not prevented El Salvador from requesting or the United States and democratic Latin nations from providing appropriate assistance on the basis of collective self-defense in such a situation. Thus, what is needed is not a new legal instrument, but recognition by the governments of the hemisphere of the serious implications for their own security of the consolidation on the American mainland of a repressive and expansionist Marxist-Leninist state aligned with Cuba and the Soviet bloc, and demonstration by those governments that they have the political will to take the appropriate measures to preserve democracy and independence.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for being here. You made an excellent statement and we appreciate it. You were a big help to our committee on strategy. Thank you.

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

MILITARY STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA AND IN THE ATLANTIC

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m. in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Cohen, Wilson, Gramm, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Jeffrey H. Smith, general counsel, and Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Robert G. Bell, Jonathan L. Etherton, Richard D. Finn, Jr., Judith A. Freedman, John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, Ronald P. Kelly, and Mark B. Robinson, professional staff members; Russell C. Miller, research assistant; Debra A. Rice, staff assistant.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Greg Weaver, assistant to Senator Levin; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Edwin S. Jayne, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Milton D. Beach and Patricia J. Buckheit, assistants to Senator Glenn; Jim Sayre, assistant to Senator Wirth; Jeffrey Hyche, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; and Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The Armed Services Committee meets this afternoon to hold another in its series of hearings on U.S. military strategy.

Last month the committee took testimony from two of our combatant, or as some people call them, warfighting commanders responsible for the Pacific and Southwest Asian regions. Today we have the opportunity to hear from two more unified commanders, Gen. John Galvin, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, and Adm. Lee Baggett, the Commander-in-Chief of the

U.S. Atlantic Command. We are delighted to have both of you here today.

Like the two other commanders, they have been asked here today to address the U.S. strategy in their geographic regions and outline the resource priorities of their commands. We welcome General Galvin and Admiral Baggett back. Both of these witnesses have appeared before the committee in the past.

Last year, the Defense Reorganization Act gave the unified commanders the authority that they need to carry out their tremendous responsibilities. That was one of the main purposes of the act, and we hope that it has done at least that. We will be asking questions regarding that as we go along.

These four-star officers play a crucial role in implementing U.S. military strategy, whether they employ large multiservice forces over a vast geographic region, like Admiral Baggett, or contend with a variety of political, diplomatic, economic and cultural factors with only a small number of U.S. troops, like General Galvin. Both sets of responsibilities are demanding and require the command, personnel and budgetary authority specified for the unified commanders in last year's reorganization law.

In planning the committee's schedule of strategy and budget hearings, Senator Warner and I decided that the committee should hear testimony from as many unified commanders as possible before it had to make its defense budget recommendations to the Budget Committee. Today's hearing will be timely because the committee will meet tomorrow to consider our budget recommendations to the full Budget Committee.

I understand that Admiral Baggett has been preparing to testify or had been preparing to testify with General Rogers in late March; however, at our request, he was kind enough to rearrange his schedule to be here today, and we appreciate your cooperation. General Rogers will be testifying later, and we look forward to that. He has had a little bout of ill health, and we all wish him a well and speedy recovery. That is the reason that he has not appeared before the committee thus far.

Finally, since he appeared before the committee last month, Gen. Paul Gorman, the former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, has visited Central America at General Galvin's invitation. Upon his return from that trip, General Gorman wrote a report of his observations. Due to this committee's great interest in his views, I would ask unanimous consent to place a copy of his report in today's hearing record. I think each of the members has been provided a copy of the report, and I assume that that is a declassified report.

Do you know, General Galvin?

General Galvin. I do not know that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. It is declassified, so it will be available to the interested news media.

[The report referred to follows:]

REPORT SUBMITTED BY GENERAL PAUL GORMAN

SUBJECT: OBSERVATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

At the invitation to USCINCSO, this past week I revisited Honduras and Panama for the first time since I left command there in February 1985. It was a most useful update for me. I agree with General Galvin that the Nicaraguan rebels of the FDN now have a fighting chance to present to the Nicaraguan people an alternative to the oppressions and militarism of the government in Managua. While a concerted effort to launch a wide-spread guerrilla campaign within Nicaragua did not get underway until after the aid authorized by Congress began to reach them in late October, they have accomplished much in a short while. The training their key tactical leaders have received, while abbreviated, was directed at the right learning objectives, and should stand them in good stead in the months of fighting which lie ahead. Fighting there will be, for nearly 10,000 FDN guerrillas, armed and organized for an extended unconventional warfare campaign, are now operating inside Nicaragua, and a significant number of these have penetrated beyond the strategic Rama Road, deep into the southeast. Their overall campaign plan seems sound, and their successful infiltration of fresh units through and around the government forces massed along the Honduran border to prevent their reentry, is one dramatic indication of what they have learned since 1985, when last I tracked their operations through the intelligence available to me in USSOUTHCOM.

It is much too early to form judgement concerning their prospects. Over the next year, we will have to watch carefully to discern whether the troops of the FDN:

a. Earn the support of the people, for this will be the most important measure of their success.

b. Link their military operations with political initiative, minimally through linking their actions afield to media campaigns directed at informing the Nicaraguan people of their struggle for a free nation, optimally through the former plus political cooperation with the numerous parties trying to bring the government in Managua to accept a test of ballots rather than bullets, and to settle for free, supervised elections.

c. Pursue a campaign which avoids engagement with major formations of the government's army, and extends and exposes the government's military force, and inhibits its control over land and people.

Concerning the approval for the $40 million remainder of the $100 million approved by Congress, I believe that members of Congress ought to vote conscious of the fact that some 10,000 Nicaraguans are now engaged in a civil war against the Marxist-Leninist government there, committed, largely at our instance, to a life-death struggle to win freedom for their countrymen. They are quite dependent upon logistics which only the United States Congress can assure them, and the promised additional aid is vital to their continuing their struggle.

But far more is at stake than the fate of the Nicaraguan rebels: the neighbors of Nicaragua, in Honduras, in Costa Rica, in Guatemala, and in El Salvador, are watching anxiously to see whether Congress supports the democratic resistance as an acid test of the U.S. national will to support democracy in Central America. All the democratic governments there are threatened, all are dependent upon continued U.S. support, and all have good reason to regard the Marxist government in Managua as inimical to peaceful resolution of the region's economic, social and political problems. The tragedy of the present circumstance is that the hubris of a handful of men handling U.S. policy re Iran is likely to undercut Congressional support for a Central American policy which overall has achieved a number of striking successes. Five years ago the following would have seemed quite unattainable:

Democracy is accepted as the wave of the future in Central America, and the U.S. is its proponent and protector. Where once we were perceived as the prime support for authoritarianism, today we are seen as the main hope for economic and social progress, and as the shield of freedom.

The U.S. now has a regional military strategy with both offensive and defensive aspects, a strategy which makes possible defense in depth of U.S. vital interests with minimal forces, underwrites our concept of helping others help themselves, enhartens the advocates of democracies, and dismays and deters authoritarians of both the right and the left.

El Salvador has not only adopted reformist democracy, but has, with substantial Congressional support, substantially reduced the numbers of insurgents, and reasserted control over most of its people and productive land. Not since Magsaysay's campaign in the Philippines has a U.S. supported government been similarly successful against guerrillas.

Honduras has been induced to extraordinary generousity toward its former enemy, El Salvador, in training Salvadoran troops in Honduras, and in policing its border areas where Salvadoran insurgents have sought sanctuary. Its long-standing border dispute with El Salvador is now being adjudicated in The Hague. Honduras, moreover, assumed grave risk by harboring the "contras", and accepted an unprecedented U.S. military presence on its soil. It has nonetheless continued its land reform and other evolution toward pluralistic democracy.

Costa Rica's investment from abroad are up two thirds this year, and despite recent publicity over President Arias' refusal to allow use of his territory for support of the Nicaraguan rebels, military cooperation with the U.S. is the closest it has been since 1948.

Guatemala's military leaders have adopted exceptionally enlightened policies providing for support by the armed forces of the constitutional, elected government of President Cerezo and for respect for human rights.

Central Americans therefore are likely to see continued U.S. support for the "contras" as an affirmation that the U.S. will help them to cope internally with staggering debt-servicing problems, stagnated economies, and grave threats to security, as well as externally with the menacing Marxist militarists in Managua. As far as the Sandinistas are concerned, the best hope for a negotiated settlement lies in their perceiving the U.S. Congress as committed to Central America for the long haul, including and especially continued support for the UNO and the FDN in Nicaragua.

Conversely, should Congress abrogate its commitment to the Nicaraguan rebels, governments of the four democracies in Central America are likely to be shaken. This is no "domino theory", but realistic assessment of the fragility of those governments.

Duarte in El Salvador, pressed now not only by the continuing war, but by a devastating earthquake, would surely have to contend with a reinvigorated Left and a reassertive Right, and his base of power, already eroded, would probably disintegrate.

With the U.S. wavering Azcona in Honduras would find it more difficult to restrain further his powerful and restive military, within which are venal, nationalist, rightist individual who question continuing cooperation with the U.S., men fully capable of seeking an accommodation with Managua, to insure against the return of FDN troops to Honduran soil, to seek respite from threatened insurgency within Honduras, and to free Honduran forces to face the Salvadorans, whom they regard as the main threat.

The Costa Rican government of President Arias would also be likely to adopt a stance less critical of Managua, conceivably at the cost of military colaboration with the U.S., but businessmen and democratic politicians alike would loose confidence, and internal security, already precarious, would be impaired.

In Guatemala, the military, already sceptical of U.S. persistence and concerned over their obdurate insurgents, would be impelled to regress.

But if the government in Managua is likely to emerge from a negative Congressional vote on aid for Nicaraguan rebels with net gain, that turned-down is quite likely to doom efforts to negotiate an end to the civil war. The civil war will continue, even intensify, as the Sandinistas throw in their reserves seeking a final victory. Some portions of the FDN force may try to reenter Honduras, and, if so, there is a possibility that the Hondurans will fight to keep them out, or to disarm them—in which case Central Americans would have to deal with one U.S. supported force fighting another. In the short run there will be human costs in casualities among the rebels and the migration of their families, and political costs in terms of lost U.S. credibility. And in the longer run, the collapse of the democratic resistence in Nicaragua could percipitate a return to authoritarianism in most of Central America, and by unfettering the Sandinistas for new mischief in the region, bring warfare to Honduras and Costa Rica as well as Guatemala and El Salvador.

It is my considered judgment that additional aid for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance is a small price to pay for preserving the gains realized in recent years by those we support in Central America, and for keeping open the prospect of negotiated settlement. I also believe that denying that aid would jeopardize all we have achieved in recent years, a risk wholly disproportionate to the expenditure involved.

Chairman NUNN. Before I invite General Galvin and Admiral Baggett to make their oral statements, Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We would just join with you in the importance of these hearings. We are glad to hear from these people.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Dixon's prepared statement will be submitted for the hearing record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Alan J. Dixon

Mr. Chairman, at todays hearing the committee will receive testimony on the U.S. military strategy from Gen. John R. Galvin, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command and Adm. Lee Baggett, Jr., Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Command.

I look forward to hearing these commanders discuss how they perceive U.S. military strategy in the geographic areas of responsibility of their commands. I also understand the witnesses will testify on the readiness of their forces, their critical deficiencies in their force capabilities, and what they consider their program priorities.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

General **Galvin**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor to be here today to discuss strategy, especially in this case, strategy in the low intensity conflict environment. I have submitted a statement, and I will just take a couple of minutes to summarize.

First of all, in looking at the situation in the theater, which is Latin America, you see a situation that can be summarized in a word, destabilization. This has come about because of a 400-year history of social, political and economic problems today exacerbated by debt problems, the drug trafficking, which has made great resources available to outlaws, and by Marxist infiltration, especially with the help of Cuba.

Senator **Warner**. General, I think since we have a very large audience watching this, it would help us if you could sketch the jurisdiction of your responsibilities just briefly.

General **Galvin**. Certainly, Senator.

Senator **Thurmond**. John, if you could talk a little bit louder and closer to your machine, it would help.

General **Galvin**. Thank you, Mr. Senator.

The jurisdiction encompasses all of Latin America less Mexico and the island states in the Caribbean. I have a Security Assistance Office in 16 countries. I also have a small Security Office in Mexico, although jurisdiction there is divided. So it covers the land mass of Central and South America.

Senator **Warner**. You mention your headquarters in Florida?

General **Galvin**. The headquarters is in Panama.

Senator **Warner**. Part of it is in Florida, is it not?

General **Galvin**. No, Senator. All of it is in Panama.

To return, the situation of destabilization is caused by the history, by the debt, by Cuba and by drugs. Ten of the 17 Latin American countries face insurgencies, which are at varying stages of development, but that is the bad news.

There is also good news. The United States is showing a greater interest in Latin America now than when I served as a young officer in this region 30 years ago. The interest is based not simply on commercialism, as I believe it once was, but on principles and ideals such as human rights and democratic development.

That is the current situation in the area, and I describe it at some length in my paper.

In carrying out my duties from my headquarters there in Panama, I execute what you might call a cavalry mission. It is to protect the south flank of the United States and be prepared for contingencies. It is also an economy of force role.

I will describe my organization very briefly. My headquarters and 9,700 troops—all services—are located in Panama, about the same average number that has been stationed there since 1915. There are 1,100 troops stationed in Honduras, 55 in El Salvador, and in 16 countries there are military groups, with a maximum possible strength of six, totaling 92 people. So, in total, Southern Command has an economy of force role performed by a force of about 12,000 or 13,000 altogether.

The essence of my strategy to carry out the South Commission with an economy of force organization is to assist in providing stability. I would like to take my strategy and discuss it with you in two different ways, first, from a generic or more overall regional sense, and then from a country-specific perspective.

In the regional sense, the strategy is to work our military with the military institutions of the 17 countries in such a way that I assist the ambassadors in those countries to achieve the goals and objectives of the United States, which for my part come down to the word "stability".

In order to contribute to stability in the countries in Latin America by working with the military side of the house, you have to have an appreciation for the role of the military in a democracy. We feel that the U.S. military, with a history of 200 years, has shown itself to be a pretty fair model. It is apolitical, it is subordinate to civilian control, and it is dedicated to democratic and national development. We try to interact with the local Latin military in such a way to foster or encourage these characteristics.

This is in very general terms the way we operate. We do so by using tools such as security assistance, exercises, war games, and anything which brings together the leadership of the military institutions of those 17 countries and our military leadership in such a way that we get an exchange of ideas and a sharing of institutional aims and goals.

Now, at a country-to-country level there is also a strategy, and that is one which is tailored to the situation. The strategy varies from country to country. First of all, in El Salvador, as you know, we have 55 advisors/trainers who are working to assist the Salvadorans in fighting a full-fledged insurgency. In the past 2 years, the internal conflict has done well militarily in the sense that there were about 11,000 guerrillas 2 years ago and today there are about 6,000.

President Duarte and his countrymen still face enormous problems. There is a national plan, however, which has been signed by President Duarte and embraced by not only the military but also all the institutions in the country, including the private sector. It seems to be working well.

The Contras is another kind of issue and one which I think illustrates several important things about low intensity conflict in my region. Although I have responsibility for military oversight of the region, the Contras are not under my control. In fact I have very little to do with them and their operations. I am concerned with intelligence and keeping up with what the Contras do, and I am concerned that, as far as possible, we have a regional strategy and not simply one which addresses only the Contras. It is difficult for me to affect these concerns because the interface of the United States with the Contras is not a military interface.

This complexity is, however, no different from that of a third situation—the counterdrug issue. There in Bolivia, where we have had Operation Blast Furnace, I was operating six helicopters and crews, plus some intelligence personnel and some other military, lifting Bolivian police. The operation on the American side was under the command and control of the DEA.

Also, if you go back for a moment to El Salvador, the command and control on the American side is under the Ambassador.

So in the three cases, El Salvador, the Contras and the drug issue, you can see that the strategy becomes somewhat complex, and it is kind of a new world for the military in the command and control arrangements. That is also true in many other arrangements.

We are breaking new ground as we move into this strategy, and for that reason I have established a small agency in my headquarters called SWORD, Small Wars Operations and Research Directorate. Its role is to look at the doctrine and the hardware of low intensity conflict.

I conclude my paper by saying two things: First, that security assistance in many ways could be improved in terms of its ability to be utilized as a tool of strategy; and in the last part, I have an action agenda of eight items which I feel the committee should look at.

I believe that it would be best to leave my summary at that point and save time for questions, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Galvin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

As Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command, I am responsible for U.S. military activities in Central and South America. This is currently an area of low intensity conflict, with war in El Salvador, war in Nicaragua, and growing subversion and insurgency in at least 10 of the remaining 17 countries that lie within the region under my cognizance. I am describing a situation that can be summed up as destabilization on a large scale. This instability results from the accumulation of four centuries of problems, recently aggravated by an enormous economic debt, and further threatened by a strong insurgent attack on national political infrastructure that is without precedent in this hemisphere. The principal support for insurgent groups has come from Cuba. Fidel Castro—with Soviet backing that now amounts to about $13 million per day—provides guidance for organizing "umbrella" groups and instills a sense of common goals. Cuba also funnels weapons and other assistance to guerrillas in several countries.

It was with the assistance of Castro that numerous insurgent groups united into the Frenie Sandinista (FSLN) in the late 1970's. The same is true for the Farabundo Marti (FMLN) in El Salvador and the union Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) in Guatemala. Castro has trained at least two groups of Hondurans in insurgent tactics, after which Nicaragua aided in getting these groups back into Honduras. Recently Cuba has also been helping guerrillas in Colombia and Chile. While he did not create the domestic situations that facilitated the destabilizing rise of communism in the area, Castro has certainly taken advantage of them.

We tend to look at Cuba as a factor threating our east-west rather than north-south security relationships. But Cuba today has 50 different school courses for terrorists and guerrillas whom it trains in several different locations on the island. From these courses more than 10,000 guerrillas are now back in the insurgent ranks in their home countries. We tend to overlook the Cuban "America Bureau" and its wide ranging influence—controlling even Ambassadors from Cuba to the various countries of Latin America. The agents of the bureau play a key role in radicalizing labor unions, school systems and many other social and political organizations within the various countries of Latin America. The bureau helps Castro set the overall, long-term direction and provides financing, guidance, and technical support.

If the insurgent threat were not enough, in Latin America today we are faced also with the phenomenal growth of illicit drug traffic—a menace which threatens both the political and economic stability of the region. Given a level of drug traffic amounting to roughly $15 billion per month in the United States, the availability of truly enormous sums of money is breaking down weak government infrastructure in Latin America.

It is also becoming clear that the drug traffickers are closely tied in with guerrillas and terrorists. Drug money is the resource for the purchase of weapons, explosives, and communications equipment, all of which may be better than the arms and equipment available to the police and the armed forces. In exchange, we have seen instances of guerrillas providing security for narcotraffickers and assisting them in the movement of drugs.

On the other side of the coin, all is not "bad news" in Latin America. There is a different kind of U.S. interest in Latin America today than there has been in the past, one that is based on our own principles and ideals (human rights, political "space," pluralism, national planning, and development, the proper role of the military) rather than a paternalistic approach that did not extend much beyond commercialism.

Latin American governments have also changed. Most are now democracies, with some notable exceptions, the nations in this theater are more participatory, collect more taxes, invest more, build more and educate more, and in general articulate their national interests within the international community better than they have at any time in their history.

THE MILITARY STRATEGY

Given the situation I have described, my mission can be seen as the classic cavalry role: Protect the flank, provide early warning of trouble, be prepared for contingencies—and do this with a small force. This also could be called "economy of force." To accomplish the mission, I have the following force strengths: In Panama: 9,700; in Honduras: 1,100; in El Salvador: 55; in 16 security assistance offices: 90.

Because of the way I am organized, with theater as well as country responsibilities, my peacetime strategy is active at two different levels—regionally and country-by-country. The regional strategy is aimed at maintaining a stable south flank. The country-by-country approach establishes the military input for 17 distinctly different country strategies that I coordinate with each U.S. Ambassador. The overall strategy also addresses national concerns which transcend political boundaries, such as the destabilizing effects of Cuba, Nicaragua, and the drug traffickers. This more general theater approach follows classical lines (objectives, threats, concepts, resources), while in individual countries I work closely with the State Department, principally the 17 Ambassadors, to insure that military relationships support the efforts of other national agencies to achieve the U.S. policy goals and objectives. This recognizes the role of the military in helping to build a shared consensus with Latin Americans on democratic ideology, the form and role of government, and the economic system.

My tools for carrying out the overall military strategy are security assistance, forward deploying forces, training opportunities, intelligence sharing, humanitarian and civic action, peacetime PSYOPS, combined training exercises, and a variety of "vehicles" for professional dialogue (staff visits, workshops, seminars and lectures, map exercises, unit and personnel exchange programs, instructor and subject matter exchanges, and the school of the Americas). I use these means to contribute militarily to regional stability by:

Revitalizing and sustaining highly professional military-to-military relationship within the framework of positive government-to-government ties;

Promoting apolitical military institutions that support democratic development, respect human rights, are subordinate to civilian control, and are committed to high standards of military professionalism and ethics;

Enhancing deterrence in Central America by signaling a firm commitment to the area, improving Honduran and Costa Rican readiness, and providing high quality training for U.S. military personnel;

Supporting counterinsurgency operations in El Salvador and helping other Latin American militaries to combat terrorism and insurgency when requested; and

Improving regional defense cooperation to counter insurgent unification and narcotics trafficking, to preclude regional conflicts, and to encourage national development and collective security.

The second level of strategy can best be seen by example. In Honduras, the country-level strategy addresses the very real threat to regional stability posed by Sandinista Nicaragua as well as its own particular security problems. In coordination with the Ambassador, I work at bolstering Honduran defensive capabilities and enhancing internal stability. The strategic means available to me to work toward these objectives with the country team are the same as in the generic military strategy—security assistance, forward deployed forces, training exercises, intelligence sharing, and so forth. Given the nature of the threat and of our objectives, my concept is based on:

Deterring Sandinista aggression and intimidation through a force presence that emphasizes a comprehensive exercise program.

Assuring the Honduran Government by our actions at several levels (such as force presence, continued exercises, intelligence sharing, and civic action programs) that the U.S. is committed to security and development in Honduras.

Assisting in the modernization and professionalization of the Honduran security forces. (Actions include visits by survey teams, security assistance, exercises, mobile training teams, and many different forms of professional dialogue.)

As we carry out this support of Honduran national strategy, we also find great benefits for ourselves. Deployments of U.S. forces to Honduras provide unparalleled, realistic training opportunities.

In sum, the two levels of U.S. SOUTHCOM military strategy aim at accomplishing a broad mission using limited resources. (For example, the entire military assistance program (MAP, i.e., donated funds) for all of South America for the last fiscal year totalled only $5.6 million.) I work through military-to-military contacts to accomplish three inter-related priorities: improve regional security, encourage national stability, and in essence serve as an example of a military institution subordinate to civilian leadership in a democracy.

MAJOR STRATEGIC ISSUES

Having outlined the basic military strategy for the theater, I will describe briefly several issues that are affecting the security relationship between the United States and Latin American countries.

The War in El Salvador

The Duarte government has retained the initiative over the FMLN during the past twelve months. Militarily, the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) are winning the war. Using other yardsticks to measure success than the traditional indicators of terrain captured or enemy killed, ESAF has come to attach greater importance to the number guerrillas remaining than to the number of guerrillas killed. They recognize that reducing the size of the insurgent force can be pursued as effectively in ways other than just killing them. Two years ago there were 11,000 guerrillas; this year our estimate is 6,000. About 2,500 guerrillas have been killed or have turned themselves over to the Government in one way or another. The other half have left the ranks of the FMLN. This trend demonstrates that the Salvadoran Armed Forces understand the triangular nature of their struggle. Low-intensity conflict in their country involves the interaction among three elements: the Government, the enemy, and the people. The Duarte government, with its police and military, and the FMLN, with its terrorist and guerrillas arms, compete principally for the support of the Salvadoran people. In this situation if the Government fights the enemy in such a way that it loses the people, it does not matter if it bests the guerrillas. The Salvadoran Armed Forces have recognized the importance of civic support and seek to keep it by stressing the non-violent elements of warfighting such as civic action, PSYOPS, and the proper treatment of prisoners.

There is still much to be accomplished, in El Salvador, however, particularly in regard to the implementation of Duarte's national plan, "United for Reconstruction" (UPR). Working with the Ambassador, I have concentrated on the military aspects of his plan. I believe that we must sustain our support for President Duarte's UPR for several more years, maintaining at least this year's basic level of $115 million for the armed force and roughly four times that amount in economic aid. Additionally, we must fund the supplemental request for reconstructing civilian and military facilities damaged or destroyed in last October's earthquake so President Duarte is not forced to divert funds for his national plan.

The U.S. country strategy being implemented in El Salvador provides a reasonable model for dealing with low intensity conflict. We must see it through to the end.

The Contra's war against the Sandinistas

As an insurgency the Contra movement does not fit the classic mold of protracted struggle: Over time developing a strong political following, a trained military arm, and a dedicated infrastructure of support before challenging the government. The Contras have grappled with the survival issues common to all resistance movements, such as the need for a sanctuary and the problem of sustained external support, but they have approached forcing internal political change in a different way. A quick look at the origins of the movement will help explain. Its birth can be best described as a spontaneous uprising of Campesinos in different parts of the central highlands of Nicaragua. In the beginning, the Contras made little effort to build a political infrastructure, but recently the movement has become more active in getting its message across to the Nicaraguan people by both word and deed.

On the other hand, the Contras still lack a number of things. Their domestic and international political profile is not strong. A logistics infrastructure has not been completed. The tie-in with the Nicaraguan people has not been established to the degree that it should.

Given these strengths and weaknesses we have to ask two questions: What will happen if we continue to support them and what will happen if we do not?

In the first instance, if we opt to continue supporting them, we must recognize that the Contra movement, like any insurgency will need time—and support. The Contras grew dramatically over the last three years when support was shaky at best. In recent weeks real progress has been made. The Contras:

Continue their painstaking efforts to unify and solidify the political structure (UNO).

Receive better training in leadership and combat skills.

Can now reach all of Nicaragua with Radio Liberation.

Sustained logistical backing and moral support from the United States can make a major difference, but of course the success or failure of any resistance effort ultimately depends on whether enough of the population is prepared to become part of the supporting apparatus.

The Contras must be visible throughout the country, either physically or psychologically, and their presence and momentum perceived to be lasting. The Contras image has to be respectable, their message clear and understandable.

Now let me suggest what will happen if we do not continue to support the Contras. In this situation, the movement would not immediately die; rather, the numbers would decrease over time to a hard core of a few thousand. Simultaneously, Honduras and Costa Rica would receive another wave of refugees. (Cost Rica is hosting about a quarter million Nicaraguans—roughly 20% of Costa Rica's population—over 100,000 of which are refugees since 1979.) It is uncertain whether the Sandinistas could eliminate the Contras (I suspect that as long as there is a Marxist government in Managua, there will be violent opposition to it), but the Contra movement would not remain an obstacle to the Sandinista pressure on all neighbors.

Sandinista intimidation would take the form of internal problems in Honduras and other neighboring countries, supported if not initiated by, the Sandinistas, backed up by the constant threat of their military force. At some point there would be an accommodation to Managua's pressure, accommodation made easier by our lack of commitment to the area. Eventually, we would be faced with a Central America hostile to U.S. interests.

Having looked at the two fundamental questions on support to the Contras, the choice is between supporting the movement, which means a long-term commitment, or letting it collapse, resulting in regional instability and expanding low-intensity conflict in Honduras, Cost Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala. Implicit in this trend are decreased U.S. National Security and increases in resources costs for the security of our south flank. It seems to me that the U.S. will either have to face the issue of the Contras now, or we will face it later in different forms.

The war against the drug traffickers

This is very much a part of the overall strategy of stabilization. Operation Blast Furnace, a successful attempt to suppress cocaine traffic in Bolivia for four months, was our first campaign in this war. We took six Blackhawk helicopters (UH-60), an intelligence team and support personnel into an unfamiliar environment to assist the drug enforcement agency's narcotics assistance unit and the Bolivian police.

When the task force arrived, the wholesale price of the coca leaf was $120 per hundredweight and it dropped to $10 to $15 per hundredweight during the operation. (A dealer breaks even at $40.) Blast Furnace forced the middleman to disperse and trafficking virtually stopped. The task force reconnoitered 250 different locations and transported the police into 106 sites. We discovered about 35 drug-related facilities, which were then destroyed. When the task force departed, we loaned Bolivia six helicopers (UH-1) and introduced mobile training teams to teach flying, maintenance, and intelligence collection and analysis.

The U.S. needs more operations like Blast Furnace. We also need to encourage bilateral operations between neighboring countries and multilateral arrangements in which several countries work together against the traffickers. With his great resources, a narcotrafficker can choose to pick up his whole apparatus and move it across borders into other countries, or he can shut down business and wait out the operation. Cooperation among neighboring countries increases the pressure on the trafficker, denying him flexibility. I believe that such multilateral operations can be coordinated—as Operation Hat Trick in the Caribbean has so successfully demonstrated.

What is needed in the war against drug traffickers in this theater is a commitment to take them on. A great deal of Latin courage has already been shown, first by President Paz Estensorro of Bolivia and now by President Barco of Colombia. We need to resolve resource issues and lay out the overall U.S. national strategy for a counter-drug campaign.

Security assistance—The foundation of security relations in Latin America

In my attempt to implement the two levels of military strategy, I find that the Security Assistance Program, which should be one of my principal strategic tools, does not serve implementation as well as it should. Because of complex, layered budgeting and funding procedures, and because of diversity of congressional involvement (interest by all foreign relations, authorization and appropriation committees), the process has become an end in itself rather than a means for carrying out national strategy. For example, in foreign military sales (FMS) pricing, regardless of the strategic value of the sale, the sale must not incur a loss to the U.S. Government. This policy often results in questionable prices for military articles, varying and unreliable price estimates, and billings for equipment that continue long after the equipment has been transferred. The provisions of the Arms Export Control Act require a foreign purchaser to pay the full cost incurred by the U.S. Government; for example, Costa Rica was recently faced with a choice between paying $162K for a 5-ton truck through U.S. FMS or $55K for a non-standard civilian equivalent. We should examine the need to charge the countries for research, development and other nonrecurring costs for defense articles that are already in service inventories as well as the cost of all pay, allowances, retirement, medical benefits, leave and holiday costs for U.S. personnel involved in training and services.

Security assistance must be supportive of strategy. If it is—and if the goal is a regional security situation that is favorable to the United States—then there is a valid reason to support some contribution on our part rather than a policy of no profit/no loss. We have lost sight of the strategic importance of other countries to U.S. national security and the need to develop solid, professional relationships between all levels of our respective military institutions. Under the current guidance, these latter considerations clearly are perceived to be less important, an afterthought to be carried out as time allows. In other words, we are providing only the manpower and finances to support the sales effort and are forgetting why we conduct the sales in the first place. I am convinced that a review of the Security Assistance Program will identify other anomalies, and to my mind there are many:

Legislative restrictions reduce the effectiveness of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. The sanctions incorporated into the Foreign Assistance Authorization and Appropriation Acts cut off security assistance to nations that in some way are at odds with U.S. policy. Countries currently subject to IMET sanctions include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Guyana, and Peru. The nations sanctioned represent 80% of my area of responsibility and 71% of its population.

Security assistance is funded on a year-by-year basis. Multi-year funding is needed urgently to facilitate consistent and long-range planning of improvements for allied defenses.

Security assistance funds cannot be used today to provide training to police and other law enforcement personnel. (The exceptions to this policy for El Salvador and Honduras, furthermore, expire at the end of fiscal year 1987.) The legislative restrictions were appropriate when approved over twelve years ago, but now they need to be made less restrictive or eliminated, because the original reasons for the prohibition are no longer valid. The challenge faced by Latin law enforcement personnel today is one posed by well-armed, sophisticated terrorists, urban guerrillas and drug dealers. The new training requirements for the police go far beyond just maintaining law and order. Because of the paramilitary nature of the threat, our military forces should be allowed to provide this training.

This list of security assistance anomalies and problems is by no means complete. The Security Assistance Program is intended as a strategic tool of U.S. foreign policy and strategy, but we are getting less than our money's worth and are doing less than we are capable of doing.

AN ACTION AGENDA

In your invitation to appear at this strategy hearing, you asked for my views on critical deficiencies in the capabilities of Southern Command to carry out its strategy. The list below represents my needs:

A coherent Security Assistance Program that can be used as an effective strategic tool. I seek your support for a step soon to be taken in this direction when the State Department submits several proposals to amend current security assistance legislation.

Implementation of the Kissinger's commission's recommendations embodied in the Jackson plan, particularly the economic and educational initiatives.

Long-term monetary and moral support for the Contra movement, including support for regional allies in Central America.

Continued economic and military assistance for El Salvador and support for supplemental requests to assist in the earthquake reconstruction effort.

Resources to help Latin governments fight in the war against the drug traffickers.

Intelligence, reconnaissance, communications, riverine, and air mobility capabilities for Latin American countries.

Continued support for U.S. Force presence (exercises and deployments for training) in the region.

Willingness to support funding for military construction which will ensure that we have facilities to respond to crisis situations and to comply with our obligations to defend the Panama Canal after the year 2000.

COMMITMENT FOR THE LONG HAUL

There are no easy solutions for the problems we face in Latin America. Our overall strategy is adequate, but it is dependent on long-term U.S. commitment. If our enemies become convinced that "waiting us out" is a tactic that will bring success, no amount of short-term effort on our part will work, and our strategy for the region will be undermined.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, General.

Admiral, why do we not go ahead and get your statement, and then we will open the floor for questions.

STATEMENT OF ADM. LEE BAGGETT, JR., USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND

Admiral BAGGETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the strategy in the Atlantic Command with you and the other members of this committee. I have a prepared statement for the record, and I would like to just summarize from that if I may.

The Atlantic strategy is a strategy that has the essential ingredients of deterrence and forward defense and recognizes the contributions in the Atlantic Command of our allies, specifically NATO. It is predominantly a maritime command through which will flow nearly all the supplies and the military equipment for reinforcement and resupply of our forces in Europe.

Wars are only won by land forces. There is no doubt, however, that we can lose wars if we cannot control the seas. In a war with the Soviet Union, my responsibility is to support the land campaign in Europe in two principal ways: First, to maintain an unbroken link to Europe to ensure that our reinforcements and resupply get to Europe in a timely fashion; and second, the direct application of combat power on the fronts that comprise the flanks of NATO.

To accomplish these missions, it is imperative that the sea war in the Atlantic be fought as far forward as possible, to allow us to capitalize on the geographic disadvantages which the Soviets face. Control of the Norwegian Sea is essential for containment of the Northern Fleet of the Soviets and for a power projection on NATO's northern flank.

If we are successful there, we will be able to accomplish both the protection of our sea lines of communication and the projection of power. Put simply, if the Atlantic Command allows the maritime battle to take place in the Mid-Atlantic, south of the Norwegian Sea, we will surely lose.

Our forward strategy capitalizes on our ability to concentrate maritime forces, seize the initiative and sustain our combat efforts in areas where the payoff is greatest. The numbers and the geographic spread of the Soviet threat are such that we impose a fatal restriction on ourselves if we only react to the movements of the Soviets.

Opposing forces at sea are backed up by very few reserves. There will be no radical alteration in numbers by constructing new fleets once war begins. Changes in the opposing forces will come from losses; losses which are irreversible if ships are sunk.

A great weakness that the Soviets have, as I said before, is access to the open oceans. The Northern Fleet faces a 1,500 nautical mile trek to the open sea of the North Atlantic. Once deployed, the Soviets are at a disadvantage because of their long and tenuous sea lines of communication to their home bases.

Another major Soviet disadvantage is their dependence on afloat logistics support, which is a rather brittle link to those homeland bases. Despite the considerable ability of Soviet space satellites, their reconnaissance task is not an easy one. Soviet aircraft face long flight paths within range of land-based NATO fighter aircraft. Early detection and destruction of these aircraft is essential to offset the Soviet long-range antiship missile systems. The counter-command, control and communications by NATO can further degrade Soviet surveillance and targeting efforts.

Our strategy takes advantage of Soviet weaknesses and emphasizes our strengths, but it does require us to concentrate forces in sufficient strength to ensure victory. Boldness will be required in the allocation of forces, for if we commit our forces piecemeal, our irreplaceable ships are going to be picked off one by one and lost.

In order to execute the Atlantic Command strategy, I am assigned elements from all three services. The Army Atlantic consists of up to three combat-ready divisions, with 15,000 troops each. The Air Force Atlantic can provide up to 1,400 tactical aircraft. Neither U.S. Army nor U.S. Air Force elements are provided to me on a day-to-day basis. However, they would be made available should I be assigned a mission requiring them. They are full participants in our planning and exercise programs.

With over 45 million square miles of ocean, the Atlantic Command has as its largest component the Atlantic Fleet, which is made up of 305 active and reserve ships, some 1,100 aircraft, and over a quarter million personnel. The Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, with its nearly 50,000 marines and over 400 tactical aircraft, provides a rapid response capability.

Today I can rely on combat-ready forces that reflect earlier decisions supported by the Congress. In addition to increasingly capable ships and aircraft, unit readiness is high and increasing steadily. Sustainability is improving as we receive the deliveries that were funded in prior years. And—the heart of readiness—our personnel status is still in good shape; we are still attracting and retaining quality personnel.

A specific concern of this committee, I judge from your letter, Mr. Chairman, is the contribution of our NATO allies to the common defense. Most often this concern is expressed in the percentage of a nation's gross domestic product which is dedicated to military programs, and how this stacks up against our own spending.

That provides a straightforward number comparison, but it fails to consider the global responsibilities of the United States and the attendant requirement for us to maintain larger forces. Nor do such comparisons always reflect the relative wealth of the nations or the small populations of some of the countries.

Also not considered are the costs borne by nations to provide land and facilities for NATO use, and the requirements to "militarize" roads, bridges, airfields and port facilities or to provide exercise areas for our troops in Europe.

Determination of relative burdensharing is not easily accomplished.

Would I like to see more funding by our allies? I certainly would. For each of the countries, I would like to see the maintenance of real spending increases so we can achieve improvements in the conventional force imbalance that currently exists.

Our NATO allies do make a substantial contribution in the Atlantic Command, both in terms of ships and aircraft. In a NATO war, 60 percent of the destroyers and frigates, the escort forces, one-third of my nuclear attack submarines and maritime patrol aircraft, all of the general purpose submarines, and the only two ASW carriers would be provided by allies. These nations also provide virtually all of my countermeasure ships and nearly one-half of the reinforcement and resupply shipping.

Any evaluation of the Atlantic Command's ability to execute its warfighting strategy must take into account Cuba, which sits astride the sea lines of communications in the Caribbean. Excluding the United States, Cuba has the most formidable military force in the region. There are about 14,000 Soviet personnel in Cuba, and Soviet economic assistance totals over $5 billion yearly.

Today, the Cuban air force is the largest in the region, excluding that of the United States. It has over 450 aircraft, including 225 high performance aircraft. The Cuban navy totals over 150 ships of various types, including about 20 fast attack boats armed with 25 nautical mile Styx missiles, two Polnocny class amphibious landing ships, two Koni class frigates, and three Foxtrot diesel submarines.

You may wonder why the Atlantic Command is concerned about three diesel electric submarines. In the early days of World War II, in a 6-month period from 1941 to the early part of 1942, the German Navy sank 114 merchant ships in the Caribbean while maintaining on station no more than three submarines at any one time.

Over the years, Cuban involvement in Nicaragua has included the transshipments of military cargo supplied by the Soviets, East Germany, Bulgaria and Libya, and also the introduction of Cuban military and technical advisors into Nicaragua. In the past few years, however, these transshipments have decreased, and the majority of military deliveries to Nicaragua have been direct from the Soviet Union and Bulgaria.

In the aftermath of Grenada, Cuba influence in the English-speaking Caribbean islands, which was never very strong, has been at a low point. That is not to say that Castro would not seize any opportunity presented to him to meddle. In the Caribbean, we must assist the democracies to develop economically and provide for their own security and stability, or risk providing Cuba with a target and the prospect of another Grenada.

Last year, a total of $24.5 million was requested for military assistance to Caribbean nations. Only $10.5 million was approved. Haiti, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and the nations of the eastern Caribbean look to us for leadership for support of their goals.

The Soviets also recognize the importance of Cuba with respect to the Atlantic. That is obvious from the Soviet signal intelligence site at Lourdes, outside Havana; the deployment of long-range Bear aircraft, both ASW and ocean reconnaissance variants to Cuba on a regular basis; and the periodic deployment of Soviet warships for exercises with the Cuban navy and operations in the Gulf of Mexico.

In the execution of the Atlantic Command's strategy, Cuba is vitally important. In the reinforcement and resupply of Europe, 55 percent of the U.S. Army's heavy lift and 90 percent of the petroleum products would originate in our gulf coast ports, and transit through the straits of Florida and the Yucatan Channel. Every day we are forced to delay the forward movement of our forces provides the Warsaw Pact with an opportunity to gain momentum, in both the land and sea campaigns.

I have already elaborated this afternoon on the military strategy in the Atlantic Command—a forward strategy to support NATO's northern flank and ensure the SLOCs remain open. As far as the net assessment is concerned, our strengths to accomplish this strategy include our best-in-the-world submarine force; tactical air, including antisubmarine warfare aircraft on our carriers; land-based aircraft, such as the P-3C; maritime patrol aircraft, the B-52G with mining and Harpoon capabilities, tankers, AWACS, and U.S. Air Force fighters; amphibious forces; and increasingly capable air defense ships such as Aegis cruisers.

They also include modern precision stand-off weapons, as well as surveillance systems, which provide us with a substantial advantage in antisurface and antiair warfare.

Success in the Atlantic Command, though, is going to depend on defeating the Soviet's combined arms, the most capable maritime component by far being their submarine force. Soviet submarines numerically dominate the Northern Fleet order of battle. Coupled with this is the fact that they have closed the technology gap. The sophistication and the capability of their new submarines, and their sensors, C3 and weapon systems are, in many areas, comparable to ours.

This situation has developed not because we have lacked support for our programs, but because the Soviets have made vast improvements in their own capabilities. Large investments in research and development, and the apparent ease with which they have acquired Western technology, have allowed the Soviets to build submarines which are very much quieter and therefore more difficult to detect.

The Soviet submarine force is the biggest maritime threat. It is a threat that concerns me far above any other. If we went to war today, I have no doubt that we would prevail at sea, but the litmus test is going to be whether we will continue to make the necessary investments for the future, or whether we allow our positive momentum to slip way.

I believe we have a correct strategy in the Atlantic. We do enjoy significant advantages in our maritime forces in many areas. While deficiencies remain, the fiscal year 1988–1989 budget strikes the required balance between current needs and the moderization that will allow us to keep pace with Soviet developments.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my presentation.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Baggett follows:]

Prepared Statement of Adm. Lee Baggett, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss military strategy in the Atlantic Command. It is a strategy that has the essential ingredients of deterrence and forward defense, and recognizes the contribution of our Allies. The United States is committed under the NATO Treaty to treat an attack on any NATO Ally as an attack against all. Thus, my USCINCLANT responsibilities and objectives are tied to those of my NATO command. However, the USCINCLANT area of responsibility is geographically much larger than that of SACLANT, resulting in regional concerns and requirements separate from NATO.

The Atlantic Command

The Atlantic Command is predominently a maritime command, through which travel the petroleum products, strategic materials and other goods vital to the United States and our Allies. Over these same SLOCs will flow nearly all the supplies and military equipment for the reinforcement and resupply of forces in Europe.

Wars are only won by land forces - but they can be lost by an inability to control the seas. In a war with the Soviet Union, my responsibility is to support the land campaign in Europe in two principal ways:

- Maintain an unbroken link between Europe and North America to ensure the safe and timely flow of reinforcement and resupply shipping over the SLOCs.

- And, the direct application of combat power in support of the land campaign.

Strategy in the Atlantic

To accomplish these missions it is imperative that the sea war in the Atlantic be fought as far forward as possible, to allow us to capitalize on the geographic constraints faced by the Soviets and, at the same time, defend the Northern Flank of NATO. Control of the Norwegian Sea will be essential for containment of the Soviet Northern Fleet and for power projection on NATO's Northern Flank. If successful, we will be able to ensure the flow of reinforcement and resupply and provide our land forces in Europe the wherewithal to prevail. If we fail, it is likely that the Soviets will be able to establish bases in North Norway from which they will be able to control the airspace over the Norwegian Sea, threaten Iceland and attack Allied shipping in the broad areas of the Atlantic.

Put simply, if the Atlantic Command allows the maritime battle to take place in the Mid-Atlantic - south of the Norwegian Sea - we will lose.

Our forward strategy capitalizes on our ability to concentrate maritime forces, seize the initiative, and sustain our combat efforts in areas where the pay-off is greatest. The numbers and geographical spread of the Soviet threat are such that we impose a fatal restriction on ourselves if our maritime forces only react to events. Steaming in the wake of the Soviets will not do the job.

Opposing forces at sea are backed up by few reserves. There will be no radical alteration in numbers by constructing new fleets once war begins. Changes in the opposing forces will come from losses; losses that are irreversible if ships are sunk. A great weakness of the Soviets at sea is the fact that their Navy is divided into four fleets, each of which has access to the open ocean which can best be described as unenviable. The Northern Fleet faces a long, 1500 nautical mile trek to the open Atlantic, past Norway and Iceland eyes and ears and through the GIN gap with NATO countries and bases on every side. The Baltic Fleet and Black Sea Fleet are similarly restricted. Once deployed, the Soviets are at a disadvantage because of their long and tenuous sea lines of communication. Operations of Soviet Naval forces far from their home bases, which can only be reached through hostile waters, present the problems of timing and risk assessment. Another major Soviet disadvantage is their dependence on afloat logistic support -- a brittle link with homeland bases that must be marked and destroyed. Where the Soviets have managed to gain a lodgment in some other part of the globe, such as in Cuba or Angola, it is important to prevent their exit to sea. Despite the considerable ability of Soviet space satellites, their reconnaissance task is not easy. Soviet aircraft face long flight paths within range of landbased NATO fighter aircraft, vectored by air search radars, including U.S. and NATO AWACS. Early detection and destruction of these aircraft is essential to offset Soviet long-range anti-ship weapons. Counter-Command, Control and Communications by NATO can further degrade Soviet surveillance and targeting efforts. Our strategy takes advantage of Soviet weaknesses and emphasizes our strengths, but it does require us to concentrate forces in sufficient strength to ensure victory. Boldness is needed in this allocation of forces: making the difficult decisions, required by our force levels, to denude one sea area in order to concentrate sufficient forces in another. If we commit piecemeal for lack of these decisions, our irreplaceable ships could be lost.

U.S. Forces

In order to execute the Atlantic Command's strategy, I am assigned elements from all three services: the Army Atlantic, Air Force Atlantic, and the Atlantic Fleet. The Army Atlantic consists of up to three combat ready divisons, with 15,000 troops each. The Air Force Atlantic could provide up to 1,400 tactical aircraft. Neither U.S. Army nor U.S. Air Force elements are provided to the Atlantic Command on a day-to-day basis; however, they would be made available should I be assigned a mission requiring them. Joint exercises are conducted on a regular basis with all forces. With over 45 million square miles of ocean, the Atlantic Command is a maritime command and has as its largest component the Atlantic Fleet comprised of 305 active and reserve ships, 1,100 aircraft, and over a quarter million personnel. The Atlantic Command's strategic nuclear deterrent resides in 30 fleet ballistic missile submarines which spend about 60 percent of their time at sea to cover assigned targets. The Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, with its nearly 50,000 Marines and over 400 tactical aircraft, provides a rapid response capability. The Atlantic Fleet also provides USCINCEUR the naval forces operating in the Mediterranean and CENTCOM some of the ships operating in the Middle East Force.

Today I can rely on combat ready forces that reflect earlier decisions supported by the Congress. In addition to increasingly capable ships and aircraft, unit readiness is high and increasing steadily, sustainability is improving as we receive the deliveries of spare parts and munitions from past years' funding, and at the heart of readiness we are still attracting and retaining quality personnel.

Allied Contribution

A specific concern of this Committee is the contribution of our NATO Allies to the common defense. Most often, this concern is expressed in the percentage of a nation's gross domestic product which is dedicated to military programs - and how this stacks up against our own spending. That provides a straightforward number comparison, but it fails to consider the global responsibilities of the United States - and the attendant requirement for us to maintain larger forces. Nor do such comparisons reflect the relative wealth of the nations (e.g. Portugal, Greece and Turkey) or the small populations of others (e.g. Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway and Denmark). Also not considered are the costs borne by nations to provide land and facilities for NATO use, and the requirements to "militarize" roads, bridges, airfields and port facilities. Simply stated, determination of relative burdensharing is not easily accomplished.

Would I like to see more funding by our Allies? Yes. For each nation, I would like to see the maintenance of real spending increases so that we can achieve improvement in the conventional force imbalance which currently exists.

You should know, however, that our NATO Allies do make a substantial contribution in the Atlantic in both ships and aircraft. In a NATO war, sixty percent of the destroyers and frigates, one-third of my nuclear attack submarines and maritime patrol aircraft, all of the general purpose submarines and the only two ASW carriers will be provided by Allies. These nations also provide virtually all of the mine countermeasures ships and one-half of the reinforcement and resupply shipping. I am fortunate in being able to count on the contributions of our Allies, which include all but one of the other great maritime forces. Our NATO Allies are absolutely essential to cope with the 350 Warsaw Pact Northern and Baltic Fleet ~~submarines~~ submarine and surface combatants that can oppose us.

The Caribbean and Cuba

Any evaluation of the Atlantic Command's ability to execute its warfighting strategy must take into account Cuba, which sits astride strategic sea lines of communication in the Caribbean. Excluding the U.S., Cuba has the most formidable military force in the region.

There are approximately 14,000 Soviet personnel in Cuba. Soviet economic assistance totals over five billion dollars yearly, and the Cuban military has been upgraded through two 5-year modernization periods, the first of which began in 1976. Prior to 1976, Cuba received approximately 12,000 tons of military cargo per year. That figure more than doubled, to over 30,000 tons annually, during the first 5-year program, and in 1981 and 1982 again doubled to over 66,000 tons per year. Deliveries in 1983 through 1985 were at least 55,000 tons annually, and may have been as high as previous years.

Today, the Cuban Air Force is the largest in the region, excluding the U.S. It has an Air Force of over 450 aircraft, including at least 200 high-performance fighters such as the MIG-21 and MIG-23. The Cuban Navy totals over 150 ships of various types, including about 20 fast attack missile patrol boats with their 25 nautical mile range Styx missiles, 2 Polnocny amphibious landing ships, 2 Koni class frigates, and three Foxtrot diesel-electric submarines armed with torpedoes. You may wonder why the Atlantic Command is concerned about three diesel-electric submarines. In the early days of WW II, in a 6-month period, the German Navy sank 114 merchant ships in the Caribbean while maintaining no more than three U-boats on station at any given time.

Over the years, Cuban involvement in Nicaragua has included the transshipments of military cargo supplied by the Soviets, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Libya, and also the introduction of Cuban military and technical advisors. However, in the past two years these transshipments have decreased, and the majority of military deliveries to Nicaragua have been direct from the

Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Cuba's covert activities and military involvement in Central America are matched by more subtle efforts toward economic and diplomatic gains elsewhere in Latin America.

In the aftermath of Grenada, Cuban influence in the English-speaking Caribbean Islands--never very strong--has been at a low point. That is not to say that Castro would not seize any target of opportunity to meddle. In the Caribbean, we must assist the democracies to develop economically and provide for their own security, or risk providing Cuba with a target and the prospect of another Grenada. Last year a total of $24.5 million was requested for military assistance to Caribbean nations. Only $10.5 million was approved. Haiti, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and the nations of the eastern Caribbean look to us for leadership and support.

The Soviets recognize the importance of Cuba with respect to the Atlantic. This is obvious from the Soviet signal intelligence site at Lourdes, outside Havana; the deployments of long range Bear aircraft, both ASW and ocean reconnaissance variants; and the periodic deployment of warships for operations with the Cuban Navy.

In the execution of the Atlantic Command's strategy, Cuba is vitally important. In the reinforcement and resupply of Europe, fifty-five percent of the U.S. Army's heavy lift and ninety percent of the petroleum products would originate in our Gulf Coast ports, and transit the Straits of Florida and the Yucatan Channel. Every day we are forced to delay the forward movement of our forces, provides the Warsaw Pact with the opportunity to gain momentum, in both the land and sea campaigns. Given our limited ordnance sustainability, every missile fired at a Cuban aircraft, every bomb or projectile fired at Cuban territory, and every torpedo launched against a Cuban submarine will detract from our ability to conduct operations against the Warsaw Pact.

Net Assessment

Any military net assessment must consider the opposing objectives, the respective strategies to achieve them, and the conventional force capabilities to execute the strategies in the face of the enemy. In the case of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the assessment should also take into account our NATO Allies and Warsaw Pact nations. An assessment is neither a tally of force levels versus force levels by types of ships, submarines, and aircraft, nor a weighing of strengths against strengths.

I have already elaborated on the Military Strategy in the Atlantic Command -- a forward strategy to support the NATO

Northern Flank and to ensure the Atlantic SLOCs remain open. Distilled down to its essence, this strategy means denying Warsaw Pact ships and submarines access to the broad Atlantic and then sinking them or running them into their homeports. This meets all of my objectives and is a war termination incentive for the Soviets.

Our strengths to accomplish this strategy include our best-in-the-world submarine force, tactical air (including ASW) at sea, land based aircraft (such as P-3C MPA, B-52G with mining and HARPOON missile capabilities, tankers, AWACS, and fighters), amphibious forces, and increasingly capable air defense ships such as the AEGIS cruisers. They also include modern precision stand-off weapons, as well as surveillance systems which are force multipliers in the sense of achieving the engagement rates required by our tactical forces against enemy platforms -- submarines, aircraft, and surface ships. We and our Allies also have better trained personnel.

Success in the Atlantic Command will depend on defeating Soviet combined arms, the most capable maritime component being their submarine force. Soviet submarines numerically dominate the Northern Fleet order of battle. Coupled with this is the fact the Soviets have rapidly closed the technology gap between ours and theirs in terms of quality. The sophistication and capability of their new submarines, and their sensors, C3 and weapon systems are, in many areas, comparable to ours. No longer can it be said that our numerical disadvantage can be offset by our technological superiority. This situation has developed not because we have lacked support for our programs, but because the Soviets have made vast improvements in their submarines. Large investments in Research and Development, and the apparent ease with which they have acquired Western technology, have permitted them to build submarines which are very much quieter and therefore more and more difficult to detect. As I reported to this Committee in my 1986 assessment of NATO versus the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet nuclear submarine force, its here and now numerical advantage, and the improved quality being built into new submarines is the biggest maritime threat and is what concerns me most.

If we went to war today, we would prevail at sea. The test is going to be whether we will continue to make the necessary investments in research and development, and new - and expensive - ships, submarines and aircraft. Ordnance sustainability - in particular, preferred munitions - continues to improve. The readiness of our forces is at its highest point in my memory. We must not permit our positive momentum to slip away - if we do, we may not be able to prevail in the future.

Conclusion

I believe that we have the correct strategy in the Atlantic Command. We do enjoy significant advantages in our maritime forces in many areas. While deficiencies remain, the FY 88-89 budget presents the appropriate balance between current needs and the modernization that will allow us to keep pace with Soviet developments.

This completes my presentation and I am prepared to answer your questions.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you very much, Admiral. We will go with the 6-minute rule today since we have a number of Senators today, which I am delighted with given the weather conditions. We appreciate everyone being here today, and we appreciate our witnesses being here.

NICARAGUA

General Galvin, one of the things we focused on in the strategy hearings is the importance of clear and well-understood objectives to a successful strategy. When Dr. Brzezinski testified, not too long ago, we asked him about Nicaragua and our goals there. He testified that our goal is "unclear, undefined and perhaps not clearly limited".

How would you describe U.S. foreign and military policy goals toward Nicaragua?

General **Galvin**. I think there is something to the point that the goal is not entirely clear. During the 2 years in which I have tried to work a regional strategy for Central America around the position of the United States with reference to Nicaragua and the Contras, it has been somewhat difficult. We have had differing approaches and have not sustained a clear policy. It is difficult for me, consequently, to work with neighboring countries such as Honduras.

Thinking about the other countries of Central America, we ask sometimes, if the Sandinistas are such a threat, why do we not see a different kind of reaction from the other countries in the region, the neighboring countries? From the experience gained by making many, many visits to all of those countries over the last 2 years, I think the reason that we do not is that our own approach has not been a straight road. It is not a clear policy.

Chairman **Nunn**. May I ask you your personal view? Now, I am not asking you to speak for the administration or anyone else, just your personal views about what our goals should be. What goals do you personally believe we should have regarding Nicaragua today?

General **Galvin**. First of all, I think the overall strategy of stability for the area is a good strategy. I think that we cannot have stability for the area as long as the Sandinistas are going to be in power in Nicaragua and are going to be Marxist and internationalist, dedicated to undermining their neighbors.

Even when they were just barely sustaining themselves in 1979, they were supporting neighboring revolutionary groups and that will continue. I think that we have to have a policy which says that the United States is against the idea of a Marxist government in Nicaragua and that we will take whatever diplomatic or other actions necessary over the long haul to show opposition.

I think that a policy in which we state clearly that this country does not consider a Marxist government in Nicaragua to be congenial to our interest and that we will support the Contras and Nicaragua's regional neighbors in a coherent, integrated way would be an unambiguous message and would turn things around.

Chairman **Nunn**. Suppose that we really do finally succeed in having free elections in Nicaragua and the people decide they want a Marxist government by a majority vote. What would the goal be then, in your opinion?

General GALVIN. It is absolutely astounding to think that in free elections you would get a Marxist government there, but that is a possibility. I think that if the conditions are such that a free election, a totally free election, comes up with any kind of a government, I think that the decision is going to have to be acceptable to us.

Chairman NUNN. Then our goal really should be free election, should it not, letting the people decide for themselves, assuming we really can find free elections in some manner there?

General GALVIN. Yes.

Chairman NUNN. When you speak of aid to the Contras, and I think you stated it very clearly in your statement, we have two choices, either to aid them or not to aid them, you walk through the results of either one of those choices, and you also mentioned that it would take a long term, how long and how much general support do you think is necessary for the United States to fund the Contras? Are we talking about 3 years, 5 years, 10 years, and at what level of funding, in your personal view?

General GALVIN. Well, I think we have to be realistic about this, Mr. Chairman. We are dealing with an insurgency. One has only to look at classical examples to see that they are not explosive things which are over within a matter of months or in a year or so. What we are really talking about when we discuss support for the Contras is our commitment to the hemisphere and our commitment to the southern flank.

First of all, to get right down to the point, I think that a successful insurgency is going to take time. It has to take time, and it cannot be artificially hurried. If it is, the result can be disastrous. We have to recognize that there is no other way than to allow the insurgency to develop itself, and that will require 3 or 5 or 7 years. Success may take more than that, and our country needs to be committed to sustained support. We also must stop thinking about some kind of miraculous result that will happen in a year.

Chairman NUNN. You are stating at least 3 years and possibly as long as 7 years? Is that the general range that you would define?

General GALVIN. Somewhere in that range.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. My time has expired.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FUNDING TO CONTRAS

Another committee of the Senate has indicated that their preference to dealing with this situation and to bring stability into the area would be to terminate funding to the Contras and put perhaps a sum as $300 million into the bordering countries, the four bordering countries.

What would you say to that course of action?

General GALVIN. I do not think it is a very good course of action, Mr. Senator. First of all, there is the question of the $300 million. I assumed that could happen, but last year when we said we were going to give $100 million to the Contras and $300 million to the region, the $300 million did not appear.

Aside from the assumption, I do not believe that with this kind of U.S. support you can help the neighbors of Nicaragua counter the kind of strategy the Sandinistas will follow. The Sandinistas will not attack across the border. Rather they will focus on undermining the countries, just as we have seen so far.

You know that two different groups of Honduran Communists have been captured after departing Nicaragua as they traveled through Paraiso and Oracho Province, and who knows how many groups were not captured. Given your scenario we will see signs of insurgency growing in the surrounding countries, a situation that is going to be very difficult for us to stop. I do not say it is impossible, but I say that it is costly. It is at least as long as continuing to support the civil war in Nicaragua. It also is not predictable.

Senator WARNER. Do I judge from your remarks, then, that you are strongly in support of the President's request for Congress to continue the funding under the 1987 budget, $40 million, and then to give the full $105 million in the 1988 budget?

General GALVIN. I am absolutely in support of that. As I go around and try to talk to the Hondurans and the Costa Ricans and the Salvadorans and the Guatemalans, I find myself constantly trying to assure them that the United States has a policy and we are going to carry it out. I feel that Central American leaders, in some cases, are on the border of being demoralized. They are under great pressure. I hope we understand how much pressure they are under from the Sandinistas.

Senator WARNER. That is very important that our policy coincide—that is, the President's policy, not that presently being moved in the Senate—the President's policy coincide as nearly as possible with the countries in the region.

Do you feel that this approach; namely, continuing the $40 million under 1987 and the $105 million under 1988, is the policy that most nearly coincides with what those four nations would recommend?

General GALVIN. It is not their stated policy, but I believe that it does coincide. The policy that those nations want to hear is a clearly articulated, firm position by the United States, one that they can rely on, one that will allow them the flexibility of making decisions. The decisions that they are making now are affected by fear of the real threat, Sandinista Nicaragua.

SUBMARINE FORCE

Senator WARNER. If I might turn now to Admiral Baggett, I was greatly impressed with your statement with respect to the submarine force and that you consider this the greatest threat to your existing forces. It brings us to the question of the SS-21 and the budget request this year. Now, the SS-21 is our newest R&D version of the attack submarine.

First, by way of history, are you free to tell us without getting into classified areas how many new attack submarines the Soviets have designed and laid down, say, in the past decade or since the

R-688, which is our most recent attack, went into production? How many new versions have the Soviets adopted?

Admiral BAGGETT. Let me put it in a different time period, if I might, Senator. Since 1980, the Soviets have put to sea seven new classes of submarines, and they have put to sea two modified classes. So that is a total of nine new classes of submarines. They average about 10 submarines per year as far as the building rate goes.

They have not gone into quantity production of any of those submarines. I think they are sorting it out, and I believe we will see series production of those classes they ultimately select.

Senator WARNER. Now, we have made the decision, of course, to go with one single new class, that being the SS-21. My question to you is how high a priority would you recommend to the Congress as the budget consideration for that funding request for the SS-21?

Admiral BAGGETT. That new submarine, Senator, is key to keep abreast of the threat. It is just that simple. It will bring to our submarine force a capability to cope with a threat in the future. Our advantage has eroded badly. Ten years ago if I had been asked what the differential was between our submarine capability, the SSN-688, and the Soviet's capability, I would have said that we had an 8 to 10 year advantage in terms of submarine versus submarine.

Today, if asked, I would say that with the new classes of submarines we are seeing the Soviets build, the Akula class for example, we are seeing quieter submarines—and that is the name of the game in submarine warfare—quietness. I would say that our advantage has eroded to the point that it is at most a 2 to 3 year advantage. They are approaching our capabilities.

CARRIER FORCE LEVEL

Senate WARNER. My last question would be the carrier force level of 15 carrier battle groups. How essential is maintaining that 15 figure to your area of responsibility?

Admiral BAGGETT. I look at achieving and maintaining 15 deployable carriers as a necessary sustainability item, frankly. It is nothing more than that. The difference is that the lead time for a carrier is many times more, both in terms of months and industrial capacity requirements, than it is to build a circuit card for a weapon system. So we need to maintain 15 deployable carriers. That is the minimum force level, and 15 will still require us to make decisions in terms of priority and sequential operations.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, welcome. I am delighted you are here today. Let me get into a few questions.

ROLE OF NATIONAL GUARD

First, I would like to ask you, General Galvin, about the role that the National Guard is playing in our overall posture in your area of responsibility. As you know, there is a growing controversy as to whether or not the Guard should be trained in Central America.

Some Governors object to the Guard being there. We are continuing to wrestle with that problem here.

It seems to me that many Governors, regardless of their political affiliation or regardless of how they feel about Central America, do not seem to understand the role that the National Guard plays in our force structure and force projection mission today. I suspect that you would agree, would you not, as the commander in the area, that we must continue to have the National Guard training in Central America to maintain the military posture which we think is important there?

General GALVIN. I would agree, Mr. Senator. Thank you.

I entered the Army through the National Guard in 1948 and went to West Point as a National Guard private first class. I remember what the training was like at Camp Edward, where we went in the summertime. We put our tent pegs in the same holes that we had used 2 or 3 years before. The training was poor in those days.

The training that the National Guard gets now when they travel to a place like Honduras includes deployment, exercising in a new environment, training with a foreign force, and the opportunity to perform tasks which are very difficult to do in the United States such as the construction that is going on in opening that 8 or 9 kilometers of road, and then redeployment back.

I remember one sergeant saying, "You can't forget nothing this time because we can't send a deuce and a half back to pick it up". It is that kind of sound, good training that pays off.

Senator EXON. General, I agree with you, and as a former Governor I think that the Governors have a very important role to play with the Guard. I think the Montgomery amendment went a little bit too far last year, and I have offered a bill on which I would like to get your viewpoint on, especially with your National Guard experience.

I think that law should be simply changed in this manner: If, for whatever reason, a Governor objects, then the President, on a case-by-case basis and for national security reasons, may override that objection.

The President, as Commander-in-Chief, would do so by simply writing a letter to the Governor. The thrust of it would be that, notwithstanding your objections, I, as Commander-in-Chief, order your Guard unit or a part thereof to overseas training.

What I am trying to draw attention to here is the explicit action by the Commander-in-Chief personally to overrule the nominal commander in chief of the Guard in peacetime. Do you think a system like that would be workable and, if not, why not? Why would a system like that not be better than the Montgomery amendment that we are now faced with?

General GALVIN. Well, I am not an expert in that, Mr. Senator. I believe that you are dealing with the question of overlapping command between the Commander in Chief and the Governor.

I really lack the kind of information and study on whether or not that way is better than other alternatives, but it is obviously a workable alternative.

CONTRAS

Senator Exon. Let me get to the matter of the Contras once again. General Gorman, your predecessor, testified in front of this committee that he thought that the Contras could never win and thought that we were making a mistake by providing additional funding. Interestingly enough, in front of me under my microphone today is a letter dated February 23, from General Gorman to this committee. In it, he kind of backs away from that position evidently after a trip down to Central America and a meeting with you.

What is your view of the fact as to whether the Contras can ever muster the military might to overthrow the Sandinistas and how much chance you think there is of that?

Second, I was interested in your statement about the people in Nicaragua having free and open elections. I happen to feel that if the people in Nicaragua in free and open elections had a choice between the Sandinistas, as bad as they are, on one hand and Somoza-type person on the other, that they would likely choose the Sandinistas if those were the only two choices. Do you agree with that, and can you answer my other question?

General Galvin. First of all, concerning the chance that they have, Mr. Senator, I believe the Contras have a fighting chance. The reason I believe so is based on my understanding that a successful classic insurgency requires about 15 years of slow growth—for example, the Sandinistas themselves only had about 500 personnel after 15 years.

The Contras have now reached the level of about 20,000 in roughly 5 years, and the Sandinistas cannot force their army to grow much beyond what they have now. So you are looking at about one Contra for every three regular Sandinistas, which in terms of insurgency is not too bad.

I believe that with sustained support, there is no doubt that the Contras can win.

In regard to question about a vote between the Sandinistas and Somoza, we have already seen that vote one time in 1979.

Senator Exon. How did it go?

General Galvin. It went for a group that became the Sandinistas, a group that was masked as a democratic alternative.

Senator Exon. How do you think it would go today if it was a choice between a Somoza and the Sandinistas?

General Galvin. I could not say on that. If it were a choice, Mr. Senator, between Somoza and the Sandinistas as they are known today, I have heard a lot of comments from Nicaraguans that it was better under Somoza than it was under the Sandinistas.

Senator Exon. I hope you are right. That is not the information I am getting.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Wilson.

Senator Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say at the outset that I would hope that the choice they would have would not be between the Sandinistas and Somoza. I think that they have not had a free election. In fact, as we know, the route by which they took power was armed force.

Many of us have traveled to the region. I met then Commandante and now Presidente Ortega. In a fit of commendable candor after I had badgered him on the same point for about an hour, he said that there was no way in which by election or by any other device, by any means, that revolution was going to be sacrificed, that it was simply too important. Of course, that is a rather self-serving justification for anyone who wishes to perpetuate his own political power.

Let me ask. I think more to the point, the document which is before us from General Gorman does, I think, quite clearly represent a change in the view that he expressed to us very recently, and I commend both him for traveling back to the region and you for inviting him to do so. I commend the chairman for his comments today and his insertion of this statement into the record.

I think a number of us who have consistently supported the Contras have done so hoping that they might be militarily successful, but even if they were not going to be as successful we might have hoped have done so because we thought that it was necessary for the U.S. Congress to be symbolically on record in favor of more than lip service for a change in the Sandinista regime.

I am delighted to hear you say today, General Galvin, that your experience there is that oftentimes those whom you visit in the fledgling democracies that surround Nicaragua have become demoralized, and I think that many of us who have traveled there have found that while they are willing to say one thing privately and some will say it publicly, the others who hang back from making public declarations will tell you privately that they do so because they are concerned with our credibility as an ally, whether or not the United States is reliable and whether we will be there as a presence in time of need.

Your comments today, I gather, are pretty much those that are contained in the rethought views of General Gorman which have been set down in these pages that the chairman has placed in the record. Do you share his general view that there has been a marked change that he has set forth?

General GALVIN. I share his view, as he tendered in that message, that the Contras have a fighting chance. He came down and had an opportunity to look. I recall that in his testimony before this committee, he said several times, five or six times, that he had not been down in the region for 2 years; that he had been busy with other things. I believe when he came down and saw the region again, he did see some changes.

From my position, I agree with him on what he says in that message, that the Contras, if sustained, have a fighting chance.

Senator WILSON. Let us shift to the political side of it as you have traveled through the region. My experience when I have been there is that there was not widespread knowledge but there was widespread hope among those that were being afforded some choice that by participating they could actually bring about democracy.

We have seen free elections in El Salvador. That resulted on the election of President Duarte. No one has been any clearer than Duarte as to the necessity for continued U.S. support to the Contras militarily as well as in terms of so-called nonlethal aid.

The proposal that you were asked about earlier, the alternative of the $300 million going to the region for various forms of economic support, I would suggest is immensely desirable but not an alternative, that it should go and go along with the kind of military assistance that will allow the Contras to sustain the military pressure which President Duarte and others less publicly than he in the same region have said is necessary, really, to keep the Sandinistas from openly exporting, not as you say, a direct attack but the kind of subversion which your testimony makes clear they are about, not just in El Salvador but in Honduras and Guatemala and Colombia and Chile.

I am just curious as to how you relate the activity of the Contras to the ability to combat this effort on the part of the Sandinistas to export their revolution by violence, not open aggression but through subversion.

General GALVIN. Well, Mr. Senator, the people in the region are listening to us, but we are not the only people talking. They are also listening to the opposition, and what they are getting from the Sandinistas and from Cuba is intimidation. They are getting a promise from us to a certain degree, and they are getting intimidation. They have to adjust to that.

They feel that if the United States does not have a regional approach, which includes very strong support for them and for the democratic side of Nicaragua, then that voice of intimidation is going to be stronger, and there is going to have to be a certain amount of accommodation. You can see this attitude in the way, at some points an ambiguous way, that they respond to events in the region.

Senator WILSON. So then, is it fair to say that our support of the Contras is one measure by which the U.S. presence and involvement in that region is reflected that combats the intimidation?

General GALVIN. I think it is the essential one. There are many, but our support for the Contras is the essential one.

Senator WILSON. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Wilson.

Senator Wirth, you are the next on the list.

Senator WIRTH. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.

We can all read General Gorman's statement for ourselves, but you are familiar with what he said before the committee last month. In response to a question about what our policy should be, he said, "We are a day late and a dollar short. We should either change the modus operandi or cut it off."

Then he came back in a February 15, 1987, memo to the committee and suggested that we should watch the Contras carefully to discern whether they do three things, and that they would have a fighting chance if they do these three things. First, earn the support of the people; second, link their military operations with a political initiative; and third, pursue a campaign which avoids engagement with major formations of the government's army.

In other words, there are three things that General Gorman believes should define, as I gather, what would be a change in the modus operandi of the Contras. They are to enlist the support of the Nicaraguan people, link their military operations with political initiatives, and avoid engagement with the major formations of the Sandinista army.

How well do you think the Contras are doing in each of these three? These are the three criteria that much-quoted General

Gorman would suggest are criteria for judging the Contras. How well do you think they are doing in these areas, General Galvin?

General GALVIN. Well, to turn to General Gorman's words, I would say, first of all, that he is correct. Those are three of the essential things that the Contras must do. Again, I would preface my response by saying we have to examine the classic insurgencies and see how they evolved. We cannot look at the Contras in a vacuum and say simply because they have not done certain things well yet that that has great meaning. An insurgency takes time. It took the Sandinistas 15 years.

Fifteen years is a timeframe that is not surprising if you look at the experience of the FMLN, FSLN, M-19, URNG in Guatemala, Bandero Roja in Venezuela, and many other groups. It takes time.

In regard to the second point, the amount of the support of the people, I would say that such support has been lacking. One of the reasons for this situation is that the Contras have not had sustained U.S. support, so they have had to leave areas where they were gaining support of the people.

The military/political connection has been lacking. The reason is that this insurgency jumps out of the classical track in certain ways. This insurgency began as a resistance movement. It did not start with a slow building of ideology. It began the way the partisans in Europe started. They did not need an ideology. A group had taken over their country, and they were trying to get it back. The political-military relationship will grow more slowly in a resistance-type insurgency.

In regard to the engagements, the Contras are going to have to work on what all insurgents do, and that is the attrition of war-making capability of the country rather than simply a face-to-face fighting soldier to soldier.

Senator WIRTH. General Gorman seemed to think that the Contras were capable at this point only of making "clumsy attacks on fixed points in a sort of crude ambushing. They could go out and sit on some remote mountain."

Do you believe the Contras have changed their tactics?

General GALVIN. I believe they are slowly changing their tactics. In terms of the classical insurgency, this progress is very rapid, but in terms of our patience, progress is rather slow. The tactics, however, really are changing.

Senator WIRTH. You said in your comments earlier, General Galvin, that El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Guatemala did not explicitly support our stated goal of support for the Contras. If I quote you properly, you said support for the Contras is not their stated goal.

Now, why is that? Why do the other countries not explicitly support the Contras? If in fact they do passively back our support for the Contras, why do they not do so explicitly?

General GALVIN. I think there are several reasons for that. One of them is that these countries are new democracies not accustomed, as ours is, to duke it out publicly on various issues. These are democracies with constituencies which vary from right to left, and the leaders are trying to hold onto what they can. A young democracy is more likely to sweep something under the rug. That is one reason.

Another is that these are democracies which are feeling strong intimidation. They do not know how to react to it, because they do not know if we are going to be around. So, as I said, sometimes you receive comments from these countries which are viewed by us as ambiguous, but going back to the chairman's first question on the regional strategy, I believe that our strategy also is viewed as ambiguous.

CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE

Senator WIRTH. Finally, let me ask you what happened to the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

General GALVIN. The Caribbean Basin Initiative received some attention, and because of it I believe there was additional pressure when it came to voting for Central America and the Caribbean Islands. I will let Lee Baggett address the Caribbean Islands.

So that in the past 3 or 4 years, we have seen more aid there than before, but when you look at what was recommended for the Caribbean Basin Initiative and what was actually voted, it is probably about 20 percent. So we had, I would say, about 20 percent success.

Senator WIRTH. We have not followed up on the economic initiative which was at one point to be the foundation of our policy in the Caribbean?

General GALVIN. That is right. We should have gone for a lot more than 20 percent success.

Senator WIRTH. My time has expired. Gentlemen, thank you very much for coming, and I look forward to working with you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Gramm was to be recognized next, but he is not here at the moment so we will go directly to Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the testimony here today. I was particularly gratified to see the statement of General Gorman.

I would also ask, Mr. Chairman, perhaps we could find out for the record how General Gorman feels about the change, or if there has been a change, in the tactics employed by the Contras. He stated that under the conditions as he knew them the Contras would be little better than a cross-border raiding party. That was not addressed in his statement. Perhaps we could get that at a later time.

Also, I think it is worthy of comment, in the continued question, General Galvin, that the American people, I think, have every justification in asking "How Long?" The United States attention span is not long, but is that not also directly related to the size and depth of the commitment on the part of the Soviets and the Cubans?

I think it would be very difficult to gauge and answer a question how long when, in fact, if it had not been for the massive Soviet and Cuban buildup, a case could be made that the Contras would have succeeded already. I am not sanguine about that aspect of it, but at the same time if we are seeing the enormously massive injection of material equipment, and even Cuban pilots and military advisors. That is a part of the equation which I think would be the determining factor in answering the question in "How Long?"

Would you agree with that?

SOVIET SUPPORT TOWARD CUBA

General **Galvin**. Yes, I would agree with that, Mr. Senator. The Soviets now are supporting Cuba at the rate of $13 million a day, and the Soviets pinch pennies. They do not throw that kind of money away.

If there is anything that is going to hurt us, it is the advantage that accrues to our adversary because of the difference between how far the Soviets are willing to look out in their planning and programming and how far we are willing to look out.

Senator **McCain**. Thirteen million dollars a day translates to considerably more than $105 million per year, which is the contribution we are making on the Contra side.

What about the military personnel aspect of the Soviet and Cuban investment?

General **Galvin**. The Soviets have, for example, about 300 military personnel in Peru, which is more military personnel than I have in the 17 countries of the region if you exclude Honduras and Panama. The Soviets have, as Admiral Baggett brought out, a large force in Cuba.

Senator **McCain**. What is the number of Cuban personnel?

Admiral **Baggett**. Fourteen thousand to 16,000, depending on any period, and that includes military and economic advisors and technical personnel.

Senator **McCain**. How many of those are military?

Admiral **Baggett**. Some 8,000 of them: 3,000 in a combat brigade, 2,000 in military intelligence and 3,000 military advisors.

Senator **McCain**. Three thousand military advisors.

READINESS OF U.S. FORCES

Admiral, I was very heartened by your statement, particularly where you said in your written statement that the readiness of our forces is at its highest point in my memory, and I am certainly pleased to hear that.

Are you satisfied that the budget as proposed which has come over here from the administration gives you confidence, in your personal opinion, that we will be able to maintain that level of readiness and sustainability?

Admiral **Baggett**. Senator, I think from what we have seen in the last 2 or 3 years of the budget, the services have stood behind readiness. They have maintained readiness in the face of budget cuts elsewhere, in sustainability, modernization and force levels.

Readiness, of course, includes the personnel, the manpower accounts and that is a big portion of that, but I think we will continue to maintain readiness. Sustainability is leveling off and is not fully supported in some areas that are of concern to me, but we have seen growth in both threat and level of effort ordnance.

Senator **McCain**. Perhaps you could provide for the record the areas that directly relate to sustainability that you would like to see improve, if you would?

Admiral **Baggett**. I would be happy to do that.

[The information referred to follows:]

Areas Related to Sustainability

If additional funding were available, I would like to see increased funding for:

(a) Threat and level of effort munition which are not yet at required levels.

(b) Repair parts/spares for aircraft and major end items of equipment.

(c) CBR defensive capabilities for our personnel.

(d) Strategic air and sea lift capabilities to support forward deployed units.

(e) Deployable medical systems for forward area support.

(f) Special and general support equipment for aviation and maintenance operations.

(g) POL needed for prepositioned war reserve levels.

Senator **McCain**. Thank you.

CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE

Getting back, General Galvin, the CBI, which was a direct outgrowth of the so-called Jackson Commission which was an outstanding one, perhaps it may go down in history as the most talked about and least acted on report in history. Given the level of support that it has received from the Congress, it does not add to my optimism about the ability to fund Nicaragua's neighbors in the event that we suspend aid to the Contras.

How much money do you think would be required as a minimum to beef up the security forces of, say, Costa Rica and Honduras and Guatemala, roughly?

General **Galvin**. First let me say that I do not think it would work. I believe that if we do not show that we will stand with the neighbors of the Sandinistas against them, no amount is going to work. We are talking about intimidation of the kind that we cannot address by somehow providing money for their armed forces.

I think that it has to be a coordinated effort in which we not only support the region, but we stand against the Sandinistas by supporting the Contras. If you had to do it. I would say it would take—right now, this year we have spent about $250 million in the region. Maybe it would take five times that, and maybe it would take more.

I have difficulty in coming up with an answer like that because I think that without our firm commitment to Central America there is no other way of stopping the Marxist intimidation and the resultant, eventual forced accommodation of the neighbors.

Senator **McCain**. General, I very much appreciate the difficulty that you have in coming up with the amounts of money and commitment on the part of this Nation to contain the Sandinistas in the event of the cutoff of the aid of the Contras.

I think it is vital, however, that we give the American people some understanding of the size of that commitment that would have to be made in the event of the cutoff of the aid to the Contras, because I think it is an integral part of this debate. It is not just a matter of whether we stop the aid to the Contras. I think it is a matter of an alternative U.S. national policy.

I would appreciate any additional information you could give us because I think it is overwhelming what would be required in order to contain as long as the Cubans have open access and Soviet/

Cuban supplies to that country, so I would appreciate any additional information you could supply for the record. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON. Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you.

U.S./SOVIET STRUGGLE MOVES TO NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENT

General, would it be fair to say that the struggle now and has been for some time moved to the North American continent, not just Nicaragua, as far as the United States versus the Soviet Union? The world is watching and so are countries like Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador and others in the area as to what kind of a commitment we keep in Nicaragua and what happens there.

Is that what you have been saying here?

General GALVIN. That is what I am saying. I am convinced that Marxism is moving and the Soviets are moving in the Third World. We may have them at a standstill in Europe, but they are moving in the Third World.

Senator SHELBY. They are coming back to us on the North American continent.

General GALVIN. They are coming back here on the North American continent; that is correct.

Senator SHELBY. Obviously, looking at the globe, any third or fourth grader would know that that is much closer to the United States.

General GALVIN. That is as close as you can get.

Senator SHELBY. Most of this has been said here in this committee. We know all of this is orchestrated through Cuba by way of funding and arms shipments by the Soviet Union; is that correct?

General GALVIN. Yes.

Senator SHELBY. And has been for some 15 years?

General GALVIN. Correct.

Senator SHELBY. Now, is it fair to say, to carry it a little further step, that this is not just a struggle between the Contras and the Marxist regime in Nicaragua but it is the regional approach there, and the American people I hope will realize that?

General GALVIN. Yes. I think that, in a nutshell, Fidel Castro has said for almost 20 years that any revolution, whatever kind, is eventually good for the spread of Marxism in Latin America. Initially, the Soviets did not agree. It did not fit their rather strict view of that kind of thing. The Soviets said that revolution would have to be clearly Marxist before we should support it.

In the past 6 or so years, the Soviets have changed their mind. They realize that Fidel is right, that any kind of revolution is helpful, and they have come over to his point of view. They now are supporting Castro to a much greater degree than they were before because it makes much more sense for Cuba to work these things in Latin America than it does for the Soviets. The Kremlin is pushing very hard now where 10 years ago it was not.

AMBIGUOUS U.S. STRATEGY

Senator SHELBY. General, could you elaborate a little on this? I believe that in your statement you said that the U.S. strategy was viewed as ambiguous by other countries in the region. That they might be looking toward accommodation down the road if we do not keep our resolve. Is this correct?

General GALVIN. Yes. They are seeing us go back and forth. First we are going to support the Contras, and it is going to be covert; then it is going to be overt; next we are not going to support them; then we are going to support them; next we are going to give $300 million to the other countries, the neighbors; and finally we are not going to give $300 million.

I think you would have to say that that chronology is somewhat ambiguous.

Senator SHELBY. Do you know about how much money we have sent directly and indirectly since late 1979, early 1980, to Afghanistan as compared to what we have sent to Nicaragua?

General GALVIN. No, I do not know that.

Senator SHELBY. Could you furnish that for the record for the committee?

General GALVIN. Yes, I could.

Chairman NUNN. I think probably we could get that information, Senator Shelby, through the Intelligence Committee. I think it is a classified number, any information regarding that program would generally be classified.

Senator SHELBY. I would be interested in what we could get that was not too classified, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Cohen is now co-partner in charge of all of that covert activity.

Senator SHELBY. I probably will need to talk with him after the hearing is over.

HOMEPORTING

Admiral, as far as the Atlantic Fleet is concerned, as far as homeporting, have you done a study of homeporting?

Admiral BAGGETT. No, I have not done a study, Senator.

Senator SHELBY. You are not into this, you are just the Commander in Chief?

Admiral BAGGETT. I am into it to the extent that I am very interested, but I would not say that my examination of the subject would constitute a study, an economic study or anything of that nature. I have looked at it from a warfighting standpoint, including the aspects of mine countermeasures and the movement of reinforcement and resupply from the gulf ports.

I have looked at it, but I have not costed it out in any detail.

Senator SHELBY. But you do know that a lot of the gulf ports are near the area of Latin America we have been talking about here today?

Admiral BAGGETT. Yes, sir.

Senator SHELBY. And where an obvious struggle is going to go on for a while; is that right?

Admiral BAGGETT. Yes, sir.

Senator SHELBY. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Shelby.

Senator Thurmond.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Galvin, I am glad to see you again. I had the pleasure of visiting with you, I believe, last year.

PRESERVING GAINS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

In testimony before this committee, General Gorman expressed pessimism about the ability of the Contras to sustain a guerrilla conflict against the Sandinista regime. Since then he has visited you, I believe, down there, and he has made a report here. I was interested in the last paragraph that he mentions, "in my considered judgment, that additional aid to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance is a small price to pay for preserving the gains realized in recent years by those we support in Central America, keeping open the prospect of a negotiated settlement. I also believe that denying that aid would jeopardize all we have achieved in recent years, and it is wholly disproportionate to the expenditure involved."

Do you have any comment on that?

General **Galvin**. Yes, I do, Mr. Senator. In the 17 countries in Latin America, we have 10 insurgencies going on now. I think it is very important to look at that fact and realize that those countries with a serious insurgent problem are wondering where we stand on security issues affecting our hemisphere.

If we somehow show that we are not really that interested and are not willing to look at these issues for the long haul and are not willing to sustain our commitment, then it is not just a question of what happens to the Contras or what happens in El Salvador. It is a question of what happens in Guatemala and what happens in Colombia and what happens in many other countries in the region.

I think that we have made great progress, particularly in El Salvador. There has been progress in other places as well, and I would like to see it continue. I would not like to see the dismay of countries that realize that, indeed, our commitment is slight.

SOVIET SUPPORT TO SANDINISTAS

Senator **Thurmond**. General, there is no question in your mind that the Sandinistas are supported by the Soviets sending tanks and war equipment in there directly and also through Cuba, is it?

General **Galvin**. One shipment a week is the average now, Mr. Senator.

Senator **Thurmond**. One shipment a week going directly from the Soviets.

General **Galvin**. Yes, from the Warsaw Pact.

Senator **Thurmond**. And also through Cuba. I believe they send some that way, too.

General **Galvin**. Yes, although that has fallen off a little.

Senator **Thurmond**. Is there any question about your opinion as to the goal of the Sandinistas to spread their aggression throughout Central America?

General GALVIN. There is no doubt that they are internationalists. They have said from the beginning that their goal lies beyond their borders.

Senator THURMOND. Now, they are now trying to take El Salvador. If they take that, will they not go after Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, the other Central American countries?

General GALVIN. I am absolutely convinced they will.

Senator THURMOND. Would not Mexico be threatened?

General GALVIN. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. Would not the Panama Canal be threatened?

General GALVIN. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. Are we obligated to defend the Panama Canal?

General GALVIN. We are obligated to defend it.

Senator THURMOND. That would throw us into war, would it not, if that happened?

General GALVIN. I believe it would.

SUPPORT OF CONTRAS VITAL

Senator THURMOND. So is it not in our best interest to support the Contras down there and take steps necessary to eliminate the Soviet influence in Central America?

General GALVIN. It is in our best interest.

Senator THURMOND. Now, the President has made recommendations for funds, and Congress is going to be called upon to release said funds and to appropriate other funds. Is it your firm opinion that any funds available should be released to help the Contras and that we should appropriate funds to assist them in that cause down there against the Marxist government?

General GALVIN. Yes. It would be disastrous for us in the long run if we do not.

Senator THURMOND. I hope the American people can understand this. If the Soviets should take those Central American countries and adjoining South American countries, would not our economy come to a collapse practically because we would have to get oil through there, and about a third of the oil that we use comes from other countries? We have to get minerals through there from South Africa and Indonesia, copper, tin, zinc, industrial diamonds and so forth? Would we not almost bring the economy in this country to collapse, much less trying to fight a war?

General GALVIN. We are a great commercial country, and anytime a whole region tends to go hostile to our interests, it is going to hurt us badly.

Senator THURMOND. In my opinion, it would be one of the greatest mistakes we made if we do not protect Central America and South America right here in our back door.

I believe the distinguish Senator from Alabama was hinting at a question I had in mind. We are sending tremendous funds to help the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, and I am in favor of that; but here in our back door it looks like we seem to be questioning, and Members of Congress seem to question the wisdom of doing what we should do if we are going to terminate Marxism right here at our back door.

Do you feel it is just as important to send funds here and take the steps necessary to preserve freedom here as it is in Afghanistan?

General GALVIN. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. Or more so?

General GALVIN. More so, Mr. Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Now, I have a couple of questions here I want to propound to Admiral Baggett.

Admiral, I believe my time is up and I have to go. I will just let you answer these for the record.

Do you still have to cross-deck ammunition on ships in the fleet, and when will you be able to terminate this practice? If you will answer those for the record, I would appreciate it.

Admiral BAGGETT. All right, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

Because of inventory improvements, it is no longer necessary to cross-deck such weapons as Sidewinders, Sparrows, MK-84 bombs, Shrike anti-radiation missiles and MK-46 torpedoes. However, as each new or improved weapon is introduced, there is an initial shortfall due to production lead times, etc., requiring the available assets to be cross-decked until inventory catches up with requirements. Cross-decking has been reduced significantly from 30 weapon types a few years ago to a few short supply assets, [deleted].

Senator EXON. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DOD SUPPORT FOR CONTRAS

General Galvin, let me ask just a couple of questions about the extent of the Department of Defense support for the Contras, if I could.

To what extent is the Department of Defense involved in the training of Contras at this point, either in Honduras or in this country? Perhaps you could be specific as you could.

General GALVIN. Well, I do not know how specific I could be in an open session. Is there going to be any closed time in this session? I do not know.

Senator BINGAMAN. I gather there is not.

General GALVIN. The whole question of that training is classified, and I prefer to provide you that answer in a classified form.

Senator WARNER. Speaking for the chairman, I think that he would consider a request, but at the moment I do not know if there is one pending.

Senator EXON. We can hold a closed session afterwards, I am advised, if that is the will of the committee.

Senator BINGAMAN. Is any information about intelligence sharing also classified?

General GALVIN. Yes.

U.S. FORCE PRESENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask about the question of U.S. force presence in the region. You list here in your testimony the number of U.S. troops in each of the countries, and you have 1,100 listed in

Honduras. I assume that does not include any of the National Guard or reserve troops that go to Honduras for training; is that right?

General GALVIN. That is right. I was describing my organization but not the training, not the exercises that take place in the area.

Senator BINGAMAN. How many U.S. troops from the Guard and Reserve or the Regular Forces were in Honduras in 1986, as an example, in training?

General GALVIN. Are you talking about the 12 months in 1986?

Senator BINGAMAN. Right.

General GALVIN. The number of total troops there, active duty and Reserve component that took part in exercises is somewhere in the vicinity of 4,000 to 5,000 over the year's time.

Senator BINGAMAN. Over the year's time. Would you expect that number to be about the same in 1987?

General GALVIN. Yes. There is an exercise called Solid Shield that Admiral Baggett runs which causes the strength to change every other year. It will occur again this year. The exercise is a short amphibious operation on the north coast of Honduras. In the year that it takes place, the total number of troops could go up to around 6,000 to 6,500.

Senator BINGAMAN. When will that occur?

General GALVIN. Very shortly, within a couple of months.

Senator BINGAMAN. Admiral, did you have a comment?

Admiral BAGGETT. That is in April, from late April to the middle of May.

Senator BINGAMAN. What is the name of that exercise?

Admiral BAGGETT. Solid Shield.

Senator BINGAMAN. Solid Shield.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION IN HONDURAS

Let me ask about the request. I gather there is a $10 million request for military construction in Honduras, much of it dedicated to sort of semipermanent dormitories at Palmerola; is that right?

General GALVIN. Yes, that is right.

Senator BINGAMAN. Could you describe the nature of that request and the reasons for it?

General GALVIN. Last year, the Senate Subcommittee on Military Construction and the House Subcommittee on Military Construction both told me that they were concerned about the quality of life of our servicemen and women in Honduras. The subcommittee indicated that if I came in with a request for better barracks and dining facilities as well as clinic construction, they would consider it.

I, therefore, looked into that and found some modular type construction; in other words, things that we could remove and take with us when we left. I have submitted the information as a request. I would like to see that request for two reasons. One is that it would provide better quality living for the soldiers, and the other is that in the long run it is easier to maintain.

That depends, however, on how long it takes to amortize it and whether or not the committees are going to see that as a viable solution. I, myself, would very much like to do it because I am thinking about the soldiers, but I do not know whether that will get through. Next month I have to testify on that before both committees.

Senator BINGAMAN. Do you still see this as temporary quarters or is this something that is semipermanent in nature? How do you characterize it?

General GALVIN. These are temporary, movable things. Depending on which firm builds them, some are like mobile homes and others are like small concrete-type buildings. What we have asked to be funded is the type of building that can be picked up and taken away.

Senator BINGAMAN. How many troops would you anticipate housing in these?

General GALVIN. Well, we have 1,100 troops there now, and they are housed, as you know, in the wooden huts. I would like to replace the wooden huts, and I would like especially to build dining halls and barracks, because those wooden ones are not too good. Also in regard to the clinic at Palmerola, hospitalization is in wooden huts, and I would prefer to change that.

Senator BINGAMAN. You said, I think, in response to a question by Senator McCain that it is essential that we stand, I believe your quote was, "stand with the neighbors of the Sandinistas." As I understand it, the neighbors of the Sandinistas met in San Jose and drew up and subscribed to what they called the Arias Plan about 2 weeks ago, which has as one of its proposals termination of Contra activity down there.

Is that a plan that you believe we should subscribe to?

General GALVIN. I really have not had a chance to study the Arias Plan. From what I have seen of it so far, I do not think I would support the approach myself, personally. It looks too much like something that the Sandinistas can work around, and I do not particularly like it.

Senator BINGAMAN. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must say I was pleased to hear the Senator from Nebraska pose a question to you, General. I have not heard the comparison between Managua and Chicago politics, but I think under the most miraculous circumstances it would be difficult to retrieve Somoza from either the gates of heaven or hell, wherever he happens to reside right now, and put him on the ballot. [Laughter.]

I think the Sandinistas are capable of a lot of manipulation. That is one that I do not think they can achieve right now, but I think the choice would be not Somoza but rather Cruz or Calero or maybe even Rubelo.

Let me talk about the goals that you said kept shifting, part of the problem you have is the goals keep shifting. I recall several years ago that one of the goals we had was just to sort of harass the Sandinistas to keep them preoccupied, interrupt their supply line from Nicaragua into El Salvador. There was no effort to overthrow the government, just sort of keep them preoccupied.

Then a second rationale was offered, that we really wanted to keep the pressure on to force them to negotiate, which raises an interesting question if in fact the Contras ever became such a fighting force that they reach the edge of the city of Managua and the Sandinistas said we would like to negotiate now, whether they would throw down their machine guns and beat them into plow shares and say let us negotiate. I doubt it.

I think you put it just about right when you said that there can be no stability as long as the Sandinistas are in power.

Then there was a little bit of a backtrack from that when Senator Nunn asked you a question. He said what if they have a free and open election, which is perhaps a contradition in terms, but assuming you could have a free and open election, should that be the test? Free elections are the test, to which you answered yes.

You do not really mean that, do you?

General GALVIN. Well, it was a confusing question to me because I find it hard to visualize a free and open election.

Senator COHEN. Assuming hypothetically; take Senator Nunn's assumption. Free elections cannot be the test under the circumstances, can it?

General GALVIN. What we have said we are looking for——

Senator COHEN. Let me take it back. I will simplify it.

Let us assume they have free and open elections and the Sandinistas are returned to power by some miracle of judgment. They are returned to power under a free and open election system. Let us suppose they make no overt move toward their neighbors. Let us assume that they maintain a 100,000 or 120,000 man fighting force. Let us assume they keep a 2-mile air strip near downtown Managua which is to promote tourism. Let us assume that they take absolutely no affirmative overt action.

Would you allow them to remain in power?

General GALVIN. You see, that is what confuses me about the question, if I could say that first, Mr. Senator.

When asked that question, I have to make all kinds of other assumptions in order to respond. That is why it is difficult to answer in the first place.

Senator COHEN. I am giving you the best case.

General GALVIN. OK. Making the assumptions you listed, it would not be in our best interest. On the other hand, if you assume something else, such as the Sandinistas all of a sudden decided to be the greatest democrats we ever ran into——

Senator COHEN. Do not make that assumption. Senator Nunn said if they have free elections, that is the test. That really is not the test. The test is whether or not they maintain the kind of society and force structure which, to use your words, pose a problem of intimidation to the Costa Ricans or to the Salvadorans or the Hondurans.

That is really the test to the extent that they force a neutralization of the area or, indeed, a pro-Sandinista attitude in the region. Is that not the kind of concern you have rather than whether they have free elections or not?

General GALVIN. That is the kind of concern I have.

Senator COHEN. Let us be clear about our goals, then. The goal is not to allow the Sandinistas to remain in power under any circumstances, is it not?

General GALVIN. That is my goal.

Senator COHEN. OK. Let me ask you about the question of maintaining popular support. If the Contras attack economic targets, "soft targets", maybe hydropower stations perhaps or food supply lines, how do you then gain the support of the people by doing that?

General GALVIN. Any insurgency risks gaining and maintaining the support of the people if you attack them. This is what has happened in El Salvador and partially explains why the FMLN is in trouble.

The Contras need to make sure that all their attacks are recognized by the people as attacks against the Sandinista government. That might have to include something like a power plant, a petroleum pipeline, or some other economy-related target. It is not possible to divorce completely an attack on the Sandinista government and the impact of the attack on the people. If attrition of any kind is contemplated the results eventually are going to hurt the people somehow, temporarily anyway.

Senator COHEN. What political activities are underway that would persuade the Nicaraguan people that morality is on the side of the Contras rather than the Sandinistas?

General GALVIN. As far as I can see, and I am not in charge of the Contras' political activities—or anything else—there is an effort being made to ensure that the Contras understand that if you fight in such a way that you lose the confidence of your own people, it will not be good for you in the long run. I think there is a big effort going on in that manner.

Senator COHEN. Who is coordinating that effort?

General GALVIN. Again, I think we are approaching a classified area.

Senator COHEN. This is not a classified matter. Senator Nunn and I had an amendment to the bill providing for low intensity conflict born within the NSC last year, and one of the things we are trying to do is to coordinate the political or military economic activities so that you do not have simply the situation where you have an effective fighting force. They cannot become an effective fighting force unless they are an equally effective moral force.

General GALVIN. Correct.

Senator COHEN. We have to have some coordination of the economic and military and intelligence and political factors, without which all the military victories are simply going to be, I think, futile in the long run.

General GALVIN. Yes, that coordination really must be made by UNO in the long run or it will not work either.

Senator COHEN. Not within our structure.

General GALVIN. We cannot coordinate it all.

Senator COHEN. Who is coordinating it? Is it being done at the NSC level?

General GALVIN. The ultimate responsibility is the State Department.

Senator COHEN. My time is up.

Senator EXON. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to join in welcoming Admiral Baggett and General Galvin. I have had a couple of occasions to meet Admiral Baggett both when he was in charge of our naval forces in the Mediterranean and visited with him there again in the Atlantic Command not long ago. I also met with General Galvin recently during a visit to the Southern Command. The time I had with both was enormously valuable and helpful, and I am grateful to the both of them for their willingness to respond to all of my questions and to provide me with the information that I requested. I welcome them here today and thank them for their presentation.

I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that earlier today we had an additional statement by General Gorman, who as a result of his recent visit down to Central America filed a report with the committee. I think that it is important and relevant to have not only the opportunity to read General Gorman's recent statement but also to examine his previous statement to find out which positions were changed and which were unchanged.

I do not know the extent to which we will have an opportunity to inquiry of the witnesses their perspective on General Gorman's views. But I hope to have at least General Galvin respond or react to some of General Gorman's concerns. I found his original presentation before the committee to be very powerful particularly when he talked about the importance of intelligence capability and foreign military sales in the areas of potential conflict both now and in the future.

I gather from General Gorman's testimony that they are really willing to fight for their own individual rights and freedom and liberties. I think this is enormously important. Too often we hear around here, let us just send more hundreds of millions of dollars of American taxpayers' money down because we have the Communists on the run.

I think Americans like to think that you are going to have some people in these countries that are going to be as dedicated and committed in fighting for their own individual rights and liberties as apparently the Communists, Marxists, Leninists are I think that that is always something that we ought to underline as we are talking about the commitment of American resources in terms of financial resources and other kinds of resources.

DRUG MOVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA

General, let me just try and take a different tack on some of the questions. I will have to submit a good many others for the record because of time limitations. But one of the things I thought was enormously powerful, among others, in your presentation is the impact of the whole drug movement in Central America. You indicate it is corrupting the democratic institutions, democratic forces, even the military forces in that part of the world. I wonder whether we are conscious of that incidious kind of force as we continue to look at conflicts in rather traditional ways as being black or white situations.

How incidious do you find both the whole movement on that power in terms of not only in Central America where you have important responsibility but throughout Latin America? How extensive is it? How threatening do you think it is in terms of democratic institutions? How real is it? What can you tell us about it?

General **Galvin**. I think that the drug trafficking is extremely destructive to the Americas, not just to the United States and the source countries but to the whole hemisphere. First of all, take the estimated $13 billion a month that the United States pays out for narcotics. Much of that money circulates in the United States but most of it drifts back into Latin America where there is a connection between drugs and guns. I have seen the guerrillas and the traffickers tied together in several different countries. This situation provides an unprecedented amount of resourcing for insurgency. It also weakens the already fragile government infrastructure in most Latin American countries, infrastructures that never really have been strong complete and professional. Over the last 100 years they have had military or church-based infrastructures, but they have not always had the rest, the fleshing out of the infrastructure.

Because there is so much money available today, furthermore the ability of the military, the police, or even the government to act is greatly inhibited.

Not only are the guerrillas growing stronger because of the drug situation, but the countries also are growing weaker. That, to me, means tremendous destabilization.

Senator **Kennedy**. I am informed my time has expired. I will wait until the second round.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Humphrey.

Senator **Humphrey**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, like so many others here today, at least I gather such, am really amazed at what I would regard as a turnaround in the testimony of General Gorman. Reviewing the transcript of his first testimony in person and reading on page 44 of the transcript, Senator Thurmond puts a couple of questions to General Gorman about the feasibility of the Contras, and General Gorman is quite pessimistic about the whole thing, replying to this effect. "I therefore would not put a great deal of hope that the Contra operation is going to succeed."

Now in this written statement which General Gorman has forwarded to the committee, General Gorman says, in part, "I agree with General Galvin that the Nicaraguan rebels of the FDN now have a fighting chance to present to the Nicaraguan people an alternative to the oppressions and militarism of the government in Managua."

Does that mean he thinks they can win? General Galvin, have you spoken with General Gorman about this statement?

General **Galvin**. No, I have not, Mr. Senator.

Senator **Humphrey**. How do you interpret that? That is rather circumlocucious, as they say. Now I agree with General Galvin that the rebels, that the FDN—let us call them the anti-Communists. One of the problems in this whole thing is we do not use descriptive terms—that the anti-Communists have a fighting chance to present the Nicaraguan people with an alternative to the oppressions and militarism of the government in Managua.

How do you interpret that? What does that mean?

General **Galvin**. I do not like to interpret his words, but I would say in answer to your question that it means they have a fighting chance to win. I think the last part of it is a definition of winning.

Senator HUMPHREY. Evidently this trip down to the region, this update on intelligence which he had lacked for, what, 2 years?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Really brought about a reversal of opinion by General Gorman, would you say?

General GALVIN. On that particular issue, yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. He said earlier, a couple of weeks ago, 2 weeks ago, "I would not put a great deal of hope that the Contra operation is going to succeed." That is what he said 2 weeks ago prior to his trip and absent any intelligence for 2 years. Now after his trip and freshly updated, he believes that the anti-Communists have a fighting chance to present the Nicaraguan people with an alternative to the oppressions and militarism of the Nicaraguan government, or I should say the government of Managua.

It sounds like he is saying they have a fighting chance to win.

Further, in his earlier testimony he felt that, as he says, the Contras were organized, trained and equipped for conventional military operations, not unconventional warfare. Now in his new statement following his update, he says of the Contras, the anti-Communists, the training their key tactical leaders have received, while abbreviated, was directed at the right learning objectives and should stand them in good stead in the months of fighting which lie ahead.

Skipping a little bit, their overall campaign plan seems sound and their successful infiltration of fresh units is one dramatic indication of what they have learned since 1985 when I last tracked their operations through the intelligence available to me in U.S. Southern Command.

I regret the chairman stepped out. I was going to ask his opinion as to whether he sees this as a complete reversal in the testimony of General Gorman. Perhaps he will.

Senator LEVIN. Our new chairman is perfectly willing to answer that. [Laughter.]

Senator HUMPHREY. He is harder to get along with. [Laughter.]

Senator EXON. Yes. If you want my opinion, I think it is a complete reversal, if that will help you out a little bit, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

Perhaps we ought not to call witnesses who are not up to date. I mean, the testimony on January 28 of General Gorman was pretty damning and counterproductive to the cause, at least if you define the cause as whipping the Communists. Thank goodness he has been brought up to date and has provided us an updated opinion on the prospects.

I suppose the question has been asked. What will be the effect? Can you sort of lay out a chronology of the effect as it would occur if the Congress withholds, what is it, $40 million that has yet to be disbursed?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir, $40 million.

Senator HUMPHREY. If the Congress somehow withholds that $40 million, can you lay out a chronology of how things would unfold, the effect, chronological effect, of that withholding on the anti-Communists?

General GALVIN. You mean withholds that stop the $40 million now?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

General GALVIN. First of all there is moral support that is at least as important as the money. If the Contras are not supported morally and practically in terms of resources, then gradually they will be driven down in size through a combination of natural attrition and Sandinista pressure to a small hard core. As long as the Sandinistas are in Nicaragua, however, there will be a Contra movement.

The Sandinistas then will be free to begin the intimidation of their neighbors. Their neighbors, without seeing any support from us, will begin to accommodate.

The intimidation will not take the form of saber rattling on the border or something like that, although the Sandinista's Red Square type force is clearly made for intimidation. What will happen is that in labor unions and in various other quasi-political organizations things will start to go wrong. The government will begin to be challenged by many different sectors of society. There will be internal turmoil in Honduras, Costa Rica, and the other countries in the region.

Senator HUMPHREY. A fairly rapid destabilization of the whole region?

General GALVIN. Yes, with a resultant Central America hostile to U.S. interests.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, you were out of the room when I was discussing the dramatic turnaround in the opinion of General Gorman in his latest statement versus his appearance before the committee on January 28.

Does the chairman regard this as a reversal of General Gorman's views about the prospect of the anti-Communist Contras?

Chairman NUNN. Well, I would reply to your inquiry that I feel it was a substantially different statement than he gave before. The premise of his previous statement was that the political and intelligence infrastructure did not exist in Nicaragua for unconventional warfare. The second premise was that the Contras had not been trained for unconventional warfare, and he does not address either one of those major premises in this new statement. General Gorman does come to a different conclusion, and I would say the conclusion that they have a fighting chance is a different conclusion than he testified to before.

Senator HUMPHREY. May I just respond very briefly to the chairman's statement about training? It seems to me General Gorman in his new statement does address it, at least in part. He says the training their key tactical leaders have received, while abbreviated, was directed at the right learning objectives and should stand them in good stead in the months of fighting which lie ahead.

Further down, he says their overall campaign plan seems sound, and their successful infiltration of fresh units, skipping, is one dramatic indication of what they have learned since 1985 when I last tracked their operations, et cetera.

Chairman NUNN. I would say that, no doubt, there is a substantial difference in this statement. He does very carefully circumscribe the number of people that had been trained. He mentions abbreviated training of a few leaders, and that is a very carefully worded statement.

I think the only way we could really elaborate on this information, Senator Humphrey, is to ask General Gorman to appear before the committee and ask him questions, because it does not seem to me he has addressed all of the premises that he had addressed before, but he has reached a different conclusion.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. I believe Senator Levin is next.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General and Admiral. I, like Senator Humphrey, am not sure what General Gorman means when he says that they now have a fighting chance to present the Nicaraguan people an alternative to the oppression.

I do not know if that means fighting chance to win or quite what it means, either. So perhaps we ought to ask General Gorman if he could explain what he does mean by that for the record.

Since this is now part of this hearing, Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if we might ask General Gorman, short of coming back and answering questions on his premises and assumptions that you have just discussed with Senator Humphrey, also to expand a bit on that sentence for us.

Chairman NUNN. Yes, we can do that but General Gorman is now retired and is not necessarily responsive to continual written questions from our committee. I think we could certainly give him a chance to come back and testify, and I think that might be the best way to approach it.

I am a little reluctant to ask a private citizen to answer numerous written questions.

Senator LEVIN. Could we ask who asked him to submit the statement for today?

Chairman NUNN. I do not know.

Senator KENNEDY. Given the fact that General Gorman is a private citizen and with all due respect, is it completely coincidental that his revision of his view lands on our desk today, when we have his successor before the committee? All I would like to ask is what was the reason.

Senator WILSON. I wish I could take credit for it, but I cannot.

Chairman NUNN. Maybe Mr. Finn could tell us. All I know is I received the statement today, and I thought in fairness to the witness and to General Gorman that it should be made part of the permanent record.

Mr. FINN. Senator Kennedy, when we began preparation for this hearing last week, we realized that much of the members' interest would have been provoked by General Gorman's testimony of January 28, and so we contacted General Gorman and asked if his views had changed after his recent visit to Central America. Rather than call me back, he asked a member of his staff to deliver this report, and I received that at 4 p.m. on Friday.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, could I ask that all of the intelligence information that was made available to General Gorman be made available to this committee if we are going to find this kind of change. When he went down there, I had a good opportunity to visit with him on the flight down, but since then his views on some areas have changed.

It seems to me that evidently he has available a good deal of intelligence information, and I, for one, as a member of this committee, would like to have that kind of intelligence information available to me.

Chairman NUNN. We can certainly do that. The question is whether this committee wants to become the committee of jurisdiction over the Contra aid program. It seems to me that it is more appropriate that we allow the Intelligence Committee to do that and the committee members avail themselves of the data there, otherwise we would be basically asserting jurisdiction as a committee.

I think the Senator is absolutely entitled to that information as a Senator. I am reluctant to have this committee really assert jurisdiction over that matter because it has not been within our jurisdiction, although as Senators we are all interested in the information. So I would certainly work with Senator Boren in making all of that information available to the individual Senators.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I just think it is a straightforward request of General Gorman to ask him whether or not he is modifying his prior testimony.

Chairman NUNN. We will draft questions for him, and we also might want to give him the opportunity to come back and appear before the committee.

Senator LEVIN. Because I just hate to interpret this, and I think the General also is a little bit reluctant to read into this exactly what he meant by it. Rather than my trying to interpret it, it might just be better one way or another to have him clear the air as to what he meant.

Chairman NUNN. Well, it depends upon how you word things. I think the only way to solve this is to have General Gorman appear here before us to clarify. Because you can say that someone has a fighting chance and then at the same time add to it that you do not think they are going to win. I do not know what it means.

Senator LEVIN. Let me ask General Galvin a question about the Contras earning the support of the people.

Have they made any progress, in your opinion, in earning the support of the people?

General GALVIN. We are looking at a pretty short timeframe for an insurgency, but I think there has been some progress within Nicaragua.

One of the frustrations, Mr. Senator, is that within the last 2 years the Contras had begun to win the support of the people in certain areas but ran out of military logistical support, necessitating that they come back out. You can say that this situation was their own fault, but realistically there are not many insurgencies that do not have some outside support. The Marxists are great at that, as you know.

So Contra task forces were in Jinotega in the Central Highlands and further south along the Rama Road, but one-by-one the units had to come back out last year. This was the second or third time that logistic support failed. The movement between Nicaragua and Honduras hurt them because the Nicaraguan people that supported the task forces were later taken away, moved to resettlement camps, punished, or even killed by the Sandinistas.

Since the Contras have never had sustained support, they are having a tough time establishing a closer relationship with the Nicaraguan people. Do they know that that is a problem and are they trying to work that out? I think they do and they are.

Senator LEVIN. My question, though, is are you saying that they were making progress and winning the support of the people in those three areas that you mentioned?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir, they were.

Senator LEVIN. Your evidence of that is?

General GALVIN. I talked to some of the task force commanders, and they told me that.

Senator LEVIN. No, I am talking about the people.

General GALVIN. No, I have not talked to the people. I have received, however, a lot of intelligence concerning whether or not that is true.

Senator LEVIN. Our intelligence tells us that the Contras were winning support of the people in the areas that they were able to move into?

General GALVIN. That is right. When the Contras were able to sustain themselves for several months, they started winning over people. Task forces had no trouble at all getting food and intelligence; however, they lost that capability and are now in the process of trying to regain it.

Senator LEVIN. Any intelligence reports in that area that you can give to us in the classified fashion would be very helpful to us, either to us personally or to the committee. I would like to see the intelligence reports on that subject.

Admiral Baggett, if I have any time left I have a couple of questions for you.

ORDINANCE SUSTAINABILITY

On the question of sustainability, your testimony indicated limited ordinance sustainability. I believe it was Admiral Hayes who was here recently who told us we only had a few days worth of some key munitions at his disposal.

I am wondering if you could tell us in the area of antiship weapons, antisubmarine weapons, antiaircraft weapons what the state of our sustainability of our munitions is.

Admiral BAGGETT. I would like to give you those figures precisely, Senator, for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Ordinance sustainability in the Atlantic Fleet has improved substantially since fiscal year 1981 and will continue to improve if the funds requested in the fiscal year 1988-89 budget are approved.

In fiscal year 1981, our inventory of threat munitions [deleted] requirements; by the end of fiscal year 1985, on-hand quantities had improved [deleted]. Existing contracts will result in inventories [deleted] of requirements by the end of the fiscal year 1987 funded delivery period. The funds requested in the fiscal year 1988-89 budget will continue these improvements, although at a slower rate, and will provide [deleted] requirements by the end of the funded delivery period.

Admiral BAGGETT. Let me say that in the Atlantic Command for naval forces, which are the predominant forces I have, from 1981 until the end of 1987, for threat munitions, we have improved our sustainability levels by 2½ times above the fiscal year 1981 posture.

Senator **Levin**. Could you just tell us generally, are we halfway where we should be?

Admiral **Baggett**. Yes, we will be more than halfway toward our objectives by the end of the fiscal year 1987 funded delivery period.

Senator **Levin**. My time is up. Whatever you wish to supply in that area for the record would be welcomed.

Admiral **Baggett**. Thank you.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Levin.

General, whatever information you may have in terms of what you believe to be relevant based on the questions presented regarding intelligence that we would require for this record. I just want to be careful that the Intelligence Committee retains their area of responsibility in this, because I know that they have, in fact, been handling this intelligence, but we will work that out with them.

General **Galvin**. Yes, sir.

MINE-LAYING THREAT

Chairman **Nunn**. Admiral Baggett, in your written statement you note that our European allies furnish most of the countermeasure ships for mine operations. How are we prepared to handle on our own east coast and gulf ports the mine-laying threat? What kind of assets do we have compared to what we need?

Admiral **Baggett**. Right now, Senator, we do not have the assets we need to totally do the job in terms of mine sweeping and port clearance, however, in the mine countermeasure program we do have some 14 mine sweeping ships to replace the old MSOs; 17 mine hunting craft; the RH–53 program, the airborne mine countermeasures helicopters, including those 10 which are going into the reserve forces; and the MH–53 program, which will provide an additional 38 mine sweeping helicopters. Those assets would enable us to clear the ports on the east coast and the gulf coast in a timely fashion to permit the flow of reinforcement and resupply shipping.

Chairman **Nunn**. When will they be available?

Admiral **Baggett**. They will be available in the time period of the 1990s.

Chairman **Nunn**. Is that in the 5-year defense plan?

Admiral **Baggett**. Yes, sir, it is.

Chairman **Nunn**. In other words, you are saying that the 5-year defense plan gives you enough mine countermeasure capability to be able to protect and handle a threat and also clear the ports that we now have by the 1990s?

Admiral **Baggett**. Yes sir.

Could I add one other point? Mine clearance and mine sweeping is one way to combat mines. The best way is to kill the platforms that are planting the mines.

Chairman **Nunn**. How do you view the unconventional mine threat, let us say, preceding a war with the thousands of boats in the harbors going out and laying mines in the ports that we have? What protection do we have against that?

Admiral **Baggett**. Right now, we have minesweepers that are doing what is categoried as "Q clearance;" they are channel clearances. With all of the trash and garbage and dishpans and things that have been thrown over the side over the years, we have to identify mine-like objects on the bottom of the channels we are going to use, whether it is in peacetime or wartime.

In the situation you described, first of all, we would identify those objects that were newly planted. That is not to say that someone could not surreptitiously come into the port with a false bottom ship, as happened with the Libyan RO/RO ship several years ago. The ship planted mines in the Red Sea, and it took forces about 3 weeks to locate the mines.

The capability to do that is going to be limited to third parties and is not going to be a mining threat generated by the Soviets, in my opinion.

Chairman NUNN. You mean if they were preparing for all out war?

Admiral BAGGETT. What I am saying is that, first of all, we have restrictions on our ports in terms of which ports the Soviets can go in and out of. For example, Hampton Roads is——

Chairman NUNN. Yes, but there are many East European ships, merchant and various other types of ship moving in and out of our ports all the time, are there not?

Admiral BAGGETT. Well, we have eight ports on the east coast and on the gulf coast that are unavailable, ports that the Warsaw Pact nations cannot use.

Chairman NUNN. Are you saying that in the 1990s we will have our capability based on this 5-year defense plan to take care of existing ports?

Admiral BAGGETT. I am saying by the mid-1990s we will have them. We will have those forces necessary to take care of the east coast and gulf coast ports.

Chairman NUNN. Is that based on the existing ports or planned ports?

Admiral BAGGETT. That is based on both.

Chairman NUNN. So we will have enough by 1995?

Admiral BAGGETT. We have to clear the ports that are used for reinforcement and resupply. We have to be able to clear the gulf and east coast ports, and we will have the forces by the end of the FDYP delivery period to accomplish what needs to be done for mine countermeasures.

Chairman NUNN. Including the new ports we are going to have?

Admiral BAGGETT. Yes, sir. There are no new ports, per se, that add to mine countermeasures requirements. The requirements for mine countermeasures have been factored into the plan because of the requirement to clear the reinforcement and resupply shipping ports, not Navy homeports.

Chairman NUNN. How do you rate this as a priority within the 5-year defense plan?

Let us say we have to remove some items from the 5-year defense plan, which everybody knows we will. How do you rate the countermine capability?

Admiral BAGGETT. I rank that requirement very high. It does us no good to win the battle of the Atlantic if we cannot get the goods out of port along the gulf or east coasts.

It would also send a very strong signal to our allies that we do attach very much importance to mine countermeasures.

Chairman NUNN. What do you rate higher than that?

Admiral BAGGETT. Antisubmarine warfare overall.

Chairman NUNN. Anything other than that?

Admiral BAGGETT. That is the most deficient area right now. It is in the program, and if we achieve the program that we have, we will meet those requirements. Mine warfare is a very neglected subject. It is cyclic. We get concerned about mines when we have a Korean war, or we get concerned about mines when the Ghat puts a mine down in a waterway in the Middle East. Other than that, we tend to ignore it, Senator.

Chairman NUNN. Which would you rate higher, getting right down to the point, if we had to make a decision between the two, and I am not sure we will, but just which would you rate higher, the expansion of the number of ports of homeporting, or would you rate the ability to get the countermine capability on board, if there was a tradeoff between those two?

Admiral BAGGETT. I do not think they are mutually exclusive.

Chairman NUNN. Well, there may be a lot of mutually exclusive items by the time we get through this budget. I am speaking of money. I am not saying they are in any way incompatible. I am asking which one would you rate higher in terms of priority. If we got right down to the budget and you had to either expand homeports or you had to have the countermine capability, which one would be more important?

Admiral BAGGETT. To give up the mine countermeasures capability totally, to take mine countermeasures out of the budget, I would attach greater importance to that.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Baggett, I congratulate you on both your testimony, written and oral. I have a question for General Galvin, so the questions I have for you, sir, I will write to you.

CONTRAS

General Galvin, let me take you away from the subject of Contras for a minute, although this is indirectly related, as your testimony indicates.

Let me also congratulate you on a very, I think, perceptive and very frank statement. I am delighted that both of these statements are not classified.

One of the segments in yours, General Galvin, is entitled "The War Against the Drug Traffickers," and you make much of the success of Operation Blast Furnace in Colombia, which involved Black Hawk helicopters, an intelligence team and support personnel. The statistics that you cite and the resultant drop in the price of cocaine so as to make it unprofitable for the traffickers, I think, is a story that needs to be told at even greater length.

In concluding that particular segment, you make this point. You say the United States needs more operations like Blast Furnace. We also need to encourage bilateral operations between neighboring countries and multilateral arrangements in which several countries ban together against the traffickers. You say, I believe that such multilateral operations can be coordinated, as Operation Hat Trick in the Caribbean has so successfully demonstrated.

I do not quarrel with any of that. In fact, I subscribe to it fully. I would only ask this. Is it not true that just as you say that such multilateral operations can be coordinated, they can also be frustrated by the lack of cooperation on the part of a single major player, a country who is involved both as a point of origin and as a point of forwarding the traffic?

I will not beat around the bush any more than your predecessor did some years ago when General Gorman was here and identified corruption in Mexico as a major cause of concern to him in terms of his responsibilities at SOUTHCOM.

When you say that Blast Furnace was a success and you commend, as you have, President Barco and his predecessor, President Paz des Eserno, let me just ask this. Have you had similar cooperation from Mexico? What has been your experience? If you suggested an Operation Blast Furnance in Mexico instead of the kind of eradication that has been an on again and off again thing down there—first, let me say, have you done so, and if not I will ask you to speculate as to what you think the response would be.

General GALVIN. First of all, we have not done so. In terms of speculating, I think there are possibilities. I believe that we are gaining more coordination between Mexican military and U.S. military. There is not something ongoing at the moment; that is a matter for the future. As I said, I think there are possibilities. I do not believe that I should go beyond that.

Senator WILSON. How much involvement was there on the part of DEA personnel and Operation Blast Furnace?

General GALVIN. DEA was in charge of the U.S. side and the Bolivian police ran their side.

I would like to make a point. I do not want to make too much of that operation, per se. It was a foot in the door. It was pump priming. It showed the possibility of some success, albeit limited.

What I really am concerned about is convincing leaders that these things have got to be done. The situation is bad.

STRATEGY FOR COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN

Senator WILSON. Well, I could not agree more with the concluding sentence. We need to resolve resource issues and lay out the overall U.S. national strategy for a counterdrug campaign. I think that is true both here and abroad, but as you have addressed your command and the obvious involvement that it has as the major source of cocaine and marijuana, I would only say that I would like to know in greater detail than you can probably provide this afternoon the basis for your optimism.

I would also be interested in whether or not something of this kind has been proposed. My reaction is one of skepticism on that basis primarily because of public response from the Mexican Government has been that they did not want very much help from us in terms of dealing with massive plantations growing marijuana and opium poppies in that country.

I think, very candidly, that if we were to approach them with something like a proposal for an Operation Blast Furnace there it would be rebuffed. I personally think that this administration has not been nearly aggressive enough in pressing the Mexican Government for the kind of cooperation to which we are entitled.

General GALVIN. I would hasten to add that my optimism is based on speculation. We do not have something planned along those lines. I speculate that it might be possible, but no more than that. I am not really optimistic.

Senator WILSON. I am not, either, unfortunately, and I think that that is more than just sad. I do not think it is a tolerable situation.

Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wilson, I agree with your concern on that subject and also the frustration expressed. This is really one of our most critical problems, and we do not seem to have any answer to it.

Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just for the record, let me say that in defense of General Gorman I was there during all of his testimony. I think he has dramatically reversed himself, but all during that hearing he said he had not been down there and had not been briefed. So we have to give some credence to the fact that everybody has a right to change their mind if they get some additional new startling information. I think that is what maybe Senator Kennedy was referring to. If there is some startling information that has not been brought to our attention we would like to know it.

Also, let me harken back just a little bit. I am sorry that the Senator from Maine is not here. He indicated that he thought my question to you with regard to an election between the Sandinistas-type government and a Somoza-type government, implied a choice of Somoza himself.

I am only bringing those things out because I think all too often we Americans, whether we are in the military or in the Congress or in government anywhere, seem to get hung up on Communist, anti-Communist, and such simplistic terms.

I have a feeling that the average person in Nicaragua today is not so much concerned about the political affiliation of those who run their government but what would be in the best interest of themselves. I, for one, spotted the Sandinistas as hardline Communists early and was one of those in the Congress that voted against the very first aid to them.

Do you agree that one of the real problems that we have in backing the Contras today is a perceived tie between them and Somoza. The hatred of Somoza and everything that he stands for is one of the problems that the Contras are having and still having, especially due to the substantiated fact that a large portion of their top military leadership were leaders of the hated Somoza national guard.

Is that true?

General GALVIN. That is true, Mr. Senator. Let me make a comment.

I said earlier that there were three wars in my theater: the drug war, the Contra war, and the war in El Salvador. In fact, there are actually four, because the fourth one is the war of information. It is not so much that the Contras have not made their position clear; rather the Marxist side, with great and well-practiced skill, bombards the United States and the rest of the world with the other side of the picture.

Here we have a country of 3 million people that is practically bankrupt sustaining information offices in 34 countries and paying a lobby here in Washington about $25,000 a month, at the last information I had on it, to keep the Sandinista picture in front of the American and European world.

We are losing the war of information. It is very clear to me that the United States needs desperately to do something about this situation. We do not have to turn into a world of American propagandists, but it seems to be more difficult to talk about the meaning of democracy than it is to talk about the meaning of Marxism.

Senator EXON. General, if this is an unfair question and you do not care to answer it, do not, because I understand it is a loaded question.

There is a thought that permeates this land of ours today that we are going to get involved militarily down there. If the Contras, for whatever reason, fail next year or 15 years down the road, what is the alternative? Are the Contras the only chance that we have for salvation down there?

Certainly I think you are not advocating that if the Contras fail we go in there with active military involvement. What other alternatives do you see down there? I do not believe that the Contadora group has even been mentioned around the table today, and yet at one time that was kind of the centerpiece of alternatives that we thought we had.

What alternatives do we have, General, as you see it?

General GALVIN. If the Contras fail, we would have to take every measure possible to bolster the neighbors, our allies. The response would be broader than just military assistance. There are other avenues, world public opinion and other diplomatic initiatives, perhaps Contadora again.

I do not have too much confidence, myself, in the success of such an effort. As I said earlier, the countries would not be able to stand up to the Sandinistas efforts to intimidate by undermining governments. Soon we would have a very hostile Central America.

What would happen after that, I do not know, but in the long run, we cannot afford to lose the Central American challenge. I do not think our foreign policy would allow that.

Senator EXON. Which is, I guess, a soft way of saying what many people are saying in the United States today, that if the Contras fail we are going to be forced into military action down there. I guess that is another option that we have to consider; right?

General GALVIN. It is a hard option because I really feel that U.S. military intervention in Latin America is nonproductive. If the problem cannot be solved by the country itself, it is going to be difficult for us to solve it. We can support allies, but we cannot become our allies. Intervention is a difficult thing to think about.

On the other hand, we have said that if the Sandinistas did certain things, such as bringing in MiGs or attacking their neighbors, we would have to view that with concern.

Senator EXON. I am on record as saying if they bring in MiGs or other provocative weapons, we should go in and take them out, and I think Americans would basically support that.

General GALVIN. Yes, that is the message we have delivered.

Senator EXON. My time is up. Just one last question, a quick question for you, Admiral.

NORWEGIAN SEA

Your talked about activities in the Norwegian Sea in case of hostilities breaking out. I support that type of operation.

Do you see us going further north than Norwegian Sea in carrying out an offensive action against the Soviets?

Admiral BAGGETT. Certainly our submarine force is going to be forward of the Norwegian Sea and into the Barents, posing a threat to not only the Soviet submarine force but also to the Soviet surface ships. It is critically important that we take out surface ships early on in hostility, so that we can then bring maritime patrol aircraft into the antisubmarine warfare campaign.

If you are talking about strikes on Soviet home bases, if we control the Norwegian Sea and have forces there, then we are already within strike range of Soviet naval bases. I would not exclude striking Soviet bases at some time in the course of hostilities, but that is not to say that we are going to race pell-mell into the Kola and lob A-6s in there.

Senator EXON. So what you are saying is that you are not advocating or planning surface craft activities above the Norwegian Sea, at least as you plan our actions at this juncture?

Admiral BAGGETT. That is correct.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REORGANIZATION ACT

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

I would like to ask both of you on another line here about the Reorganization Act last year and your operations under it now, whether they have moved into a transition where you have more authority and so forth and your views, pro and con, of that act.

General Galvin.

General GALVIN. My view of the Reorganization Act is that this good legislation was warranted. I think that it is beginning to do what was intended, and that is to provide authority to the regional Commanders in Chief that is equal to their responsibilities for operations if necessary. It is doing that.

I have already been able to exercise greater control over the people that I get. I also have been able to change certain ways of operating because of the greater freedom given me by this act. Little by little I have begun to get control of the military people in my region who previously were not subordinate to me, making things very awkward.

In every aspect of the JCS reform, I feel great benefit. In regard to funding, I am able to articulate better my needs. I am able to work the budget better. My relationship with the Chairman has been clarified, and I like the way it is set up. The whole thing has turned out to be what was expected of it.

I would say that I am 20 percent along on acting in accordance with the changes. It has taken me some time, but I am very happy with it.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much.

Do you have any particular critique that we should be alerted to now. Or particular concerns that we should go back and look at, or issues that should be monitored more closely?

General GALVIN. I do not know how Lee Baggett feels about this, but I think we have a problem that needs to be looked at concerning the planning, programming and budgeting aspects.

It was very difficult before to work those aspects because I had to go up through the services and fight it out there, and then go on and fight it out again with the Defense Department. That can be done, and I think that was going along all right.

Now, as more budgeting responsibility comes down to me, I have to look around at whom I have who is an expert. Who can do that kind of budget planning for me? The act also puts me in competition with the other CINCs, which was not so before because I was just going straight in to the services. So I am looking at that one too. I may make a comment later on through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I think we may have solved some problems only to create others in the PPBS aspect of the act, which is the only place where I see a problem right now.

Chairman NUNN. Over all, you are very positive, but we need to be particularly aware of that.

We took out a few items in the Reorganization bill that would have, in effect, set up almost a separate planning department in each of the CINCs, and we did not want that. We did not want you to be burdened with the bureaucracy here.

We are always alerted to the overkill in that direction, and if we have anything to take a look at in the future, we would welcome your opinion. We do not feel this is locked in concrete. This is a massive change, and we welcome views that are helpful and constructive in that regard.

Admiral Baggett.

Admiral BAGGETT. Generally, Senator, I think the bill has been right on the mark. It has institutionalized things we were starting to do under the DRB.

I have two problems that are going to have to be solved one way or the other. The first is in the programming and budgeting arena here in Washington. When the budget formulation is in its final stages, it is very important that the CINCs know what is being changed. It is very difficult to do that because of the short turnaround times that exist in the DOD budget review process.

That is something that we are working on. The Chairman is aware of that, and I think all the CINCs have expressed that concern to one degree or another. What I do, of course, is provide my priorities to the system and then try to guard those priorities as the budget is finally put to bed. That is a problem we can accommodate and work on, and the Chairman, as I said, is aware of it.

The only thing that is in the legislation that does concern me is the requirement for 3½ or 3 years of service on a joint staff before you become qualified to be a joint staff officer. I do not know how the Navy is going to do that with say 50,000 eligible officers.

That kind of requirement over a 26-year career pattern would mean that about 15 percent of their time is going to have to in a joint billet qualification program, if you would, including the service school. That is going to require, for the Navy alone, about 7,000 or 8,000 billets in joint duty. We just cannot get from here to there and still man the ships and aircraft.

I think the same would apply to the other services in terms of just pure numbers. Now, I may be overly simplistic in running those numbers out and may have missed the boat somewhere, but it seems to me that that is going to be very hard to accommodate.

I know the bill provides a relook at that, at least the way I read it, and that is the only thing that I really truly am concerned about.

Chairman NUNN. We worried about that, and we tried to tone it down, and then we finally reached a compromise that said in effect that we are going to put it this way now but we know we are going to have to relook at it, or at least we think we may have to relook at it.

Admiral BAGGETT. I do not have very many officers on the USCINCLANT staff that would make the cut, Senator. It is less than 25.

Chairman NUNN. Can you tell the difference, in your personnel powers, between now and before. Also, can you tell any difference, as General Galvin mentioned, in the people's willingness to serve in joint billets?

Admiral BAGGETT. Well, I think the best indicator is that I have had some flag and general officers who are stationed in Washington come up and say to me: "let me know which good people you want, because they are standing in line to go." So that has been a positive impact on the mentality.

The true test is going to be what the promotion rates are. There is no career planning other than to look at a promotion list, and then look at the organization of the DOD phone book and see who got promoted. That is the only career planning that I think is valid. We can have all sorts of guidelines, but the true test is who gets promoted in this world. If a person gets promoted to flag officer because he was skipper of an aircraft carrier, then everybody wants to be skipper of an aircraft carrier.

In the past, it has not been salutory for a carrier skipper to go to a unified CINCs command. I think that is a fair statement. That has turned around.

Chairman NUNN. Do you think that is going to turn around some?

Admiral BAGGETT. I think it already has.

Chairman NUNN. You think it has.

Do either of you have anything else you would like to add, anything that we have not covered that you think is important in your area that we should know? We would like you to tell us.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

General GALVIN. I would like to make a comment with reference to the low intensity conflict. First of all, I appreciate the effort of this committee to emphasize the need for us to look at low intensity conflict.

In doing that, however, the question has arisen in the committee about the utility of the light infantry division in low intensity conflict. I would like to say that I really believe that there is a role, a good role, in low intensity conflict for the light infantry divisions now being created.

Low intensity conflict is dynamic. Starting with subversion without any violence, LIC can transition all the way to a very violent conflict. The light infantry division has a role across this spectrum. As an insurgency begins, the division is a source of expertise to train the government's forces, supplying mobile training teams and many other supporting activities. The division is available, and can sustain itself all the way up through any other kind of conflict, including commitment as a division itself.

In fact, if you look back over the last 30 years, we have had the equivalent of a light division in my theater. There initially was a brigade—or a regiment—in Puerto Rico and two in Panama. Now we have a brigade and the equivalent of a support command, in other words the logistics part, in Panama and a National Guard brigade in Puerto Rico and in Florida.

This is about the same kind of force that the United States has had here for three decades. I think such a light infantry force has been very useful in what we have seen as low intensity conflict in my theater.

I believe that it is appropriate to say for the record that there is a significant need for the light infantry division in low intensity conflict.

Chairman NUNN. You are speaking of the new light infantry division; is that right?

General GALVIN. That is correct.

Chairman NUNN. Admiral, do you have anything else?

Admiral BAGGETT. We talked today, Senator—and I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before this committee—about sustainability and readiness and strategies. The only additional thing I would say is that fundamental to whatever we are doing is the people.

Several years ago, you were in San Diego when I was in command of the Naval Surface Forces in the Pacific, and we had a fundamental problem. We could not train people because we were breaking equipment, and we were breaking equipment because we did not have trained people. It was a downward spiral.

We have broken out of that thanks largely to the support of this Congress, and we are now, as my statement says, getting the right people, and we are retaining them.

I am concerned about any perception on the part of the people or any real cuts that affect people programs, whether it is hospitals, which General Galvin mentioned, or whether it is selective reenlistment bonuses for the hard skills that are so sought after in industry, or whether it is childcare centers or whatever.

People programs are critically important, because people are the bottom line in terms of whatever our readiness happens to be, and it carries out into the future. It takes me 20 years to get a petty officer with 20 years experience, and I cannot replace them when they leave.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. I remember that trip to San Diego and all my conversations with your people. I spent a lot of time with your enlisted people, as you know, on the ships. Out of that came what was later known as the Nunn-Warner legislation which started to turn it around. Once you get on the downward spiral in terms of quality personnel, it is hard to interrupt it. It just keeps spinning and feeds on itself. That is what is so tough.

Admiral BAGGETT. It is a death spiral.

Chairman NUNN. It surely is.

General Galvin, do you have anything else?

General GALVIN. No sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear here.

[Questions for the hearing record, with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Senator KENNEDY. What is your personal view of the role of our military groups in your area of responsibility? As I understand it, you have 17 milgroups functioning in 17 different countries.

Are those milgroups able to function the way that you think they should function?

If not, what impediments to their activities are there, and how would you change the situation to improve our ability to function?

General GALVIN. The sixteen (vice seventeen) military groups, known as Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs), are crucial to the development and implementation of U.S. regional and country-specific military strategy. Working as part of Country Teams, the SAOs provide invaluable insight into the host nation's strategic concerns and political motivations as well as the organizational and training requirements of the military establishment. All such information figures prominently in the development of strategy. The programs carried out by the SAOs serve to professionalize military institutions, improve regional military capabilities, promote national development, and develop host country military support for democratic institutions. Indirectly our SAOs combat terrorism, insurgency, and drug trafficking. These are policy goals. The SAOs should be manned accordingly, reflecting all of their functions not just those that support foreign military sales. The Foreign Assistance Act needs to be amended to recognize that the SAOs play an important role in support of U.S. policy and are not simply the clerks of security assistance.

LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS

Senator KENNEDY. There has been a good deal of controversy about the utility of light infantry divisions in low intensity conflict.

Could you give us your view on this issue?

Would you find light infantry of use to your command? Can you envision scenarios in the Southern Command that would involve the use of such troops? Can you tell us what those scenarios are?

General GALVIN. Light infantry divisions are ideally suited to contribute to the realization of the three strategic priorities outlined in my prepared statement: improving regional stability, encouraging national development, and serving as an example of a military institution subordinate to civilian leadership in a democracy. With their core of support units (engineers, medical, intelligence, aviation, logistics, and other), light infantry divisions have the capability to perform a wide range of tasks short of actual engagement in low intensity conflict. They also have the correct structure for sustained combat operations should they be necessary. The utility of these units is found in their inherent flexibility in performing many different missions (or scenarios). Not only do they posses a wide range of expertise from which to draw mobile training teams to assist engaged military establishments to help themselves, but they also can contribute, through exercise and humanitarian/civic action projects, to the development or repair of government infrastructures. The net effect is to assure a host government of continued U.S. commitment to their security and development.

While light divisions are stationed elsewhere, Southern Command does have light forces. The Army component, organized to deter acts of aggression against the Panama Canal, has the essential core of support units to play a significant role in nation building and to provide the right resources to support counterdrug operations in a Latin American country.

INTELLIGENCE ON CENTRAL AMERICA

Senator **Kennedy**. Are you satisfied with the quality of the intelligence that you are getting?

I know that you are operating with a lot of twenty-year old electronic equipment. Is this adequate for your purposes?

General **Galvin**. We have experienced an improvement in the intelligence-gathering in Central America over the past several years as we have gradually increased the assets focused on that region and as we have gained experience in tailoring our intelligence operations to support low-intensity conflict (LIC) operations.

[Deleted.]

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) support has lagged somewhat because of a variety of factors. One major factor is frequent cloud cover over our target areas. We simply do not have enough theater and national-level collection assets to be able to cover our target areas when cloud and weather conditions are favorable for collection. Looking at the spectrum of IMINT systems from national through tactical, we simply do not have enough. [Deleted.] These systems are used to the maximum extent but they are old and not ideally suited to the missions. The Air Force has a program to modernize the systems, but the number of aircraft actually fielded will be fairly small. [Deleted.]

An important aim of all of our intelligence efforts is to increase the coordination of intelligence among the countries of Latin America and between ourselves and them. The intelligence capabilities of the countries themselves are frequently woefully inadequate in consideration of the concerted and extra-national threats upon their national sovereignties. We are working diligently to help these countries increase their own intelligence capabilities through training efforts and assistance in obtaining more modern technical collection systems. An example of the latter would be a basic aircraft-mounted SIGINT collection platform to help counter the increasingly sophisticated communications employed by terrorists, insurgents, and narcotics traffickers. As a nation, we need to cultivate carefully measured "intelligence sharing" in the region, between ourselves and selected countries and among the countries themselves. This would have an importance far beyond countering specific threats to the countries involved. It would represent a step forward in promoting mutual trust and interdependence among the nations of the hemisphere which could have far reaching political implications in the Latin American region. The threats of low intensity conflict transcend geographical borders. We need to overcome bureaucratic hurdles and inertia which inhibit the exchange of information. An initial step which the U.S. could take to further this aim is the establishment of formal intelligence-sharing agreements with selected countries facing the gravest threats.

CONTRA PROGRAM IN NICARAGUA

Senator **Kennedy**. I have read General Gorman's revised statement on the Contra program in Nicaragua.

Many of the criticisms that General Gorman made of the Contras are not in any way refuted by his revised statement.

The Contras still have no capacity to function in the urban areas of the country, where the issue will ultimately be resolved.

The Contras still have no visible political support among the people of Nicaragua that allow them to move at will in the countryside or to build a transportation infrastructure.

I have only three questions for you:

(1) Does the FDN have political support among the people of Nicaragua?

(2) Are the Contras able to operate inside the urban areas of Nicaragua today?

(3) Do the Contras have an intelligence, communications or transportation network inside Nicaragua that allow them to operate freely inside that country?

General **Galvin**. It is difficult today for anyone inside or outside Nicaragua to gauge accurately the support for the Contras among the populace. The Sandinista leadership downplays this interaction in public and controls access to the population. On the other hand opportunities to travel with resistance units is equally difficult to obtain. There are, however, two valid indicators that begin to convey the dimensions of the support for the Contras. From the Contras' perspective, the length of time that a task force can safely remain in Nicaragua is one measurement. The nature of the Sandinistas' reaction to this presence and to the possibility of popular support is a second.

Individual task forces enjoy popular, or at least passive, support in several geographical areas within Nicaragua. The locales, formerly in the central highlands, have spread southward. Elements of the Jorge Salazar Regional Command, for example, operated for 18 months deep inside the country before returning to Honduras last summer to refit. This situation would have not been possible without local support in the south central areas. Other units have had similar support, particularly along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. To date, movements of resistance units within Nicaragua have never been compromised by the local population, and the strength of the Contra Movement continues to grow.

Responding to deny this support, the Sandinista government already has relocated thousands of local campesinos and Miskito Indians out of selected rural areas and continues to do so. The Sandinistas have also imposed increasingly stringent control measures on the Nicaraguan society which make operations difficult for the Contras. The internal control measures make demonstrable political support for the Contras an extremely risky undertaking. This has had the greatest impact in the urban area, although public opposition has become more apparent since the first of the year in three major cities (Managua, Leon, Chinandega).

The Contras are still unable to operate in the urban areas of Nicaragua. This is not indicative of strong Sandinista solidarity; rather the situation results from a decision by Contra leadership not to attempt such operations until ready. The establishment of resistance infrastructure in an urban area takes time and patience. The frustration level in the urban areas, however, is becoming difficult for the Sandinistas to hide. If tapped properly, it may generate nascent urban support for the Contra movement.

In regard to the existence of a Contra intelligence, communications or transportation network inside Nicaragua, these exist on a limited scale in several small geographical areas, mostly in the rugged central highlands and in the jungles of Zelaya Department in the eastern half of the country.

JURISDICTION OF CINCLANT–SOUTHCOM

Senator **Kennedy**. The current Unified Command Plan assigns the Southern Command responsibility for Central and South America. Responsibility for the adjacent waters in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, however, lie with the Atlantic Command.

The entire introductory testimony of General Galvin focuses on the threat posed by Cuba to the Hemisphere.

Does splitting military command responsibilities for the Southern half of the Western Hemisphere effectively serve U.S. national security interest, particularly with regard to low intensity conflicts where Cuba is playing such a significant role?

Would either of you recommend any changes in the Command Plan? Shouldn't Cuba and the Caribbean fall within the jurisdiction of the Southern Command?

Admiral **Baggett**. Existing Unified Command Plan arrangements covering the Caribbean, Central America and South America should remain in force. The current delineation of responsibilities ensures that our military activities not only meet peacetime needs, but will also be successful in supporting our deterrent posture and sustaining our readiness to fight should deterrence fail.

[Deleted.] The underlying threat in this hemisphere is of Soviet design and direction. The Soviets, by providing funds, advisors and arms to Cuba, Nicaragua and various revolutionary groups, are continually exploiting endemic unrest and weakness.

The communist exploitation of instability and its influence on third world nations is a threat to U.S. national interests and those of other nations in the free world. However, this threat is not limited to the Caribbean and Latin America, nor is it most severe in the Western Hemisphere. Cuban presence, including direct military operations, is currently most extensive in Angola and Ethiopia. Varying degrees of Cuban presence also exist in South Yemen, Aden, Libya, Afghanistan, and numerous Sub-Saharan African states. [Deleted.] The greatest threat posed by Cuba lies in its Soviet-supplied and guided military capabilities to interfere with or disrupt the flow of raw materials into U.S. ports and the flow of vital material and personnel destined for the resupply and reinforcement of Europe and Southwest Asia in times of crises and war. Cuban capabilities are considered [deleted] in defense of our critical sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

Because these SLOCs have such an impact on the warfighting capability of the United States and the sustainability of our European allies, it is militarily sound that their protection remain under the single maritime-oriented commander, USCINCLANT/SACLANT, who has the forces and full responsibility in both the U.S. and NATO military command structure in the areas through which the SLOCs pass. [Deleted.]

A long history of operations has enabled USCINCLANT to develop close and extensive relationships throughout the Western Hemisphere. Nowhere are these relationships better than in the Caribbean, where strong ties still exist between Caribbean nations and the Netherlands, France and the UK. LANTCOM's expertise and relationships with these European nations, on both a bilateral and NATO basis, reinforce and support our responsibilities in the Caribbean. Additionally, U.S. and European naval forces operate in the Caribbean on a frequent basis; [deleted].

USCINCLANT and SACLANT plan for and direct operations in the Caribbean and the Atlantic south of the Tropic of Cancer. NATO plans provide for worldwide naval control and protection of shipping. [Deleted.] Formation of the convoys arriving from various CONUS ports and the transfer of responsibility from USCINCLANT/SACLANT to appropriate NATO commanders requires thorough NATO maritime expertise and coordination to ensure that these requirements are properly satisfied.

[Deleted.] These "blue water" operations of the South American navies are tied to the U.S. Atlantic Command and NATO in an area of operations south of the Tropic of Cancer. (The Atlantic above the Tropic of Cancer is covered under the NATO treaty.) We must ensure that there is no disconnect between these U.S. and NATO plans and the potential wartime support from SOAM navies. CINCLANTFLT is the provider of U.S. maritime forces, and, for the past twenty-eight years, the single point of contact with these navies for blue water operations, exercises and training.

In summation, there are substantial operational and organizational factors which argue against transfer of responsibility. The UCP, as it currently delineates USCINCLANT's responsibilities, provides the most appropriate geographic division for the Atlantic and Southern Commands.

General GALVIN. We tend to look at Cuba as a factor threatening our East-West rather than North-South security relationships. Remembering the missile crisis of 1962, we focus on the Soviet military presence on the island, Cuban force expansion, and the threat both the Soviets and Cubans pose to maritime operations in the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea and the adjacent Atlantic. These essentially are the appropriate, long-standing concerns that are addressed in the current Unified Command Plan. These concerns, however, neither reflect nor compare with the day-to-day challenge to our security interests presented by Cuba's execution of its national strategy to replace the US as the dominant influence in Latin America. The destabilization of the Caribbean Basin over the last 15 years, and now increasingly in South America, with an increased frequency of low intensity conflicts must be viewed in this light.

I understand that the command arrangement in the Caribbean Basin today is to be studied this year in a scheduled review. This is needed because Cuban sponsorship and involvement in the destabilization of Latin America poses a significant threat; however, Cuba is seen from two valid but different military perspectives. I am sure this will be considered in UCP discussions and that an agreement can be reached to insure that the military requirements implicit in USLANTCOM and USSOUTHCOM perspectives on Cuba can be satisfied.

WAR ON DRUGS IN CARIBBEAN

Senator KENNEDY. Do you have everything you need to interdict drugs being transported from South America to the United States—by air or by sea?

In my meetings with you last week, you said that there were severe problems in our ability to track flights coming into the Southern United States over the Caribbean.

How would you improve that situation? Do you need more radars deployed? What is being done to accomplish this? What are the obstacles?

General GALVIN. Interdiction in the Caribbean is a United States Coast Guard mission. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic, (CINCLANT) has DOD responsibility for the area. Both CINCLANT and I contribute DOD assets to support the Coast Guard efforts; CINCLANT on a greater scale than CINCSOUTH.

My primary mission in this war is to work with producer nation militaries through Security Assistance to attack the problem at its sources: Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Belize. What we lack to interdict drugs at the source is adequate security assistance resourcing and the authority to train and equip the forces that are involved in counter-drug operations. My problem in this latter regard is that DOD is prohibited from training and equipping police forces. Paradoxically, the police forces have the lead in counter-drug efforts in the majority of the producer nations.

Additional radars would be a boon to all our efforts and we are pushing hard for radars in several locations in the Caribbean, Central America, and the Northern tier of South America. With a viable network we could track down smugglers from South America to the Southern United States more effectively and more economically.

The obstacles are primarily sovereignty issues with the countries involved and adequate funding for the number of necessary sites. We can and will work around the first problem through various ownership, operation, and data sharing arrangements. The funding problem needs your support.

To sum up: We need a surge in security assistance for the next several years. We need the authority to train for these operations. We especially need resourcing of U.S. military counter-drug operations. We need continued deployments by Coast Guard vessels. With help in these and some complementary areas we can greatly reduce the flow of illicit drugs toward the United States, bolster new democracies, and clean up streets of America—North and South.

Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Baggett, do you have everything you need to interdict drugs being transported from South America to the United States—by air or by sea?

Admiral BAGGETT. The national drug interdiction mission is coordinated by the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) under the Office of the Vice President. In support of these operations, four frigates/destroyers, a hydrofoil ship and maritime patrol aircraft have been provided by the Atlantic Command for Coast Guard Caribbean interdiction operations.

Airborne early warning aircraft and crews and Marine OV-10 intercept aircraft and crews have been provided to assist U.S. Customs with air interdiction. In January, the Navy transferred a total of four E-2C Early Warning aircraft to the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Customs Service to assist in the airborne tracking of suspect aircraft.

If the question includes a requirement to seal the borders of the United States, the answer is no. Considering the number of ships, pleasure craft, and aircraft that are potential drug carriers, and the resources required to intercept and search each one of these, it is clear that sealing of our borders would require a huge investment of forces and funding—far beyond the existing and substantial efforts of the Navy, Coast Guard and other federal agencies.

Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Baggett, in my meetings with you last week, you said that there were severe problems in our ability to track flights coming into the Southern United States over the Caribbean.

How would you improve that situation? Do you need more radars deployed? What is being done to accomplish this? What are the obstacles?

Admiral BAGGETT. There are on-going initiatives to improve radar coverage in the Caribbean.

The Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN), sponsored by USCINCSO and USCINCLANT, [deleted]. The program is two-phased, with the Air Force as the lead agency. Total cost of the program will be approximately $210 million. [Deleted.]

Existing radar sites in the northern sector are located at Punta Salinas and Punta Boringuen in Puerto Rico, Cudjoe Key and Key West in Florida and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [Deleted.]

The existing radar site in the southern sector is at Cerro La Mole, Honduras, [deleted].

BUDGET REQUEST

Senator KENNEDY. I know that you submitted certain requests for certain programs for fiscal year 1988 and fiscal year 1989.

I would be grateful if you provide me or the committee with the requests that you made and the response that you received from the service.

More specifically, would you tell us here this morning what programs you requested that were not funded? Did you receive all that you wanted in the fiscal year 1988–89 budgets?

Are you happy with your sustainability situation—when it comes to the ability of your fleet to sustain conflict with the Soviet Union? ·

Admiral BAGGETT. The fiscal year 1987 budget request was reduced from $311.6 to $281.7 billion. Similarly, projected funding for both fiscal year 1988 and fiscal year 1989 declined approximately $20 billion for each year. Given these reductions, the fiscal year 1988/89 budget is appropriately balanced.

My sustainability requests of the services included munitions, repair parts, stocks for Army reserve forces, medical, support equipment and lift. These areas were funded by the services at levels consistent with the fiscal environment. If additional funding were available, I would further increase sustainability in these areas, as well as CBR defensive capabilities and the prepositioning of POL war reserve stocks.

NAVY PRIORITIES

Senator KENNEDY. What are we to think about the Navy's commitment to spare parts, ammunition, and support equipment when one year it says it needs a certain amount and then it comes in with substantially lower requests. Should we conclude that the Navy's projections are not accurate as to what was really needed? *OR* Should we conclude that the Navy's priorities are off base?

In your personal opinion, are we shortchanging readiness and sustainability in the Navy today in order to pay for new weapons—like aircraft carriers?

Admiral BAGGETT. It is understandable that projections can change as they become current year budget programs. Requirements computations, for example, are highly sensitive to force structure changes, varying program obligation rates, changes in fiscal guidance, and savings realized through competition. The decline in DOD projected funding for fiscal year 1986 and fiscal year 1987 and current funding constraints are also factors which affected the fiscal year 1988/89 budget request. I agree with the balance in the fiscal year 1988 and 89 budget, given the funding constraints imposed.

Readiness and sustainability are not bearing a disproportionate share of the reductions in funding projections; every area of the DOD budget has been impacted. For instance, if the Navy's fiscal year 1984 5-year shipbuilding program had been followed, a total of 30 additional ships would have been requested in the budgets for fiscal year 1985 through fiscal year 1988.

The Navy has always had a major portion of its budget dedicated to readiness and sustainability accounts. The budget share for readiness and sustainability will increase from 60 percent in 1987 to 64 percent in 1992. While the two replacement carriers do require a significant acquisition investment, the expenditures are spread over eleven years and amount to less than one percent of predicted Navy outlays. This outlay level does not seriously imbalance the Navy budget or cause disruptive impacts in other accounts.

Chairman NUNN. We appreciate both of you being here today. We appreciate your coming in on this bad day, and we hope you can find your way home in the traffic.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

MILITARY STRATEGY IN EUROPE

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Quayle, Wilson, Gramm, Symms, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Richard D. Finn, Jr., Judith A. Freedman, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Frederick F.Y. Pang, professional staff members; Lori M. Jackson, Pamela G. Powell, and Debra A. Rice, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Greg Weaver, assistant to Senator Levin; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; Leon Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; James R. Sayer, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Samuel J. Routson, assistant to Senator Symms; Lorne Craner, assistant to Senator McCain; and Patrick A. Putignano, assistant to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order.

Senator Warner is attending another meeting and will be here shortly. But we will go ahead and get started this morning.

The Armed Services Committee convenes this morning to resume its examination of U.S. national security strategy and, in particular, its military strategy component.

Today's hearing will be the 14th in a series of hearings that has offered a wide range of witnesses and views. We have interrupted our strategy hearings to move on to the necessities of the budget, but we are going to divert because we have a very special witness here this morning and come back to strategy because this is, indeed, not a short-term process; it is a very long-term process.

I think it is appropriate today that our committee meets in this historic room to take the testimony of today's witness, Gen. Bernard Rogers, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. European Command.

Bernie Rogers is an historic figure in his own right. General Rogers is retiring soon from active duty, after having worn some kind of Army uniform, I understand, since the age of 16. Thus, his career has not only encompassed the great leaders and events of the post-war era, but it has deeply influenced them as well. For this service to his country, the members of this committee and the entire Nation are indeed grateful.

General Rogers, I want to express my own deep gratitude to you this morning for your many years, where I have been the beneficiary of your wise counsel on NATO military as well as NATO-type political matters. You have not only been a "soldier's soldier," but you have been one who has no reluctance to speak your mind. You always have called a spade a spade. I have never heard you describe it as a "manned, portable, hand-operated earth-moving device."

We are grateful for that frankness and candor.

We will miss your presence at the top of the NATO military chain of command. But we will continue to consult with you and consider you a valued advisor in whatever capacity—and I know it will be active and productive—you choose in the future.

General Rogers will be the fifth unified commander to appear before the committee during its hearings on strategy.

In inviting General Rogers to testify, Senator Warner and I have asked him and other warfighting commanders who have preceded him to address two related subjects.

First, we are interested in the U.S. military strategy in General Rogers' area of command. In particular, we would appreciate General Rogers' views on the military ends or objectives that he is responsible for achieving, the military means or capabilities available to him to secure these objectives, and, most importantly, the strategy that links the ends and the means.

The second subject we have asked General Rogers to cover in his testimony are the critical deficiencies in his forces and the budget priorities that he would assign to correct these deficiencies.

The broad scope of this morning's hearing is evidence of the tremendous responsibility and authority of the unified commanders, like General Rogers. Our Armed Services Committee has always been interested in their views. In fact, one of the major thrusts of the Reorganization bill last year was to give more authority to these combatant commanders who have so much responsibility.

General Rogers, I know we did not give all the authority that you believe was necessary, but I hope we have made a little bit of progress in that regard.

I know that you have with you this morning a very distinguished colonel, Colonel Estes, and perhaps you would like to introduce him as you begin.

STATEMENT OF GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS, USA, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, ACCOMPANIED BY COL. HOWELL ESTES, USAF, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, SHAPE

General Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other distinguished members of the committee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to respond to your invitation of last December to appear.

I do have Colonel Estes—promotable—who is my brains for this session. I am delighted to have him.

The day will come when General Estes will sit here in his own right, to appear before your committee, in my opinion.

I would like to commend your committee, Mr. Chairman, for keeping the horse before the cart by examining U.S. vital national interests, our objectives, and the military strategy to provide the foundation for the review of the defense budget. I only wish that circumstances would have permitted me to appear earlier at the time that you had requested.

Now I have prepared a quite lengthy statement responding to the concerns raised in your letter of invitation, and with your permission, I would like to submit my statement for the record. It is unclassified and copies may be available to interested parties.

I would like to highlight points of particular concern to me and I believe of particular relevance to your deliberations.

I remind the committee again that the primary mission of the U.S. European Command is to support NATO efforts, to preserve peace with freedom by deterring aggression and successfully defending should deterrence fail.

The President's statement on the National Strategy emphasized the importance of this mission, saying that the security of Western Europe constitutes a "vital" interest of the United States. This view has been reinforced by Secretary Weinberger when he said that the United States could not tolerate a world in which Western Europe became the subject of Soviet domination.

As a result, the present administration and others since World War II have recognized that our frontiers of freedom are in Europe and that our interests, our obligations, make the defense of those frontiers our most important military objective after the defense of the U.S. homeland.

The only way that the United States can protect is vital security interests in Europe, in my opinion, is through participation in what has been called the greatest peace movement in history—NATO.

While the Europeans cannot stand against a Soviet threat alone and they need our help, we cannot maintain our interests without the cooperation of our European allies.

As George Marshall said, we are a strong Nation, but we cannot live to ourselves and remain strong.

Just as we cannot have security separate from the European allies, we can not have an effective strategy separate from the NATO strategy for our purposes in Western Europe. Therefore, it is no accident that the NATO and U.S. military strategies are fully compatible.

After nearly 8 years of supporting the defense of NATO in my U.S. role, I remain convinced that the strategy of flexible response and forward defense as agreed by all NATO nations in 1967, remains valid today.

While there has always been a discussion of alternate strategies, careful examination reveals that each one entails either an unacceptable risk or imposes unacceptable costs.

I think we must keep in mind that flexible response and forward defense is a strategy of both deterrence and defense, to include the deterrence of intimidation.

It seeks to deter any possible aggression, ranging from subversion to all-out nuclear war, by causing a potential aggressor to recognize that the costs of aggression would far exceed any possible benefits. The broad range of the three responses we envision under flexible response is designed to be responsive to the changing threat, to new technological developments, and to changes in the Warsaw Pact concepts and doctrines, provided that we maintain adequate forces to implement our strategy.

It is through our efforts to maintain these forces that we demonstrate to the Soviets the requisite capability and will so vital for successful deterrence.

Warfighting capabilities are necessary for successful deterrence, and they are embodied in the three legs of the NATO triad, all of which this country supports with its forces.

All three legs must remain strong or our deterrent becomes as unstable as a tripod with a leg missing.

An examination of NATO's triad reveals both good and bad news. The continued modernization of the strategic nuclear forces by the United States and Britain will ensure that the deterrent value of these forces remains high in the foreseeable future. And the NATO decision of December 1979, to modernize its nonstrategic nuclear forces, has addressed the gap that had grown in our spectrum of deterrent in that important leg.

The implementation of this decision is proceeding on schedule. But NATO's current conventional posture does not provide a credible deterrent. That conventional posture has been one of my major concerns for 8 years.

A credible deterrent requires that NATO maintain a conventional capability that is perceived by the Soviets as giving the West a "reasonable prospect" of frustrating a nonnuclear attack by conventional means, thereby forcing the Soviets to confront the onus of escalation.

I say to you, as I have said before in this committee, that if attacked conventionally today, NATO would face fairly quickly the decision to escalate to the nuclear response in order to try to cause the aggressor to halt his advance.

In order to avoid mortgaging NATO's defense to the early nuclear response, I have applied the following priorities for the improvement of ACE conventional forces since 1979.

First is to do better with those forces that nations have already committed to Allied Command Europe [ACE] by bringing them up to our standards for manning, equipping, training, sustaining and maintaining. Thus, it is very helpful that the Secretary of Defense places the highest priority on readiness and sustainment of U.S. forces now in Europe.

The second priority is to continue to modernize our weapon systems and, as we do, seek the means to enhance our ability to reduce to a manageable ratio the number of enemy forces against which ACE forces would have to defend in its forward defensive positions.

To address this issue, SHAPE has developed the concept of follow-on force attack, or FOFA, which is described more fully in my written statement.

Our capability to implement this concept, I believe, will determine how long Allied Command Europe can defend conventionally.

Our third priority is to add to our force structure, primarily with trained, mobilizable reserves.

The accomplishment of these priorities will require all nations, including the United States, to renew their commitment to addressing the imbalance of conventional military power. Further deterioration of the balance threatens to allow the Soviets eventually to obtain their objective in Western Europe, that of using their military power to intimidate, coerce, and blackmail in order to gain political, economic, and military concessions—or, in another's words, to gather the fruits of victory without the pains of war.

While the necessary conventional force improvements will require additional resources, I wish to make it clear again to this committee that, as a defensive alliance, we do not need to match the Soviets one for one in any area of force comparison. But we must ensure that the military situation, measured in terms of what is required to deter both aggression and intimidation, does not get beyond restoration.

While we do need to maintain a "reasonable prospect" conventional posture, we must not delude ourselves into thinking that defeating a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact without the threat by us of the first use of nuclear weapons is feasible. Such a result would only weaken our deterrence by creating the possibility that the aggressor could believe that the costs of aggression might be limited to acceptable levels.

We must maintain the full spectrum of deterrence, or live with a greatly increased risk of war, because it is Soviet uncertainty about whether we will use nuclear weapons that makes such weapons the final guarantor of our deterrence.

The Soviets must always face the possibility that if they attack the West, their ultimate risk will be the potential escalation to the strategic nuclear exchange, the one thing which they fear most.

Unfortunately, we cannot wish away the Soviet military threat and the realities of that threat. Our responsibilities as an alliance force us to confront the need to make sacrifices to maintain the level of security we desire.

Rather than face up to the fact that all alliance members need to do more, some Americans argue that our allies should carry a larger share of the burden for their defense. I believe the contribution of our allies is often misunderstood and underestimated. European nations provide the majority of the forces in NATO, now and after mobilization. Ninety percent of the land forces and 75 percent of the air and Navy would be West European if we went to war tomorrow. And, after full mobilization, if it worked the way we have it planned, 75 percent of the land forces would be European, 50 percent air, and 30 percent of the Navy.

They have shouldered the political consequences of deploying the Pershing IIs and ground launched cruise missiles on their soil, as well as conscripting their populace in most instances.

Allied funding commitments for NATO infrastructure programs has doubled, and for the first time an ally, Germany, is absorbing a significant cost of supporting U.S. units by providing 93,000 reservists dedicated to U.S. support requirements.

There are hidden costs for allies in the area of collective burdensharing, hidden costs for which they get no credit. Despite misperceptions by some, our NATO allies make very substantial contributions to our mutual security, much more than is usually acknowledged.

Those who advocate the reduction in U.S. commitment to NATO, in order to prompt our allies to increase their defensive efforts, are pursuing a counterproductive strategy. Visible reductions in the U.S. commitment, such as a sizable withdrawal of U.S. forces, would signal our allies, as well as our enemies, that we were either less concerned about the threat to our collective security or that we no longer share the determination to resist that threat.

The former message could lull Europeans into a false sense of security, and the latter could create a sense of hopelessness and defeatism that would encourage accommodation and appeasement with the East, which is precisely what the Soviets want. Neither of these responses furthers U.S. interests.

U.S. forces in Europe are a critical component of the defense of NATO, as well as a vital element of successful deterrence.

The Soviets know that we will not abandon our troops in the event of a conflict, and we will take whatever steps are necessary to include the use of nuclear weapons to ensure their safety.

Answering the question how many U.S. troops are enough to deter is very difficult because it requires us to crawl into the Soviet mind. But it is safe to say that, based on Allied Command Europe's requirement for the United States to provide two Army corps on line and 28 tactical fighter squadrons plus supporting Naval forces, we do not have enough U.S. troops in theater to fulfill our assigned missions should a war start tomorrow. In fact, a large number of troops are needed to do the tasks that Allied Command Europe expects of U.S. forces on M-Day, which are essential to raise the combat support and combat service support units currently in theater to wartime strength and to provide their required support structure. An additional number are needed to make up the shortfall aggravated by our efforts to make room within the European troop ceiling for critically needed capability enhancements, such as the ground launched cruise missile.

And troop reductions are an economically bankrupt idea as well. As Secretary Weinberger has pointed out, it will cost more than $5 billion to withdraw the proposed troops from Europe and create the facilities for them in the CONUS, and providing airlift to return them and their equipment to Europe is unrealistic, as it would require about $100 billion.

Even the most cost-effective solution, prepositioning their equipment in Europe—if we could find the real estate—and airlifting personnel back to Europe will cost almost $25 billion.

As Secretary Weinberger has said, every cost argument favors staying in Europe, not pulling out.

Further, unilaterally withdrawing a sizable portion of U.S. troops from Europe would undermine U.S. negotiations with the Soviets for balanced conventional troop reduction. Moscow would be handed our reductions with no quid pro quo on her part.

The idea of troop withdrawal is not new. I have been working with it since the days of the Mansfield amendment in 1971. Each time we look at it, however, we come to the same conclusion: to reduce our commitment reduces our own security, and the costs of that are more than I think we should want to bear.

If our forces in Europe are to be effective, we must maintain adequate levels of readiness and sustainability. And while our capabilities have been improving steadily in recent years, we must continue to improve if we are to prevent the Soviets from attaining their objective in Western Europe.

In my written statement, I have outlined a number of manpower, training, support, reinforcement issues that are affecting our ability to accomplish our mission. U.S. European Command warfighting requirements have been prioritized in the Commander in Chief's integrated priority list in order to provide guidance for the development of budget proposals.

The highest priority in our current priority list is for programs affecting people within our command.

Next are programs to maintain readiness and sustainability.

The third priority on the U.S. side is to develop and field key modernization items to redress gaps in required capabilities.

The final priority, again, is force structure—enhancements that will improve readiness and sustainability.

As I said earlier, we have made considerable progress over the past several years. However, we will need your support and commitment if we are to continue to ensure that our national security objectives are met.

Congressional action in the following areas will pay high dividends in increasing the capabilities of the forces of U.S. European Command.

Support our military construction requirements;

Remove the European troop strength ceiling so I no longer have to cut or to defer improvements to conventional forces to make room for theater nuclear modernization;

Hold the line on readiness cuts that affect much needed training as we transition to modernized systems;

Support combat service and combat service support enhancements required to support adequately the in-being forces as well as those reinforcing units;

Continue support for the three balanced elements necessary to meet our force deployment commitment to NATO—air and sealift improvements; prepositioning, and infrastructure construction;

Support the funding for critical war-stopper munitions and equipment necessary to sustain our conventional defense;

Continue the support for chemical defense and retaliatory capabilities, and;

Support the in-theater casualty treatment capability, thus decreasing airlift and replacement requirements.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I again salute you and your committee for your recognition that the determination of our defense needs must be based on a clear understanding of our vital national interests, the threat to those interests and our strategy to meet that threat, and not just on the availability of resources.

In an era of constrained resources—and when have they not been constrained—we recognize the need to set priorities in order to ensure our most important requirements are met. And so, we have done that.

I am hopeful that that country will have the foresight required to take the actions necessary to protect both peace and freedom—for, in the final analysis, we will get the level of security that we have convinced our people they need and are willing to pay for.

While the costs may be high, effective deterrent requires sacrifice. But I cannot help reflect on the much greater price we pay should that deterrence fail.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Rogers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. I welcome this opportunity to appear before you for my last time as the CINCEUR. I salute your efforts to examine the threats to our vital national interests and the linkage between them, U.S. goals/objectives, U.S. military strategy and capabilities. Your review highlights the importance of determining force levels based on needs and objectives, not merely resource availability.

To set the stage for my discussion of the topics you asked me to address in your letter of invitation of 17 December 86, I believe it appropriate to review briefly U.S. interests and security objectives as related to Western Europe and NATO. For those interests and objectives, along with consideration of the threat to them, help shape our strategy and the military capabilities needed to implement it.

U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

NATIONAL INTERESTS

The primary U.S. national interests are peace, freedom and prosperity for ourselves and our friends around the world. The continued freedom of Western Europe from Warsaw Pact (WP)/Soviet aggression and intimidation/coercion is crucial to these interests. Currently, U.S. defense policy places the defense of Western Europe as second only to the defense of North America itself. This is appropriate because the defense of North America begins not on the beaches of the Eastern seaboard, but at the Inner-German border. Any other approach only makes it more likely that we will someday have to defend those beaches.

While I will speak at greater length about the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, our European allies are of strategic importance because without them the global balance of power would shift alarmingly in favor of the Soviet Union. Our NATO allies are strong and capable militarily, more so than the allies of the Soviet Union, and they contribute significantly to the global military balance so vital to American security. Control over Western Europe would take the Soviets a giant step along the path toward their goals of isolating the United States and eventually dominating the world.

In addition to the strategic importance of our NATO allies, we cannot forget the economic importance of Western Europe to our continued prosperity. Trade with our NATO partners in 1985 constituted more than 20% of the total U.S. foreign commerce, totaling over $120 billion, almost twice the amount traded with the Orient. In addition, two-way investment between the U.S. and Western Europe exceeds $830 billion, approximately 40% of the U.S. total. Europe has become even more important to our well being in the past 40 years, as our economies have become increasingly interdependent. The combined economic power of the NATO nations is more than double that of the Warsaw Pact. If Europe were brought into the Soviet orbit, the balance would shift to the Soviets, to the long term detriment of U.S. interests.

In addition to military and economic interests, there are the deep-seated political and cultural ties we have with our NATO partners. To allow the neutralization or domination of these democracies by the Soviet Union would call into question our commitment to freedom around the world and would isolate the U.S. from potential friends and allies everywhere.

As we examine U.S. objectives, strategy and forces, we must remember that our commitments as a member of NATO contribute directly and centrally to our own vital national interests. We are not in Europe solely because of an altruistic concern for their security; we are there because of a pragmatic concern for our own welfare as well as theirs.

NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

From a clear assessment of our national interests, we can identify those security objectives that should form the basis for strategy and force structure. Rather than restating all the U.S. security objectives, let me just mention those that are of particular relevance to U.S. interests in Europe.

° Deter nuclear attack on the U.S. and its forces and allies and to discourage the use of nuclear weapons in any war.

° Deter, but should deterrence fail, defeat armed aggression of any kind against the U.S., its allies, friends and critical U.S. interests abroad.

° Encourage and assist our allies and friends in defending themselves against armed invasion, insurgencies and terrorism.

° Pursue equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

Just as our interests are inextricably linked to Western Europe, so too are these objectives. We cannot achieve our security objectives without ensuring that NATO remains a bulwark against communist expansion. With these interests and objectives in mind, let me turn to the military objectives in the European Command Area of Responsibility.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN USEUCOM

U.S. European Command's primary mission is the support of NATO. The objective of NATO as a defensive military alliance is to preserve peace with freedom by deterring enemy aggression, and, should an attack occur by defending successfully at minimum cost. While NATO was established to preserve the economic and political freedom of Europe by preventing attack, Senator Arthur Vandenburg identified another of its crucial responsibilities when he included as an objective, "to avoid appeasements which are but surrender on the installment plan." It is not enough therefore, for us to deter an actual attack, NATO must also prevent the Soviets from achieving a situation whereby using their military power as a backdrop, they can successfully intimidate and blackmail Europe into accommodating to Soviet desires.

MILITARY STRATEGY: MATCHING OBJECTIVES AND CAPABILITIES

NATO and U.S. military strategies are fully compatible. Both recognize that deterrence and defense must be accomplished collectively, as an alliance, in order to be successful. The primary goal of NATO strategy is to deter the threat of any kind of war, not just nuclear war. And it is to achieve this end that NATO's strategy has evolved in response to changing threats confronting NATO.

The current strategy of Flexible Response/Forward Defense was adopted in 1967 in response to changes in the strategic nuclear balance which weakened the credibility of NATO's previous strategy of "massive retaliation". Flexible Response seeks to deter any possible aggression, ranging from subversion to all-out nuclear war. It does so by causing potential aggressors to believe that the costs of aggression would far exceed any possible benefits.

For a deterrent strategy to be effective, it must be credible. To maintain credibility, NATO must demonstrate both the capability and the will to prevent an aggressor from achieving its objectives. Flexible Response remains credible by maintaining a full range of options to counter military aggression. Should deterrence fail, the strategy envisions the use of the following responses to restore the territorial integrity and security of NATO.

(1) Direct defense to defeat an attack or to place the burden of escalation on the aggressor. This is NATO's preferred response. It deters attack by being able to deny the aggressor his initial objectives and depends for its success on the maintenance of adequate conventional forces. Effective conventional defense strengthens the crediblity of deterrence since threats of nuclear response to limited conventional aggression are of questionable credibility in an era of nuclear parity.

(2) Deliberate escalation on NATO's part, to include the possible first-use of nuclear weapons. The first-use option of nuclear weapons is the crucial factor in our equation of deterrence and its being credible.

(3) General Nuclear Response. The ultimate guarantor of deterrence.

CAPABILITIES OF MILITARY FORCES TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES

The broad scope of responses envisioned under Flexible Response/Forward Defense enables NATO to accommodate to a changing threat, to incorporate new technological developments and to respond to changes in concepts and doctrines developed by the Warsaw Pact -- provided that the Alliance maintains adequate forces to implement and support its strategy. It is through our efforts to maintain these forces that we demonstrate our capability and will necessary for successful deterrence.

Our ability to deter rests primarily, but not solely (e.g. will) upon our ability to defend. The ability to defend rests primarily upon our military warfighting capabilities. To be able both to deter and defend, we must support with an adequate capability each leg of our triad of forces: strategic nuclear, non-strategic nuclear, and conventional. Weakening any leg of the triad creates a danger that deterrence could collapse and jeopardizes our ability to accomplish NATO's defense. An examination of the NATO triad reveals both good and bad news:

° The current modernization of strategic nuclear forces by the United States and Britain will ensure that the deterrent value of these forces remains high in the foreseeable future.

° The NATO decision of December 1979 to modernize its non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF) has addressed the gap that had grown in our spectrum of deterrence in that important leg. The implementation of that decision is proceeding on schedule.

° But, NATO's current conventional posture does not provide credible deterrence.

CONVENTIONAL FORCE POSTURE

Credible deterrence requires that NATO maintain a conventional capability that would give us a reasonable prospect of frustrating a non-nuclear attack by conventional means, forcing the Soviets to confront the onus of escalation. At a minimum, we require sufficient conventional forces to permit our political authorities to make a determined and deliberate decision to move to a nuclear response, if that is necessary. These forces should also be sufficient to protect our nuclear assets so they are available when and if we need them. Further, we need an adequate conventional capability to permit our reinforcements to get deployed.

At the same time, we should not have such strong conventional forces -- even if we could achieve such a level, which we can't -- that we delude ourselves and the Soviet Union into thinking that it would be feasible to defeat a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact without the threat of nuclear weapons. I want to make it absolutely clear that the threat of our resort to nuclear weapons is key to our deterrence being credible.

NATO's current conventional posture is one of my major concerns and has been for over 7½ years. If attacked conventionally today, NATO would face fairly quickly the decision to escalate to a nuclear response in order to try to cause the aggressor to halt its advance. We are in such a posture for several reasons, but primarily it results from NATO's inability to sustain its forces adequately with trained manpower, ammunition, and war reserve materiel.

In order to avoid mortgaging NATO's defense to an early nuclear response, as SACEUR I have applied the following priorities for the improvement of conventional forces:

- First, to do better with those forces that nations have already committed to Allied Command Europe (ACE) by bringing them up to ACE standards for manning, equipping, training, sustaining and maintaining. It is therefore helpful that the Secretary of Defense places the highest priority on readiness and sustainment of U.S. forces in-being.

- Second, to continue to modernize our weapons systems and, as we do so, to seek the means to enhance our ability to reduce to a manageable ratio the number of enemy forces against which ACE forces would have to defend at its forward defensive positions. We have developed the concept of Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA), which is discussed later in the paper, in order to address this problem. Our capability to implement this concept will be the determinant of how long ACE can defend conventionally.

- Third, to add to our force structure, primarily with trained, mobilizable reserves.

ROLE OF NUCLEAR FORCES

Even if NATO could achieve a "reasonable prospect" conventional posture, we would still need to retain the threat of nuclear escalation for its deterrent value. We must always ensure that the Soviets realize that any level of military aggression against NATO carries with it the ultimate risk of the conflict escalating to the strategic nuclear exchange, the one thing they fear.

Nuclear weapons remain the final guarantor of our deterrence. Today, as in 1967, the Soviet Union cannot predict with any certainty when or where the Alliance would resort to the first use of nuclear weapons to defend NATO territory. Whether the Alliance will have the will to do so, will in the end depend upon the perception of the men in the Kremlin about what kind of people we are and of what kind of stuff we are made. The Soviets may doubt that we will exercise the first use option, but they can never be certain that we will not. This uncertainty plays a crucial role in the credibility of our deterrence.

FUNDAMENTAL TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE -

CAPITALIZING ON OUR STRENGTHS AND EXPLOITING WP WEAKNESSES

The specific elements of NATO's strategy of Flexible Response incorporate several basic principles:

(1) Keep Soviets and the Warsaw Pact off balance.

(2) Cause Soviet defense expenditures in ways which detract from their offensive capabilities.

(3) Emphasize and focus Allied strengths on Soviet and Warsaw Pact shortcomings.

Based on these principles we have initiated plans and programs designed to exploit a number of Soviet and Warsaw Pact weaknesses:

Unreliable allies. The Soviets have no assurance of full political/military support for Soviet aggression from all its WP allies. Their fidelity to the Soviets varies from very strong to weak. We intend to take advantage of this current, and potential dissension.

Inflexible doctrine and centralized command and control. The Soviet concept of operations depends on the echeloning of forces behind its first line of engaged troops and is characterized by a comparatively rigid system of command and control and time-distance milestones for those forces. Early disruption of WP timing, complemented by using our electronic warfare tools to forcibly interrupt command and control communications and electronic systems, is planned in order to delay, disrupt and neutralize follow-on forces, to separate units from higher headquarters and to increase the fog of war.

Constrained access to the seas. Soviet naval capabilities are expanding greatly, but access to "blue waters" is still limited by a few choke points. NATO plans to block choke points early, e.g., the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap, the Danish Straits, and the Turkish Straits.

Warsaw Pact technological inferiority. The West is still able to use its advantages in technology to offset Soviet/WP quantitative advantages, although our lead is narrowing. Despite Soviet gains, the potential for NATO cooperative efforts to expand our technological edge is high. Such an approach, which shares R&D knowledge and costs, maximizes the comparative advantages and strengths of each nation. To be successful, however, we must prioritize our efforts in selected areas and follow through aggressively with necessary support and funding.

Manpower. Soviet demographic problems, short conscription/ training time and troop morale may be significant when facing a robust ACE defense. Our conventional defense enhancements are designed to exploit this weakness.

NATO PRIORITIES IN A CONFLICT

NATO's first priority is to destroy initial attacks from Warsaw Pact ground and air forces; if this is not accomplished, conventional defense against follow-on forces is fruitless. Second, to preclude being overwhelmed and to take advantage of WP weaknesses, we must also have the ability to delay, disrupt and destroy their follow-on forces, as well as a concurrent capability to reduce the effectiveness of Soviet air and missile forces.

The initial attack is being addressed in numerous ways. NATO nations have initiated cooperative production efforts to improve the capabilities of in-being forces. Barrier plans to disrupt, slow down and attrit lead echelons of mechanized forces have been developed. Standoff munitions and electronic warfare systems are being developed that can attack Soviet C^3 centers, airfields and forces, while increasing the survivability of friendly forces. Finally, night and all weather air capability is being improved in order to find Soviet lead echelons and to complicate their movement and supply.

Our response to the problem posed by Soviet follow-on forces is two-pronged. First, Special Operations Forces will be used for intelligence gathering, direct action operations and against noted weaknesses. Second, is the doctrine of Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA), whose aim is to prevent these reinforcements from reaching the battlefront. FOFA is designed to give us the capability to attack, with conventional weapons (not forces), those enemy forces (including Operational Maneuver Groups) which stretch from just behind the troops in contact to as far into the enemy's rear area as our target acquisition and conventional weapons systems will permit. As I mentioned earlier, the objective of FOFA is to reduce to manageable proportions the number of attacking Warsaw Pact forces against which we would have to defend at our forward defensive positions. That is FOFA in a nutshell. In order to dispel some misconceptions about FOFA, I would also like to remind you of what it is not.

- FOFA is not a new strategy. As a subconcept of defensive operations, it simply provides more effective conventional means to implement Flexible Response better.

- FOFA does not ignore the Soviet/WP offensive doctrine, but rather it comes to grips with the realities of that doctrine.

- FOFA is not the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle in disguise. NATO cannot accept a policy of preemption nor a doctrine of massive ground attacks to the East.

- FOFA capability will not be acquired at the expense of our forces defending at forward defensive positions. Defending forward and attacking follow-on forces are complementary, mutually reinforcing key mission components. A strong forward defense will protect our longer range FOFA systems, and attacking WP follow-on forces will reduce the strength of enemy forces attacking forward defensive positions.

- Most importantly, FOFA will not replace the nuclear option, but it will reduce our reliance upon it, at least early reliance. The price of an attack on Western Europe must remain the possibility of triggering an incalculable chain of escalation.

- Finally, FOFA does not lean solely on future technology. Rather, much of the capability we need is possible with current, proven technology. What we are seeking is to exploit better our use of current technology for FOFA purposes while we continue, in a systematic way, to evaluate emerging technology to see if it has potential to be mission- and cost-effective for FOFA.

Follow-on Forces Attack, like other components of Flexible Response, attempts to maximize our strengths while attacking WP weaknesses. In order for any of the elements of Flexible Response to accomplish its goal, we must heighten our efforts to improve the training, readiness, sustainment and quality of our troops. For, in the final analysis, they are the key ingredient in any competitive strategy.

AN ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

I believe that the The NATO Strategy of Flexible Response/Forward Defense is as valid today as when it was adopted in 1967. It is the tools to implement the strategy that are needed. However, a wide range of concerns have been registered about this strategy, and several alternatives have been proposed. In spite of the breadth of these concerns and alternatives, the various challenges to our strategy can be grouped into two broad categories. One group focuses on the nuclear elements of strategy. These alternatives are variously concerned with the correlation that exists between nuclear and conventional forces and seek to vary the deterrent role of nuclear weapons. A second broad grouping is concerned primarily with the strategic role of our conventional forces and proposes either a radical restructuring of them or fundamental changes to the manner in which they are employed.

CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IMPROVEMENT VS. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Some fear that any improvement of our conventional capabilities might jeopardize our deterrence by raising the nuclear threshold. There is concern that reducing NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons will undermine the credibility and deterrent value of our threatened escalation, that is, the uncertainty of response inherent in "deliberate escalation."

Variations on this theme are:

- that deterrence in Europe would become disconnected or "decoupled" from the American strategic nuclear umbrella;
- that conventional war in Europe would become more likely because an aggressor would face a lesser risk of nuclear escalation; and
- that escalation to nuclear weapons would come eventually, so it is useless to sacrifice further to improve conventional forces when all that would be achieved is a delay of the inevitable.

Improving our conventional posture to the level that I am advocating would give the Alliance a more convincing basis for deterrence, which, after all, is our mission. It would reduce to a more credible level our reliance on nuclear weapons to deter conventional attacks. This shift in reliance away from nuclear weapons would only reduce the likely necessity to escalate; it need not reduce our resolve to escalate first to nuclear weapons should the requirement, in fact, arise. Indeed, the credibility of our threatened first use would be enhanced. By improving our conventional forces we would move away from a posture in which capitulation might be viewed as the most credible choice facing NATO. Shifting to a more credible and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, combined with improving our conventional defense capability, would convey to a potential aggressor that NATO is resolved to defend itself by all means available. Further, improved conventional forces would not only increase NATO's ability to execute deliberate escalation by giving NATO time for the determined political consultation required, they would also provide better protection for our instruments of escalation should they be needed. Because deliberate escalation would be more feasible, it would also appear more credible to a potential aggressor. In sum, deterrence overall is improved by the synergistic contributions of both nuclear and conventional capabilities.

STRENGTHENED CONVENTIONAL POSTURE VS. PREEMPTION

A related concern is that a strengthened NATO conventional posture will only invite a preemptive nuclear strike. Some fear that an aggressor which has already made the decision to attack NATO would also be ready to initiate the use of nuclear weapons if it encounters a strong NATO conventional defense. The response to this concern is that currently such nuclear strikes are deterred by NATO's threat to retaliate with its nuclear weapons, with the probability of further escalation to the strategic nuclear exchange. But, as I've said, it is the non-nuclear attack that we are not deterring adequately today. Improving NATO's conventional forces will not provide an aggressor more incentive to use nuclear weapons, rather it will help to convince him that he could not succeed with any kind of attack or hope of intimidation. Conventional forces threaten the seizure of our territory and it is upon such threats which Soviet intimidation and coercion would be based. Strengthened conventional forces would enhance our ability to deter this menace.

The fundamental reassurance for the various concerns about raising the nuclear threshold is this: improving NATO's conventional forces increases NATO's deterrence of any type of aggression or coercion by signalling NATO's determination to do everything reasonably possible to guarantee peace with its freedom intact.

CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE AND NO FIRST USE

Fear of nuclear war, exacerbated by concerns about nuclear winter theories and the fallout from the Chernobyl incident, has caused some to advocate the abandonment of nuclear deterrence altogether, or at least the declaration of no first use. They argue that by increasing our conventional capabilities we can deter attack without relying on nuclear weapons, thereby clearing the way for their elimination.

Such an approach has important flaws. Not only is it too expensive, more importantly it is very doubtful that conventional deterrence will work. Many no-first-use advocates recommend that such a declaration be preceded by a strengthening of our conventional forces. While such a strengthening would certainly add to NATO's security, the subsequent step of a no-first-use declaration would in fact undermine our deterrence. Of all the arguments against a no-first-use policy, the most important is that it would increase, not decrease, the likelihood of both conventional and nuclear war. This is because a no-first-use policy would remove the key source of NATO's deterrence, the threat of eventual nuclear retaliation against a conventional attack. A first use option deters not so much because a potential aggressor might be convinced that we would carry out our escalatory threat, but rather because he could never be sure that we would not carry it out; as I have mentioned, such uncertainty of response is a significant factor in NATO's deterrent equation.

In essence, a no-first-use doctrine would make it appear that NATO would rather accept a conventional defeat than resort to nuclear weapons. This fundamental truth cannot be finessed by advocating that NATO build up its conventional forces before making a no-first-use declaration. Even with such a build-up, we could never guarantee the success of our non-nuclear defense. A no-first-use doctrine would weaken our deterrence of a conventional conflict which eventually might, and probably would, go nuclear.

The answer to preventing nuclear war is not a no-first-use declaration. We cannot create an artificial firebreak between conventional and nuclear war where a natural one does not exist. Between nuclear powers, such a firebreak is unenforceable, immune to lofty statements and peacetime declarations of "no-first-use." Between nuclear powers the flames of any major conventional conflict would burn too intensely to allow us to have faith in the existence of any such firebreak. The only durable and meaningful firebreak is the one between peace and any kind of war. This we achieve by resisting the allure of shortcuts in favor of the harder, but wiser, challenges to increase our deterrence of all types of aggression.

ABANDONING FORWARD DEFENSE

Turning to the second group of alternatives to Flexible Response/Forward Defense -- those concerned specifically with the strategic role of our conventional forces. Some analysts argue that we should abandon the principle of Forward Defense on the grounds that NATO cannot defeat a numerically superior attacking force if our forces are obliged to deploy into static defensive positions at the border. It is argued that by planning to defend forward, NATO is adopting a Maginot Line mentality which will lead to defeat.

There are three factors which impact upon this line of reasoning. First and foremost, NATO is committed -- politically and militarily -- to the Forward Defense of all NATO territory. Alliance members support Forward Defense, not just those who have common borders with WP countries. There are sound tactical reasons for starting our defense as far forward as practical: we offer no early encouragement to enemy forces by allowing them initial success in their offensive; we ensure that our defense has the greatest possible depth; and we avoid the necessity of having eventually to retake ground ceded previously to the enemy. Secondly, despite what many have been led to believe, we do not envisage deploying our forces in a thin defensive line along the border markers; rather commanders are expected to deploy their forces on the best defensible terrain near the border and to place covering forces between their defensive position and the border. Thirdly, flexibility, firepower, mobility, speed, surprise and initiative are all characteristics we look for in our armed forces, and the fact that most are mechanized is evidence that we are far from adopting a static Maginot defensive posture. The principle of Forward Defense is entirely compatible with the range of our planned defensive maneuver operations designed to seize the initiative from the attacker and turn it to the advantage of the defender.

"DEFENSIVE DEFENSE"

A radical alternative to our current strategy is the concept of "territorial" or "social" or "defensive defense" which is getting some attention in Europe. This alternative is advocated by those who believe that the maintenance of weapons systems which have an "offensive capability" -- tanks, attack helicopters, bombers, cruise missiles, aircraft carriers -- is inappropriate for a defensive Alliance such as NATO and may even invite preemptive attack from nations who feel threatened by our military potential. The advocates of the "defensive" defense concept envision large numbers of civilian reservists equipped with "purely defensive" weapons, such as anti-tank missiles and air defense weapons, who would disrupt enemy passage through NATO territory utilizing a mix of organized anti-armor defense, passive resistance, civil disobedience and guerrilla warfare. Theoretically this would present the Soviets with the daunting task of subduing a large, hostile and combative population.

This concept is beset with inadequacies: it would leave the West vulnerable to blackmail by the threat of overwhelming conventional force, to say nothing of the nuclear threat; the concept provides no convincing deterrent to aggression; it would take effect primarily after NATO territory had been occupied; and it would make the aggressor's territory a sanctuary. Finally, this concept, with no means of ejecting the enemy from NATO territory, is void of hope for our people. The Soviets have proven particularly adept at pacifying captive populations and at absorbing the costs involved in pacification programs over a long period.

"OFFENSIVE RETALIATION"

In sharp contrast to advocates of "defensive defense", there are others who argue that deterrence cannot rest on a defense which solely denies the aggressor his objectives. Seeking to improve deterrence, they advocate that NATO should place Warsaw Pact territory at risk by threatening to launch retaliatory conventional ground offensives into Eastern Europe in the event of a Soviet attack on NATO.

As with some of the other alternatives discussed, this proposal holds an initial attraction. After all, offensive action is an essential element of a viable defense, and Soviet/Warsaw Pact offensive strategy and their operational doctrine would seem to make Warsaw Pact nations vulnerable to the threat of a conventional drive by NATO into Eastern Europe. Indeed, NATO has always been firmly committed to offensive counter-attack operations in order to recover any NATO territory lost to an aggressor; our operational plans reflect this commitment.

But, NATO is a defensive alliance and retaliatory invasion into Eastern Europe on a large scale by NATO's ground forces is not a concept that would be acceptable politically to the Allies. Neither is it likely that the Alliance would -- nor could -- build up its conventional forces to the level where they could simultaneously defend adequately at the general defense positions, protect our rear areas, and conduct large scale cross-border offensive operations into the teeth of the Warsaw Pact second strategic echelon. Thus a conventional offensive retaliatory strategy is neither acceptable politically, feasible financially, nor appropriate militarily. If ACE had the forces necessary to make such a strategy work, Flexible Response/Forward Defense would be more than adequately provided for, and defense and deterrence would be assured without the need to endorse a politically and operationally risky course.

ROLES AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUR ALLIES

It is very difficult to measure exactly the relative contribution of each member of NATO. There is no single, universally accepted formula for calculating the contributions of each of the diverse nations that form the Alliance. Contributions include both quantifiable and, equally important, non-quantifiable factors. The bottom line is that our allies make a very substantial contribution to collective security -- much more than they are usually given credit for.

European nations provide the majority of forces to NATO. Prior to mobilization, Europe provides 90% of the land forces and 75% of the naval and air forces. Even after mobilization of U.S. based forces, Europe still provides 75% of the land forces, 50% of the air forces, and 30% of the naval forces available for NATO's defense.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND AGREEMENTS

The contribution of our allies is manifested in other concrete ways as well. The deployment in Europe of Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles has enhanced our nuclear deterrent significantly. There was a political cost for West European nations associated with this deployment.

With respect to conventional force improvements, a number have been made:

(1) Infrastructure. Substantial increases have been made to the NATO Infrastructure Program. Funding commitments in the current six-year plan, which started in 1985 are more than double those of the previous six years, rising from an average of $850 million per year to over $1.7 billion annually.

(2) Ammunition. Our allies are beginning to make significant increases to their holdings of some critical ammunition stocks.

(3) Reinforcements. Allied arrangements for reception, onward movement and other logistical support for deploying reinforcements have improved significantly. The Allies have also committed almost 500 commercial ships, and about 84 B-747 aircraft equivalents to facilitate U.S. reinforcement.

(4) Host Nation Support. Through Host Nation Assistance Agreements, our allies are absorbing a significant portion of the support costs for U.S. units. We estimate that the U.S./FRG host nation support agreement alone would cost the U.S. 40 times more if it had to provide these capabilities. Nations throughout ACE are committed to providing substantial wartime Host Nation Support.

ADDITIONAL ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS

There are also a number of "hidden costs" for security are being borne by European allies:

(1) All European NATO nations, less UK and Luxembourg, have the politically unpopular system of conscription with its social/human costs.

(2) FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK have provided substantial facilities for prepositioning of equipment for U.S. reinforcement forces.

(3) There are over 900 U.S. installations in Europe provided by host nations. The value of the real estate provided in the FRG and UK alone exceeds $20 billion. Nations receive no revenues from the real estate or facilities on them.

(4) Military training activity imposes a heavy burden on European populations. For example, in the FRG -- the size of Oregon -- which alone hosts over 400,000 troops from six other nations, over 5,000 military exercises are

held annually. Allied air forces fly 580,000 sorties over Germany each year; over 100,000 at low level.

(5) The storage of U.S. nuclear weapons has become a controversial political issue, yet we have received strong governmental support from allies.

(6) Finally, it is our European Allies that will provide the battlefields again, with the concomitant devastation, in any future NATO-WP war.

OTHER NATO INITIATIVES

We have also seen numerous initiatives to gain greater warfighting capability with fewer resources:

(1) International cooperation in arms production has improved, due in part to actions such as the Nunn and Quayle Amendments.

(2) Development and acceptance of the SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan has improved our ability to increase our forces rapidly.

(3) Acceptance of the SACEUR's Conceptual Military Framework, to include implementation of the Follow-on Force Attack concept, has improved our ability to properly focus R&D resources.

(4) The Conventional Defense Improvement Initiative of the Secretary General provides needed emphasis to enhance this leg of the NATO triad.

(5) Timely programming and authorization of NATO infrastructure funds have recouped 294.2 million and deobligated another 67.4 million U.S. dollars since 1980.

Although it appears at times that the Europeans are not helping U.S. global containment efforts, the reality is a bit different. For example, both Britain and France assisted the U.S. in mine clearing operations in the Red Sea. In addition, the French are active in Africa, the British in Oman, and both contribute to Western security efforts in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Other NATO countries are involved in peacekeeping and provide military aid to developing nations.

Our allies also contribute economically to nations within the Alliance, as well as assisting developing nations. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, makes significant contributions to the economies of Turkey and Greece. It will surprise some Americans to note that Europe provides almost 30% more development aid to the Third World than does the U.S., in spite of having a total Gross Domestic Product only 60% the size of the United States -- hardly the picture of an insular group failing to contribute to Western global interests.

ROLE OF U.S. FORCES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO

As the leader of NATO and its wealthiest, most powerful member, the United States incurs certain special responsibilities that it should not ignore. The level of our defense effort sets the standard for the rest of the Alliance. If we falter and reduce our contributions to collective security, rather than the others filling the gap it is more likely that we will see reductions in their defense efforts. Those who advocate a reduction in the U.S. commitment to NATO in order to force our allies to increase their efforts are pursuing a dangerous and counterproductive strategy. Visible reductions in U.S. commitment, such as withdrawal of U.S. forces, would signal our allies that we were either less concerned about the threat to our collective security or that we no longer share a determination to resist that threat. The former message could lull the Europeans into a false sense of security, the latter could create a sense of hopelessness and defeatism that would encourage accommodation and appeasement with the East. Neither of these responses furthers U.S. interests.

U.S. forces in Europe have two roles: deterrence and defense. The value of 326,000 U.S. troops is considerable, especially in the face of Warsaw Pact advantages in conventional forces. Reductions would weaken NATO in the critical region of the central front, making rapid Soviet conventional progress more likely. More important, however, is the deterrent value of U.S. forces in Europe. The Soviets know that we will not abandon our troops in the event of conflict and that we will take whatever steps are necessary, to include the use of nuclear weapons, to ensure their safety. As long as the Soviets realize this fact, they will think long and hard before committing aggression.

There are some persons who, while agreeing that U.S. troops must remain in Europe for reasons I have mentioned, believe we can reduce the number without an adverse impact on deterrence. After all, won't the U.S. protect 200,000 troops as tenaciously as 326,000? Answering the question, "How many troops are enough to deter?" is very difficult, because it requires us to guess what our adversaries think. But it is safe to say that based on Allied Command Europe's requirement for the U.S. to provide two Army Corps on line, and twenty-eight tactical fighter squadrons plus supporting naval forces, we do not have enough U.S. troops in theater to fulfill our assigned missions should a war start tomorrow. In fact, an additional 100,000+ troops are needed to do the tasks ACE expects of us on M-day -- not 100,000 less. 76,000 are essential to raise the units currently in theater to wartime strength and to provide their required support structure.

An additional 30,000 are needed to make up the shortfall in conventional combat and support forces aggravated by our efforts to make room within the European Troop Ceiling for critically needed capability enhancements, such as GLCM.

Troop reductions are an economically bankrupt idea as well. As Secretary Weinberger has pointed out, the initial costs of withdrawing 100,000 troops would exceed 5 billion dollars; providing them airlift to return them and their equipment to Europe is unrealistic as it would require about 100 billion dollars. Even with prepositioning of equipment in Europe, the costs would be between 20-25 billion dollars. As the Secretary said: "Every cost argument favors staying in Europe, not pulling out."

Further, unilaterally withdrawing a sizeable portion of U.S. troops from Europe would undermine the U.S. negotiations with the Soviets for balanced troop reductions. Moscow would be handed our reduction with no quid pro quo on her part.

The idea of troop withdrawal is not new. We have looked at it again and again whenever the U.S. has become annoyed with its allies, or perceive that they are not bearing a fair share of the burden of defense. Each time, however, we come to the same conclusion: to reduce our commitment reduces our own security, and the costs of that are more than we should want to bear.

ASSESSMENT OF NATO AND WP FORCES

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided this Committee with a net assessment when he appeared on 21 January. In general I agree with his assessment for NATO/WP forces. The WP has fielded massive conventional, chemical and nuclear forces opposite NATO. The threat facing ACE includes:

- Almost 190 divisions, with a full range of combat and support formations, versus 80 NATO divisions.
- Approximately 8000 combat aircraft and attack helicopters arrayed against NATO's 3700.
- Over 1,000 naval vessels, including more than 250 submarines and approximately 200 major combatants, targeted for use against the European Theater. To counter this threat, NATO has approximately 150 submarines and less than 350 major combatants.
- Over 1100 LRINF/SRINF land based launchers deployed within range of NATO, with over 1600 immediately available warheads. NATO has less than 500 LRINF/SRINF land based launchers with only 316 warheads that can reach Soviet soil.

SOVIET/WP IMPROVEMENTS

Annual improvements have significantly increased overall WP capabilities. During 1986 alone several important improvements were noted: increasingly complex and realistic exercises, improving force readiness; continued modernization and upgrading of their ground forces with self-propelled artillery, modern tanks, and improved forward air defense systems being fielded in large numbers; improved fighters, ground attack aircraft and strategic aviation bombers were produced and based opposite NATO; additional naval forces were constructed for use against NATO with the increased availability of more modern strategic systems making older SSBN's increasingly available as theater assets. The result of these relentless Soviet efforts to enhance their military machine is a continuing widening gap between the conventional force capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in spite of NATO's improvements.

As mentioned earlier, we estimate that ACE forces are currently capable of engaging and holding an initial conventional assault for only a relatively short time due primarily to a lack of sustainability: trained replacements for casualties, ammunition stocks and prepositioned war reserve materiel to replace battlefield losses. Our current deficiencies can lead to an early choice between escalation or capitulation.

Major deficiencies which have been noted and targeted for improvement include:

(1) Ground Forces and Reinforcements. Shortfalls in standing ground forces and dependence on timely arrival of reinforcements, which limits our capability to defeat the lead echelon and complicates our efforts to prevent a breakthrough of the forward lines.

(2) Mobilizable Forces. Mobilizable forces vary considerably in levels of training, equipment, manning and availability. This variance is notable within as well as between nations; and many, including some U.S. forces, are inadequate for their tasks. All are dependent on an early political decision if they are to provide any meaningful increase in NATO's capabilities.

(3) Aircraft. We lack adequate numbers of suitable aircraft and the modern air munitions with which to arm them. As a result, we depend on early reinforcements, especially in the flanks, to maintain a favorable air situation. The lack of a common, compatible, secure system of identification also creates widespread and severe operational limitations.

(4) Sustainability. Sustainability stock shortfalls complicate the situation. We must have the capability

to adequately supply our conventional forces with needed munitions, replacements and spares.

(5) Quality. NATO's current qualitative advantage over the Soviets is eroding. The Soviets are not blind to their own weaknesses. Command reorganizations and qualitative improvements are designed to eliminate areas that may be exploited by the West.

The Soviet political system offers two military advantages. First, they deploy what they have (U.S. debated MX deployment for 12 years while Soviets deployed 8 new missiles). Second, their centralized political system provides a firm base for planning steady investments in military technology. They are able to predict what systems will be deployed in the future and no concern is given to environmental studies, funding debates or public pressure and opinion.

As a defensive alliance, we do not need to match the Warsaw Pact one for one in any area of force capability. However, we must ensure that the military situation, measured in terms of what is required for deterrence of aggression or intimidation, does not get beyond restoration. For if that were to happen, we not only increase the possibility of aggression, we also expose Western Europe to coercion and blackmail.

The Soviets would prefer to avoid war - they're too smart to run the risks involved. The primary role of their military power in Europe is to enable the Soviets eventually to intimidate Western Europe in order to gain political, economic and military concessions. In other words, to gather the fruits of victory without the pains of war. As I have mentioned, this is the Soviet objective in Western Europe, and she means to accomplish it patiently and opportunistically. My major concern is that the gap between comparative NATO-WP force capabilities will grow so large that she might eventually succeed.

As you consider the linkage between interests, strategy and capabilities, I would like to interject a note of caution. It would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of our interests in Western Europe. The greatest potential vulnerability to the U.S. homeland would result from a confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe. The concern we have about other parts of the world is valid, as we are a global power, but Western Europe must remain the centerpiece of our containment strategy. The United States must demonstrate its willingness to defend its interests in this region and to provide leadership in setting the standard for meeting the resource requirements that securing those interests requires. If we reduce our efforts, we can expect our allies to do the same.

It would also be a mistake to underestimate the threat posed by Warsaw Pact military power. As Zbigniew Brzezinski has stated, the Soviets are essentially a one dimensional power. World domination through an expansionist foreign policy remains the overarching Soviet goal, and military force is the principal instrument for achieving it. The Soviet economy is weak, as their leadership admits, and their ideology is being exposed around the world as a bankrupt vision for the future. It is military power alone that supports the Soviet claim to superpower status, and it is military might that provides their ability to influence and intimidate other nations.

Soviet military might already is far greater than that required to defend the "motherland", so we have to ask ourselves: Why do the Soviets continue to spend 15-17% of their GNP on the military? Why does Soviet military doctrine emphasize rapid offensive operations and why is their arsenal filled with weapons designed to implement such an aggressive doctrine? Why do they continue to occupy Eastern Europe with more than half a million troops? Why do they crush any glimmer of freedom or independence among their allies and neighbors? These questions must be answered before we can relax our vigilance or reduce our efforts to defend our interests.

Finally, it would be a mistake to reject the strategy of Flexible Response/Forward Defense just because we find the costs of implementing it to be burdensome. At this time there are no viable alternatives that do not entail either much greater expenditures or much greater risks.

What must we do to maintain the security of the NATO alliance? We must maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. We must improve our conventional forces so that they can continue to contribute effectively to our overall deterrent posture. And we must pursue effective, balanced and verifiable arms reduction accords in order to reduce the level of threat, thus enabling us to legitimately reduce the costs of protecting peace and freedom.

US EUROPEAN COMMAND

In your letter of 17 December 86, Mr. Chairman, you asked that I not only discuss military strategy in my area from various aspects, but you also sought my views on the readiness of U.S. EUCOM forces, their critical deficiencies and my resource program priorities. I wish to turn to those matters now.

READINESS/SUSTAINABILITY.

The readiness and sustainability of our forces in Europe, in my opinion, are in better shape today than at anytime since NATO was formed some 38 years ago. Our troops are smarter, better trained and have more modern equipment; all of which serves to strengthen our deterrent posture. However, while we are better, we have not advanced as far as we need to go toward a force that meets all the needs of deterrence. We still have deficiencies in our capability to deploy, fight, and sustain ourselves in a conventional war in Europe.

That being said, let me turn to some of the key elements that affect the readiness of our forces in Europe today and limit the preparedness of current units.

Working and Living Conditions. The working and living conditions for our forces in Europe continue to be inadequate. Your continued support for family housing new construction and increased lease authorizations now is all the more important. As funds have been reduced, efforts to eliminate the Services' backlog of deferred maintenance has been reduced and delayed. This translates into less repairs for working and living areas and increased sacrifices for our Service members and their families. Contradicting signals are also being received from Congress on how MWR facilities at new or expanded mission bases should be funded. While the discussion between the use of appropriated versus non-appropriated funds continues, the real losers are the individuals and their families for whom the facilities were requested. This impacts especially hard on those families overseas where limited off-base facilities are available. Even where off base activities exist, the current and forecasted exchange rates have made these host nation facilities unaffordable. A continuation of this trend, combined with recent PCS extensions, continued reductions in military construction for DOD dependents schools, and the potential charges for out-patient medical care will significantly reduce the morale of our forces and affect both their performance and retention on active duty.

In the past, some of these negative effects could be countered somewhat by providing realistic training where a sense of purpose for their sacrifices could be provided. Currently, this effort is not as effective because of training reductions.

Training Reductions. Reductions in readiness funding have degraded training by lowering operating tempos and deferring flying hours program growth in all Services. The Army's flying hour operating tempo goals for training will not be achieved until FY 91. The reduction in the operating tempo of Army ground units has reduced the level of readiness achieved during ground training. Additionally, the reduction in range construction will translate into lost training opportunities which will potentially inhibit growth in combat capabilities.
Naval flying hours are programmed to return to 1985 levels next year but will not increase through 1992. Air Force flight training reductions are even sharper than the Navy's. Active forces flying hours will not return to the 1985 levels until 1990, while reserve units are not programmed to ever return to

their 1985 level. These reductions are occurring at the same time our fielding of modernized equipment has increased training requirements for the crews who need to learn the capabilities of, and become familiar with, their new systems.

European Troop Strength (ETS) Ceiling. USEUCOM efforts to improve force capabilities are constrained by Congressionally mandated troop ceilings. During the past several years, all Services have modernized and changed their force structure to achieve the most efficient use of manpower and equipment. Increased manpower was sometimes required to accomplish this goal. In Europe, implementation of the improvements is being hampered by the troop ceiling. Currently, we are faced with a Hobson's choice: to create spaces necessary for theater nuclear modernization, conventional forces must be returned to the United States. This adverse impact could not have been intended when the ceiling was enacted. Today, we are cutting conventional combat muscle to make room for modernization efforts such as the continued deployment of the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM). Cutting conventional capabilities lowers the nuclear threshold, and thus, instead of enhancing stability and deterrence, it actually has the opposite effect, thereby weakening NATO's overall deterrent posture. I don't believe this was the intent of Congress in enacting the ceiling. Congress should continue to control the end-strength of the services, but should let the SecDef and JCS allocate manpower according to the threat and our response to it.

Inadequate Combat Service Support. The Combat Service Support (CSS) Structure available to sustain U.S. combat forces during the early days of a crisis or conflict in Europe is another major concern. Sustained combat operations require a structure which services and repairs equipment, distributes supplies, and receives and supports reinforcing units on their arrival. These are the functions of the CSS units.

The Army's CSS structure, even when augmented by available and planned Host Nation Support, is incapable of supporting the forces currently in Europe, much less the reinforcing units. The CSS units in theater are undermanned and require thousands of additional troops the day mobilization begins in order to accomplish key tasks prior to the start of any hostilities. The situation for reinforcing units is even worse. Most of their support is to be provided by Reserve Component CSS units, many of which are undermanned, underequipped, and unable to perform the tasks for which they were formed. As a result, many reinforcing units will be required to remain in CONUS after mobilization awaiting essential equipment, additional manpower, and necessary training.

Mobilization and Deployment. Our inability to mobilize and deploy U.S. support units and combat forces remains a problem area. The U.S. is committed to provide NATO a sustainable 10 division force within 10 days of mobilization. Despite progress, this pledge remains an objective not realizable. Army studies indicate the Reserve Component units scheduled to support this combat force will require from several days to weeks from the start of mobilization before they are ready to deploy. Thus, by the time they are prepared to deploy, they must compete with combat units and critical supplies for a position on the limited strategic lift assets. Although scheduled Air Force reinforcements can deploy more rapidly, only 20% of the planned aircraft which will operate from Collocated Operating Bases (COB) are currently supported with minimum essential facilities.

To meet our NATO commitment and ensure a timely and affordable reinforcement capability in the mid-1970s, the U.S. initiated a balanced program involving strategic airlift, fast sealift, and prepositioned unit equipment. This approach allowed trade-offs to be made between the cost of moving the forces to Europe and the lower cost of storing unit equipment in theater. The increased vulnerability of the equipment and decreased flexibility in force deployment were judged to be acceptable risks when compared to the cost of building the large fleet of ships and aircraft needed to deploy U.S. land forces. Timely reinforcement requires all three elements to remain balanced because a shortfall in any one prevents overall success. Although progress has been made, the rate of air and sealift procurement, the fill of POMCUS stocks, and the speed of infrastructure completion are not progressing as rapidly as envisioned. These shortfalls prevent the timely reinforcement of Europe.

The inability to rapidly deploy reinforcing units and the shortfall in support assets complicate efforts to implement our strategy in Europe and increase the potential for failure should deterrence breakdown. However, even if these forces could arrive as scheduled, their effective employment would be hampered by deficiencies within the reception units and sustainability stocks.

Sustainability Stocks. Our stockage of essential war materials determines how long a conventional defense of Europe can be conducted. Although there has been continual improvment over the last 5 years, stocks of major end items of Army equipment, repair parts and Air Force war reserve kits are still not able to sustain 30 days of conflict. Even more disturbing is the significant shortage of key items; items which when exhausted could cause our defenses to collapse. To provide just a few examples, the following key items are at stockage levels below 5 days of supply or 30% of that required to counter specific threat targets: modern artillery munitions, 5 ton trucks, drive train components for wheeled vehicles and M1 tanks, air-to-air missiles, air launched HARPOON air-to-ship missiles, HARM/SHRIKE anti-radiation missiles, and anti-runway (DAACM/DURANDAL) munitions.

These shortfalls are so significant that efforts to conduct a prolonged conventional defense of Europe, as currently envisioned by our national strategy, could prove impractical.

Force Survival and Reconstitution. Our ability to protect and reconstitute our forces also needs continued attention. Thanks to Congressional support of the NATO infrastructure program, construction of aircraft shelters is progressing rapidly, with over 900 available for use. Additionally, agreements with our alliance partners are improving short range air defense and ground defense capabilities at air bases. But work still needs to be done to improve our rapid runway repair (RRR) capability. Operational runways are essential for air superiority and support of committed ground units. The advantage gained by protecting aircraft from air or ground attack is negated if our inability to repair rapidly a damaged runway prevents us from engaging the aggressor.

Chemical Weapons. Another area where protection and deterrence capabilities are required is with the potential use of chemical weapons by the WP. The Soviet's continued research and production, growing stockpiles, training exercises, and use of chemical weapons during their occupation of Afghanistan clearly demonstrate the threat to our forces. Although the ability to protect our people is improving, even the best protective suits will reduce the efficiency of our troops by as much as 30-50%. If the Soviets can choose the time and place where this restriction can be imposed on our forces, while theirs can operate unencumbered, they would accrue significant advantages. Effective deterrence will require both protective measures and the capability to retaliate in the event of an attack. With that in mind, Congressional action to approve production of binary weapons was a major step forward. In World War II both sides possessed a chemical capability but neither side used it for fear of retaliation. In recent cases where chemical weapons have been used, the victim was unable to retaliate with chemical weapons of his own.

Casualty Treatment. Readiness shortfalls in casualty treatment can cripple our strategy. Being able to rapidly treat casualties in-theater would permit the rapid return to duty of numerous individuals rather than requiring a patient to be evacuated to, and a replacement returned from CONUS. Current estimates indicate that an initial 15 day evacuation capability (growing to 60 day capability by D+60) would permit the treatment and return to duty of over 200,000 casualties during the first 90 days of conflict. Thanks to Congressional emphasis and WHNS programs, the theater is rapidly achieving the ability to execute a 15 day evacuation policy. The developing capability to support a 30 days policy would increase in-theater casualty treatment while lowering the strain on airlift and decreasing trained manpower replacement requirements. Viewed over the long term, it will be less expensive and more efficient to increase treatment assets and achieve a 30 day evacuation capability than training replacements to offset projected casualties.

SETTING PRIORITIES

For the past several years, CJCS and SECDEF have asked CINCs to prioritize their warfighting requirements that are unfunded or underfunded. This document, the Integrated Priority List (IPL), provides a guide for Service programmers to develop budget proposals and a benchmark to evaluate the Service programs' support of USEUCOM's needs. Since the inception of the IPL in 1982, specific readiness and sustainability deficiencies have comprised the majority and highest priority items on the IPL.

This year is no exception. The highest priority on the current IPL is for programs to redress shortfalls affecting the people of European Command. Next are programs to correct the readiness and sustainability deficiencies, many of which we have just discussed. Third priority is for programs to develop and field key modernization items in order to redress gaps in required capabilities or improve existing assets. The final IPL priority involves force structure enhancement programs which contribute to improved readiness and sustainability.

CONGRESSIONAL ASSISTANCE

As I said earlier, we have made considerable strides over the past several years. However, we will need your support and commitment if we are to continue to ensure that our national security objectives are met. Congressional action in the following areas will pay high dividends in increasing the capabilities of our forces in European Command:

° Removal of the European troop strength ceiling so I no longer have to cut or to defer improvements to conventional forces to make room for theater nuclear modernization.

° Hold the line on readiness cuts that adversely affect much needed training as we transition to modernized systems.

° Support CS/CSS enhancements required to support adequately the in-being and reinforcing units.

° Continue support for the three balanced elements necessary to meet our force deployment commitment to NATO: air and sealift improvements, prepositioning, and infrastructure construction.

° Support funding for critical warstopper munitions and equipment necessary to sustain our conventional defense.

° Continue support for chemical defense and retaliatory capabilities.

- Support in-theater 30 day casualty treatment capability, thus decreasing airlift and replacement requirements.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, there are some thoughts I would like to leave with you as you consider the FY 88-89 budget and how it supports our national strategy.

First, and most important, U.S. national objectives are to ensure the continued peace and freedom of all Americans. Although insufficent resources may be available to attain every objective, this does not mean that they are unimportant. What it does mean is that we must prioritize the order in which the objectives are to be achieved and then develop a strategy to guide our efforts.

Second, the strategy developed must be based on an assessment of the risks to the U.S. if an objective is not attained. Those areas where the consequences to the U.S. security are greatest if the objective is not achieved must be assigned the highest priority. During periods of constrained resources, objectives for which non-attainment entails slight or acceptable risks should become the areas where efforts are lowered or deferred. Across the board reductions in programs abdicates responsibility for maintaining priorities and reduces efficiency. Since a direct attack on the U.S. will cause the greatest consequences, its deterrence must always remain the highest priority. Next priority should be accorded the overseas areas where a failure of deterrence can rapidly lead to escalation and possible attack on the U.S. itself.

Finally, as the proposed budget is being reviewed, with perceived pressure to continue the trend of reduced defense spending, many will propose new, more economical strategies which seemingly provide more capabilities for less cost. While these may appear attractive initially, their overall impact on our ability to achieve national objectives must be closely evaluated to be sure we are not increasing the risks to our security or incurring hidden costs, or both.

Again I salute you for your recognition that a determination of our defense needs must be based on a clear understanding of our vital national interests, threats to those interests and our strategy to meet the threat, not just on the availability of resources. I am hopeful that our nation will have the courage and foresight required to take the actions necessary to protect both our peace and our freedom. For in the final analysis we will get the level of security that we have convinced our people they need and for which they are willing to pay. While I realize that effective deterrence requires sacrifice, and freedom is not maintained cheaply, I cannot help but reflect on the much greater price we shall pay if we let deterrence fail.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, General Rogers.

Just one or two points.

There was an article in the Washington Times, I believe, by Admiral Zumwalt and Admiral Worth Bagley that attributed to me a proposal to withdraw 100,000 forces from Europe to put them back in this country so they could then be available to go back to the Middle East.

That was testimony that we had before our committee. I have never said that. You know the background of my amendment. I have not said that at all.

I don't know where they got that. That was made from whole cloth.

In the same article—and Senator Warner needs to know this—they also attributed a statement to me that I was opposed to the carriers that had been proposed because they were vunerable and sitting ducks and I was in favor of small carriers.

Now, I have expressed some skepticism on the carriers, but it was not on any of the grounds they cited. So that article from stem to stern was totally erroneous. I do not know whether you saw it or not.

General ROGERS. No, sir. I did not.

Chairman NUNN. Nevertheless, I did want to get that on the record.

General Rogers, I have another committee meeting that I will have to go to and come back later. I will leave this hearing in the hands of my colleagues. The meeting I must attend is on the Iran/Contra matter, and I have to be there for a few minutes.

General, we are delighted to have you here and I want to ask you just one question before I have to depart.

INF PROPOSAL

You have expressed some skepticism about the current INF proposal, Zero-Zero.

Would you give us your views on that?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Since 1981, when it was first proposed, my position has been that the Zero Level Option in isolation is a fine political gambit, but, militarily, it gives me gas pains. I have not changed that position since 1981. Probably in 1981 I could have chosen a better phrase than "gas pains," but it is true.

The reason for that is this. In isolation, the Zero Level Option put us back to where we were in 1979 in NATO, when we made the decision to fill the gap in our spectrum of deterrence which had developed because the only land based system left in Western Europe that could reach Soviet soil with nuclear weapons was going to be the F-111 aircraft. It is very important in our continuum of escalation that we have that capability. So we decided to fill that gap with ground launched cruise missiles and Pershing IIs.

Now, if we eliminate them, in fact we will be in a worse position than we were in 1979 because of what the Soviets have done, both in the conventional area and the nonstrategic nuclear area—namely, forward deploying the SS-21s, 22s and 23s, which can reach most of the targets that the SS-20s presently reach in Western Europe. Once again, the only thing we will have land-based in Western Europe to retaliate with and thereby deter their use of those kinds of weapons is the F-111. So, it makes no sense to me to have the Zero Level Option adopted in isolation.

Having said all of that Mr. Chairman, it was very popular to promote the Zero Level Option after 1981. Western European publics were led by their governments to believe that that is the route we should go. It would be very difficult for those governments now—having expected that the Soviets would not accept it when they initially agreed—it would be very difficult for those governments now to say that they were mistaken.

So, I do think that we will have a Zero Level Option. I am very hopeful that, within that treaty, there will be constraints on short range INF weapons, which is the intent of the United States. Now if I review the bidding correctly that had also been agreed by the Soviets. But on February 28, Gorbachev took a step backward saying there would be a separate agreement to be negotiated down the road on the shorter range INF missile. In my opinion that would be a mistake.

In the aftermath of Reykjavik, I think the West Europeans recognized that a Zero Level Option, in isolation, would cause them problems and tend to make, as some have put it, Western Europe safe for conventional war because of the large conventional imbalance, or more susceptable to intimidation and coercion on the part of the Soviets.

So, the short answer is, Senator, the Zero Level Option is a major step backward in isolation. But if it is coupled with constraints on the short-range INF and an agreement that we can either go to the level that the Soviets have and that level would be frozen, or they would build down to our level, with our level frozen, and progress is made toward balanced, verifiable levels, reduced levels, on the conventional side, I know then it would cause much less difficulty to me.

Chairman NUNN. Well, I said the other day that we should at least consider abrogating or terminating the INF Treaty under the supreme national interest clause. I assume such a clause will be in the treaty, since it is in most treaties, including the current ABM Treaty. Maybe we should serve notice in advance that we are going to be looking very carefully, not at incorporating conventional and chemical restrictions in the agreement, but at not completing the total withdrawal of INF absent progress in the conventional and chemical weapons arms control negotiations.

How would you feel about something like that, or how would you feel about Congressman Aspin's proposal to allow 50 missiles to remain in Europe on each side?

General ROGERS. Well, I was frankly quite pleased to find in consultation with the allies on INF, in one or two stages prior to this time that the U.S. was proposing 120 warheads on each side. That made sense to me.

It continues to make sense to me to keep a certain number on each side. But if we could get agreement along the lines that you propose, Senator, namely that we will build down to X-number, whatever that number is, and then decide whether we continue to Zero Level, I think that would be very helpful.

Chairman NUNN. I was not suggesting a formal agreement. I was suggesting more of an understanding between allies and statements that we would consider under the unilateral right of a supreme national interest clause. I was not suggesting that we basically have an agreement along that line with the Soviets, although I would not exclude that possibility.

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Well, we have a principle under which we operate at SHAPE. Maybe it is quite narrow, but our principle is accept no agreement that will impact unfavorably upon Western security.

Then, looking at our mission, the threat and our response to that threat, we asked four questions and we applied these questions to the Zero Level Option.

One, does it reduce the threat?

Two, does it improve our ability to respond to that threat?

Three, by agreeing to Zero Level in a certain category of nuclear weapons, does it make us more vulnerable to other categories?

Four, what is the level of risk and whose risk is it?

When we applied those questions, plus other considerations, which impact on the continuum of deterrence such as making Soviet soil a sanctuary from land-based West European weapons, we reached the conclusion that I gave you, that, in isolation, it would impact unfavorably upon West European security.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, General Rogers.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to defer to our distinguished colleague who must co-chair another meeting, Senator Thurmond.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Thurmond, we are glad to recognize you.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I appreciate your kindness, Senator Warner.

General Rogers, we are glad to have you with us. You are no stranger to us. We have all benefited from your wise counsel for many years. It has always been a pleasure to have you appear before the committee. You have provided us with candid advice tempered by many years of experience.

In your years as Chief of Staff of the Army, it was during a difficult time for the Army, and I admired your strength of character and tenacity during those years.

I must say that I understand you are planning to retire, and I don't see why. You are younger than I am. I think you should continue working.

[General laughter.]

General ROGERS. Senator, may I correct that premise of yours. I am being retired. There is a difference.

I had decided many years ago that I would serve in the Army until I was kicked out, and that time has come at the end of this June.

Senator THURMOND. Well, I regret to see you go.

Now I have just a few questions here.

General Rogers, when I visited you last May, we discussed the need for a dual capable short-range weapons system as a means to improved deterrence.

In light of the recent developments concerning the Zero Option for intermediate range weapons, what increased priority, if any, do you place on dual capable, short-range systems?

General Rogers. Sir, we need short-range systems both with conventional warheads and our Nuclear Weapons Requirement Study 1985, which we took 5 years to develop, shows that we need short-range weapon systems with nuclear warheads.

The alliance cannot afford to have single capable warheads. And so, I would establish a high priority to have dual capable replacement for follow-on to Lance and a dual capable air to surface missile, which we need with both a conventional warhead and with a nuclear warhead.

SHORTAGE OF COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Senator Thurmond. General Rogers, another topic we discussed was your shortage of combat support and combat service support in theater.

Your concerns have been highlighted by a recent hearing in which the sad condition of Army combat support and combat service support in both the active and reserve components was presented to the Readiness Sustainability and Support Subcommittee.

Would you critique for us the Army leadership's decision to add light divisions to the force structure while these serious shortcomings exist in combat support and combat service support units?

General Rogers. Well, my position has always been, Senator, and it was the same when I was a Chief, that we need to do better with the forces we already have created before we create new combat forces.

When I was a providing responsible officer for Al Haig, the status of our combat service, bothered me, particularly combat service support manning. I am equally concerned on the receiving end because we need additional combat service support/combat support personnel to fill the ranks of the units that are currently deployed to support the forces forward deployed in Western Europe.

We need still more with units that are not there, to support the combat forces, currently forward deployed.

Then we need another large number of combat service support personnel in units to support the M plus 10 forces that are supposed to be in theater by M plus 10.

My position—and I do not bear the responsibility, obviously, and the Army has to do what it believes is the proper thing—but if I had been asked, I would have said that I would much prefer that we do better with the forces that we already have to support the combat structure that we have created, rather than create additional combat structure which has a combat service support manpower cost associated with it.

Senator Thurmond. General Rogers, while at your headquarters, we also discussed the April attack on Libya and the use of conventional Tomahawk missiles against targets, as opposed to fighter aircraft.

While the details are of a sensitive nature, would you assess for us in general terms how well we incorporate technological advances into the force structure so that they provide operational utility in a timely fashion?

General ROGERS. We have incorporated that technology into the system and would be able to exploit that under conditions of anger, if directed to do so.

What that really means, Senator, we are better off now than we were when you were there.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I think my time is about up.

I want to express my appreciation to Senator Warner for his courtesy.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

General, I just want to add my words of welcome and commendation to those expressed by my colleague, Senator Nunn. We are going to miss you very much when you leave your command, as will the nations of Europe.

I do not know how to express myself except to say that both sides of this committee, regardless of political affiliation, has had the utmost confidence in your and your straightforward manner. We appreciate that so very much.

I do hope that you will remember that we will be seeking your counsel and advice in the future, and we hope that you will be able to come here and give us the guidance that I think we desperately need in wrestling with the continued problems, of national security.

Godspeed in what you are going to do, General, and thank you for the significant contribution that you have made for many years in the national defense of the United States of America and the Free world.

I simply will say that no one could have been better in the position that you have been in. Certainly, I think all would agree that you have been the best, certainly one of the best of the NATO commanders that we have ever had.

While there has been some speculation as to why you are leaving your command, I do not think it is too early to let the public know that following the usual routine of NATO commanders, the real reason that you are leaving is that you are returning home to become President of the United States and I wish you well in that endeavor.

[General laughter.]

General ROGERS. Boy. Senator Exon, thank you for your very fine comments.

As I have had occasion to say before, I come from a town of 250 people in Kansas, which is my permanent address. They have two elected officers. One is mayor and one is dog catcher. When I reviewed my credentials, I found I was not qualified for either.

[General laughter.]

Senator EXON. Well, one of your great attributes has been your wonderful sense of humor over all the years.

Let me wax serious once again. I was very serious in the earlier part of my comments and I wanted to add that levity into the last part because I thought you might enjoy it.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, on this side we would suggest you now start your 5 minutes because we shared in those opening remarks.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much.

You are just one super guy, General, as far as our committee is concerned.

General ROGERS. Thank you, sir.

Senator EXON. We had a very interesting hearing the other day on chemical and biological warfare. There is growing concern—I think that is the best word to use in that regard--on the committee with regard to the attitudes of the NATO countries, toward chemical weapons.

Once again, we get the impression that our NATO brothers are very strong on an awful lot of talk, but it seems once again that, their action falls short of that talk. Other than some defensive equipment they are once again taking a step back by saying basically the chemical deterrent has to be furnished by the United States, paid for by the United States, stored by the United States on their soil because we cannot touch it.

That is causing great consternation in this Senator's mind.

Could you give me any reassurances as to how we are going to deal with this in the future?

You know of the great battle that we have had in the Congress on this issue. It has been decided in the past by a vote or two. I think the Vice President on two separate occasions has cast the deciding vote on a modernized chemical deterrence that I happen to think we need.

We are not getting very much help from the NATO allies. Could you tell us your view on what we should or should not be doing in this area and are the concerns and the questions that I have raised valid ones?

General ROGERS. There is no question that even the discussion of chemical weapons is an extremely sensitive subject in the West European nations.

They do recognize, however, that there is a need to deter the use of chemical weapons by the other side. They do recognize that the way you deter is to have a modern retaliatory capability, not only with defensive measures but also with a retaliatory capability.

Steps are being taken on the defensive side to provide the kinds of gear and warning systems that are needed. It ranges from almost a zero capability with one or two countries up to quite a good capability with another couple of countries.

On the retaliatory side, as you are aware, the French, in their latest defense program, have come out and said that they intend to develop chemical weapons for retaliatory use. They make no secret of that. In the final analysis, when tension or crisis arises, it is my perception that the French have no alternative but to throw in their lot with the rest of the NATO nations in the defense of Western Europe.

And so, with respect to retaliatory capability, it again runs the gamut of those nations who are supportive of the need to have modern weapons for retaliation. Included are nations that to my knowledge, do not intend to manufacture such weapons at least at this juncture, but which are delighted, just as in most of the nuclear area, that the United States is prepared to bear and discharge that responsibility.

And so, it is true that there are some nations that have said that they do not intend to have those kinds of weapons on their soil. When you ask them the question, as I have, have you an agreement with the Soviet Union that there won't be any of their weapons on Warsaw Pact soil, I do not get a very satisfactory answer.

But, here again, what needs to be done is what the Congress has done, and I thank the Congress for what it has done. It has been a long and a difficult fight, and I know it is a sensitive subject in the halls of Congress.

But we cannot deter the use of chemical weapons with the capability that the nations have given me today. I cannot do that.

Of course, what I am talking about is what we have forward stored from the United States.

But I can see the probability of deterrence if the Congress continues to move forward, as it has, come 1 October of this year to permit the manufacture of the binary, short-range round with a nonpersistent chemical in it, to move toward to the Bigeye with the persistent chemical in it—which we need—and to permit us to take a look at researching and developing a medium-range round, for example, with a multiple launched rocket system or with an air-to-surface stand-off weapon.

So, when you ask me what should you do, sir, I would ask that you continue to march down the road in the direction you have started.

It does two things for us.

One, it will put us in the posture that both sides were in in World War II, where both sides had chemical weapons and neither used them for fear of retaliation. And so, our deterrence is enhanced.

Second, it gives us greater strength at the negotiating table, where the final objective ought to be eliminating these kinds of systems from the face of the earth, if we can find some way to capture the chemical weapons of the other 16 nations that have them besides just the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is true. I have taken the position that we need not go through the transatlantic debate about putting chemical weapons on the soil of Western Europe but keep them here on our own soil. We have developed a deployment plan in my U.S. role, coordinated with myself in my NATO role, which I think will provide us the capability to forward deploy those weapons in time of tension and time of crisis.

So, the short answer, sir, is just keep on doing what you have been doing. Keep voting yes for this kind of retaliatory capability.

Senator EXON. My time is up.

I just want to say that when you leave, General, I suppose you will leave with some kind of message for our European allies. I would hope that in your going away statement and in your future trips to Europe in the capacity of private citizen, perhaps, you can do an awful lot to help us here.

I get the question that I suppose most of my colleagues do: Exon, why are you voting for those chemical weapons to protect those Europeans when those Europeans do not even want them on their soil?

That is a pretty tough question for one who has to answer to his constituency. I am going to continue to vote that way and make the best explanation I can.

I just wish there was some way we could convince the people over there who have their political problems also to recognize that at least most of us presume that if hostilities break out, chemical weapons are a serious threat if we do not have a deterrent in the European theater.

People out in Nebraska cannot quite understand their attitudes. I think we both know the sales job that has to be done there. If anybody can help, you can.

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join with others today in paying tribute to this great American soldier. I see that World War II victory ribbon there, and it brings back my own recollections as a young sailor in that period. When I look back and see it is over 40 years, I begin to think that we have been around for a long time.

I think, if I may say, in the years that you and I have worked together—and they go all the way back to the Department of Defense, when you were Chief of Legislation for the Secretary of the Army and I was there in the Navy Secretariat, just competing for every dollar that you were trying to get out of the Congress for the Army at that time—that things have not changed, General. It is the same situation.

General ROGERS. That's right, sir.

Senator WARNER. I believe as you step down, you step down, if I may say, in the mold of General Eisenhower and his contribution to NATO. I want to say that we thank you.

General ROGERS. Thank you, sir.

Senator GLENN. John, would you yield for just a couple of seconds?

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Senator GLENN. I have to leave, General. I want to add my remarks to all the others here today.

We will have a number of questions for you.

Let me say that I have read your whole statement and I think it is outstanding. I hope every member of this committee reads it and studies it. I think you point out some things in there that are absolutely vital. I am sorry that I have to leave, but will submit some questions to you.

I want to talk to you, maybe privately, about this some time in the future. I think you are right on with a lot of this.

General ROGERS. Thank you.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, John.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Senator Glenn. I would like our timekeeper not to take that out of Senator Warner's time.

Senator GLENN. No, take it out of my time.

Senator WARNER. General, knowing you as I do, and your concern for the troops, I have been studying the impact of the decline of the dollar on the lifestyle of those serving in Europe. I wonder if you might comment on that and whether or not you think the Congress should address in this subject any sort of emergency provision to take care of that situation?

General ROGERS. It does have its impact, a major impact. We have seen this before and we have seen the dollar go up to 3.4 marks per dollar, and we find that some of our troops have made commitments when the dollar was stronger—not necessarily at 3.4 marks, certainly, but when it was stronger. They have borrowed money or have rented apartments or what have you. As a consequence, it is making it difficult for them as the dollar decreases in value.

But we also find if one were to make a poll of every one—and we do not—but some component commanders have taken a poll of some who are arriving and have found they arrive in debt. So it is not just unique with what is happening in Western Europe. They arrive in debt.

Many have taken up to 6 months advance pay which they then have to pay back over the successive months. That makes it difficult for them.

Senator WARNER. I was addressing specifically the dollar as it relates to today, and whether we should take anything by way of emergency action to help these personnel situations.

General ROGERS. Senator, what you have to do, in my opinion, and I would ask you this, is help us with the morale, welfare, and recreation facilities for our troops.

Senator WARNER. I am familiar with that issue and I will take that up. I am looking at that. I give you that assurance.

Let me shift to another subject.

LASER WEAPONS

Senator Exon raised the chemical issue, which is important, and I am glad that he did. We read this morning reports about the Secretary of Defense and his concern over the laser potential and that of the use of battlefield lasers.

It seems to me that this type of weaponry falls into the same category, in some respects, as chemical weapons.

Would you care to address that?

General ROGERS. Well, of concern is the Soviets laser designator and also their laser range finder.

We have known for some time that the Soviets use a stronger laser than we do or think is necessary.

Senator WARNER. Well, particularly, in the article that I am referring to, I indicated quite apart from the weapon use of it, it could be used to impair the vision of the troops.

General ROGERS. It can. And that, in fact, is what is happening as they use it. It is impairing the vision of the opposing side.

That kind of optical laser I think, if we wish to go that way, could be quite effective against individuals, but it can be protected against by countermeasures.

Senator WARNER. So there are countermeasures that are reasonable?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir, there are countermeasures.

Senator **Warner**. Now, General, let's return to your discussion, which has been very helpful, on the arms control issues.

What is your understanding of the opinions, either collectively or individually, in the Military Committee of NATO with respect to this zero option INF?

General **Rogers**. I cannot speak for the Military Committee, because each one of those military representatives is instructed by his nation as to what position he will take within the Military Committee.

So that you'll have the same kinds of positions being taken by those military representatives as their nations have taken.

Senator **Warner**. So there's a consistency and a parallelism——

General **Rogers**. Yes.

Senator **Warner**. And really no independent thinking, then.

General **Rogers**. Well, not in that committee, because they are tethered to their chiefs of defense, who are in turn tethered to the ministers of defense.

But if you can talk to them outside of the Military Committee, you will find that there is considerable concern about a zero level option, in isolation, as I've described before.

You do find some pretty fancy footwork now—and I will not be more specific than that with respect to the ones I have in mind, who had taken a position counter to the zero level option who now are using language which can be read as beng counter to the zero level option. But it's been sugar coated to such an extent it's hard to discover it.

And why? Because the nations, no matter whether they want it or not, the leaders of those nations—and I can assure you there's a difference of opinion at those levels—but publicly, because of the position they've taken over the past 6 years, they're going to go for a zero level option.

They're concerned that they can capture the verification regime that's necessary, and concerned that there can be some constraints put on the short range systems.

But there's such a desire to have an INF agreement, my concern is that there will be pressure put on the United States to accept an agreement more quickly than is necessary with terms within that agreement that are counter to both the verification and the constraints on the short range systems.

And I'm just hopeful that the United States keeps its heels dug in, as it has up to this time, on those two issues and remains firm and staunch, and accepts only an agreement that can be verified and gives us the constraints on the short range systems.

Senator **Warner**. Well, I think that advice is very helpful. As you well know, I have confidence in our President to negotiate a fair and equitable agreement which will be protective of the interests of this country and our allies.

But the fallback position is right in the halls of the United States Senate. And fortunately, particularly in this committee, there are many who have spent long hours studying arms control.

As you know, there are eight Senators that go back and forth, of which I am one, Senator Nunn our chairman is another; Senator Gore who is on this committee is another.

We've spent a lot of time, and we're prepared to share our views with our colleagues on the framework of any agreement that may evolve from this process.

So let's hope for the best. But I think in summary you're saying that while there are official statements both by the heads of state and government and the military men follow almost in lockstep, there is considerable private view in opposition to this agreement, both within the civilian side and the military side?

General **Rogers**. I would put it that there is some nervousness, privately, about what the agreement may consist of and its impact on the security of the nations of Western Europe.

Senator **Warner**. I thank the witness.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Exon**. Senator Shelby.

Senator **Shelby**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Rogers, on page 10 of your statement, which I have certainly enjoyed reading, it says a lot, it's well done. And it's reflective of what you've done in the past and how you feel about things.

On page 10 where you talk about conventional deterrence and no first use, some of the advocates of no first use of nuclear weapons have bothered me, and I think you have pointed that out here, because if we advocate as part of our doctrine that we're not going to use nuclear weapons first, I think it weakens the whole NATO response.

I'd like you to comment on that.

General **Rogers**. Well, sir, it does. There's also a good military reason for the first use option. It causes the Soviets to recognize that they cannot mass for an attack, because of the threat of a nuclear weapon targeted on that mass, and so they have to spread out. It makes it easier for us to defend.

And then there's always the question of, even if we had conventional forces in which we had the greatest confidence that we could succeed—and we will never be able to build that kind of a conventional force, but even if we did—we could never be sure, because there's never anything that's certain.

In my opinion, in the back of the Soviet's mind there must always be the fear of our using nuclear weapons first, uncertain but what we might, which may well escalate to the strategic exchange which is the one thing they fear and don't want.

So the vital factor in our equation of deterrence, I believe, is the first use option.

Senator **Shelby**. General, there are advocates of a totally conventional response to anything in Europe. You've talked about this here.

That's fatally flawed, is it not? Standing alone?

General **Rogers**. Makes no sense, certainly not under current conditions in which the gap between the force capabilities of NATO versus that of the Warsaw Pact continues to widen by all instruments of measure as each year goes by.

So no, it makes no sense at all. Well, at least to me.

Senator **Shelby**. Or to me, General.

General, let's get into the zero-zero option just a minute. If we go to that in negotiations, based on past history, how are we going to verify that?

I know there have been certain proposals. If that agreement was reached, would that weaken NATO considerably?

General ROGERS. It would if it were reached in isolation.

Senator SHELBY. And by isolation?

General ROGERS. And by that I mean zero level option only, and nothing being done with respect to the shorter range INF weapons, which have chemical, conventional, and nuclear capabilities, the SS-21s, 22s, 23s, and steps not being taken to overcome the imbalance in the conventional forces.

Senator SHELBY. So any negotiations that we enter into you would recommend, or it would be basically your thought, that we do it on a comprehensive basis, chemical, conventional, the whole deal, if we're going to really take a look at Europe, right?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir. That would be the way I would like to have it done. But in my opinion the realities of the world won't support my position.

I think that the best we can do, moving toward a zero level agreement, will be including within that agreement constraints on the shorter range INF, and then working in the CSCE or alliance-to-alliance on the conventional side.

Senator SHELBY. Just to remove the Euro-missiles, if we removed all of those from Eastern Europe and Western Europe, what would we really gain, if anything?

General ROGERS. Well, I don't want to take too much of your time.

Senator SHELBY. No, my time is your time as long as the chairman lets me.

General ROGERS. I would like to point out that the determining factor from 1973 to 1979 when the decision ws made by NATO to put the ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing IIs on their soil, was the track which said we have to deploy to fill this gap in our spectrum of deterrence.

Then in order to get that track approved, i.e. the deploying track, we found it necessary to have the negotiating track, which said, we will also try to negotiate.

If we hadn't had the negotiating track, we wouldn't have had the deploying track. It was, of course, better to have two tracks than no track.

Since 1979, the tendency has been to give the greatest visibility to the negotiating track, you see, and not to the deploying track, as being the most important thing in our interest.

To answer your question specifically. The SS-20 threat will disappear. The 100 will be someplace else outside the range to reach Western Europe, but of course they're mobile and could be moved. We'll have 100, we can do the same thing with ours, to reach Soviet soil.

So it does improve our lot. It does improve our situation with respect to the SS-20, but it does not capture the SS-22, with a range of almost 1,000; the SS-23, with a range of near 500 kilometers: and then the SS-21, which is forward deployed, with 120 kilometers as its range.

So we don't capture that. We don't do anything with respect to the imbalance in the conventional forces, which continues.

That is why I think that in isolation the Zero Level Option impacts unfavorably upon our security in Western Europe.

And when one answers that fourth question that we at SHAPE apply, what's the level of risk, I think the risk is high. And whose risk is it? It's the West Europeans risk. And they understand that.

Senator SHELBY. General, my time is up. I appreciate your candor, and I think the committee also appreciates it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Senator Shelby.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just for a moment on the zero option, General Rogers, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Mr. Aspin has proposed that there be a minimum level of warheads maintained on both sides.

Doesn't that complicate the verifiability part of this equation dramatically?

General ROGERS. Yes, it does, and I didn't answer the previous question with respect to the verifiability. I gather that what has been agreed by the United States and the deploying nations of the ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing IIs is a fairly strict regime on verification.

But one has to always wonder if one of those missiles can't be stuck in a cave somewhere. So you're not at the Zero Level Option; and that's of concern to me.

But specifically, when I was getting into the verification business of SALT II as a chief of staff, it's so complicated, so complex, that I finally had to just depend on the opinions of experts in the area, which led me to believe, at least as far as SALT II was concerned, the then-means that were proposed for verification would have been adequate.

And here again, I'm sure that's what the chiefs are doing with respect to the verification procedures in this agreement.

Senator McCAIN. Would the conversion or use of Pershing as a short-range missile satisfy some of your concerns about the imbalance?

General ROGERS. Yes, it would. And I think that is a position the United States has taken and should hold to.

Because if, in fact, we get the constraint in the INF agreement that the Soviets freeze at their current level of shorter range INF missiles with the authority for us to build to equality, that's the quickest way we could do it, and frankly, the most painless way we could do it.

They're already deployed on West European soil, so we don't have to go through that trauma.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. General, I appreciate very much your statement. I must say in all honesty, however, I don't share your view of the contribution that the allies are making.

I'm frankly somewhat astonished to hear of a troop shortage in order to defend Western Europe. And I think it's important for us also to take into account the real lack of cooperation and contribution on the part of particularly some of the smaller nations in the NATO alliance, going on the premise to some degree that the chain is only as strong as its weakest link.

The activities in the Netherlands, I think, are a disgrace. And I and many others believe that coupled with our trade imbalance and the unfair trade practices, which have exacerbated relations between ourselves and our European allies, that perhaps we ought to review again General Eisenhower's testimony before this committee, where he said, if we don't have U.S. troops out in 10 years, then the experiment would have been a failure.

I also think it's worthy of note historically that during the Vietnam war, as you well remember, there was a significant draw down of U.S. troops in Western Europe, and it neither led to confrontation nor conflict.

I was very pleased in your statement, however, to see your statement that readiness and sustainability of our forces, in my opinion, are in better shape today than anytime since NATO was formed some 38 years ago.

Are you concerned, not just from a NATO standpoint but from the many positions that you've held, about what appears as if we're in an era of declining defense budgets?

General ROGERS. Yes. May I respond also to your comments with respect to burdensharing?

In my statement, it says that all of us have to do more frankly. And when the United States does its study on the amount of the burden that's being borne by individual nations vis-a-vis their ability to bear that burden, you come up with categories of those who are bearing a greater share of the burden, including the United States, and those who are not bearing a fair share of the burden.

We all know that, they know that, and it's been brought to their attention. The fact is, we all have to do more.

As we watch nations being unable, apparently, to meet the ministerial guidance of a 3 percent real increase in defense budgets per year, including this Nation and most of the nations in Western Europe—there's one over 3 percent, but it starts at a very low base, and some at 2 percent and so on—of course it is of concern.

Because what it means is that where the cuts are being taken is where you don't have a constituency, in most instances that means in the readiness and sustainability area.

Now, there is a constituency for modernization and one for force structure.

That's the thing that concerns me, and the plea I make to this committee year after year is if you believe you must make a cut in the defense budget, then I would plead that you let us do better with what you have already given us. Let us do better with the troops we already have.

And that's the plea I make to other nations. Let us do better with the forces you already have committed to Allied Command Europe in the area of manning and training and maintaining and equipping.

And that's the plea I would make to this committee.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. I'm sure you have noted with some interest that the Army has proposed—or the Department of Defense has proposed—in this year, next year's budget, to curtail production of the Apache helicopter.

In testimony before this committee by General Wickham and Secretary Marsh, and even Secretary Weinberger, they basically said, well, it's just a matter of money.

It's my understanding that Apaches in significant number were crucial to your ability to carry out your mission, and I would appreciate your opinion as to the importance of that program as far as NATO is concerned.

General ROGERS. When one is faced with the multitude of tanks and other means of mobility on the other side, the attack helicopter—and the Apache's the best one in the world—is a force multiplier for us.

The commanders can move it around the battlefield to meet the thrusts when needed and then move them off someplace else.

U.S. Army Europe has been promised 252 eventually. And I'm told even with the Army's reduced buy we'll still get our 252.

But I understand that if the Army had its own way—let me rephrase that—if the Army had $7 billion additional, it would prefer to have a little over 1,000 of these platforms. In fact, its buyout is going to be somewhere a little less than 600, I think.

You know, just as one who needs this kind of a platform and it's needed in other areas of the world as well, I would prefer having them go for 1,031 than 593, because I think it's a force multiplier around the world.

It's not my business, and I hate to stand in judgment of those whose business it is, but I just happen to think that an Apache in a forward deployment area is worth two other helicopters on the drawing board.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Rogers, let me add my welcome and my congratulations for your lifetime of service, your dedication, your commitment, your patriotism is a model for all of us.

General ROGERS. Thank you.

Senator LEVIN. And I just want to add my thanks for it.

General, I have read your entire statement also, and have found a great deal of wisdom and food for thought in it. Parts of it I disagree with, particularly in the area of burdensharing, which Admiral and now Senator McCain mentioned.

I think we tend to apologize a bit for the lack of adequate burdensharing on the part of some of our allies. I think it is important we talk about some of our allies.

But to say, for instance, they're supplying the battlefields. That means to me that they're defending their homeland. I don't view that as a contribution to the common defense to say that they're supplying the battlefield we'd have to fight on.

I don't view it frankly as much of a contribution that they make the political judgment to have a draft. We make a political judgment to raise taxes to pay for a volunteer Army. That's a political cost to us in a sense; it cost more.

So I think that somewhat too much of a defense of what I consider to be in some instances indefensible.

But I'd rather focus on the parts of your statement that I think are—particularly in the area of strengthening conventional forces.

Being the chairman of the Conventional Forces Subcommittee, I have a particular interest in what you have to say about that.

For instance, you say that reductions in readiness funding have degraded training by lowering operating tempos and deferring flying hours program growth in all services.

I'm wondering whether or not those reductions that you are experiencing are being restored in the budget request that's now before us?

General ROGERS. In the budget request, most of the operating tempo for our training is increased. And of course it comes out of the operations and maintenance funds. That's why I would plead that you look at that very carefully, because we do need to keep the training levels up.

For example, the Sixth Fleet, when it has unprogrammed operations, as it must in the Mediterranean, we have to eat that. And we end up instead of having the 50 some hours of steaming time a quarter, we end up with something like 12 or 14 hours of steaming time.

And that's very harmful to our purposes.

Senator LEVIN. You also have testified very dramatically, I believe, that certain key items are at a low stockage level of supply, or 30 percent of the requirement to counter specific threat targets, and then you identify some of those items. Then you say these shortfalls are significant. My questions on that is: Do we have other items that we could substitute for those key items which are in such short supply in time of an emergency?

General ROGERS. I believe those that I have identified are systems for which we don't have substitutes, or if we do, we're also short of the substitute items.

But let me, sir, if I might, just say to you, when I first arrived in 1979 in the theater, I found on my U.S. side that we didn't have adequate reserve stocks.

But today, by the NATO standards, there's improvement being made.

The reason I draw attention to these warstoppers, and particularly those in ammunition, is it doesn't help me to send over a lot of plain vanilla 155 millimeter ammunition when we've achieved NATO standards.

And rather than spend money on that, buy these other munitions that are critical preferred munitions we need.

Senator LEVIN. Now, when you point that out to the Defense Department, what's their answer?

General ROGERS. Well, it's always reflected in the budget. And I think in each of those instances that I have shown, it'll show in the out-years getting up near 100 percent or to the number of days of supply we want.

Some of us have become somewhat cynical about out-year funding, because it always seems to be 5 years hence each time. Because there's no constituency for that kind of sustainment.

Senator LEVIN. General, in that same area of conventional force capabilities, you say on page 19 of your testimony is that your major concern is that the gap between comparative NATO-Warsaw Pact force capabilities will grow so large that certain things would follow.

Is that gap between NATO and Warsaw Pact force capability grown over the past few years?

General Rogers. Yes, sir

Senator Levin. We are talking about conventional forces.

General Rogers. Exactly. I have here unclassified charts that show the measurement that we use since 1973 in a number of areas of equipment. I would like to leave copies of that for members of the committee if I might, because I think you would find interesting to see how we look at it. It does not measure training, morale, leadership, and some of those intangibles which are so important on the battlefield, but its sort of a bean-counting exercise and measures the difference in force capabilities.

[The material referred to follows:]

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
BELGIUM

VIGILIA PRETIUM LIBERTATIS

NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT FORCE COMPARISONS 1973-1986

MARCH 1987

INTRODUCTION

The object of the SHAPE Force Comparison is to demonstrate broad trends in the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance. The attached graphs reflect only a quantitative comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities. Qualitative factors that can affect the military balance are not included. Historically, NATO has relied on its technological advantages to offset Warsaw Pact numerical superiority. In recent years however, the Soviets have made significant strides in closing the technology gap, thus eroding NATO's qualitative advantages. While qualitative considerations are important when assessing the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, they are beyond the scope of this comparison.

METHODOLOGY

1. In order to avoid subjective judgements wherever possible, NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are compared without reference to scenarios. Therefore, as reinforcements are sensitive to a number of assumptions, the comparisons include only equipment and active duty personnel located within the geographical area of Europe or the surrounding seas. For the Warsaw Pact, included are equipment and active duty personnel located in Eastern Europe and in Soviet military districts west of the Urals (with the exception of Moscow, Volga, and Ural MD). Equipment comparisons include items for rapidly mobilizable forces stored within the geograhical area (e.g., U.S. POMCUS and Soviet equipment for Category D Divisions). Soviet strategic reserves, and NATO forces and equipment in North America are excluded.

2. As in the NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons, 1984, global data is given for Longer-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (LRINF) missiles. This is consistent with the global approach taken by the United States in arms control negotiations. For the remaining land-based nuclear systems, NATO forces in Europe are compared with Warsaw Pact forces in the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries and Western USSR (including Moscow, Ural and Volga MD).

3. NATO figures are based on data from national annual reports to NATO. While these reports do not necessarily include all the forces of each nation, all reported forces, to include those not "committed" to NATO, are included.

4. Warsaw Pact figures are derived from generally agreed NATO intelligence sources.

5. Specific criteria for particular comparisons are noted, as applicable, on the graphs.

6. Although France and Spain are members of the North Atlantic Alliance, neither participates in the integrated military structure. Therefore, French and Spanish forces are not included in this comparison.

FORCE COMPARISON CHARTS



LRINF WARHEADS ON MISSILES (WORLD-WIDE)



SNF MISSILES

(MISSILES WITH RANGE LESS THAN 1000 km)

NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT
(LAND BASED DCA)



PERSONNEL UNDER ARMS IN EUROPE



DIVISION EQUIVALENTS IN THEATRE



MAIN BATTLE TANKS



(TANKS WITH MAIN ARMAMENT OF 90mm OR GREATER CALIBRE)

ANTI-TANK GUIDED WEAPONS



ARTILLERY/MORTARS/ROCKET LAUNCHERS



(WEAPONS OF 100mm OR GREATER CALIBRE)

ATTACK HELICOPTERS



AIRCRAFT FIGHTER-BOMBER/ATTACK (LAND-BASED)



AIRCRAFT
FIGHTERS/INTERCEPTORS

(LAND BASED)



NAVAL VESSELS
ATTACK SUBMARINES

(IN NORTH ATLANTIC AND SEAS BORDERING EUROPE)



NAVAL FORCES MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS (IN NORTH ATLANTIC AND SEAS BORDERING EUROPE)



Senator Levin. Thank you, General. My time is up.

Senator Exon. Thank you, General. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Quayle.

Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, I believe I may have been here earlier.

Senator Exon. I thought you might inquire about that. The Chair rules that Senator Quayle was here. We have the early bird rule. He had to step out, and comes back. I am sorry. I do not want to get involved with who talks first on the Republican side, but the Chair recognizes Senator Quayle.

Senator Quayle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I would like to go back to the Zero Zero and the possibility of conversion of the P2s to the P1Bs. How practical is that, first from a military point of view and second from a public opinion and political point of view?

General Rogers. From a military point of view it is practical to do it. I think we could do that fairly expeditiously. From the political standpoint it might cause some difficulty with the German government, but I do not know. I noticed yesterday that Horst Teltschik, who is, well, I suppose he would come closest to being the director of their national security council, I notice that he is on record as having said that we might have conversion so it may be that the Federal Republic has agreed to it. What the politics of the issue would be within this country, I do not know.

Senator Quayle. Looking at what the post-zero INF environment would look like, you have the asymmetry on the short range INF forces. They have somthing like 700, I guess, if you total them all up, and we have maybe 120. Some have advocated going to zero, and that as well. Would that be the preferable position, or would a more preferable position be to focus on how we are going to go ahead with conversion and make that priority from a military point of view, because I think that the two are different, and I know that they are both being tossed around. I just would be curious if you have looked at this closely and what your thoughts are.

General ROGERS. Yes. Well, if we are going to accomplish the former, which is to get rid of all short-range completely, we have to do the latter, I think. We have to show the Soviets we are serious, and they are not going to be able to continue at a six or seven to one advantage. I think that is not only for our own purposes in this country but also for assurance of our allies. If we do that, then the chances of getting serious negotiation for the elimination of that category of nuclear weapons, I think, are much better. If we do that, going into it with out eyes wide open, we must understand what we have left. We have manned aircraft and we have cruise missiles. We have the sea-launched ballistic missile, but that is a strategic weapon and I do not think this country should put itself in the position that it is going to after the traditional role of the sea-launched ballistic missiles. So if we go solely to air breathers in Western Europe or we were to go to zero ballistic missiles worldwide period; we must understand that the operational stockpile that is needed for deterrence or for defense or for warfighting capability, that operational stockpile—when you translate it into requirements after you have looked at survivability, reliability, and penetrativity—is going to have to be larger because of the penetrativity difference between air breathers and ballistic missiles. We give the ballistic missile a high penetrativity factor and the air breathers a significantly lower factor. It depends on which one you have. When you factor all of those together, it means that your stockpile requirement is going to be considerably greater or larger than is your operational requirement today.

Senator QUAYLE. Would the best scenario be if we got an agreement to eliminate all of these INF forces, both the intermediate and the short-range, and you get a real Zero Zero, not that you have a 100 stationed there, and you keep the asymmetry in the short range. Would that be our best objective?

General ROGERS. Well, I think that would be a worthwhile objective for us to set for ourselves, and then take into account how do we respond to time urgent targets, how do we service time urgent targets, for example? That has been one of the reasons we have needed the ballistic missile—to penetrate on a timely basis and now with great accuracy to take out time urgent targets. Now, how do you take care of those time urgent targets? You have got to figure that out.

Senator QUAYLE. Well, how would we?

General ROGERS. I am not sure. I do not have the answer to that.

Senator QUAYLE. Is anybody looking at this?

General ROGERS. Oh, I think so. We are looking at it at my NATO headquarters, for example. We are looking at the proposals that were tabled at Reykjavik. We are looking at all of those proposals to determine what impact it will have upon our strategy, ability to deter, and our ability to defend. We must report that out to the ministers at the Nuclear Planning Group in May. So they are looking at it, and we are also looking at it, if I could just interject this, from a standpoint of the ceiling on nuclear weapons in Europe that was mandated by the Nuclear Planning Group ministers in Montebello in 1983 and which our Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study in 1985 showed we could reduce significantly. If we did certain things such as I mentioned earlier, for example a follow on to Lance with greater accuracy.

Senator QUAYLE. Would that be the ATACMS?

General ROGERS. It could be.

Senator QUAYLE. It could be?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir, and if we had an air to surface missile which we believe we need, we could go significantly below that, but if we do away with ballistic missiles, and use only air breathers, and you look at those three factors I mentioned which give you the probability of arrival over target of a warhead, then we will find that the numbers that we need may well be higher.

Senator QUAYLE. So in other words to reach down to the Montebello level we are really going to have to modernize our tactical nuclear capability? Is that basically what you are saying? And specifically, since my time is up, let me ask you specifically your position on the ban that we presently have on the ATACMS of being dual capable. It seems to me that this is precisely the direction that you are going, that this is not a very good policy that Congress has instituted, particularly in a Zero Zero environment, that we have to have a follow on and we really need this capability. Am I hearing you correctly?

General ROGERS. You are, Senator. We cannot afford single capable weapons in Western Europe for nuclear purposes. We need follow-on to Lance and we need the air-to-surface missile. We need to modernize artillery fired atomic projectiles, and we also need the modernization, the range, the accuracy on the conventional side. And so we need to have those systems dual capable. One of the things, if we are going to go the direction in which I believe we must go, is to come and knock on the door of the Congress and ask for relief in two areas. One is not being able to make the follow-on to Lance dual capable. We would ask for relief on that. And second, we would ask for relief on the ceiling of artillery fired atomic projectiles because our Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study shows that although we can reduce fairly dramatically the number that we need, we still need more than the ceiling in Europe alone if we are going to hold at risk the mobile type targets that we must hold at risk under the scenario and the methodology by which we develop these numbers. So we would come to ask for relief on that, on both of those, at the appropriate time.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am not making a request now, but this is something to think about. I think it would probably be prudent for the full committee or for your subcommittee in conjunction with Senator Levin's subcommittee to look at what some of our military requirements are going to be post-INF in a Zero Zero option. I just bring that up now, and I will be discussing it with you and the chairman later on, but it certainly makes sense listening to this. The discussion particularly has commented that they really have not thought through this much what we really need in a post-INF involvement. I think it would be very important for this committee to take a look at that.

Senator EXON. Senator Quayle, I thank you, and I think that is a good point.

General ROGERS. May I add to this, Senator Quayle. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are looking at all of this. Much of the information that we need in order to do a critical study at SHAPE is contingent upon receiving information from the United States. All of that kind of information must come to us at SHAPE. So I know the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff are working very diligently in this area looking at all these contingencies, these what-ifs. They have provided us with considerable information already, and we expect to get more so that we can report out in May.

Senator EXON. Under the rules, Senator Symms is recognized next.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General, thank you for your excellent statement and your other testimony which you have added here this morning. I have learned a great deal from it. I took it from your statement and from your other responses that you disagree with the suggested idea of removing 100,000 U.S. personnel from Europe. Is that correct?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMMS. What manpower level do you see as necessary for the United States to maintain then?

General ROGERS. Well, when we factored the requirements against the missions assigned to U.S. forces by Allied Command Europe, we find that we are about 100,000 short. And as a I mentioned in my statement, 76,000 are associated with the combat service support, combat support forces to support the forward deployed combat forces already there. As we have remained beneath the ceiling that Congress has mandated on European troop strength, we have had to make adjustments that have amounted to about 30,000 military spaces that we think we really need.

Senator SYMMS. Do you believe we will be able to keep our requirements with the All Volunteer Force?

General ROGERS. I believe that there will be greater difficulty, of course, as the——

Senator SYMMS. Let me ask the question in a different way. Would you feel more comfortable in your position if the United States had a draft?

General ROGERS. Yes, I would, Senator Symms, but that is a position I have had even before I was a Chief of Staff. It would be a selected draft directing itself toward the major problem that we have. Our problem is not recruiting, and our problem is not reenlisting. Our problem is the combat support, combat service support. I think that we need a selective draft for that purpose on the basis of a lottery as we had near the end of the draft period in the early seventies which addressed itself to that problem. If that happened it would certainly make it easier to recruit and also to retain, I believe, but let us face it. Any kind of draft is anathema in this country at the present time. Well, yes, to answer your question, I would be more comfortable if we had a draft for that purpose.

Senator SYMMS. General, my time is short. I have too many areas that I want to get into, so I will shift gears just briefly. Maybe this is a question that cannot be answered briefly, but Senator Exon brought up a question concerning nuclear, biological, chemical warfare. Are we a long ways behind from where we should be with respect to the terms of equipment, tactics to meet the Soviet capability in this area?

General ROGERS. The United States is in as good a shape as any nation and it is in quite good shape. We need to spend more effort, I think, on warning systems, detection systems, and decontamination systems to ensure that we have the full gear for our troops. But the United States is doing very well in that area. Where we are behind is in the retaliatory capability, but the Congress has taken steps to provide that for us with certain stipulations as to timing and when the Nation can start producing, but as I mentioned earlier——

Senator SYMMS. But we do not have that right now, and if we do not have it right now, you are not ready for it.

General ROGERS. We do not, and no, we are not. It is so important that you continue marching in the direction that the Congress started—to give us that capability.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you. Now, General, I want to get back down to something more fundamental. It is a little less sophisticated, but I am very concerned about the Army's slowness in rearming our infantry troops with new rifles, remodernizing the M60 machine guns, getting the M-19 40-millimeter grenade launcher at the company level or at least at the battalion level so that it would be there for the company commander in a closed situation. Do you have M-16 A2s at all?

General ROGERS. I am not sure if we have the A2 or not. But if it comes into the Army inventory we usually get it first in Europe.

Senator SYMMS. The next question is the squad automatic weapon. I have received correspondence from the Army, from the Secretary's office that they intend to replace the M-60 with a squad automatic weapon. Although the squad automatic weapons is an excellent weapon, it does not have the same capabilities of a machine gun of a 762 caliber with a T&D mechanism on it. Do you think that is a wise thing, to limit our front line combat troops from access to heavier machine guns with such mechanisms so they can have control and aim fire at further range?

General ROGERS. I really could not nor would I wish to stand in judgment in this area other than to say that it is not the trend of Army Chiefs of Staff or Secretaries of the Army to do anything which is counter to the interest of the individual soldier. If they believe that providing the infantrymen with that kind of weapon was not in his best interests, they would not do that. They just would not do it.

Senator SYMMS. Well, I think it is a good weapon. I just hate to see the Army remove the 762 caliber away from the company.

General ROGERS. I really would have no comment on that.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Senator. Under the rules, Senator Wilson is recognized. Senator Humphrey would have been recognized but he has stepped out of the room, so we will get back to him when he comes back in. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, it is always a pleasure to welcome you back. We always learn from your testimony. I apologize that I was late in arriving here and if these questions have been asked by someone else, just so signal and I will consult the record. I am very much concerned that as we approach these INF negotiations that there be adequate concern paid to the problem that was so sharply focused by the testimony that we had about 15 months ago in the subcommittee of this committee that is assigned responsibility for strategic and nuclear weapons problems.

Rufus Gormley appeared before the subcommittee and depicted a scenario vastly different than the sort of classic scenario Warsaw Pact attack upon NATO, and what he said in substance, I do not think I am doing violence to the substance of what he said, was that in the first few hours of such an attack, short-range Soviet missiles of an infinitely greater capability and accuracy then their predecessors had the capability of knocking out airports, ports, Pomcus sites, railheads, and in short within a matter of the first few hours of that attack largely denying to the west the ability to reinforce and resupply, and that that would be accompanied by Spetznatz attacks and rather than a broad front of armor moving across Europe selected penetrations with Soviet armor punching through, and as I have indicated, the Spetznatz attacking command and control points sensitive to the coordination of any resistance.

My colleague, Senator Quayle, with my support last year succeeded in placing provisions in the DOD authorization bill that were aimed at meeting that threat, and it specifically addressed the requirement that we develop with our NATO allies an antitactical ballistic missile defense capability. I have two questions. First, if you had an opportunity, and I hope you do, to counsel with our negotiators, would you be urging them to deal with the subject of INF negotiation in isolation or would you insist that the subject of short-range INF weapons be included?

General ROGERS. I would ask that they continue to take the position that they are taking, which is to provide in the agreement on longer range a provision for constraints on the shorter range INF, and I am hopeful that that will be the outcome. With respect to what you say in the antitactical ballistic missile, and I was surprised that the subject had not come up up to this time, that certainly is one of the ways that one can account for the shorter range INF in addition to try to capture them at the negotiating table. And I just add a footnote to what I said to you, Senator Quayle. If we capture them at the—you know, if we were to capture them at the negotiating table, and those ballistic missiles are eliminated on both sides, it could make it difficult for us then to carry out the attack on the follow-on forces with conventional warheads on missiles, and we understand that. Depending on where the lower range limit was set for SRINF we would be giving up something there, you see, because I think the follow-on force attack will be the determinant of how long we can defend conventionally at the general defensive position. On the theater ballistic missile defense, there is movement on that within Europe and in about three areas which I will not discuss to include the normal planning procedures of NATO. The decision has not yet been made by NATO whether or not the threat is great enough to warrant it. Then if it is determined it is, and they approve the long-term planning guideline that we have sent forward from my NATO headquarters to them, it will mean then that they will look to see whether or not they can develop a system that is mission effective and cost effective. I think under those conditions they need to work very closely with Europe and what we are doing in the SDI organization—the boost phase destruction, the midflight intercept, and the terminal destruction—because we will need that in any theater ballistic defense. We need to work very closely.

So there is movement in the system in that area and as members of this committee know, the United States has provided funding from the SDIO to the United Kingdom and Israel to develop an architecture for a theater ballistic missile defense, and they have provided funding to seven consortia to do the same thing. So there is a lot of movement in that area.

Senator WILSON. It really poses a dilemma for us, as I gather Senator Quayle's earlier questioning to you did as to what the better way to go about that is. I gather that you are saying that if you would be assured that it were possible to achieve it at the negotiating table, then you would not necessarily pursue the ATBM requirement.

General ROGERS. Any more than we would pursue the SDI in this country if all ballistic missiles were eliminated through negotiations. And then the question is, do you need to keep an SDI? Do you need to keep a theater ballistic missile defense in case the other side has cheated?

Senator WILSON. That is precisely what my next question was going to be, and it brings up the question of the difficulty of verification if, as is proposed, there are 100 warheads held back on each side. It is very difficult, I would think, to know whether or not the 100 are in fact 100 or whether they are 400 or 600.

General ROGERS. I just say to you, and this is only Bernie Rogers talking, and it is certainly not the NATO position, I am never sanguine from day to day that I know what the Soviet Warsaw Pact has in the way of equipment, because there are so many places they can put it where we cannot find it with national technical means or even with on-site inspection that I could never assure myself to the point that I would be sanguine that I knew what the hell they had, and that certainly goes for missiles, mobile missiles as well as anything else. I have not yet been given any great evidence in the past 44 years as a commissioned officer that I should be trusting the Soviet Union, no matter who their leader is.

Senator WILSON. If you accept a portion of what Mr. Gormley predicted is possible, the attack that he envisioned would be devastating in terms of our ability to resupply from the air that the devastation to our airfields there would be such that it would virtually eliminate our ability to resupply with the aircraft that we now have for airlift. Is that in your judgment reinforcement for the view that I think you have earlier expressed along with virtually every other CINC we have talked to endorsing the C–17 as an aircraft having a capability that would deal with that problem?

General ROGERS. We could bring them into almost any airfield that we have and give us a greater capability. I do endorse the C–17 for a number of reasons, not the least being that. Let me say with respect to the scenario that you have created it is because of the accuracy and range of Soviet nonstrategic ballistic missiles. It will have the same accuracy in 1990 that it has gotten the attention of Western Europeans and that maybe something ought to be done about developing a defense against those kinds of weapons—not to defend against them only with nuclear warheads on them, but to defend against them with a conventional warhead on them at the outset, because if you were the Soviet planner at the same time you unleashed your massive air strikes you also would unleash in coordination with your missile strikes. And of course Spetznatz——

Senator WILSON. And you would go nonnuclear, you would go nonnuclear because there is no necessity to go nuclear. Why escalate it?

Thank you, General. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Senator Wilson, I believe we have just about completed our first round, though Senator Gore has not yet been recognized.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I wish to apologize to General Rogers for missing most of this hearing up until now.

General, I have the greatest respect for you and really congratulate you on the job you have been doing and are doing. I think you are a great credit to the military services of this country, and I certainly do appreciate your work.

What do you think the future holds for the seemingly interminable arms control talks on conventional forces in Europe?

At Stockholm we saw a little bit of progress, and now that MBFR has sort of wound down toward oblivion, there is a new interest in the other fora where these discussions are taking place.

What role should these discussions play in our analysis of U.S. national security strategic in Europe?

General ROGERS. Well, if you use the past as a prologue, looking toward the future there is not much about which to be encouraged in the MBFR talks, but there was some progress made.

What I would hope would happen, and I have no voice in this nor need or should I, is that we would continue to work to take advantage of the progress that was made over the 14 years in the MBFR and to continue to work that problem alliance-to-alliance and not get so submerged in the CSCE that we end up starting from square one once again.

That is a sensitive subject within the alliance, as you are aware, because some nations who wish to participate who do not have forces assigned to the alliance wish to have it done one way, and others wish to have it done another.

They are still sort of walking that line as I view the political side of this issue, but that is the way I would like to have it come out.

Frankly, I thought the December 5, 1985 proposal that the United States tabled, made sense. It was almost everything that the Soviets had indicated they are prepared to accept, but they found they could not say yes to that.

So my projection is it is going to be slow and painful, but if we can be viewed in NATO as taking the steps to overcome the deficiencies we know we have on the conventional side and they know we have—and I am just saying being perceived as taking the steps necessary to try to overcome those—we are going to have greater strength at the negotiating table to get serious negotiations, and the Soviets know that.

So I am hopeful, you know, with the support of this committee and with the support of committees such as this and all the NATO nations we can create that perception in their mind and make some serious progress; but I would like to see alliance-to-alliance negotiations myself.

Senator GORE. I appreciate that response. Let me shift gears here.

Before shifting gears, assuming that the issues of format are settled and we figure out the right way to proceed, what should our objectives be? What should our preferred negotiating outcome be in these talks?

General ROGERS. To achieve equality as close as we can, which means not only equality in numbers but it means equality in strength represented by divisions, represented by tank battalions, represented by artillery battalions and so on. It may be difficult to design in such a fashion that it can be verified, but that should be our overall goal in these, equality.

That includes such issues, controversial issues, as to whether or not if we were to reduce the strength that we have in the NATO guidelines in NBFR now and in future discussions and bring forces home that we are permitted to at least leave the armament, the weapons systems, the platforms there prepositioned in Western Europe so that the distance that we have to ship those is not much greater than the distance the Soviets have to bring theirs should they reinforce.

Senator GORE. Would we want more constraints on exercises?

General ROGERS. That is a confidence building measure to me, Senator, and I think the constraints that we have reached in Stockholm on exercises are adequate.

Senator GORE. Now, with regard to exercises, it has been my understanding that the Soviet exercises in the past have always been predicated on the assumption that they are striking across the border deep into Western Europe. Is that correct?

General ROGERS. Well, they have been caught. Yes, we believe that is so, and we have other evidence of that, as a matter of fact, with names of towns in Western Germany being named. Of course, Minister Woerner was clever enough and smart enough to release that to his people in one instance that I know of.

Senator GORE. Was there a change in that regard in their last exercise?

General ROGERS. Well, they always start their exercises, Senator, in a defensive posture, defending against NATO and using that as the excuse for the size of the forces that they have. Then it ends up with an attack to the West to restore territory that they have lost to NATO and then a continuance of that attack in most instances.

Now, they know as well—if you work under the premise that I do that everything that happens in NATO the Soviets know about, everything that happens in this country, or almost, the Soviets know about—that we are a defensive alliance. They know that I have no offensive plan in my whole kit of plans other than what corps or divisions have for counterattack purposes to restore territorial loss.

So they know we are a defensive alliance, and they do not have to worry about that.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Gore, let me say that we do have a time problem.

Senator GORE. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman, and I am concluding. I would just ask him for the record to provide an analysis of any changes along that line in the last Soviet exercise, and I appreciate your patience, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

SOVIET EXERCISES

We have not noticed a change in the pattern of Soviet exercises as I described earlier.

General ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, may I respond just a little bit further, because I wanted to point out that we do not expect the Soviets, the Warsaw Pact, if they intend to attack, to attack under the guise of an exercise. They could do that, but if they want to attack conventionally, they want to succeed conventionally, and attacking under that scheme does not provide them with sufficient forces.

We think that at least in the central region, for example, that they would wish to attack on three fronts reinforced by at least two fronts behind them, which means that there is going to be time for us to pick up some anomalies, some abnormalities, occurring behind the inter-German border and for us then to convince our political authorities to let us take some prudent precautionary steps as a consequence.

Now that does not mean that they could not attack from an exercise. They could swing to the west and attack, but it would have to be an exericse of such tremendous size in order to support a three-front attack that I just do not think that would happen.

I would just add a footnote to all of that. The Soviets do not want war. They think they can achieve their objective in Western Europe to intimidate and to coerce and blackmail without calling the troops out of the barracks. That really is their objective.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wirth, have you had your first round yet?

Senator WIRTH. No, sir.

Chairman NUNN. I will recognize you at this time.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Rogers, I want to add my comments to those of Senator Gore in commendation and appreciation of you. I am sorry I was not here earlier, as we had markups in both Energy and Budget Committees this morning as well.

I want to follow up very briefly if I might with you on some very compelling and, I thought, fascinating testimony given to this committee by Ambassador Abshire on cooperation between the United States and our NATO allies in terms of procurement and logistics.

An issue that I noted at that time I have heard about all of my adult life, a problem that I have heard about but one in which it would appear, given the financial constraints, that we are all under, has a greater imperative now than perhaps it has ever had before. The Ambassador pointed out the difference in size and scope our GNP and population and so on related to the Warsaw Pact but then came back and pointed out the familiar figures as to how, even given that gap, even given our greater power and greater population, they are outproducing us very significantly in a variety of ways.

Now, granted that the strategies in military procurement policies are different between the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact, but even with that it would appear that the time is ripe for a major effort related to more cooperation.

The question that I have really has four parts to it, if I might. One, if you could describe briefly for us what the status of cooperative efforts are as you see them and how those have evolved.

Second, if there are some sort of indices that we might have of what the cooperation is. Is it rhetrocial, or is it real? If it is real, how do we measure it?

Third, going on down the line, what steps, if any, should we be taking as a Congress, as a committee, to put greater urgency into the need for cooperation?

I guess it is three parts rather than four: status, indices and what should we be doing.

General ROGERS. All right, sir. With respect to Ambassador Abshire, he really has taken the lead while he was there in trying to get a resources strategy started within the alliance. He has had considerable assistance from some members of this committee, the chairman, Senator Quayle and others, in trying to make progress, because the fact is with the massive waste and duplication that we have in our system within NATO, we are tending to structurally disarm.

Now, as for the first question, the status of cooperative efforts, it is continuing to improve. It started about 1984, and it is improving in two specific areas, one, within NATO itself.

It is the Conference of National Armament Directors [CNAD] that are supposed to decide how they furnish the capabilities that commanders say they require in order to defend. There has been much good work done in the CNAD over the past 2 or 3 years to include the deputy secretaries, the deputy ministers of defense meeting periodically to discuss this very issue. Secretary Taft has taken a leading role in that. So I am encouraged by what they are doing.

They have picked up Senator Nunn's amendment to provide equal funding for particular weapons systems, and seven of them have been adopted by nations with as many as 13 down to three participating in it. That is progress.

Another area of progress is the Independent European Program Group [IEPG] which consists of all of the NATO nations in Western Europe. In the meeting in the fall of 1984 where the ministers for the first time met, they set a new direction for that organization, an organization which was created for this very purpose, cooperating and collaboration on weapons systems and on platforms. They, too, are making progress.

In the end, they will never achieve the goal that I think they would like to have, which is to have a Western European defense industrial base that could compete collectively with the industrial base here in the United States, but they are tending in that direction, which means that there is greater collaboration within that IEPG.

So progress is being made. I would solicit the support of the committee to continue to support that.

What indices of cooperation and how can we measure it? You measure it, I think, on systems, in which nations are collaborating.

There has been collaboration in the past on a number of systems. The F-16 is a good example, but coproduction is very important to them, to a nation such as Turkey. So in offering our kinds of weapons systems we must provide them the means to coproduce. That is very helpful.

So you can measure it, I think. The chairman is more knowledgeable than I on this whole thing, but I think you can measure by what you see being done on these projects that are being accepted by nations for collaboration.

What steps should the committee take? Keep an open mind. I know the problems you face when there is unemployment in defense industries within constituencies, and I know sometimes on this side of the Atlantic we get upset with our allies on burden-sharing and a number of other issues in the aftermath of Libya and Reykjavik, a whole series of things. I would say just keep an open mind and think NATO.

I have said so many times that if I really were serious about what I have been trying to do, I would have had signs printed that I would have tried to put on every Congressman's desk and every Parliamentarian's desk and every desk of the members of the Bundestag and all the nations which just says "Think NATO".

If we are serious about trying to get greater returns for our investment, it has to be done within that context, in my opinion. That means a major shift in the thinking of some Members of the Congress and the thinking of some Members of the British Parliament and in the French Parliament and so on, in the Chamber of Deputies particularly.

If we are going to succeed, it has to be in that context, and there are a lot of things, a lot of obstacles to it that occur, as you well know, to prevent us from doing as much as we would like.

Senator **Wirth**. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Wirth.

I think we are ready for the second round for those who want to participate.

Senator Warner, we have dominated the last 12 minutes on this side, so why do I not defer to you, and then I will come back with my questions.

Senator **Warner**. Well, I do have a few questions, but I will ask my colleague from Indiana if he would like to go first.

Senator **Quayle**. Whichever, yes.

Senator **Warner**. Very well, then why not go ahead.

Senator **Quayle**. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I might just propose a quick statement to you as I did to Senator Exon when he was chairing it. It would seem to me to be helpful for this committee to really look at some of our probably emerging military requirements in a post-Zero INF environment.

Obviously, it depends on what the agreement is and what we are going to do, but in some of my discussions with General Rogers, some of the new things, they really are just starting to look at these things. I think it would be helpful, at least from my viewpoint, to have some hearings and have a real good discussion on that. I just bring it out.

Now, I have not yet talked to Senator Warner about this, but just listening to this this morning and trying to grapple with some of the issues, I think that we really need some edification on what some of our choices are going to be.

Senator WARNER. If I understand the Senator, you would establish as a base a premise that there would be a Zero option?

Senator QUAYLE. Looking at it if a Zero Zero comes down, what are going to be our military requirements? What are we doing now to look at that possibility, and what are our needs going to be?

I would just throw that out as a suggestion that we can perhaps think about, but as one who has followed this thing, it just seems to me it would be good for this committee to get into that.

Chairman NUNN. It is a good suggestion.

As the Senator knows, we are going to be right in the middle of the budget cycle and process pretty soon, and if we can make strides toward a 2-year budget, if we can—it is going to be difficult, but if we can—perhaps this could be subsequent to it, and we would have more time to get into these kinds of issues.

Senator QUAYLE. Yes, this could be subsequent to a markup, but this is an emerging issue that I think we are going to be dealing with.

General, I want to go back to something. You said you were surprised that ATBM had not been mentioned until Senator Wilson brought it up. I would like to go back to that issue.

When I was in the committee last month going around, I found a recognition of the emerging threat in the imbalance on the SRINF, but I found there was not a real coherent consensus on the emerging conventional ballistic missile threat.

They were aware of it, but since these weapons, they felt, were more dedicated to the nuclear forces that it was more of a nuclear problem, and I just found that they had not really focused in on this conventional capability that you have mentioned to Senator Wilson.

I personally think that that is the emerging threat that we have on the SS-21s and SS-23s and SS-22s as well, that they are going to go conventional, that you are going to have a good conventional ballistic missile with high accuracy in ATPM or something like that.

Could you fill me in as far as the agreement on this emerging threat that our NATO allies have or do not have?

General ROGERS. We do not have agreement on that threat. Let me be very specific about it.

Under the long-term planning procedures of NATO, a major NATO commander, from his conceptual military framework is to flow long-term planning guidelines to nations to tell them we need something and to get them to agree that we need it.

When we sent forward the long-term planning guideline last year on a theater ballistic missile defense, we ran into this very thing that you mentioned. Some said yes, that threat is there and we must do something about it, and others said we are still not convinced there is a threat adequate to warrant our continuing to consider it.

We pulled back the long-term planning guideline and expanded that threat and made it much more, I think, incisive than we had before. We have now sent forward that long-term planning guideline again. I would anticipate this time that we will find that most nations will agree to there is a threat. Then they will have to decide, do they wish to do something about it and when do they wish to do something about it.

Then it is the commander's responsibility to apprise the Conference of National Armament Directors what capability he needs through our mission need documents, and they are supposed to provide it.

Senator QUAYLE. So you think a consensus is being developed on this threat?

General ROGERS. I think so, yes.

Senator QUAYLE. Well, I would hope so because I think it is obviously very imperative as we go forward.

Would this threat, establishing a NATO threat, would this be this AGARD 25 that is due in June? Is that perhaps what you are referring to?

General ROGERS. They have looked at it as well, and I think they will confirm that there is a threat.

Senator QUAYLE. In your judgment, there is no doubt that we have this conventional ballistic missile threat?

General ROGERS. That is correct. We have to do something about it, and we can do something about it along the lines we discussed before, you see, of their reducing or our increasing or eliminating all of them.

But I just want to point out again the impact that our attack of the follow-on forces would have on what we are trying to do for FOFA if we lose that.

Senator QUAYLE. I would like to get into FOFA for just a moment and to go through with you to establish the correlation of FOFA and the conventional forces and our nuclear forces, because it seems to me that to be able to effectively have FOFA and to be able to make sure that the Soviets keep the echelon and things of that sort that we have to have a nuclear capability. Does not the nuclear capability enhance our conventional deterrence and our conventional forces, and is there not some interrelationship between the two?

General ROGERS. Yes, there is.

Senator QUAYLE. Would you spell that out a little bit in detail, because I think there may be some confusion here that somehow we just focus on conventional and that there is really not that real necessary requirement of having that nuclear capability that enhances our conventional capability and particularly FOFA.

General ROGERS. I think the reason, and this is just my perception of what occurred, is that in order to get movement on weapons systems to be used by FOFA, it was necessary to have them only conventional to get the funding and so on necessary within the Congress.

As I said earlier in the chairman's absence, I do think that we have to make those systems dual capable. Now, let us just play the scenario, sir.

The purpose of attacking follow-on forces is to try to defend as long as we can conventionally without my having to implement the guidance under which I function from political authorities, which is you, SACEUR, if you project that you are going to lose the cohesiveness of your defense, i.e., subject to penetrations on a fairly broad scale, you will request the release of nuclear weapons. I have no option. I will request their release.

That means if we can reach back and delay, disrupt or destroy these follow-on forces before they can get to the general defensive position or exploit what the lead echelon has done, we can defend longer as long as we have sufficient sustainment so that we can continue the conventional fight. It is the lack of sustainment today that has me requesting fairly quickly the release of nuclear weapons under those conditions.

Then when I have to request the release of nuclear weapons, we found that we needed a warhead on a follow-on to Lance, a nuclear warhead, and we would also like a conventional warhead on a follow-on to Lance with a similar range and the same accuracy, you see.

We would also like to do the same with the air-to-surface missile, conventional and nuclear, a standoff weapon so we do not have to expose ourselves to the massive air defense that the Soviets have built; also, so that we can attack follow-on forces on a timely basis with some platform other than manned aircraft, which we have always done. We called it interdiction in the past. We have always done that.

There are so many missions for manned aircraft at the time when you want to strike the follow-on forces that it is very doubtful that the commanders can release enough manned aircraft for that purpose.

So that is why we need them with a conventional warhead, and then if and when we have to go nuclear, then we are going to need them also to strike targets at those ranges that lie back on non-Soviet Warsaw Pact soil in addition to having the capability to reach the Soviet Union from Western Europe soil with nuclear weapons with an accurate system other than manned aircraft if we can do that.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Quayle.

General Rogers, let me just go over a couple of things very quickly with you here. A few years ago, you stated, in fact several times you have stated, that because of NATO's conventional weaknesses which you alluded to this morning, that this would require you to request permission to use nuclear weapons. Is that statement still true today?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir. But we can fight a little longer conventionally today than we could 3 years ago because of what we have done with respect to sustainment.

Chairman NUNN. That leads to the next question: What progress have we made in munitions sustainability, let us say in the last 3 years?

General ROGERS. We have made considerable progress. We tend to take credit for what we plan to do oftentimes in NATO, rather than what we have done.

Chairman NUNN. I have noticed that.

[Laughter.]

General ROGERS. But we have made some progress, and if the plans are fulfilled we will continue to do so.

Chairman NUNN. In terms of implementation, how much better off are we now than we were in 1984, when the so-called "bad Nunn amendment" was proposed, in terms of sustainability, in terms of actually what would happen if we had D-Day tomorrow?

General ROGERS. May I furnish that for the record? In the first place, there is some classified information; and second, I would like to do it by days of supply or percentages might be better.

Chairman NUNN. That will be fine. We will have that for the record.

[The information follows:]

MUNITIONS SUSTAINABILITY

[Deleted.]

Chairman NUNN. Would you do the same thing on the hardened bases, hardened shelters, and the minimum essential facilities?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. And distinguish between the plans and where we are right now?

[The information follows:]

AIRCRAFT SHELTERS AND COLLOCATED OPERATING BASES

[Deleted.]

General ROGERS. And in that connection, Mr. Chairman, you should know that we will in this slice group which is exhausted in 1990—we now plan to program hardened aircraft shelters. We have every reason to believe that we will be able to fulfill that, and then to provide the rest of the 1,130 that are needed in the following slice group.

I have made that commitment to you, and we watch that very carefully. We are in the hands of nations, as you know, to implement construction of the projects once the funding has been programmed, and in some instances the implementation has not met the schedule we would like.

But I do believe that we are going to fulfill the commitment that we made to you.

Chairman NUNN. You do not think you need any more stimulus this year? [Laughter.]

General ROGERS. For one, I do not think we need any more stimulus. And two, we have looked at whether or not additional funding would help us and we decided what it is the nations can do, or at least they tell us they can do, and I am convinced they are doing about the best they can with what we have.

Chairman NUNN. Let me shift to another subject. I cannot let you get away, and you may have already been asked this. And if you have, I will delete the question and you will not have to answer it. But what is your impression now of what is happening in the reorganization as you view it in terms of where it is now compared to where it was before the law was passed and where you believe it is going?

General ROGERS. Well, my perception is that there has been a considerable effort devoted to fulfilling the details of the law. I do think that there are some areas where there may be a desire to come back and talk to the Congress about certain things. You know, not broad general portions of the reorganization, but certain things which the Defense Department might not be able to implement in the manner that was expected.

Chairman NUNN. Are you speaking of the required joint experience?

General ROGERS. That is part of it.

Chairman NUNN. We anticipated that, and those of us in the Senate conference had some language written in saying that we anticipated some problems and we wanted some assessments.

I do not think anybody is foreclosing the possibility of readdressing that issue and maybe some others.

General ROGERS. But other than that, certainly from where I sit, we are moving along in the reorganization.

Chairman NUNN. Has it helped your authority? Has it helped you as combatant commander, in that hat?

General ROGERS. It gives me authority that I did not have before. The answer is yes, sir. It gives me authority I did not have before, and authority that a combatant commander has to have if he is going to perform the missions that have been assigned to him.

Chairman NUNN. Have you streamlined or do you have underway any look or study of streamlining under your more flexible authority now some of the layers under you?

General ROGERS. We are doing that at the European command, yes, sir, at that headquarters.

Chairman NUNN. Is that a 2 or 3 year project or is that something that we are going to hear about in the future?

General ROGERS. Well, I would hope that it would not be that long before we have made some decision. I expect I will make what decisions I can without leaving that as a legacy to General Galvin. You know, we are laying that out now, what decisions can I make as SACEUR and CINCEUR.

Chairman NUNN. But you do believe that you can make some progress under your new authority?

General ROGERS. Oh, I know I can. We are looking now very closely at legislation on the Special Operations Forces as to whether or not that will dilute the authority of the CINC if the organization is constructed as we believe the intent of the Congress is. We are looking at that, and I just do not have an answer on that one yet.

But we intend to pursue the intent of the Congress under any circumstances. It may impact, it may not. I do not know.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, this hearing has many purposes in terms of the work of this committee. For one, however, it is a valuable addition to our ongoing series of hearings on national strategy which we have jointly launched together.

I would like to just pose a question or two in that area. President Carter I think very wisely made a commitment that this Nation would protect certain areas of the Middle East. At the same time, in the course of our hearings we learned I guess what we already knew, that we did not have any specific forces in this country committed to enforce that commitment.

And indeed, if you look at the spectrum of commitments we have, there is a question of whether there is a mismatch or misalignment of forces to fulfill all of the commitments and obligations we have worldwide.

So I come directly to my question. I choose as a hypothetical: Should the Iran-Iraq situation spill over to where the Straits of Hormuz are sealed one way or another, now, those straits permit the passage of energy which I think—I do not recall exactly the figure, but I think it is a very high percentage of West Germany's requirements that come through those straits, and my guess is a considerable portion of the Benelux energy comes through those straits.

Now, what flexibility, if any, does NATO have to have a force go down and reopen those straits under the guise of a NATO action? My recollection is you do not have that authority.

But if you do not, should we examine the use of that authority, because quite frankly, there are advantages in having a common military objective shared in by nations other than ourselves, just the United States being a policeman in that area.

And as we continuously look at our resources and the allocation of those resources worldwide, we see a very large commitment to NATO, which has served its purpose well for 40 years. But what about the flexibility of the use of the NATO forces in other areas that are unrelated to the mission of NATO?

General **Rogers**. Yes, sir. It would be as allies assisting the United States and not as NATO assisting the United States.

Senator **Warner**. The charter itself would preclude it? That is my recollection.

General **Rogers**. Yes, the charter itself would preclude it. The boundary of the territory is drawn, because the United States did not wish to get involved in the colonial issues of member nations in 1949. Now, those nations do not get involved out-of-the-area as an alliance, as a corollary.

But there are certain nations in the alliance, such as France, which is not integrated but still is on the political side, and also the United Kingdom, that could, and I think would, assist us.

Senator **Warner**. Well, we saw that in Lebanon.

General **Rogers**. Yes, sir, we saw that in a number of places.

Senator **Warner**. We had the four-part force there.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Warner, excuse me. I have to leave and I just want to say goodbye to General Rogers and to thank you.

Senator **Warner**. This is my last question, I guess. And I want to thank the General, too.

So your short answer would be, do not change what works?

General **Rogers**. It is just not politically feasible to change the boundaries. I am not sure it is militarily desirable to do so. So just leave it as it is, and the United States then should convince those allies that have the capability to assist us in those areas.

I know this is the end of the hearing, but I do not want to leave something dangling, which I think it is, in a fashion which I do not like. And it has to do with Senator Thurmond's question about my retiring. I want to just be sure that the record is straight on this, so that it is not thought that I am embittered or anything about what is happening.

The facts are I was asked by the Secretary General last August, would I stay on for an additional 2 years come this June, which would make 10 years. Well, you know, 8 years is a hell of a long time, as it will be the end of June.

So my wife and I discussed this at some length and we decided, well, yes. But I told the Secretary General I would only stay if all nations wanted me to stay, and if there was any nation who did not want me to stay I would not want to stay; and second, that in my U.S. role I must by law be reappointed every 2 years, and I was not sure whether or not, since having been here 8 years, which is longer than anybody, that the United States might not think it was time for something else to occur.

Well, as it turned out that is just what happened, and the decision was made by the United States not to reappoint me in my U.S. role and, therefore, I should not stay as the SACEUR. You know, I was in a no-lose situation. I would have been happy to have stayed on, because I was prepared to do so, and I told the Secretary General that and that was my position right up until the time it was announced otherwise.

On the other hand, we are looking forward to retiring and doing something else, if nothing else, to learning how to play golf in a proper fashion, which I have been playing since age 13, and I still play it that way.

But I do not want my comment to Senator Thurmond to lead people to believe that I am unhappy or that I take exception to what has been done and so on. There is a place for younger people. There is a place for new thinking. There is a place for new blood.

You can only figure out how to say the same thing over and over again in certain ways, and pretty soon you run out of alternatives.

And the United States picked a hell of a good man to come into that position. But I was afraid that what I said to the Senator, because I did correct him—I have to correct him, because my allied nations watch what I say before this committee. And they know that I was prepared to stay, you see. So they would expect me to say what I did.

But do not let anybody leave thinking that Bernie Rogers is unhappy or disturbed because of the action that was taken. If I had been on this side of the Atlantic and were in a position of some authority, I would have probably done the same damn thing.

And you just do not know what a thrill it has been to be able to serve for 8 years in that position as the last assignment that you have in the military service, and what a hell of a privilege it is for some guy from Kansas, you know, whose dad was a mechanic, to have the chance to wear the uniform for 44 years of this country, and to have gotten the support from this country and from all of its agencies that I have gotten over those 44 years.

Well, I have said more than I intended to say and more than I probably should have said. But I just felt that I left something dangling there, which I did not want to do.

Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, General.

Senator LEVIN [presiding]. I just have a couple of more questions. I hate to not end on that note because it is such a powerful note and such an emotional one, which we share. I think all of us would like to retire as gracefully and with the kind of record that you have had, General, and that would be a goal for all of us.

General ROGERS. Thank you.

Senator LEVIN. I am not as old as Senator Warner, so I cannot remember World War II quite so vividly as he does.

Senator WARNER. And I want more respect out of you. [Laughter.]

Senator LEVIN. General, let me just ask you a few probably more mundane questions than the one you have just addressed, which is your own personal retirement, which frankly is more important than most of the questions at least that I have asked this morning.

You made a comment here this morning which has a major impact on me, and that has to do with the conventional force balance and the growing imbalance, which is a major concern to us, and the perception of the imbalance as well. I think there are places where we are probably a little better off than the perception, but we have to address both the real imbalance as well as the perceptions of imbalances if we are going to deter properly in that area.

You have testified on page 10 that nuclear strikes against us are adequately deterred effectively by our threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons. But then you go on to say that it is the nonnuclear attack that we are not deterring adequately today, the conventional attack which is not being adequately deterred.

I must say, I agree with you 100 percent. But now I want to read you some figures. We have allocated the programs in the budget request according to various functions. Strategic forces programs have a real growth that is requested. Conventional forces have a real cut in this year's appropriation.

Projection forces have a real cut after inflation. So what we have done, or at least what the administration's priorities seem to be, are somewhat different from that concern that you reflect here, which is that we have an adequate nuclear deterrent. And I know you want to keep it adequate.

But the point being that we basically have an adequate nuclear deterrent, so if they use nuclear weapons there would be an adequate nuclear response. It is in the conventional area that you have such concerns.

Then I look at these figures on this budget, and this is what disturbs me so much, that there is a fairly large increase for the nuclear forces and there are real cuts for the conventional and the projection forces. I am wondering if you could comment further and leave us with some concerns in that area that I could share with my colleagues, who obviously cannot all be with us at the same time, in terms of a plea for some priority to be placed on our conventional forces.

General ROGERS. Well, there is a need to enhance conventional capability, and I view it primarily across the board as an allied commander in Europe. And before this committee, as long ago as 1976 I have testified that I believe that the number one priority for the allocation of resources for security of this country needs to go to the strategic nuclear forces, to ensure that their deterrent value remains very high.

I think the question that has to be asked is, do we have duplication in our strategic nuclear forces? Do we need the Midgetman, for example, and also the MX? Or could we get by with just the MX and not spend the money on the Midgetman? I think that is a fair question.

I think there are other questions that Congress needs to ask, even in the allocation of funding for conventional force and how the allocation is made. But I for one think that strategic nuclear needs have to have the priority for this country, and I said so in 1976, when one of your members said to me: Do you not know that you could have all the tanks you need and all of this and that you need if we would just cut out one program, the B-1, or if we cut out the MX?

And that is right, but that is where the priority has to go. I would look very closely at the duplication within that, as to whether or not we need it.

Then the next thing I would have to say is, it is not automatic that funds which are found available at the strategic nuclear side make their way into the conventional pocket. Oftentimes they find their ways into programs that are not associated with security, as you well know.

Senator LEVIN. General, I have a question on page 7 of your testimony, where it talks about barrier plans to disrupt, slow down, and attrite lead echelons of mechanized forces have been developed. I have been concerned that we have not implemented some of the barrier plans.

I know the political problems that exist in Germany particularly, but still I think we probably could buy a few days at least if we did implement some non-intrusive barriers, such as piping which explosives could be flowed through in times of emergency, which could be blown up to create ditches, which could buy us perhaps a couple of days, which are critical days.

I am wondering if you could be a little more explicit as to what your testimony is on these barriers or plans for barriers and whether you think we have actually done enough to implement those plans in the ways we could which are non-obtrusive?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir. Well, you were alluding on the political side to the Central Region Barrier Agreement between the Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Central Region Commander in the allied chain of command.

There are certain stipulations as to when the barriers can be implemented in certain zones. But under that plan, we have about 10,000 barriers.

We have about 10,000 planned barriers, over half of which are preconstructed. I will not describe them to you, but they do include such things as creating recesses in roads, and destroying bridges over the autobahn, we have done a number of things such as that.

You know, we implement that and we keep those up to date. We have them in both other regions, too.

But what you alluded to, I think, the buried pipe at key areas of attack that we would judge the Warsaw Pact might use, I think that we can construct those, bury them in time of peace, at least in some areas, in such a fashion that it will not be greatly disturbing to the farmers or to others. And then all you have to do, as you know, is if we choose the right mix, is to pour it in and set it off by remote control.

I have seen that happen. It makes a hell of a barrier.

Senator **Levin**. Why are we not doing that?

General **Rogers**. Well, we are working on it, sir. We are working that problem. The United States is working it. I am working it as the SACEUR. The United States is working it bilaterally. I am working it as the SACEUR on the NATO side, and my appropriate component commander on the U.S. side is working it in his area of responsibility in Europe.

So I think we are going to get there. So do not give up, sir. I think we are going to make it.

Senator **Levin**. All right. My last question has to do with chemicals. We read recently or not so recently, a few months back, that there was an agreement reached between the President and Kohl which would provide that existing chemical weapons be withdrawn by 1992 from Europe.

Putting aside the question of the binaries as to how useful they are if they cannot be deployed in Europe, and if there is no agreement to deploy them, and why should we be paying for 100 percent of the binaries when 90 percent of the troops that would be protected by their deterrent effect, for instance, are non-U.S. troops, is there not a European sharing of the cost of any of the chemicals, putting all of that aside, my question has to do with the existing stockpiles.

Why are we unilaterally withdrawing existing stockpiles from Europe when their substitutes, if any, would not even be in Europe? It would be either on ship or back in the United States, and would not be as available as the existing ones. It is not a safety issue. It is a political issue. Why are we doing it?

General **Rogers**. I cannot answer that question. I was not consulted when the agreement was made, and I do not know what the rationale was for making such an agreement. Even though they are running into a wall of obsolescence, and even though it is projected that we might have the binary round in the same configuration as what we have in that stockpile in Europe by 1992, there still is a deterrent associated with having them forward deployed there until we get something better to replace them, in my opinion.

I read in the press just very recently of this withdrawal coming about, and when I investigated as to why I discovered there was a bilateral agreement which provided for them to be withdrawn by 1992.

You see, my position had always been that they should be withdrawn, but only when we had something else to replace them. But there must have been some good reason to the contrary. Otherwise that agreement would not have been made.

Senator LEVIN. General, again this is an appropriate room for your last visit, at least in your present capacity, to the Armed Services Committee. I am sure we will be drawing upon your experience and wisdom in the years ahead. Again, all of us have expressed our deep feelings about your service and we wish you the best of luck.

General ROGERS. Thank you.

[Questions for the hearing record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN GLENN

RESERVE READINESS

Senator GLENN. General Rogers, in recent Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee hearings, I have raised questions about whether or not the Army has gone too far, too fast, in assigning missions to its Reserve components.

My concern was triggered by statements made by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Jim Webb, and former Chief of Staff of the Army, Shy Meyer, that there are potential war-stopping shortfalls in Army combat support and combat service support units—70 percent of which are in the Reserve components.

When a Reserve Forces Policy Board report indicates 55 percent of Army Reserve units were rated as not combat ready in fiscal year 1986, I think there is real cause for concern.

Are you aware of this problem and how does it affect your ability to carry out your wartime mission?

General ROGERS. We are aware of, and are deeply concerned with this situation. To a large extent it is caused by major equipment shortages in the Reserve Component. This is a subset of the overall combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) shortfall in Europe. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. A very serious problem is with wartime medical support. How do you evaluate this problem?

General ROGERS. Reserve Forces play an integral role in the U.S. wartime medical support system in Europe. Current plans include reserve units to staff many of our contingency hospitals and smaller treatment units, and to perform medical duties on aeromedical evacuation missions. Existing material and personnel shortages in Reserve Forces will impact adversely our wartime medical capability. However, initiatives to increase the reserve medical force and to acquire Deployable Medical Systems [DEPMEDS] for use by reserve units are ongoing. Acquistion of DEPMEDS sets is essential to providing the prepositioned capability required to treat casualties promptly within the theater. This serves to reduce the aeromedical evacuation workload, which in turn frees aircraft to fly combat support missions. Moreover, it increases the number of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who can be returned to duty in theater. Reserve recruiting and retention programs must provide both sufficient numbers and the right specialty mix of people to assure adequate staffing of DEPMEDS facilities. Your support of the DEPMEDS and reserve personnel programs is essential to permanently fixing our medical support shortfalls.

Senator GLENN. Do you agree with Jim Webb and Shy Meyer that the Army has gone too far, too fast, in assigning missions to the Reserve components?

General ROGERS. In that missions have been assigned to the Reserve Components [RC] without providing them adequate resources, yes. But at the same time, RC units equipped adequately, capable of rapid mobilization, and with substantial full-time manning (on the order of ten percent or better) are potentially a defense bargain. So, from a conceptual standpoint, the Army's approach is a sound one. [Deleted.]

Senator GLENN. Do you see any short term solutions to this problem?

General ROGERS. No, I do not. We need to buy equipment, and recruit and train people to provide the necessary combat support/combat service support; that takes time and money. Army equipment cross-leveling and development of exportable training packages for the RC has helped, but permanent solutions require more resources. We must face these problems and find solutions.

Senator GLENN. General Rogers you, as well as other combatant commanders have continually stressed the need for a credible chemical deterrent capability. The 1987 DOD assessment of Soviet Military Power, released yesterday, states: "The USSR has the most extensive chemical warfare capability in the world."

As you indicate in your statement, the Congress, albeit slowly, is approving the binary modernization of our ground and air-delivered chemical weapons.

In contrast, however, last summer the administration agreed to withdraw its only stockpile of nerve gas from Europe—and further agreed to allow West Germany to refuse, even in time of crisis, to allow the deployment of the new binary weapons.

To what extent do the Soviets and WP countries store chemical weapons in central Europe?

General ROGERS. As indicated in Soviet Military Power, there are numerous chemical munition stockpiles in [deleted].

While the Soviets maintain a wartime stockpile of chemical munitions, we cannot determine the precise size of the stockpile. [Deleted.]

REMOVAL OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Senator GLENN. Do you agree with administration decision to remove all chemical weapons from Europe?

General ROGERS. I was not consulted when the agreement was made, so I don't know the rationale behind the agreement. I would say my position has always been they should be withdrawn but not until we had something else to replace them. You see, there is still a deterrent value associated with keeping them forward deployed, at least until a replacement comes along. But there must have been some good reason to the contrary. Otherwise, the agreement would not have been made.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS DETERRENT

Senator GLENN. Are chemical weapons stored in the United States a credible deterrent to chemical warfare on the Central front?

General ROGERS. Yes. In my opinion, modern chemical weapons do not rely on proximity to the battlefield for their deterrent effectiveness. Clearly, storage of chemical munitions in the United States entails great risks in that they would not be as rapidly available. However, forward movement can be expedited by an in-being plan and by timely decisions to deploy. Two conditions are key to deterring Warsaw Pact use of chemical weapons against NATO. First, the United States must possess chemical weapons capable of forcing Warsaw Pact troops into the same degree of chemical protection—and resulting loss of combat effectiveness—that initial use of chemical weapons by the Warsaw Pact would impose on NATO forces. The modern binary munitions that are now in development can do that. Second, the Soviets must perceive that the United States has the will to employ chemical weapons in retaliation. The decision to produce modern chemical weapons sends an important signal that the United States is serious about chemical warfare deterrence. Thus, neither of the conditions for deterrence requires the forward deployment of chemical weapons during peacetime.

CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE PRIORITIES

Senator GLENN. In your excellent prepared statement you state that "we estimate that Allied Command Europe forces are currently capable of engaging and holding an initial conventional assault for only a relatively short time due primarily to a lack of sustainability: trained replacements for casualties, ammunition stocks and prepositioned war reserve material to replace battlefield losses. Our current deficiencies can lead to an early choice between escalation or capitulation."

You further state that major deficiencies that have been noted and targeted for improvement include: Ground Forces and Reinforcements; Mobilization Forces; Aircraft; Sustainability; and Quality.

General Rogers, when we here on the Armed Services Committee read such a statement from a major Combatant Commander, it should get our attention—I know it gets mine.

Given the fiscal realities we are facing on this committee, however, it would be very helpful if you could help us prioritize these deficiencies and perhaps provide some additional rationale.

General ROGERS. My highest priority is the elimination of the European Troop Strength ceiling. The ceiling impedes the flexibility necessary to balance force improvements fielded by the Warsaw Pact. The ceiling requires a reduction in capabilities in one area to field an increased capability in another area.

Readiness and sustainability programs are the next priority. This includes measures to support and sustain conventional combat capability, to improve sustainability by concentrating efforts on critical shortfalls, and to increase the deployability of reinforcements and supplies.

My third priority is key modernization programs which increase current capabilities, eliminate areas where no capability currently exists to exploit an aggressor's weakness, and balance or negate advantages enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact. Examples include: improved counter-air capabilities, systems to achieve a Follow-on Forces Attack [FOFA] capability, and an ungraded chemical defense and retaliatory capability.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Senator GLENN. There has been a lot of discussion here in Washington this year over the role of aircraft carriers and Naval Maritime Strategy vs National Strategy.

I would appreciate hearing your views on the role of Naval and Marine Forces, particularly the Carrier Battle Group, in meeting military objectives in USEUCOM and NATO.

General ROGERS. Marine and Naval Forces, particularly the Carrier Battle Groups [CVBGs], play a vital role in meeting USEUCOM and NATO missions during both peace and conflict. During peace, these forces are a visible sign of the United States' commitment to support and defend allies while offsetting the Soviet's political/military presence throughout the area. At the same time, they provide the power projection platforms necessary to conduct limited peacetime contingency operations. The volatile situation in the Mediterranean underscores the necessity of contingency support and for two CVBGs to meet peacetime security requirements. The political situation and continuing episodes of international terrorism require the flexible and responsive forces of the Navy/Marine team. During war, the Navy/Marine team would have the key tasks of ensuring the security of sea lanes for the reinforcement of Europe, providing essential support for the land battle, and neutralizing Warsaw Pact naval forces. For the Atlantic Ocean and Northern NATO flank, these responsibilities include:

Preventing a penetration of the Greenland—Iceland—United Kingdom gap (G-I-UK gap) by Soviet forces to ensure the safety of reinforcements and supplies.

Neutralizing enemy forces which may be present in the Atlantic at the start of any conflict.

Support of the land campaign in Northern Norway through both naval air support and Marine ground forces.

Neutralizing the Soviet's Northern and Baltic Fleets.

In the Mediterranean, naval forces would also support the land battle while neutralizing the Soviet's Black Sea Fleet. In sum, the value and contribution of these forces are an essential part of USEUCOM and NATO's capability, are instrumental to protecting sea lanes for reinforcement and resupply of Allied Command Europe, and play a key role in NATO wartime operations on both the Northern and Southern flanks.

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS MODERNIZATION

Senator GLENN. General Rogers, Admiral Crowe testified earlier this year that we are "only in mid-stream in the conventional force modernization program." He further stated that by the end of fiscal year 1987 the status will be:

About 25 percent of the Army's active mechanized battalions and about 40 percent of its tank battalions will be re-equipped with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and M-1 Tank.

From 50 percent to 65 percent of our tactical air wings will have received new fighter/bombers;

In spite of this situation, a review of the services' budget submissions for fiscal year 1988/89 indicate a clear slow down in the production rate of most of the modernization programs including the M-1 Tank, Bradley, Apache Helicopter, and most tactical aircraft.

Conversely, all of the services appear to be pressing forward at full speed with the next generation of conventional weapons systems such as ATF, ATA, LHX, V-22, and C-17.

Do you believe that we should proceed to the next generation of conventional weapons at the expense of our current modernization plans?

General ROGERS. When it comes to proven systems, as a CINC I tend to believe one of anything in the field is better than two on the drawing board. But history would tell us deterrence is maintained best through a balance of continuing modernization programs, developing new technology systems, and ensuring sustainability programs are not allowed to slip. In my opinion, the President's budget provides a reasonable balance of these areas.

[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

MONDAY, MARCH 30, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
Washington, DC.

MILITARY STRATEGY

The committee met at 2 p.m. in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Dixon, Gore, Shelby, Warner, Humphrey, Quayle, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Gerald K. Bankus, George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, Norman G. Mosher, Gordon G. Riggle, Mark B. Robinson, professional staff members; Debra A. Rice, staff assistant.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Leon Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Samuel J. Routson, assistant to Senator Symms; Patrick A. Putignano, assistant to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. This is the 15th hearing on U.S. national security strategy, and its military strategy component. In the preceding 14 hearings, the committee has received a wide range of views on the numerous elements of U.S. strategy.

I think it would be helpful for the committee to begin to analyze and synthesize this diverse testimony.

Accordingly, the principal purposes of the hearing this afternoon are: first, to identify, building upon previous testimony, the central themes that are emerging from the strategy hearings; second, to relate these themes to the defense budget; and third, to begin the process of formulating mission and program priorities for use in the committee's markup of the Defense authorization request.

The committee is very fortunate today to have a panel of three distinguished, retired military officers to assist the committee in its work on U.S. strategy.

I have, and I think I speak for everyone on the committee, great respect for each one of our witnesses, not only for their outstanding military careers, but also for the wise counsel and thoughtful assistance they have provided the national security community, including this committee, since their retirement from a active duty.

We welcome today Gen. David C. Jones, U.S. Air Force (retired), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. Edward C. Meyer, U.S. Army (retired), former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army; and Adm. Harry D. Train II, U S. Navy (retired), former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command.

The committee realizes that all of you are out in the free enterprise system now and your time is, of course, very valuable to you, and we appreciate the time you have taken from your schedules to come and be with us today.

This is the first appearance of Generals Jones and Meyer and Admiral Train before the committee since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was signed into law. Because of that I want to take this opportunity to recognize and laud the outstanding contributions our witnesses made in making that historic legislation possible.

General Jones, without your leadership the long road toward defense reorganization would not have been started. You, of course, undertook a great deal of critique and criticism, but you never retreated from your convictions as what was needed in terms of correcting the problems of our military establishment.

Comprehensive and serious study of the issues in this committee and in the Congress justified, in our view, your position and proved you were right in at least our minds. We agreed with you. Your testimony before this committee and your wise counsel were invaluable in formulating effective legislation, and we are grateful for that.

Shortly after the start, General Meyer joined General Jones in this battle as a second incumbent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to argue for reform. General Meyer gave critical momentum to the effort. He was a key member of the Defense Reorganization effort at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, chairing the working group on military command structure.

General Meyer also testified before this committee on defense reorganization in what proved to be a very pivotal and indeed decisive hearing.

Admiral Train was also a major participant in defense reorganization. Like General Meyer he was a member of the Steering Committee on the Defense Reorganization Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Admiral Train also testified before this committee and provided critical uniform support for reorganization.

Of course, Admiral Train we all recognize that you have a tougher job with your service than did General Jones and General Meyer, because the Navy historically did not favor reorganization.

We thank each of you for the splendid career you have had and the continuing efforts you have made on behalf of our Nation's defense.

All of us understand that the fruits of defense reorganization, although some of the changes are apparent, will take at least 3 or 4 years before we can fully appreciate the magnitude of what we have undertaken in reorganizing the defense establishment. We have a long way to go, and while we are taking a look at that we hope that all of you will keep us informed, because we do not contend that it is a perfect piece of legislation.

We know there are going to be headaches, and that there are going to have to be adjustments and changes made as we go along. And we will continue to rely on you in that degree.

I also appreciate you being here today to assist this committee on military strategy. We started these hearings early this year as a prelude to the budget. We got busy with the budget cycle as usual, and we had to proceed with the budget. We have also had quite a few hearings on the budget at the subcommittee level.

We should begin markup on the budget shortly after the Senate returns from the recess period, which will be the latter part of April. We hope to have a bill on the floor sometime in the month of May.

That schedule renders these hearings timely. They are not one shot propositions. We are not expecting to come out of this with a document called U.S. Military Strategy by the Armed Services Committee. We believe it is an evolutionary process, and hope that what we are doing will help stimulate the Department of Defense and the executive branch to take a much more intensive look at strategy as the foundation and the prelude to our military budget, and indeed our military posture.

We do not have any particular order of priority today, I will leave it up to you three distinguished witnesses to decide who goes first. We look forward to hearing from you and we will then have questions. Your full written statements will also be included in the record.

General Jones, back when you were chairman, everyone was equal. Now the chairman assumes a little bit more of an edge. So why don't we give you that edge retroactively and ask you to go forward.

General JONES. All right. That is consistent with what General Meyer suggested in the other room, that I go first and he clean up the battlefield at the end. [Laughter.]

STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID C. JONES, USAF (RET.), FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, we deeply appreciate the opportunity to be here and to participate in these hearings. I am pleased to be with such distinguished colleagues.

We would also like to thank you and members of the committee for the great support on the Defense Reorganization bill. I think it will serve the Nation very well.

I would like to talk about two subjects briefly, and in summary, and I have a statement to submit for the record.

One would be on the process of developing strategy, and the other would be on the strategy itself.

Chairman NUNN. If you would like to give your whole statement, we are not in any rush this afternoon. We think what you have to say is important, so we will leave it up to you the way you would like to present it.

General JONES. Well I will not read it, but I will maybe expand a little on what I had thought talking about, that being four points with regard to the process.

First is that the military strategy and the requirements that flow from that strategy always exceed the military capabilities.

The second point is that the budget levels are determined basically independently of what that strategy is.

Third, it is impractical, and would be very undesirable to cut back on the strategic requirements to meet the capabilities.

Finally, every time we make a decision to do something, we make implicit decisions not to do other things.

Now, on these four points, first with regard to the strategy exceeding the capabilities. In 1982 I wrote an article for the New York Times where I pointed out this strategy-force mismatch, and I think General Meyer was the first one to ever come up with the term strategy-force mismatch. I said in 1982 that despite the projected increases in the Defense budget, our strategy and the requirements that flowed from that strategy would continue to exceed the military capabilities, because the strategy had been upwratcheted up at the same time the budget was increased. I said that all of that increase, and we have had a substantial increase, will not match the strategic requirements we have.

Of course the requirements were subsequently increased by SDI by Midgetman, by emphasis on special forces, and now we see a constrained budget. So we have a substantial gap, even though we have a greater capability.

Second, I say that the budget had developed almost independently of the strategy, it is other factors, just generally how we see the east-west balance, the perception of efficiency of defense expenditures, but most importantly the budget deficit. The administration this time I think recognized the 3 percent real growth did not meet all the requirements that they said were needed. But that was about all the traffic would bear.

Congress right now, in trying to determine budget levels is putting more emphasis on the budget deficit and Gramm-Rudman than it is looking at the national strategy, and trying to meet those strategic requirements.

A third point I make is it is impractical and undesirable to try to cut back on the strategy. I think it was illustrated in 1950 by the disaster of saying Korea was outside our sphere of primary interest.

We cannot afford to cut back to that point. We can tidy up the strategy, and I think the latest document by the administration does kind of step back a little from the strategy that was proposed in 1982.

On the point of every time we make a decision to do something we make an implicit decision not to do other things. People ask do we need a weapon system a or do we need this support, or do we need that, and the answers to those questions are very easy, yes.

There's a good rationale for every program and every weapons system.

DETERMINING PRIORITIES

The bigger problem is in determining priorities. We can't do everything, and, therefore, there are going to be risks. There are going to be gaps in capability. The challenge is to try to find out where to take those risks, how to minimize them, and how to prepare a fully integrated program.

Because our strategy exceeds our capabilities and the dollars to support those capabilities, each service honestly looks through their own prism as to what is most important in that strategy and tends to put that at the highest of the priority list.

Then the Defense Department tries to integrate this, but there are thousands and thousands of programs, so it is very difficult to come up with a good integration of this overall effort.

So the real challenge that we have in the process is to come up with this integrated effort. This is a problem that I know the Congress has as well as the administration.

I foresee great difficulty in the days ahead with a constrained budget. I do not think that we appreciate, and I include the Pentagon, I include the Congress, the impact of what is likely to happen in the defense budgets in the next 4 or 5 years.

The way it looks now, we would be fortunate to get 3 percent real growth in the Defense budget. We need every single dollar of that or the risk will increase. I don't think we really understand because our expenditures, outlays, are going up. I think there are going to be some very tough decisions to make.

Therefore, I would put much more discipline into the 5-year program. I applaud the movement to the 2-year budget. I think that is essential if we really are to get on track. But frankly, the 5-year program does not have much discipline in it. It is sort of based upon everything is going to go great and well, and that things are going to be on schedule and on cost. And then we run into that bow wave.

And so I would caution this year, in funding new, large strategic capital investment, not just strategic, but strategic and conventional, capital programs that commit us to expenditures for the next few years until we really know what our situation will be and get more discipline into the 5-year budget.

STRATEGY

Turning to the issue of strategy, we have had for 40 years an overall strategy that's worked quite well. It is an overarching strategy of nuclear deterrence, forward deployments, and a coupling of nuclear and conventional forces. It wasn't designed to prevent the Vietnam's and the Korea's, but in the most important area of keeping out of a conflict with the Soviet Union, it has been a good strategy.

Along with that strategy there has been a desire at times to get rid of the nuclear component, a frustration with it. I remember President Carter asked me a question one time. He said do you think the world would be better off if all nuclear weapons could disappear overnight, never to return. And it was obviously a hypothetical question, but a good question. Because it stopped to make one think. And I said, Mr. President, there is something fundamentally wrong with man having in his own hands the tools of his own destruction. And for that purpose it would be good to get rid of them.

On the other hand, if we got rid of them overnight, I think the possibility of a conventional war would go up quite sharply.

We have found that in history, in World War I, in Vietnam, it was easy to drift into a conventional war. We have had peace in Europe between the superpowers for more than 40 years, and I think it is the nuclear dimension that has made both sides real cautious.

The conventional forces have made an important contribution, but it's that coupling, it's that linking to the nuclear forces that made both sides act in this cautious manner.

There have been two approaches in the last few years to sort of getting rid of nuclear weapons. One was 4 years ago this month in SDI, and the other was in Reykjavik in trying to get rid of either all strategic offensive forces or at least all ballistic missiles.

Senator **Warner**. Excuse me, General. Four years ago, SDI did not——

General **Jones**. Three years ago.

Senator **Warner**. It was not to get rid of nuclear weapons, it was only a system to get rid of ballistic missiles.

General **Jones**. Senator Warner, I should have gone on to say, I kind of held my hands in coats when I said get rid of them in that regard.

What I really was going to say is the making of nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete is sort of a code word for getting rid of the influence of nuclear weapons. And so I am glad you stopped me, and I have that in my statement that the making of nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete is really an inference of somehow we are going to make them nonoperative in the days ahead.

Now, in our discussions, in the Soviet Union here a few weeks ago, quite a discussion with General Secretary Gorbachev, 3 hours with the General Secretary, a long discussion with Marshall Akhromeyev, chief of the Soviet general staff, and other people in defense and foreign policy and economic areas and so forth. We had quite a discussion of this issue of the role of nuclear weapons and conventional forces.

It was clear to me from a lot of these discussions that, although it is not possible to get rid of all weapons, or even all strategic offensive weapons, and I think it would be ill-advised to get rid of all ballistic missiles, I think there are some common grounds for understanding.

At first, what comes through in these discussions is the belief, on both sides, that a major war between our two countries would be catastrophic. That somehow it would deteriorate into a nuclear exchange of some sort with great damage on both sides.

FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY

Second, although each side accuses the other of trying to achieve a first strike capability, a serious discussion pretty well reveals, when you get down to the specifies on it, a conviction that neither side can build offensive or defensive forces of such capability that it can conduct a disarming first strike capability against the other side. That the other side, in some way, shape or form, is going to protect the capability that can retaliate, that can penetrate on through.

There's a lot of loose talk about first strike. I do not think there's a disarming first strike capability. I think there is a preemptive capability, if you are convinced the other side is coming, then there might be some advantage in going first in that. But that's not a disarming first strike capability.

Also in discussions with the Soviets, there is quite a bit of concern about nuclear proliferation. We both have it. Frankly, I do not think either one of us do enough about trying to prevent nuclear proliferation. But in the discussions with the general secretary and Marshall Akhromeyev and others, I stressed the point that we can make some reductions in the nuclear forces. But if we go beyond a certain level, the conventional forces then become critical. I made this point about being easy to drift into conventional war if it were not for the nuclear deterrent.

I stress the need for us to emphasize much more the conventional issues in Europe, in NATO and Warsaw Pact. I got support from them on the need to get more serious about such reductions. In one of the discussions, not with the general secretary, but he indicated he supported what the others said, a proposal was raised that we look at a 25-percent reduction of the conventional forces from the Urals to the Atlantic in the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

Very significantly, that includes forces based within the Soviet Union west of the Urals. It does not include forces stationed within the United States. They also talked about onsite verification to support that type of cutback. I think that needs to be explored.

Looking at conventional reductions we found out——

Chairman NUNN. Could I ask you a question on that. Were the Soviets talking, General Jones, about United States-Soviet forces or Warsaw Pact-NATO forces?

General JONES. The implication was it was NATO-Warsaw Pact forces. I think we all concluded that was it, and I will check my notes, but I am pretty sure that was NATO-Warsaw Pact forces they were talking about. There was also recognition that it is much harder to cut conventional forces because there are asymmetries in the forces, not only in size, but in capability. Looking at nuclear forces is much easier, and there was a recognition that we need a much better dialogue to understand each other.

I think it clearly demonstrated that military to military talks would be very useful, not to negotiate, but to understand each other.

I think the time is ripe. The Soviets said that they were now willing to have such talks, and so I would hope we would take the initiative, quietly behind the scenes to arrange some talks that I think will help move along that dialogue.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

On the Strategic Defense Initiative, of course raising that issue a few years ago has caused a debate in our country, unfortunately it has become politicized with some saying that if you ask questions about SDI you are either weak on defense or you don't have enough confidence in American technology. But there are some questions that seem to me should be asked as we look at where we go in this program.

Are we talking about defense of people or are we talking about defense of weapon systems. Are we talking about making nuclear weapons obsolete and impotent, or are we talking about increasing deterrence by protecting primarily our ICBMs.

If we are talking about the latter, we can build a defense that can at least make the price of admission of an attack by someone against our ICBMs and our other targets very high.

So that part we can do. The question is though, can we defend people? It has been stated that SDI could defend against a fanatic or an insane Third World leader. But I don't think that holds up under scrutiny.

A terrorist could conceivably steal a nuclear weapon. And there are Third World nations that can build nuclear weapons. It is much harder to see how they would get their hands on ballistic missiles and the launch facilities, land-based or submarines or whatever to launch those missiles.

It would seem to me that a terrorist or a Third World insane person would use a much easier way of delivering the weapon. Put it on an airplane. Put it on a ship coming into our harbor. Or as Jim Schlesinger says, wrap it up in a bale of marijuana.

So if we are looking at that threat, I think it's more serious in other ways than with ballistic missiles.

I first became involved in nuclear targeting in 1954. What came home clear to me at that time was that the easiest thing to do was to destroy cities. Call them urban-industrial areas.

Conversely, the hardest thing to do was to protect cities from any attack. And a very small percent, I estimate that 2 percent of the force of either side, impacting on the cities of the other side would do catastrophic damage to most of the urban-industrial area. It only takes a few hundred weapons, and probably not more than a couple hundred, to impact and make very, very great damage.

I also became convinced that neither the offense nor the defense could completely dominate, and/or the defense could completely dominate the other side if the other side wanted to prevent it. But that the offense had built-in advantages in selecting the time and place and thus could achieve surprise, and, in fact, now with nuclear weapons we can destroy urban areas with one weapon that would have taken tens of thousands of bombs in the days before.

There has been talk of making the SDI operational in 1993 or 1994. If you look at the 1993 number that's only 6 years ahead. If you look back 6 years, I remember very clearly that we were talking about building B–1's and systems of this nature in 1981. And the B–1 was already developed to a great extent. Earlier models were already flying, and here 6 years later, after the decision we still only have a token capability. It is going to be an important system, and I support the B-1. But we have undue optimism too often.

If we approve the aircraft carriers in the current defense budget, it has been claimed that some portion of SDI would be operational before those aircraft carriers, and aircraft carriers do not have any technological breakthroughs to go with them.

So I think there are some tough questions that should be asked.

What will be the architecture, how many layers, what are the technological challenges? If we move early and pick kinetic energy, does that foreclose maybe some more promising opportunities?

What about a schedule and risks? What about C^3I? That's going to be tough. And very frankly, we have not done very well in worldwide military command and control systems. We still have serious problems today.

What about attacks against spaced-based systems, Soviet countermeasures and counter-countermeasures, logistics, cost? But then there's a whole other series. Are we talking about cities, and if we are, what about the threat of the air breathing systems, particularly cruise missiles against our cities?

We are very exposed. We have coastal areas that are exposed, and we have much of our population along the coast and we have a token air defense capability today.

I would expect that the Soviets could have Stealth cruise missiles launched by submarines by the time we could have a capability against SDI, and we have no capability to destroy a visible cruise missile today, and that would take a lot of technology.

I think very importantly, and coming near the end is the impact on other systems. We have the tough decisions I mentioned, we are going to have issues of force structure size, modernization, and we should look at the competition for resources, and what the impact will be.

ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS

The third item we should be looking at is arms control implications.

In our discussions with the Soviets, they were quite forthcoming on the testing of SDI. And the question is, I think the fundamental question, is SDI dependent on some limitations on ballistic missile ceilings, and how do we achieve that at the same time we proceed with testing?

When we talked about the testing, they said sensors would be fully permitted because we already have sensors in space.

Sensor testing is a very critical part of the SDI program. Not only in point tracking, but how to differentiate between decoys and warheads and a lot of that sensing.

On lasers, there was some discussion about yes, on low powered lasers, but not on high powered lasers kill mechanism.

The real point fundamental point on SDI, the hang up by them was on any kill mechanism. But I think all of us found the mood in the Soviet Union somewhat muted on SDI.

On the last visit everybody was just very outspoken about how bad SDI was. I think they have changed and muted it a little bit for two reasons.

One is they saw that they're hollering so much that it is so terrible convinced a lot of Americans that if it is bad for the Russians it must be good for the Americans. But also they have done a great deal of study. They have published a book. They are very outspoken about the fact that they think they could counter SDI at less cost than it would cost us to build it. That doesn't mean that their concerns have disappeared at all.

CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION

Finally, on the overall issue of strategy, I was impressed by the great changes taking place in the Soviet Union, particularly in the Glasnost and the opening, and the willingness to discuss issues that would not be discussed before.

We should not expect that it will change to the point that it won't be an authoritarian one-party nation. It will be. It will still be a very authoritarian country.

But there are a lot of changes taking place. I think there are opportunities in agreements with the Soviets. My sensing was the Soviets want an agreement, but aren't desperate for it. They don't need it in the sense of being desperate to achieve something, but they would like to achieve agreement.

I think more importantly we should step back and think about the changes that are taking place in the Soviet Union, and how we should try to influence those changes.

We can't but be a major influencing factor. Would we be better off with Gorbachev succeeding or failing? What would be the alternative, and what should be our role, not only in arms control but on other issues of East-West relations?

I think that if we could have a good serious discussion on that, particularly within the administration, and then some clearcut policies be enunciated, and everybody in the administration be obligated to follow those policies, and to try to get a more coherent statement out.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you very much General Jones for an excellent statement.

[Prepared statement of General Jones follows:]

Prepared Statement of Gen. David C. Jones, USAF (Retired)

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you once again. I applaud holding hearings on strategy, for all too often both branches of government jump to specific program and budget items before addressing the broader issues.

There are a number of points about the process of developing strategy that I would like to discuss, along with comments on the substance of the strategy our nation has been following.

The process:

1. Our military strategy always exceeds our capabilities to implement that strategy.

Referring to the Defense Guidance, I wrote in 1982: "the guidance almost invariably leads to what the Joint Chiefs of Staff have long called the 'strategy-force mismatch' as requirements outpace capabilities. Current guidance is so demanding that developing coherent programs to carry it out is impossible even under the most optimistic budget assumptions."

I went on to state that the guidance called for: across the board modernization of the strategic forces; great improvements in our conventional capabilities in Europe and the Far East; increased capability to project power, including building a 600 ship Navy; widespread modernization of our conventional forces; improvements in readiness and sustainability; greatly increased strategic-mobility capabilities; improvements in our industrial base; and other demanding requirements.

Quoting once again: "There is simply not enough money in the projected defense budgets to do all this, but the defense guidance does little to set meaningful priorities or mandate a search for new directions to maintain our security. This is not a problem unique to this Administration.

These words were written before the requirement for Midgetman, the new emphasis on Special Forces, and most importantly, before the initiative on SDI. And this was during a period of sharply increasing defense budgets. We have had very substantial improvements in our military capabilities, but the strategy-force mismatch remains.

2. The defense budget levels are determined almost independently of the strategy.

Budget levels for defense depend more on the evaluation of east-west trends, the perceived efficiency of defense expenditures, and the budget deficit levels, than any specific strategy. For example, the Administration recognized the budget submitted in January did not meet its strategic requirements, but considered 3% real growth to be all that could be supported. The Congressional actions are now being driven more by deficit projections and attempts to meet the Gramm-Rudman targets, than the current national strategy.

3. It is impractical and undesirable to cut the strategy to fit the capabilities.

Although some constraints can be placed on strategy, we cannot walk away from major commitments by again saying "Korea is outside our area of primary interest" or signaling similar limitations. Consequently, there will be considerable risks in any adopted strategy. The challenge is to know where those risks are, how to minimize them, and how to set priorities.

We do not do this very well. Although progress has been made, the budget outcome is too much a collection of individual Armed Services inputs with limited integration of efforts. In recent years, neither the U.S. nor, fortunately for us, the Soviets have been able to achieve a synergistic capability with military forces. Too often the result for us has been the opposite: the total has been less than the sum of the individual parts. The important legislation on reorganization sponsored by this Committee last year will help a great deal in solving many of these problems, but much remains to be done.

4. Every time a new budget item is added, it is at the expense of other areas, often without assessing the consequences.

Too frequently, both the Pentagon and the Congress tend to approve high visibility programs without giving enough thought as to what will be left underfunded. As a result the system ends up nibbling many programs by stretching production, reducing sustainability and cutting other areas where the political visibility is low, but the delayed impact on defense capabilities can be high. Also, the impact of quite constrained budgets for the next few years has not been fully realized. Some very tough decisions will have to be made over the next few years even with real growth in the defense budget; therefore, it is important that caution be used this year before authorizing large new capital programs.

Strategy:

For more than forty years we have had an overarching strategy of nuclear deterrence, forward deployments, and a coupling of nuclear and conventional forces. This strategy has served well in preventing a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and although not sacrosanct, it should be changed only with great care. Many have been frustrated with the reliance on nuclear weapons and have hoped they could be eliminated someday. President Carter once asked me if I thought the world would be better off if all nuclear weapons could be eliminated overnight with no possibility of their returning. It was a difficult question causing one to think of the consequences. My answer was there was something wrong with man having in his hands the tools of his own destruction, but that an overnight elimination of nuclear weapons would increase the possibility of a conventional war.

We found out in World War I and again in Vietnam just how easy it is to drift into a conventional war. The forty plus years of peace in Europe is unprecedented in modern history. Two alliances—with fundamental differences in objectives and with large forces butted against each—have invariably ended up at war. The different dimension this time is the nuclear threat which has caused the superpowers to act with caution.

Two approaches have been proposed in recent years to eliminate or at least minimize the role of nuclear weapons. First, the SDI proposal four years ago this month to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" and second, recent arms control proposals to eliminate all ballistic missiles within ten years, or perhaps all strategic offensive weapons in that time.

Arms control and nuclear weapons:

Although the elimination of all nuclear weapons is impractical, a serious dialogue with Soviet officials clearly reveals areas of common interest on which we can build. Most Soviets conclude, as we do, that a major war between our two countries would be catastrophic for both sides. Second, while each side accuses the other of trying to achieve a disarming first strike capability, substantive discussions lead to the inevitable conclusion that no matter what is done offensively and/or defensively by one side, the other would preserve—one way or other—the capacity to impose severe damage in response to an attack. Finally, each side professes concern over nuclear proliferation and has a stake in its prevention, but too little is done about it.

During our recent visit to Moscow, I stressed very strongly to General Secretary Gorbachev, Marshal Akhromeyev, and others that as nuclear weapons are reduced, the subject of conventional arms becomes critical. I pointed out that if we are not careful, we could end up with nuclear reductions, but have a less stable relationship. The Soviets, including military leaders, expressed a willingness to explore more seriously this issue. They proposed a 25% reduction in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces stationed between the Urals and the Atlantic. Very significantly, this includes forces in the Soviet Union but none in the United States. Just how committed the Soviets are to such an approach remains to be seen.

Achieving such an objective will be far harder than reducing nuclear forces; therefore, an intensive dialogue on conventional forces and the way to determine how to achieve reductions is essential. U.S.-USSR military to military talks—not to negotiate but to understand each better—are vital. I believe the time is ripe, for the Soviets have now expressed a willingness to have such meetings.

SDI:

The SDI proposal caused a continuing strategic debate within the United States, including how arms control issues should be approached. Unfortunately, the SDI issue has become politicized to a point where raising serious questions about this program has been seen as weakness towards supporting a strong defense or a lack of confidence in American technology. But there are many tough questions that need to be asked.

The fundamental question is whether we can build a defensive system to protect the people of the United States from severe casualties if a war should erupt with the Soviet Union. We can provide a positive answer to the lesser question of whether it is possible to defend nuclear targets such as ICBMs. The main question there is cost effectiveness.

It has been said that SDI would protect us from a fanatic or an insane third world dictator, but that argument does not stand up to close scrutiny. It is conceivable a nuclear weapon could be stolen. Also, many third world nations could build such a weapon. It is hard to understand how control of a ballistic missile and the launching facilities could be obtained. If new technology were to be used, cruise missiles will be much easier to build in the days ahead than ballistic missiles and their extensive launch facilities. However, a terrorist or third world delivery of a nuclear weapon is more likely to be done by an aircraft or a ship sailing into one of our harbors or other such simple ways.

The primary rationale used for SDI remains the protection of people. In 1954, when I first became involved in nuclear targeting, it soon became clear to me that the easiest task was to destroy urban-industrial targets. Conversely, the toughest job is to defend such targets. Only a very small percentage of the strategic force is necessary to devastate a large portion of urban-industrial areas of any nation. Today, it would take no more than 2% of the strategic force of a superpower striking the other side to cause catastrophic damage to much of the urban area.

I also became convinced that neither the offense nor defense of one country could completely dominate the actions of the other side; however, the advantages rest with the offense in that it can set the time and place and thus achieve surprise. Furthermore, with the yield of todays nuclear weapons, a single warhead can destroy large city areas that in the past required tens of thousands of bombs.

Many tough questions should be addressed. All cannot be answered but should at least be studied and discussed seriously before advanced testing is planned or any decision to develop or deploy is made. The alternative is to suffer the unpleasant surprises which have plagued so many programs. Undue optimism is not unknown. Some recent proposals call for an initial SDI operational capability in 1993 or 1994 for the most complex program that would ever be undertaken. 1993 is only six years away, so it is useful to look back six years.

In 1982, a decision was made to produce the B-1, a system that already had many years of development and early models had flown. Six years later we have a very limited capability. The B-1 will make an important contribution to our strategic triad; however, there are substantial problems, especially with the countermeasures system. An SDI program would be many times more complicated and would prompt even greater countermeasures from the Soviets. Another example: if the Congress approves the two new aircraft carriers in the 1988 budget, the SDI, as claimed by some, would be operational before the carriers, and the ships do not require any technological breakthroughs.

The SDI questions should include: What will be the architecture? How many layers? What are the technological challenges? Would an early decision to deploy kinetic energy weapons foreclose other options which may be more promising in the long term? What will be the schedule? What are the risks? How will the integration of the various elements be accomplished? Can the C3I system be developed and tested to insure high reliability, especially in view of the major problems we continue to have with the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)? How would we cope with attacks against the space-based elements of SDI? What other countermeasures are available to the Soviets? What are the counter-countermeasures? Could the Soviets simply retarget additional weapons against cities to overcome an initial SDI capability? What are the logistics requirements, especially for space boosters? What would be the impact on other space programs? What would be the range of costs and with what confidence level?

I have often wondered why there has not been more discussion on the serious threat air breathing weapon systems would pose to our cities, even if we were able to deploy a near-leakproof ballistic missile defense. Questions on what to do about this threat are also required, especially with such a large percentage of our population living near our exposed coastal areas and we have only a token air defense capability today.

The Soviets have learned that spending hundreds of billions of rubles to build the most modern and effective air defense system in the world has not assured protection against the U.S. air breathing threats. They are deeply concerned about our bombers and cruise missiles. How can we defend our cities against cruise missiles launched from submarines off our shores? How to defend against other air breathing systems? What about the challenge of stealth cruise missiles that in all likelihood the Soviets will have deployed by the time SDI could become operational? What about the potential problem of multiple warhead cruise missiles, which may be developed as miniaturization proceeds? What would be the capabilities, costs and schedules for an air breathing defense system? If such a system is not planned, what is the rationale for defending our cities against ballistic missiles and not against air breathing systems?

Another concern is the budgetary impact on other military capabilities. The budget levels in the five year program are badly needed, but even if fully funded, there will be severe limits to many military capabilities. Very tough decisions will have to be made even without substantial increases in ballistic missile or air breathing defenses. If such takes place, will we be able to maintain close to our current conventional force structure, which is already badly outnumbered? Will its modernization programs be set back even further? Will we slip back to the days of the "hollow Army" and similar operational difficulties in other Services?

What would be the arms control implications of a decision to proceed with full testing or development and deployment of SDI? Is SDI dependent on ceilings on ballistic missiles? If so, how would the U.S. achieve such an agreement at the same time we could be perceived as walking away from the ABM treaty? Is there a middle ground possible with the Soviets which would allow pursuing for years many of the answers on SDI without a conflict over the treaty?

The recent discussions in Moscow lead me to believe that such a course of action is worth exploring. In todays Washington Post, Ambassador Paul Nitze writes about such a possibility. The Soviets expressed to us their willingness to discuss interpretations of the ABM treaty and were quite forthcoming on many important SDI tests which, in their judgments, would not deviate from the treaty. For example, they said testing of sensors would be within any interpretation. When laser testing was raised, there was no objection to low powered lasers. The sticking point remains the testing in space of kill mechanisms.

Our group found it interesting the Soviet mood on SDI was quite different than that shown on earlier visits. The criticism was muted this time for what appeared to be two reasons. First was self serving in they saw the reaction in the U.S. to the

Soviet concerns: if something such as SDI appeared so bad for the Russians, it must be good for the U.S. However, they have also studied the ways to counter SDI weapons to the extent they state with great conviction that countermeasures will cost less than the cost to the U.S. to deploy such a system. This does not mean their concerns have disappeared, but SDI is not quite the burning issue it was a few months ago.

The future:

Although we should not expect the Soviet Union to be anything other than an authoritarian one-party state, substantial changes are taking place. Gorbachev is less predictable than his predecessors. This could bode both good and ill for the Western world. We cannot determine whether or not he will be successful, but we can have some influence.

It appears that Gorbachev wants a period of stability in the world so he can concentrate on internal problems, but it is clear he is not about to withdraw from international involvements. My impression is that the Soviets want an arms control agreement with the United States but are not desperate for one. An agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons by 50%, accompanied by middle ground approach to SDI, is a distinct possibility. However, even greater opportunities may be available; therefore, it is important that a serious debate take place within our government on how to deal with the changes occurring in the Soviet Union, followed by the enunciation of policies which all U.S. officials would be obligated to support.

Chairman **Nunn**. Admiral Train.

STATEMENT OF ADM. HARRY D. TRAIN II, USN (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND

Admiral **Train**. Mr. Chairman, I am honored and pleased to be included among those who have been afforded the opportunity to contribute to this enormously important subject.

Like General Jones, I would like to express my own personal and professional appreciation of the fine work this committee did on defense reorganization. I think that was a very important accomplishment for the country and for all of us, and you done good.

Knowing that the time of this committee is so precious, I will let that be the extent of my pleasantries and go right on into my statement if I might.

I have written this very tightly Mr. Chairman, and with your permission I would like to read it.

Strategy is quite simply a bridge; a bridge linking the Nation's political objectives with the means to achieve them. While this might make Admiral Mahan roll over in his grave, this somewhat pragmatic view of strategy seems to serve the needs of political leaders, distributors of public funds and warfighting commanders better than the more esoteric definitions learned in the classroom.

Even this simplified construct is complicated by our respective areas of accountability. Warfighting commanders for example tend to think exclusively in terms of a strategic bridge between today's political objectives and today's forces. Resource authority, such as service secretaries and service chiefs are prone to focus more on tomorrow's objectives and the forces which might reasonably be procured in years ahead to achieve those objectives. And political authorities tend toward declaratory strategies intended more to influence the behavior of other nations than for execution.

Historically there has been a reasonable fit among this family of strategic mindsets. But it has always been and will always be important for accountable officials, whether political or military to create the strategic bridge which meets their own particular need. The differing areas of accountable concern are not flaws in our strategic planning system. They are necessary, and this fact should be recognized and accepted.

NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

Procedurally the National Security Objectives contained in the Defense Guidance represent the trusswork of the strategic bridge. They provide today, as they have for decades a reasonably coherent statement of those political objectives which can be supported by military capability.

Loosely paraphrased they are: To deter attack on the United States, its allies and its friends; to prevent the coercion of the United States, it allies and its friends; to protect U.S. citizens and U.S. economic interests abroad; to maintain access to petroleum supplies and other critical resources; to reverse the geographic expansion of Soviet military presence and influence throughout the world; to encourage long term political and military changes within the Soviet empire that will facilitate building a more peaceful and secure world order; and, if deterrence fails, to conduct war to achieve the political objectives of the Nation; and to terminate war to enhance the political objectives of the Nation.

As peacetime commanders of warfighting forces, we all understood these national security objectives, and were intellectually persuaded that they probably represent as succinct a statement of national security policy as is possible.

They were and are completely consistent with the Sense of Congress Amendment in section 782 of the 1982 Defense Appropriations Act. These National Security Objectives have also been reasonably constant through successive administrations.

The gray area of strategy is the absence of an equally coherent evolving statement of the vital interests of the United States. Promulgation of the vital interests, whether classified or public, served the strategic planning process best when the vital interests are intellectually supportable. Our vital interests in Western Europe are readily understood. They are further supported by a publicly declared policy that the security of Western Europe is econd only to the security of the United States.

In a similar vein, our vital interests in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Asia are equally apparent, even to crews of ships which in the late 1970's and early 1980's were deployed to the Indian Ocean and remained at sea for 8 strenuous months at a time.

But our vital interests in Vietnam were much more difficult to explain. And history has done little to shed light on this dilemma. A more complex challenge is being faced by our current political leadership in describing the vital interests of the Nation which are at risk in Central America.

Between these two extremes lie a myriad of unanswered questions as to what is important and what is not.

Procedurally it is a shift in sand of vital interest, with which we as a Nation have the greatest difficulty in the strategic planning process.

To the extent that we can conquer the challenge of this dynamic feature of strategy, we can make considerable progress toward a living, breathing and executable national strategy. For strategy can never be static. Should we ever conclude we have devised the perfect strategy and succumb to the temptation to etch it in stone, we will be on the threshold of a grievous mistake.

Finally, in the strategic planning process, we should avoid the common pitfall of confusing techniques with strategy. As we assess our strategy today in an attempt to evolve that strategy, we need to recognize and accept that development of strategy and the development of budget levels are separate processes.

Additionally, our strategy, and the strategy of our allies and our adversaries must be interactive. This may not explain to everyone's satisfaction why a force-strategy mismatch is inevitable, but it does to mine.

To cite one example among several, both United States and NATO maritime concepts of operation call for the maritime defense of the economic arc around Africa and through the South Atlantic. This economic arc connects the industrial machinery of Western Europe and North America with its sources of energy and raw materials. We have neither budgeted for or procured forces to carry out such a campaign. Nor do we believe the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact intend to conduct an extensive interdiction campaign in the South Atlantic. But our strategy must contain the elements of such a campaign, should it be forced upon us.

Our vital interests in the security of this economic arc do not disappear because we do not have the forces to protect it. I am not saying that we should procure forces for such a campaign, but we have, however, a classic force-strategy mismatch.

The solution lies not in deleting that portion of our strategy which calls for protecting the economic arc, but rather in thinking through in advance from what theater of operations we can divert forces with acceptable risk.

The challenge of the force-strategy mismatch is for our political leadership to assess the probability of unwelcome dynamics on our national strategy and conciously accept the risks.

The setting of priorities must be an essential component of our national strategy.

There is a reasonably coherent logic trail from which our strategy, such as it is, is derived.

It begins with the recognition that the Soviet Union is the only potential wartime adversary capable of direct military attack upon the United States. We plan to defend as far forward as possible. Not only to protect our vital interests, but also to ensure that wartime engagements are as close to the source of the threat and as far from the continental United States as possible.

If the security of Western Europe is a vital interest, and if reinforcement and resupply of Western Europe is crucial to its survival, then the place to attack the threats to that line of communication is the Norwegian Sea, rather than the Strait of Florida or Yucatan Channel. We can reasonably predict, therefore, that the first maritime campaign of a World War III in the Atlantic will be over control of the Norwegian Sea. But here we encounter once again the challenge of priorities. If such conflict begins not in Western Europe but rather in the Middle East or Southwest Asia, the maritime forces of the alliance may well be malpositioned for a Norwegian Sea campaign.

Risk assessments need to be made, not only in the course of committing forces in combat, but also at the time force levels are discussed in the budget process years before the force commitment decision is required.

For years we were prone toward viewing techniques as strategy. We knew we required a sea bridge between North America and Western Europe to execute that portion of our strategy which calls for the reinforcement and resupply of United States and allied forces and the warfighting machinery in Europe.

But we tended to look at the techniques of sea lane protection as a supporting strategy. We thought in simplistic terms of convoy escort and naval control of shipping and other World War I and II experiences. It was not until the emergence of the maritime strategy and NATO's maritime concept of operations that we were able to force our maritime support of NATO thinking away from techniques and into strategic terms.

General Rogers' follow on forces attack concept in NATO Europe is a similar example of how strategy can and should evolve away from a preoccupation with techniques and into a strategic concept.

The strategic planning chores in the European Command and in the Atlantic Command are relatively easy when compared with the Pacific Command. In years past, our Pacific strategy was reasonably simple. Keep 54 Soviet divisions pinned down in the China border so they can not be shifted to the Soviet western front and threaten NATO.

Today, with the emergence of major industrial capacity and trade dependencies in the Pacific rim, our strategy requirements are far more than geostrategic. We need to assess whether there might not be a greater element of risk in that theater than we are willing to accept.

As budget realities force us to accept shortcomings in our ability to execute strategy, we need to pay considerable attention to the balance between peacetime and wartime needs. We buy certain weapons systems solely for warfighting purposes. Examples are attack submarines, mine warfare forces and strategic bombers. We need such capability to deter war and we need such capability to fight effectively should we cross the threshold of war with the Soviet Union.

Other forces have both a peacetime and a warfighting character and can be employed in crisis management situations involving the full spectrum of nations whose interests do not coincide with ours.

Included in this category are special forces, land based and sea based tactical air, AWACS and amphibious forces. Our strategic thinking must include a continued effort to keep these capabilities in balance.

The British have not done well in this regard. A thousand lives were lost in the Falkland Islands conflict because of the loss of balance in their maritime forces and because of the perceptions on the part of the Argentine political and military leadership that the United Kingdom lacked the maritime strength to defend their interests far from home, and lacked the national will to employ what remained.

One strategic imperative which was brought home in the Falkland Islands conflict is that navies do not win wars. The want of a navy can cause a war to occur and can cause a war to be lost, but it is ground forces or armies which win wars.

The British Army won the Falkland Islands conflict. The Royal Navy's diminished capability caused deterrence to fail. And the Royal Navy could have lost the conflict. But it was the British Army supported by the Royal Navy which prevailed. This recent lesson on balanced forces and on the nature of deterrence should remain very much a part of our strategic thinking.

Mr. Chairman, I purposely left discussion of the nuclear dimension of our strategy to General Jones, and in doing so I do not intend to convey the erroneous impression that it is not a consuming part of my own appreciation of strategy.

As I said, I am most grateful for this opportunity to contribute to this important examination of our strategic planning process and of the national strategy which should, but does not always emerge from that process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Admiral Train. We appreciate your statement, and I have benefited from it. We will come back for questions.

[Prepared statement of Admiral Train follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. HARRY D. TRAIN II, U.S. NAVY (RETIRED)

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To maintain access to petroleum supplies and other critical resources.

To reverse the geographic expansion of Soviet military presence and influence throughout the world.

To encourage long term political and military changes within the Soviet Empire that will facilitate building a more peaceful and secure world order.

And, if deterrence fails: to conduct war to achieve the political objectives of the nation; to terminate war to enhance the political objectives of the nation.

As peacetime commanders of warfighting forces we all understood these National Security Objectives and were intellectually persuaded that they probably represent as succinct a statement of national security policy as is possible. They were, and are, completely consistent with the "Sense of Congress Amendment" in section 782 of the 1982 Defense Appropriations Act. These National Security Objectives have also been relatively constant through successive administrations.

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Procedurally, it is this shifting sand of vital interests with which we, as a Nation, have the greatest difficulty in the strategic planning process. To the extent that we can conquer the challenge of this dynamic feature of strategy we can make considerable progress toward a living, breathing and executable national strategy. For strategy can never be static. Should we ever conclude we have divised the perfect strategy and succomb to the temptation to etch it in stone we will be on the threshhold of a grievous mistake.

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As we assess our strategy today and attempt to evolve that strategy we need to recognize and accept that the development of strategy and the development of budget levels are separate processes. Additionally, our strategy and the strategies of our allies and adversaries must be interactive. This may not explain to everyone's satisfaction why a force-strategy mismatch is inevitable but it does to mine. To cite one example among several, both U.S. and NATO Maritime Concepts of Operations call for the maritime defense of the economic arc around Africa and through the South Atlantic. This economic arc connects the industrial machinery of Western Europe and North America with its sources of energy and raw materials. We have neither budgeted for nor procured forces to carry out such a campaign. Nor do we believe the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact intend to conduct an extensive interdiction campaign in the South Atlantic. But our strategy must contain the elements of such a campaign should it be forced upon us. Our vital interests in the security of this economic arc do not disappear because we do not have the forces to protect it. I am not saying that we should procure forces for such a campaign. We have, however, a classic force-strategy mismatch. The solution lies not in deleting that portion of our strategy which calls for protecting the economic arc, but rather in thinking through, in advance, from what theater of operations we can divert forces with acceptable risk. The challenge of the force-strategy mismatch is for our political leadership to assess the probability of unwelcome dynamics in our national strategy and consciously accept the risks.

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For years we were prone toward viewing techniques as strategy. We knew we required a sea bridge between North America and Western Europe to execute that portion of our strategy which calls for the reenforcement and resupply of U.S. and Allied Forces and the warfighting machinery in Europe. But we tended to look at the techniques of sea land protection as the supporting strategy. We thought in simplistic terms of convoy escort and naval control of shipping and other World War I and II experiences. It was not until the emergence of the Maritime Strategy and NATO's Maritime Concept of Operations that we were able to force our maritime support of NATO thinking away from techniques and into strategic terms.

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I have purposely left discussion of the nuclear dimension of our strategy to General Jones. In doing so I do not intend to convey the erroneous impression that it is not a consuming part of my own appreciation of strategy.

I am most grateful for this opportunity to contribute to this important examination of our strategic planning process and the national strategy which should, but does not always emerge from that process.

Chairman Nunn. General Meyer.

STATEMENT OF GEN. EDWARD C. MEYER, USA (RET.), FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE U.S. ARMY

General Meyer. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be here.

Normally, when I appeared before this committee and other committees in the past I never said either I was delighted to be here, glad to be here, or happy to be here, because I was ordered over here.

In this particular circumstance, I am delighted to be here because I have come on my own volition and at your request for two reasons.

First, because of the respect that I have for this committee and some of the old timers here plus both staffers and Senators for the support they have given to the Defense Department and to the services over time.

Second, because you are addressing a subject which really is elemental to the determination of how we spend our national defense resources.

I did not write my presentation tightly enough that I would want to read it. I will avoid repeating the broader issues that General Jones and Admiral Train addressed.

MILITARY ROLES IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

I will focus more in my discussion on specifics of current military roles in national security strategy. And some of those might be what Admiral Train refers to as techniques. Rather, I believe they are military options, military strategic options that I will address that I think will obtain to some of the decisions that you have to make.

When I was asked to be here, I debated whether I wanted to come and talk about strategy 2 years before a national election. Because strategy is never addressed in Washington except during the 6 to 9 months after a change in administrations. At that point in time, each new administration decides what was wrong with what the old administration did and decides how they will change it.

Also, they know that it is going to take them 3 years to make any changes that they want to in the way in which they approach a strategy change.

It was different with the Reagan administration. You will recall that in the Nixon administration they did a detailed review among all of the various organizations of government.

In the Carter administration there was an addressal, but it was internally within the Defense Department. It was not used as a basis for organization but it was a complete addressal.

In the case of the Reagan administration, in the early days, there was a focus on the financial and fiscal issues, there were so many things broken that even in a hollow army, for example, there was a need to fix a lot of things that were broken. The defense guidance was written but it was written so broadly that anyone's approach toward strategy could be driven through the defense guidance.

They early on came up with an approach toward arms negotiations, and so I would argue that in the early stages of the administration that what has happened is there has been change in strategy by commission. It has been changed by the Scowcroft Commission, it has been changed or influenced, by the Kissinger Commission; it has been changed or influenced by the Fletcher Commission up to this point.

I am sure that in responding to that challenge Mr. Weinberger would say that he has reaffirmed the basic strategy of deterrence in speeches he has made within the past year, that the President's current strategy document does outline a strategy which has been the basis for their approach, that Fred Ikle has put together a study group which is addressing strategy which will be completed by the end of this year. He would challenge the critics to respond to the question that General Jones referred to, and that is where should we withdraw forces if we have inadequate resources to respond to our national security interests.

In my view, the problem with that approach is that many of the basic issues that need to be addressed failed to be addressed as frontally as they should be.

Senator Warner always accuses me of frontal attacks, so I would say that these issues also need to be addressed frontally and those are the issues of continental versus maritime strategy. Both sides of that issue have been argued quite well either by John Lehman or other elements in the Navy or by Ambassador Komer in laying out those two alternatives.

FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

Forward deployments is an issue at the present time because, if we continue to maintain in excess of 50 percent of the conventional armed forces of the Army overseas, that has a long term impact on the quality of the force that we have.

The resources that go to strategic and conventional forces, the role of reserve components, and then the need to become professional in the low intensity conflict arena are other issues.

I would argue that today, however, there is a good reason for addressing strategy. That is because I believe that there has been a confluence of events that permits the U.S. military today to provide a unique input to the military aspects of national security strategy. Reykjavik refocused the linkage between conventional and nuclear forces. In all my visits to Europe in the past, well since Reykjavik and having spoken to members of all parties of all countries with regard to this issue, there is a clear understanding now of the linkage, a clear understanding, and it is articulated externaly as opposed to internally with regard to the relationship between external strategic forces, theater nuclear forces and conventional forces.

That provides us an opportunity. It also means that we have the opportunity to look at conventional options to hold the Warsaw Pact hostage as opposed to having had to rely in the past solely on nuclear alternatives.

Resource constraints is the second of those events that's occured that focuses on national security, and clearly there's not enough money to do everything, and that has already been discussed.

The Strategic Defense Initiative has made it clear that the arguments between strategic offense or defensive forces and conventional forces will be as much a budget issue as a strategic issue, so that needs to be addressed.

The impact on conventional forces of the resources needs to be addressed, and the technology that's coming out that's available as a result of some of the early looks at the strategic arena are very interesting as far as what we might be able to do in the conventional arena.

The JCS reorganization provides an opportunity because now you have the ability to call over here regional and global commanders for regional and global assessments directly. And they will have a greater voice in defining the needs for conventional forces and conventional alternatives. In the past, we always dealt as members of the JCS very closely with CINCSAC and we're very careful in protecting his requirements for offensive systems. We never dealt very fairly or very often with the commander in chief down at Norfolk in understanding exactly what his requirements were and seeing that they were equally as well articulated as those you have the opportunity to hear now.

And finally, demographics as an issue has come into effect and that clearly indicates that the manpower base of U.S. and allied forces is eroding and what that means as far as the quality of, and ability to man, forces out in the 1990's becomes questionable.

So the military has a significant opportunity in view of this confluence of events to be ready to develop alternative approaches toward military strategy and to respond to the challenges of Secretary Weinberger. If he says that you can't declare Korea off limits then the issue is: if you don't declare Korea off limits or if you have to protect the littoral North Africa, how do you go about doing that short of continuing to spend resources in the same direction we have in the past.

So the door is open today in my view for the military to prove that they can provide the military advice needed by the administration and requested by Congress.

CENTRAL EUROPE

Now, I'm going to pick one specific region of the world to talk to you and explain to you what I believe is an alternative which needs to be addressed. I know that General Rogers was here last week, and I think that is appropriate because I think NATO and particularly central Europe is the key to military strategy if we are to make any adjustments in the way in which our resources are spent.

Today, NATO consumes the largest share of conventional resources that go into the Army and the Air Force, and it is key to solving many of the issues that I referred to: the Reykjavik issue; the linkage issue; the JCS reorganization issues; the demographic issues; and the resource issue.

Central Europe requires greater rationalization than it has had in the past. Since 1980, there's been a tremendous improvement in the capability of the ground forces in central Europe as a result of modernization and as a result of the quality of the servicemen that we have sent over there.

But the correlation of forces, if you believe the output of the Defense Department, have not significantly changed. The reason is that adding more of the same has not succeeded because the Soviets are able to respond at or about the same pace as we are in providing tanks, aircraft, and the other means to improve their capability in central Europe.

If the allies continue their current approach, it's a question of whether or not we can change that correlation of forces over the next 10 years.

So we need to look at alternatives within NATO and also within the confines of the military strategy which exists in central Europe, MC14/3, which calls for direct offense at the border and a succeeding defense and transition into nuclear war if it is necessary.

But that change needs to take place over a 5- to 10-year period. If you look at this confluence of events, it says that we must now look seriously at considering negotiated reduction of conventional land forces.

Now the answer to the question which you asked, Senator Nunn, of General Jones as to whether or not those were U.S.-U.S.S.R. forces or whether those were Warsaw Pact-NATO forces is an elemental issue. In my own judgement, in the U.S. point of view there are advantages if it were U.S.-U.S.S.R., because that would permit us to solve some of these problems that I have identified earlier in looking at a strategy for central Europe.

If we were to do that in conjunction with a nuclear reduction, then the linkage between conventional and nuclear could be more clearly identified, and it would permit us to be able to respond to some of the other challenges. Now whether that would be done as modalities which would include short range nuclear and conventional land forces in the negotiations that are on going with regard to medium range missiles is something that I would leave to the negotiators.

It is an issue which has its time and I believe its time is now. Some of the reasons are:

Europeans understand linkage. It permits substitution of technology that provides us superior capability and deep attack weapons.

In 1985, the Federal Republic of Germany was permitted to add additional reserves. The Western European cap on their strength was lifted so that's changed and there's the ability for the Federal Republic to increase their reserves and to have combat forces in those reserves.

The Soviets may have the incentive now because some of the same sort of economic pressures that we have on our Defense Department also must be occurring in their own economy, and I would argue that the General Secretary must have to weigh those as well.

The demographic issue is one that seriously concerns me as I look to the future and the continued maintenance of a large overseas Army force in central Europe.

And also because I believe that the type of intrusive verification that is going to be necessary if we go about such an operation or such an agreement is more likely now as a result of what we saw the Soviets agreeing to in Sweden, and what we've seen them indicate they would agree to.

First of all, this is a negotiated reduction. It is not a unilateral reduction such as the one Zbig Brzezinski proposes. It has to be asymmetrical to take into account some of the differences of geography. It has to permit reserve units for allies, and it has to be one in which we are able through confidence building measures or verification to ensure that we have a better appreciation that it is, in fact, being adhered to.

If we did that, NATO could then design a new defense based on the same MC14/3 strategy. The U.S. contribution would be fewer forward deployed divisions. U.S.S.R. would have fewer forward deployed divisions. We could focus on the things that we do better. We could focus on some of the same items that General Jones raised: intelligence, command control, communications, electronic countermeasures, strategic mobility, technology, composite materials, artificial intelligence, and some of the other special weapons capabilities that are being developed at the present time.

And we would have competition between the alliance and the Warsaw Pact in an area in which we have an advantage, and that's technology as opposed to just the turning out of more and more systems, an area where we do not have an advantage.

So that's the central European front, which I consider to be the key problem that has to be resolved if we are in fact to change the way in which we go about looking at strategy and allocating resources.

I also would be derelict if I didn't address a few other areas of the world. I do believe that we need to look at those nations which are absolutely critical.

TURKEY

I will only identify one, though I thought of many, and that is Turkey.

Turkey is not only the southern flank of NATO, it is also the keystone geographically in the mideast, Persian Gulf imbroglio. And what it means is that where we have identified countries such as that, we must make certain that all the means available to our country are available to provide support. Whether they be supported by the World Bank, whether they be FMS or whether they be other support, that is necessary. We need to ensure that the capability is provided to those regions that are geostrategically critical to U.S. national interests with or without treaties.

In the spectrum of warfare, I have excluded low intensity conflict. I have been asked to appear Wednesday before Senator Kennedy's subcommittee and so I won't go into detail here. We have to become professional in the art of dealing with low intensity conflict.

It has to be a coordinated effort, and some of the Special Operations Forces play a role in low intensity conflict, but they are not the answer to low intensity conflict. And if you are not asking every CINC when he arrives here to discuss his approach to low intensity conflict within his region, you should because it is a CINCs responsibility.

In summary, I believe that this confluence of events puts the military at center stage in being required to develop a military portion of a national security strategy. I think Congress can help by energizing the military to address options, to explain what the second and third order effects of the alternatives that they propose are, both to the civilian leadership and to Congress. So that the resources spent are focused on the highest priority items.

Because we must prioritize the dollars that are spent. When we spend them, we have to understand what the impact of our capabilities are based on that prioritization.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Gen. Edward C. Meyer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. EDWARD C. MEYER, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED)

In the past, when someone mentioned reviewing our national security strategy, my response was—"Wait until the next change in the White House!". Historically, the time in which the senior leadership of our nation focuses on strategy is during the year following an inauguration. There are a lot of reasons for such a spasmodic approach toward strategy. The dominating reasons are that the new administration does not want to endorse, carte blanche, the approach taken by their predecessors, and that it will take at least the three remaining years of their electoral mandate to cause the Washington bureaucracy to respond to the changed direction.

In the case of the Reagan administration, no such broad address took place. The first year was primarily focused on changing the financial and fiscal underpinnings of our Government. National security strategy continued to be a strategy of deterrence established by past administrations. Changes were proposed by commissions addressing discrete elements of our national security: strategic offensive weapons (Scowcroft); Central America (Kissinger); Strategic Defense Initiative (Fletcher); etc.

Secretary Weinberger has responded to criticism concerning the absence of a strategy by reaffirming the basic strategy of deterrence, by putting a study group together to review national security strategy between now and the end of 1987, and by challenging his critics to define where we should withdraw forces in the world without having an undue effect upon our U.S. national security interests.

Despite the above prologue, which argues that addressing strategy now is a waste of time, events of the past six months and a look at some of the trends facing our national security establishment in the next few years make it appropriate to address our national security strategy *NOW*.

A confluence of events makes such an address pertinent and timely. These events include:

REYKAVIK

Caused European's to openly link conventional and nuclear.

Permits U.S. Military to address conventional options to holding Warsaw Pact hostage.

Encourages development of confidence building measures.

Suggests negotiated reduction of conventional forces as well as nuclear forces.

JCS REORGANIZATION

Provides for regional and global assessments by military commanders.

Provides greater voice for conventional force commanders.

Forces joint address of leverage technologies.

RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS

Forces readdress of conventional/nuclear mix.

Forces development of leveraged technologies.

Forces readdress of strategic alternatives.

Applies to Soviet Union as well as U.S.A.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Focused arguments on offense/defense issues.

Impacts on resources available for conventional forces.

Provides technological breakthroughs.

DEMOGRAPHICS

U.S. and allied manpower base is eroding. Calls into question how forces will be manned with quality personnel in 1990's.

Addressing national security strategy now, out of cycle with the national presidential election, is not inappropriate. The strategy that forms the basis for our force structure and the weapons systems that support that structure, must be more clearly tied to the resources available for national defense.

If we continue to allocate money against uncertain strategic parameters, then our strategy in the 1990's will be budget derived, rather than on how best to support our worldwide national interest. We may already be well down that budget road.

Despite being critical about the lack of a coherent strategic plan. I will not attempt to define my own concept of such an entity. Rather, I'll attempt to respond to your request to define some critical strategic themes and the budget implications of those themes.

Central Europe represents the strategic region that requires the greatest rationalization. U.S. forces in Central Europe have undergone a significant upgrade in war fighting capability over the past six years. Equipment modernization and the improved quality of the serviceman have been the prime reasons for the increase in capability. Despite the improvement of U.S. forces and those of our allies, the correlation of forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO have not significantly changed. The Soviet Union has continued to upgrade and improve its war fighting equipment at a quantitatively superior rate and at a qualitative rate which has prevented the U.S. and its allies from gaining a competitive advantage.

Looking to the future there is little hope that within the constrained budgets of the alliance that continuing on the current approach toward providing for the defense of Central Europe, that the allies will be able to improve that correlation of forces for the rest of this century.

What needs to be done is to loosen the knot which binds NATO together just enough to permit changes to be made in the conventional structure of the alliance. If certain changes could be made over the next five to ten years then the knot that binds the alliance together could be not only stronger in binding the countries together, but also provide the opportunity to ensure that the correlation of forces are such that the Warsaw Pact will continue to be deterred from aggessive action, and that the NATO nations of Central Europe do not feel forced to submit to hegemonous pressures by the Soviet Union.

As a result of the confluence of events outlined above, I believe now is the time to seriously consider a negotiated reduction of conventional land forces in Central Europe as a part of the reduction in nuclear weapons in Central Europe. We have been involved in Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction discussions since 1973. To date these discussions have been unsuccessful in reducing forces. Why do I believe it is in the U.S. and NATO's best interest to be willing to link negotiated conventional and nuclear reductions now?

Because:

1. The Europeans now understand more clearly the linkage between conventional and nuclear.
2. The reduction of U.S. ground forces permits the U.S. to substitute technologically superior deep attack conventional weapons systems.
3. The FRG is permitted to have more combat forces in their reserves as a result of restrictions being lifted in 1985.
4. The current "build more of the same" approach will not change the correlation of forces.
5. Budget restrictions on U.S. and perhaps on USSR encourage fewer foward deployed ground forces.
6. The U.S. Army may not be able to sustain large combat component overseas due to demographic and budget constraints.
7. The reduction permits U.S. to improve combat/combat support balance.
8. The Soviets are more likely to permit intrusive verification procedures based on recent agreements and statements.

A negotiated reduction would have to be asymmetrical to take into account the geographical differences inherent in reinforcing the Central Front from the USSR, or the U.S. Also such negotiations would have to permit reserve units of our allies in Central Europe to be created to substitute for U.S. force withdrawals.

Such a reduction would permit the U.S. and its NATO allies to compete with the Soviets in a regime in which we have a chance to win—technology. U.S. contributions to the reordered defense of Central Europe would be fewer forward deployed divisions; but, more deep attack weapons systems, intelligence gathering systems, improved command, control and communication, improved electronic counter measures, as well as the application of artificial intelligence, composite materials and other advanced technologies provided to the Alliance.

It also provides an alternative to the either/or approach provided the Alliance today. Either provide more conventional capability or we must use nuclear weapons at an early stage of the war in Central Europe.

The ability to work out a negotiated withdrawal over the next five to ten years would permit NATO and perhaps even the Warsaw Pact the opportunity to rationalize the contributions of all of the nations of the Alliance.

The impact of such a proposal would be:

(1) It would not necessitate review of the basic NATO strategy.

(2) It would permit NATO countries to specialize in what they can provide best to the Alliance.

(3) The U.S. could provide equipment to Germany or other forward deployed NATO nations to expedite the upgarding of Non-U.S. NATO forces.

(4) The U.S. Army's manpower problem would be alleviated.

(5) The Alliance would be competing with the Soviets in an area in which allied technological advantage could prevail.

Such a proposal would have little effect on the current budget. But in future budgets it would have a major impact on how resources were spent and how they were applied to the various programs.

By focusing on the Central European battlefield it is not intended to ignore the flanks of NATO. Both the Northern and Southern Flank will continue to use U.S. reinforcements. Turkey is critical not only to the NATO defense, but is vital in any resolution of the Middle East/Persian Gulf imbroglio. Our national security strategy must continue to provide through all means available—World Bank, Foreign Military Sales, and other U.S. economic support means—for the improvement of the Turkish armed forces. As part of our address of strategy, we need to identify countries such as Turkey which are geo-strategically so critical to our national interests that we provide them with continued and expanded assistance.

Another region of the world where U.S. ground forces are forward deployed is in North East Asia. Again a confluence of events is occurring in a nation critical to U.S. national security—Korea.

The next year and a half are likely to determine the future of Korea and U.S. involvement on the peninsula and in the region. The election in 1988, the Olympics in 1988, the economic imbalance in trade between the U.S. and Korea, and the continued concern over the transfer of power in North Korea all contribute opportunities for crisis.

U.S. interests will be served best by military, economic and political policies which support a peaceful election and stability during the critical eighteen months ahead. Attempting to reassess our long term strategy toward Korea until after the events outlined have occurred would be imprudent.

In addition to the conventional force aspects of our strategy, I would like to indicate that I believe Special Operations Forces and our ability to respond to Low Intensity Conflict requires special attention and oversight. Since I will be appearing before that sub-committee I will not repeat my comments in this hearing.

In summary, as we review our current strategy, I would hope that we would look most closely at what has been our number one priority—Central Europe. If it is believed possible to negotiate conventional force reductions in that region, we have an opportunity to bring some order to our force structure and our defense resources. We can never expect to have our strategy and our forces come out even. We must always be willing to accept prudent risk. But all of us would feel more comfortable about the risk we take in the strategy-force mismatch if we were able to improve our posture in Central Europe by some other means than "more of the same" or the early use of nuclear weapons.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much for an excellent statement. We are going to enforce the 6-minute rule today, and we will keep up with it and pass around the time slip because we have a number of Senators and I know everyone wants to ask questions.

During the committee's budget hearings we asked the witnesses to relate the Defense authorization request to our strategy. One witness, Richard Stubbing, who in terms of addressing the link between strategy and defense budget, testified, and I quote:

> The defense program and budget is a "bottom up" process controlled by the military services in which their preferred force and weapons modernization programs are normally determined independently of any given defense strategy.

Could each of you just give an assessment of whether that statement is anywhere near accurate, and if not, how would you relate strategy to the defense budget based upon your experience. General Jones.

General JONES. I think there is some truth in that statement, but I think it is an overstatement.

There is quite a bureaucratic process of developing defense guidance and in some JCS papers that flow from that, and guidance goes to the service. So it does start top down.

I think the point all three of us made earlier to one extent or another is that that process outlines such broad requirements across the board to allow the services to sort of pick and choose within that which areas they emphasize. So there's quite a bit of bottom up at that point because you can't meet everything, and the priorities tend to be in very general terms, or they can be very specific. It might tell some service to build exactly two of these, or three of these.

But in general, the priorities are fairly vague and fairly general. So there is a bottom up process, once you go through this initial top down guidance process. And so it doesn't connect very well in a fully integrated programmatic sense.

Chairman **Nunn**. Admiral Train.

Admiral **Train**. I agree with what General Jones has just related in that clearly the budget process and the strategic planning process are performed along their separate routes. But there is that overlay of such guidance documents as the defense guidance, the joint capabilities plans and other chains in the strategic link that should, but do not always, govern the process of developing service budgets.

There's also a time disconnect. The strategy that emerges from the defense guidance and that is contained in the joint capabilities plan governing the behavior and the planning efforts of the warfighting commanders is basically a today's strategy.

The resource authorities, operating on the problem of buying weapons systems for tomorrow, are not as constrained by today's strategy as those who have to execute today's strategy. Therefore, they can go farther afield and stray more from basic strategy guidance mandates if you will, and can take some literary license with what they are given in the form of guidance.

I think that this can probably be tightened up quite a bit if we are disciplined enough to inventory what we work with today and then decide what has to be changed and change it. Much in the same manner as you went about the defense reorganization. But as long as we say defense guidance and we think defense guidance means one thing or means the same thing to everybody, and do not understand that it means one thing to a warfighting commander and another thing to resource authority, then we will never get there.

Chairman **Nunn**. General Meyer.

General **Meyer**. Very briefly, with some of the caveats that have been outlined here, I agree that the strategy is so broad that it does permit services to focus on the things that are service-oriented within this broad rubrick.

Examples of that are the fact that CINCs' needs for command, control, communications, intelligence, strategic mobility, those types of things have always taken second or third priority. The CINCs' need for, in the past, an ABM has always been something that was not supported very strongly by an Army, because they needed resources elsewhere.

So in my view, there is need for more direction from the top. Direction that's been defined by the CINCs and the JCS Chairman in a coordinated program to the Secretary of Defense, which even defines for example the types of divisions that the Army makes. Those decisions should be made by CINCs and JCS, not just by the Army, in my judgment.

Chairman **Nunn**. What do we do, General Jones, as you alluded, with the upcoming tough budgetary choices. You said we would be fortunate if we get 3 percent growth and that would be very constrained. Of course, quite a few people believe that over the next 3 or 4 years, unless there is a real breakthrough in overall agreement on the budget, we will be fortunate if we get even lower than that.

What do you think we have to start looking toward in terms of relating the budget realities you mentioned to a fiscally constrained 5-year plan. We supposedly have that kind of move in the reorganization bill. What kind of decisions and trade-offs are we going to have to look for, not in terms of specific weapons systems, but in terms of relating this lower growth budget to the overall posture we find ourselves in now.

General **Jones**. It seems to me that the balance of force structure, modernization and readiness needs close examination.

From what I know about the defense budget, I think the readiness and sustainability part have been shortchanged in the current budget, and I am concerned that we are drifting back to the days when we might end up with a hollow Army.

It will be a long time before that, because we can live off things we have already purchased, and there is still quite a bit being purchased. But I have a feeling that in that balance that the readiness side is going to take a little bit of the short end of it.

I would also take a look at the allocation of resources between the broad strategic nuclear area and the conventional. I think there again, it has started to tilt too much toward the strategic nuclear. Unfortunately, we are having to modernize, or at least are modernizing every piece of the strategic triad with multiple systems in it. And I don't think the strategic balance is quite that fragile.

I'm not advocating major surgery, but I just think in that balance, as I mentioned earlier, I would be very careful at this point about approving new, large capital investments that require funds for the next few years, because we really don't know the impact of the defense cuts. Even if we have 3 percent real growth, we're not sure what the impact will be on force structure and readiness and modernization.

Modernization, I think the Army has been shortchanged in modernization in the current budget. So the balance of those, and particularly the strategic and conventional balance, without a major shifting, but a good look at that, would be an area that I would suggest you take a look at.

Chairman **Nunn**. General Meyer and Admiral Train, what would you look toward right now?

General **Meyer**. I would cover the same things that General Jones indicated, and I think they are the ones that I outlined in my presentation. But there is one other segment that I would add to this discussion. And that is that I continue to believe, Mr. Chairman, that until the day that the Secretary of Defense and this committee of Congress are able to have military leaders come over and explain to them how much more capable they are at carrying out the contingency plans which they are charged with doing based upon the resources they have, that we are not going to be able to bring the order to this system that needs to be there.

Admiral **Train**. I agree basically with what has been said thus far.

I would urge that we attempt to exercise great care that we don't wish strategic problem areas away because we can't afford to address them.

It was mentioned earlier that the problem that we encountered in Korea back in the early 1950's was a product of our writing off Korea as of strategic importance to the United States. And it turned out to be more important than we thought. Deterrence failed, and we ended up in a conflict. There is always the possible outcome from budget cutting exercises that we will cut forces and cut discernible capability so much that we'll drop below that threshold necessary to deter our adversaries from taking military action against us.

Much the same has happened to the British in the Falkland Islands.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you. Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, we have had a number of hearings now, and I can certainly say, having been through all of them that the statements we have received today are among the finest and I know of no better.

Good contribution, gentlemen, and we are fortunate here in our country to have persons like yourselves who have long and distinguished careers who wish to remain current and come before Congress and other public forums to share your views.

I would like to ask a follow-on question to Senator Nunn's issue of prioritization on the budget.

PRIORITIZATION ON THE BUDGET

Let me see if I can put it in really very simple terms, and hopefully get a short and simple answer from you.

This committee is simply going to be presented with a cut, I fear, although we came out supporting the $312 billion figure of the President. The way we are structured in Congress today, the budget committee's will eventually determine the figure, and we have to at least comply with that in terms of providing a bill on the floor. Thereafter we can argue as best we can for increases. But supposing we get that very substantial reduction, and we simply have to sit in here and make the following decisions in terms of priorities.

Take the Army. Do we buy some more tanks, do we cut back on O&M, or do we cut back on end strength?

In the Air Force do we buy some more airplanes or cut back on O&M or end strength?

And in the Navy, a ship or two dropped out, O&M, or end strength?

Now, if you were sitting here, how would you prioritize? What would be the first priority, second, and third?

Let's start off with you Admiral.

Admiral **Train**. My first priority would be force structure. That is to maintain the force structure that we have ascertained is necessary to pursue our strategy.

Senator **Warner**. Force structure translates into end strength.

Admiral **Train**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Warner**. That is your first priority, to maintain, and if necessary increase the existing end strength.

Admiral **Train**. That is correct. Recognizing that our long-term strategy a number of years ago was based on modernizing the Navy and mortgaging that modernization with force structure or end strength. And we have dropped down from over 600 ships to about 450 ships for a long period of time to mortgage that modernization. And it is crucially necessary to get back to that.

Senator **Warner**. All right. End strength is first priority. Second priority.

Admiral **Train**. The second priority is readiness and sustainability.

Senator **Warner**. That is your O&M.

Admiral **Train**. That is O&M, yes sir.

Senator **Warner**. So the third is buying new ships, even though you had to tie them up in case of a contingency, you could find some men somewhere, Reserves or elsewhere to crew them.

Admiral **Train**. Yes sir.

Senator **Warner**. General Jones.

General **Jones**. I think it is important that we try to figure out a way to get some synergism out of our forces. Neither we nor the Soviets have done very well, they in Afghanistan and we in Vietnam, in trying to pull everything together.

So I think the most important things we try to do are pull our things together.

The three areas that you had, I would tap force structure, but I wouldn't tap all force structure before I hit some modernization items. Of those two I would hit, if you do have to take a cut and I think you're right, I would hit in some cases force structure, some in modernization.

I would not hit much in readiness. I would like to——

Senator **Warner**. That would be your top priority then.

General **Jones**. I would rather see us be like the Israelis. I would rather have real first class outfits that are well equipped, well trained, and we have the mobility. We can't move much of what we have today. We can't fully support it.

I'm not talking about drastic cut in force structure, but I would like to see really first classed outfits.

Senator **Warner**. Sir, you would want to see those that we have in perfect working order.

General **Jones**. Not perfect, but better than we are today. We depend heavily on the Reserve Forces, about 50 percent in the Army in a lot of areas. The Reserve Forces don't have a lot. I'm not talking about a big increase in it, but I wouldn't cut much in that area.

I would try to bring up the Reserves even with smaller Reserves.

Senator **Warner**. Your said that O&M is your first priority, then you have a balancing between cuts in end strength and modernization. General Meyer.

General **Meyer**. Well, because I clearly believe that 780,000 is not adequate to do all the things the Army is trying to do. I therefore, believe that you need to maintain the end strength in the Army.

Second priority would be a mix between O&M and equipment.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you gentlemen. We will take that advice in mind as we have to make these cuts.

General Jones, I was quite interested in your comments on meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. Senator Nunn and I had the opportunity some 18 months ago, and we both followed very carefully his enunciations since that time. My recent research, and it is far from complete, indicates that some of the senior military people have indicated publicly that a military doctrine change is underway.

I am not certain just exactly which way it is going to go. Gorbachev is reported to have said two things here in the last 60 days. I am not sure I have the accurate quote, but the words are correct. Superiority, and that is strategic superiority borders on insanity.

Second, he feels the Soviet Union should be proceeding in a direction of sufficiency of forces.

My question to you is, since so much of our national strategy is predicated on the direction in which we feel the Soviet Union is going, I myself think that Gorbachev is a bright man and trying to go about some changes, certainly in the civilian sector, to make his nation more competitive.

But I am very reluctant to think that there is any major change in their military strategy. Certainly in terms of their preparedness from a defense perspective.

I wonder if you might have a different view predicated on your own visit with him and some research that you probably have done.

General **Jones**. I was in the Soviet Union about 14 months before this recent trip of ours. My impression of what happened in those 14 months is quite stark as far as the difference.

The earlier trip, it was more just what you read in Style on alcohol and that sort of thing. This last time, a much greater openness, internally, but even externally. They showed a 45-minute program on national television. They said 120 million people heard that Ogorkhov and I had taped it here in Washington a few months before and they showed every minute of it.

They played a little game and said they censored it in the United States but we are showing this in its entirety. They had cut it back in order to fit within a 30-minute program in the United States, and I think it was balanced.

But they did show it. And they had a Bob Dole article in Pravda on why SALT II was bad and then said we will do like George Will does in the Washington Post, we will editorialize on it.

So you are seeing more openness. And in the discussion with the military, Marshall Akhromeyev and others were somewhat more forthcoming this time. I sense there is, and I must say it is more sensing than anything specific, but there is some rethinking going on. I don't mean that it is the type that is benign toward us and it will solve our problems.

First, I think you sense that Gorbachev would like a quiet world for a while, but he is not going to cut and run from his international involvement.

Marshall Ogorkhov, I think, still is playing quite a role in the thinking process within the Soviet Union. His thoughts are generally that the strategic nuclear has been somewhat overemphasized and the technology has not been pursued in the Soviet Union.

So, I perceived in the discussions, even with the current military, a feeling in that direction, but not trying to overstate it as a big shift.

Also, I got from the discussion a greater interest in quality of forces and a recognition by them that they've got a lot of outfits that aren't any good. A lot of C–3 and C–4 outfits.

I would not be surprised with a somewhat smaller Soviet military. Not less-capable, but one that is tighter bound and more capable on the individual units, with a degree of increased technology.

I sense that thinking is going on within the Soviet Union. It isn't one though that's benign, that's going to mean it will make them less capable. And they may be more capable. I think they have learned a lot from Afghanistan. Every one of them talked about Afghanistan and the problems they had there. They were very, very frank about the difficulty.

I think that is influencing their thinking on getting better units, but maybe somewhat smaller. And they have a demographic problem coming also.

So I think there is a consistency within that.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

General MEYER. Could I just add one little fillip at the end of that. I have been following very closely what Ogorkhov has written, and of course, as you know, he wrote about this particular issue that General Jones outlined. That would indicate that he wanted to degrade the nuclear at the expense of improving the convention and he was relieved of his job.

A sort of buddy in the community that sort of follows what is going on said all right, he has been relieved of his job, therefore that is not the party line.

About 6 or 8 months later he was brought back in, and he is still writing in that vein. And we reviewed, we took a very long, hard look at all of the evidence which would tend to indicate whether or not there has been a shift.

None of the experts that have sat and read the unpurged data concluded that there has been a change or a shift at the present time, although there are some indications. But nobody among that group, even the most wild liberals or the most staunch of the conservatives concluded that there had been a shift yet.

General JONES. And I didn't perceive that a shift had taken place, but that there was some thinking going on. I was very impressed with many of the Soviet military I met, and Andrei Sakhorov, we spent an evening with that most impressive individual and with Elena Vanev, and he said for the most part that the best young people are going into the military. Their officers are really first class in capability.

And so it is, we have always known it is a formidable capability and they may be getting even more capable in the days ahead.

Senator WARNER. My time is up Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman NUNN. I believe Senator Shelby is next.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LINKING CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS WITH NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

General Jones, I would like to open up with a few questions for all of you, General Meyer, and Admiral Train regarding the linkage we have been talking about. Linking conventional reductions with the nuclear reductions, which is a logical thing, because if you do not, if you reduce the nuclear, you are going to have to make it up with conventional weapons.

Is that the thesis, and if you do not do them both, are you moving anywhere? And I would like your comments.

General MEYER. My comment on that is very simple. I have listened to poor General Rogers for 8 years, and General Rogers, every time he comes in makes a very great plea, saying I am on the twin horns of dilemma. On the one side, I have inadequate conventional forces; on the other side, I have to go to tactical nukes very, very early.

We have to help solve that dilemma somehow. I argue, perhaps not persuasively, but at least I argue that we should consider conventional reductions at this time as part of the treaty negotiations.

Senator SHELBY. But when you are talking about real conventional reductions, are you talking about real conventional reductions?

General MEYER. I am talking about real conventional reductions on the part of both the Soviet Union and the United States.

Senator SHELBY. General Jones.

General JONES. I would agree, but I would not, in the first negotiations on nuclear weapons tie in a full agreement on conventional weapons. Or we will be here for years trying to achieve that.

The way we are going, I would try to put in there a commitment on both sides to become more serious about this problem. And maybe think about having an agreement that they will pull out a number that is slightly more than token. And we take a number out slightly more than token.

Senator SHELBY. So that we are not playing games.

General JONES. Well not only that we are not playing games, but it gets the momentum going and allows us to start figuring how to verify that. I mean, until we start the ball rolling, we really won't know the problems of verification and so forth, and how to get to the next problem.

So without thick documents on how to verify and how to do it, take an amount out that, if it fails, and it isn't verified, you have not jeopardized what is going on.

But it allows the momentum to build up. So I think that could be written up in very short order, and then if progress is made in both sides really being objective and trying to make the progress, and we see hope for the further reductions.

If they play games, everything is off, and say well, we just can't move from there.

Senator SHELBY. Admiral Train.

Admiral TRAIN. I would like to reinforce what General Meyers said earlier, and that is in looking at the conventional balance, we have to take great care that we do not become engaged in a force reduction trade with our potential adversaries and allow them in the course of that trading conventional forces away to end up in a situation where we have nowhere to go but resort to tactical nuclear weapons, and therefore make the war nuclear.

If we ever create in the minds of our adversaries a vulnerability in the form of, we have no place to go but nuclear, we are really vulnerable. Because they will probably perceive that we are not really serious.

Senator **Shelby**. I think General Rogers mentioned that the other day.

Admiral **Train**. He mentions it all the time. I am reinforcing what he says.

I believe, to the depth of my soul, that it is a very important point.

General **Jones**. Could I just mention a point on this whole conventional issue, to illustrate how we see things differently than the Soviets, or at least what they profess.

CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IN WESTERN EUROPE

I received a briefing from a member of the Soviet General Staff on the conventional balance in Western Europe, or in Eastern Western Europe, between NATO and Warsaw Pact. It wasn't a detailed briefing, but it is interesting to hear the rationale they used, and it supported their position the best. It was a self-serving rationale that was technically correct but not too meaningful.

That was, they said we do not foresee a war in Europe breaking out of the blue, in some sort of surprise attack and so forth.

We see the greatest likelihood of something happening with great deterioration of relationships of the two superpowers and the two alliances. And things get worse and worse and worse. And they said the reason we say the West either being equal or better than the Warsaw Pact is you have greater population, you have a greater wealth, you have a greater industrial base. For the first time, they admitted you have greater technology, and that will come to bear.

I told them that was not a balanced briefing, that was an elephant and rabbit briefing, one elephant and one rabbit. I mean it just was not that meaningful in what he had to say. But then we went on for discussion and they said we would be willing to discuss the balances based on surprise attack without saying who caused it, a short period of build up where you augment but can't crank up the industrial base, and then the long term one.

I think you have to take all three into consideration as you move toward reductions.

Senator **Shelby**. General Jones, in quoting you earlier, you said you didn't think that Gorbachev would cut and run from his international involvement although he was interested in some security while developing internally.

Do you mean that there is probably no reason to believe that we could link nuclear, conventional, and probably some adventurism together on some pressure point such as Angola, and the removal of Cuban troops there.

General **Jones**. I think there is some limited linkage you could have, but I don't think unilaterally he is going to do it in Afghanistan.

The discussion by all on this subject and Shevardnadze was meeting with the foreign minister of Pakistan and with the foreign minister of Afghanistan at that time, separately meeting with them, to have a discussion on this issue.

But they made it very clear that they were not going to cut and run out of Afghanistan. They said we will be glad to have a coalition government and look back with warm thoughts on the days of King Safair, but they wanted to add, we don't want the King back. But Harold Brown went on to say if you are interested in coalition government, it makes a big difference as to who is minister of sports and who is minister of interior.

But I think there is some mileage we can get out of it, but I would not couple major linkage on regional issues to an arms control agreement on, let's say, nuclear weapons.

Senator SHELBY. But they are a danger point, are they not?

General JONES. They are a danger point, but agreement on nuclear weapons should be able to stand on its own as being advantageous to us without having to be linked. But we should get all the mileage we can out of it.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you. My time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also appreciate very much the testimony of the witnesses, who I have had the opportunity of knowing in the past, and appreciate the enormous contributions they have made to this country. It is with some trepidation that I make some comments since I have paid close attention to the questions and the comments.

First of all, General Jones, I agree that Mr. Gorbachev wants a period of stability in the world so he can concentrate on internal problems. However, he is not about to withdraw from international involvements. Then I think he would have the best of all worlds. I know of no other Soviet dictator that would not want exactly the same thing.

I am impressed that you have received briefings in the Soviet Union. I think the majority of the American people believe that we cannot have an arms control agreement that simply stands on its own while there is an unprecedented military buildup in Angola, in Central America, and in Afghanistan.

The situation in Afghanistan has worsened with recent attacks into Pakistan. I understand a news report today said that an Afghan aircraft was shot down.

I appreciate everything that you said on SDI. But when we discuss SDI and all of the pitfalls that lie ahead, as you so eloquently stated, let me say that you neglected to mention the enormous contribution that SDI has already made to the process.

The fact that it brought the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table after they walked out and said that they would never return, in my opinion is worth an enormous investment in itself.

I do not think beneficial events would have transpired by Reykjavik if SDI had not played a major and key role.

Those who support a reduction of 50 percent of offensive nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles in exchange for doing away with SDI, I think should remember that that would return us to about the level of nuclear weapons that we had in 1972.

I think the smartest line that the Soviets could take is that they could easily counter SDI very cheaply. Still I am not inclined to believe the Soviet Union despite their openness.

I think that we need a more clear-cut proposal as to how we address the strategy-force mismatch because it is crucial when we address these budgetary issues.

But perhaps some of the most interesting testimony this committee had was that by General Gorman on the subject of aid to the Contras. I am sure you all followed that.

I would appreciate your statements on the viability of the present United States policy in Nicaragua, and should it be pursued or changed. It is obvious to most of us on this committee and in the Congress that no policy in the United States can be sustained over time that is not supported by the majority of the American people.

It is clear that a majority of the American people do not support present U.S. policy toward aid to the Contras. Within about 5 or 6 months there will be a major debate on this issue in the Congress and in the country, and I would appreciate your input and advice.

General JONES. First, on Gorbachev, we should not be complacent. He is one smart individual who came up through a system that you have to have a lot of toughness to get to the top. And so I do not think that any of us should underestimate him.

I am not trying to say there should be no linkage, but the idea that somehow we can get all the arms control agreements, and at the same time solve lots of problems around the world, I think, is not realistic. And so there is some sort of middle position in there.

Now on SDI, I do agree that President Reagan has given us leverage on SDI. I did not say that I believe the Soviets can counter at less cost. I am saying that I sense that they now believe they can, not only saying they can. I mean from the conviction of many, many people. There could be disinformation in that, but my point was that they are now saying differently than 14 months before, that now they think they can counter it.

With regard to Central America, first I am very careful to normally limit my comments to areas in which I have tried to stay up to date on. I have not been to Central America for years. I have not spent much time there. I was on a Central American commission, didn't have time, left it 4 years ago.

So I read the New York Times and the Washington Post and lots of other things trying to get information. Overall, I would support aid to Contras. On the other hand, I do not think the administration has done all that great a job, right from the beginning, of articulating what we really want to try to achieve in the area. And have made at least the perception too much that it is a military solution when really that is only a part of the political, economic and social equation in the area.

And so, although I am a critic of how they have articulated and handled the policy, I would, in the absence of any information that I don't have, I would support continued aid to the Contras. But I would hope that we would get our act together and articulate what we are trying to do and what we think can be successful.

Are we trying to get a nation that is going to leave its neighbors alone, or are we trying to overthrow a government of a nation?

There is a fundamental difference there, and that should be better articulated.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you General, I agree.

General MEYER. I have followed Central America reasonably closely, Senator, and I would like to put it in a little bit broader context. That is I believe that the focus in Central America needs to be on much of the content of the Kissinger Report, which focused on support for Honduras, for El Salvador, for Guatemala, for Costa Rica. And if I were you, I would be watching very carefully today Panama, because I am more concerned about Panama today than I was 4 years ago. I think of all the things that could cause us problems in Central America it would be Panama.

With regard specifically to the Contras, having sat in on the original discussions about support for Contras in the region, and having started truly with an agreed concept that said that the purpose behind supporting that group was to cut off the flow of goods from Nicaragua into El Salvador and into Honduras and into those other areas which made sense in my judgment at the time. To have transitioned into a support for a group without a clearly stated mission, that the administration has been unable to articulate, is difficult.

I still believe that we need to provide support to them, but I also agree that we need to define their missions more clearly and even proscribe them if that is necessary.

Chairman NUNN. To what extent?

General MEYER. Proscribe them. To limit what we believe our moneys could be used for down there.

Admiral TRAIN. I, for my part, am not sure that I know what vital interest we are defending in Central America in the case of Nicaragua.

Is our vital interest geostrategic, and if it is geostrategic, are not there perhaps other alternatives? I am asking these as questions not to you, but to the system in general. Is our vital interest the creation of a friendly government in Nicaragua? And if so, maybe that challenge is too much to pursue. Or is that a valid vital interest. Is it a vital interest at all, or is our vital interest maintaining the United States in a position of leadership in the Caribbean basin.

That is probably a pretty good, valid vital interest, but I'm not sure Nicaragua is the place to pursue it.

Grenada was, where we could get a cheap win, but in Nicaragua the challenge is greater.

Or is the vital interest the reversal of the expansion of Soviet military influence and presence throughout the world? That seems to be another quite valid vital interest. And if that is our interest and that is the interest that we are pursuing, then we are probably on the right track, but using the wrong techniques in the course of doing so; namely, aid to the Contras.

And in the rather sporadic way that we have gone about it, certainly we do not have a mandate of the American people that support that.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much. I believe next we have Senator Exon.

Senator Exon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first welcome my three friends here. It is always good to see you back again. I want to associate myself with the first class remarks by Senator Warner.

You are all great Americans, and we need your help and advice and appreciate your coming here to let us pick your brains a little bit today.

Let my first question be to General Meyer.

General, I am very much concerned about the strength of our Army. Is the Army getting what it needs to perform in case they are called upon to perform sooner than we would like to think?

I am particularly concerned about the helicopter situation, and I guess that I am worried that the Army may be looking so far down the road on the LHX helicopter that maybe we are being somewhat shortsighted in looking that far down the road.

What is your view? Do you think we should cut back helicopter procurement in favor of the LHX?

General Meyer. Senator Exon, I believe the answer to that question is the same answer to the other questions that have been asked. And that is that you should ask the Army how much less capable their forces are going to be as a result of not having helicopters there, not having attack helicopters there and lift helicopters.

The commander of the armored cavalry regiment along the border in Europe says he does not have his new helicopters, and, therefore, his forces can only fight in the daytime because he doesn't have that third dimension to add to his maneuver capability. Because they are not there now. So you can tell by the way I am answering your question that I believe that it is something that we cannot afford to have a gap exist that prevents this very critical element of the combined arms team from being there when it is needed.

Senator Exon. Thank you. I thought probably that was your viewpoint. I think we should keep driving that home. If there is one place where the Army needs some vast improvement in a hurry, it is in that area.

General Jones, I am glad to see you back again. Let me first question, so I can set the timeframe, what year did you become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

General Jones. I was on the Chiefs from 1974 to 1982 and from 1978 to 1982 served as Chairman.

Senator Exon. So you went on, in 1974 you went on?

General Jones. I was there under four Presidents, which was very interesting.

Senator Exon. That is quite a record. Either for you or the frequent change in presidency. [Laughter.]

OK. In that timeframe, were we looking seriously at the possibilities of a strategic attack out of the blue? I suspect that you feel that an attack out of the blue is not nearly as likely as it was at that time.

Or do you think it changed before or after the date that you became a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? What I am trying to get at is, that from the perspective of a bolt out of the blue attack that we now feel considerably different from the standpoint of

1974? Do you believe that there has been such a significant change? Has there been a similar change in planning and procurement as to how we would properly and best defend the national security interests of the United States and the free world?

General JONES. Well first, on the bolt out of the blue, I felt then and I feel now that it is not zero probability, but it is extremely low.

As to relative then and now——

Senator EXON. Now you said you feel the same now as you did in 1974?

General JONES. Yes. That in both cases that it was extremely low as to the probability of it happening. You would have to see some change in the world East-West relations and so forth to do it. Some increased tensions could happen over a short period or a long period.

We have improved since then. Soviets have improved, particularly in hard target capabilities since 1974, but I think in both cases it is very low. And in some ways could even be lower, because clearly Chernobyl was a real traumatic experience for the Soviets, and it really brings home what a small nuclear accident can do. I mean very small compared with what you would think of big accidents or use of nuclear weapons.

And so I think they even recognize more the impact of nuclear weapons falling on their soil which would undoubtedly happen if there is a surprise attack by the Soviet Union.

So I think it is as close to zero as you can get. That does not mean we should not stay on alert and keep SAC on alert, and keep the looking glass airborne and all the rest of it. We ought to.

Senator EXON. Well then——

Senator WARNER. Would the Senator yield, would he clarify the use of preemptive strike, bolt out of the blue, and first strike. You have used two and now a third; I think it would be helpful if we had that in mind.

General JONES. Well, preemptive is, I am convinced that the other side is going to strike. And I may be wrong, but for some reason, we are in war in Europe and things are getting bad, and we have had a policy that we might strike under that condition. The Soviets might interpret that as we were going to strike and preempt, or we may think that they are getting ready to strike.

I don't think, in the current environment, there is any thought of preemption. But in a bad situation of the two countries fighting each other, each increasing the alert, when you are finally convinced that the other guy might be coming at you there is some advantage of beating him to the punch, only if it is absolutely certain that he is going to come.

Knowing that you are going to still receive tremendous damage as a result of it. So it is not a first strike in the sense of disarming him, as we think about in first strike capability. And the Soviets accuse us of trying to achieve a first strike capability, and we have said, many people have said they are trying to achieve a first strike capability.

That to me is different than preemption out of the middle of a terrible crisis where you figure it is inevitable.

Senator **Exon**. Is it fair to say General, that you feel that under the present situation the high probability is that we would have all of our strategic forces on full alert before there would be the signal that they had launched?

General **Jones**. I think that is very likely. Something in the world would change of such seriousness that we would put them on alert. That does not mean we ought not do everything we can to keep the maximum amount, within reasonable cost, on alert. But I think the probabilities are we would have time for alert, but we ought not to count 100 percent on that.

Senator **Exon**. Mr. Chairman, they just told me my time is up.

Senator **Warner**. Why doesn't he use part of my time. Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Exon**. If I could just have one quick question General, which I think is a very important one, which we are wrestling with today.

Given the budget constraints that we are in and the tough decisions that we are going to have to make here, do you see, as a former member of the Joint Chiefs and as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, a pressing need to build both the rail garrisoned MX and the Midgetman missile to modernize our ICBM leg of the triad? And if it would come down to one or the other, which would you recommend?

General **Jones**. First, I think you could make a case for both of them. So I think it is in the priority system, if you have to cut some area, I would be inclined to look to a great deal of the technology of the two.

I have not had recent briefings, but I think mobility with ICBMs is very difficult to achieve. Whether it is on the railroad with the MX or it is in the other capsule mode movement of the Midgetman. And so I would be looking very much at which mode would provide the best support.

I would also look at, can the mobile ICBMs be supportable without some ceiling on warheads from the other side?

I mean, if you can saturate and barrage, then you would have a different problem.

So I do not know which one I would chose right now, but I would not put large amounts of money frankly on both of them simultaneously. I would explore both areas in the way of being able to deploy, because I think the deployment decision, how to provide survivability, I don't think we have a good answer to that one yet. I haven't had enough detail in the briefings to give you a judgment of which one, but I would not go high expeditures on both of them simultaneously even though I have been a strong advocate of the modernization of the ICBM force.

Senator **Exon**. Well, I would just press you one step further.

Assuming you could only have one or the other you could not give us just a little bit of a hint as to which one you would take?

General **Jones**. I really don't know enough about what is in the budget right now on the total cost.

I think putting a few MX's on a railroad would be cheaper from the standpoint of number of warheads. Whether or not from the standpoint of getting survivability, there would be enough survivable warheads to make that tradeoff. And so I am going to beg to pass on this.

Senator EXON. All right. Would the other two distinguished witnesses answer my question?

General MEYER. I cannot answer your question. The reason I cannot is because I spent 8 years also in the JCS, 4 years as a DCSOPS and 4 years as a chief. During that period of time I heard the Air Force come in and the Defense Department come in every 2 months with a new basing mode which was the absolute solution to the problem. And then you know we went from vertical to horizontal to six pack to dense pack to what ever else it happened to be, and when we got, all I would say Senator——

Senator EXON. General, that was dunce pack.

General MEYER. Well regardless of what pack we went to, we went through a series such as that, and it has been so that the argument between the rail ICBM and the small ICBM is sort of in the same equation, except that I think some of the arguments that were made for the small ICBM in the Scowcroft review ought to be looked at seriously before you overrule them.

General JONES. Senator Exon, we are now in the position of not having to have fixed opinions on subjects such——

Chairman NUNN. If you do not mind, I am going to move on, if Admiral Train could just hold that thought so that Senator Quayle could get in his time before the vote, because I am afraid we will not be able to get the Senators back from the Senate floor.

I know our witnesses may not want to wait 15 or 20 minutes. Senator Quayle, we have a vote on.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.

I welcome our panel. I am sorry I was not here to hear your testimony. I tried to read very quickly Admiral Train's and General Jones' statement, and General Meyer, I will read yours in the record.

In a very quick reading, General Jones, of your statement, I came away with the impression that you were really somewhat negative toward SDI. That you did not feel that it had too much hope or promise, and went through a lot of reasons that perhaps it may not work.

Whether it be the cruise missile threat that may replace the ballistic missile threat or the fact that maybe someone in the Third World having this nuclear capability was not that important. I just wonder, I gathered that opinion that you really do not feel that SDI holds a lot of promise, that you are saying basically go a lot slower than we are.

You also said in answer to Senator McCain's question that you thought but you were not certain that you had a feeling that the Soviets perhaps felt that they could in fact counter our SDI. Nothing conclusive, but you felt that.

Well if that is the feeling, that they could in fact perhaps counter it, or there is a sense that there maybe, and given the feeling at least in my reading of this that you do not think there is that much hope or promise on the Strategic Defense Initiative, why is it that the Soviets are so adamant and have set out basically to kill SDI?

I just get an entirely different reading from what you said here and your answer to Senator McCain. You have just come from the Soviet Union, and the negotiators that I have talked to, that is what they are completely interested in.

Now if that is the case, I would think that you might, or maybe it is a misreading on a very cursory reading of mine that you might feel that there is a little bit more optimism with the Strategic Defense Initiative.

General JONES. Senator Quayle first, I did not want to be negative; I wanted to be skeptical. I think we are playing games. Not you and I, but I think the country is playing games on this whole subject.

There are those who say that SDI is to protect people, and then there are a lot of other people who kind of wink and say well it really isn't for people, it is for deterrence, it is for a whole bunch of other things.

I would like to see a better articulation of really what do we expect out of SDI. I am a complete skeptic I must say about SDI being able to protect the people of this country in the sense of an attack on the country.

Deterrence is another subject.

Senator QUAYLE. Well, I think the way at least the Secretary has defined it in his posture statement this year, that the words that he used, that he wanted to bolster deterrence. And that in fact he sees a correlation, particularly with START that you are going to have a potential reduction of offensive forces, the introduction of defensive forces. That would be a far more stable world than what we have today.

Now you obviously do not agree with that.

General JONES. No, I don't say I don't agree with that.

Senator QUAYLE. That is certainly the goal, and if you are able to bolster deterrence and be able to see the interaction of strategic forces and defensive forces, I always get a little bit of, you know when people say that they are skeptic of this or whether it is population or a point defense, I mean what we are talking about if in fact you are able to deter the Soviet Union you are talking about saving people's lives.

I mean the distinction to me is rather marginal.

I think what we are really talking about is whether we as a Nation are going to move forward with the concept that strategic defenses are in fact not only important, but strategic defenses in fact have a good chance of providing improved deterrence and improved stability.

Now many people say, want to move in that direction and feel that in fact offers a very viable option some day.

I do not know where the technology is going to lead, noboby knows where the technology is going to lead, but every time we do a test, whether it is a delta 180 or the delta 181 or whatever it may be, everytime we do these things we always learn a lot more than what we ever learned before. We are always surprised on how far along.

I know the Secretary of State George Shultz in these posture statements, he says quite frankly, he says I am impressed about how far along we are on SDI. It seems that that is just sort of a natural thing, that anytime we get involved in technology that we are always surprising ourselves with what kind of capability we have.

Therefore I guess I just, I know that the Soviets want to limit SDI, constrain it. If they are so adamant in trying to restrain our SDI, why is it so important to them. Why is that so important to the Soviet Union if it is not within our interest to go forward with a rather robust SDI program.

General JONES. First, I have not been really surprised by what we have been able to accomplish. I have a lot of confidence in technology in this country and what we can do.

Where I tend to be a skeptic is in this: is where we are going with the program trying to cover the whole country? If we want to cover——

Senator QUAYLE. That is way beyond, in the future. You know, the year 2020, 2030.

General JONES. As I point out in my statement, if it's primarily the defense of the strategic forces, particularly ICBM, we can answer that in the affirmative.

I don't have any question that if that is the basic role, to defend our strategic forces primarily, then we can accomplish that, I have no question. I point out in my statement that there are questions about cost effectiveness and other things that would have to be answered as to whether the best way to deter is to go that direction.

Now with regard to the Soviets, first, a kill mechanism in space in their mind is the real key factor on the whole issue of SDI and what happens and the testing of that. So they are still very strongly opposed to proceeding with SDI to the point where their kill mechanism is tested in space.

They still strongly link it in the arms control negotiations. But they linked INF strongly until recently. And we got the hint of unlinkage, or delinkage when we were in the Soviet Union in the discussions there.

I doubt if they will delink SDI but I would not be totally surprised if they delinked it somewhat in the days ahead. They told us they had examined that. They used those words, that they had examined delinkage.

They are concerned about it for two reasons.

One is they would have to respond with something, both in offense and in defense.

Second, they are worried about our technology. A little bit different worry this time from the discussions with them. Before it was a total focus on technology, but this time it was more a narrowing of technology and maybe other opportunities lost.

So they are concerned about it, and I am not against it.

Senator QUAYLE. Why are they so opposed against us testing the space kill vehicle?

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle, let me suggest this.

Senator QUAYLE. If they could just answer that real quickly.

Chairman NUNN. I thought we might come back and let them complete the questioning after the vote. Can you all wait a few minutes?

General JONES. I can wait.

Senator **Quayle**. If you want to answer that real quick, could you do that?

General **Jones**. Well, I think it is fundamental that they see that as a cross over point of preceding with something else outside the ABM Treaty and proceeding with the ultimate development and deployment.

Senator **Quayle**. The ABM Treaty, the one that they have already violated.

General **Meyer**. This is not a consensus view, because I happen to have been on the committee that was set up in 1983 to review this SDI and have been following it ever since. I do believe we should get on with research and testing and I do believe that it has the opportunity to bolster deterrence over time along the lines you mentioned.

Admiral **Train**. And for the record, I agree with General Meyer.

Chairman **Nunn**. The hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

FRIDAY, APRIL 3, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

REVIEW OF PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY REPORT

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Dixon, Shelby, Warner, and Quayle.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Kathryn E. Bognovitz, special assistant; Richard D. Finn, Jr., James R. Locher III, Norman G. Mosher, Daniel J. Wildfong, professional staff members; Russell C. Miller, research assistant; Lori M. Jackson and Kathleen L. McGuire, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Greg Weaver, assistant to Senator Levin; Gregory B. Craig and William J. Lynn, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Leon Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Patrick A. Putignano, assistant to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. We will go ahead and get started this morning because we do have a rollcall vote, I am informed, at 10 o'clock.

The Armed Services Committee meets this morning to conduct its 16th hearing on U.S. national security strategy and its military strategy component.

Today, the committee will have the opportunity to hear testimony from three well-known defense analysts: Dr. Amos "Joe" Jordan, the president and chief executive officer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Mr. John Steinbruner, the director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution; and Mr. Bruce Weinrod, the director of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies at the Heritage Foundation.

All of these witnesses have solid backgrounds on defense issues, so I am confident they will be able to contribute to the committee's

73-838 0 - 87 -- 34

ongoing review of U.S. strategy and be of great assistance to us this morning.

I would like to thank Senator Warner at the outset, because he has helped instigate and organize the strategy hearings and also this morning's hearing.

He and I have worked closely together on this entire series of hearings and I am very grateful for the overall assistance and counsel of Senator Warner in getting this strategy series off to a good start.

Dr. Jordan, Mr. Steinbruner, and Mr. Weinrod have been asked to review the testimony of the witnesses who have preceded them in order to identify neglected subjects, and also, hopefully, to identify some central themes and a strategy work agenda for the national security community.

At the same time, we are especially interested in their views on the first annual National Security Strategy Report that the President submitted to the Congress earlier this year.

Because that report is one of the central strategy documents of the executive branch, it would certainly be useful for us to have them identify those portions that need more attention and thought.

Before we hear the witnesses this morning, Senator Warner, do you have any opening comments?

Senator **WARNER**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Indeed we have formed a partnership in many programs, but I think this is one of the more important ones that we have had in the years that we have been privileged to work together.

I also wish to put into the record my statement in its entirety to cut down on my remarks, and also wish to recognize in the audience Maj. Tom Harvey, who was associated with me in my work in preparation for the President's Report on National Security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER

Mr. Chairman, let me commend you again for holding this series of hearings on national and military strategy.

The subject of this morning's hearing, the administration's report on the National Security Strategy of the United States resulted from legislation which we initiated together last year—along with our colleagues Senators Goldwater, Lugar and Pell.

While I am certain that there are those who might find reasons to criticize this initial effort, I would like to take this opportunity to commend the administration for bringing together for the first time in one comprehensive document, our foreign policy and military strategy.

The National Security Strategy Report should become the foundation document for Members of Congress as we measure the value and relevance of individual programs ranging from Pentagon spending to foreign assistance. It will enable those of us in the Congress to assess how each of these programs contribute to our overall national and military strategies and foreign policy.

The document is of equal value to the public. The American people expect and deserve a clear statement of our national goals and the way in which we intend to make them reality. Informed public debate on these goals, strategies, and available options must reflect an awareness of the dangerous complexities facing the United States. The President's Report provides an excellent means for understanding the strategic direction of the country, as articulated by the administration.

Finally, the National Security Strategy Report describes for our friends, allies and potential adversaries a coherent, proactive American strategy to advance goals of world peace and freedom.

Perhaps one of the "acid tests" is what our adversaries have to say about this report. In the February 5, 1987 issue of the Soviet newspaper, Krasnaya Zzezda or "Red Star," one Soviet reporter remarked, and I quote:

"The essence of the report's content can be expressed in one word—anticommunism * * * America's main priority is to rearm America and modernize its strategic forces as the cornerstone of Reagan's modernization program." By providing a clear view of an America committed to the prevention of conflict, but realistically prepared to defend freedom, we strengthen links with our friends and allies, while reaffirming our resolve to the rest of the world.

I would like to take this opportunity to recognize Major Tom Harvey for his work on this report. As a Congressional Fellow working in my office, Tom was the driving force behind the legislation which I introduced last year. Tom was then transferred to the National Security Council staff where he became the key individual in pulling this report together. While he should be at home recuperating from a recent bout with hepatitis, dedicated soldier and citizen that he is, he is here today and I would like for him to stand and be recognized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from this distinguished panel.

Chairman **Nunn**. I will also insert for the record at this point, Senator Dixon's prepared statement.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Alan J. Dixon

Mr. Chairman, this morning we will receive testimony on the U.S. national security strategy to include a review of the President's recent report, "National Security Strategy of the United States."

I believe that we must carefully examine our country's international commitments and the capabilities of our military to fulfill them simultaneously. I think we must consider restructuring our strategic nuclear forces so that the money saved can be used to remedy our conventional military's shortcomings.

I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses regarding these issues.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. We have scheduled Dr. Jordan first this morning, but if you want to get your breath, we can switch the order around a little bit.

Are you ready to go?

Dr. **Jordan**. Surely.

Chairman **Nunn**. Well, I have already given you a glowing introduction, in case you missed part of it. So why don't you just begin.

STATEMENT OF AMOS A. JORDAN, JR., PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. **Jordan**. Thank you, Senator.

I am submitting a statement for the record in addition to my oral remarks today. It is a great pleasure for me to be here and to contribute to these important hearings.

I welcome the opportunity to comment on the President's first National Security Strategy Report and some of the central themes that have been advanced by other witnesses.

The views I express are, of course, my own. The institution that I head, namely the Center for Strategic and International Studies, does not take positions. Members of it take their own positions, as you have undoubtedly discovered from the testimonies of Drs. Schlesinger and Brzezinski, who are counselors in residence at CSIS.

I think we should begin with a definition of strategy and would suggest that we say strategy is how a nation develops and applies its resources in order to accomplish its objectives.

With that as a working definition, let me talk primarily today about national security strategy, which is, of course, a broader concept than military strategy, the latter referring to defense objectives and military resources, the former to all the nation's resources and the full range of its objectives.

I will talk primarily about national security strategy in part because I think in these hearings and in the country generally, there is too little attention to non-military instruments. In this committee, of course, a military focus is understandable. But, nevertheless, there is inadequate attention to those non-military instruments and, in particular, how they might be orchestrated with or substituted for the military instrument.

Turning to the President's first Strategy Report, the concept of an unclassified National Security Strategy Statement, I stress an "unclassified statement," would strike almost any other people, except the American people, as rather unsound.

Strategy must rest upon a realistic appreciation of the environment and the threats and the opportunities it holds, must establish a prioritization of objectives, as necessitated by resource shortages, and must set forth an objective assessment of the problems, risks, and trade-offs in applying resources; accordingly, it is clear that such a document, given in some precision and detail, would be of incalculable value to an adversary.

Of course, the document can deal with all these subjects on such a level of generality that it does not help the adversary. But, then it does not help this committee much, either, or the American people.

This is exactly the difficulty that the President's National Security Strategy Statement has fallen into. It is so general that it does not provide very much guidance about strategy.

It is a useful document in the sense that it brings together familiar statements of American foreign and defense policies, and that is, indeed, a useful function. It also sets out, in a fairly comprehensive way, American interests and objectives—again, usefully, and in a far less thorough way it lists some of the threats to those interests and objectives.

What it does not do, and I suggest cannot do in unclassified form, is to set forth the priorities and choices which are the essence of strategy.

I recommend that the committee request a classified supplement to the 1988 document, to do this and to do it in some detail.

Chairman NUNN. Could I ask one question here?

Dr. JORDAN. Yes.

Chairman NUNN. You are assuming something which I would like to see if you know for a fact or if you are indeed making an assumption. You are assuming that there is something classified, a lot of things classified in strategy, that are not in here. Is that something you know or is that an assumption?

Dr. JORDAN. I am assuming that a document could be readily pulled together in classified form from existing documents and provided to this committee.

Chairman **Nunn**. But you are not saying that there is such a document now.

Dr. **Jordan**. No, I am not. I do not believe there is.

Chairman **Nunn**. OK. Thank you.

Dr. **Jordan**. The document's statement of goals, objectives, and threats is largely unexceptionable. But I am surprised that in the list of major objectives, there is no mention of the Persian Gulf area. One can infer it from statements elsewhere in the document, but it is not listed as one of the principal subjects under "interests and objectives."

I think that we, certainly I, would want to insist that this area of Southwest Asia presents a central strategic front—to use Dr. Brzezinski's words.

Senator **Warner**. If we might interrupt you, the chairman reminded me that when we drafted the law, we put in here that each National Security Strategy Report should be transmitted in both a classified and unclassified form. You have brought to our attention that the classified form has not yet arrived.

Mr. **Jordan**. It has not, I see.

While I am noting shortfalls in the document's list of major objectives, I would observe that checking nuclear proliferation is not mentioned. While it should be a central objective; so should improving allied burdensharing.

Again, these get a glancing reference. I think the White House list of 24 objectives should be expanded to 27, a modest inflation in these days.

Turning to the principal threats section, I agree that the Soviet Union is the major continuing challenge. But far too little attention is given to other threats. They are all summarized in one short paragraph.

Most of the challenges to America's interests over the next decade or so, many of them serious ones, will arise out of non-Soviet challenges. Again, there is nuclear proliferation, and the economic challenges that confront us in an interdependent world.

I note, too, that in the section on the elements of national power, there is only brief mention in the document of political and informational elements. This strikes me as extremely weak. This is an area where the United States has a strong comparative advantage and a subject that needs a great deal more attention as we confront a closed society.

There is no mention, for instance, of the instruments of VOA, Radio Free Europe or Radio Liberty, and little recognition of cultural exchanges or other instruments in the war of ideas.

Indeed, apart from foreign assistance, which rightly receives considerable attention, nonmilitary resources of all kinds are given inadequate attention in a document that should deal with the full range of our instruments.

In sum, the concept which generated this report is a sound one. The first product you have received is useful, but far too sketchy, general, and vague. There should be much more specificity and there should be a classified annex.

I would like to turn next to some general thoughts about strategy which have emerged in these hearings and add a few ideas of my own.

Let me say, first, that strategy must proceed, of course, from a statement of interests and objectives, and for our purposes, I think we could accept the ones the President has set forth in his documents—the familiar ones about physical survival, with values and institutions intact, viable alliances, a vigorous domestic economy and international economic stability and so forth—with the slight additions that I have suggested, could stand.

Of course, we may not be able to afford all of these objectives in defense of our interests, a subject which is not really addressed in the documents, and a subject to which I want to return later.

Before tackling the hard questions of choices, how we carry the burdens, let me examine the environment in which the choices have to be made, again, something that is dealt with inadequately in the document.

Strategy must deal with the world as it is, not as we wish it was.

Four features of today's international climate critically condition our strategic choices: first, American unreadiness to shoulder the responsibilities carried in the past; second, pervasive global instability, which shows no sign of disappearing; third, a marked and accelerating diffusion of power; and, fourth, continuing intense U.S.-Soviet rivalry.

Whether from sheer weariness, Vietnam fallout, a train of policy disappointments, attrition of the so-called foreign policy establishment—whatever—Americans are increasingly skeptical and unpredictable about their external commitments.

As the President's strategy document points out, the vast bulk of Americans take no interest in foreign affairs, and a bare, eroding majority even believes that this country should play an active part in world affairs.

This is not the kind of support on which to build continuity and reliable policies. The assumptions, convictions, and consensus, which once underwrote confident, reliable American behavior in the world, have eroded and become progressively less persuasive to our friends, our adversaries, and ourselves.

A massive conclusion leaps from this, namely, that a constituency must be built in the public, and specifically in the Congress, for this kind of American policy and commitment, if we are to have a coherent, credible, and consistent national security strategy. It is an enormous task to which I think this committee could greatly contribute.

Second, instability, which is often violent, disorderly, and unpredictable, results from a breakdown of condominia or empires that we have known, the fragmentation of traditional societies, widening economic disparities, rising expectations and the communication explosion that feeds them, and a plethora of ethnic, racial, religious, and ideological rivalries. Our central problem here is in diagnosing these and their implications for American interests. Not all of them require a U.S. response.

We have been too ambitious in attempting to meet these throughout the world in the past. Some outbreaks of course are intrinsically damaging or could become so. But others are relatively benign, and some are essentially irrelevant to our interests.

By contrast, we cannot ignore any of the dimensions of the third factor in our environment, namely the diffusion of power. Our era has witnessed unprecedented changes in the structure and distribution of military and economic power and influence. In the military arena, power has shifted centrifugally to both ends of the conflict spectrum.

I need not dilate on that subject, which is familiar to you gentlemen.

But let me echo, with regard to the relationship between the nuclear superpowers, what Jim Schlesinger has told you, the old rules of strategy do not seem to work. This dimension of strategy is going to be enormously complicated in the future as the number of nuclear powers grows.

With regard to the low intensity end of the spectrum of conflict, let me say only that the combination of interdependence and fragile infrastructures in the developed world makes this traditional form of "warfare of the weak" especially dangerous to us and difficult to combat. Strategic maxims here of the traditional variety are also of relatively little use. We have to develop the tallored instruments to deal specifically with these kinds of difficulties, and we cannot rely on our conventional forces, even so-called light forces, to help us with these kinds of problems.

The diffusion of economic power is less dramatic than that of military power, but it, too, is important. The growth of economies competitive to the American one has coincided with the growth of interdependence that I have mentioned, along with energy shortages, structural shifts away from heavy industry, etc. These changes vastly complicate the Nation's harmonization of defense and economic policies.

Finally, let me turn to the subject of U.S.-Soviet competition. Here I cannot emphasize too strongly the words of my colleague, Dr. Brzezinski, before this committee. I quote:

> The American-Soviet rivalry is a long-term conflict, a classical, historical conflict between two major powers, and is not susceptible to a broad and quick resolution, either through a victory by one side or through a grand act of reconciliation.

Again, an immediate strategic conclusion leaps from this assessment. We must gear our policies and programs for the long haul. The kind of stop/start, up/down which has characterized our strategy and our programs in the post-war period, particularly in the last decade, has to be changed if we can expect to succeed in the long haul.

We cannot expect the Soviet Union's well advertised internal problems to paralyze it in external affairs. It may slow the challenge somewhat, but the time of Soviet passivity that we saw during those successive leadership transitions is behind us.

Communist ideology, Russian history, and the Soviet view of the world all forecast a continuing, vigorous contest.

For the United States, the implications are clear. We have a dangerous adversary across the entire globe, even in our own backyard. And the opportunities for our own and Soviet miscalculations increase steadily as Soviet global involvement builds.

The record of the 20th century suggests that miscalculation is perhaps the single greatest catalyst for major conflict.

While it would be futile to frame our national security policy without regard to Soviet interests, capabilities, and intentions, as I have suggested earlier, it would be just as wrong to allow the Soviet-American relationship to drive all our policy choices.

I do not discount the Soviet threat. But this administration in particular, I think, has paid too little attention to non-Soviet threats.

Before turning to specific strategic concepts, I would like to stress a general point that I touched on earlier, that strategy is about choices. These choices have to be based on priorities, judged in the content of risks. For a nation that leads a worldwide coalition with global interests, these choices cannot be directed to a single, immutable end, or even to a set of ends. Our problem is not to draw a roadmap to get us across terrain from point A to point B. Rather, our problem is one of continual choice, as the terrain changes. We have to develop a template of preferences and priorities, of options and restrictions, with which we can continually make choices as the situation changes.

All of our choices of course will involve risks, for even if we cut back commitments somewhat, they are almost certain to outrun resources.

This inevitable strategy-resources gap can at least in part be covered—as Dr. Schlesinger has indicated to you—by American prestige. But prestige, as he further said, can evaporate rapidly and a withdrawal from commitments can reduce a nation's prestige so that the gap actually increases, rather than shrinks.

Prestige is a multiplier of power, and we must guard it carefully. We have wasted it flagrantly in the past.

Let me turn now to a half dozen strategic propositions.

First, preserving the strategic nuclear balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union is essential to undergird all our other strategies and policies, and because of its centrality, minimal risk here should be the rule.

Thus, despite the expense, the strategic triad of land-based ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers has to be maintained, and always with a survivable strategic C^3 system. Hence, modernization of existing systems will be required. But it does not follow that all of them have to be modernized simultaneously, which seems to be the policy at the present time which is not sustainable economically.

Second, a vigorous R&D program, aimed at developing strategic defenses for our offensive forces, should be pursued in order to test the feasibility of the concepts involved, to guard against Soviet ABM breakout, and to enable us to judge various offensive-defensive mixes, stability and costs.

This R&D should be accomplished within the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty and without pressure to rush to early deployment decisions.

Third, deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms as well as conventional and chemical arms should be sought, particularly reductions in large, MIRVed ICBMs, which threaten crisis stability.

Since nuclear weapons cannot be "uninvented," and cheating at the margin in nuclear matters could prove profoundly destabilizing, deep reductions should not be aimed at total elimination.

Other stabilizing arms control measures should be pursued as well, such as (a) more vigorous use of the SCC to challenge confidence-eroding Soviet tactics; (b) creation of nuclear risk reduction centers, as envisaged at the Geneva Summit and as promoted by Senators Nunn and Warner, in a very creative initiative; and finally, (c) adoption of other confidence-building measures, as set forth in the Helsinki and Stockholm conferences.

Arms control, however, cannot be treated as a substitute or an alternative to defense measures, but as an intrinsic element of national security strategy.

Fourth, greater emphasis should be placed in American strategy on the long-term attrition of the base from which the Soviet Union builds and projects its military power.

In the first instance, this calls for a reinvigorated information program aimed at the Soviet Union, primarily at its non-Russian peoples, that will convey the truth within its own borders about what is going on inside those borders, as well as about Soviet relations with the rest of the world. The Voice of America and Radio Liberty are the primary, but not the only, instruments of such a strategy, and should be provided by the Congress with a modest increment in resources required to do a more effective job.

Similarly, an even more intensive effort should be strengthened to tell the truth within the Soviet empire, especially in Eastern Europe. Radio Free Europe and, again, the Voice of America, should receive the modest resource increments needed as an urgent priority.

Economic and political initiatives, applied with selectivity toward Eastern European countries, should accompany these renewed information and public diplomacy programs in order to weaken the Soviet bonds and their claims to legitimacy of rule over their satellites.

I would also favor the most vigorous people-to-people cultural and scientific exchange programs and other means of letting the Russian people find out the truth about the West as long as these are on the basis of strict reciprocity.

Beyond loosening the Soviet clutch on its satellites, our various economic instruments are not suitable for use in pursuit of a strategy of weakening the Soviet base. I reject economic warfare against the Soveit Union as nonproductive and unnecessarily provocative.

But we should take care that our economic policies are not unwittingly strengthening that base. Thus, though Soviet economic intercourse with the West provides some long-term hope of amelioration of East-West tensions, we should be careful in the short run that we do not, through our trade policies and investment, strengthen the Soviet capacity for mischief.

Trade should be exclusively in nonstrategic items and it should not be subsidized in any fashion.

Fifth, in dealing with deterrence in the three crucial theaters already discussed, we should continue to pursue a force projection strategy, and based on forward deployments, sea control, and augmented airlift and sealift, together with the maximum possible contributions by allies. Often, we do not adequately factor in these allied contributions.

Insofar as feasible, this element of strategy should utilize prepositioning and flexible basing, but apart from Western Europe, it need not entail the presence of large U.S. ground forces.

In Western Europe, some marginal reductions in the numbers of U.S. troops could, and should, be made with some of the American heavy units converted to light ones. However, a force reduction on the cover of one-third, as recommended to you by Dr. Brzezinski in these hearings, cannot be achieved without sacrificing the forward defense of the Federal Republic, which I consider politically essential.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Jordan, we are going to continue this hearing, but we have a vote on the floor now. So we are going to shift back and forth in the interest of saving time.

On the latter statement about Dr. Brzezinski, I wish you would please tell Dr. Brzezinski, your colleague, that he did an excellent job before us and that his rather provocative statement about troop withdrawal has been attributed to me——

[General laughter.]

Chairman NUNN [continuing]. Erroneously in an article in the Washington Times by Admiral Zumwalt and Admiral Bagley. So, in the future, his really good, brilliant ideas, I am not going to in any way apologize for plagiarizing. Would you give him that message.

Dr. JORDAN. But you did not plagiarize that one?

Chairman NUNN. No, I did not. It was done vicariously for me by others. [General laughter.]

Why don't you just continue, Dr. Jordan. We are going to try to keep the hearing going during this vote.

Dr. JORDAN. I was saying that a force reduction on the order of one-third, as recommended by Dr. Brzezinski, cannot be achieved without sacrificing the forward defense of the Federal Republic, which is politically essential.

As Dr. Jeffrey Record told this committee, substantial U.S. withdrawals could undermine the political cohesion and consensus which is essential for deterrence in Europe. I would concur with that.

Further, with regard to Western Europe, if politically possible, the retention of a small number—perhaps 100 is an appropriate order of magnitude—of theater nuclear weapons there is important to a continuation of the strategy of flexible response. That strategy has kept the peace for a quarter century and shows no signs of wearing out soon.

Although it is theoretically possible, it is totally impractical in the foreseeable future for the West to build a sufficient conventional force to provide assured theater deterrence in the absence of a credible threat of nuclear escalation.

In the Far East, improvements of the Korean Peninsula, increased Japanese defense commitments, and continuation of Soviet-P.R.C. rivalry also suggest that some slenderizing of U.S. forces, particularly of ground and air forces, is possible. But there, too, balances are delicate and political sensitivities high, so that only marginal changes can be made in the short term without a wholesale revision of strategy, which I would not recommend.

Sixth, with regard to the Third World generally, American strategy should be to assist friendly regimes wherever they have the support of their own people and are contributors to regional stability. Overwhelmingly, this assistance should be economic in nature, although on a selective basis, it should be military as well.

Not only do I reject direct American intervention with U.S. troops to deal with unfriendly, destabilizing regimes throughout the Third World, but I also think that most other military responses in such areas—responses such as naval blockades, nearby troop exercises, or a naval show of force—are wasted and often counterproductive.

Gunboat diplomacy, the kind of hollow threats, which are still the favored approach of many to Third World problems, does not work if the targeted people refuse to be cowed, and that is increasingly the case. We waste our operations, our money, our readiness by these futile gestures.

Rather than carrier task forces, we should lean more in these areas on the economic instruments in which we have a strong, comparative advantage. They should be brought into play earlier and more consistently, and be better integrated with other instruments.

I refer in the first instance to foreign assistance, which takes only about 2 percent of our annual Federal budget, yet which is consistently starved by the Congress, year-in and year-out.

We have probably received more benefit per dollar from foreign assistance over the years than from any other instrument, including the defense instrument.

Of course foreign assistance mistakes have been made, some of them at the Congress' insistence, such as selling, rather than granting, aid to nations which desperately needed it but could not afford to pay for it, at least on commercial terms.

Three years ago the Carlucci Commission set forth a number of reforms and policy initiatives to strengthen our foreign affairs programs, which I would recommend to you.

In the wake of the Iranian arms sales fiasco, there is, of course, a temptation to legislate further constraints on the provision of foreign assistance. The Tower Commission concluded the Iranian arms mess did not prove the NSC system was faulty. The fiasco occurred because the system was not followed.

Similarly, that mess does not indicate that fresh amendments to the Arms Control Export Act should now be enacted. The administration's covert arms transfers to Iran were conducted outside the existing system. A chastened president needs more, not less, flexibility in the use of this important instrument.

In particular, military assistance, which is clearly as much a defense instrument as our own forces, should be flexible enough that the President can use it in support of our national security strategy.

I would hope that this committee would join hands with the Foreign Relations Committee in strengthening, rather than weakening, this key tool.

Of equal import, in some cases of even greater import than foreign assistance is American trade and investment policy. As the world's largest market and, highly regrettably, also the world's largest debtor, the United States has tremendous economic and political impact through these policies, for good or ill. If we close off our market to a Third World country, for instance, or pinch off our public or private investment there, the consequences for that nation's economic and political health are likely to be far greater than could be offset by any conceivable amount of foreign assistance or the use of other instruments.

As you know, the Departments of Treasury and Commerce are generally left entirely out of the National Security Council process, with the consequence that there is no institutional or procedural way for an adequate assessment to be made of the role that economic instruments can play in national security strategy. This needs mending.

Turning to budgets and strategy, we are sometimes told that force structure, budgets, and deployment decisions in fact drive strategy, rather than vice versa. Of course, the real answer is that each should be determined in an interactive, iterative process, with constant feedback.

We cannot afford to sacrifice defense on the alter of a balanced budget. Neither can we undermine defense by undermining our economy.

We have gotten ourselves into a budgetary mess by over-spending on long lead-time procurement accounts during the early years of the Reagan administration. Now we must work ourselves out of that while preserving our readiness and the force structure needed to accomplish the strategy at hand. To do so will require deferring fresh starts for a time, lest we be unable to execute our strategy, currently or prospectively.

We find ourselves, as Larry Korb told this committee, in a situation in which we have the worst of both worlds, and there is an absolute certainty that unless something like a 6 or 6.5 percent of the GNP goes to the defense budget, we cannot work ourselves out of this mess.

Although the tie between strategy and forces and budgets is a very loose one, there is no way that we can satisfactorily work our way through this dilemma if we do not have budgets which are at least stable and, if possible, include the 2 percent or 3 percent real spending growth.

Let me close by making an observation or two about the process of making national security strategy.

It is not a rational or a linear process, which is implied by the President's strategy document and the usual textbook treatment. Military programs, security assistance allocations, the deployment of forces, for example, cannot be logically derived from analyses of interests, objectives, threats, and strategies.

I would recommend the very thoughtful analysis of this process which the Hon. Les Aspin provided on March 17, 18, and 19 in the other body. I think the reforms in the process that he suggests are laudable. But, again, they are predicated on the view that it is a rational and linear process. And, although those kinds of initiatives that he suggests ought to be pursued, they miss the central point that in a large, complex democracy, such as our own, with separation of governmental powers as a central part, policymaking is not and cannot be a purely deductive and rational process.

Deductive logic is inevitably overwhelmed many places along the road by politics. Induction and synthesis are as important in the process as deduction and analysis.

We can improve the machinery. I would strongly recommend that the concept that Dr. Brzezinski advanced before this committee, of a National Security Council Planning Staff, be adopted. That staff would have to be fenced off within the NSC, as it was in the days of the Eisenhower administration in order for it to avoid being swooped up in current operations.

As I suggested earlier, the addition of the Departments of Treasury and Commerce in the national security policymaking process is another valuable procedural or organizational step. But the prinicipal hope for improving the national security policymaking process lies in the direction of building a better informed public and policymaking community, a broader consensus across the Nation on interests, objectives, and risks, a better trained and more experienced group of experts involved more intimately in the process, and a broader, deeper, and more widely shared dialogue among all the participants in the process on Capitol Hill as well as in the executive branch.

Because these hearings can contribute importantly to all these ends, I particularly welcome them and I appreciate the opportunity I have been afforded to participate in them.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Jordan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMOS A. JORDAN

I appreciate your invitation to me to testify on U.S. national security strategy and in particular to comment on the President's first National Security Strategy Report. I am also happy to respond to your request that I comment on the central themes which have emerged from previous testimony and relate those to the budget formulation process in which you are engaged. Before beginning, permit me to note that the views that I express today are entirely my own. The institution which I head, namely, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, does not take positions—members of the Center set forth their own personal views, as you have undoubtedly noted from the testimonies of Dr. Schlesinger and Dr. Brzezinski, both Counselors in residence at CSIS.

I would suggest a simple definition of strategy as a starting point for today's discussion: "Strategy is 'how' a nation develops and applies all its resources to accomplish its objectives." "National security strategy" should be distinguished from "military strategy," because the former is a much broader concept than the latter, encompassing the full range of foreign policy as well as defense objectives and all the instruments of national power available for pursuing those objectives.

Today, I will talk primarily about the subject of national security strategy, because our country has given too little attention to nurturing and using non-military instruments in advancing its interests. Moreover, there has not been a sufficiently widespread appreciation of the relationships among the various instruments and the importance of building structures and processes within the government to ensure that those relationships are capitalized upon. I will plan to say a few things about military strategy, particularly as it relates to the defense budget problems before you.

Turning to the President's national security strategy document, the concept of an unclassified but official national strategy statement would—I suspect—strike almost anybody other than an American as unwise. Since strategy must rest upon a realistic appreciation of the international environment and its threats and opportunities, because of resource constraints must establish priorities among objectives (necessitated by inevitable resource constraints), and must set forth an objective assessment of the problems, risks, and trade-offs involved in applying resources, the publication of such a strategy would be of incalculable value to an adversary. Of course, the document can deal in such a level of generality that the adversary will not be informed by it, but then—by the same token—neither will you, nor the public.

Inevitably, then, the President's National Security Strategy Statement of January 1987 is so general that it does not add much to our knowledge about strategy. It is a useful document in bringing together familiar statements of American foreign and defense policies. It also sets out, in a fairly comprehensive way, U.S. interest and objectives and, in a far less thorough way, some of the threats to those interests and objectives. What it does not do, and I suggest should not do in unclassified form, is to lay out the priorities and choices which are the essence of strategy. I recommend that the committee request a classified supplement to the 1988 document that will go beyond declaratory policies to the actual strategy so that you can assess the wisdom, the realism and financial feasibility of what the President declares to be our policy.

The Presidential strategy document's statement of goals, objectives and threats is largely unexceptionable. I am surprised, though, that in the list of "major objectives in support of U.S. interests" there is no mention of the Persian Gulf area. Although one can infer from statements elsewhere in the document that the Persian Gulf has considerable priority in American strategy, that point is not made explicit. I agree with the presentations before you of Dr. Brzezinski and others that the Gulf and Southwest Asia comprise a "central strategic front," along with Western Europe and the Northeast Asia.

While noting shortfalls in the document's list of "major objectives", I would observe that "checking nuclear proliferation" and "improving allied burden sharing" should also be major objectives—thus expanding the White House list of such objectives to 27. I oppose inflation, but this 12% growth in objectives does not seem inappropriate for the first year of an enterprise, although I recognize such inflation cannot be long tolerated.

Turning to the "principal threats" part of the President's strategy document, I agree that the Soviet Union is the major continuing challenge, but I believe that far too little attention is given to other threats. Indeed, most challenges to America's interests—many of them serious ones—over the next decade or so will be non-Soviet ~~ones.~~ Economic challenges, in particular, are given far too little attention.

In the document's discussion of the elements of national power there is only brief attention to political and informational elements. Inasmuch as this is an arena in which the United States has a strong comparative advantage, it needs far more attention. There is no mention of such instruments as VOA, RFE, or Radio Liberty, and little recognition of cultural exchanges or other instruments in the war of ideas. Indeed, apart from foreign assistance, which rightly receives considerable attention, non-military resources of all kinds are given scant notice.

In sum, the concept which generated the President's strategy document is a valid one: the Administration should periodically rethink its national security goals, strategies and resources and present its conclusions to the Congress and the public. The first product you have been given is useful but far too sketchy, general and vague to help in your own deliberations about strategies and resources. You need more specifics throughout and a classified annex providing greater detail on priorities and choices.

I would like, next, to table some general thoughts about strategy. Strategy must proceed in the first instance from interests and objectives. For our purposes this morning, I suggest accepting the generalized national interests set forth in the President's document, i.e., the familiar ones about physical survival with values and institutions intact, a healthy domestic and international economy, vigorous Alliance, etc. The major objectives that support those interests as set forth by the President are also mostly adequate—although I would expand his list modestly as I suggested earlier and lace in more specifics throughout. Since we may not be able to afford the means to pursue all of these aims, should we curtail our ambitions and try to disengage, selectively, from some of our commitments so we will have enough resources to meet our remaining needs? Or should we trim resource inputs somewhat across the board and accept higher risks broadly? Can we shift more of the burdens to friends and allies?

Before tackling such hard questions let's briefly examine the environment in which such choices must be made. Strategy must deal with the world as it is, not as we wish it were. Four features of today's international climate critically condition our strategic choices: first, the American public's unreadiness to shoulder the responsibilities carried in the past, second, pervasive global instability, third, a marked and accelerating diffusion of power, and fourth, continuing, intense Soviet-American rivalry.

Whether from sheer weariness, continuing fallout from the Vietnam War, attrition of the so-called "foreign policy establishment," or whatever, Americans are increasingly skeptical and unpredictable about external commitments. As the President's strategy document points out, the vast bulk of Americans take no interest in foreign affairs and a bare, eroding majority believes this country should even play an active part in world affairs. The assumptions, convictions, and consensus which once underwrote confident, reliable American behavior in the world have eroded and become progressively less persuasive to our friends, our adversaries, and ourselves.

A massive conclusion leaps out from this unhappy fact, namely, that a constituency for responsible international engagement must be built in the public and the government if we are to have a coherent, credible, and consistent national security strategy. Congress, and particularly this committee must help build this constituency.

Instability—often violent, and unpredictable—results from the breakdown of empires and the concurrent fragmentation of traditional societies; from widening economic disparities aggravated by rising expectations and the communications explosion; and from a plethora of ethnic, racial, religious, and ideological rivalries. Of course, not all instability requires a U.S. response. Some outbreaks of instability are intrinsically damaging, or could lead to wider dangers; but others are relatively benign and ought to be tolerated or even encouraged; still others are essentially irrelevant to American interests and should be ignored.

By contrast, we cannot ignore any dimension of the growing diffusion of power. Our era has witnessed unprecedented changes in the structure and distribution of the military and economic instruments of influence. In the military arena, power has shifted centrifugally to both ends of the conflict spectrum. At the high end, as my colleague Dr. Schlesinger has observed before this committee, nuclear weapons have revolutionized strategy. The fact that the U.S.S.R. can dump the equivalent of 6 million tons of TNT on the U.S. in a brief period, killing perhaps 150 million Americans means, in his words, that "The old rules do not work . . . in the relationship between the nuclear superpowers." I would observe, moreover, that there are at least four or five other nuclear powers now, and perhaps that many more will join the club in the next decade.

At the other low intensity conflict end of the spectrum, diffusion of power has been most pronounced. Dozens of weak nations and even weaker non-state actors now regularly have recourse to terrorism, armed subversion, raids, and other forms of limited violence. The combination of interdependence and fragile infrastructures, particularly in developed states, makes this traditional form of warfare by the weak especially dangerous in our era and difficult to combat. Here, too, traditional strategic maxims need rethinking.

The diffusion of economic power has been less dramatic, but no less important, in affecting national security. The post-World War II growth of economies competitive with our own has coincided with the growth of interdependence, energy shortages, and structural shifts away from primary production and heavy industry. These changes vastly complicate a nation's harmonization of its defense and economic policies. We have paid far too little attention to the opportunities and challenges presented by this dimension of power diffusion.

Finally, any assessment of strategy must focus on the fact that a militarily powerful Soviet Union will contest American values, interests, and policies around the globe for a very long time to come. I cannot emphasize too strongly the words of my colleague, Dr. Brzezinski, before this committee, "The American-Soviet rivalry is a long-term contest, . . . a classic historical conflict between two major powers and is not susceptible to a broad and quick resolution, either through a victory by one side or through a grand act of reconciliation." An immediate strategic conclusion leaps from that assessment: we must prepare ourselves and gear our policies and programs for the long-haul.

Despite the hopes of many, we cannot expect the Soviet Union's well-advertised internal problems to paralyze it in external affairs, though they may slow the growth of its challenge somewhat. Communist ideology, Russian history, and the Soviet view of the world all forecast a continuing, vigorous, dangerous contest that we cannot shirk. Of course, at the same time, we must not lock ourselves into a possibly self-fufilling prophecy of unremitting hostility leading to war. We need to leave the way open to, indeed find means to encourage, a more cooperative relationship across the board, if the Soviets genuinely so desire.

Before turning to some specific strategic concepts, I would like to stress a general point I touched on earlier, namely, that strategy is about choices—choices based on priorities and entailing risks. For a nation leading a worldwide coalition and with global interests those choices cannot be directed to a single immutable end or even set of ends. Our problem is not to draw a road map of how to get from (A) to (B) or (C). Our problem is one of continual choice as the terrain which a map would represent constantly changes. We have to develop a template of preferences and priorities, of options and restrictions which we can choose as our situation changes.

All choices will entail risks, for even if we cut back commitments somewhat they are almost certain to outrun resources. This inevitable "strategy-resources gap" can in part be covered—as Dr. Schlesinger indicated to you—by American prestige. But, as he further noted, prestige can evaporate rapidly and a withdrawal from commitments can so reduce a nation's prestige that the gap actually increases, rather than shrinks.

Let me turn now to a number of specific strategic propositions:

First, preserving the strategic nuclear balance between ourselves and the U.S.S.R. is essential to underpin all our strategies. Because of its centrality, minimal risk here should be the rule. Thus, despite the expense, the strategic triad of land-based ICBM's, SLBM's and bombers should be maintained, along with a survivable strategic C3 system. Modernization of existing systems will be required periodically, but all do not need it simultaneously.

Second, a vigorous R&D program aimed at developing strategic defenses for our offensive forces should be pursued, in order to test the feasibility of the concepts involved, to guard against Soviet ABM break out, and to enable us to judge various offensive-defensive mixes' effectiveness, stability and costs. This R&D can and should be accomplished within the restrictive interpretation of the ABM treaty and without pressure to rush to early deployment decisions.

Third, deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms (and conventional and chemical arms as well) should be sought, particularly reductions in large MIRVed ICBM's which threaten crisis stability. Since nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented and cheating at the margin in nuclear matters could prove profoundly destabilizing, reductions should not be to total elimination. Other stabilizing arms control measures should be pursued as well, such as more vigorous use of the SCC to challenge confidence-eroding Soviet tactics (for instance, in telemetry encryption), creation of nuclear risk reduction centers as envisaged at the Geneva Summit, and adoption of various other confidence building measures as set forth at the Helsinki and Stockholm conferences. Arms control should not be treated as a substitute for defense measures, but as an intrinsic element of national security strategy. In particular arms control should not be pursued in one isolated realm—nuclear, for example—in ways that will destabilize other realms—such as the conventional one.

Fourth, greater emphasis should be placed in American strategy on long term attrition of the base from which the Soviet Union builds and projects its military power. In the first instance, this calls for a re-invigorated information program, aimed at the Soviet Union, primarily at its non-Russian peoples, that will convey the truth within its own borders about what is going on inside those borders and also about Soviet relations with the rest of the world. Voice of America and Radio Liberty are the primary but not the only instruments of such a strategy and should be provided by the Congress with the modest increment in resources required to do a more effective job.

Similarly, more intensively, efforts should be made to tell the truth within the Soviet empire, especially in Eastern Europe. Radio Free Europe and, again, Voice of America should receive the modest resources needed as an urgent priority. Economic and political initiatives, applied with selectivity toward Eastern European countries, should accompany these renewed information and public diplomacy programs in order to loosen Soviet bonds over their satellites. I would also favor the most vigorous people-to-people, cultural and scientific exchange programs and other means of letting the Russian and satellite peoples find out the truth about the West—as long as these are on the basis of strict reciprocity. We have nothing to fear from encouraging Americans and our free world friends to get to know the Soviet Union and its empire first hand.

Beyond loosening the Soviet Union's clutch on its satellites, our various economic instruments are not suitable for use in pursuit of a strategy of weakening the Soviet base. (I reject economic warfare against the U.S.S.R. as non-productive and unnecessarily provocative.) But we should take care that our economic policies do not unwittingly strengthen that base. Thus, although Soviet economic intercourse with the West could lead, long term, to amelioration of East-West tensions, we should continue to try to ensure that trade between the U.S.S.R. and the West is exclusively in non-strategic items and that it is not subsidized in any fashion.

Fifth, if we are not to drift into becoming a beleagured fortress, the United States must deny the U.S.S.R. domination of the rimlands of Eurasia, in particular of the three "central strategic fronts" listed by Dr. Brzezinski, i.e., Western Europe, Southwest Asia (including the Gulf) and Northeast Asia. To do so we should continue to pursue a coalition-based strategy.

Insofar as feasible, this dimension of strategy should utilize prepositioning and flexible basing; but, apart from Western Europe, it need not entail the presence of large U.S. ground forces. In Western Europe marginal reductions in number of U.S. troops could and should be made and some of the American heavy units should be converted to light ones. However, a force reduction of the order of ⅓, as recommended to you by Dr. Brzezinski and others cannot be achieved without sacrificing the forward defense of the Federal Republic, which is politically essential at this time. Moreover, as Dr. Record told this committee, substantial U.S. withdrawals could undermine the political cohesion and consensus which is essential for deterrence in Europe.

Furthermore, with regard to Western Europe, the retention of a small number (say 100) of theater nuclear weapons there is important to continuation of the flexible response strategy, which has kept the peace for a quarter of a century and remains valid. Though theoretically possible, it is totally impractical in the foreseeable future for the West to build a sufficient conventional force to provide assured theater deterrence in the absence of a credible threat of nuclear escalation.

In North East Asia, improvements on the Korean peninsula, increased Japanese defense commitments, and continuation of Soviet-PRC rivalry also suggest that some slenderizing of forward deployed forces is possible. But there, too, balances are delicate and political sensitivities high, so that only marginal changes can be made without a wholesale revision of the force projection strategy which I believe essential.

In Southwest Asia, too, we should pursue a policy of denying Soviet hegemony, though our instruments—in the first instance—should be weighted heavily toward diplomacy and economic and military assistance. Militarily, we should strengthen the reserves earmarked for contingencies in the region and improve air and sealift for getting there "firstest with the mostest."

Sixth, with regard to the Third World generally, American strategy should be to assist friendly regimes wherever they have the support of their own people. If they confront insurgencies, we should return to the "Nixon Doctrine," augmented by heavy emphasis on a more constructive use there of our economic strength. As you will recall, the Nixon or "Guam Doctrine" called for self-help, primary responsibility for regional stability to be shared by neighbors, and "residual U.S. responsibility," meaning provision of military assistance as needed. Overwhelmingly though, in most LDC's the need will primarily be for economic aid, investment and trade opportunity.

As for unfriendly, destabilizing Third World regimes, our effort should be directed toward limited help for their neighbors and domestic insurgents, if those insurgents have a genuine domestic base. Not only do I reject direct American intervention with U.S. troops in such circumstances, but also—in most cases—other U.S military responses in those areas, such as blockades, nearby troop exercises, or naval shows of force; except in special cases, these sorts of actions are wasteful and counterproductive. Gunboat diplomacy, the kind of hollow threats which are still the favored approach of many to Third World problems, does not work if the targeted people refuse to be cowed—which is increasingly the case.

Rather than calling on the Navy for carrier demonstrations or battleships to shell suspected terrorist positions, we should lean much earlier and more heavily in Third World areas on our economic instruments. In this context, I note that foreign assistance, which takes only about 2% of our annual federal budget, is consistently starved by the Congress, year in and year out. We are now in a period of particularly harsh cuts, yet we have probably received more benefit per dollar from foreign assistance over the years than from any other international or defense program we have. Of course, mistakes have been made, some of them at the Congress' insistence, such as selling rather than granting aid to nations which desperately needed it but could not afford to pay for it on commercial terms. Three years ago the Carlucci commission set forth a number of reforms and policy initiatives to strengthen our foreign assistance programs which I recommend as even more valid today.

In the wake of the Iranian arms sales fiasco there is, of course, temptation to legislate further constraints on the provision of foreign assistance. The Tower Commission concluded that the Iranian arms mess did not prove that the NSC system was faulty; rather, the fiasco occurred because the system was by-passed. Similarly, that mess does not indicate the need for fresh amendments to the Arms Control Export Act, for the Administration's covert arms transfers were conducted outside the existing system. The Commander-in-Chief needs more, not less, flexibility in the use of foreign assistance which is clearly a defense instrument that should be readily available to pursue national security strategy. I would hope this committee would join hands with the Foreign Relations Committee to ward off efforts to weaken—indeed, would help to strengthen—this key tool.

Of equal import, in some cases even greater import than foreign assistance, is the instrument of American trade and investment policies. As the world's largest market and, quite incredibly, also the world's largest debtor, the United States has tremendous economic and political leverage throughout the world. If the U.S. closes off a part of its market to a Third World country, for instance, or pinches its investments there, the consequences for that nation's economic and political health are likely to be far greater than could be offset by any amounts of foreign assistance or help through other American instruments. Yet, consideration of our economic policies are often taken with little regard for these kinds of national security consequences. As you know, the Departments of Treasury and Commerce are not part of the NSC system and the secretaries and their assistants from those departments are generally left out of the whole National Security Council process—with the consequence that there is often an inadequate assessment made of the role that economic instruments can play and how they can reinforce or even substitute in some cases for the military instrument.

The kind of overall strategy of vigorous, global engagement that I have been setting forth will, of course, cost considerable resources. I do not believe it will require more than a wisely spent 6 to 6.5%, probably closer to 6%, of our GNP—surely an affordable amount. Because of past sins by both Administration and Congress, we now confront a defense budget mess from which even somewhat larger amounts could not rescue us immediately; it will take a few years time to work out of the problem. With the large bow wave of procurement now hitting us, outlays will rise, even though budget authority is squeezed severely. In such circumstances the old temptation to preserve forces and modernization at the expense of readiness will be strong; for both deterrence and defense reasons it must be resisted. Some modernization of even the strategic triad can be postponed or foregone. Hard choices about deferring even sexy new starts—the carriers and stealth bombers, for instance—must now be made.

Above all, we must gear our national thinking—among the public, the Administration and Congress—to the long haul, with the kind of stable strategy and funded programs needed to meet the long run challenges that confront us. Facing an invigorated U.S.S.R. that has emerged from its leadership transition doldrums, we cannot afford the on-again, off-again defense approaches that have marked the last two decades. Remembering the Schlesinger adage cited earlier, we cannot cut our commitments to reduce the risks in this dangerous era. Rationally allocating means (drawing in the process on the Goldwater-Nichols and Packard reforms) should ensure that spending of 6–6.5% of GNP does not increase the risks inherent in our policies. If some minor additional risk must be run temporarily while we work out of the budget mess, that is preferable to unravelling our objectives and commitments.

Turning now to process, the making of long-run national security strategy is hardly the rational and linear process which is implied by the President's strategy document and the usual textbook treatment. Military programs, security assistance allocations, trade policies, or the deployment of forces, for example, are not logically derived from analyses of interests, objectives, threats, strategies, etc.—though, of course, they theoretically could be.

In the other body, the Honorable Les Aspin recently (March 17, 18, 19) addressed the subject of formulating national security policies. He pointed out that national security objectives and the means to achieve them become divorced in our decision processes so that strategy/forces mismatches are inevitable. He suggests a series of reforms in the policy-making process, including building in feedback, involving experts from the start, and insisting on detailed quantitative analyses of force balances, mixes and costs in an iterative process in which the President would be involved from the start. All of these are laudable suggestions which should be pursued, but they miss one central point, namely, that in a large complex democracy such as our own, with a separation of governmental powers, policy-making is not and cannot be a purely rational process. Deductive logic, from ends to means, is inevitably overwhelmed at many places along the route by politics. Induction and synthesis in these cases are as important as deduction and analysis.

Procedural reforms can certainly help both the deductive and inductive processes. In addition to the reforms I have already indicated and measures which I hope the Congress will take under your goading to mend its ways, I would endorse one further reform, namely, Brzezinski's idea of a NSC planning staff. I would caution, however, that it needs to be fenced off from the day-to-day work of the rest of the NSC staff, as President Eisenhower did—otherwise it will inevitably get swept up in the flow of daily business as comparable efforts in the Departments of State and Defense invariably have.

The Aspin recommendations and some of the improvements I have suggested can provide helpful, reasonably short term fixes. The principal long term hope for improving the national security policy-making process, however, lies in the direction of building a better informed public and policy-making community, generating a broader consensus on national interests and objectives and the associated threats and risks, developing better trained and experienced experts who will be involved more intimately in the process, and stimulating a broader, deeper and more widely shared dialogue among all the participants in the process. Because these hearings can contribute to all these ends, I particularly welcome them and appreciate the opportunity you have afforded me to participate in them.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Dr. Jordan, thank you very much. I have been interested in your testimony. Many of us have been very much concerned for a long time, about the lack of coordination between this Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, which have such important dual roles in so many areas. There is at least an apparent lack of coordination and understanding with where we are going and how we are going to get there. My colleague, Senator Glenn, has expressed this very well.

So I think you have really broadened our view this morning with bringing in other factors that have to be considered when we make this policy.

Thank you for your statement.

We will now go to Mr. Steinbruner.

Welcome, Mr. Steinbruner. We are very glad to have you here this morning.

STATEMENT OF JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Mr. STEINBRUNER. Thank you, Senator.

I have prepared a statement for the record, which I will submit.

Senator EXON. It will be accepted, without objection.

Mr. STEINBRUNER. Thank you.

As usual, it makes clear that I am speaking as an individual, which is, I am sure, true of everyone who comes before you.

I have great respect for both the importance and the difficulty of what is being attempted both in the statement and in the purposes of the committee. Formulating a national strategy is obviously important for coordinating our Government in a complicated world. It is obviously very difficult in a large democracy with a great diversity of opinion.

I have considerable respect for the first official attempt in the sense that I believe it projects an appropriately broad conception of security, including economic performance, political process, technical impulse, individual rights, and many other things that contribute to our effect on the world. It does not simply discuss the traditional considerations, and important ones, of military power. The President's strategy statement sets the right scope of aspiration and provides a very good start in that sense.

With that said, however, I do want to criticize the document, for the purpose of encouraging improvement. It should not surprise us that the first official attempt is not everything that we want it to be, and I do not think this one is. In its current state, I do not think the strategy statement can command the very broad and substantial consensus required to formulate a national strategy. It may be a good step in that direction, but it is not entirely there.

Nor do I think it is entirely consistent with what I will call the elemental realities of strategic interaction, and that is, indeed, a serious flaw. However we might choose to formulate our consensus, it must be consistent with the realities of the world in which we live. If it is not, we are likely to experience a great deal of grief.

I therefore want to focus on those areas where I think the strategy statement does have some problems and does need to be evolved in a constructive way as it goes through future revisions.

First is a very general point, perhaps subtle but nonetheless important. It reflects attitude. I think in the strategy statement there are too many partisan passages. This is not the place for conducting political campaigns or bringing in the attitudes and rhetoric associated with that. It is the place in which the overall position of the country has to be formulated and marshalled. There are partisan passage in this document or ones that read in that way. Though they are lightly done, they nonetheless reflect the fact that the drafters did not fully grasp the necessity of achieving national consensus, a consensus that goes well beyond the demands of electoral majority.

Second, I would say, again in very general terms, that the strategy statement needs to take a more balanced conception of security and exercise more balanced judgments about what determines the role of the United States in the world. Although the dimensions of our power and effect on the world are all described, the relative weights given to them still focus disproportionately on the contribution of military power to overall security.

Curiously, although the President expresses a great deal of pride in our economy and political system, he seems to underestimate the role that both play in our influence on the world and on world events. He emphasizes rather more than is warranted, the contribution of military power. Military power is obviously a necessity for security, but it stands in the background, and I do not believe in the modern world it is, in fact, the cutting instrument.

We, as a country, and the President, in particular, need to go through some further elaboration of our thoughts in order to appreciate that.

The President is also prone to underestimating the military capacity of the United States and our allies relative to the primary opposing alliance. There is no safety in that. It does not do us any good to underestimate our power. We are likely to make errors in judgment and security if we get it wrong in either way, either by underestimating or by overestimating.

In particular, I do think that the strategy statement misestimates the type of security problem posed by the Soviet Union. It exaggerates both the capacity and the inclination of the Soviet Union to engage in territorial expansion or to attempt to influence events through the direct application of military power. These are problems to be sure, but the strategy statement focuses on these problems to an unwarranted degree.

It underestimates the Soviet Union's own sense of threat, and that is a serious problem. The Soviet Union is far more dangerous when threatened at home than it is when it is attempting to aggrandize in the world at large. We ought to recognize that.

There is little appreciation in the strategy statement of the implications U.S. nuclear forces have for the Soviet military infrastructure. We are evolving a very impressive threat against Soviet forces, and Soviet leaders are very concerned about it, in particular about the possibility of preemptive attack. We have not recognized this fear in this strategy statement or in our national discussion generally, and that is not prudent on our part.

To the professional community it is increasingly clear that maintaining a powerful deterrent effect is only one of the components necessary to prevent war. In a world in which there are large and capable military establishments, the interaction between those establishments, does need effective and safe control. That requirement goes far beyond the issue of maintaining a deterrent effect.

This interaction is complicated by the mutual capacity for preemptive attack, and if we are not even aware of that fact, we are not in very good shape for managing those very complicated interactions.

That is probably the single most fundamental problem in this current strategy statement—not even to reflect awareness of the complexity and the difficulties of managing these very, large-scale operations that we have created in the last 30 years.

These issues are general and admittedly debatable, and we probably will continue to debate them for a great deal of time. But I think they do connect to the SDI question, and on that issue there is truly a flaw in the document which will have to be resolved—fairly quickly, as a matter of fact.

I believe that the President's conception of SDI, as presented in his strategy statement, misconstrues the underlying consensus in this country and certainly misconstrues the external, strategic realities in which we are operating, for that reason, it is destined to be adjusted, whether gracefully or not.

The conception of a transition from a security regime based upon mutual deterrence to one based on mutual defense is attractive in principle to many Americans, including this one. But the essence of the idea put forward by the President imagines that this transition is to be forced by the independent development of defensive weapons technology that we can develop the technology which will force the world, and in particular the Soviet Union, to go through the transition that we find attractive. The strategy statement, tacitly acknowledges that the immediate technical prospects for forcing this transition are not very good, and it speaks of an interim period during which partially effective defensive technology will be used to enhance deterrence.

The idea that the United States can force a transition through partially effective defenses, is truly fundamentally flawed and is destined to use a great deal of problems unless it is adjusted.

There is no meaningful technical prospect that defensive technology can dominate offensive technology. They both use the same technical base, and a defense conceding the first move to the offense is not likely to be reliably dominant now or any time in the future. We do not need to do more research to understand that point.

Partially effective defenses which are not reliably dominant do not enhance deterrence as much as they enhance the incentive for preemption. The enhancement of deterrence has to do with increasing the ability to retaliate after attack, and the effect of partially effective defenses introduced on the margin is to enhance the underlying incentive of both sides to initiate attack if it comes to that. For that reason, partially effective defenses profoundly destabilizing, even within the logic of mutual deterrence and certainly within the expanded logic of the interaction of very large-scale military operations.

The Soviet Union does appear to grasp these facts and is inspired to do so by interpreting our projected deployment of partial defenses in the context of a very large-scale offensive modernization program that does, indeed, materially improve our ability to conduct a preemptive attack. That is the context they see for SDI. In their view it is not defense at all; it is an elaboration of preemptive offense.

The Soviets are motivated ultimately to engage in a material reaction against U.S. assets in space if we push SDI too far. Such a reaction is physically possible, it is strongly motivated, and ultimately would be decisive. The United States is destined to go down this track, and the quicker we realize it, the better off we will be.

Let me also suggest that the strategy statement does not appreciate the appropriate role that strategic arms control has and must play in our overall security. Given what I have just said, I think it is important that we come to realize that strategic force reductions, as now being considered, are, in fact, both feasible and necessary improvements to our security in the future. The principal thing that force reductions can accomplish is to diminish some of the preemptive attack capability that does exist in both forces at the moment. Those reductions cannot be accomplished without simultaneous restrictions on defense. It is inevitable that both offense and defense will have to be regulated at the same time, and the strategy statement does not acknowledge that fact.

The defensive restrictions which the strategy statement resists are necessary, I believe, to preserve the true element of national consensus that does support the SDI program. I think everyone agrees that we must, indeed, conduct a robust research program to assess the technical prospects of defensive technology. We do not want to engage solely in theory about this. We want empirical information to make as precise an assessment as possible. We will not be able to conduct empirical experiments outside the context of international acceptance. They simply would be too divisive and too subject to disruption by the opponent. We do need a framework of agreement. The ABM Treaty, rather than threatening to kill SDI, in fact, is the only context in which it can legitimately proceed.

Moreover, the reaffirmation of that treaty in the framework of arms control is extremely important to prevent the serious degradation of our security that might occur if both sides begin to develop elaborate antisatellite capabilities. We have assets in space that are extremely critical for the management of our forces. They are extremely vulnerable to the interaction of antisatellite technology that could be triggered by SDI. If we do not prevent that, we are going to deteriorate our security in a major way, and ultimately the country is not going to like that.

In sum, then, an adjustment in the conception of SDI that we are almost certain to have to go through. We had better anticipate it and go through it before we begin to experience the very real threat to our security that could emerge.

Finally, let me note that I do not think the strategy statement appreciates at all the importance of arms control arrangements, or the entire regime of arms control for maintaining the coherence of our alliances even though it does appreciate the importance of the alliances for maintaining the coherence of our worldwide conventional force posture.

Let me end my comments since they have been fairly critical with a point of praise and a point of warning.

I think the document does do very good service in emphasizing the importance of conventional forces, and I would side with those who urge this committee and the country as a whole to realize the strategic significance of our deployment of balancing conventional capability at the principal points of engagement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We are in Europe not simply as a favor to our allies but for the fundamental security of the United States. We ought to recognize this. I do not think it is wise at the moment to engage in reduction of forces there. And although it is appropriate to ask for burden-sharing, I think we should ask in full recognition that we are engaged in Europe for our own benefit as well as for that of our allies, and would want to be there even if they did not want us to be there. And we ought to be thankful that they do.

This does not mean that we should not ask our allies for a commensurate contribution. But we should keep our eye on the fundamental security interests at stake.

I would agree with those who have pointed out that in the assessing and identifying of the relative importance of a robust conventional force posture in the overall security situation, we must face the necessity of exercising greater discipline in the allocation of our defense budget.

We have had a surge in defense spending that will guarantee an average 3 percent real increase in defense spending from 1980 through the end of the century if all we do is maintain the budget with zero real growth.

If the budget is held at zero real growth from this point on to the end of the century, it will average a 3 percent real increase over that period of time, simply as a result of the surge that has already been put into it.

Chairman Nunn [presiding]. Going back to when? Where do you get that average?

Mr. Steinbruner. The calculation takes projected inflation rates and traces out the budget. If we choose to give a zero real increase for every year from now till the end of the century, then dating back to 1981 and averaging out the increases will produce an average of 3 percent real increase per year, surprisingly enough.

Chairman Nunn. Even in budget authority? You are not talking about outlays now, are you?

Mr. Steinbruner. No. I am talking about budget authority.

That is just a way of describing the fact that we have gone through a sudden surge, and it was not allocated over time or within budget categories all that carefully.

One of the lessons that I think we will now have to learn is to do that better. And, in learning that lesson, I think it is obvious to most people that the drift of consensus in the United States is to allocate away from the strategic forces, which need more restraint, and toward the conventional forces, which do need somewhat more development.

Finally, in closing, let me comment very briefly, as a bit of warning, on the issue of low intensity conflict.

Surely we should have learned from our history and current experience in this regard that we get ourselves into the greatest trouble in involvement in low intensity conflict situations when we operate without national consensus, and we ought to be extremely careful when we are handling these situations whether we have it or whether we do not have it.

In the case of the Philippines, I think we probably do. I think there is a national consensus in favor of support of the Aquino government, and we are in reasonably good shape to try, at least, to evolve mechanisms of policy that will encourage a constructive outcome for the violence that obviously does go on in the Philippines.

In the case of Nicaragua, it should be obvious to all of us that we are in fundamental disagreement about our purposes, we as a country, and that there is nobody who can dominate or who can impose a particular strategic perspective at the moment. This is serious trouble.

We are likely to make a hash of that situation until we get clear about our purposes, and we are fundamentally at odds about that. This is a serious warning.

So, in general, in the area of low intensity conflict, I would say that definition of purpose, political purpose, is the first and most demanding element before we can begin to consider the balance of various means that we ought to apply.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Steinbruner follows:]

Prepared Statement by John D. Steinbruner, the Brookings Institution

I very much appreciate the opportunity to comment on the First National Security Strategy report. As I am sure you understand, I can only offer personal judgments that do not implicate the Brookings Institution or any other group of people. I will endeavor, however, to give you judgments that do reflect major lines of opinion in the professional community.

Let me begin by acknowledging both the importance and the difficulty of formulating a national security strategy for the United States. It is important because strategic wisdom and coherence of action are obvious necessities in the contemporary world. It is difficult because accepted wisdom and effective coherence are very demanding products in a large democracy. We have in the United States a rich diversity of opinion on the subject of security and we have a form of government and a political process that prevents tyranny by any narrow segment of that opinion. We are all united, I hope and believe, in an unalterable commitment to the principles of democracy but we must therefore realize that they make the authoritative formulation of a national security strategy very difficult to accomplish.

Impressive as they are, the powers of the presidency do not by themselves confer the capacity to formulate a statement of strategy that will have enduring practical effect. If it is to organize the actions of our deliberately divided government and our competitive political process, such a statement must extend well beyond the president's personal vision. It must reflect or inspire a broad consensus of opinion and must also fit the evolving realities of international life.

These are demanding requirements. There is no guarantee that prevailing domestic opinion is consistent with international realities, and indeed it is usually not. Perfect consistency of this sort is rarely a feature of the human condition. Hard choices necessitated by conflicts among desirable objectives are regularly denied in popular opinion up to the point where harsh experiences makes them unmistakable. Similarly. intense and narrowly focused opinions often override broader, more judicious judgments in our political process until some corrective lesson is imposed.

Given these strong tendencies, it is not realistic to expect a completely successful formulation of national strategy in the first official attempt, and we have not in fact been presented with such a document. Though there is much that is laudable in the president's statement, there are also some obvious misjudgments of major and minor proportions. I will dwell on these misjudgments not out of political prejudice or meanness of spirit, but simply because the process of correction is the principal means of achieving a better result.

PARTISAN ATTITUDE

First, there is an issue of style that appears simple on the surface though it does have deeper substantive resonance. A statement of national strategy is not the place for partisan political arguments, and the president's document is diminished in its weight by the fact that it is laced with passages of that sort. There are several references to accomplishments of the past six years and deprecating comments about everything that went before. An authoritative statement of national strategy must be valid for the United States as a whole and must therefore transcend both the rhetoric and the partisan attitude characteristic of political campaigns. The consensus on which an enduring strategy must rest is more demanding than an electoral majority.

STRATEGIC CONCEPTION

There are also several problems of general conception that should be corrected both by supplement and by revision. Though the initial pages of the document present an appropriately broad definition of the dimensions of security—including economic aspiration and performance, cultural and political dynamics and individual rights—the dominant conception it presents holds security to be a matter of responding to military threat, particularly the threat of an allegedly expansionist Soviet military policy. That is in fact a widely held formulation but one increasingly at odds with evolving circumstances in the world. Territorial expansion and the exercise of influence based on military power are not the primary commitments of most contemporary states, including the Soviet Union, for the very sound reason that such enterprises are too expensive and too dangerous for the benefits that they might bring. Advanced societies are not driven to acquire territory they do not already possess, but rather to defend what they have and to structure international relationships in a manner that enables strong economic performance. The blocking and deterring effect of military power is necessary and important but it is not the cutting edge of security. The net circumstances of security are more affected by economic development, preventative diplomacy, and the forging of constructive opportunity than they are by marginal improvements in our very substantial capacity to respond to threat.

The president's document does not give these emerging realities the weight they ultimately must command and is particularly defective in its appreciation of how they affect the Soviet Union and of the resulting implications for U.S. policy. The Soviet Union is effectively contained and powerfully deterred by the United States security posture but insufficiently reassured that we would not under the pressure of crisis use our power to initiate attack. Though we do not choose to advertise it, we do in fact have a considerable capacity to conduct a preemptive attack against Soviet forces and are improving that capacity significantly in our weapons modernization programs. The prevention of war in the presence of nuclear weapons requires a balance between threat and reassurance, and there is little appreciation of that fact in the president's document.

In general the president has presented an intensely nationalist and rather militaristic conception of security, and for all the pride he appears to have for our economy and culture, he underestimates their relative importance for our standing in the world and our influence on events. The true interests of the United States demand a broader and more internationalist conception of security with military power as the necessary background rather than the primary instrument of policy.

These issues of general conception have long been debated in the United States and it is quite possible that we may never resolve them at a philosophical level.

Even so, we will almost certainly have to achieve a better resolution of two specific instances: the SDI program and the role that strategic arms control plays in an overall security posture.

SDI

The president has advanced a conception in which the development of defensive weapons technology will force the elimination of ballistic missiles and ultimately, it is suggested, of offensive nuclear weapons generally, thereby transforming the entire regime of international security from one based on mutual deterrence to one based on mutual defense. The most distinctive feature of this conception is the means by which the president imagines this transition in security arrangements will be achieved; namely by independent national development of defensive weapons technology. That idea requires that the defensive application of weapons technology be developed to the point that it can defeat any offensive application of the same technology. That ultimately is the meaning of the often repeated criteria that defensive weapons be survivable and cost-effective at the margin. There is no meaningful technical prospect that this requirement can be achieved and in tacit recognition of that fact the president's strategy statement speaks of partially effective defenses enhancing deterrence during the initial phases of the imagined transition to a new security arrangement.

However popular this idea may be in domestic American politics, it is simply not a viable basis for national security policy because it ignores elemental facts of strategic interaction. The same basic technology that a defensive system would use can also be used to defeat its purposes. The probability is vanishingly low that a defensive system design could defeat a sophisticated unrestrained offense if the offense is conceded the first move. For that reason, partially effective defenses enhance the incentive for preemption far more than they do the capacity for retaliation and their deployment would therefore reduce the stability of mutual deterrence rather than strengthen it.

These hard realities will eventually impose themselves and will force a fundamental adjustment in the current statement of national strategy. The only question is whether this adjustment will be accomplished gracefully without the very damaging interaction of weapons deployments that could readily occur. If not the incumbent president, then certainly the United States as a whole will have to acknowledge eventually that the only feasible means for either a partial or a complete transition from mutual deterrence to mutual defense are direct restrictions on offensive weapons deployments. The president's vision of an international security arrangement based on defensive capability might conceivably be accomplished by comprehensive arms control measures. It certainly cannot be accomplished by the unilateral pursuit of weapons technology.

ARMS CONTROL

The serious misjudgment of strategic interactions embodied in the president's conception of the SDI program also distorts his conception of the role that arms control has played and must play in the overall strategy posture of the United States. Rather than killing SDI, as the president claims in his statement, the ABM Treaty and the updated understanding of it projected at the Reykjavik summit provide the only feasible context in which the legitimate purposes of SDI can reasonably be pursued. It is a matter of solid national consensus in the United States that defensive technology be vigorously investigated in order to provide an empirical basis for an assessment of its prospects. The Soviet Union appears to concede the legitimacy of that specific purpose. At the point at which technical assessment becomes dedicated weapons development, however, the American domestic consensus breaks down and Soviet objections become strong enough to motivate material reactions. Though envisaged defensive systems designs could not defeat the offensive countermeasures they would readily inspire, they could be effective enough against current offensive systems—most notably the Soviet SS-18—to force the otherwise avoidable deployment of those countermeasures. An obvious common sense arrangement therefore is to define testing rules allowing full scope for technical assessment but preventing dedicated weapons development. It is technically feasible at the moment to draw such a distinction for the most prominent weapons technologies.

Despite the president's insistence on depicting it as an unacceptable concession to the Soviet Union, such an arrangement is most plausibly seen as a codification of the logical, even inevitable, outcome. Both sides will insist on a rigorous research program including some testing of physical devices. It appears unlikely that the Soviet Union at least would tolerate an advanced weapons development or early deployment effort without direct resistance and it is obvious that direct resistance can be decisive. We are not going to be able to use the environment of space if we have to put the equivalent of tanks and carrier battle groups up there, and as a nation we should be clever enough to realize that in advance.

The single most glaring omission in the president's strategic document is the failure to appreciate the importance for the United States of restricting weapons interactions in space and thereby projecting the assests that are required for warning, strategic assessment, arms control verification, and worldwide communication. That is another error of judgment too important to resist correction indefinitely.

In related matters of arms control, the president's strategic document displays little appreciation of the relationships between restrictions on defensive weapons, offensive force reductions and weapons modernization programs. The major improvement in the current strategic posture that must be pursued is the reduction of existing incentives to embark on a preemptive attack under the pressures of intense crisis. That, far more than any cold-blooded inclination for aggression, looms as the most significant potential cause of an annihilating war. Force reductions reduce the incentives for preemption if they remove the capacity for attacking the opponent's strategic forces, while leaving a capacity to retaliate against the full array of other targets reasonably associated with the idea of deterrence. Force reductions will not be undertaken without simultaneous restraint on offensive weapons modernization and defensive weapons development and deployment simply because the reduced forces would be more vulnerable to preemption and less effective in retaliation without these accompanying restraints.

Similarly, the president's strategic statement underestimates the importance that these related arms control arrangements have for the political coherence of our alliances. The coherence of those alliances is in turn very important for maintaining an acceptable balance of conventional military capability as a supplement to our overall deterrent position.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Lest I appear unrelievedly critical, let me praise the president's strategic statement for its general appreciation of the importance of conventional forces for our overall security posture. In my judgment, a stable balance of conventional capability at the principal points of engagement between the U.S. and the Soviet military establishments is a fundamental requirement of security. Both establishments should feel secure in their hold over their own territory and in their ability to protect allies. Neither side should be forced to act under the apparent threat of an armed invasion. The importance of these principles for all other dimensions of security often appear to be lost in arguments over burden-sharing among allies, the balance of resource allocation in our own defense budget, and the credibility of extended deterrence. We sometimes talk as if the forward positioning of conventional forces were solely a favor to our allies and as if nuclear weapons were all that mattered. Neither assumption is valid.

I do believe that the president's statement rather exaggerates the relative conventional capability of Soviet forces and therefore underestimates the feasibility of a robust forward conventional defense of NATO. I also believe that the much touted surge in defense spending which he undertook would have yielded far greater returns to security had it been allocated to conventional force improvements with more internal discipline and a clearer sense of purpose. It is increasingly important to achieve that discipline and sense of purpose in the defense budget as aspirations for the technical improvement of all types of weapons and for increases in the readiness of our forces collide with fiscal realities. I do acknowledge, however, that assessments of the conventional balance and the allocation of resources needed to improve it are matters of debatable judgment. Whatever the exact resolution of these matters, I believe the president does reflect a valid and important emerging consensus of the United States in emphasizing the importance of conventional forces and the role they play in strategic security.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Finally, let me suggest that certainly a major debate and very likely a conceptual adjustment will have to occur before we have a viable and workable national consensus on the issue of low intensity conflict. There are certain instances, such as support for the Aquino government in the Philippines, where a reasonable consensus on national objective appears to exist, however demanding it may be to find effective means of accomplishing them. In other instances, most notably Nicaragua, it is obvious that we do not have sufficient agreement on our basic purposes to formulate an effective national strategy. There are some who believe, with particularly intense passion, that the fundamental character of the Nicaraguan government must be changed before the general purposes of economic development, political stability and individual well-being in Central America can be adequately addressed. Many others, however, honor contrary principles with similar passion; that it is neither morally appropriate nor practically effective to impose our political order on another sovereign country; that it is inimical to the principles of our own democracy to promote the violent overthrow of an established government. If we attempt to act in areas of low intensity conflict without establishing a viable consensus on our purpose, we will most assuredly cause a great deal of grief, including the local violence and hostile foreign involvement that we all oppose. I do not see in the president's statement sufficient sensitivity to this problem.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, just let me say that I have listened very carefully to what Mr. Steinbruner has said. As a member of the Budget Committee and as a member of this committee, looking at the extremely difficult budget situation, if we are going to average out to no real growth the defense expenditures going back to 1980 or 1981, things are complicated even further. I am just about ready to throw up my hands. I don't see how we could ever do that. But I would be interested in the question and answer session, to get in some of the numbers about that with Mr. Steinbruner.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

Thank you, Mr. Steinbruner.

I want to thank both you and Dr. Jordan for very thoughtful statements. You have a lot of meat there, and it is very helpful to us.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, if I might interject myself for a moment, I want to extend my apologies to the witnesses for my inability to be here throughout this hearing. I intend to fully study each of the statements.

Together with the chairman, I had looked forward to this day in anticipation of receiving precisely what we are receiving, some very helpful guidance.

I assure the members of the panel that their statements will be carefully reviewed in the context of the work we are doing here and whatever final product we may decide we want to prepare. But it has been a valuable contribution, and I apologize for coming in and out.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Mr. Weinrod.

STATEMENT OF W. BRUCE WEINROD, DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE STUDIES, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. WEINROD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

At the outset, I do have a prepared statement, which I would like to submit for the record. I will summarize it for the hearing.

Chairman NUNN. We will have your entire statement submitted for the record, without objection.

Mr. WEINROD. Thank you. Again, as the other panelists have said, I am speaking for myself and not for my institution.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and other members of the committee, it is an honor to have the opportunity to appear here today as the committee reviews overall U.S. national strategy and its military strategy component.

OVERVIEW

At the outset, I would like to add my voice to those who have commended the initiative of the chairman and the ranking minority member in pursuing these important hearings. As Senator Nunn said when these hearings began, a sound strategy is more important now than ever before in our Nation's history.

I think it is important to begin by pointing out what is perhaps obvious, but, nonetheless, should be said, and that is that strategy is not a value-free subject. One's views on the specifics of both the procedure and substance of strategy will inevitably be heavily influenced by one's views on underlying fundamental questions concerning America's proper role in world politics, as well as one's conclusions concerning the likelihood of certain eventualities, such as war in Europe or the requirements for deterrence.

Further, in many cases, the correct strategy will change as circumstances do. In sum, as Paul Nitze has observed, there is not any mechanical solution to the formulation of national strategy.

CONTEXT FOR STRATEGY

The context for a U.S. strategy is the post-World War II international environment, which presents several new or increased challenges:

First, a sustained effort by a global and ideologically oriented adversary to undermine U.S. security, institutions and values;

Second, the formulation of appropriate relationships by the United States with friendly authoritarian regimes, whose internal practices do not always meet our standards, and the effort to encourage democratic evolution in those countries;

Third, responding to subtle, indirect forms of aggression, such as infiltration, subversion, aid to radical insurgencies, terrorism, et cetera;

Fourth, dealing with the advent of massive nuclear arsenals;

Fifth, managing a voluntary alliance of independent democratic nations.

Sixth, maintaining access to overseas bases; and

Seventh, maintaining access to crucial resources, such as energy supplies.

Views on proper U.S. strategy, commitments and resource allocation are very much dependent upon one's conclusions about the proper U.S. role in responding to these challenges.

The principal threat to U.S. security remains the Soviet Union. Soviet objectives still appear a function of Communist ideology and traditional Russian expansionism, which impel a perpetual and compulsive attempt to undermine the West.

In the past two decades, Moscow has perfected techniques of indirect aggression, to which the United States has difficulty in responding. Under Gorbachev, the rhetoric and the packaging of policy have changed somewhat, but thus far, Soviet international behavior has not changed in any significant way.

Thus, what National Security Council Document 68 said in 1950 remains true today: "the greatest threat to the security of the United States stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the U.S.S.R. and from the nature of the Soviet system."

Senator WARNER. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. May I interrupt the witness?

I have your complete statement here.

Now, you are reading from your own summary, are you?

Mr. WEINROD. Yes, from an abbreviated statement for these hearings. It has a few little interjections to make the flow go better.

KEY STRATEGY ISSUES

Let me summarize briefly my perspectives on some of the key issues, key issue areas and themes that have been covered in these committee hearings.

The first is U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

While there have been changes in rhetoric and policy packaging, there as yet have been no significant substantive changes in Soviet international behavior, certainly nothing that would thus far justify reconsideration of U.S. strategy or military policies, nor the loosening of restrictions on the transfer of militarily significant technologies or restrictions on subsidized credit flows.

The second is strategic forces.

Much of the strategic force debate depends ultimately upon unprovable assumptions about what really deters and what would happen if conflict occurs. Given these ambiguities, it is preferable to err on the side of more rather than less when what is at stake is the survival of the United States and its important allies, and since the United States will have to rely on a nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future.

The third is strategic defense.

The real issue, it seems to me, is whether there is sufficient probability on technological grounds, and a reasonable possibility on the policy level, to conclude that effective defenses can be developed and that their deployment would strengthen both U.S. security and strategic stability.

If this is the case or appears likely the case, then it is very reasonable to allocate what amounts to a small percentage of the overall defense budget to an energetic program for finding out whether such systems will work and, if so, to commence plans for deployment.

Paradoxically, we may well be more likely to achieve the objectives of the arms control process with strategic defenses than without them. Consider that: first, SDI has already brought Moscow back to the bargaining table to publicly talk about deep offensive reductions for the first time.

Second, mutually deployed defenses could be a very useful safeguard against cheating, should deep reductions be accepted.

Third, even unilateral deployments, as Dr. Brzezinski has pointed out, could achieve traditional arms control objectives, such as strengthening stability, lessening damage should an attack occur, and guarding against accidental or third nation attacks.

The fourth issue is conventional forces.

This area, too, is complex and multifaceted, and the U.S. role in NATO is obviously very much intertwined with this issue.

Pending a full review of NATO strategy and the U.S. role, U.S. objectives should be to deter a Soviet attack and also to have the capability to bog down any initial Soviet attack, thus foiling Soviet military strategy for rapid victory and also delaying the possible necessity to use nuclear weapons.

Allocations to NATO must be based upon presumptions about whether NATO's capability should be sufficient only to deter or should be sufficient, as Jeffrey Record put it to this committee, to "in the event of war, restore peace on politically favorable terms and at an acceptable cost."

With specific respect to NATO, the U.S. approach to NATO is in flux, if not in transition.

Very serious questions about the political impact of any significant change in the military component of the U.S. commitment to NATO also have to be considered.

In the longer run, some changes in the relationship of the United States to the NATO alliance seem almost inevitable. For a variety of historical, political, economic, and cultural reasons, the allies have begun to develop differing perceptions of the nature and extent of the Soviet challenge, as well as other issues that confront us.

Political parties with substantially differing approaches than the United States to international politics have a good chance of eventually gaining power in important NATO countries. Thus, the United States, in general, should encourage NATO countries to think more seriously about their own defense and about working together in a Western European defense community, despite the fact that this may mean a more independent policy on some issues. The alliance is important, but we must review ways to keep it healthy. I suggest that two commissions should be considered:

First, a new Harmel-style commission, with members from all NATO countries, to review the political, economic, and military dimensions of the alliance. Much has happened since the earlier report, and even more has changed since the original flexible response doctrine was devised. For example, the strategic, theater nuclear, and regional conventional balances have all changed significantly and new arms control agreements may be arrived at.

Second, the President and/or the Congress should establish a special commission to review NATO and the U.S. role. This would be a rare chance to get ahead of the curve on an important evolving policy issue. There is clearly a growing interest in a reassessment of the U.S. role in NATO. What is most interesting is that this interest is coming from all parts of the U.S. political spectrum.

Further, except for a small group, the suggestions for change are offered in a tentative way, suggesting that there is an opportunity for full and dispassionate consideration of this issue. Thus, this commission would not serve to ratify an already established position, but, rather, as a forum for genuine inquiry.

Third, if this committee has not already done so—and I confess I do not know—it might be appropriate to take a very careful look at the implications of specific levels of troop reductions for the United States in Europe. I have seen numbers thrown out which seem somewhat arbitrary—100,000 or 150,000—but I am not sure these have ever been connected in a direct way with what the military requirements are or would be under those circumstances.

The U.S. commitment to the Persian Gulf has received less attention than it deserves. As Jeffrey Record said before this committee concerning a U.S. role in countering an invasion of Iran, "the feasibility and strategic implications of a U.S. attempt to counter such an attempt deserves thorough examination."

Further, while Persian Gulf energy may be increasingly important to the United States, it is even more so to U.S. allies, such as the NATO countries, Japan, and Turkey.

Is it not responsible to expect these nations, and perhaps others, to be actively involved in preparation to protect this area and to commit their own ground forces, if necessary, as opposed to merely transferring resources, so that U.S. manpower could bear the entire brunt of battle?

In any event, future historians may well remark upon the seemingly cavalier assumption of a major new commitment thousands of miles from the U.S. homeland, possibly involving major land force deployment or even the use of nuclear weapons without much debate, while intense controversy surrounded whether to spend $100 million to assist forces near our homeland, fighting to end the influence of our major world adversary in this region.

The other principal U.S. commitment is a more general one, to assisting various nations potentially or currently threatened by indirect aggression by Soviet bloc assistants. This is sometimes placed in a category referred to as "low intensity conflict."

There must be more attention given to whether, and how, a consensus in democracies can be developed on ways to respond to indirect aggression and low intensity conflict.

In addition, as General Gorman suggested before this committee, a higher priority should be given to development of U.S. weapons which can be directly used by friendly regimes threatened by Soviet-backed insurgencies.

Other actions are also appropriate. Military exercises by U.S. troops in countries, for example, surrounding Nicaragua have a deterrent effect upon a possible direct role by the Sandinistas in subverting neighboring nations.

RESOURCES AND COMMITMENTS

Let me now turn to the more general issue, which is that of the resource-commitments, match or mismatch.

It is true that there is not a full consonance between our total global obligations and our resources, especially if the United States had to meet all of these major obligations simultaneously.

This is a legitimate cause for concern, but it seems to me is mitigated somewhat by the following.

First, as Admiral Crowe noted in his statement to the committee, military strategy is always resource constrained.

Second, resources have never been consistent with commitments since the United States assumed great power responsibilities. As Jeffrey Record observed to this committee, since 1945 "there has always been a significant gap between declared U.S. military goals and actual capabilities to fulfill them."

Third, it is unlikely that the United States will be challenged simultaneously in a major way on all its important global commitments, except in the case of an all-out war with the Soviet Union.

Fourth, some degree of risk, vis-a-vis U.S. commitments, is probably inevitable. As Colonel Summers has noted, "In the absence of unlimited resources, a nation may have to accept some risk in areas where vital interests are not immediately at stake."

Fifth, it seems to me that much can still be done to make full use of whatever resources are available, even if they are more limited than we would like. First: exploitation of the U.S. comparative advantage in advanced technology areas, such as the Stealth aircraft and cruise missiles, the Strategic Defense Initiative; and other defense projects, such as in the area of fiber optics, lasers, and kinetic kill and other technologies, with direct application in the conventional battlefield as well as other areas.

Second: even more participation by U.S. allies in common security efforts. This is easier said than done, of course. But more can be done, particularly with respect to Japan and perhaps a European role in the Persian Gulf.

Third: actions which, by applying a modest resource in the present, can avoid the need to expend substantially more resource in the future, such as:

Working with democratic allies to build a democratic and private sector infrastructure in those developing nations vulnerable to Soviet-backed insurgencies;

Providing security assistance, including communications and intelligence aid to those developing nations threatened by Soviet-backed insurgencies;

Timely shows of force—and here I disagree with Colonel Summers—such as carrier deployments or troop maneuvers and also direct military aid in certain important instances, such as to the democratic resistance in Nicaragua;

Avoiding unnecessary or duplicative military spending on, for example, redundant military bases.

More efficient and cost effective military procedures—for example, former Secretary of Defense Brown has suggested that many more projects could be run along the lines of current secret programs, arguing that "the much better record of highly classified programs suggests that modifying development and procurement along these lines would be a great improvement." I realize there are political issues involved there, but this is Harold Brown speaking purely on the cost effective component of that issue.

Finally, on the issue of resources, it seems to me that strong Presidential leadership and an active U.S. international policy can, in and of themselves, be an important resource. Compare the late 1970s to today. While the U.S. is better prepared militarily, it has also faced no significant new challenge from Moscow since the Reagan administration made clear its willingness to use U.S. force under appropriate circumstances.

Last, there are more resources, if they are really needed. In terms of the percentage of our GNP spent on defense, it has been significantly higher, even in the early 1960s. If it were absolutely necessary, more resources could be obtained.

EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONSHIP

Let me turn briefly to a couple of other points. First is the role of the Executive and the Legislature.

A continuing and perhaps not fully resolvable tension exists between the Executive and the Congress concerning U.S. strategy. It is a fact, however, that inordinate involvement by the Congress in the development, or more particularly, the implementation of U.S. international policies does make it more difficult to carry out consistent, coordinated, and coherent policies.

Congressional participation is necessary and congressional oversight is obligatory. But micromanaging policy, redundant committee and subcommittee involvement, or failure to maintain confidentiality of vital information, can make the development of strategy most difficult.

NATIONAL STRATEGY REPORT

Let me turn briefly to the National Strategy Report.

I think the report is an important and useful new congressionally mandated development; members of this committee are in the best position to say whether the first edition meets their objectives and expectations.

I would say, however, that it is a useful initial effort, with subtle and nuanced analysis of the international environment, but it could be improved in several ways.

First, there should be more detail on Soviet international objectives, and Moscow's strategy and tactics to accomplish these objectives. Specific U.S. responses should be discussed directly in this context, rather than separately.

Second, other significant threats to U.S. security should be more fully identified, along with U.S. responses.

Third, much more attention should be given to the often neglected battle of ideas and perceptions. Specific actions the United States is or should be taking in this area should be laid out in detail.

Fourth, overall there should be more prescription and less description. While there is much information on current policies, most of which can be found in other administration documents, there is little in the way of new policy recommendations or directions for the future. These should be included, along with a projection or, in fact, perhaps alternative scenarios for the strategic environment over the next 5 to 10 year period, and recommendations for U.S. strategy based upon these projections.

Fifth, the structure for strategy is curiously ignored in this document. While sound structure cannot assure good policy, unsound structure can surely make bad policy more likely. More attention should be given to this area.

I have offered some suggestions in my prepared remarks, which I will not go into.

Sixth, the implications for strategic and theater nuclear and for conventional forces of a defense-dominant strategic environment should be laid out. Pursuit of SDI is current administration policy. Therefore, it seems to me that it should be obligatory for such a document to lay this out in some detail.

Finally, as Paul Nitze noted about NSC 68, in that document there were contained alternative scenarios for the future and alternative strategy responses. It seems to me that we need not necessarily think only of one correct strategy or response. We can lay out several possibilities. I would think that this document might be used as a vehicle to do that.

CONCLUSION

Let me just conclude by saying that strategy should not be a conservative or a liberal issue, or a partisan issue. But the reality is that we will continue to have difficulty in developing a consistent national strategy for the foreseeable future.

There are the normal difficulties that democracies present for conducting foreign policy which de Tocqueville noted 200 years ago. In addition, there is a fundamental absence of consensus on the appropriate U.S. role in the world, particularly with respect to responding to indirect aggression.

Until this and other divisions are resolved, conducting a national strategy will prove difficult indeed.

Finally, there will always be an inherent, and to some extent unresolvable, tension between the need for a fixed, long-term strategy, and the bureaucratic necessities for its implementation, and the equally compelling requirement for both short-term tactical flexibility and for reassessment and change in long-term strategy, as conditions change. And conditions do not, unfortunately, change at convenient 4 or 5 year intervals.

Despite these problems and limitations, it is well worth the effort to seek both consensus, where it can be reached, and to at least highlight areas at issue for public debate. Through such a process, a genuine national strategy may once again be possible.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weinrod follows:]

Prepared Statement by W. Bruce Weinrod, Director of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies, the Heritage Foundation

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner and other members of the Committee, it is an honor to have the opportunity to appear here today as the Committee reviews overall U.S. national strategy and its military strategy component.

At the outset, I would like to add my voice to those of the others who have commended the initiative of the Chairman, and the ranking Minority Member, in pursuing these important hearings. As Senator Nunn said in his opening statement: "A sound strategy is more important now than ever before in our nation's history." It is entirely appropriate, indeed very necessary, for the Congress or its constituent elements such as the Armed Services Committee, to consider U.S. national strategy and to insist that this or any Administration present its national strategy to the Congress and the American public for review.

National strategy is of course a wide-ranging topic about which many books and countless articles have been written. The statements presented to this Committee during these hearings have covered much ground thereby giving some indication of the multi-dimensional nature of national strategy. It is my hope here to make a modest contribution toward providing some coherence and perspective on the earlier discussions before this Committee.

Several important points about U.S. strategy should be made at the outset. First, it is very important to think about strategy and make certain that policy makers do so as well; second, except under wartime conditions, it is probably impossible for a democracy such as the U.S. to implement complete strategy in the ideal sense of that term; third, strategy is not a value-free subject. One's views on the specifics of both the procedure and substance of strategy will inevitably be heavily influenced by one's views on underlying fundamental questions concerning America's proper role in world politics, as well as one's conclusions concerning the likelihood of certain eventualities such as a war in Europe; and fifth, strategy has both a substantive and a procedural dimension; while theoretical separated, in reality they interact synergistically. Further, on many of these issues, the correct strategy will change as circumstances do.

SUMMARY FRAMEWORK

National Strategy Overviews.—The United States must think about a national strategy; the U.S. is a great power with global responsibilities and is confronted with both a global Soviet challenge and regional problems.

Devising and implementing a national strategy—meaning a systematic, consistent and coordinated effort to mobilize resources to achieve given objectives—is difficult and problematical in a democratic and pluralistic environment; in addition, the objectives themselves are often in dispute; and political and economic constraints on mobilizing means inevitably have some impact upon the strategy's objectives, commitments undertaken and resources allocated.

Whatever the difficulties in implementation, a national strategy can and should be devised and continually reviewed; such a strategy must emanate from the President; the Congressional role should not be to substitute its own strategy for that of the President, but rather to insist that a strategy be presented and with great care to match resources which the political system is willing to generate to that Presidential strategy; or else to fundamentally reject that strategy. Obviously, the former is vastly preferable.

The challenges for any President in devising and implementing an effective national strategy are significant and include: a determined and persistent global adversary—the U.S.S.R.; the growth of other regional power centers and diffusion of high technology weapons to many smaller nations; the diminution of Presidential power and authority; nonetheless, a President who has a clear policy vision, governs wisely, manages well, and chooses subordinates who share his policy agenda, can at least to some extent devise and implement a national strategy; a President who does not do these things will inevitably end up with an incoherent or contradictory strategy.

Perhaps the most significant challenge for strategy is the growing lack of consensus on the appropriate U.S. role in the world as reflected in disagreement on: (1) the nature and extent of the Soviet challenge; (2) the proper U.S. relationship to friendly authoritarian regimes especially those threatened by Soviet-backed radical anti-western insurgencies, and the best ways to encourage democratic transitions by such regimes; (3) the appropriate U.S. response to covert or indirect aggression by Moscow or its proxies; and (4) the best approach to strategic doctrine.

U.S. strategy should, of course, take into account U.S. resources, but this is not a one-way analysis. If resources are deemed insufficient for commitments, there are four non-mutually exclusive options: (1) accept the risk involved in the mismatch, (2) reduce U.S. commitments, (3) increase resources or (4) seek to reduce the threat which has called forth the commitments. In the past, the U.S. has devoted higher percentages of its resources to defense than it does today. Whether the political process decides that the U.S. is overcommitted, that certain commitments are not worth the allocation of resources, or that the current commitments should be maintained or expanded is a determination that the democratic process must make.

Context for National Strategy.—The most useful way to think about strategy, however, is not to begin with current resources or commitments but rather with the threats and challenges to U.S. security.

The context for U.S. strategy is the post World War II international environment which presents several new or more serious challenges: (1) a sustained effort by a global and ideologically oriented adversary to undermine U.S. security, institutions and values; (2) the formulation of appropriate relationships with friendly authoritarian regimes whose internal practices do not always meet our standards; and the encouragement of democratic transitions, (3) responding to subtle indirect forms of aggression such as infiltration, subversion, aid to radical insurgencies, terrorism, etc.; (4) dealing with the advent of massive nuclear arsenals; (5) managing a voluntary alliance of independent democratic nations, (6) and maintaining access to overseas bases; and (7) maintaining access to crucial resources such as energy supplies. Views on proper U.S. strategy, commitments and resource allocation are very much dependent upon one's conclusion on how to respond to these challenges.

The Soviet Challenge.—The principal system for U.S. security is the global Soviet challenge which offers itself in various ways; no other challenge presents a fundamental threat to U.S. security, institutions and values; therefore, response to the Soviet challenge is the single most important aspect of U.S. strategy.

Soviet objectives still appear a function of Communist ideology and traditional Russian expansionism which impel a perpetual and compulsive attempt to undermine the West; Moscow's strategy remains essentially unchanged since Churchill remarked that the Kremlin wants the fruits of victory without actually having to engage in war. In the past two decades, it has perfected techniques of indirect aggression to which the U.S. has had difficulty responding. Under Gorbachev, the rhetoric and packaging of policy have changed somewhat, but thus far Soviet international behavior has not changed in any significant way.

The initial state of formulating a strategy toward the U.S.S.R. is to prepare a thorough threat assessment including the objectives, capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union.

U.S. strategy for responding to the Soviet challenge should consist of two parts: (1) a long-term strategy that seeks ways of fundamentally modifying or changing Soviet international behavior; (2) a shorter-term strategy to respond to the immediate Soviet international policies.

Longer-term U.S. strategy should seek a permanent end to Soviet expansionism. A U.S. policy of firmness may help catalyze a change in the Soviet ideology which views policy through a prism of inherent class and economic system conflict, obligatory fraternal aid to radical revolutionary insurgencies, overlaid with traditional Russian interest in neighboring territories.

U.S. strategy toward Moscow should be viewed as several separate policies toward the Soviet Empire; that Empire consists of: (1) the consolidated periphery (such as Cuba); (2) the consolidating periphery (such as Nicaragua); (3) the consolidated border (Eastern Europe); (4) the consolidating border (Afghanistan); (5) the consolidated internal empire (such as the non-Russian nationalities); and (6) the Russian nation.

Variegated and nuanced policies can be designated for the various elements of the Soviet empire; these policies should be designed to take advantage of U.S. and Western strengths and to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities. For example, U.S. technological skills should be intensively applied to developing Direct Broadcast Satellites (DBS) and miniaturized reception adapters so that the vulnerability of the closed Soviet system to outside information can be exploited.

Shorter-term U.S. strategy includes all of dimensions of U.S. policy such as the political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, and military.

U.S. Security Commitments

U.S. security commitments should be initially undertaken, and periodically reviewed, on the basis of whether they are required in order to protect U.S. very important security interests from the Soviet challenge or other potential threats.

It is tempting to reassess the major U.S. commitment which is to the defense of Western Europe since it takes up considerable resources and the policies of U.S. allies on defense commitments and other important matters is not always as we would like. Despite these frustrations the alliance remains very important to U.S. interests and, especially as long as strongly pro-alliance governments remain in power in key NATO nations, the U.S. should avoid unsettling actions. Nonetheless, as discussed later, reviews of NATO policy and the U.S. role should commence.

To summarize, the following are some perspectives on the key issue areas or themes that were covered during the Committee's series of strategy hearings:

U.S. Policy re U.S.S.R.—While there have been changes in rhetoric and policy packaging, there as yet have been no significant substantive changes in Soviet international behavior under Gorbachev; certainly, nothing has changed thus far that would justify reconsideraiton or U.S. strategy of military policies, nor the loosening of restrictions on the transfer of militarily-significant technologies.

Strategic Forces.—There appeared unanimous agreement of Committee witnesses with the proposition that the nuclear deterrent will be necessary for the foreseeable future. Thus, strategic force policy should be shaped with the need in mind to maintain a deterrent that is credible meaning that there is no doubt that it would survive a first strike and that Moscow would not be dominant if nuclear escalation occurred.

Strategic Defense.—The real issue is whether there is sufficient probability on technological grounds, and reasonable possibility, on the policy level, to conclude that effective defenses can be developed and that their deployment would strengthen both U.S. security and strategic stability. If this is the case, then it is very reasonable to allocate what amounts to a small percentage of the overall defense budget to finding out whether such systems will work.

Arms Control.—There was little apparent enthusiasm for arms control as such among witnesses at the hearings. As, Zbigniew Brzezinski has said: "it is a mistake to make a fetish out of arms control or to make it the central facet of U.S.-Soviet relations". Paradoxically, we may well be more likely to achieve the objectives of the arms control process through strategic defenses than without them. First, SDI has already brought Moscow back to the bargaining table to publicly talk about deep offensive reductions for the first time; second, mutually deployed defenses could be a very useful safeguard against cheating should deep reductions be accepted; and third, even unilateral U.S. deployments, as Dr. Brzezinski has argued, could achieve traditional arms control objectives such as strengthening stability, lessening damage should an attack occur, and guarding against accidental or third nation attacks.

Conventional Forces.—This is a complex and multi-faceted area. Two important general issues are the allocation between convention and strategic forces, and the division between procurement for the future and current readiness. As with many of these dilemmas, there may not be any one answer that is correct under all circumstances. Under current circumstances, mobility and substantiality should be emphasized.

In any event, these general issues must be viewed within the context of the specific major U.S. overseas commitments:

NATO.—The U.S. approach to NATO is in flux if not transition. Allocations to NATO must be based upon presumptions about whether NATO's capabilities should be sufficient only to deter or should be sufficient, as Jeffrey Record put it to this Committee, to "in the event of war restore peace on politically favorable terms and at an acceptable cost". Very serious questions about the political impact of any significant change in the military dimension of the U.S. commitment to NATO also have to be considered. One way to perhaps offset a reduction of U.S. troops militarily, as Dr. Brzezinski suggested, would be the development of an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) for NATO and the application of SDI technologies to conventional warfare.

Two questions nonetheless, occur regarding the NATO alliance: first, the level of U.S. troops and, second, the longer-term U.S. role and the viability of the alliance. Any troop reductions should have a military rationale as well as a political one; if NATO can function effectively with fewer U.S. troops, then those not needed should be withdrawn; but to undertake reductions of an arbitrarily selected number of troops would be a mistake. Such action should be undertaken only after the most careful assessment of its impact upon U.S. or NATO military and deterrent capabilities.

In the longer run, some changes in the relationship of the U.S to the NATO alliance seem inevitable; for variety of historical, political, economic and cultural reasons, the allies have differing perceptions of the nature and extent of the Soviet challenge as well as other issues; and political parties with substantially different approaches to international politics than the U.S. have a good chance of eventually gaining power in important NATO countries.

The U.S. should in general encourage NATO countries to think more seriously about their own defense and about working together in a western European defense community.

In addition, two commissions should be established: first, a new Harmel style commission with members from all NATO countries to review the political, economic and military dimensions of the alliance. Much has changed since the earlier Harmel Report and even more has changed since the original flexible response doctrine was devised; for example, the strategic and theatre nuclear and the regional conventional balance have all changed significantly. The Commission should review where NATO should be heading until the year 2000 and in particular should consider newer ideas for NATO defense such as Professor Samuel Huntington's offensive retaliatory strategy and the role of Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles (ATBMs) and shorter-range Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF). Other issues that the NATO Commission should consider include: how to further develop cooperative European defense efforts; the possibility of a multilateral European nuclear forces; the role for Europe in out of areas situations where European interests are significantly affected; whether NATO forces are primarily intended as a deterrent or should also have true war-fighting potential; the role of INFs and shorter-range nuclear forces in NATO strategy; the best locations for NATO troop deployments; and the possibilities for fortification defenses. Of course, some of these matters are reviewed in an ongoing way by various NATO committees, but there is a need for a longer range systematic assessment.

Second, the President and/or the Congress should establish a special commission to review NATO and the U.S. role; this would be a rare chance to get ahead of the curve on an important evolving policy issue. There is clearly a growing interest in a reassessment of the U.S. role in NATO; what is most interesting is that the interest in such a reevaluation is coming from all parts of the U.S. political spectrum. Further, except for a small group, the suggestions for change are offered in a tentative way suggesting that there is an opportunity for full and dispassionate consideration of this issue. Thus, this commission would not serve to ratify an already established position but rather as a forum for genuine inquiry.

The U.S. commitment to Persian Gulf security has received less attention than it deserves. As Jeffrey Record said before this Committee, concerning a U.S. role in countering an invasion of Iran, "the feasibility and strategic implications of a U.S. attempt to counter it deserves thorough examination".

There are three questions concerning the U.S. commitment in the Persian Gulf: first, as record asks, can the U.S. really be militarily effective against an invasion of Iran; second, given the difficulties Moscow has experienced in Afghanistan, is it in fact likely to succeed in moving rapidly through Iran; in other words, is there really a need for U.S. ground forces to be involved; third, while Persian Gulf energy may be increasingly important to the U.S., it is even more so to U.S. allies: 30% of NATO oil, 65% of Japanese oil and 80% of Turkish oil comes from the Persian Gulf, and these percentages may increase. Is it not reasonable to expect these nations, and perhaps others, to be actively involved in preparations to protect this area, and to commit their own ground forces as opposed to merely transferring resources so that U.S. manpower can bear the entire brunt of battle?

In any event, future historians may well remark upon the seemingly cavalier assumption of a major new commitment thousands of miles from the homeland by the U.S. possibly involving a major land force deployment or even the use of nuclear weapons without much debate while intense controversy surrounded whether to spend $100 million dollars to assist forces near the homeland fighting to end the influence of our major world adversary in that area.

Other Commitments.—It is tempting to seek other places for reducing U.S. commitments to get them more in line with current resources, but it is difficult to locate exactly where these reductions should occur. President Carter thought South Korea was the place, but this proved not acceptable. The other principle U.S. commitment is a more general one to assisting various nations potentially or currently threatened by indirect aggression via outside Soviet bloc aid to radical revolutionary insurgencies, sometimes referred to as Low-intensity Conflict.

Low Intensity Conflict.—This involves the U.S. response to Soviet-backed indirect aggression against friendly governments via covert arms transfers and other military involvement with radical revolutionary insurgencies and the use of other indirect aggression methods such as terrorism. These techniques obviate the need for overt cross-border aggression and are likely to be a continuing challenge for U.S. policy. There must be more attention given to whether and how a consensus in democracies can be developed on ways to respond to indirect aggression and low-intensity conflict. In addition, as General Gorman suggested, a higher priority should be given to development of U.S. weapons which can be directly used by friendly regimes threatened by Soviet-backed insurgencies. Military exercises by U.S. troops in countries surrounding Nicaragua also has a deterrent effect upon a possible direct role by the Sandinistas in subverting neighboring nations which might then require a more substantial allocation of resources in response. The use of U.S. ground troops is usually inappropriate in this context, but the capability should exist if vital interests are threatened. U.S. air and sea forces should also be prepared for interdiction capability under limited circumstances.

Resources/Commitments Match.—All of this brings us to the more general issue of the relationship between resources and commitments. It is true that there is not a full consonance between our total global obligations and our resources if the U.S. had to meet all of those major obligations simultaneously. This is a legitimate cause for concern, but is mitigated somewhat by the following:

As Admiral Crowe noted in his statement, "military strategy is always resource constrained." During WW II for example, we would have preferred to liberate France in 1943 but the resources . . . were not available until 1944."

Resources have never been consistent with commitments since the U.S. assumed great power responsibilities; as Jeffrey Record has observed: "Since 1945 there has always been a significant gap between declared U.S. military goals and actual capabilities to fulfill them . . . it has never possessed the ground, naval and tactical air power to deliver on all its defense commitments overseas, and certainly not simultaneously." Overall the U.S. has done remarkably well in this commitment-resource mismatch environment. This is not to suggest that this is the ideal way to operate but merely that such a mismatch does not in and of itself automatically mean great difficulties for the U.S. in world politics.

It is unlikely that the U.S. will be challenged simultaneously in a major way on all its important global commitments, except in the case of all out war with the U.S.S.R.—a much less likely prospect than continuing Soviet challenges through indirect aggression.

Some degree of risks vis-a-vis U.S. commitments is probably inevitable; as Colonel Harry Summer has noted "in absence of unlimited resources, a nation may have to accept some risks in areas where vital national interests are not immediately at stake".

In fact, strong Presidential leadership and an active U.S. international policy can itself be a resource. Compare the late 1970s to today; while the U.S. is better prepared militarily, it has faced no significant new challenge from Moscow since the Reagan Adminstration made clear its willingness to use U.S. force."

One way of ameliorating the disjunction between commitments and resources as several of your witnesses have suggested such actions, can make it less likely that even greater allocations of U.S. resources will be required later to fulfill U.S. commitments. Let me suggest some examples: (1) policy towards the U.S.S.R.—a modest increase in defense spending annually wisely apportioned is a strong signal to Moscow and can make overt Soviet aggression which would cost much more in U.S. resources, highly unlikely; (2) U.S. response to indirect aggression—timely military assistance (as well as economic and other involvement) can prevent takeovers by Soviet-allied Leninist regimes that might require much greater U.S. resources to deal with later; General Gorman suggested in his remarks that the military priorities to deal with indirect aggression should be security assistance, intelligence and communications, (3) U.S. involvement with friendly authoritarian regimes—timely assistance in encouraging democratic evolution and transition through such mechanisms as the National Endowment for Democracy can avoid the ultimate polarization and chaos upon which Soviet backed insurgencies thrive; (4) massive nuclear arsenals—strategic defenses could provide a way out of the massive offensive nuclear buildup, (5) alliance management—U.S. friends and allies should play an increasing role in U.S. strategy; as mentioned earlier, our allies should play a larger military role in the Persian Gulf; and Japan, in particular, should be expected to play a larger role, both directly via increased participation in regional defense and indirectly by playing a larger role in the democratic world in efforts to improve economic conditions in pro-western developing nations.

Marginal vs. Critical Interests.—Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger suggested in his remarks that the test of critically, and therefore presumably commitment, is "whether or not a nation will affect the international balance". The difficulty is that very few nations in and of themselves will dramatically affect the balance. This leaves a wide path for Moscow to gradually slice away at Western influence by subverting nations each of which in and of itself may not be critical to the balance but taken as a whole do affect the balance; and in and of themselves each provide a further base for subversion. This challenge in less than vital areas via indirect aggression is one of the most serious challenges facing U.S. strategy.

Role of Executive/Legislative.—A continuing and perhaps not fully resolvable tension exists between the Executive and the Congress concerning U.S. strategy. It is a fact, however, that inordinate involvement by the Congress in the development or more particularly the implementation of U.S. international policies makes it more difficult to carry out consistent, coordinated and coherent policies. Congressional participation is necessary, and Congressional oversight is obligatory but micromanaging policy, or failure to maintain confidentiality of vital information, can make the development of strategy a moot exercise.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT

One particularly useful approach to strategy (formulation and implementation) is the new Congressionally-mandated Annual President's Report on National Security Strategy of the United States. Members of this Committee, such as Senator Warner, who led the effort to institutionalize this Report, are in the best position to say whether the first edition meets their objectives and expectations. It is a useful initial effort but could be improved in several ways: (1) there should be more detail on Soviet international objectives, and its strategy and tactics to accomplish those objectives; specific U.S. responses should be discussed directly in this context rather than separately; (2) other significant threats to U.S. security should be more fully identified along with U.S. responses; (3) much more attention should be given to the often-neglected battle of ideas and perceptions and specific actions the U.S. is or should be taking in the area; (4) overall, there should be more prescription and less description; while there is much information on current policies (most of which can be found in other Administration documents), there is little in the way of new policy recommendations or directions for the future. These should be included, along with a projection of the strategic environment over the next five to ten year period and recommendations for U.S. strategy based on these projections; (5) the structure for strategy is curiously ignored. While sound structure cannot assure good policy, unsound structure can surely make bad policy more likely. More attention should be given to this area.

DEFENSE BUDGET PRIORITIES

Given the strategic context that I have outlined here and more fully in my prepared remarks, defense budget priorities should include:

An overall real spending increase of 3-5%—continued modernization and improved survivability for the strategic deterrent force—emphasis on areas of possible technological advantage such as SDI conventional spin-off technology, and conventional warheads with higher destructive potential.

Continuing to improve mobility—sustainability of conventional forces—enhanced low intensity conflict capability including communications and intelligence assistance and the development of a transport plane suitable for developing nations—increased cooperation from U.S. allies overall and especially concerning Persian Gulf.

STRATEGY FORMULATION/IMPLEMENTATION

Let me turn to the process of strategy formulation within the Executive Branch.

Strategy Implementations.—Some Strategists like to consider strategy implementation in abstract and design organizational charts which are intended to produce the best strategic thinking and strategy implementation. In reality, however, strategy implementation is part of an interactive synergistic process in which strategy formulation and implementation may be ongoing at the same moment.

Given the nature of our political system, and current absence of consensus on important matters, it is best to assume that any particular strategy can be sustained for about a four year period; obviously, it is to be hoped that (if it is a wise and effective strategy) it will be sustained over time. Of course, on those fundamental elements about which there is consensus, a strategy can be maintained for much longer periods.

In any event, it seems not unreasonable to expect any incoming Administration to prepare and present an overall national strategy at an early point in its tenure. Indeed, it would be reasonable for the Congress to require such an exposition before it will assess specific policies and appropriations advocated by the new Administration. In this regard, the Congress, and particularly Senator Warner of this Committee, are to be commended for the legislation adopted recently which in fact requires an annual strategy report by the President. The full impact of this requirement will be felt, however, only at the start of a new Administration in 1989.

Obviously, circumstances change over time. Thus, there must also be mechanisms for periodic review and assessment of the stated strategy in view of current conditions. A formal restatement of the strategy in the Annual Report required by the recent Congressional legislation is an appropriate mechanism to assure such review.

In addition, such ongoing reassessment overlaps and in many ways becomes indistinguishable from strategy implementation. In order to implement strategy (or, looked at another way, to devise policies to carry out strategy), each specific policy has to be reviewed in the context of overall strategy. Thus, ongoing policy formulation and implementation can itself be a mechanism for ongoing strategy review. (Strategy implementation is discussed subsequently.)

Just as it is tempting to seek a technological "fix" for military problems, so it is also tempting to seek an institutional "fix" for an absence or deficiency in strategic thinking in the Executive Branch. Keeping this in mind, there are nonetheless institutional devices which could potentially be marginally useful in helping to produce coherent strategic thinking and policy implementation in the White House and elsewhere.

At the same time, it should be kept in mind with respect to the establishment of institutional mechanisms—or more informal procedures—for long-term strategic planning, that they are only as good as the individuals at the top. The Carter Administration provides a clear demonstration of the proposition. As Zbigniew Brzezinski noted in his comments to this Committee, he pulled together a long-term strategy for the entire Carter Administration at a very early point, and it was signed off on by all key officials. Yet, by common assessment, the Carter foreign policy was relatively incoherent and inconsistent (regardless of its accomplishments). There were at least two important reasons for this which are relevant to my argument: first, Carter himself just did not think systematically; he treated individual policy issues each in isolation from the other rather than as part of a consistent whole; second, by Brzezinski's own admission, Carter took on many more objectives than were feasible to accomplish in a systematic way. Thus, despite the existence of a well-thought-out strategic plan at the beginning of the Carter years, a coherent, consistent policy did not result.

On the reverse side of the coin, during the Nixon Administration, many of the established institutional structures for formulating policy were ignored or bypassed. Yet, whether one agrees or disagrees with the actual policies, there can be no doubt that they were informed by a fairly comprehensive and consistent strategy.

The fundamental proposition I would suggest from all of this is as follows: a necessary, and even in some cases sufficient condition for strategic thinking in an Administration is that there be individuals at the top—the President and perhaps also the National Security Advisor—who think strategically. A formal (or informal) institutional framework for strategic thinking in the White House or elsewhere in the Executive Branch could play a useful role in complementing a President and NSC Advisor who think strategically but such an institutional mechanism would be only marginally useful at best where the top officials do not think strategically.

With this very important caveat in mind, it could still be useful for a mechanism to be established to encourage strategic thinking in the formulation of Administration international policy. The fundamental objective of such a mechanism would be to make it as difficult as possible for the highest-level decision-makers to, first, avoid actually formulating their own national strategy, and, second, avoid systematically relating daily decisions to this strategy and viewing individual decisions within the context of all relevant factors.

It could be argued that such a result often occurs anyway; for example, when relevant Cabinet officers debate an issue in front of President Reagan before he makes a decision. But there is certainly no significant harm, and there could possibly be some benefit, in institutionalizing the relationship of overall strategy to particular decisions. This is, of course, not a matter for the Congress as such, but it may be that the Congress would have to authorize establishment, or appropriate funds, for such a mechanism. It should do so.

Consideration of the best mechanism (or mechanisms) should take into account the usual assortment of bureaucratic factors: for example individuals who are very involved in immediate decision-making rarely have the time or the inclination to relate those decisions to overall strategy; and individuals who are detailed from other parts of the government often maintain the institutional perspective of that department, particularly since they will someday be returning there.

At its most basic, such a mechanism cold consist of a requirement that each decision memo for key officials include a section discussing how the particular issue—and the decision recommended—relate to stated national strategy. If taken seriously, such a requirement could force real thinking on such matters.

Additionally, two other mechanisms might be useful. First, as Dr. Brzezinski and others have suggested, a small full-time National Strategy Staff at the National Security Council with the proviso that members be recruited from outside the government, understand and sympathize with the particular President's agenda, and be required participants in preparation of all decision memos and in decision meetings. Separately, a National Strategy Board, along the lines of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, could be established to consider refinements or changes in Administration strategy as time passes, and to provide regular comment to the highest officials on the relationship of Administration strategy to actual policy both substantively and in its implementation.

Let me add one final point: it should not in my view be the objective of any Administration, the Congress, or any institutional mechanism to assure that actual policy never deviates from, or is inconsistent with, national strategy. The realities of world and domestic politics make such deviations inevitable upon occasion. But it should be the objective to assure that decision-makers are forced to recognize the fact that such a deviation from proposed strategy will occur, the nature and the extent of that deviation, and its implications for overall U.S. international policy. Even being aware of deviations and their potential ramifications, high-level officials may still decide to pursue a particular policy, but at least they will be aware of its deviation from the professed national strategy.

CONCLUSION

The Senate Armed Services Committee's exercise in strategy review has been a most important effort. It has forced many institutions and people to think more seriously about fundamental questions of U.S. national policy. While the current Administration may benefit from this review, it is hopeful something that will have a real impact upon the new Administration that will arrive in January, 1989. Owing to the efforts of this Committee and others in sensitizing the policy and political communities to the importance of thinking about strategy, it is to be hoped that the new Administration will commence from day one to integrate strategic thinking into its national security policy.

Strategy should not be a conservative or liberal issue or partisan issue. But the reality is that we will continue to have difficulty in developing a consistent national strategy for the foreseeable future. In addition to the normal difficulties that democracies present for conducting foreign policy, there is a fundamental absence of consensus on the appropriate U.S. role in the world, particularly with respect to responding to indirect aggression. Until this and other divisions are resolved, conducting a national strategy will prove difficult indeed.

Finally, there will always be an inherent and to some extent unresolvable tension between the need for a fixed long-term strategy and the bureaucratic necessities for its implementation, and the equally compelling requirement for both short-term tactical flexibility and for reassessment and change in long-term strategy as conditions change—and they do not change at convenient four or five year intervals.

Despite these problems and limitations, it is well worth the effort to seek both consensus where it can be reached, and to at least highlight areas at issue for public debate. Through such a process a genuine national strategy may once again be possible.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Weinrod.

I think all of these statements are excellent. We have had three excellent presentations this morning, and there are some differences and some common themes.

I know this is a tough question for you and I will give you a little time to think about it. But one thing that I would like, before we conclude this hearing, is to learn where you each believe you fundamentally agree and where you disagree, just from the point of view of visiting one or two areas where the others have given something that you disagree with. We can try to sort out then what the common themes are. I will not ask you that question immediately, but will let you think a moment on it.

Let me defer first, Senator Warner, to you, and then I will come back to my questions.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, these gentlemen have directed their attention quite properly I think to an emphasis on substance. I would like to turn to procedure.

We will go in the order of their presentations.

Each of you witnessed several presidents in your careers, and you, Joe, more than both of us would like to remember, as to how they went about devising their strategy.

What is your view on how that procedure can be improved? Or is it satisfactory?

Dr. JORDAN. I think the procedures now leave a great deal to be desired.

As I suggested in my remarks, one of the fundamental problems is that there is not planning and oversight of a national security strategy at the present time in anything like a consistent and a continuing way.

The NSC is not organized to and does not currently attempt that kind of planning role. And yet, that is the only place where bringing all of these threads and perspectives together can truly be accomplished.

I have the strong impression that this document has been massaged in the NSC, but it is, essentially, a compilation of what was turned in by State and Defense.

Senator **Warner**. I think you are absolutely right. It was responsive to a request.

This will lead to my second question, and if I may, Mr. Chairman, I will just have the two questions.

Dr. **Jordan**. May I just say one further thing about that, Senator.

Senator **Warner**. Yes.

Dr. **Jordan**. I think that if we are going to really work on the procedure side, we have to take that as a major challenge. That is not a side issue. That is truly a major challenge, because I think it not only goes to how things are done in the NSC, but how things are done in the State Department, in the Defense Department, and, very importantly, in Treasury and Commerce. As I suggested, they, too, should be players in here, and perhaps significantly, as in the executive branch, right here on Capitol Hill. So it is a major problem.

Senator **Warner**. That will be my second question, which I will propound in a moment, which is the role of Congress in participating in the dialogue on national strategy, and that participation not reaching the fundamental separation of powers in the Constitution where, implicit therein, implicit in the Constitution, is given the Chief Executive the primary role.

Let's return to the second question in a moment and let me hear now, please, from Brookings.

Mr. **Steinbruner**. You ask a very difficult question.

It is clearly conceptually difficult to integrate the dimensions that we are talking about, and it is politically difficult to do so in the presence of a lot of diversity of opinion. Probably one of the most important things is simply attitude.

Does one adopt the attitude of trying to put across a personal and rather partisan view and to induce the country to go along with that—of beating back opposition—or does one attempt to marshall a consensus position of the country?

Now, I fully believe that a strategy must be based on the latter, and I do not think that we have had that attitude.

If you do have that attitude, clearly one wants public discussion. One is open to it. One certainly wants engagement with Congress, which represents the mainstrands of political opinion in this country. One must marshall a bipartisan and broad consensus of opinion in order to have a strategy that will work, that will actually direct the actions of the United States.

I do believe that we have had altogether too much divisiveness. Quite apart from the way the planning process has worked, the political process has been too divisive to enable the formulation of a national strategy, we will have to realize that. We will have to work on agreeing rather than on clobbering political opponents.

Mr. **Weinrod**. I think that ideally there should obviously be a much more close working relationship between the executive and the legislative branches. But I think we cannot look at it in isolation from the factors that I have laid out. We have some real divisions in public thinking on very important issues. I think that is No. 1.

No. 2, I happen to believe that, fundamentally, there are some really key issues where you cannot work from a consensus and hope it is there, but you have to lead. You have to get out front on an issue.

I think regarding the Truman doctrine and all of that at the end of World War II, there was not necessarily a strong public sentiment for it at the time, or for our sustained involvement in NATO. There was more of a consensus of the elite, that is true, but not among the general public or maybe even in the Congress until those issues were debated.

So I think sometimes you have to just take a stand and then try to educate and lead and hope that a consensus develops.

At the same time, there could be more bipartisanship. For example, as Dr. Brzezinski has observed on more than one occasion—I think it was Dr. Brzezinski—there was a golden opportunity for the Reagan administration, when Senator Jackson, Scoop Jackson, was alive and he was a part of the Reagan transition team, to perhaps appoint him as Secretary of Defense, or to bring in some other people to help develop at least a consensus to the extent that you can.

But if you have divisions on issues that are pretty sharp and strong, I am not sure that you can always bridge them by a consensus mechanism. You have to do it where you can, but it may not always be possible. In that case, you have to take your stand and lead.

Senator WARNER. I don't know the story about Jackson and the Reagan administration's Secretary of Defense, but I know it was true with President Nixon. He did want Jackson. I remember that well.

The second question concerns the role of Congress. Speaking for myself, I feel very strongly that the Constitution does have a clear direction in it, although not as clear perhaps as it should be. The President is the Chief Executive Officer when it comes to external affairs.

The chairman and I and members of this committee will be looking at what we should do with this very valuable material that has been collected in the process of these hearings. Perhaps you have some views on what is the role of Congress in formulating a national strategy—bearing in mind the Constitutional division, and bearing in mind that I think there are 535 potential Secretaries of State up here and from time to time we all like to assume that we know what should be done.

Chairman NUNN. May I amend that—because that was one of the questions that I was going to ask and we will probably run out of time here this morning—and add not only the role of Congress in formulating a national strategy but also specifically what this committee itself should do in your mind, from where we are now.

Dr. JORDAN. I think that the hearings that this committee has undertaken are an excellent beginning to the process. In essence, the committee and Congress should be able to press the administration to think through these issues and present the results of that thinking in a carefully formulated document. All three of us have suggested that that document, of which we have seen the first iteration, leaves a great deal to be desired.

But this is a beginning. Pursuing it along the lines that I have suggested can shape it very clearly into a more useful document.

There is an open question here—my colleagues obviously disagree on this. On the one hand is the suggestion from John Steinbruner that the document shall only be reflective of national consensus, that partisanship should be ruled out. On the other hand, it is not a value-free document and partisanship will necessarily intrude, and it should exercise leadership along the lines the President feels.

Without taking sides in that particular debate, it is obvious that the rationale for these policies has to be clearly spelled out and the choices and tradeoffs and so on elucidated.

The second part of it is to get the administration witnesses up here and make them explain, defend, and elucidate that document so that there can be if not, hopefully, a meeting of the minds, then at least an understanding of the disagreements and a looking to where the bridging and consensus-building has to occur.

Up to this point, there has not been a dialogue on those issues. In essence, it has been the micromanagement issues and the line items in the budget that you have dealt with.

So I think you have a hold of the right end of the elephant at this point, and you can just pursue it along the lines that I am suggesting.

Mr. **Weinrod**. May I say briefly that it seems to me that realistically we are at the latter days of a current administration, but there will be a new one coming in January 1989. This is a golden opportunity to have begun this process now, to sensitize people in the community that thinks about this issue, and in the policy community and the political community to this. The time to really pin people down is when a new administration is coming in.

As one of your earlier witnesses noted at the beginning of the Reagan administration, apparently there really wasn't any thorough effort to pull together something like this. Some of the results have been good anyway, some maybe not, depending on your point of view. But I think it would be useful to really pin down an incoming administration at the very start, and from your end to push them on this and to insist that they come up with something at the very start, so that this becomes an institutionalized part of the procedures from the very beginning of that new administration.

Mr. **Steinbruner**. I would just comment that it is obvious, as you implied in your question, that Congress is not organized very well to be the initial formulator of policy.

Senator **Warner**. Would you excuse me for just a moment?

[Pause.]

Mr. **Steinbruner**. I think Congress is well organized to discipline and to ratify, formulations that the executive branch comes up with and is moved to produce a conviction when the President's and the Executive's formulation departs from tolerable bounds.

I believe that these hearings are an exercise of that sort. In part because of a natural historical transition, the problems are becoming more complicated and somewhat different, and in part because this particular administration did not engage in a very elaborate, internal disciplined construction of policy in its early phases, the Congress has intervened and demanded that. I think that is an appropriate function.

As I said in my testimony, I think the administration has put the country on a track with their particular conception of SDI that is simply not viable. It is going to cause a great deal of grief, and I think you are seeing that. Some reasonable adjustment is going to be required, and we are in the process of trying to figure out what it is and how to bring it about.

This is fundamentally a part of what is going on here.

In effect, Congress is a corrective mechanism to force reconsideration of misjudgments or force actions when there are errors of omission, and that is an extremely important function, to put it mildly.

Chairman NUNN. Someone described it as a "shovel brigade," right?

Mr. STEINBRUNER. Well, that is a graphic, but I do not think very adequate conception.

Dr. JORDAN. That is not the end of the elephant that I was referring to. [General laughter.]

Mr. STEINBRUNER. Progress occurs by trial and error, by and large, and Congress is a mechanism whereby errors are pointed out.

Chairman NUNN. I agree. I think the greatest effect that we can have is on the administration witnesses knowing that they are going to be asked these questions when they come here because it has an effect on the way they prepare, and that has an effect on the way they allocate their time and efforts.

Mr. STEINBRUNER. Exactly.

Chairman NUNN. May I ask each of you, if you could, to pick out one point of agreement across the board and one point of disagreement that you may have, so that we can begin to crystallize these down. Of course, I would not limit you to one.

Dr. JORDAN. I think that I would agree with Dr. Steinbruner pretty well across his testimony.

I have some concern on that point that he seems to feel that this document ought not to get out ahead of any public consensus.

My reading of the public consensus in this country is that it is so weak and so uninformed on most of these issues that it is, in fact, the President's and the Congress' joint responsibility to get ahead of the consensus.

I fear that in that respect, he and I differ.

I do not, however, agree with my colleague on my right in the sense that he is perfectly happy with the thought that the SDI, for instance, should not only be in this document, but in this document more fully, as I understood him, spelling out the rationale and the kind of offensive-defensive regimes, et cetera, et cetera. I myself would not have quarreled with some further explication of it, but I think that, again, it is so far beyond the consensus not just in the public at large but in the opinion elite, among the people who pay attention to these issues, that it is a mistake to put weight on it.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Weinrod.

Mr. **Weinrod**. I would say, in terms of agreement, I sense that we all agree on the great importance, probably for many of the same reasons, of trying to encourage the infrastructure of democratic evolution in developing nations, where we may have friendly, authoritarian regimes, that may come under challenge from a Soviet-backed insurgency.

To the extent that we can encourage a more pluralistic and a more democratically oriented structure and a developing economy and a middle class, we can, perhaps, avoid having to use or consider the use of more significant resources later on.

I think that is one area. I would put into that category a program that I happen to think is a very good one—I know that there has been some controversy on Capitol Hill about it—the National Endowment for Democracy, which I think is a really creative, innovative, far-sighted approach to trying to develop the infrastructure for democratic evolution in many countries.

I think we may, hopefully, agree on at least this principle.

Obviously an area where there is disagreement is on strategic defense. I think I am the only one on the panel who happens to think that the program ought to be pursued very vigorously and that we ought to find out, as quickly as possible, if it will work and how it will work.

Chairman **Nunn**. You are not advocating deployment at this time or a deployment decision are you?

Mr. **Weinrod**. Not a deployment decision.

I do believe, Senator Nunn, that the so-called "broad interpretation" is a legitimate one and that we could proceed under that, and I think we should, not only for the reasons that have been discussed. We are waiting on a report about technologies that might be tested. But it seems to me, as far as I understand the process, within the Pentagon, they are restricted in their planning for the future to what is allowed under the restrictive interpretation. So, even if an experiment may be 2 or 3 years from now, unless you begin the actual planning now, it will not be 2 or 3 years from now, it will be 2 or 3 years from the date on which it is allowed.

Chairman **Nunn**. Are you saying that broad interpretation you think is legally correct, after looking at the legal law, or are you saying that it is inconvenient if we do not have it—or both?

Mr. **Weinrod**. I am saying that it is legally correct. Actually, I am a lawyer, but that does not necessarily mean that I am right. I have studied this pretty thoroughly, and I honestly believe that under international law, that is the correct interpretation based upon what I know.

But I have said, and will say again, that if my conclusion had been different, when I first began to look into this, which was probably 1½ or 2 years ago, I would have suggested forthrightly that we ought to seek to either amend the treaty or move out of it, if that were necessary to achieve the objective.

The fundamental issue is a policy issue and not the legal issue, and I believe that is the one that everybody should keep his eye on, rather than the legal question, although I do happen to believe that is the correct view.

Chairman **Nunn**. Mr. Steinbruner, I am going to have to ask you to hold your comment. We have Senators coming back from this vote, but I want to get your view on this consensus or disagreement. I will be right back. But I must vote now.

We will take about a 5 minute break.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator EXON [presiding]. I wish to apologize to our witnesses for the comings and goings this morning. There is a whole series of votes on the Senate floor, all of which could easily be disposed of with voice votes, but that is not the way we do things around here.

It is one of the reasons we have such a great deal of difficulty in getting anything done.

As I understand it, Senator Nunn has just asked a question. Mr. Steinbruner, we will delay your answer until he returns.

I have a question of you and of some of the other witnesses that we will proceed with at this time.

First, I want to say that I think I have gotten the thread of what you have been saying, and I appreciate very much your coming here. You have given us some very, thoughtful and very helpful testimony as we go about the difficult duties that we have to discharge here. These duties are made considerably more difficult, I would suggest, by the budget constraints that we are under. The tighter the budget gets, the more important it is that we have thoughtful consideration of where we are going in the future.

So, let me first get back to the question that I indicated I wanted to ask of you, Mr. Steinbruner.

As I understood your testimony, you suggested that one option might be to average out as quickly as we could, a no real growth policy—in other words, freeze defense at a certain level, as I understood it, and then only each and every year add to it inflation-wise.

Is that correct?

Mr. STEINBRUNER. I was not advocating that, Senator.

What I was saying was meant to give perspective on where we are with the defense budget. I said that if that happened, from now to the end of the century, the state of the defense budget at that point would be the same as if it had gone through a 3-percent real increase from 1980 on to that point. All that reflected was that we have gone through an unusually large surge in the defense budget, and we are beginning to experience the consequences of that.

It is obvious that we are not going to be able to sustain that surge. It is crashing against a ceiling imposed by fiscal policy and political sentiment. And, as a result, what we have is a problem of sorting out more carefully than we have had to in the past the internal allocation of the budget. It is this point that I was trying to emphasize.

Senator EXON. I had not fully understood, then, the point that you were making. I think I understand it now.

You have obviously put the pencil to it. Was the base year 1981?

Mr. STEINBRUNER. The base year is 1981. That is when the surge began.

Senator EXON. Then, how many years in the future do you take it for a 3-percent real growth? Up until 1991, is that right?

Mr. STEINBRUNER. I hesitate to make these too formal. But, basically, the calculation shows that if you track the actual increases in the defense budget to this point and at this point and forward kept them to a zero real increase, the result at the end of the century would be the same as if one had begun in 1981, with a 3-percent real increase and continued that year by year up till the end of the century.

Senator EXON. Are you talking about outlays or budget authority?

Mr. STEINBRUNER. I am talking about budget authority in this case. Outlays, obviously, ultimately will follow budget authority although they will not show the same kind of movement. There will be more turbulence in the outlay figures.

Senator EXON. One of the big problems that we are having right now, gentlemen, is that the relationship between budget authority and outlays is driven much more by outlays in the defense budget than any other part of the budget, it seems to me.

In other words, you can cut, you can make dramatic changes if you want to in a program like agriculture, for example, cut subsidies, and you will have an immediate positive effect—not positive from my standpoint representing an agricultural State—but you will have an immediately positive effect with regard to the deficit.

But defense is quite another matter.

We enter into long-term deficit contracts, and sometimes it costs us as much to get out of a contract as it does to go ahead with it. During the meantime, the national defense budget gets devastated.

With these general thoughts in mind, let me get into this subject.

Would you all agree that the Reagan administration, rightly or wrongly, has attempted to modernize all three legs of the strategic triad simultaneously. Do you think it is necessary to do that, or do you think the national defense might be better served if we would approach it from a priority standpoint? I would ask each of you this question.

Second, I would like to ask a question that I asked of key defense witnesses previously in both open and closed session. It is not an easy question but it is a question that we have to deal with here.

I would like to ask each of you to rank the following strategic programs in terms of their importance, as far as your judgment is concerned. This means that you are not for canceling any of these necessarily—or maybe you are, what I am trying to say is if you run out of money, strictly from a budgetary standpoint, with regard to our national defense, how would you rank these programs with number one being that which you think is most important, and the last on down? These programs are: SDI, rail garrison MX, the Midgetman, the Trident D-5 missile-submarine combination, the Stealth bomber, and chemical deterrence.

Those are pretty important programs that we are wrestling with up here.

While you begin to give a little thought to ranking those in priority as far as each of you is concerned, I will first ask you this question.

Do you think it is necessary to modernize all three legs of the triad simultaneously?

Dr. JORDAN. As I said in my prepared testimony, Senator, I do not believe it is essential to do so. I think it is essential at this point to defer all new starts, if possible, and to continue only the most essential modernization, to work ourselves out of the budget mess that we have gotten ourselves into.

So, I would not favor the simultaneous modernization.

As far as ranking those items in importance——

Senator EXON. Oh, let me get back to that in a moment. Let me get the other answers to this question and come back to the priorities.

Mr. STEINBRUNER. Yes, I agree with that.

It is obvious, when you look at the budget, that there is an excess of available strategic power. That is why we are talking about reducing strategic nuclear forces by 50 percent. Although it is desirable to do it in the context of an arms control agreement, it also tells us where our budget allocation ought to go. It ought to go to conventional forces and not to the strategic forces. We have adequate strategic power.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Mr. Weinrod.

Mr. WEINROD. I think that we do not necessarily have adequate strategic power in all areas. But I think there are ways that we could shape that to not do everything at once. That would be my answer.

Senator EXON. Whether we would like to, or want to, or should, I guess what you are all saying is that we have some budget problems that we have to wrestle with, and that probably more than anything else, is driving us to that decision, whether we want to be dragged there or not.

Let's go now to the prioritization of the different strategic programs that I asked you about. Could you give us some priorities on that.

You started, Dr. Jordan. I am sorry for interrupting you, but I thought we could handle it in a more orderly way in this fashion.

Dr. JORDAN. I would rank those in order of importance as the Trident D-5 first; the redeployment of the MX second; the new chemical deterrent third; four is SDI research—and I stress research; fifth is the Stealth bomber; and sixth is the Midgetman.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Mr. Steinbruner.

Mr. STEINBRUNER. Let me ask you this. Did your question refer to research and deployment, or did you specifically say research or deployment?

Senator EXON. Well, I think it was very clear what Dr. Jordan said, that he is for SDI research but not deployment as a priority. If you want to put any caveat such as that on your answer, I think that would be very much in order.

Mr. STEINBRUNER. OK.

Let me say, in general, that I think we ought to do research in all these areas. It is not expensive enough to force meaningful prioritization. We can afford research in all those areas.

So let me comment on the deployment. Quite frankly, I do not think we need deployment of any of these things.

Senator EXON. Quite frankly you do not think what?

Mr. STEINBRUNER. That we need to undertake actual deployment of any of these.

Senator EXON. Of any of these?

Mr. STEINBRUNER. Of any of these.

Now, if we are to do so, I guess I would begin in the following fashion. Stealth, assuming that we can have some sense of what it is. I think it is ridiculous to deploy a system that has but a label, with no sense of what its capabilities really are and its net capacity. But I am presupposed to believe that there is a case to be made there.

In all other cases, I am skeptical. The D-5 clearly has a lot of political support, but I think we ought to sharply ask the question what is it really adding to our capability. The system is designed to provide an advanced hard target attack capability more than increased protection of the submarine. I think that is a questionable priority in development of a follow-on submarine program.

I would put Midgetman as third, simply because I think a single warhead missile, however it is based, probably does have a constructive role to play in the modernization of forces in the context of arms control agreements.

Let me actually put Midget second, over D-5.

Senator EXON. So you would put Midgetman as second and D-5 as third?

Mr. STEINBRUNER. Yes.

Next would be chemical deterrent, fourth; the rail mobile MX is fifth; SDI is sixth—again, SDI deployment, as distinct from research.

I think we ought to do research on all of these things.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.

Mr. Weinrod.

Mr. WEINROD. Senator, I would put SDI first—and I mean a vigorous research, development, and testing program. I am not a scientist and I do not claim to know all the details of what works and when it will work. But, as I said in my remarks, I think there is enough possibility there to justify spending what is a really small proportion of the overall defense budget, and an infinitesimal portion of the GNP on a program that I think offers dramatic opportunities for the future.

Second would be the D-5. I think that has been in train for some time, in the Carter years and now it is something that ought to be continued. We have gone this far and we should just move it along.

Third would be the new 50 MX. I think we need a survivable multiwarhead MIRVed system.

Senator EXON. When you say 50 MX, you are talking about the suggested rail——

Mr. WEINROD. The additional 50 rail ones, that is correct.

I would put in fourth place the chemical weapons. I think we need to do something on that, for balance in Europe.

I would put in fifth place the Stealth.

I would put in sixth place the Midgetman—not because it would not be ideally nice to have, because I do not have anything against it, but if you have competing priorities, I am not sure that it will prove to be the most cost effective and useful way to proceed in our strategic balance of forces.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much.

My time is up in the first round. I am pleased to yield to my colleague from Indiana, the national champions in basketball—no applause, please—Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Just like the movie "Hoosiers." You know, they are in town today. They are coming to town to see the President and are going to go over and see Dr. Bowen. When he was governor—you would appreciate this, being a former governor—he went to all the home games, and I think he went to almost all the away games. He is one dedicated Indiana University fan, much to the chagrin of Purdue. He was able to balance that and win by overwhelming odds.

I don't know how you would be able to do that, Senator Exon, or whether you would play favorites, but I will tell you that Dr. Bowen liked them all, but Indiana was always very much of a soft spot for him.

Let me ask a couple of questions on competitive strategy and what we ought to be doing about that.

First, I would like a very quick definition of competitive strategy. My definition is along the lines that since we cannot match the Soviets on a tank for tank basis, we ought to attempt to exploit their weaknesses and emphasize our strengths. That is sort of my understanding of it.

First, could you give us a quick definition of competitive strategy, and if it is along the lines that I have said, what weaknesses do you think perhaps we could exploit, or what strengths do you think we could enhance?

Dr. JORDAN. Well, as the leadoff witness, I have usually been asked the questions first.

I will accept your definition of a competitive strategy and say that I think that quite clearly the principles of war demand that we should, in fact, exploit the other side's weakness and capitalize upon our own strengths. The most significant weakness that the Soviet Union has, compared to ourselves, is indeed in the technological arena.

So, we should be exploiting high technology, as appropriate.

I think the best example of this probably is our ability to generate the deep penetration weapons that permit us to attack the follow-on forces, the current NATO doctrine.

Now, those emerging technologies are not yet adequately in place, and so, for the time being, we are not about to disband our tank forces, et cetera. But we should not attempt a tank-for-tank matching. We should use technologies that are both relatively inexpensive, compared with the total cost of tank armies, and also that promise to be extraordinarily effective.

I think that is the first biggest area where we could exploit our comparative strengths.

The second area is in terms of the political position that we occupy vis-a-vis our allies, in contrast to the one where the Soviet Union is with respect to its allies. Those are highly unreliable allies, and we should, as I suggested in my prepared statement, make every effort to attrit that base by doing everything possible to strengthen the ties between the Eastern European and the Western Europeans, to use trade, and most particularly information and public diplomacy programs to disintegrate, if you will, the Soviets' tight hold on its satellite and cause them further concern about the reliability of those allies.

At the same time, we have to capitalize on the strength of the coalition of the Free world by making sure that we move forward in our arms control negotiations, in our force building and deployment, in harmony with our allies; that this truly be coalition diplomacy.

Those are two things. I am going on too long.

Senator **Quayle**. Thank you.

Mr. Steinbruner.

Mr. **Steinbruner**. The notion of a competitive strategy has to do with figuring out what will give the Soviet Union the most problem, rather than simply matching our own activity.

It obviously has some importance and utility.

I would emphasize, however, that it has some limits in its role, its appropriate role, in our security policies.

We should not imagine ourselves to be in total opposition to the Soviet Union. There ought to be some constructive element to security. We are trying to have positive, as well as negative, incentives, and the competitive strategy, if that is all there was, would leave very little room for that.

I would say in the history of this relationship and certainly projecting into its future, devising meaningful, constructive incentives has been our biggest problem, and we ought to think a bit about that.

With that said, I would agree that our real leverage on the Soviet Union has to do with our technical advantage over them across the board, certainly in the most critical areas of weapons technology, and we ought to be aware of that. We ought to use it to our real advantage.

That does not necessarily mean giving them the greatest problem. Sometimes we want to do that and sometimes we do not.

Senator **Quayle**. In other words, do you believe that by pursuing a competitive strategy and pursuing your strengths and looking at their weaknesses and doing that in an efficient manner, would not that increase deterrence?

Mr. **Steinbruner**. I think that we have to be aware of this. Security requires a balance, if you will, of containment and——

Senator **Quayle**. Wouldn't this be one key component of a balance? Don't we really have to exploit our advantages and their disadvantages and let them know that we understand with this particular balance what, in fact, would hopefully deter any thought of aggression on their part?

Mr. **Steinbruner**. Yes, indeed. But, in general, I do not believe that we have a great problem in deterring the Soviet Union. If we have a problem with them, it is in including them into what we would call constructive forms of behavior and reassuring them that our very substantial military capacity will not be used to initiate war against them.

They are quite worried about that.

We do not seem to perceive that worry. I think that is a danger.

What I was trying to say in my earlier statement is that we have very large establishments out there and the passing of deterrence message is not all that goes on. They have very elaborate, routinized operations and deeply engrained plans, and in those two establishments are very powerful inclinations to initiate operations if it ever comes to that. And a control of that interaction is a very important security problem. It requires an additional element, beyond competitive strategy. It requires a controlling strategy as well.

We do not conceptualize the need for that and that is a problem.

Senator **Quayle**. But you do not have any problem with pursuing a competitive strategy as part of an overall strategy?

Mr. **Steinbruner**. No—in due measure.

Senator **Quayle**. Thank you.

Mr. Weinrod.

Mr. **Weinrod**. Senator, I think your definition is very fine.

I have always used another term, "comparative advantage," which I think means roughly the same thing.

There are two dimensions to it. One is the political and one is the military.

As Joe Jordan said, in the political area I think our strong advantage and their strong disadvantage is in information, for example.

In my view, we should be doing even more, for example, to try to develop direct broadcast satellite technology and the miniaturized equipment, which could be used inside the Iron Curtain to receive information from an unfettered source.

So I think there are things that we can do along those lines.

In terms of overall perception of the Soviet Union, I think it helps to break it down into several categories. One would be what I would call the periphery. Within that, there is a consolidated periphery, which would be, for example, Cuba. Then there would be a consolidating periphery, such as Nicaragua. Then there would be the border area. You can have a consolidated border area—Eastern Europe. Obviously, by "consolidated," I simple mean that they have a strong hold right now. It does not mean that everybody there likes it. Then there is what I would call the consolidating border area, and that would be, for example, Afghanistan.

Then there is the Soviet Union itself. You have the consolidated internal empire, and that is the non-Russian nationalities that have been absorbed into the Soviet Union; and then you have the Russian nation-state itself, which has traditionally been there.

It seems to me that if you think of it that way, it helps you to break down the same strategy or approaches that might be useful for one of these areas and which might not be the right one for another. So you have to look at all of them together to figure out what combination of competitive strategies, if you will, or comparative advantage, would be best in trying to respond to the challenge we face.

Senator **Quayle**. I want to ask just one final question of the panel, just to get a feel for how we might pursue a better understanding or perhaps some of the Soviet weaknesses.

Would it be helpful if we asked the Department of Defense to furnish us some additional detailed information on what they feel would be Soviet weaknesses, so that we might have an understanding of what kind of requirements or what kind of investments we might be willing to make from the Senate Armed Services Committee?

Would that be a helpful dialogue?

Dr. **Jordan**. I am sure that it could be helpful, Senator.

As I suggested in my prepared remarks, I think that the National Strategy document very badly needs more facts. One of the facts that it obviously needs is about the Soviet Union and its strategy.

I also said that I thought there should be a classified annex and perhaps most of the material that you would be interested in would have to appear in such a classified annex—Soviet strategy, Soviet tactics, and so forth.

I think that any attempt to formulate a national security strategy, in the absence of a detailed understanding of our principal adversary, is rather a futile exercise.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Senator Quayle, we have a hearing scheduled for next week, and because we are trying to accelerate all the subcommittees and get a markup going, we had to cancel it. But it was exactly on that subject.

We are going to have a hearing with several witnesses on the subject of Soviet strategy and tactics as part of our plans.

Senator QUAYLE. I would look forward to that hearing. Maybe we could get into this in that hearing.

But I will tell you what I am precisely asking for Mr. Chairman. It is to get into this area of competitive advantage and what Soviet weaknesses are that we perceive and from our viewpoint what we are doing to exploit those with technological development and investment in our military.

I think those hearings overall will probably somewhat go in that direction. I guess I have a subsection to that specifically.

I might consider this maybe for the committee. We might want to think about asking the Department of Defense to help us think through and give us some rather detailed information on what they think are really the Soviet weaknesses. And once we understand that, if we can get a consensus on it, then we ought to see what we are doing about those weaknesses.

I look forward to that hearing.

Chairman NUNN. I am not going to turn myself into a witness or an expert here, but one of the weaknesses that has been most apparent to me for a long time has been the Soviets' large deployment of forces on the Chinese border, which are connected only by one train, one railroad. Now they are building another one. Intersecting that rail, or the capacity to intersect that rail, without having to go nuclear, to me is one heck of a technological deterrent if we can do that. I do not think we are that far away from being able to do it, if we can put our resources on it.

Senator QUAYLE. Could it be possibly some long-range conventional cruise missiles that would have the capacity and the accuracy to do that on a conventional basis? That, I think, might answer one of the questions.

Chairman NUNN. Well, if you can do that, you would send a signal that if they start a war in one area, that we are going to cut off their forces in the other area. I think that is a very powerful psychological deterrent, given the historical phobia of the Soviets about two fronts and also their phobia about the Chinese.

Senator QUAYLE. And also, if they knew that we were capable of doing that from a technological point of view and that we had made our investment, I don't have any problem in talking about it publicly. I do not think this is something that ought really to be that classified. We ought to talk about definite strategies and what we are going to do.

Chairman NUNN. I made that suggestion down at CSIS once and Joe Jordan told me that whatever I suggested at his forum would immediately become U.S. policy. But it is now 3 years later and it has not.

I don't know what happened. [General laughter.]

Senator QUAYLE. They are working on it. [General laughter.]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, as far as hearings, there is another hearing that we had regarding the long-range integrated strategy. We are going to have a hearing on that and it, too, has been canceled. It is the second time it has been canceled.

We have about three of the witnesses who are coming from outside Washington, with a couple from L.A. Can we get a definite time—not today, but sometime soon—and stick to it on the third time because twice this thing has been canceled.

Chairman NUNN. I regret that.

The problem is that we have to meet on Wednesday to give our staff the committee policy direction on the numbers they have to work toward on the markup over the recess. That is the reason it was canceled.

Senator QUAYLE. I understand that. I just hope that we can get some sort of date for the next meeting fairly soon. Maybe it could be even this summer. I don't know when you can have it. But I hope we can get it fairly soon because I think it dovetails in and would be a good wrap-up session of what we have been doing.

Chairman NUNN. I agree with you.

Senator QUAYLE. I know there are unforeseen circumstances, where we may be in conference, or something like that will come up. But I hope that we can try to stick to it. I know a number of them have contacted us with, "gee, this is the second cancellation, are you guys really serious about it." I said from my viewpoint we are serious, we want to have it.

I explained to them the reasons, but I just hope we will schedule it for another time and can stay with it. I think it is very important.

Chairman NUNN. I agree with you.

What we have been overrun with is the budget. The budget is on top of us and we have to deal with it. At this point we have had something like 17 or 18 strategy hearings and now the budget has overrun us. We are going to have to put strategy on the back burner until we get that done.

Senator QUAYLE. I fully understand that and I understand the problems of the chairman. It is just that since it has been canceled twice—not once, but twice——

Chairman NUNN. The problem is to try to never do it again. [General laughter.]

Senator QUAYLE. We will reschedule it, won't we, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman NUNN. Oh, yes, we will. Definitely.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. We want to thank all of you for being here.

Senator Exon, do you have anything further?

Senator EXON. Yes, I do.

Chairman NUNN. Then I am going to have to leave this in your charge. We have another briefing going on in S-407 in about 5 minutes, on security problems.

Senator EXON. Oh, yes.

Chairman NUNN. I must leave and want to thank all of you for being here.

Senator EXON. First, did you want an answer to your question from Mr. Steinbruner, since it never got into the record.

Chairman NUNN. Yes, I would like to have that before I leave.

Mr. STEINBRUNER. Just very briefly, you asked what we agreed on and what we disagreed on.

I think that one area of agreement, which is probably fairly substantial, is that economic performance worldwide has a great deal more to do with security than we had fully fathomed, and we have to work on that conceptually.

I think we do disagree, however, sharply, as to whether it is appropriate with that thought to engage in imposing or attempting to impose our political system on another country. Obviously, we have made a very different judgment about that, and I think rightly so, with regard to China, and I think we just do not agree at all on the limits of what is appropriate and effective in that regard.

Clearly, we disagree with the role that SDI does, and should, play in our overall security policy. That is a very sharp disagreement. The burden of my testimony is that until that is resolved, we are simply not going to have a viable national strategy. This is a compelling issue that does need to get resolved.

We sharply disagree about that.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Gentlemen, it was interesting to listen to your remarks again and your listing of the priorities. I note with some interest that the D-5 Trident program was the only one of all the programs that I asked you about that ended up in the top three of each of your lists.

If there is any unanimous choice, I guess most of you agree that the Trident D-5 is an important program. I think it is by far the most important program, without any question, with regard to our nuclear deterrent. It is the only one that can give us hard target kill and the only one that we can be reasonably assured would not be open to an effective first-attack because it simply cannot be located.

From my standpoint, the D-5 is by far the most important program that we have going for us from the standpoint of deterrent.

I was somewhat surprised that there was only one that I think might challenge that. I would put the Trident first myself. But the only one, which only finished in the top three by one of you, although it was four by the other two, is the chemical program.

It seems to me that if we have a shortage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union today, it is clearly in the chemical area. We do not get so excited about that because it does not have the sex appeal, the military sex appeal of many of these other programs. But I think that is the one in my view where we are furthest behind at the present time.

Dr. JORDAN. Senator, I was the one who ranked it number three, and I had a hard time whether I should rank it two, ahead of the

MX, and I chose the MX basically on the grounds that I think there is a little more urgency there.

But, clearly, in my view, the chemical deterrent is of great importance, and I think as our existing stockpiles become less and less persuasive as a deterrent, over time it increases in importance.

Senator EXON. Would you all agree that, from a deterrent standpoint, it is the weakest part of our deterrent today?

You seem to feel that way, Dr. Jordan?

Dr. JORDAN. I do.

Senator EXON. I suspect that you might, Mr. Weinrod.

Mr. WEINROD. Yes.

Senator EXON. What about you, Mr. Steinbruner?

Mr. STEINBRUNER. I would make a more qualified statement about that.

I think that the role that chemical weapons play or might realistically play in military power is a good bit more limited than some of the public discussion has indicated.

It is very clear that they do have some very substantial potential use right along the line of forward engagement as a supplement to conventional high explosive artillery. That, in fact, is the way both sides plan to use them, as about 10 percent of the artillery rounds would be chemical rounds and would induce the other side to adopt protective measures that would be debilitating to their movements.

When you look at the actual detailed, technical facts of what chemical weapons might achieve in other roles, they turn out to be not very effective actually against prepared military positions, although enormously damaging, of course, to civilian populations.

My comment about its relatively low priority, reflected a feeling that we have tended to exaggerate the military significance of those weapons, and the extent to which the Soviet Union is into offensive chemical operations as opposed to defensive ones.

Until we sort that out, I do not think we are likely to develop a very judicious or wise program. I think we have a lot of conceptual work to go before we go into a weapons deployment.

Let me just comment briefly on the D-5.

I would distinguish between the exact weapon you are talking about and the submarine program generally. I absolutely agree with you that if you have to prioritize our deterrent force, the submarine comes in as number one, clearly. There is no question about it.

The issue is do we need the D-5 beyond the C-4, which is also a very good weapon? Do we want to pose that degree of hard target attack threat against the Soviet Union. Does that produce a good result?

I think that we ought to think a little bit more carefully about that than we have.

We have tended to assume that it obviously is a good thing to do, and, again, what I was trying to say is that we have not been as judicious as we ought to be in assessing the appropriate level of threat and the point at which we drive them to measures that we would prefer not to have them do.

I think we ought to be a bit careful about that.

So, I think the judgment is do we want to go this way. The D-5 has been designed to give us primarily an advanced hard target attack capability. It does very little, I think, to the improved protection of the submarine.

If we are going to have a new submarine missile, I would weigh the protection of the submarine and the design features of the missiles associated with that rather more heavily than improving the hard target attack capability.

That was the context of my ranking of that system.

Senator EXON. I think, that if there is one thing that I think would give the Soviet extreme pause, it would be retaliation after an attack.

Our submarine force and the ballistic missiles therein are a significant deterrent. The Soviets could not put its eyes out, and I don't even think they could even find it.

Let me go to one last question.

I guess this is primarily directed to you, Mr. Steinbruner.

You put the Midgetman very high up on your list—I believe in second place.

It would seem to me that with Midgetman here we have a program that is in its infancy. It is generally agreed that if it ever goes to where it is projected to go it is going to be $40 billion to $50 billion program at a minimum.

I think you are going to find that the battle between the Midgetman and the rail deployment of the MX is going to be the battle of the century as far as weapon systems are concerned.

If you think we had a tough, close vote in the United States Senate yesterday on a matter that the President of the United States got himself, in my opinion, overly involved in, you ain't seen nothing yet, I predict, until this scrap comes down the line.

I am leaning to the position that we get more bang for our buck, that we get more deterrent, with the MX based in a rail garrison mode than with Midgetman.

No one in the Congress fought harder against the purchase of the MX missiles to go into vulnerable Minutemen III silos. It never made any sense to begin with. It does not make any sense to me now. And now the general consensus is that it does not make any sense in the future.

This is why we are going to rail mobile deployment.

But as strongly as I was against silo-based MX missiles, I am leaning just as strongly in favor of the rail garrison MX.

But this brings us to the Midgetman.

I guess you all saw what the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee did yesterday. It zeroed out the MX rail deployment and put in more money for the Midgetman.

I would suggest that, while the Midgetman has some characteristics that I like, and while we had better start thinking about producing some kind of missile that will eventually replace the Minutemen IIs and maybe the Midgetman could play that role, either out of those silos or some kind of mobile based back-of-the-truck concept, I just do not understand the argument that the Midgetman is really good for arms control.

I realize that with Midgetman, you get away from vulnerable multiple targeted missiles.

Mr. Steinbruner, what is your answer to the fact that if both sides had midget-like systems that they would be much more difficult to keep track of? Wouldn't they be much more difficult to verify on both sides than almost any other type of system that we have envisioned?

Mr. **Steinbruner**. Yes.

Let me answer first by putting the remarks that I made in ranking these systems in context.

I said that I do not think we ought to proceed with deployment of any of them, and I certainly do not agree that a $50 billion program is appropriate at this point.

Let me also say with reference to your last comment, that the problem of verifying a mobile missile deployment is a significant issue. I do not think it is an irresolvable issue. But it does require cooperative measures. It has to be deployed in a way that it can be counted, and if it is not done so, it is very significant trouble.

I supported the notion of developing a single warhead missile as a modernizing replacement for those that we already have in our force because I think that kind of missile probably will play a role in facilitating strategic force reductions. If you reduce forces to the 6,000 warhead level, or even down to the 3,000 warhead level ultimately, and you run the numbers, you discover that it is very desirable in doing so to remove first, in the first phase of reductions, the highly MIRVed systems, because that leaves a much more assured deterrent capability on both sides.

If you are doing that, then you want a single warhead missile in the R&D program as a potential replacement. That was the role I imagined that the Midgetman would play—not as an immediate deployment program, but as the modernization program that might indeed be important in facilitating reductions in strategic forces, which I think is desirable.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you.

I guess maybe what we are saying is this. I have never been able to understand why some of the main components of arms control put so many eggs into the Midgetman basket, but they have.

I guess if we had a world free of all submarine launched missiles and a world free of multiple launching devices for warheads, the theory is that, therefore, the world would be safer.

Is that the bottom line theory?

Mr. **Steinbruner**. Yes.

I have engaged in elaborate exercises in taking current forces and cutting them to 6,000 in various ways, and testing how stable the result would be. Without trying to track you through all those details, let me say that it does help if you have available a single warhead missile to replace existing weapons. It helps to remove the highly MIRVed systems, the Soviet SS–18 and the MX. And then it does help in stabilizing the remaining forces if you have a single warhead missile to replace them.

You are raising some important questions. It has to be verifiable, that is for sure. And I think you are right in saying that we ought not to consider this to be the token or the chief mechanism of arms control. Its importance probably has been exaggerated, but I would say that it is desirable to have that weapon as an option, as opposed to an immediate deployment commitment.

Dr. **Jordan**. Let me point out on that, however, Senator, to observe that it is extraordinarily unlikely that the Soviets would be willing to trade off existing heavy MIRVed systems for a not-yet developed single warhead, a U.S. system.

Senator EXON. Are you telling me, Dr. Jordan, that you think the Soviet Union, with somewhat up to 75 percent of their nuclear strength in the ICBMs that they now have, might be reluctant to give that away for something that they have not begun to see?

Dr. JORDAN. Negotiating the sublimits within that 6,000 warheads is going to be the toughest part.

Senator EXON. I tend to agree.

I think as forthcoming as the Soviets like to perceive that they are right now, I am not sure that they are going to want to go that far.

My last question is this. Assume we would get to that place, where the bear would agree to be peaceful and we would all go to a Midgetman. Would that favor us or would that favor the Soviet Union?

One of the concerns that I have in that area is that they have a much larger geographical area in which to hide that type of system, and if we ever got to that ultimate dream, we would not be as happy with it as we think we might be right now?

Mr. STEINBRUNER. Let me make two quick comments.

I think the trade you were originally referring to is not the Soviet SS–18 for the Midgetman, but the Soviet SS–18 for the MX. I think that trade may indeed happen eventually, in which case we are going to want something other than the MX to modernize our forces.

The second point is this. I think you are making a very important distinction with regard to Midgetman that ought to be emphasized. There is a real difference between the single warhead feature of it and the mobile feature of it. The single warhead feature of it is definitely in our interest in my opinion. The mobile feature of it is not so clear.

It is obvious that we have less territory and that we have no tradition in this regard, and that competing in mobile deployments is not a very good thing for us to attempt to do.

So I am very skeptical, in fact, about the mobile variant of that, whether it is desirable or necessary.

But I do think that we ought to focus on the fact that we need probably for the future a single warhead missile as a modernization option. Let's leave the mobile question as a subsequent matter. I am very skeptical about that.

Senator EXON. Would you care to comment about that, Dr. Jordan, and Mr. Weinrod?

Dr. JORDAN. I would agree.

Dr. WEINROD. I would agree, to the extent that money is available to continue pursuing research. Initial development of the program seems to me eminently sensible. It's just that you asked for a list of priorities, and it would be lower down in terms of what we need to do.

Senator EXON. Gentlemen, we wish to thank you very much. You have been very helpful and very informative, and we are now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

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